Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 159 / Wednesday, August 18, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 50859 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0269; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–320–AD; Amendment 

39–16395; AD 2010–17–05] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, and 

–900 series airplanes. This AD requires 

replacement of the power control relays 

in the P91 and P92 power distribution 

panels for the fuel boost and override 

pumps with new, improved relays 

having a ground fault interrupter (GFI) 

feature, or installation and maintenance 

of universal fault interrupters (UFIs) 

using a certain supplemental type 

certificate. This AD results from fuel 

system reviews conducted by the 

manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent pump housing burn-through 

due to electrical arcing, which could 

create a potential ignition source inside 

a fuel tank. This condition, in 

combination with flammable fuel 

vapors, could result in a fuel tank 

explosion and consequent loss of the 

airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective September 

22, 2010. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of September 22, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 

2207; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; e-mail 

me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Document Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Georgios Roussos, Aerospace Engineer, 

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM– 

130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 917–6482; fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to 

certain Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 series airplanes. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on March 11, 2008 (73 FR 

12910). That NPRM proposed to require 

replacement of the power control relays 

in the P91 and P92 power distribution 

panels for the fuel boost and override 

pumps with new, improved relays 

having a ground fault interrupter (GFI) 

feature. That NPRM also proposed to 

require a revision to the Airworthiness 

Limitations (AWLs) section of the 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness to incorporate AWL No. 

28–AWL–20. 

Actions Since NPRM Was Issued 

To avoid including redundant 

requirements in this AD, we have 

removed the proposed requirement to 

revise the AWL section of certain 

maintenance documents to include new 

repetitive operational checks of the 

ground fault interrupter (GFI) for all 

alternating current fuel tank boost 

pumps to ensure continued 

functionality of the GFI circuit. This 

AWL revision is already required by AD 

2008–10–10 R1, Amendment 39–16164 

(75 FR 1529, January 12, 2010), for 

certain Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 series airplanes with an 

original standard airworthiness 

certificate or original export certificate 

issued before March 31, 2006. Airplanes 

with a certificate issued on or after 

March 31, 2006, must already be 

compliant with the AWL because those 

limitations were applicable as part of 

the airworthiness certification of those 

airplanes. We have removed the AWL 

revision requirement from this AD 

(specified in paragraph (g) of the 

NPRM), the related requirement to 

obtain FAA approval for any alternative 

inspections or inspection intervals 

(specified in paragraph (h) of the 

NPRM), and Note 1 of the NPRM. We 

have re-identified subsequent 

paragraphs accordingly. 

Boeing has issued Revision 1, dated 

May 28, 2009, to Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1201. (The NPRM 

referred to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1201, dated February 19, 2007.) 

We have revised paragraphs (c) and (f) 

of this AD to reference Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1201, Revision 

1, dated May 28, 2009, and have added 

new paragraph (g) of this AD to provide 

credit (with certain provisions) for 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1201, dated February 19, 2007. 

Revision 1 corrects the wiring 

configuration group for some airplanes, 

adds and corrects some figures and 

references and adds a resistance check 

between the GFI relay’s mounting flange 

and a point on the panel cross member 

of the P91 and P92 panels. Revision 1 

also adds a resistance measurement for 

airplanes that have accomplished the 

actions specified in Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1201, dated February 

19, 2007. 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 

2009, refers to Honeywell Service 

Bulletins 1151932–24–61 and 1151934– 

24–62, both Revision 5, both dated May 

25, 2009, as additional sources of 

guidance for accomplishing a resistance 

check between the GFI relay’s mounting 

flange and a point on the panel cross 

member of the P91 and P92 panels. 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 

2009, refers to Honeywell Service 

Bulletin 1151932–24–61, Revision 5, 

dated May 25, 2009, as an additional 

source of guidance for replacing the 

power control relays in the P91 power 

distribution panel. Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1201, Revision 1, 

dated May 28, 2009, also refers to 

Honeywell Service Bulletin 1151934– 

24–62, Revision 5, dated May 25, 2009, 

as an additional source of guidance for 

replacing the power control relays in the 

P92 power distribution panels. 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 

2009, references an incorrect date for 

Revision 5 of Honeywell Service 

Bulletins 1151932–24–61 and 1151934– 

24–62. Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 

28, 2009, states January 22, 2009, for 

Revision 5 of Honeywell Service 

Bulletins 1151932–24–61 and 1151934– 

24–62. The correct date for Revision 5 

of Honeywell Service Bulletins 

1151932–24–61 and 1151934–24–62 is 

May 25, 2009. 


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Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received from 

the eight commenters. 

Support for the Proposed AD 

Ermelinda Villagomez, a private 

citizen, supports the NPRM. 

Request To Revise References of Part 

Numbers 

Continental Airlines (CAL) requests 

that we prevent future part number 

problems by removing reference to the 

part number of the panel assemblies and 

adding reference to the GFI relay part 

number that is installed. CAL states that 

there is a possibility that P91 and P92 

panels can have internal components 

and wiring modified without the FAA’s 

knowledge or approval. 

We infer that CAL is requesting that 

references to the part numbers be 

changed due to concerns about the need 

for AMOC requests. We agree that 

references to the part numbers need to 

be changed from the panel part numbers 

to the GFI relay part number. Otherwise, 

AMOC approval would be needed for 

any change to the P91 and P92 panels. 

The NPRM did not reference panel part 

numbers, but referenced Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1201, dated 

February 19, 2007, which did reference 

those panel part numbers. Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1201, Revision 

1, dated May 28, 2009, also references 

those panel part numbers. We have 

revised paragraph (f) of this AD to 

reference the part number of the GFI 

relay that is installed at certain relay 

positions in the P91 and P92 panels. 

Requests To Cite Later Revision of 

Honeywell Service Bulletins 

Boeing, CAL, SkyEurope Airlines, and 

Japan Airlines request that we revise 

Note 2 of the NPRM to reference the 

current revision (Revision 4, dated 

March 25, 2008; or Revision 3, dated 

June 22, 2007; respectively), of 

Honeywell Service Bulletins 1151932– 

24–61 and 1151934–24–62. Boeing 

requests that we reference the latest 

revised Honeywell service bulletins and 

notes that the latest revisions were being 

submitted for FAA approval. Japan 

Airlines also notes that the original 

issue, dated November 10, 2006, of the 

Honeywell Service Bulletins 1151932– 

24–61 and 1151934–24–62, could not be 

applied to actual airplanes due to a 

parts interference problem. 

We concur with the intent of the 

requests. Since the four commenters 

submitted their comments, Honeywell 

has issued Revision 5, dated May 25, 

2009, of Honeywell Service Bulletins 

1151932–24–61 and 1151934–24–62. 

Honeywell Service Bulletins 1151932– 

24–61 and 1151934–24–62, both 

Revision 5, both dated May 25, 2009, 

were described previously in the 

‘‘Actions Since NPRM Was Issued’’ 

section of this AD. We have revised 

Note 1 of this AD (Note 2 of the NPRM) 

to reference Honeywell Service 

Bulletins 1151932–24–61 and 1151934– 

24–62, both Revision 5, both dated May 

25, 2009. 

Request To Justify Need for Rulemaking 

AirTran Airways (AirTran) requests 

that we confirm that adequate analysis 

was performed to justify this 

rulemaking. AirTran believes that fuel 

pump arcing issues have been addressed 

by current rulemaking and that there is 

no need to retrofit airplanes with GFI 

relays. AirTran references AD 2002–19– 

52, Amendment 39–12900 (67 FR 

61253, September 30, 2002) (for all 

Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, and 

–900 series airplanes; Model 747 series 

airplanes; and Model 757 series 

airplanes), as an example of an AD 

issued against the fuel pump motorimpeller assembly to ensure that the 

wire routing mitigates arcing. AirTran 

also states that in order for an ignition 

source to enter the fuel tank, it believes 

significant arcing would have to occur 

on one or more phases of the circuit to 

burn through the motor-impeller 

assembly and through the housing. 

AirTran asserts that an arc of this 

significance would trip the currently 

installed circuit breakers without the 

need for a GFI relay. 

We disagree with AirTran’s 

assessment. We have examined the 

underlying safety issues involved in fuel 

tank explosions as detailed in the 

Discussion section in the NPRM. We 

have determined that an additional 

layer of protection is needed to mitigate 

potential ignition sources within the 

fuel tanks due to certain electrical 

failures internal to the fuel pumps. 

Standard circuit breakers are not 

designed to detect arcing events nor are 

they able to trip in time to protect the 

fuel pumps under these arcing 

conditions. The primary function of the 

circuit breakers is to protect the wiring. 

We have not changed the AD in this 

regard. 

Requests To Permit Installation of 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 

ST02076LA as a Means of Compliance 

TDG Aerospace, Southwest Airlines, 

CAL, and the Air Transport Association 

(ATA) on behalf of its member 

American Airlines, request that we 

allow the installation of TDG Aerospace 

STC ST02076LA as a means of 

compliance for providing electrical fault 

protection for the center override boost 

pumps. All four commenters state that 

the universal fault interrupter (UFI) has 

been demonstrated and approved as 

equivalent to or better than the 

protection provided by a standard GFI 

relay. 

TDG Aerospace points out that UFIs 

have been approved as alternative 

method of compliance (AMOCs) for 

paragraph (b) of AD 2002–24–51, 

Amendment 39–12992 (68 FR 10, 

January 2, 2003) (for all Model 737–600, 

–700, –700C, –800, and –900 series 

airplanes; Model 747 series airplanes; 

and Model 757 series airplanes), and 

paragraph (a) of AD 2001–08–24, 

Amendment 39–12201 (66 FR 20733, 

April 25, 2001) (for all Model 737 series 

airplanes). TDG Aerospace adds that, for 

airplanes with STC ST02076LA 

installed, mandating the installation of 

GFI relays at center override boost 

pump positions R54 and R55 duplicates 

protection, adds unnecessary costs, and 

could generate nuisance events in the 

UFI system. TDG also points out that 

referencing STC ST02076LA in the AD 

would save the FAA and operators time 

and effort spent on coordinating 

multiple AMOC requests. 

We agree with the commenters’ 

requests. We have evaluated the STC 

and agree that installing and 

maintaining the TDG Aerospace UFI 

using STC ST02076LA is an acceptable 

alternative means of addressing the 

unsafe condition identified in this AD. 

We have revised paragraph (f) of this AD 

to require replacement of the power 

control relays in accordance with 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 

2009, or installation of the STC. 

Request To Extend Proposed 

Compliance Time for Installation 

The ATA, on behalf of its member 

American Airlines, requests that we 

extend the compliance time for 

replacing the power control relays from 

60 months to 72 months. American 

Airlines states that this extension would 

allow operators to align the 

modification with the industry-standard 

heavy maintenance visit interval of 72 

months. American Airlines also points 

out that a 60-month compliance time 

will increase out-of-service time due to 

unscheduled modifications. 

We disagree with this request. In 

developing an appropriate compliance 

time for installing new fuel pump 

control GFI relays, we considered the 

safety implications and the practical 

aspect of accomplishing the installation 

within a period of time that corresponds 

to the normal scheduled maintenance 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 159 / Wednesday, August 18, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 50861 

for most affected operators. In 

consideration for these items, we have 

determined that a 60-month compliance 

time will ensure an acceptable level of 

safety and allow the installation to be 

done during scheduled maintenance 

intervals for most affected operators. 

However, under the provisions of 

paragraph (h) of this AD, we will 

consider requests for approval of an 

AMOC if sufficient data are submitted to 

substantiate that the request would 

provide an adequate level of safety. We 

have not changed the AD in this regard. 

Request To Reference Other 

Maintenance Procedures 

CAL requests that we revise the 

reference to Airworthiness Limitation 

(AWL) 28–AWL–20. CAL notes that the 

maintenance documentation for AWL 

28–AWL–20 is too generic to show each 

specific requirement as detailed in the 

airplane’s center tank pump override 

relay configuration. 

We disagree with CAL’s assertion that 

AWL 28–AWL–20 is insufficient. That 

AWL identifies a section of the airplane 

maintenance manual (AMM) as a 

document that provides appropriate 

guidance for doing GFI operational 

checks. However, to avoid including 

redundant requirements in this AD, we 

have removed the proposed requirement 

to revise the AWL section of certain 

maintenance documents to include 

AWL 28–AWL–20 (which would require 

repetitive operational checks of the GFI 

for all alternating current fuel tank boost 

pumps to ensure continued 

functionality of the GFI circuits). This 

AWL revision is already required by AD 

2008–10–10 R1, Amendment 39–16164, 

for certain Boeing Model 737–600, –700, 

–700C, –800, and –900 series airplanes 

with an original standard airworthiness 

certificate or original export certificate 

issued before March 31, 2006. Airplanes 

with a certificate issued on or after 

March 31, 2006, must already be 

compliant with the AWL revision 

because those limitations were 

applicable as part of the airworthiness 

certification of those airplanes. We have 

removed the AWL revision requirement 

from this AD (which was specified in 

paragraph (g) of the NPRM) and reidentified subsequent paragraphs. 

Request To Clarify the Use of GFIs 

CAL questions the use of GFIs for 

protection against arcing conditions 

identified in the NPRM. CAL contends 

that the use of arc fault circuit 

interrupters (AFCIs) is the appropriate 

device to protect pumps from damage 

due to arcing. CAL states that its 

understanding of the GFI is that GFIs are 

used to disconnect a circuit whenever it 

detects that the current flow is not 

balanced. When a ground fault above a 

prescribed threshold level and time 

duration is detected, the GFI relay is 

tripped. CAL also states that electrical 

arcing (that the NPRM actions are 

supposed to prevent) is a localized, 

high-energy event and the GFI relay is 

not an AFCI that is designed to prevent 

fires by detecting those electrical arcs 

and disconnecting power before the arc 

starts a fire. 

We find that we need to clarify the 

use of the GFI relay. We have 

determined that the GFI is an 

appropriate method to protect the fuel 

pumps from other electrical faults, and 

from damage caused by electrical arcs 

that result from wiring coming in 

contact with the housing of the fuel 

pump. The proposed AFCI are 

susceptible to nuisance tripping. These 

circuit breakers are not yet 

recommended for use in airplane 

systems, especially systems that perform 

functions essential to the safe flight and 

landing of the aircraft. However, under 

the provisions of paragraph (h) of this 

AD, we will consider requests to 

approve different solutions if sufficient 

data are submitted to substantiate that 

the change would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. We have not changed the 

AD in this regard. 

Requests To Consider Other Methods of 

Compliance 

CAL is concerned that the FAA did 

not give enough attention to solutions 

other than that specified in Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1201, dated 

February 19, 2007. TDG Aerospace is 

curious why the NPRM did not simply 

state the requirement for GFI at the six 

fuel pump positions and then list the 

approved solutions for each position. 

We infer that CAL and TDG 

Aerospace request that we evaluate 

solutions from other companies to 

address the unsafe condition addressed 

by this AD. We evaluated the proposed 

solution from Boeing and verified that it 

addresses the unsafe condition. In 

addition, as explained under the 

previous header ‘‘Requests to Permit 

Installation of Supplemental Type 

Certificate (STC) ST02076LA as a Means 

of Compliance,’’ we agree that installing 

and maintaining the TDG Aerospace 

UFI in accordance with that STC is an 

acceptable means of addressing the 

unsafe condition identified in this AD. 

We cannot address all possible 

solutions in an AD in a timely manner. 

It is more practical from a workload and 

cost-effectiveness standpoint to make 

the AD applicable generally to the 

affected fleet and to deal with other 

possible solutions individually via the 

AMOC process. Under the provisions of 

paragraph (h) of this AD, we will 

consider requests to approve different 

solutions if sufficient data are submitted 

to substantiate that the change would 

provide an acceptable level of safety. 

We have not changed the AD in this 

regard. 

Request To Correct a Typographical 

Error 

Boeing requests that we correct a 

typographical error. Boeing states that 

paragraph (h) of the NPRM references 

paragraph (j) instead of paragraph (i) of 

the NPRM, and points out that there is 

no paragraph (j) in the NPRM. 

We agree. However, as explained 

previously, we have removed paragraph 

(h) of the NPRM. No further change to 

the AD is necessary in this regard. 

Explanation of Change to Applicability 

We have revised this AD to identify 

the legal name of the manufacturer as 

published in the most recent type 

certificate data sheet for the affected 

airplane models. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these changes 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Explanation of Change to Costs of 

Compliance 

Since issuance of the NPRM, we have 

increased the labor rate used in the 

Costs of Compliance from $80 per workhour to $85 per work-hour. The Costs of 

Compliance information, below, reflects 

this increase in the specified hourly 

labor rate. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD would affect 

754 products of U.S. registry. The 

following table provides the estimated 

costs, at an average labor rate of $85 per 

hour, for U.S. operators to comply with 

this AD. 


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ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours Parts Cost per 

product Fleet cost 

Installation of GFI relays .................................................................................. 8 $11,010 $11,690 $8,814,260 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2010–17–05 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–16395. Docket No. 

FAA–2008–0269; Directorate Identifier 

2007–NM–320–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective September 22, 2010. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to The Boeing 

Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, and –900 series airplanes, certificated 

in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1201, Revision 1, 

dated May 28, 2009. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent pump housing 

burn-through due to electrical arcing, which 

could create a potential ignition source 

inside a fuel tank. This condition, in 

combination with flammable fuel vapors, 

could result in a fuel tank explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(e) Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

Replacement or Installation 

(f) Within 60 months after the effective 

date of this AD, do the actions required in 

paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD. 

(1) Replace the power control relays that 

are located in the R18, R19, R20, R21, R54, 

and R55 positions in the P91 and P92 power 

distribution panels for the fuel boost and 

override pumps with new, improved relays, 

part number KDAG–X4F–001, having a 

ground fault interrupter (GFI) feature, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

737–28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 

2009. 

(2) Install and maintain TDG Aerospace 

universal fault interrupters (UFIs) using 

Supplemental Type Certificate ST02079LA. 

Note 1: Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737– 

28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009, 

refers to Honeywell Service Bulletin 

1151932–24–61 and Honeywell Service 

Bulletin 1151934–24–62, both Revision 5, 

both dated May 25, 2009, as additional 

sources of guidance for replacement of the 

power control relays in the P91 and P92 

power distribution panels. 

(g) Actions done before the effective date 

of this AD in accordance with Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–28A1201, dated 

February 19, 2007, are acceptable for 

compliance with the requirements of 

paragraph (f) of this AD, provided that 

Revision 5 of Honeywell Service Bulletins 

1151932–24–61 and 1151934–24–62, both 

dated May 25, 2009, are used as additional 

sources of guidance. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: 

Georgios Roussos, Aerospace Engineer, 

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6482; fax 

(425) 917–6590. Or, e-mail information to 9- 

ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–28A1201, Revision 1, dated 

May 28, 2009, to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766– 

5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; 

Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 159 / Wednesday, August 18, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 50863 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 27, 

2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–19696 Filed 8–17–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0806; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–SW–071–AD; Amendment 

39–16397; AD 2010–15–51] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Agusta 

S.p.A. Model A119 and AW119 MKII 

Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration, DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: This document publishes in 

the Federal Register an amendment 

adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 

2010–15–51, which was sent previously 

to all known U.S. owners and operators 

of Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A119 

and AW119 MKII helicopters by 

individual letters. This AD requires, 

within 5 hours time-in-service (TIS), 

and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 

50 hours TIS, removing the cover of 

each pilot and co-pilot control box 

assembly (control box) and inspecting 

each rotary variable differential 

transformer (RVDT) control gear locking 

pin (locking pin) for proper position. If 

a locking pin is recessed, extended, or 

missing, this AD requires replacing the 

control box before further flight. This 

amendment is prompted by a report that 

an RVDT locking pin that was installed 

on a Model AW119 MKII helicopter 

moved from its proper position, 

resulting in loss of connectivity of the 

pilot and co-pilot throttle controls. The 

actions specified by this AD are 

intended to prevent the RVDT locking 

pin from moving from its proper 

position, which could lead to loss of 

manual engine throttle control, and 

subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

DATES: Effective September 2, 2010, to 

all persons except those persons to 

whom it was made immediately 

effective by Emergency AD 2010–15–51, 

issued on July 16, 2010, which 

contained the requirements of this 

amendment. 

The incorporation by reference of 

certain publications listed in the 

regulations is approved by the Director 

of the Federal Register as of September 

2, 2010. 

Comments for inclusion in the Rules 

Docket must be received on or before 

October 18, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

AD: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

You may get the service information 

identified in this AD from Agusta, Via 

Giovanni Agusta, 520 21017 Cascina 

Costa di Samarate (VA), Italy, telephone 

39 0331–229111, fax 39 0331–229605/ 

222595, or at http:// 

customersupport.agusta.com/ 

technical_advice.php. 

Examining the Docket: You may 

examine the docket that contains the 

AD, any comments, and other 

information on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov, or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The Docket 

Operations office (telephone (800) 647– 

5527) is located in Room W12–140 on 

the ground floor of the West Building at 

the street address stated in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rao 

Edupuganti, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations 

and Policy Group, 2601 Meacham Blvd., 

Fort Worth, Texas 76137, telephone 

(817) 222–4389, fax (817) 222–5961. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July 

16, 2010, we issued Emergency AD 

2010–15–51 for the specified model 

helicopters, which requires, within 5 

hours TIS, and thereafter at intervals not 

to exceed 50 hours TIS, removing the 

cover of the pilot and co-pilot control 

boxes and inspecting each RVDT 

locking pin for proper position. If a 

locking pin is recessed, extended, or 

missing, the AD requires replacing the 

control box before further flight. That 

action was prompted by a report that an 

RVDT locking pin that was installed on 

a Model AW119 MKII helicopter moved 

from its proper position, resulting in 

loss of connectivity of the pilot and copilot throttle controls. Investigation 

revealed that the pilot’s locking pin had 

moved from its proper position, which 

resulted in the loss of the co-pilot 

throttle control. This condition, if not 

detected and corrected, could result in 

loss of manual engine throttle control, 

and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, notified us that an unsafe 

condition may exist on Agusta Model 

A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters. 

EASA advises of a nonconformity of 

certain control boxes, unseating of a 

locking pin, and loss of the pilot and copilot engine throttle synchronicity. 

EASA states this condition, if not 

detected and corrected, could lead to 

the loss of manual engine throttle 

control and consequent loss of control 

of the helicopter. 

Agusta has issued Alert Bollettino 

Tecnico No. 119–39, dated July 2, 2010 

(ABT). The ABT describes procedures 

for inspecting the pilot and co-pilot 

control box for correct positioning of the 

locking pin. The ABT states that the 

investigation is still in progress to find 

a solution to the malfunction. The 

instructions in the ABT are prescribed 

as precautionary pending future 

corrective action. EASA classified this 

ABT as mandatory and issued 

Emergency AD 2010–0142–E, dated July 

5, 2010, to ensure the continued 

airworthiness of these helicopters. This 

AD differs from EASA Emergency AD 

No. 2010–0142–E in that we use the 

term ‘‘hours time-in-service’’ rather than 

‘‘flight hours.’’ Also, we clarify the 

inspection requirements and do not use 

the calendar date of August 31, 2010 as 

a required compliance time. 

These helicopter models are 

manufactured in Italy and are type 

certificated for operation in the United 

States under the provisions of 14 CFR 

21.29 and the applicable bilateral 

agreement. Pursuant to the applicable 

bilateral agreement, EASA has kept the 

FAA informed of the situation 

described. We have examined the 

findings of EASA, reviewed all available 

information, and determined that AD 

action is necessary for products of these 


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