Visit our website for other free publication 

downloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic 

studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics 

having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of 

special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of 

conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation.
THE SAUDI-IRANIAN RIVALRY

AND THE FUTURE OF MIDDLE EAST SECURITY

W. Andrew Terrill

December 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose 

classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives 

in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is 

cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 632 Wright Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046. 

*****

I would like to thank Dr. Steven Metz, Mary J. Pelusi, and 

Sarah E. Womer for their useful and insightful comments on early drafts of this work. I would also like to thank Jacob A. Librizzi 

for his valuable work as my research assistant. All mistakes in 

this work—be they of fact, omission, interpretation, or speculation—are entirely my own.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be 

downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of 

this report may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last 

by placing an order on the SSI website. The SSI website address 

is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail 

newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and 

upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research 

analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please 

subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.

army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-518-6
iii

FOREWORD

The Middle East is undergoing an era of revolutionary change that is challenging the foreign policies 

of the United States and virtually all regional states. In 

this new environment, opportunities and challenges 

exist for a number of regional and extra-regional states 

to advance their national interests, while attempting to 

marginalize those of their rivals. Despite these changes, the Arab Spring and revolutions in countries such 

as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have not altered some 

of the more fundamental aspects of the Middle East 

regional situation. One of the most important rivalries 

defining the strategic landscape of the Middle East is 

between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The competition between these two states is long-standing, but it is especially important now. Political relationships that have 

endured for decades, such as the one between Iran 

and Syria, now seem to be in some danger, depending upon how current struggles play out. The stakes in 

this rivalry can thus become higher in an environment 

of revolutionary upheaval.

In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill considers an old rivalry as it transitions into a new environment. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been rivals 

since at least the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. As 

Dr. Terrill points out, this competition has taken a 

variety of forms and was especially intense in the 

aftermath of the Iranian revolution. Under Iranian 

President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), the rivalry relaxed to some extent, but a permanent détente 

was not possible because of a backlash within the 

Iranian political system. The successor presidency of 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad further damaged relations 
iv

and the Saudi-Iranian relationship was dealt an especially serious setback over the Saudi-led intervention 

into Bahrain. Because the current Saudi-Iranian rivalry is taking place in a variety of countries of interest to 

the United States, an awareness of the motivations and 

issues associated with the rivalry is important to U.S. 

policymakers. Dr. Terrill clearly identifies the struggle 

as region-wide, encompassing countries as far apart 

as Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and especially Iraq, where the United States is preparing to 

withdraw almost all of its troops. He also notes that 

while U.S. interests often overlap with those of Saudi 

Arabia, such is not always the case. Saudi Arabia and 

the United States often work well together in seeking 

to contain Iranian influence, but Saudi Arabia also is 

an absolute monarchy opposed to Arab democracy 

or any democratic reform of the existing monarchical 

systems.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer 

this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject, as our nation 

continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the future of the Middle East and the 

ongoing challenge of advancing U.S. interests in a 

time of Middle East turbulence. This analysis should 

be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders and intelligence professionals as they seek to address the 

complicated interplay of factors related to regional security issues, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, 

fighting terrorism, and providing for the support of 

local allies. This work may also benefit those seeking 

better understanding of long-range issues of Middle 

Eastern and global security. We hope this work will 
v

be of benefit to officers of all services, as well as other 

U.S. government officials involved in military and security assistance planning.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in October 2001, and is SSI’s Middle 

East specialist. Prior to his appointment, he served as 

a Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. 

Terrill also served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. 

Air War College on assignment from LLNL. He is a 

former faculty member at Old Dominion University in 

Norfolk, Virginia and has taught adjunct at a variety 

of other colleges and universities. He is a retired U.S. 

Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel and Foreign Area 

Officer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in numerous academic journals on topics including nuclear 

proliferation, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT 

STORM, Middle Eastern chemical weapons and ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, and commando 

operations. He is also the author of Global Security 

Watch-Jordan (Praeger, 2010). Since 1994, at U.S. State 

Department invitation, Dr. Terrill has participated in 

the Middle Eastern Track 2 talks, which are part of 

the Middle East Peace Process. He has also served as 

a member of the military and security working group 

of the Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group since its 

establishment in 2006. Dr. Terrill holds a B.A. from 

California State Polytechnic University and an M.A. 

from the University of California, Riverside, both in 

political science, and a Ph.D. in international relations 

from Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, 

California. 

ix

SUMMARY

Saudi Arabia and Iran have often behaved as serious rivals for influence in the Middle East, especially 

the Gulf area, since at least Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. While both nations 

define themselves as Islamic, the differences between 

their foreign policies could hardly be more dramatic. 

In most respects, Saudi Arabia is a regional status quo 

power, while Iran often seeks revolutionary change 

throughout the Gulf area and the wider Middle East 

with varying degrees of intensity. Saudi Arabia also 

has strong ties with Western nations, while Iran views 

the United States as its most dangerous enemy. Perhaps the most important difference between the two 

nations is that Saudi Arabia is a conservative Sunni 

Muslim Arab state, while Iran is a Shi’ite state with 

senior politicians who often view their country as the 

defender and natural leader of Shi’ites throughout the 

region. The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has 

been reflected in the politics of a number of regional 

states where these two powers exercise influence. 

The 2011 wave of pro-democracy and anti-regime 

protests, now known as the Arab Spring, introduced 

new concerns for both Saudi Arabia and Iran to consider within the framework of their regional priorities. 

Neither government’s vital interests were involved in 

the outcome of the struggle in Tunisia where the Arab 

Spring began, but both leaderships became especially 

interested in these events once the unrest spread to 

Egypt. While Saudi Arabia watched the ouster of 

Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak with horror, the 

Iranian leadership saw some potential opportunities. 

Riyadh’s decision in late May to grant Egypt $4 billion 

in loans and grants quickly became a powerful incen-
x

tive for Cairo to consider Saudi priorities, especially 

in light of Egypt’s declining tourism revenues and 

the interruption of Western private investment in the 

Egyptian economy. Both nations are continuing their 

efforts to improve relations with post-Mubarak Egypt, 

although Saudi Arabia’s financial resources give it an 

advantage in the struggle for influence.

Iran seeks to expand its power in the Gulf, which 

is a key area of competition between the two states. 

Saudi Arabia and to varying extents other Gulf Arab 

states often seek to contain Iran’s quest for dominance. 

In the struggle for Gulf influence, Saudi Arabia has 

consistently maintained a vastly higher level of political clout with local states than Iran. Iran currently cannot hope to overshadow Saudi regional influence in 

the Gulf, but it does seek to influence Gulf Arab states 

and is especially interested in pressuring them to minimize or eliminate their military links to the West. In 

recent years, Sunni-Shi’ite tension in the Gulf seems to 

have been rising for a number of reasons. Such problems reached a high point with the March 2011 Saudiled military intervention in Bahrain. Consequently, it 

is increasingly likely that the rivalry between Riyadh 

and Tehran will intensify in the near future. In this 

environment, U.S. intelligence officials and policymakers will correspondingly need to be aware of the 

possibility that Saudi Arabia may overestimate Iranian involvement in any regional crisis and at times 

conflate Shi’ite assertiveness with Iranian activism on 

the basis of their own form of worst-case analysis and 

very little evidence. 

Iran’s closest Arab ally has been Syria, and Tehran has been watching the 2011 popular unrest in 

Syria with considerable alarm. Syrian leaders sometimes believe that their country is or could become 
xi

the junior partner in the relationship with Iran, and 

Damascus has disagreed with Tehran on a variety of 

important issues within an overall context of cooperation and friendly ties. The Syrian relationship with 

Riyadh is different. As a monarchy, Saudi Arabia has 

maintained a long tradition of distrust towards Syria, 

which defines itself as a republican and sometimes 

a revolutionary regime. While the Saudis have been 

willing to work with Damascus on occasion, they do 

not have much in common with the Syrian government beyond Arabism. More recently, both Saudi 

Arabia and Iran have needed to consider how Syrian 

unrest impacts upon their interests. Tehran clearly has 

the most to lose, and it is mostly standing by its Syrian ally. The previous Saudi détente with Damascus 

was significant, but Riyadh never viewed the Assad 

regime as an ally and could be expected to take some 

pleasure in seeing Tehran lose its most important Arab 

partner should this regime fall. On the negative side, 

Riyadh almost certainly would not view the turmoil in 

Syria as an unqualified Saudi victory even if the Assad 

regime was overthrown and replaced by an anti-Iranian government. The Saudi leadership remains ultraconservative and, correspondingly, takes a dim view 

of both revolutionary upheaval and Arab democracy, 

although Riyadh would almost certainly seek to maintain a high level of influence with any post-Ba’athist 

government. If Syrian President Assad is overthrown, 

the United States may seek to work with Saudi Arabia 

and other friendly states to make certain that Syrian 

financial and military ties to Iran do not survive the 

transition. 

In a major bid to enhance its regional influence, 

Tehran has attempted to portray itself as the leading 

power supporting Palestinian rights and opposing Is-
xii

rael through a variety of means, including supplying 

weapons and funding to Palestinian militants. Saudi 

Arabia has made numerous efforts to help the Palestinians and to use its financial resources and political 

influence on their behalf, but it has also served as the 

chief sponsor of an Arab League peace plan that is of 

interest to some Israeli leaders. Riyadh maintains normal political relations with both of the major Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, the latter of 

which has been designated a terrorist organization by 

the United States. Saudi influence with Hamas has declined steadily in recent years and been almost totally 

displaced by that of Iran. Elsewhere in the Levant, 

large numbers of Lebanon’s Shi’ites consider Iran to 

be an important ally that has extended considerable 

support to the Lebanese in resisting what they define 

as Israeli aggression. In this environment, the United 

States will almost certainly wish to continue to pursue 

the Middle East Peace Process for both its intrinsic value and in order to undermine Iran’s efforts to enhance 

its role in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

The future of Iraq is a central concern for both Iran 

and Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States. The 

planned withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq will also 

complicate the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the region. 

The departure of U.S. troops may radically change the 

ways in which regional states help their Iraqi supporters. After the United States withdraws the remainder 

of its military forces from Iraq, it will be difficult for 

Saudi Arabia and the other Sunni Gulf monarchies 

to remain passive should Iran continue to arm Iraqi 

Shi’ite militias. One of the most troubling ways in 

which Iran exerts its influence in Iraq is through various Shi’ite militia organizations that engage in terrorism and strikes against U.S. troops and other targets 
xiii

inside Iraq. These pro-Iranian militias are sometimes 

called Special Groups. Iran has considerable influence 

with them and provides weapons and training to some 

of these forces through the elite Iranian Revolutionary 

Guards Corps’ al-Quds Force.

Finally, U.S. diplomats and military leaders dealing with Iraq must be prepared for Iranian attempts 

to take advantage of serious disagreements between 

Baghdad and Riyadh after Washington withdraws its 

troops from Iraq. To contain Iran while supporting 

stability and democracy, the United States must be 

prepared to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iraq 

and limit Iranian efforts to insert itself into such a process. Since key Saudi concerns may involve Iraqi government actions in Sunni Arab areas, the United States 

will have to be aware of issues in those areas, and be 

prepared to support measures to increase Sunni Arab 

willingness to participate in the political system along 

with a Shi’ite and Kurdish willingness to share power.
1

THE SAUDI-IRANIAN RIVALRY

AND THE FUTURE OF MIDDLE EAST SECURITY

Introduction.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have viewed themselves as 

serious rivals for influence in the Middle East, particularly the Gulf area, at least since Iran’s 1979 Islamic 

Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, when Riyadh provided strong diplomatic and financial backing to Baghdad. The nature of this rivalry has a fluctuated significantly in the decades since Iran’s Islamic 

Revolution, and the rivalry approached the level of 

a cold war in the years immediately following the 

ouster of the last Iranian shah by Islamic revolutionaries. In more recent years, limited cooperation between 

these two states has been possible within an overall 

atmosphere of suspicion and competition. Yet, even at 

high points in this relationship, cooperation between 

these two states is almost always tinged with suspicion. Additionally, in 2011, the Saudi-Iranian relationship took a dramatic turn for the worse due to strong 

disagreements over the wave of unrest known as the 

Arab Spring and the March 2011 Saudi-led military 

intervention to prop up the Bahraini monarchy. 

Rivalry between the two states is often fueled by 

significant ideological and geopolitical differences 

that can become more divisive during times of regional turbulence. Saudi Arabia is governed by a Sunni 

Muslim absolute monarchy with a political agenda 

that often centers on preserving the status quo in the 

Gulf region. The Saudi leadership works closely with 

the smaller Gulf Arab monarchies to achieve this objective, sometimes assuming the role of a well-intentioned, if somewhat overbearing, “older brother.”1
2

This coordination is frequently carried out through 

the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a six-nation regional organization consisting entirely of Gulf Arab 

monarchies and based in Riyadh.2 As part of its long 

established traditionalist orientation, the Saudi leadership is uncomfortable with the idea of expanding regional democracy, and often looks with concern on the 

possibility that Arab monarchies or other conservative 

states will be replaced by radical, liberal, or populist 

governments. The Saudi Royal Family is unwilling to 

share power with elected bodies in their own country 

and has sought to pressure other monarchies to reject 

this option and thereby avoid setting what Riyadh 

views as the wrong kind of example.3 Conversely, Iran 

seldom seeks to defend the regional status quo regarding pro-Western monarchies, although it maintains an 

uneven level of commitment to revolutionary changes 

throughout the Middle East. This commitment is usually based on prevailing regional conditions and the 

degree to which potential change in various Middle 

Eastern countries appears to benefit Tehran. Another 

factor influencing Iranian foreign policy is the existence of ongoing power struggles in Tehran where 

different leaders often work at cross purposes for a variety of reasons including efforts to outmaneuver and 

weaken their political rivals. Iran is a non-Arab and 

non-Sunni country, and these factors are important 

in Iranian interaction with Saudi Arabia and other 

Arab states. As a general principle, Tehran also seeks 

to eliminate U.S. influence in the region, although Iranian leaders can sometimes see some limited value to 

U.S. regional diplomacy on those few occasions where 

Iranian and U.S. interests overlap to some extent. 

Sectarian issues often influence the policy orientations of both states. Saudi Arabia has never been known 
3

for its strong commitment to religious diversity even 

within the Islamic community. Rather, Saudi Arabian 

society mostly embraces the ultra-conservative form 

of Islam usually known in the West as Wahhabism, although its adherents usually prefer the terms Unitarians or Salafis.4

 According to Thomas Hegghammer, a 

scholar of political Islam, mainstream Saudi religious 

scholars often did not view non-Wahhabis to be Muslims throughout the kingdom’s early history. This approach changed in the 1950s when the Saudi Grand 

Mufti met with senior non-Wahhabi religious leaders 

of Sunni Arab communities outside of Saudi Arabia.5

Despite this breakthrough, Saudi views of Shi’ite Muslims often remained disapproving into contemporary 

times. Saudi Arabia is therefore often described as 

hostile to Shi’ite empowerment throughout the region, 

and concerned that its own Shi’ite minority of two 

million people could emerge as a source of recurring 

difficulties for the government.6 Iranian leaders, by 

contrast, often tend to be publicly dismissive of the divide between Sunnis and Shi’ites, but their consistent 

support for Shi’ite parties to any dispute suggests a 

deeper commitment to the members of their own sect. 

Iran often views itself as the chief defender of Shi’ite 

rights, although it does not consider this to be its only 

important regional role. Rather, Iranian leaders often 

view their country as a key regional state that stands 

as an important leader for the Islamic World. 

Despite their competition with Riyadh, the Iranians most serious military rival for influence within 

the region is the United States, not Saudi Arabia. Correspondingly, Tehran often finds itself in the difficult 

position of opposing Saudi foreign policy objectives 

while seeking to avoid pushing the United States and 

Saudi Arabia into a closer political relationship. In this 
4

environment, major Iranian leaders have often found 

it necessary to reassure the Saudis in public that they 

do not wish them ill.7 Rather, they maintain that the 

United States is seeking to “dupe” the Gulf States into 

believing that the Islamic Republic constitutes a threat 

when it does not.8 In some ways, the competition between Iran and the GCC states mirrors that of the United States with Iran, while in other ways these rivalries 

differ. Both regional leaderships are aware of ways in 

which they can seek advantages by maintaining a civil 

dialogue with the other party when this is possible. 

The Iranians are often at odds with Saudi Arabia and 

its allies, but sometimes seek to project that opposition 

in ways that focus most of their criticism on the United States. Conversely, Saudi Arabia remains alert to 

the danger that an assertive opposition to Iran could 

cause Tehran to escalate its acts of hostility. At various 

points in the relationship, Riyadh has even provided 

reassuring comments about Iran’s peaceful intensions 

and high level visits have occurred between the two 

countries. 

Additionally, neither Tehran nor Riyadh is immune to the political turbulence now sweeping the 

Middle East. Saudi Arabia has seen limited levels of 

political discontent during the Arab Spring, while Iran 

experienced serious unrest in 2009 following its disputed June presidential election, which is widely understood to have been “stolen” by the Ahmadinejad 

government.9 Saudi Arabia seems to have contained 

serious domestic unrest by introducing massive new 

economic benefits programs for its citizens designed 

to increase their stake in the current political system. 

Iran, by contrast, used repression to defeat the Green 

Movement, which called for substantial reform and 

the decertification of President Ahmadinejad’s dis-
5

puted re-election victory in the immediate aftermath 

of the 2009 election crisis. To the extent possible, both 

countries will correspondingly adjust their foreign 

and domestic policies to guarantee regime survival 

in the face of regional unrest. The future replacement 

of either or both countries’ governments, should this 

occur, will probably alter rather than eliminate their 

rivalry, which is based on a variety of factors in addition to the differing systems of government. 

The Background of Saudi-Iranian Relations.

Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution overthrew a proAmerican autocrat and replaced his government with 

a radical Islamic regime to the consternation of both 

the United States and Saudi Arabia. After achieving 

power, the Iranian revolutionaries quickly established 

themselves in strong opposition to both the institution of monarchy (which they had just ended in their 

own country) and the pro-American foreign policy 

of Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf Arab states.10 In 

November 1979, shortly after the success of the Iranian revolution, serious unrest ignited among Shi’ites 

in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, beginning with an 

illegal religious procession to celebrate the important 

Shi’ite holiday of Ashura. These religious activities 

had a political edge to them, and some members of 

the crowd carried pictures of the Iranian revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as well as 

signs denouncing the Saudi government and United 

States. When Saudi authorities attempted to disperse 

the crowds, three days of rioting ensued, culminating 

in considerable property damage. The Saudi Arabian 

National Guard (SANG) was then called upon to suppress the riots, which it did with a number of civilian 
6

casualties.11 Riyadh viewed Iran as the instigator of 

these problems.

In the early zealous years following the Islamic 

Revolution, Tehran directed a great deal of incendiary 

propaganda against the Saudis and what the Iranians 

called Riyadh’s American brand of Islam. Adding to 

the discord, during the early 1980s, Iranian pilgrims 

repeatedly disrupted the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca in 

Saudi Arabia which all Muslims who are able must 

make at least once in their lifetime.12 This problem became a crisis in 1987 when Iranian protest efforts led to 

over 400 people being killed as demonstrations turned 

into riots.13 Iran blamed Saudi Arabia for the incident 

and in a sea of invective demanded that Riyadh turn 

over custody of the Holy Places to the Islamic Republic.14 Saudi Arabia, which closely controls the entry of 

foreigners into the kingdom, had few options other 

than accepting at least some Iranian Muslims seeking 

to fulfill a religious duty, but Riyadh also moved to 

dramatically reduce the number of Iranians allowed 

into the kingdom for Hajj in the aftermath of this 

event. After Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, relations gradually improved between Saudi Arabia and 

Iran, with post-Khomeini leaders including Ali Akbar 

Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, who 

established themselves as less contentious than their 

predecessor. Khatami, in particular, sought to improve relations with Riyadh and end Iranian subversion and covert action directed against Saudi Arabia.15

In 1999, he became the first serving Iranian president 

to visit Saudi Arabia, where he was courteously received. Nevertheless, neither Rafsanjani nor Khatami 

were fully able to control the hard liners, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) remained 

capable of conducting covert actions in foreign coun-
7

tries, including Saudi Arabia, without consulting the 

president, who was not their commander-in-chief (the 

Supreme Leader is constitutionally at the top of the 

IRGC chain of command). Since 1989 the office of Supreme Leader has been held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who is conservative and suspicious of reform. 

President Khatami’s effort to improve relations 

with Saudi Arabia was further motivated by occasional U.S. efforts to persuade the Gulf States to increase 

their role in isolating Iran due to that country’s support for terrorism and suspicions about a surreptitious 

Iranian nuclear weapons program. U.S. diplomatic efforts have increased as concerns about that program 

have grown over time, while Khatami’s successor as 

president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has not made improving relations with Riyadh a priority. This failure 

seems to have led to predictable results. In early 2010, 

then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary 

of State Hillary Clinton called for the Gulf Arab states 

to use their influence with China to help persuade 

Beijing to agree to tough United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions on Iran. Saudi Arabia, for its 

part, appeared publicly skeptical that increased sanctions would slow the Iranian nuclear program and 

displayed no public interest in approaching China 

on this issue.16 Privately things might have been different, and various journalist sources suggested that 

Foreign Minister Prince Saud made a confidential effort to encourage China to support sanctions.17 Secretary of Defense Gates also stated, without elaborating, 

that he had detected an increased Saudi willingness 

to use its commercial ties with China to push Beijing 

to distance itself from Iran.18 In any event, the Chinese 

agreed to a fourth round of UN sanctions, including 

a comprehensive arms embargo that passed the Secu-
8

rity Council in June 2010. There remained limits to the 

level of Chinese support for efforts to sanction Iran, 

and Beijing later criticized President Barack Obama 

for signing a bill that imposed more expansive unilateral American sanctions.19

These events are not unusual. Riyadh has often 

found itself navigating between U.S. policy priorities and maintaining some level of normal relations 

with Tehran. No one in Riyadh wishes to return to the 

poisoned relations of the early 1980s when Iran was 

intensely involved in supporting propaganda, subversion, and terrorism directed at the Arab monarchies. 

Likewise, the Saudis and other GCC states do not wish 

to place themselves in a position where they are automatically brought into an escalating political conflict or 

even a war between the United States and Iran, should 

one break out. Beyond the gamesmanship, however, 

issues do matter, and the Iranian nuclear program is 

of considerable concern to the Saudis.20 Should Tehran 

cross the nuclear threshold, this development could 

add enormously to Iran’s regional standing and the 

prestige of the Islamic Revolution. The damage to the 

Iranian nuclear infrastructure caused by the Stuxnet 

computer virus/worm has been described as serious 

by a variety of journalist sources, but it is unclear how 

long such assaults will delay the acquisition of an Iranian nuclear weapon. It is also unclear if the Iranian 

discovery of a second major computer virus attack following the Stuxnet strike is a real event, and, if so, if it 

is a serious and potentially debilitating attack.21 Moreover, a nuclear armed Iran is often viewed as having 

a much more robust capability to threaten or engage 

in either unconventional or conventional military operations since other states may be more reluctant to 

escalate any confrontation with a nuclear power. Ad-
9

ditionally, friendly Arab states might fear that U.S. 

backing for any disagreement with Tehran would be 

less enthusiastic, should Iran become a nuclear power. 

Riyadh and Tehran View Egypt and the Arab 

Spring.

The 2011 wave of pro-democracy and anti-regime 

protests known as the Arab Spring introduced new 

concerns for both Saudi Arabia and Iran within the 

framework of their regional priorities. Neither government’s vital interests were involved in the outcome 

of the struggle in Tunisia where the Arab Spring began, but both leaderships became especially interested 

in these events once the unrest spread to Egypt. President Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt had sometimes played a 

significant role in opposing the expansion of Iranian 

influence in the Middle East, and the two countries 

never re-established diplomatic relations throughout 

the years of the Mubarak presidency. In particular, 

Mubarak often worked against the interests of the 

radical Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, which is an 

important and well-funded ally of Tehran. The future 

of Egyptian-Iranian relations consequently remains 

uncertain, as Egyptians decide on their future foreign 

policy orientations and priorities following the revolution. There is, nevertheless, a strong bias among 

Egyptians favoring a dramatically expanded regional 

leadership role for their country after the long years 

of a mostly passive foreign policy under Mubarak.22

Simultaneously, the interim military government has 

been under public pressure to improve its relations 

with the Palestinians, including Hamas. In late May 

2011, Egypt opened its border with the Gaza Strip to 

ease the Israeli blockade of that territory, which was 
10

imposed after Hamas seized control of Gaza. Egyptian 

leaders announced the Fatah/Hamas reconciliation 

rendered the blockade unnecessary, a very different 

interpretation of the situation than found in Israel. 

Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi stated that 

his country’s previous involvement with the blockade 

was “shameful.”23

In the short term, the ouster of a hostile Egyptian 

president following an 18-day uprising may play to 

Iranian advantage, although in the long term there 

could be problems for Tehran. Currently, Egypt’s 

future governance is subject to considerable uncertainty, and the Iranians are calling for an Islamist 

government, which, at this point, could only be led 

by the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s most important 

contemporary Islamist movement. While Iranian preferences are irrelevant for Egyptian priorities, the destruction of the Mubarak regime is expected to allow 

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood a chance to compete for 

a share of political power. If this organization rises to 

political dominance in Egypt, the United States may 

face a potentially dramatic setback, but this sort of development would not necessarily be advantageous to 

Tehran. Ideological regimes can often emerge as bitter 

rivals, which viciously denounce each other for failing to understand and implement the correct path. 

The potential for such developments have already 

been seen elsewhere in the Middle East, including Kuwait, where hardline Sunni Islamists are often among 

Iran’s most bitter critics.24 In the Kuwaiti parliament, 

for example, various Sunni Islamist leaders do little to 

hide their deep hostility toward the Iranians, which 

is clearly influenced by their strongly sectarian outlook.25 In this spirit, some opposition Kuwaiti members of parliament (MPs) have sharply criticized their 
11

Prime Minister for failing to support Saudi Arabia by 

dispatching Kuwaiti troops to Bahrain in March 2011 

to help crush Shi’ite-led demonstrations.26 Additionally, the decision for a large and important country like 

Egypt to play a more important regional role might 

inevitably place it in disagreement with Iran, which 

seeks a similar position of leadership. 

Despite these potential difficulties between Cairo 

and Tehran, the Saudi leadership also has trepidations over Egyptian developments, and now considers their kingdom to be more isolated in efforts to 

contain Iranian influence without Mubarak’s Egypt.27

The Riyadh leadership viewed the Egyptian uprising with considerable alarm once it started gathering 

momentum and quickly and severely began criticizing the protesters while proclaiming solidarity with 

Mubarak. At the beginning of the crisis, Saudi King 

Abdullah condemned what he called protester acts of 

“malicious upheaval” and fitnah (creating discord and 

chaos within the Islamic community).28 Later, as the 

Saudis understood the increased likelihood that the 

Mubarak regime would be ousted, they softened their 

rhetoric and focused on calling for a peaceful settlement between the government and its opponents.29 In 

the aftermath of Mubarak’s fall, it seems increasingly 

possible that Riyadh will become more engaged in regional politics since it is no longer certain that it can 

depend upon Egypt to play a major role in supporting 

the containment of Iran.

While Saudi Arabia watched the Mubarak ouster 

with horror, the Iranian leadership also saw some 

potential opportunities. Early in the crisis, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made enthusiastic statements endorsing the Egyptian protesters 

and attempting to portray events in that country as an 
12

Iranian-style revolution likely to lead to an Egyptian 

Islamic republic.30 He further stated that region-wide 

regime-changing upheaval and demands for Islamic 

government were natural extensions of Iran’s 1979 

Revolution. This set of statements represents an unlikely analysis of events since Islamic elements were 

not leading either the Tunisian or Egyptian revolutions, although such groups did hope to benefit from 

the revolutionary aftermath. Khamenei’s statements 

are more objectively understood to represent good 

politics, suggesting that populations in both countries sought to oust their leaders in order to install an 

Islamic government based on the Iranian model. Iranians, by contrast, already have an Islamic republic, 

and under this logic there is no need to challenge the 

Tehran government with grievances such as those directed at Mubarak’s regime. Khamenei has also publicly worried that the United States will “confiscate” 

the Arab Spring revolutions.31

Following Mubarak’s removal from power, the 

Tehran leadership requested that Egypt take the “courageous step” of reestablishing diplomatic relations 

with Iran.32 Then-Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil alArabi seemed well-disposed to this action and stated 

in April 2011 that, “The Egyptian and Iranian people 

deserve relations which reflect their history and civilization, provided they are based on mutual respect 

of state sovereignty and non-interference in any kind 

of internal affairs.”33 Predictably, Riyadh reacted with 

shock to these overtures and shortly after al-Arabi’s 

statement pressed Egypt to limit any rapprochement 

with Iran, noting a surge in hostility between Tehran 

and the GCC states following the March 2011 Saudi 

intervention in Bahrain. In late April 2011, Egyptian 

Prime Minister Essam Sharaf met with Saudi King 
13

Abdullah in Riyadh for comprehensive discussions of 

key regional issues where the king clearly emphasized 

GCC concerns about Iran. In response, Prime Minister 

Sharaf stressed Egypt’s interest in “stronger political 

relations” with Saudi Arabia, as well as the need to 

“bolster economic cooperation.”34 Riyadh’s decision 

in late May 2011 to grant Egypt $4 billion in loans and 

grants quickly became a powerful incentive to respect 

Saudi priorities, especially in light of Egypt’s declining 

tourism revenues and the interruption of Western private investment in the Egyptian economy.35 Additionally, some of the smaller Gulf Arab states, especially 

Qatar, appear to be interested in helping Egypt with 

loans and grants as well.36 While the Qataris have better relations with Iran than Saudi Arabia, they would 

likely still be concerned if Cairo moved too rapidly to 

improve relations with Tehran. 

Currently, both Iran and Saudi Arabia remain uncertain over how Egypt’s foreign policy fundamentals might evolve, and both are encouraging Cairo to 

move more closely in line with them. The Arab Spring 

also introduces the possibility that various other governments beyond Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya may be 

overthrown, creating gaps that can be exploited by a 

variety of nations who may attempt to realign postrevolutionary governments or take advantage of 

chaos. Saudi Arabian and the smaller Gulf Arab states 

are particularly concerned about preventing the overthrow of any monarchical Arab government. To this 

end, the GCC has shown an interest in offering full 

membership to the two Arab monarchies that are not 

yet part of the organization, Jordan and Morocco.37

Such membership can be lucrative, and the extending of invitations for Jordan and Morocco to apply 

for membership reflects a concern by current GCC 
14

members to bolster monarchies that do not have much 

wealth, even though they are not geographically part 

of the Gulf.

Saudi-Iranian Competition in the Gulf Area.

The most important arena of Saudi-Iranian conflict 

traditionally has been the Gulf, although this competition has recently expanded to include efforts to 

influence post-Saddam Iraq. In the struggle for Gulf 

influence, Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained a 

higher level of political influence with local states than 

Iran. Riyadh has worked diligently to establish strong 

ties with the other Gulf monarchies and with Yemen 

in order to support regional stability. The GCC, which 

includes the six Gulf monarchies, was established in 

1981 during the Iran-Iraq War as part of a strategy for 

these countries to advance their common interests in 

the face of regional turmoil. Since that time, the GCC 

has developed into a useful instrument for advancing 

its members’ conservative approach to regional security. Likewise, Saudi Arabia is more influential in Yemen than any other regional or extra-regional power 

due to its willingness to commit impressive financial 

resources to the Yemeni economy, even in times of political upheaval.38

While Iran cannot hope to compete with Saudi regional clout in the Gulf, it does seek to influence Gulf 

Arab states, and is especially interested in pressuring 

them to minimize or eliminate their military links to 

the West. Tehran also seeks to establish some degree 

of influence with local Arab Shi’ite communities in order to pressure the Gulf Arab governments on issues 

of particular importance to Tehran. The GCC does not 

have a unified strategy to deal with the expansion of 
15

Iranian power, although each of the Gulf Arab leaderships is concerned about Iranian assertiveness to varying degrees.39 In particular, some states view Tehran 

as having the power to inspire and support internal 

opposition to their governments. Gulf nations with a 

significant number of Shi’ites often view themselves 

as particularly vulnerable to Iranian subversion since 

Shi’ite communities are often considered more susceptible to Iranian propaganda than Sunni Muslims. 

The Bahraini leadership has been especially concerned 

since it maintains a Sunni monarchy and a majority 

Shi’ite population in a country where relations between the two communities have experienced serious 

episodes of violence even before the dramatic events 

of the Arab Spring.40 In 1994-99, for instance, there 

was an especially serious cycle of violence, confrontations, and repression between opposition Shi’ites and 

the monarchy.41

The above concerns are informed by some recent 

history. Middle Eastern Sunni-Shi’ite tensions in the 

recent past have often been at least partially linked to 

the state of relations between Iran and the Arab World. 

The most important example of this trend was the 

1979 Iranian Revolution, which was viewed by some 

Arab Shi’ites as an empowering event.42 According to 

Yitzhak Nakash, a leading scholar of Shi’ite politics, 

Saudi Arabian Shi’ites regard the era following the Iranian revolution as the most difficult in their recent history because of increased Saudi government suspicion 

and repression, as well as the escalating hostile rhetoric of Saudi Arabia’s government-supported Sunni 

clerics.43 Moreover, increased government repression 

helped to render the Saudi Shi’ites more receptive to 

Iranian propaganda. Formal reconciliation between 

the Saudi government and Shi’ite community leaders 
16

occurred in 1993, but bitterness and continuing antiShi’ite discrimination remain, albeit at lower levels.44

Tensions also increased in some Gulf Arab countries 

during the Iran-Iraq War, when many Shi’ites were 

viewed as potentially sympathetic to Iran’s efforts 

to encourage armed opposition to anti-Iranian Sunni 

monarchies.45

Sunni-Shi’ite tensions have been especially worrisome in Kuwait. Kuwait has a population which is 

around 30-40 percent Shi’ite, and some of the Shi’ite 

leadership has claimed their community faces ongoing problems with discrimination. An especially unfortunate time occurred during the Iran-Iraq War of 

1980-88, when a small but serious campaign of Shi’ite 

terrorism was directed against the government for 

supporting Iraq in the struggle against Iran, a decision 

the Kuwaiti government later came to regret.46 More 

recently, Kuwaiti leaders and media have expressed 

occasional concerns about Iranian sleeper agents, 

whom the Iranians could activate to perform acts of 

sabotage in any future conflict involving Kuwait or 

U.S. military bases there.47 On at least one occasion, 

the authorities have arrested individuals whom they 

have described as members of an Iranian espionage 

and covert action ring.48 In March 2011, two Iranians 

and a Kuwaiti national were convicted in a Kuwaiti 

court of espionage on behalf of Iran and sentenced 

to death.49 The charges centered on accusations that 

the suspects had obtained information on the Kuwaiti 

military and U.S. military units in Kuwait, and then 

passed it on to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards 

Corps.50 In explaining the meaning of the trial, one 

Kuwaiti columnist stated that “Iran is shown to be 

systematically enlisting people to spy on its behalf.”51

Kuwait also expelled Iranian diplomats for espionage 
17

activities and recalled the Kuwaiti ambassador from 

Tehran as part of the fallout from the crisis.52 The Iranians, for their part, have denied the existence of spy 

rings in Kuwait and accused the United States of pressuring the GCC states to accuse Iran of interfering in 

their domestic politics.53

Saudi Arabia and Iran have also maintained serious differences over the recent conflict between the 

Yemeni government and Yemen’s Houthi minority, 

who live in Sa’ada province in the northern part of that 

country. Both Saudi and Yemeni government leaders 

have frequently accused Iran of backing the Houthi 

rebels with funding, training, and material aid. Yemen 

further claims that such support is provided either directly by Iran or through Arabic speaking surrogates 

such as the radical Lebanese group, Hezbollah.54 Yemen’s charges involving Iranian materiel support and 

training have not been proven and may be at least partially based on the fact that the rebels are Shi’ite, although they are Fiver Shi’ites rather than the Twelver 

Shi’ites found in Iran. The Iranian leadership adds to 

this perception with rhetorical support for the Houthis 

in a policy of religious solidarity, but it is difficult to 

imagine they could remain silent on an issue so important to the Shi’ite community.55 Saudi and Yemeni 

government officials have sometimes charged that the 

Houthi leadership seeks to move its followers away 

from the principles and practices of moderate Shi’ite 

Islam to a more militant form of Twelver Shi’ism modeled after the Iranian approach to religion.56

The Yemeni government’s conflict with the Houthis 

assumed a new dimension with direct Saudi Arabian 

military intervention into the northern Yemen in November 2009. At this time, some of the rebels crossed 

into Saudi territory, killing at least two border guards 
18

and apparently taking control of two or more Saudi 

border villages.57 These audacious actions provoked a 

strong Saudi response due to the Riyadh leadership’s 

anger over the aggressive violation of its sovereignty 

and the special concerns they maintain about hostile 

forces based in Yemen. Yemen has a 700-mile border 

with Saudi Arabia that is porous in many places and 

can be used by criminals, smugglers, terrorists, and 

insurgents. The easy availability of arms in Yemen is 

a further complication, and most of the illegal weapons and explosives smuggled into Saudi Arabia come 

from Yemen. The Saudis correspondingly watched 

the Sa’ada conflict carefully, and became especially 

concerned when Houthi forces crossed into Saudi territory. Houthi spokesmen stated that they had crossed 

into Saudi Arabia because Riyadh had allowed the 

Yemeni military to use their territory to wage war 

against them.58 In response, Riyadh unleashed military strikes against Houthi rebels with the permission 

of the Sana’a government. This engagement rapidly 

emerged as the largest combat operation that Saudi 

Arabia had undertaken since the 1991 Gulf War. Saudi 

tactics in this conflict involved the heavy use of artillery and airpower bombardment followed by the 

deployment of infantry in mopping up operations.59

The goal of this form of warfare was to destroy large 

elements of the Houthi forces with ordinance so that 

Saudi infantry could more easily defeat the residual 

military forces. Such tactics were only partially successful.

The Saudi army reported that at least 133 of its soldiers were killed in action, with an undisclosed number of others wounded or captured in the fighting.60

The Saudis discontinued their military involvement in 

the war in February 2010, when the Houthis withdrew 
19

from Saudi territory, a cease fire involving both the 

Yemeni and Saudi governments was established and 

all Saudi prisoners were returned.61 It remains possible that, at a time they feel most beneficial to them, 

the Houthis will seek to take advantage of the 2011 

Yemeni crisis in governance to renew their demands 

for regional autonomy should government authority 

continue to recede. 

The March 2011 Saudi-Led Intervention in Bahrain 

and the Iranian Response.

The island nation of Bahrain is currently an important center of Saudi-Iranian political conflict. This 

small state is ruled by a Sunni Royal family, and Sunni Muslims comprise the political elite of the nation, 

although Sunnis make up, at most, 35 percent of the 

population. Bahrain’s close proximity to Saudi Arabia 

has often caused Riyadh to pay special attention to it. 

The Saudis are continuously suspicious of Iranian intentions regarding Bahrain, due to its majority Shi’ite 

population. Bahrain is also connected to Saudi Arabia by the 16-mile King Fahd causeway, and political 

activity there can consequently echo throughout the 

kingdom. The Bahraini monarchy has consistently 

welcomed Saudi support including financial aid and 

does not display the independent streak that can be 

seen with some of the wealthier small states of the 

Gulf, most notably Qatar.

Bahrain has endured a series of difficult encounters with Iran under both the last Iranian shah and the 

Islamic Republic, dating back to the formal independence of the Bahraini state from protectorate status 

under the United Kingdom (UK) in 1971. At that time, 

the shah revived historical Iranian claims to Bahrain 
20

and announced that the island nation would be reunited with its Iranian homeland upon the British withdrawal. He also maintained that unification would 

be accomplished by force if necessary. Iranian claims 

were nevertheless weak and based on the temporary 

Persian occupation of Bahrain in the 18th century.62

Most leading members of the international community opposed such an annexation. The crisis was averted 

when the shah instead focused his attention on seizing 

three tiny but strategically important islands near the 

mouth of the Gulf. These islands were also claimed by 

the United Arab Emirates (UAE) which, like Bahrain, 

had achieved independence in 1971. Iran then backed 

away from its claim to Bahrain, but Manama’s problems with Iran did not end with the overthrow of the 

Iranian shah. In a burst of revolutionary exuberance, 

Ayatollah Rouhani, a leading spokesman of the Islamic Republic, briefly reasserted the Iranian claim to 

Bahrain shortly after the shah’s removal from power, 

although his irredentist statements received almost 

no official follow-up.63 Also, during this time frame, 

Iranian naval maneuvers near Bahraini waters led to a 

request from Manama for Saudi Arabian military support. Riyadh met the request and airlifted two infantry brigades for temporary duty in Bahrain.64

Even more ominously, in December 1981, 73 Bahrainis were arrested and accused of planning a coup 

against the Bahraini government. This plot was unexpectedly uncovered when a Dubai airport immigration 

official noticed various irregularities in the passports 

of some young men waiting for a flight to Bahrain. 

These individuals and others later identified as part 

of their network were charged with being members 

of the Tehran-based Islamic Front for the Liberation 

of Bahrain and coordinating their subversive actions 
21

with Iranian intelligence.65 Iran vehemently denied 

involvement in the effort to overthrow the government.66 The Bahraini and Saudi leaderships remained 

certain that Iran was responsible for the planned coup 

attempt, and the entire episode helped to move Bahrain and Saudi Arabia closer to Saddam Hussein in 

the then-ongoing Iran-Iraq War.67 Many Saudi and 

Bahraini Sunni leaders, including Bahraini King Hamid, remain deeply concerned about this history and 

harbor strong suspicions about Iranian designs for 

sovereignty over Bahrain.

Currently, almost one-third of Bahrain’s Shi’ites 

are Arabic-speakers of Persian origin, who are often 

particularly distrusted by the Sunni monarchy. Even 

prior to the Arab Spring unrest, violent confrontations 

have occurred between the communities. In a variety 

of instances after 1981, the government claims to have 

unmasked additional terrorist cells linked to Iran. The 

government has also conducted harsh periodic campaigns to root out any actual or potential resistance 

in the rural Shi’ite areas.68 The ability of the Iranians 

to influence the majority of Bahrain’s Shi’ite citizens 

is nevertheless in considerable doubt. Most Bahraini 

Shi’ites appear to be more interested in seeking spiritual guidance from the leading Shi’ite clergy in Iraq 

rather than in Iran.69 These clerical leaders, including Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, have a tradition of 

“quietism,” which calls for religious leaders to confine 

their statements to moral and religious issues and remain outside of politics. Ayatollah Sistani’s quietism 

nevertheless could not extend to the Bahraini revolt 

which began in February 2011, and he called upon the 

regime to stop attacking unarmed civilians.70
22

Beginning in February 2011 and continuing 

throughout the 2011 Bahraini mass demonstrations 

for expanded rights and democracy, the Saudi leadership solidly backed King Hamid, stating somewhat 

disingenuously that it stood “with all its power behind the state and people of Bahrain.”71 At this point, 

Bahraini protestors were focusing their attention on 

the need for political and economic reform, including 

efforts to address unemployment, anti-Shi’ite discrimination, severe poverty, and the powerlessness of the 

elected parliament.72 These demonstrators were mostly Shi’ite, although some sympathetic Sunnis were 

also involved with the movement at its early stages. 

Later, when some of the demonstrators began calling for the end of the Khalifa monarchy, virtually all 

Sunni support evaporated.73 In Riyadh, the leadership 

viewed either a constitutional monarchy or a republic 

as an anathema and feared that revolutionary actions 

in Bahrain would provide an unacceptable incitement 

for the Saudi population, as well as empowering an 

unpredictable Shi’ite majority that could easily collaborate with Iranian military and intelligence organizations.

As the crisis escalated, Bahraini authorities declared martial law and sought help from other Gulf 

monarchies in suppressing the unrest. On March 14, 

2011, Saudi Arabia sent around 1,000 troops to support the Bahraini government in its effort to suppress 

the overwhelmingly Shi’ite protesters. Around 500 

police officers were also sent from the UAE. Several 

other Arab Gulf States made token contributions to 

the effort, and all GCC members provided political 

backing to the operation, which was conducted under 

GCC aegis following a request from the Bahraini government. The Saudi and Emirati soldiers and police 
23

did not confront the demonstrators but instead took 

up routine duties such as infrastructure protection. 

This approach was implemented in order to release 

Bahrain troops from routine duties and allow them to 

be deployed to control the demonstrators. In an effort 

to justify the intervention, Saudi and Bahraini officials 

maintained that GCC forces had intervened to help 

protect the island country from an Iranian threat, not 

to become involved in Bahraini domestic politics.74

Tehran responded with fury to both the Saudi intervention in Bahrain and the GCC efforts to blame it for 

the Bahraini unrest, referring to the intervention as an 

occupation. Iranian leaders also demanded UN intervention to “stop the killing of the people of Bahrain.”75

On March 21, Bahraini King Hamid stated, “An 

external plot has been fomented for 20 to 30 years until the ground was right for subversive designs. . . . 

I announce today the failure of the fomented plot.”76

These charges were clearly directed primarily at Iran, 

but Manama also accused the Lebanese Shi’ite group 

Hezbollah of playing a role in fomenting civil unrest.77

The Bahraini government was particularly angered by 

a statement from Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan 

Nasrallah, in which he told Bahraini demonstrators 

that their blood would “defeat the tyrants.”78 The Manama government suspended flights from Bahrain to 

Lebanon and later accused Hezbollah of training Bahraini oppositionists at military camps in Lebanon and 

Iran.79 These charges remain unproven and farfetched. 

A departure date for the Saudi troops in Bahrain has 

not been announced, and it is possible that they will 

remain for some time. If Bahraini unrest escalates 

again, it is also likely that Riyadh will reinforce its 

troops there and even consider using them to assist 

Bahraini forces in suppressing riots and demonstra-
24

tions. Despite GCC fulminations, no clear evidence 

of an Iranian covert or military role in this unrest has 

been made public.

Following the Saudi-led intervention, Bahraini 

authorities unleashed a more comprehensive crackdown. The government moved to establish its own 

control of all mosques throughout the country, asserting that this was necessary to ensure clerics did not 

promote radical ideas.80 As part of this confrontation, 

the authorities destroyed at least 30 Shi’ite places of 

worship, including at least 16 mosques, which they 

claimed had been built on private or government 

land.81 Whatever the merits of these charges, they were 

not fairly adjudicated in court, and the destruction 

certainly contributed to the deepening of the sectarian divide. Bahraini Sunni hostility to Shi’ites became 

especially overt and ugly at this time. Throughout the 

Bahraini demonstrations and upheaval, Sunni leaders frequently accused Shi’ites of being loyal to Iran, 

suggesting that they immigrate to that country. Some 

moderate Shi’ites admitted that community relations 

are harmed by the rhetoric of Shi’ite extremists, as 

well as the history of discrimination the Shi’ite community has suffered. Many Bahraini Sunnis also claim 

that Iraq’s post-2003 history of internal Sunni-Shi’ite 

war and crisis suggests that democracy does not work 

in sectarian states such as their country.

There were other problematic ways in which the 

Bahraini government sought to consolidate its power 

after the Saudi-led intervention. In April 2011, the 

Bahraini government moved to have the Wafaq party 

and the Islamic Action Association, a smaller Shi’ite 

party, banned.82 Wafaq is the largest political party 

in Bahrain and held 18 of the 40 seats in the lower 

(elected) house of the Bahraini parliament when un-
25

rest broke out on February 14. While the government 

move to crush Shi’ite political representation was almost certainly viewed with approval by Saudis, the 

United States reacted with concern and defended the 

organizations as legitimate political parties that were 

struggling for reform by legal means.83 The Bahraini 

government quickly reconsidered its position due to 

sharp U.S. criticism, and movement towards outlawing these parties seems to have halted. In this regard, 

the Bahraini government continues to value good relations with the United States, even though its most 

important ally remains Saudi Arabia. It is probable 

that Bahrain’s monarchy would like some sort of 

counterweight to Saudi influence in order to prevent 

their further decline into complete satellite status. Additionally, the Bahrainis may value U.S. cooperation 

against Iran and view the presence of the U.S. Fifth 

Fleet headquarters in Bahrain as an important deterrent in limiting Iran’s military options against them.

Charges and countercharges over Bahrain also led 

to a substantial escalation of hostile rhetoric between 

Iran and the GCC over other issues. In April 2011, a 

meeting of the GCC foreign ministers issued a statement that the member states of the organization were 

“deeply worried about continuing Iranian meddling” 

and maintained that Tehran was “violating the sovereignty” of GCC states.84 Previously, Riyadh had responded to Iranian criticism of the Saudi-led intervention in Bahrain by stating that Iranian charges were 

“irresponsible” and contained “void allegations and 

blatant offence against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”85 Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Mohammad Sabah 

al-Sabah also called on Iran to change its behavior, 

but none of the Gulf States severed relations with Tehran.86 Bahrain has, on a variety of occasions, arrested 
26

individuals suspected of working with Iran. In one 

recent incident, Bahraini authorities placed two Iranians and one Bahraini on trial on charges of conducting espionage on behalf of the Iranian Revolutionary 

Guards Corps.87

Saudi Arabia and the Syrian-Iranian Relationship.

Iran’s closest Arab ally has been Syria, and Tehran 

has been watching the 2011 popular unrest in Syria with 

considerable concern. The scope of the Syrian unrest 

and bravery of the demonstrators is impressive, but 

at the time of this writing, it remains unclear whether 

the Assad regime will fall as a result of this unrest. The 

Alawite minority Islamic sect who comprise the Syrian leadership view remaining in power as essential to 

their future welfare and perhaps the future survival of 

many members of their community. Although members of the Alawite community comprise only around 

10 percent of the Syrian population, the repressive regime that they dominate has remained in power for 

40 years and under two presidential regimes. Elite 

units including Syria’s Republican Guard and the 4th 

Armored Division are manned almost exclusively by 

Alawite officers and soldiers. Intelligence and security 

forces are also Alawite-dominated, and non-elite units 

usually have Alawite officers placed in key positions 

throughout their organizational structure. All of these 

structural precautions make it exceedingly difficult to 

mount an effective rebellion against regime authority, 

although angry demonstrators are certainly showing a stunning level of courage in confronting regime 

forces, perhaps in the hope that they can incite Sunni 

members of the armed forces to commit mutiny and 

join them. 
27

In watching the ongoing struggle in Syria, the Tehran leadership likely understands that it has a great 

deal to lose. Iran and Syria have maintained good 

relations for over 3 decades, since the establishment 

of the Islamic Republic.88 After the triumph of the 

Iranian Revolution, Syria was one of only two Arab 

states that provided diplomatic and rhetorical support 

for Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War (the other being 

Colonel Qadhafi’s Libya).89 The animosity that both 

Iran and Syria held for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq helped 

to maintain this alignment, despite the very different 

political systems that these countries maintain. Syria, 

as a secular Ba’athist state, differed sharply in governmental structure from the Islamic Republic. Yet, the 

good relations between these states lasted beyond the 

Iran-Iraq War for a number of reasons. One particularly important factor in bolstering the ongoing relationship was Iran’s professed willingness to provide support for Syria in any future confrontation with Israel. 

Both states are also deeply distrustful of the United 

States. During the presidency of George W. Bush, Iran 

and Syria were pushed together by the unrelenting 

hostility of the United States toward both countries. 

While only Iran was designated an “Axis of Evil” 

state, Damascus was openly worried that the U.S.-led 

invasion of Iraq might be followed by an invasion of 

Syria if Iraq could be quickly pacified and turned over 

to a pro-Western government, as the Bush administration hoped to do.90 Although such Syrian concern 

now appears to have been unfounded, it did reflect 

the abysmal state of U.S.-Syrian relations at that time. 

While U.S.-Syrian relations improved slightly during 

the administration of President Obama, they remained 

poor due to Syrian unwillingness to reduce its backing 

of Hamas and Hezbollah (despite promises that they 
28

would significantly reduce such support).91 Later, relations with Washington declined even further due to 

U.S. sympathy for demonstrators struggling against 

the brutal repression of the Assad regime.

In recent years, the Syrians and the Iranians have 

called themselves, along with Hamas and Hezbollah, 

“the axis of resistance,” referring to the shared willingness of these countries and organizations to confront 

Israel. The Iranians often seem to view themselves as 

the natural leaders of this coalition, while Damascus 

resists Tehran’s efforts to push it into a junior partnership in this relationship. This struggle has sometimes 

been difficult since Iran is an important source of military aid for the Syrians, particularly with regard to 

rocket and missile technology. Tehran has also sought 

to help deter future Israeli attacks against Syria. At a 

press conference in Damascus, Iranian Vice President 

Mohammad Irda Rahimi stated that Iran would fight 

beside Syria against any aggression by Israel.92 Damascus, by contrast, appears to have less to offer to Tehran. The chief value of the Syrian relationship to Iran 

is providing it with the logistical support that allows 

Tehran to support its allies in Lebanon. Since Hezbollah is a Syrian ally as well, it is difficult to maintain 

that Syria is making any sort of sacrifice to support 

the Iranians in this way. Additionally, Iran’s value as 

an ally against Israel has probably diminished as the 

Assad regime has become increasingly aware that Israeli leaders doubt that regime change in Syria will 

enhance Israeli security. Interestingly, Israelis appear 

divided in their assessment of the implications of Syrian unrest for their country. While generally detesting 

the Damascus regime, the Israelis are also concerned 

about an energized and equally anti-Israel post-Assad 

regime replacing a decrepit Ba’athist government.93
29

The key questions for many Israelis may be whether 

a democratic revolution in Syria can produce a liberal 

regime, and, more importantly, could revolution in 

Syria help reignite revolutionary turmoil in Iran, such 

as what occurred in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 

election.

As noted, Syrian leaders have sometimes believed 

that their country is or could become the junior partner 

in the relationship with Iran. This concern may be one 

of a number of reasons for Syria to establish good or at 

least acceptable relations with other regional powers. 

In pursuing this effort to gain a variety of allies, Damascus established dramatically improved relations 

with Turkey prior to the Arab Spring, although these 

relations then collapsed as Ankara became increasingly critical of escalating Syrian repression in 2011.94 It is 

also a serious oversimplification to suggest that Syria 

has automatically sided with Iran on all major issues. 

In Iraqi politics, the Assad regime has consistently 

backed secular leader Ayad Allawi, and Damascus 

also maintains a friendly relationship with some deposed Iraqi Ba’athists despised by Tehran.95 Despite 

this preference, the Iraqi government, including many 

of its Shi’ite leaders, have been generally supportive 

of the Syrian government throughout the popular uprising against it.96 The chief reason for this support appears to be a fear among Iraqi Shi’ites that Assad will 

be succeeded by a radical Sunni regime. Such a regime 

might be inclined to support rebellious Sunni tribes 

hostile to Baghdad’s Shi’ite-dominated government. 

The Syrians have also shown independence from Tehran on issues related to Yemen. As noted earlier, Saudi 

Arabia and Iran maintained deeply opposing policies 

on Yemen’s Houthi rebellion, but, at least rhetorically, 

Damascus has sided with Saudi Arabia.97 The Syrians 
30

further supported the Saudi military intervention in 

Bahrain in March 2011 in an especially vivid break 

with Tehran.98

As a monarchy, Saudi Arabia has maintained a 

long tradition of distrust towards Syria, which defines 

itself as a republican, and sometimes a revolutionary 

regime. While the Saudis have been willing to work 

with Syria on occasion, they do not have much in 

common with the Syrian state or government beyond 

Arabism. Since 1970, Syria has also been led by strong 

Alawite presidents from the Assad family. Alawites 

are usually viewed as a subgroup of Shi’ite Muslims 

that are even further from orthodox Sunni practices 

and beliefs than the Twelver Shi’ites found in Iran, 

Iraq, and Lebanon. Nevertheless, the Saudi approach 

of seeking to bribe and co-opt potential adversaries 

has been applied to Syria with considerable success on 

occasion, and sometimes the two nations have found 

the basis for serious cooperation. The most notable example of this approach may have been the 1990 Gulf 

crisis, when Damascus sent an armored division and 

supporting troops (totaling 300 tanks and 17,000 personnel) to Saudi Arabia to participate in the 1990-91 

international coalition opposing Saddam Hussein’s 

invasion of Kuwait.99

Saudi-Syrian relations took a dramatic turn for the 

worse on February 14, 2005, when former Lebanese 

Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and eight of his aides died 

after a massive bomb placed in his car detonated as 

his motorcade drove home from parliament along 

Beirut’s seafront road. In the immediate aftermath of 

the attack, it was almost universally assumed that the 

bombing was the work of the Syrian intelligence services. Saudi Arabia’s special relationship with Hariri 

made his murder an important geostrategic setback, 
31

as well as an act of savagery directed against someone 

who was well-known and liked by the Saudi leadership. In the aftermath of the attack, Saudi Arabia renewed its support for UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (September 2, 2004) which required Syria 

to withdraw its military forces from Lebanon and 

backed U.S. diplomatic efforts to remove the Syrian 

military and intelligence services from Lebanon.100

These efforts led to the April 2005 removal of Syrian 

forces from Lebanon, where they had been stationed 

since the mid-1970s. 

At some point, the Saudis were able to overcome 

their hostility towards the Syrian regime, and sought 

to work with Damascus in an effort to help salvage 

a deteriorating situation in Lebanon involving political polarization aggravated by Hariri’s assassination. 

Riyadh may also have been interested in rolling back 

Iranian influence in both Syria and Lebanon, while 

Damascus saw value in Saudi ties to avoid overdependence on Iran. In January 2010, Prince Saud stated that 

“If the situation reaches separation or division of Lebanon, this would mean the end of Lebanon as a model 

of peaceful coexistence between religions, ethnicities 

and different groups.”101 He went on to describe such 

an outcome as “a loss for the Arab nation.”102 On July 

30, 2010, Assad and Saudi King Abdullah made a joint 

visit to Beirut to help calm the situation and defuse 

tensions created by the feared reaction to the expected 

indictment of Hezbollah members for the murder of 

former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the UN Special 

Tribunal on Lebanon (STL).103 Surprisingly, the STL 

did not hold Syria directly responsible for Hariri’s 

murder, and instead issued arrest warrants for four 

Lebanese suspects who are Hezbollah members. Hezbollah reacted with fury to the indictment while pro-
32

Hariri groups demanded Lebanese cooperation with 

the STL. This situation has yet to be resolved, although 

the indicted individuals have disappeared from public view and may have fled to Iran.

More recently, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have 

needed to consider how Syrian unrest impacts upon 

their interests and how to address these new developments. Tehran clearly has the most to lose if the Assad 

regime is overthrown, and it is mostly standing by its 

Syrian ally.104 Various U.S. and European leaders including representatives of the U.S. State Department 

and European Union (EU) have accused the Iranians 

of helping Syria repress anti-regime demonstrators, 

although few details of such activities have been given 

in public.105 Journalistic sources suggest that Iran has 

provided Syria with equipment, planning advice, and 

technical expertise related to breaking up efforts to organize anti-government protests.106 Some of this support may be quite useful and allow the Syrian security 

forces to learn from Iranian experiences in suppressing massive unrest in their country following the 2009 

elections. Syrian demonstrators have also accused Iran 

of providing snipers to fire on the crowds in Syria, but 

this seems unlikely. The Syrian regime would not lack 

committed marksmen to perform this function, and 

would have little need to call upon foreigners to do so. 

Iran will probably be the last country to abandon 

the Syrian regime for a variety of reasons, including 

fear of a Sunni-led successor government that will 

be more oriented towards working with other Arab 

states rather than with Iran. Tehran’s leaders are also 

concerned about the potential emergence of a proAmerican government in Damascus.107 Either of these 

types of successor government may also seek a complete break from the previous relationship with Teh-
33

ran. Moreover, if a new Syrian government discontinued its relationship with Iran, Tehran would lose a 

great deal of its capability to project power into Lebanon and perhaps the Palestinian territories, a serious 

setback for Iranian efforts to portray their country as 

a regional leader.

The uprising in Syria has also introduced a new 

dimension into Saudi views about Syria, which has 

led to a more hardline approach. This new toughness 

was clear when Saudi King Abdullah demanded “an 

end to the killing machine and the bloodshed” that 

the Syrian regime had unleashed against its population.108 The Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Bahrainis also withdrew their ambassadors to Damascus in early August 

2011 to protest Assad regime policies.109 The previous 

détente with Damascus was significant, but Riyadh 

never viewed the Syrian regime as an ally, and could 

be expected to take some pleasure in seeing Tehran 

lose its most important Arab partner should this regime fall. Conversely, Riyadh almost certainly would 

not view the situation in Syria as an unqualified Saudi 

victory, even if the Assad regime was overthrown 

and replaced by an anti-Iranian government.110 The 

Saudi leadership remains ultra-conservative, and correspondingly takes a dim view of both revolutionary 

turmoil and Arab democracy. A strong, vibrant Syrian 

democracy would at least be a serious inconvenience 

for Riyadh, and it could emerge as a real challenge to 

the Middle Eastern status quo. 

Saudi-Iranian Competition in the Palestinian 

Territories and Lebanon.

Evaluations of Saudi Arabian attitudes and policies towards the Palestinian issue and the Middle East 
34

Peace Process vary widely. Clearly, Riyadh is a strong 

supporter of Palestinian national rights and a sharp 

and frequent critic of Israel. Additionally, the Saudis 

have strongly supported Palestinian Muslim claims 

to East Jerusalem and are hostile to Israeli efforts to 

expand their presence in the old city. Critics of Saudi 

foreign policy sometimes charge that Riyadh tolerates 

or supports Palestinian terrorist activities and these 

concerns are examined later in this monograph. Despite the blame directed against it, a variety of observers consider the Saudi government to be moderate, or 

at least to have a moderate side on Arab-Israeli issues. 

The strongest evidence for this viewpoint is the Saudi 

Arabian Peace Plan adopted by the Arab League at a 

March 2002 summit conference in Beirut.111 The proposal offers comprehensive recognition of Israel by all 

Arab League states in exchange for the return of all 

territories captured in the June 1967 War. Many Israeli 

political leaders, including Defense Minister Ehud 

Barak and Kadima party leader Tzipi Livni, have 

stated that they see many positive aspects to the Plan, 

although they refuse to accept it on a take-it-or-leaveit basis.112 While Riyadh has not always been enthusiastic about the potential for progress in the peace process, Saudi leaders also fear that its complete collapse 

will enhance Iranian regional power at their expense. 

Under such conditions, the hard line approach of the 

Iranians would appear vindicated to many Arabs, 

while any efforts to negotiate peace will appear to be 

acquiescing to Israeli delaying tactics used to consolidate control of the Palestinian territories. 

Saudi Arabia has made numerous efforts to help 

the Palestinians and to use its financial resources and 

political influence on their behalf. Riyadh maintains 

normal political relations with both of the major Pales-
35

tinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, the latter of 

which has been designated as a terrorist organization 

by the United States. In this regard, the Saudi government has transferred funds directly to a variety of Palestinian organizations and causes over a considerable 

period of time. A significant amount of this money has 

been provided to the Palestinian Authority in the West 

Bank, which is controlled by Fatah and has also been 

supported by the United States.113 Financial relations 

with Hamas are more controversial and murky. The 

Saudi government has condemned terrorist actions 

by Hamas against the Israelis, but King Abdullah has 

also called Israeli military strikes into the Gaza Strip 

acts of genocide against the Palestinians.114 Additionally, the Saudi government strongly maintains that it 

does not provide money directly to Hamas, although 

in the early 2000s, Saudi private money was estimated 

to be around half of the Hamas operating budget.115

Since that time, both Israeli and American sources 

have indicated that private Saudi money flowing to 

Hamas has diminished or even largely dried up.116

These developments may be the result of international 

pressure on Riyadh, or, more likely, Saudi discomfort 

that Hamas has leaned so dramatically towards Iran. 

It is also possible that at least some private Saudi donors have become more discrete. 

 Iran has approached the Palestinian problem very 

differently. Instead of presenting formulas for peace, 

Tehran has attempted to portray itself as the leading 

militant power supporting Palestinian rights and opposing Israel through a variety of means, including 

supplying weapons and funding to Palestinian Islamic militants. This leadership role is important to Tehran as a way of consolidating support for the regime 

internally and elevating its regional role and standing 
36

among anti-Israeli publics throughout the region. At 

present, Iran has clearly become the leading financial 

patron for Hamas. Hamas now depends so heavily on 

Iran that it is often accused of being a proxy. Fatah 

leaders have stated that Iran seeks to use Hamas to 

impose its own agenda on the Palestinian people.117

Iran’s interest in providing weapons to Palestinian groups is well established. One of the most dramatic incidents involving Iranian-Palestinian relations occurred on January 3, 2002, when the Israelis 

captured the Palestinian owned-freighter Karine A. In 

late 2001, the Karine A had stopped off at an island 

near the Iranian coast where the ship was loaded with 

arms, including Katyusha rockets, mortars, Kalashnikov rifles, ammunition, anti-tank weapons, plastic 

explosives, and other weapons, which the Israelis 

maintained were to be provided to the Palestinian 

Authority (rather than Hamas).118 While Iran has often 

been hostile to the Palestinian Authority, Tehran was 

interested in supporting and militarizing the al Aqsa 

Intifada, a Palestinian revolt against Israeli authority 

that broke out in September 2000. This interest in taking advantage of unfolding events seems to have been 

Tehran’s primary motivation in seeking to provide 

weapons. Yassir Arafat, then the leader of the Palestinian Authority, denied any link to the ship, although 

he later became much more equivocal about the issue.119 If Iran hoped to harm the peace process, it could 

hardly have staged a more effective undertaking. The 

capture of the Karine A also had a catastrophic impact 

on Israeli-Palestinian relations and undermined U.S. 

ties with the Palestine Authority. Unfortunately for 

Tehran, the Karine A incident also contributed to U.S. 

President George W. Bush’s belief that Iran was an irredeemable rogue state. In his January 29, 2002, State 
37

of the Union Address, President Bush identified Iran, 

Iraq, and North Korea as part of an “axis of evil.”

Since the Karine A’s capture, the success of Iranian 

smuggling efforts have sometimes been difficult to 

gauge, but a significant number of weapons have been 

smuggled over time to Gaza through tunnels from 

Egypt. The Israelis believe that many of the weapons 

and explosives provided in this way originate with 

the Iranians.120 More dramatically, the Israelis seized 

an additional merchant ship in March 2011, which 

they reported to be loaded with missile systems as 

well as operating manuals in Farsi.121 Israeli sources 

stated that the Iranian plan was to have these weapons offloaded in Egypt and then attempt to infiltrate 

them to Gaza through the tunnels. The Israelis maintain that there has been a substantial increase in problems along the Egyptian border since the January 2011 

overthrow of President Mubarak.122 Iran may seek to 

take advantage of this situation. 

The Iranian leadership has also made a number 

of flamboyant but transparently hollow promises to 

highlight its opposition to Israel and its support of the 

Palestinians in response to international headlines. 

One such incident occurred after a Turkish aid ship 

was intercepted in June 2010 by the Israeli Navy, creating a major international incident including nine 

Turkish deaths.123 In the aftermath of the strike, a representative of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 

stated that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps would 

be willing to provide naval units to escort ships bringing supplies to Gaza in the future even though Iran’s 

ability to implement this policy was nonexistent.124 It 

is difficult to believe that even the most hard line Iranian leader believes that such actions would turn out 

well for them, and these statements are probably best 

understood as propagandistic bombast. 
38

Elsewhere in the Levant, Iran often seems to dominate the rivalry with Saudi Arabia in Lebanon. Lebanon is a small, weak state influenced by a variety of 

countries from both within the region and globally. 

In recent years, the most important powers influencing Lebanon have been Syria, Iran, the United States, 

Israel, and Saudi Arabia. In this struggle, Iran has 

some clear advantages in the competition for influence, the most important of which are its strong ties to 

the Lebanese political organization Hezbollah, which 

maintains its own militia and is known to practice terrorism.125 Hezbollah is often identified in the West as 

a terrorist organization, but it is also one of the most 

powerful political organizations in Lebanese politics. 

Hezbollah operates an extensive welfare and educational network for Lebanese Shi’ites who are expected to reward the organization with their loyalty and 

support. Hezbollah also has its own television station 

(al-Manar television) and has consistently maintained 

representatives in the parliament and cabinet. Perhaps 

most importantly, Hezbollah is the only Lebanese 

political organization that currently retains a militia 

from the civil war era. Other political parties that used 

armed axillaries in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-90) 

have since disbanded them under the September 1989 

Taif Agreement that ended that conflict. Hezbollah’s 

decision to retain a military arm is often considered 

a problem by other Lebanese, although Hezbollah 

members and the Iranians justify such actions as a deterrent to Israeli military action.126

Iranian influence over Hezbollah is maintained 

through lavish financial and material aid, usually funneled into Lebanon through Syria.127 Hezbollah may 

also be growing in its role as a strategic asset for Iran. 

In October 2010, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah 
39

claimed that his organization had increased its missile 

stocks to around 40,000 rockets and missiles, while in 

the 2006 War it only had around 14,000 to 20,000, of 

which at least 14,000 were short-range Katyusha rockets.128 In April 2010, Israeli President Shimon Peres 

charged that Syria was providing SCUD missiles to 

Hezbollah, which would have been done in coordination with Iran. Peres was the first of a number of 

Israeli officials to make such charges, with U.S. journalistic sources reporting that Hezbollah has up to 10 

SCUD-D missiles.129 The International Crisis Group 

also suggested that Israel may have come close to attacking these weapons, according to interviews they 

conducted with Israeli officials.130 Hezbollah officials 

refuse to discuss whether or not they had obtained 

such systems or anti-aircraft missiles capable of seriously increasing the threat to Israeli aircraft in a future 

attack.131 As long as these weapons continue to exist, 

Iran will have the ability to demand that Hezbollah 

unleash them in any future Israeli-Iranian conflict, 

particularly an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. 

Saudi Arabia became especially important in Lebanese politics after it helped broker the 1989 Taif Accords, which ended the Lebanese Civil War. Following the Taif Accords, Saudi Arabia also began playing 

a major role in Lebanese reconstruction. In 1992, proSaudi Lebanese billionaire Rafiq al-Hariri became 

prime minister as a result of the Taif Accords leading 

to a clear boost of Saudi influence within Lebanon and 

a strong potential for Saudi involvement in economic 

rebuilding. Hariri, a Sunni Muslim who made his vast 

fortune in Saudi Arabia, quickly overshadowed the 

traditional Sunni elite in Lebanon because of his financial power and his close relationship with the Saudi 
40

leadership. According to Beirut’s Daily Star editor, 

Michael Young, it was often difficult to discern where 

Hariri’s personal fortune ended and Saudi funding 

began when being directed at Lebanese investments, 

patronage, and aid networks.132 In Young’s estimation, Hariri was something of a front man for Saudi 

interests in Lebanon.133 He served as prime minister 

from 1992-98 and again from 2000-04. 

The July-August 2006 Israeli military intervention 

into Lebanon against Hezbollah is sometimes considered to have created opportunities for Tehran since 

Israeli leaders, by their own admission, were deeply 

dissatisfied with the outcome of that intervention.134

Israel’s poorly-planned 33-day war against Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 failed to meet its objectives 

and dramatically elevated the status and reputation 

of Hezbollah and its Iranian supporters due to the 

spirited resistance the Lebanese Shi’ite fighters displayed. Even more dramatically, Hezbollah was able 

to strike back against the Israelis using large numbers 

of Katyusha rockets and some longer-range missiles. 

During the 2006 Lebanon war, Saudi officials and clerics were often critical of Hezbollah’s adventurism for 

kidnapping two Israeli soldiers and thereby igniting 

the conflict.135 Saudi caution was not always appreciated by Arab publics watching these events unfold, 

and at least initially many Arab observers chose to embrace the narrative of brave resistance fighters struggling against Israel’s high technology war machine. 

According to this interpretation, Iran was viewed as 

helping maintain the dignity of the Arab resistance, 

while Saudi Arabia was blaming them for inciting the 

Israeli strike. This narrative began to fade over time 

as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was increasingly blamed for the 1,100 Lebanese deaths in the war 
41

and the $3-5 billion worth of damage to the Lebanese 

economy include the destruction of 10,000 homes.136

In the aftermath of the 2006 war, the struggle 

between Iran and Saudi Arabia and their Lebanese 

clients continued. In the deeply fragmented environment of Lebanese politics, different groups often 

view Iranian involvement in their country in starkly 

contrasting ways. Large numbers of people within 

Lebanon’s Shi’ite community consider Iran to be an 

important ally that has extended considerable support to the Lebanese in resisting what they define as 

Israeli aggression. The March 8 Movement, a political 

coalition led by Hezbollah, is an important leader of 

this trend, which Tehran finds to be of considerable 

value. Iranian President Ahmadinejad made his first 

state visit to Lebanon in October 2010, at a time of escalating tension between Hezbollah and its rivals, as a 

way of highlighting Iranian-Hezbollah ties. The 2-day 

visit involved a trip to the southern part of the country near the Israeli border, where Iran has also built a 

number of roads.137 The Iranian president viewed the 

visit as highly successful and was mobbed by adoring 

crowds.138

Various other groups within Lebanon view Iran 

as an intruder and meddler in Lebanese politics, and 

seek the support of Saudi Arabia as a counterweight to 

Tehran, at least in the realm of financial aid. The group 

most closely identified with this outlook is the March 

14 Movement, which includes a variety of important 

political leaders usually drawn from the Christian and 

Sunni Muslim communities. Some March 14 Movement officials are quite blunt about their assessment of 

the relationship with Iran. Former Prime Minister Saad 

Hariri, the leader of the Future Movement and son of 

Rafiq Hariri, went so far as to state, “We in Lebanon 
42

do not accept to be an Iranian protectorate.”139 He then 

went on to say that, “Saudi Arabia is the biggest and 

first investor in Lebanon’s stability. This investment 

is priceless. It is the basis for Lebanon’s progress and 

economic growth.”140 Such statements were further 

emphasized by a variety of other pro-Saudi politicians, 

including former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who 

also noted that Hezbollah ignored the role of Saudi 

aid in rebuilding Lebanon after the 2006 war.141 Other 

leaders of the Lebanese Future Movement’s Parliamentary bloc have claimed that Saudi Arabia provided tremendous support to Lebanon, surpassing that of 

Iran after the 2006 war, including providing funds for 

the construction of 55,200 residential units. These statistics were quoted in an angry debate in which Future 

Movement leaders strongly criticized Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah for thanking Iran, but not Saudi 

Arabia, for post-war assistance.142 The importance of 

Iran in Lebanese politics has nevertheless also been 

acknowledged by moderates in the Lebanese government who are known to distrust Tehran. In November 

2010, then-Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri made 

an official visit to Tehran in what was described as an 

effort to strengthen the economic and political ties between the two countries.143 Iran’s influence is simply 

too sweeping for any Lebanese Prime Minister to disregard while in office. 

Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s government collapsed in January 2011 when Hezbollah cabinet members and their allies resigned en mass in order to bring 

the government down. They did this over disagreements about whether or not to cooperate with the UN 

Special Tribunal on Lebanon (STL) investigating the 

murder of Rafiq Hariri in 2005. The STL was then on 

the verge of indicting four members of Hezbollah.144
43

After Hariri’s ouster, a new Lebanese government 

was not assembled until 5 months later, when billionaire and former Prime Minister Najib Mikati was 

able to gain that post with Hezbollah backing.145 The 

new cabinet was dominated by Hezbollah and its allies.146 Under these circumstances, the Saudi Arabian 

and Sunni Lebanese communities’ hopes for obtaining some kind of justice in the murder of Rafiq Hariri 

suffered a considerable setback. Mikati, for his part, 

strongly maintained that he is an independent politician and not a Hezbollah stooge.147 Despite these assurances, his ministers have been widely indentified 

as comprising one of the most pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian cabinets in Lebanese history, and the new Prime 

Minister is sometimes described as a close friend of 

Syrian President Bashar Assad.148

Unsurprisingly, the Mikati government has directed no serious criticism at Syria’s brutal repression of demonstrators, while the Future Movement 

has denounced the Syrian actions as “crimes against 

humanity.”149 Future Movement leader Saad Hariri 

has called on the Mikati government to denounce the 

“open massacre.”150 On one particularly memorable 

occasion, he presented his stance as following the 

lead of Saudi King Abdullah’s decision to denounce 

Syrian actions and recall the Saudi Ambassador in 

Damascus. Hariri stated, “There is no doubt that the 

historic speech yesterday of the Custodian of the Two 

Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz to Syria 

and its people came at a pivotal moment to crown the 

Arab stance with an honest and firm vision which issues a warning against the risks of continued violence, 

bloodshed, and chaos.”151

The establishment of the Mikati government 

created problems for the United States, which has 
44

previously designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and took a dim view of their newfound 

prominence within the Lebanese government. In 2010, 

Lebanon received around $100 million in U.S. military 

aid to help strengthen its security forces. The United 

States provided up to $800 million in funding for 

military and law enforcement programs since the end 

of 2006.152 Following the establishment of the Mikati 

government, some U.S. policymakers raised questions 

about continuing this aid.153 In response, the Iranian 

government announced that it was willing to replace 

the United States as Lebanon’s chief source of military 

aid. This change is unlikely, as any serious attempt to 

realign defense procurement to Iran would create a 

severe domestic and international crisis. 154 Saudi Arabia continues to back the Lebanese opposition, particularly the leadership of Lebanon’s Sunni Muslim 

community. 

The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Iraq.

Iraq is of central concern to both Iran and Saudi 

Arabia, and prior to 2003 mutual hostility to the Saddam Hussein regime was one of the chief anxieties 

that these countries shared. Both Riyadh and Tehran 

have contended with an unfriendly Iraq at important 

points in their history, and both nations are concerned 

about the possible emergence of a hostile regime in 

Baghdad. Since Saddam’s ousting, this problem has 

appeared more difficult for Riyadh than Tehran. Iran 

has significantly improved its relations with Iraq under a series of post-Saddam Shi’ite dominated governments, while Saudi Arabia has maintained fairly 

strained relations with many Iraqi leaders including 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. There is also the question of oil. Iraq is now beginning a serious effort to 
45

work with international oil companies to rebuild its 

oil infrastructure in a way that may allow it to emerge 

as a leading oil exporter.155 This development could 

weaken Riyadh’s regional and international influence 

over the world oil market, but would probably not be 

a problem for Iran since Tehran and Baghdad have 

similar concerns regarding oil. More ominously, the 

Saudis are certainly worried that any establishment 

of a Shi’ite-dominated government in Baghdad could 

create the conditions under which Iraq and Iran could 

join forces to organize against them in a diplomatic 

propaganda, and perhaps subversion effort. Even a 

temporary alliance of this sort could be potentially 

devastating for the advancement of Saudi interests 

throughout the region.

Iranian leaders, despite their current influence in 

Baghdad, remain aware that they have more to fear 

from a hostile re-energized Iraq than Saudi Arabia if 

relations sour. The legacy of the 8-year Iran-Iraq War, 

in which hundreds of thousands of people were killed 

on both sides, is particularly sobering in this regard. 

The presence of hundreds of thousands of disabled 

war veterans (janbazan) within Iranian society makes 

the war’s consequences difficult to forget.156 More 

tellingly, while often judged as a stalemate, the war 

ended on terms significantly more favorable to Baghdad than Tehran. As the war entered its final phases, 

the Iranians agreed to a cease-fire only after offensive 

operations no longer seemed possible for them. At the 

war’s conclusion, Iraq gained control of disputed territory, and the border with Iran was defined in a way 

that reflected Iraqi interests.157 Several years later, Iran 

watched with interest as Iraq was comprehensively defeated in Operation DESERT STORM in conventional 

combat. While Iranian leaders were delighted to see 
46

Saddam defeated, it was troubling to watch U.S. forces 

easily slice through Iraqi military forces that they had 

been unable to defeat in 8 years of fighting. Currently, 

the Iranians with their own aging conventional weapons and equipment would not wish to be at war with 

an Iraq armed with Western military technology.158

While Iran has spent considerable sums on its missile 

forces and nuclear enrichment program, it has badly 

neglected its conventional forces, which have not 

been modernized much since the Iran-Iraq War and 

are obsolete by Western standards.159 Moreover, even 

if Iran chose to invest in modernizing its conventional 

forces, this would probably be impossible because of 

UN sanctions, which impose a comprehensive arms 

embargo on Iran due to its undeclared nuclear activities.160 The only country that is violating this embargo 

in any clear way is North Korea, which cannot serve 

as a major military patron for conventional arms.161

The Iranians are further concerned about the future of a U.S. military presence in Iraq, which Tehran 

views as providing Washington with increased conventional options against them. Even a limited or temporary U.S. Navy or Air Force presence that does not 

involve ground combat troops would be problematic 

for the Iranians. Additionally, Tehran cannot be comfortable with the prospect of a well-armed Iraq with 

continuing access to U.S. military technology unless 

its leadership believes that Iraq will emerge as a permanent ally, which can hardly be taken for granted. 

Currently, the Iraqi Army remains dominated by nonmechanized infantry forces, but Baghdad is also seeking to acquire expanded armored forces and a modern 

air force, including F-16 fighter aircraft.162 The Iranian 

Air Force, which is based on older Russian/Soviet and 

Chinese aircraft, could never compete with a force 
47

equipped with modern Western-supplied aircraft. 

Some Iraqi politicians are also calling for a large and 

well-equipped military, which they view as a complement to Iraq’s role as an important regional power, 

and such comments only increase Iranian unease.163

The dangers presented to Iran by Iraqi conventional 

forces will naturally be mitigated if Iran crosses the 

nuclear threshold, but Iran may not be able to use 

nuclear weapons without provoking a response from 

the United States.164

Riyadh is also known to have maintained serious 

reservations about the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 

to oust Saddam Hussein, although these concerns 

were not based on a fear of expanding U.S. regional 

influence. While the Saudis were deeply concerned 

about Saddam Hussein when he was at the height of 

his strength and aggressiveness shortly after the IranIraq War, these fears receded following Iraq’s massive 

military defeat in 1991 and the imposition of postwar military sanctions that made it difficult for Iraq 

to modernize and even perform proper maintenance 

on its weapons and military equipment. Concurrently, the Riyadh leadership understood that a friendly 

government in either a democratic or undemocratic 

Shi’ite-led Iraq would always be elusive. One of Saudi 

Arabia’s greatest fears after Saddam’s 1991 defeat was 

the potential emergence of an energized, anti-Saudi 

Shi’ite regime in Iraq led by pro-Iranian politicians. 

After Operation DESERT STORM ended, Riyadh appears to have viewed Saddam as a crippled and isolated Sunni strongman who was treated with loathing 

by much of the world and placed under ongoing sanctions. As such, his capacity to threaten Saudi Arabia 

was severely limited in ways that would not constrain 

a hostile successor.
48

Tehran has been significantly more active in attempting to gain influence in Iraq than Riyadh has 

since 2003, in part because it was especially alarmed 

by the sudden rise of U.S. military power and influence in its neighboring states of Iraq and Afghanistan.165 This Iranian effort has involved diplomacy, 

economic investment, covert action, and cultivating 

Iranian clients within the Iraqi political system including the leadership of armed militias. This approach 

has produced results, and Iran has emerged as a major 

power in domestic Iraqi politics. Iraq’s Prime Minister 

Maliki, who is drawing on a Shi’ite domestic power 

base, is reluctant to offend Tehran, and has stated that 

strategic ties between the two nations serve the interest of both.166 He also hosted Iranian President Ahmadinejad on an official visit to Baghdad in March 2008. 

This was the first visit of a serving Iranian president to 

Iraq. In another indication of Iranian influence, Tehran 

has helped to broker important agreements between 

competing Iraqi Shi’ite factions, including helping to 

establish a 2010 working relationship between Maliki 

and populist leader Muqtada al-Sadr to help them put 

together a governing Shi’ite-led coalition in the Iraqi 

parliament.167 Maliki and Sadr have detested each 

other since at least March 2008, when Maliki ordered 

the Iraqi army to move against Sadr’s followers in 

Basra in Operation CHARGE OF KNIGHTS. This confrontation resulted in a number of deaths and was a 

substantial setback to Sadr’s bid for political influence 

in Iraq. It is difficult to imagine that these two sides 

could have reached agreement without Iranian intercession.168 The Iranians view the Sadr Movement’s influence within the Iraqi government as useful, despite 

its leader’s erratic behavior, because Sadr is so passionately committed to a speedy withdrawal of all U.S. 
49

forces from that country. He could also reasonably be 

expected to oppose all future strategic ties between 

the United States and Iraq, and is currently the leading Iraqi politician demanding a full U.S. withdrawal 

from Iraq without leaving any residual force.169

 One of the most troubling ways in which Iran 

exerts its influence in Iraq is through various Shi’ite 

militia organizations, which engage in terrorism and 

military strikes against U.S. troops and Iraqis opposed 

to these forces. These pro-Iranian militias are sometimes called Special Groups. Iran has considerable 

influence with them and provides weapons and training to some of these forces through the elite Iranian 

Revolutionary Guards Corps’ al-Quds Force.170 In the 

years immediately following Saddam’s removal from 

power, the Iranians worked closely with a number of 

Shi’ite Iraqi political parties and movements, including the Sadr Movement. This movement maintained 

its own militia, the Mahdi Army (Jaysh al Mahdi), which 

received financial aid and military supplies from Tehran. Around 2007, the Iranians appear to have de-emphasized their support for the Mahdi Army due to its 

reckless behavior and the inability of anyone to control it. Later, in 2008, Sadr disavowed violence against 

other Iraqis and ordered the Mahdi Army to disarm 

and become a “humanitarian group.”171 At the present time, Sadr remains in Iran and controls another 

militia organization, the Promised Day Brigade. The 

Promised Day Brigade, which has a strength of 5,000 

men, is a mere shadow of the Mahdi Army, which, at 

its peak strength, included 60,000 militiamen.172

Despite his problems, Muqtada al-Sadr remains an 

important Iraqi political and militia leader. He controls 

around 40 seats in the 325-member Iraqi parliament 

and revels in his role as an uncompromising politi-
50

cal leader opposing any U.S. military presence in Iraq 

after December 2011. To underscore his commitment, 

Sadr has issued a number of warnings that any U.S. 

troops remaining in Iraq as trainers past the December 

2011 deadline for their withdrawal will become targets 

for his militia forces.173 This threat was reiterated following the August 2011 Iraqi government announcement that it would open talks with the United States 

about some U.S. troops remaining as trainers and subsequent indications of progress in these talks.174 Sadr 

also stated that, “[the Iraqi] government which agrees 

to them staying, even if it is for training, is a weak government.”175 Iraqi domestic politics are moving in a 

way that suggests it will be a severe political problem 

for any major non-Kurdish Iraqi leader to support an 

extension of a U.S. military presence remaining in that 

country, although Baghdad’s national security needs 

could be well-served by such a request. 

Other Iranian-supported militias in Iraq include 

the Asaib al Haq (AAH-League of the Righteous), 

which has about 1,000 militiamen, and the Kata’ib Hezbollah (Party of God Brigade). The smaller size of the 

Hezbollah Brigades may allow them to be more easily 

controlled by the Iranians. The Iranians have supplied 

both of these groups with increasingly effective weapons including rocket assisted exploding projectiles 

(RAEPs), which they use for attacks on U.S. troops.176

Iranian weapons supplied to Special Groups have 

been used with considerable effectiveness against 

U.S. forces in Iraq, causing Defense Secretary Leon 

Panetta in July 2011 to comment that, “We’re seeing 

more of these weapons coming from Iran, and they’ve 

really hurt us.”177 Yet in addition to its involvement 

in arming the radical militias, Iran also has a number 

of legitimate interests in Iraq. President Ahmadinejad 
51

visited Iraq in early March 2008, at which time a variety of trade agreements were signed providing the 

basis for further economic ties.178 At this time, Iran is 

Iraq’s largest trading partner, and the Iranians are also 

one of the largest investors in Iraq’s construction and 

industrial sector.179

Surprisingly, Washington and Tehran also had 

some overlapping interests in Iraq as the United States 

was beginning its troop drawdown in that country. 

The United States supported Iraqi Prime Minister 

Maliki and his State of Law political coalition because 

he was viewed as a leader of continuity who would 

continue to support Iraqi self-sufficiency in internal 

defense. Iran also supports Maliki, whom they view as 

a friendly Shi’ite leader whose responsiveness to the 

United States will probably decline after the United 

States withdraws from that country. Conversely, the 

Saudis have often been deeply critical of the U.S. policies in Iraq, which they have viewed as pro-Shi’ite, 

pro-Kurdish, and anti-Sunni. Saudi leaders have also 

sometimes portrayed U.S. policies as playing into the 

hands of the Iranians.180 Saudi leaders further dislike 

Maliki, and accuse him of being a sectarian figure who 

hinders reconciliation among Iraqi communities. At 

an international conference in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt 

in May 2007, King Abdullah refused to meet Maliki, 

whom he described as, “embodying sectarian divisions.”181 Serious differences continued, and the Iraqi 

government has sometimes accused Saudi Arabia of 

failing to stop its citizens from entering Iraq and joining the Shi’ite dominated insurgency. This was a serious charge that carried the potential to complicate or 

even damage Riyadh’s relationship with Washington. 

As noted, Riyadh has not involved itself in Iraq 

to nearly the extent of its Iranian rivals. Saudi Arabia 
52

got off to a slower start due to its reluctance to send 

diplomats to Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion of 

that country by U.S.-led forces. Previously, the Saudis 

had broken relations with Iraq in 1991 on the eve of 

Operation DESERT STORM, but they formally reestablished these ties in 2004. Riyadh did not, however, 

reopen its embassy in Iraq, citing security issues and 

the targeting of Arab diplomats by terrorists and insurgents. Neither Iraq nor the United States took these 

statements at face value, although various Arab diplomats were certainly being attacked by insurgents in 

this time frame. Iraq reopened its embassy in Riyadh 

in 2007, but relations remained tense. Conversely, the 

Iranians appointed an ambassador to that country in 

May 2006.182 The United States has encouraged the 

GCC states to improve ties with Iraq and possibly to 

include such moves as considering allowing Iraq to 

join the GCC, which seems almost impossible. During an April 25, 2009, visit to Baghdad, Secretary of 

State Clinton expressed concern about the poor state 

of relations between Baghdad and Riyadh according 

to journalistic sources, citing conversations with U.S. 

diplomats.183 In a 2009 address to Arab military officers in Washington, Defense Secretary Gates stated, 

“The embrace of Iraq by its fellow Gulf States will help 

to contain the ambitions of Iran.”184

During the lead up to the March 2010 Iraqi national election, the Saudis clearly favored secular Shi’ite 

leader, Dr. Ayad Allawi, who led a political coalition friendly to Sunni Arab interests and concerns. 

In this environment, Riyadh was widely believed to 

have provided funds to Dr. Allawi for his organization’s electioneering efforts.185 Prime Minster Maliki 

was particularly incensed about this possibility and 

warned against the influence of money coming from 
53

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab countries.186

Conversely, some Sunni politicians and secular leaders maintain that Iraqi Shi’ite parties accept substantial instruction, as well as money, from the Iranians.187

Ayad Allawi has been particularly critical of Iranian 

meddling in Iraqi politics and complained that Iran 

interfered quite heavily in the political negotiations 

that followed that election.188 The March 2010 election was inconclusive and underscored the fact that 

Iraq remains deeply divided on sectarian and ethnic lines.189 Prime Minister Maliki noted this himself 

when he stated that the nation had returned to square 

one on the issue of sectarianism in the aftermath of the 

election.190

The Iraqiyah bloc under Dr. Allawi has strongly 

criticized Prime Minister Maliki and his allies for failing to defend Iraqi interests in interactions with Iran. 

These politicians specifically charge that Maliki has 

failed to address Iranian military incursions into Iraqi 

territory or the bombardment of Iraqi Kurdish villages 

by Iranian forces. The Iraqiyah bloc also maintains that 

Iran has diverted water from rivers flowing into Iraq 

so that they are virtually dry by the time they reach 

Iraq.191 Sunni Iraqis have sometimes demonstrated 

against Iranian leaders visiting Iraq to indicate their 

community’s distrust of Tehran.192 More alarmingly, 

the New York Times has reported that members of the 

pro-U.S. Sunni Awakening Councils are reestablishing links to Sunni insurgents, including al-Qaeda, as a 

way of hedging their bets against an oppressive Shi’ite 

majority government once the United States has withdrawn its military forces from Iraq.193 Some observers 

have suggested that Saudi Arabia has been providing 

financial support to some of Iraq’s major Sunni tribes, 

including those involved with the Awakening move-
54

ment.194 Saudi Arabia has attempted to mediate among 

Iraqi factions under the umbrella of the Irbil initiative, 

which sought to bring Iraqi political factions together 

to form a coalition government.

Iraq’s Shi’ite dominated government has maintained a number of disagreements with Saudi Arabia 

into the era of the Arab Spring. Strong Iraqi criticism 

of both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia over the crackdown 

also led to a GCC decision to request the cancelation 

of an Arab League Summit Conference to be hosted 

in Baghdad in 2011.195 This action further angered the 

Iraqi leadership, many of whom viewed the Summit 

as an important step towards Iraq’s reintegration into 

the Arab World as the U.S. occupation of that country draws to an end. A compromise settlement led to 

a decision to postpone the Summit until March 2012 

because of the turmoil in the region, with the location to remain in Baghdad.196 Large numbers of Iraqi 

Shi’ite citizens were also deeply angered by the Saudi 

intervention in Bahrain. A leading Iraqi Shi’ite newspaper called for a boycott of Saudi goods to protest 

the intervention in Bahrain.197 Shi’ites throughout Iraq 

held demonstrations against the Saudi intervention in 

cities including Baghdad, Basra, and Najaf.198

Sectarian problems therefore remain serious within 

Iraq, and are of concern to both Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

After the United States withdraws the remainder of its 

military forces from Iraq, it will be difficult for Saudi 

Arabia and the other Sunni Gulf monarchies to remain 

passive should Iran continue to arm Shi’ite militias.199

Previously, the most important power opposing Iranian influence within Iraq was the United States, but 

the removal of all or most U.S. military forces from 

that country will have some impact on U.S. ability to 

counter this influence. In the past, Saudi Arabia could 
55

rely on the United States to oppose Tehran without 

seeking to use its own influence. Moreover, any high 

profile Saudi activism in Iraq prior to the U.S. withdrawal threatened to irritate that United States, which 

has been supportive of Prime Minister Maliki, a leader 

whom the Saudis deeply distrust. 

Conclusions.

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is a central feature in the 

Middle Eastern security landscape that reaches into 

both the Gulf region and the Arab-Israeli theater. It is 

therefore a reality that will touch upon the interests of 

the United States in a number of situations. In many 

instances, Saudi opposition to Iran will serve U.S. interests, but this will not occur under all circumstances. Saudi Arabia remains a deeply anti-revolutionary 

state, with values and priorities that sometimes overlap with those of Washington on matters of strategic 

interest, and often conflict over matters of reform 

and democracy for other Middle Eastern states. Additionally, Middle East regional politics do not consist of rigid blocs that can be viewed as a miniature 

cold war, even in cases where sectarian differences are 

involved. With these parameters in mind, this monograph makes the following recommendations.

1. The United States must understand that the 

differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran will be 

reflected elsewhere in the Middle East, particularly 

in Iraq and Lebanon. In this regard, it is possible that 

the United States will not be the most influential external power interacting with the Iraqi government. 

Nevertheless, the U.S. leadership may have to decide 

what kind of Saudi Arabian behavior it is willing to 

accept in Iraq if Riyadh chooses to support Iraq’s Sun-
56

ni Arab population against a Shi’ite-dominated government in Baghdad. In the future, it is possible that 

Saudi Arabia will consider a policy of ignoring the efforts of potentially increasing numbers of its citizens 

to infiltrate Iraq and fight beside Iraq’s Sunni Arabs if 

a bloody intercommunal conflict breaks out. Riyadh 

will be given increased freedom to do this by the U.S. 

military withdrawal, which would end the possibility 

for Saudi infiltrators to strike at U.S. targets in Iraq. 

Such intervention may be an inevitable response to intercommunal warfare, but cannot end well for either 

the United States or Saudi Arabia since a new crop of 

radicals will be generated to bedevil civilized nations 

throughout the world, possibly for decades to come. 

Therefore, the United States must seek to deescalate 

conflict among Iraqi communities before such a scenario can play out.

2. U.S. intelligence officials and policymakers 

must also be aware of the possibility that Saudi Arabia may overestimate Iranian involvement in any 

regional crisis and may conflate Shi’ite assertiveness with Iranian activism on the basis of very little 

evidence. Such concerns may reflect an honest Saudi 

appraisal based on their own assumptions or worstcase planning, but these cannot be accepted without a 

skeptical examination of the evidence. In many cases, 

Arab Shi’ite leaders will work closely with the Iranians, but not always. This problem of overestimating 

Iranian influence appears to be present to some extent 

in Saudi evaluations of both the Houthi rebellion in 

northern Yemen and the situation in Bahrain immediately prior to the March 2011 Saudi-led military intervention. Iran has shown an interest in the conflicts in 

Bahrain and Yemen, but there is a lack of conclusive 

evidence of Iranian involvement beyond the levels of 
57

propaganda and diplomacy. While Iran could become 

more involved in each of these conflicts, it appears to 

be a secondary player at the current time. 

3. The United States needs to recognize that Saudi Arabia will seek to support conservative regimes 

in the Gulf, such as Bahrain, and that this Saudi 

support may come regardless of other governments’ 

willingness to engage in human rights abuse, especially against Shi’ites. The United States should distance itself from such policies by continuing to call for 

reform. While Saudi Arabia is a friend and partner to 

the United States, U.S. leaders cannot remain unconcerned about repression based on sectarianism. Such 

repression is an open invitation to radicalization and 

the expansion of Iranian influence. It also inflames the 

situation in Iraq. 

4. U.S. military training for GCC states, including Saudi Arabia, must have a strong human rights 

component. This should include both training provided in the GCC countries, and military education and training provided in the United States. The 

importance of this training must be stressed for both 

moral and practical reasons. It should be presented 

to U.S. allies as a valuable tool that will allow them 

to reduce the potency of Iranian propaganda and attempts at subversion. Repression against Shi’ites can 

honestly be portrayed as playing into Iranian hands. 

Also, when dealing with foreign military officers, U.S. 

trainers and educators should avoid accusatory approaches and indicate that respect for human rights is 

simply good strategic planning. 

5. The U.S. civilian and military leadership must 

be aware of the fact that Saudi influence is not always an effective counterweight to Iranian activism 

in many instances, including those where U.S.-Saudi interests overlap. While Saudi Arabia usually at-
58

tempts to influence its neighbors by using money and 

diplomacy, Iran is much more willing to fund radical 

militias in states that have weak central governments 

and a large Shi’ite community, including pro-Iranian 

elements. The foremost model of this policy, serving 

to advance Iranian interests, is Hezbollah in Lebanon, 

a strong and reliable Iranian ally. This policy is also 

apparent in the creation of the Special Groups in Iraq. 

In both cases, the establishment of militias has helped 

pro-Iranian elements not only operate as open allies of 

Tehran, but also to become influential players within 

the national government. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is 

the most important and influential political organization with its members and allies currently dominating 

the government. In Iraq the pro-Iranian groups have 

not achieved this level of power, but Tehran is clearly 

seeking to empower them towards that goal. Tehran 

will also be willing to put a great deal more effort 

and resources into an attempt to dominate Iraq since 

Baghdad’s concerns and ambitions directly touch 

upon Iranian core interests in a way that activities in 

Lebanon almost never do. These efforts will have to be 

countered by the United States in conjunction with its 

regional partners.

6. The United States must remain aware that local 

powers such as Saudi Arabia are sometimes viewed 

as overbearing by even their closest allies. The 

United States may, at times, have a stake in providing a friendly counterweight to Saudi Arabia for states 

seeking to emphasize their independent streak. This 

effort will sometimes be tricky, and U.S. policy will 

have to be adjusted on a case-by-case basis. In general, 

the small Gulf States view Saudi Arabia as one of their 

most important allies, but believe that they will have 

more freedom of action on a variety of important issues if they have more than one important ally. 
59

7. The United States leadership must also understand that many countries concerned about Iran are 

nevertheless reluctant to confront such a powerful 

regional state. U.S. officials sometimes complain that 

Saudi and other Gulf officials are unwilling to say the 

same things in public as they do in private about such 

issues as the Iranian nuclear weapons program and 

Iranian sponsorship of terrorism. This may be true, 

but Riyadh and the smaller capitals have a vested interest in not returning to the 1980s pattern of relations, 

which involved virulent propaganda, constant acts of 

subversion, and serious efforts to disrupt and cause 

casualties at the Hajj. The United States will therefore 

have to understand when a firm stand is possible for 

these states and when it is problematic.

8. The U.S. military should be prepared for possible new relations with a post-Assad government 

in Syria so long as that government does not seek 

to threaten Israel. If President Assad is overthrown, 

the United States may seek to work with Saudi Arabia 

and other friendly states to make certain that Syrian 

ties to Iran do not survive the transition. This effort 

may require the development of low level military 

ties including military education and training so long 

as Damascus appears to be interested in peace and 

democracy. In this regard, it might be remembered 

that Sadat’s Egypt formed an important civilian and 

military relationship with the United States prior to 

its peace treaty with Israel. These ties helped to pave 

the way to that treaty, but they could not go beyond 

a certain point until the peace treaty became a reality. 

9. The United States military should consider the 

need to continue working with the Bahraini military 

for the time being to help prevent Bahrain from becoming a total Saudi satellite, so long as the United 
60

States makes progress in pushing for improvements 

to the Bahraini human rights situation. The U.S. ability to moderate repression and encourage reform will 

be diminished, or even ended, if the United States 

withdraws its forces, and no other nation is capable 

of performing even a limited role in pressuring the 

Bahraini government to show moderation in its governance. Training opportunities for Bahraini military 

personnel should, whenever possible, stress human 

rights issues. Military leaders within the Bahraini 

military with known human rights problems in their 

background should not be allowed to participate in 

U.S.-sponsored military education and training programs.

10. The United States should strongly encourage 

Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, to support largescale anti-poverty programs for Bahraini Shi’ites 

who currently have solid reasons for giving up on 

the political system and turning to Iran for help. The 

deplorable living conditions of many Shi’ites are a reminder of what this community believes is unrelenting discrimination against them by a Sunni minority. 

Strong jobs and anti-poverty programs could help improve relations between the communities and ease the 

process of reconciliation and national dialogue. Since 

Bahrain’s total population is less than one million citizens, targeted economic aid could go a long way in 

easing suffering there. 

11. The United States must use what influence it 

has to encourage Iraq to treat Sunni Arabs fairly, and 

thereby prevent intercommunal warfare that would 

almost certainly involve supporting roles for Iran 

and Saudi Arabia. The fragmented political mosaic of 

Iraq is a perfect context for these differences to play 

themselves out if Iraqi political leaders fail to act with 
61

wisdom and tolerance. The United States will have to 

work closely with Saudi Arabia on Iraq policy. Saudi 

Arabia is, nevertheless, an imperfect partner for U.S. 

efforts to promote stability in Iraq, and the United 

States must not be distracted from efforts to mediate 

and resolve differences at an early stage, while recognizing the rights and claims of all parties to any Iraqi 

internal conflicts. 

12. The United States should continue to pursue 

the Middle East Peace Process for both its intrinsic 

value and to moderate tendencies within states such 

as Saudi Arabia, while seeking to undermine Iran’s 

efforts to enhance its role in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. The Iranians prosper when they 

are able to portray themselves as the champions of 

Palestinian and Lebanese forces opposing what they 

maintain is an aggressive Israel. They are diminished 

when they are seen as seeking to disrupt a viable peace 

process.

13. The U.S. Army should keep the U.S. Congress particularly well informed about the value of 

its training mission for Lebanon, and any problems 

that mission faces because of the Mikati government 

and its Hezbollah allies, but it should not assume 

that military cooperation with Lebanon is no longer 

possible. Lebanon has special problems with sectarianism that make its military different from a Western military. Lebanese government requirements for 

the military to take significant action in the interests 

of only one sect or political trend could lead to the 

collapse of the military as an institution. It will only 

become an effective instrument for repression if it is 

thoroughly purged, which probably cannot happen 

without inciting civil unrest. The severing of U.S. ties 

to the Lebanese military could demoralize Western-
62

oriented officers within that organization while raising the importance of the Hezbollah militia forces to 

the Lebanese defense. These forces will continue to be 

well-armed and equipped by Iran. 

14. The U.S. diplomats and military leaders dealing with Iraq must be prepared for Iranian attempts 

to take advantage of serious disagreements between 

Saudi Arabia and Iraq after Washington withdraws 

its troops from that country. To contain Iran while 

supporting stability and democracy, the United States 

must be prepared to mediate between Saudi Arabia 

and Iraq, and limit Iranian efforts to insert itself into 

such a process. Since key Saudi concerns may involve 

Iraqi government actions in Sunni Arab areas, the 

United States will have to be aware of issues in those 

areas, and it will have to be prepared to support measures to increase Sunni Arab willingness to participate 

in the political system along with a Shi’ite and Kurdish willingness to share power. 

15. The United States should remain aware of political changes that might occur in Iran in the hope 

that meaningful dialogue on security issues may become possible at some point. The failure of the Green 

Revolution in 2009 was a serious disappointment to 

many Americans and other supporters of liberal, democratic government. Nevertheless, the last chapter 

may not have been written in this story. The examples 

of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya are already of considerable concern to Tehran. In these times of revolutionary 

upheaval, the United States must continue to point out 

the hypocrisy and opportunism of the Iranian regime 

on issues such as Syrian repression. 
63

ENDNOTES

1. Officials of some Gulf Arab states have used this description in an exasperated way in discussions with the author. Also 

see King Abdullah, “Eldest brother of Egypt: Sharaf,” Saudi Gazette, April 24, 2011. 

2. At the time of this writing, it appears that Jordan and Morocco have an excellent chance of being admitted into the GCC. 

Neither of these two countries has the geographical or financial 

profile of the current members, but it is likely that the current GCC 

states hoped to help shore up these states and their monarchial 

governments during the “Arab Spring.” See “GCC Welcomes Jordan, Morocco membership,” Kuwait Times, May 11, 2011. 

3. On recent Saudi efforts to influence King Abdullah of Jordan against reform, see Paul Richter and Neela Banerjee, “U.S.-

Saudi Rivalry Intensifies,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2011. 

4. The term “Wahhabi” is almost never used in the Arabian 

Peninsula, although the other more preferred terms are confusing and do not clearly delineate these individuals from other religious conservatives. See Christopher M. Blanchard, The Islamic 

Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. 2.

5. Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and 

Pan-Islamism since 1979, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 

Press, 2010, pp. 17-18.

6. Toby Jones, “The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East 

Report, Winter 2005, pp. 20-25; “Mutawwa accused of beating Shiites,” Kuwait Times, August 6, 2007.

7. “US wants to divide and rule Muslims: Iran,” Arab News, 

December 5, 2010. 

8. “S. Arabia ‘does not advocate military action against Iran’,” 

Jordan Times, February 17, 2010. 
64

9. Michael Buchanan, “Saudi Arabia: Calls for political reform 

muted,” BBC News, May 24, 2011. On Iran’s stolen election, see 

Hooman Majid, The Ayatollah’s Democracy: An Iranian Challenge, 

New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010, especially pp. 48-66.

10. Graham E. Fuller, The ‘Center of the Universe’ The Geopolitics 

of Iran, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, Chap. 6. 

11. Henner Furtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the 

Gulf Wars, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2006, p. 37. 

12. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America, New York: Random House, 2004, p. 199.

13. Scott Peterson, Let the Swords Encircle Me: Iran—A Journey 

Behind the Headlines, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010, p. 106. 

14. Fuller, p. 106.

15. Ray Tekeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World 

in the Age of the Ayatollahs, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2009, pp. 198-199. 

16. “S. Arabia ‘does not advocate military action against 

Iran’.” 

17. See, for example, Mark Landler, “Clinton Raises U.S. Concerns of Military Power in Iran,” Washington Post, February 16, 

2010. 

18. Yochi J. Dreazen and Margaret Coker, “Gates Seeks Help 

from Gulf Leaders on Iran Sanctions,” Wall Street Journal, March 

12, 2010, p. 15.

19. Willem van Kemenade, “Which way will China lean on 

Iran?” Daily Star, (Beirut), October 8, 2010. 

20. Jay Solomon, “Saudi Suggests ‘Squeezing’ Iran over Nuclear Ambitions,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2011; “Saudi will 

seek nuclear arms if Iran gets them,” Gulf Times, July 1, 2011.
65

21. “Iran says it uncovers second cyber attack,” Daily Star, 

April 25, 2011. 

22. Michael Birnbaum, “Egypt Shows Signs of New Assertiveness Abroad,” Washington Post, April 28, 2011.

23. Ernesto Londono and Joel Greenberg, “Egypt’s Rulers to 

Reopen Gaza Crossing in Days,” Washington Post, May 26, 2011. 

24. “Govt tries to calm sectarian tensions,” Kuwait Times, September 15, 2010.

25. “MPs File to Question Kuwait PM over Pro-Iranian Remarks,” The Peninsula, May 23, 2011; B. Izzak, “MPs file motion to 

oust PM over Iran,” Kuwait Times, June 15, 2011. 

26. Ibid.

27. “King Abdullah slams acts of ‘Fitnah’ in Egypt,” Saudi Gazette, January 30, 2011. 

28. Ibid.

29. “Saudi Arabia Urges peaceful resolution of Egypt Crisis,” 

Arab News, February 8, 2011.

30. Scott Peterson, “Iran’s Khamenei praises Egyptian protesters declares ‘Islamic Awakening,’” Christian Science Monitor, 

February 4, 2011.

31. Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran leader: West cannot ‘confiscate’ 

Arab Spring,” Daily Star (Beirut), August 31, 2011. 

32. “Iran seeks brave move from Egypt to resume ties,” Jordan 

Times, April 24, 2011.

33. “Egypt: Iran ties will not undermine Gulf Security,” Kuwait Times, April 27, 2011. 

34. “Regional Turmoil in Focus at Saudi King’s Talks with 

Egypt,” Arab News, April 26, 2011.
66

35. “$4 Billion Saudi Aid for Egypt,” Arab News, May 22, 2011.

36. “Qatar plans $10 billion in Egypt projects,” Saudi Gazette, 

May 25, 2011. 

37. “GCC Ministers to discuss Jordan’s membership bid.” Kuwait Times, August 28, 2011. 

38. See “Yemen Leader’s Role Presents Thorny Issues for US,” 

New York Times, January 5, 2010; Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, “Yemen: External Affairs,” Jane’s Information Group, 

January 8, 2010. 

39. Oman probably has the best relations with Iran of any 

GCC state.

40. Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group (ICG), May 2005, p. 2. 

41. Ibid., pp. 2-5. 

42. Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power, The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World, Princeton and Oxford, UK: Princeton University 

Press, 2006, p. 34. 

43. Ibid., p. 50. 

44. See Jones, pp. 29-32; “Saudi Shiite held after meeting 

King,” Kuwait Times, May 19, 2008.

45. Lori Plotkin Boghardt, Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution 1979-1991, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, pp. 110-119.

46. Ibid., Chap. 6.

47. “Kuwaitis, Iranians among sleeper cells’ members,” Kuwait Times, August 24, 2010.

48. “Kuwait court tries alleged Iran spy cell,” Khaleej Times, 

October 13, 2010. 
67

49. This sentence can still be appealed to the Kuwaiti Supreme 

Court. See “Death for Three Iran Spies in Kuwait,” Gulf Times, 

March 30, 2011. 

50. “Three get death in Iran Spy Ring,” Kuwait Times, March 

30, 2011.

51. Fouad al-Obaid, “Regional Powder Keg,” Kuwait Times, 

April 4, 2011. 

52. Reuters, “Bahrain tries 2 Iranians, Bahraini in Iran spy 

case,” Gulf Research Center, Gulf in the Media Electronic Newsletter, April 13, 2011. 

53. “Ahmadinejad denies spy rings in Kuwait,” Kuwait Times, 

April 5, 2011.

54. “Yemen’s War: Pity those caught in the Middle,” Economist, November 21, 2009, p. 49.

55. Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb, Brussels, Belgium: 

ICG, May 27, 2009, p. 12.

56. Ibid., p. 10.

57 .“Saudis held briefly by Yemeni rebels,” Arab News, April 

25, 2010.

58. Mohamed Ghobari and Raissa Kasolowsky, “Yemen’s al 

Qaeda calls for jihad, fighting in north,” Reuters, February 8, 2010.

59. “Saudi Air Force hits Yemen rebels after border raid,” Jordan Times, November 6, 2009.

60. Robert F. Worth, “Yemen Seems to Reject Cease-Fire with 

Rebels,” New York Times, February 1, 2010.

61. “No Changes in border with Yemen, says Prince Khaled,” 

Arab News, March 7, 2010. 

62. Tore T. Petersen, Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula: 
68

Making Allies out of Clients, Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 

2009, p. 50.

63. See Fred H. Lawson, Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, p. 123; and Anthony H. 

Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997, p. 41.

64. Lawson, pp. 128-129.

65 .“Timeline: Bahrain,” BBC News: World Edition, August 25, 

2005. 

66. R. K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf,” Current History, January 1985, p. 7.

67. Henner Furtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the 

Gulf Wars, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2006, p. 64.

68. Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge, pp. 2-6.

69. M K Bhadrakumar, “Saudis Bring Iran, US closer together,” Asia Times Online, March 18, 2011.

70. Ibid.

71. “Bahrain protesters seek to oust the royal family,” Kuwait 

Times, February 22, 2011. 

72. Neela Banerjee “As Cries for Revolution fade, Bahrainis 

wonder what went wrong,” Los Angeles Times, April 15, 2011. 

73. “Gulf Business hub Bahrain faces uncertain future,” Kuwait Times, March 24, 2011.

74. “Bahrain king offers reform talks in July,” Kuwait Times, 

June 1, 2011.

75. “Tension rises as GCC asks UN to curb Iran,” Gulf Times, 

April 19, 2011.

76. “Bahrain puts down foreign plot,” United Press International, March 21, 2011. 
69

77. Bahrain tells 16 Lebanese to leave, 5 gone: diplomat,” Daily Star, April 4, 2011. 

78. Ibid.

79. Alex Delmar-Morgan, “Bahrain to Ease Restraints,” Wall 

Street Journal, May 9, 2011.

80. “Bahrain to reassert its control over mosques,” Gulf Times, 

September 7, 2010; and “Shi’ite mosque demolitions raise tension 

in Bahrain, Kuwait Times, April 23, 2011. 

81. “Bahraini Opposition flays government crackdown,” Arab 

News, April 24, 2011. 

82. Joby Warrick and Michael Birnbaum, “Questions as Bahrain Stifles Revolt,” Washington Post, April 15, 2011. 

83. Paul Richter, “Bahrain Backs Away from Ban on Two Shiite Political Groups,” Los Angeles Times, April 16, 2011; “Bahrain 

not trying to disband opposition groups” Khaleej Times, April 16, 

2011. 

84. “Respect our Unity, GCC tells Tehran,” Kuwait Times, 

April 21, 2011. 

85. “Gulf Arabs Discuss Iran ‘Meddling’,” The Nation (Pakistan) April 4, 2011.

86. “GCC to turn new leaf in relations with Tehran,” Kuwait 

Times, April 23, 2011.

87. Reuters, “Bahrain tries 2 Iranians, Bahraini in Iran spy 

case.” 

88. On the development of this relationship, see Patrick Seele, 

Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 

CA: University of California Press, 1988, Chap. 21. Also see Hugh 

Naylor, “Syria, Seeking Investors, Turns Cautiously to Iran,” New 

York Times, October 4, 2007. 

89. Seele, pp. 351-354.
70

90. Matthew Tempest, “’No Plans’ to invade Syria, Insists 

Blair,” Guardian, April 14 2003; David Ignatius, “Iran and Syria 

are just waiting the Bush administration out,” Daily Star, July 25, 

2008.

91. ”New U.S. warning to Syria on Scuds,” BBC News, May 

5, 2010.

92. Agence France-Presse, “Iran warns Israel against attacking Syria,” Gulf Research Center, May 1, 2010.

93. The author has spoken to a number of Israeli military officials on this issue.

94. Christopher Torchia, “Turkey urges Syria to stop crackdown,” Associated Press, April 28, 2011.

95. Reuters, “Signs of Thaw Between Syria and Iraq PM Maliki,” Gulf Research Center, Gulf in the News, September 15, 2010.

96. “Iraq’s Shiites grudgingly back Syria’s Baath,” Kuwait 

Times, April 26, 2011.

97. Reshuffling the Cards? (1) Syria’s Evolving Strategy, Brussels, 

Belgium: ICG, 2009, p. ii. 

98. “US Reacts to Fear of Iran’s Rising Clout,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2011.

99. See Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-91, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 96.

100. Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President Bush and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah,” 

Washington, DC: The White House, April 25, 2005, available from 

georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov.

101. Mirella Hodeib and Hassan Lakiss, “’Window of Hope’ 

opens in Lebanon crisis,” Daily Star, January 20, 2011.

102. Ibid. 
71

103. “Syria, Iran underline support for Lebanon against Israel,” Jordan Times. August 12, 2010.

104. “Ahmadinejad calls upon Syria to engage in dialogue, 

Kuwait News Agency, August 25, 2011; “Tehran accuses West of 

meddling in Syria,” Kuwait Times, June 15, 2011.

105. “U.S. suspects Iran Bracing Syria,” Daily Star, April 15, 

2011; Nada Bakri, “Europe Accuses Iranian Force of Aiding Syrian Crackdown,” New York Times, August 25, 2011. 

106. Adam Entous and Matthew Rosenberg, “US Says Iran 

Helps Crackdown in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2011. 

107. “Iran Warns against Western Intervention in Syria,” Daily Star, August 16, 2011. 

108. “Kuwait, Bahrain follow Saudi Lead as Syrian Crackdown continues,” Arab News (Riyadh), August 8, 2011; Nada 

Bakri, “3 Arab Countries Recall Ambassadors to Syria,” New York 

Times, August 8, 2011. 

109. Ibid.

110. For one aspect of this concern, see “Saudi Arabia arrests 

164 anti-Syrian protesters,” Daily Star, August 25, 2011. 

111. See Marwan Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of 

Moderation, New Haven and London, UK: Yale University Press, 

2008, Appendix 2. 

112. “Tel Aviv ‘Mulling Saudi Peace Plan’,” Jordan Times, October 20, 2008.

113. The United States has spent about $600 million a year 

supporting the Palestinians since 2007, although the future of this 

support is uncertain. See Jennifer Steinhauer and Steven Lee Myers,” House G.O.P. tightens its bond with Netanyahu,” New York 

Times, September 20, 2011. 
72

114. Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and 

U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. p. 32

115. Christopher M. Blanchard and Alfred B. Prados, Saudi 

Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 2007, p. 

16.

116. Ibid. p. 17.

117. “Tehran ‘blocking’ Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation,” Kuwait 

Times, March 14, 2010.

118. Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies Iran, the U.S. 

and the Twisted Path to Confrontation, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 

2007, p. 91.

119. Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, New York: Free 

Press, 2008, 270-71.

120. “IAF hits Gaza Tunnels in wake of bombing attempt 

by sea,” Ha’aretz, February 2, 2010; “How Israel Foiled an Arms 

Convoy Bound for Hamas,” TIME, March 30, 2009; and Barbara 

Opall-Rome, “Underground Weapon: Israeli Tunnel Blaster Targets Threats from Gaza Strip,” Defense News, June 6, 2011, p. 24.

121. Joshua Mitnick, “Israel’s Seizure of arms shipment highlights rising unease about Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, March 

15, 2011. 

122. “The Gaza-Egypt Smuggling Tunnels must be Closed,” 

Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2009. 

123. Ian Black, “Gaza Blockade: Iran Offers Escort to Next Aid 

Convoy,” Guardian, June 7, 2010.

124. “Iran Revolutionary Guards ready to escort Gaza ships,” 

Kuwait Times, June 7, 2010.

125. “Hezbollah chief meets Ahmadinejad,” BBC News, February 26, 2010.
73

126. “Hezbollah brought stability to Lebanon: Iranian official,” Daily Star, June 27, 2011. 

127. Bergman, Chap. 15; Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: 

A Short History, Princeton and Oxford, UK: Princeton University 

Press, 2007, pp. 34-35.

128. Thanassis Cambanis, “Stronger Hezbollah Emboldened 

for Fights Ahead,” New York Times, October 6, 2010; and Amos 

Harel and Amos Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War 

in Lebanon, New York: Palgrave, 2008, p. 48.

129. Michael R. Gordon and Andrew W. Lehran, “U.S. Strains 

to Stop Arms Flow,” New York Times, December 6, 2010. 

130. Drums of War: Israel and the “Axis of Resistance,” Brussels, 

Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 6.

131. Ibid. 

132. Michael Young, The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010, p. 67.

133. Ibid., p. 67. 

134. Harel and Issacharoff, pp. 241-253.

135. Morten Valbjorn and Andre Bank, “Signs of a New Arab 

Cold War: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Sunni-Shi’i Divide,” 

Middle East Report, Spring 2007, p. 7. 

136. Harel and Issacharoff, p. 249.

137. Thanassis Cambanis, “Stronger Hezbollah Emboldened 

for Fights Ahead,” New York Times, October 6, 2010.

138. Babak Degghanpisheh, “Lebanon Stages a Diversion,” 

Newsweek, October 25, 2010. 

139. Hussein Dakroub, “Hariri slams Iranian interference,” 

Daily Star, April 8, 2011.
74

140. Ibid.

141. “Siniora: Hezbollah has disregarded Saudi help,” Daily 

Star, April 14, 2011. 

142. “Future criticizes Nasrallah over 2006 Saudi Aid,” Daily 

Star, April 13, 2011.

143. Borzou Daragahi, “Lebanon’s Prime Minister Visits 

Iran,” Los Angeles Times, November 28, 2010.

144. Liz Sly, “U.N. Court Indicts Hezbollah members in 2005 

assassination in Lebanon, Washington Post, August 17, 2011. 

145. Mikati is a Sunni Muslim, although he is very sensitive 

to Hezbollah interests. Because of Lebanon’s confessional system, 

all prime ministers must be Sunni Muslims just as all speakers of 

the parliament must be Shi’ite Muslims, and all presidents must 

be Maronite Christians.

146. “Hezbollah rise in Lebanon gives Syria, Iran sway,” 

Khaleej Times, June 14, 2011. 

147. Nicholas Blanford, “An Interview with Lebanon’s Prime 

Minister Najib Mikati,” TIME, March 13, 2011.

148. David Ignatius, “Hezbollah’s Play of Shadows,” Washington Post, February 28, 2011.

149. “Political rivals increasingly divided on Syria,” The Daily 

Star, August 10, 2011.

150. Hussein Dakroub, “Hariri praises Saudi Stance on Syrian 

Unrest,” The Daily Star, August 9, 2011. 

151. Ibid.

152. Casey L. Addis, U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011, p. 3.

153. Matthew Lee “US Considers Slashing Financial Aid to 

Lebanon,” Washington Times, January 26, 2011. 
75

154. “Iran is ready to start defense funding for Lebanon: Minister,” Daily Star, February 7, 2011.

155. Patrice Hill, “War-Weary Iraq sees economic rebound,” 

Washington Times, April 11, 2011. 

156. Jim Muir, “Iran’s Mixed Feelings on Looming War,” BBC 

News: World Edition, January 17, 2003.

157. These gains were short-lived as Saddam gave up all of 

the fruits of victory in the Iran-Iraq War after the invasion of Kuwait in order to establish diplomatic relations with Tehran and 

pacify his eastern front in preparation for war with the United 

States and its allies. See Freedman and Karsh, pp. 108-109.

158. Andrew Tilghman, “Experts: Iraq Air Force Unready,” 

Defense News, January 24, 2011. 

159. Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat to the Northern 

Gulf, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007, pp. 196-199.

160. Bruce Riedel, “The Mideast after Iran Gets the Bomb,” 

Current History, December 2010, p. 372.

161. “Iran Denies Getting Missile Technology From N Korea,” 

Associated Press, May 17, 2011; “Iran: Parliament Speaker to visit 

North Korea Sunday, underlining close ties,” Washington Post, 

August 31, 2011. 

162. “Iraq to purchase 36 F-16 fighter jets from U.S.,” Reuters, 

July 30, 2011; Jim Loney, “U.S. and Iraq Talking but No F-16 Deal 

Yet,” Reuters, August 31, 2011; Tim Craig, “Big Guns Fire Up 

Iraqi Army’s Confidence,” Washington Post, June 6, 2011. 

163. “Iraq Keen on Rebuilding Own Army—Iraqi VP,” Kuwait News Agency, August 15, 2011. 

164. Bruce Riedel, “The Mideast after Iran Gets the Bomb,” 

Current History, December 2010, pp. 370-375. 
76

165. This rise of U.S. influence and involvement in both Iraq 

and Afghanistan occurred shortly after President George W. Bush 

had identified Iran as part of “an axis of evil.” Such rhetoric contributed to the Iranian view that they were now being encircled 

by enemies led by a particularly hostile power. 

166. “Iraqi President calls for strategic ties with Iran,” Kuwait 

News Agency, March 28, 2011. 

167. Thomas Erdbrink and Leila Fadel, “Maliki, Iran’s Leaders Talk About the Future of Iraq’s Government, Washington Post, 

October 19, 2010. 

168. “Iraq’s Looming new government,” Economist, November 13, 2010, p. 57.

169. “Shiite Cleric Warns U.S. Forces to Leave,” Washington 

Post, August 10, 2011. 

170. On the al-Quds Force, see Cordesman and Kleiber, pp. 

78-81; and “Iran’s ‘invisible man’,” The Middle East, August/September 2008, pp. 28-31.

171. “Iraqi cleric threatens to revive Mehdi Army,” Kuwait 

Times, April 10, 2010.

172. See Michael Knights, “The Evolution of Iran’s Special 

Groups in Iraq,” West Point Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel, November 2010, p. 13. 

173. Aseel Kami, “US trainers could be targets: Iraq’s Sadr,” 

Reuters, August 7, 2011. 

174 . Ed O’ Keefe,” Iraq to Seek Talks to Keep American Trainers Past 2011,” Washington Post, August 3, 2011.

175. “Moktada Al-Sadr Warns U.S. Troops to Leave Iraq,” 

New York Times, August 8, 2011.

176. Michael S. Schmidt and Jack Healy, “Shiite Militia Claims 

Responsibility for Attack in Baghdad,” New York Times, June 11, 

2011. 
77

177. David S. Cloud, “Panetta: Iranian weapons used to attack 

Americans in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, July 11, 2011. 

178. “Iraq and Iran: Big Brother Comes to Town,” Economist, 

March 8, 2008. 

179. “Turkey, Iran battle for clout, deals in Iraq,” Kuwait 

Times, December 9, 2010.

180. Robert Gibbons, “Saudi Says U.S. Policy is Handing Iraq 

to Iran,” Reuters, September 21, 2005. 

181. “No More Gestures to Saudis: Maliki,” Agence FrancePresse, May 29, 2009. 

182. Tarek al-Issawi, “Report: Iran appoints ambassador to 

Iraq,” Associated Press, May 10, 2006.

183. “Maliki Rules Out more gestures to Saudi Arabia,” Daily 

Star, May 29, 2009.

184. Viola Gienger, “Gates Urges Gulf States to ‘Embrace’ Iraq 

to put Brakes on Iran,” Bloomberg.com, June 23, 2009. 

185. “Ahmadinejad, Saudi King hold more phone talks: 

IRNA,” Associated Free Press, October 21, 2010. 

186. Anthony Shadid, “Maliki Creates Coalition to Compete 

in Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, October 2, 2009.

187. Daniel W. Smith, “Iraqis Stay Silent on Protests in Iran,” 

Washington Times, July 9, 2009. 

188. “Allawi accuses Iran over election,” BBC News, March 

30, 2010; Ayad Allawi, “How Iraq can Fortify its Fragile Democracy,” Washingtonpost.com, June 10, 2010. 

189. Michael S. Schmidt and Tim Arango, “Bitter Feud Between Top Iraqi Leaders Stalls Government, New York Times, June 

26, 2011.
78

190. Steven Lee Myers, “As Maliki Clings to Power, Iraq’s Fissures Deepen,” New York Times, October 3, 2010. 

191. “Iraqi List threatens to withdraw confidence from Maliki’s government,” Kuwait News Agency, July 21, 2011.

192. “Iraqis protest visit of ex-Iranian president,” Kuwait 

Times, March 5, 2009; and “Iraq and Iran,” Economist, March 8, 

2008, p. 55.

193. Timothy Williams and Duraid Adnan, “Sunnis in Iraq 

Allied with U.S. Quitting to Rejoin Rebels,” New York Times, October 17, 2010. 

194. Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and 

U.S. Relations, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

June 2010. 

195. “Fate of Baghdad Summit to be decided by Arab League 

FMs,” Jordan Times, April 15, 2011.

196. “Arab League delays summit by year to March 2012,” 

Khaleej Times, May 6, 2011.

197. “Iraqis call for Boycott of Saudi goods over Bahrain,” Kuwait Times, March 21, 2011; “Iraq’s own sectarian divide remembered,” Kuwait Times, April 24, 2011. 

198. “Iraqis protest GCC Troops in Bahrain,” Reuters, March 

20, 2011.

199. Helene Cooper, “Saudis Say they might back Sunnis if 

U.S. leaves Iraq,” New York Times, December 13, 2006. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil