UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

NATHANIEL HINES,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORRECTIONS MENTAL HEALTH

PROGRAM,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 14-13619

Thomas L. Ludington

United States District Judge

Stephanie Dawkins Davis

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Dkt. 44)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 17, 2014, plaintiff Nathaniel Hines, an inmate currently

incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) at the

Macomb Correctional Facility (“MRF”) in New Haven, Michigan, brought this

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of his rights under the United

States Constitution. (Dkt. 1). On November 13, 2014, District Judge Thomas L.

Ludington referred this case to Magistrate Judge Michael Hluchaniuk for all

pretrial purposes. (Dkt. 9). By way of Administrative Order, this matter was

reassigned to the undersigned in January 2016. 

On March 30, 2015, Magistrate Judge Hluchaniuk issued a Report and

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Recommendation, recommending defendant’s motion to dismiss be granted, and

plaintiff’s complaint against the defendant be dismissed. The Court also

recommended that plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint. (Dkt.

26). On June 23, 2015, Judge Ludington overruled plaintiff’s objections, adopted

the Report and Recommendation and granted leave to plaintiff to amend his

complaint to name proper defendants. (Dkt. 29). 

On July 31, 2015, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, but, again, named

only MDOC Mental Health Program as defendant. (Dkt. 30). Defendant filed

another motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Dkt. 33).

Plaintiff responded to defendant’s motion by filing another amended complaint

naming three individual defendants. (Dkt. 34). In the newly amended complaint,

plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, acknowledged that he previously failed to understand

what was expected of him in filing an amended complaint, but that he now

understood and corrected the deficiencies. (Dkt. 34). Defendant’s then-pending

motion to dismiss (Dkt. 33) was terminated as moot, without prejudice to refile a

motion to dismiss as to the amended complaint (Dkt. 34).

On February 10, 2016, defendants MDOC, Garlapati and Beauvais did file a

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint. (Dkt. 44). Plaintiff filed a

response to defendants’ motion on April 21, 2016. (Dkt. 46). Defendant’s motion

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to dismiss is now ready for report and recommendation.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 44) be GRANTED, plaintiff’s complaint

against defendants MDOC, Garlapati and Beauvais be DISMISSED. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of

his rights under the United States Constitution. (Dkt. 34). Specifically, plaintiff

claims that the defendant has involuntarily injected in him with anti-psychotic

medication in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Due Process requirements,

and he seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and

punitive damages. (Id.). 

III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must first

comply with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires “‘a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A plaintiff is also obliged “to provide the grounds of his

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entitlement to relief,” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Association

of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted)). And, while a complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations,

its “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are

true.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500

F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (the factual allegations in a 

complaint need not be detailed but they “must do more than create speculation or

suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to

relief.”). 

The Sixth Circuit recognized that in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

(2007), “a case decided just two weeks after Twombly, the Supreme Court clarified

Twombly by holding that a prisoner bringing a § 1983 claim against his captor is

not required to state [s]pecific facts in their complaint; and Twombly itself

suggests that its holding may be limited to cases likely to produce sprawling,

costly, and hugely time-consuming litigation.” U.S. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d

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496 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Sixth

Circuit applied a more stringent pleading standard in U.S. v. Ford because a fraud

claim was involved, which requires the application of the heightened pleading

standard set forth in Rule 9(b), rather than the more liberal pleading standard

found in Rule 8(a)(2). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally

construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citation omitted). Thus, when applying

Twombly, except as to a claim of fraud, the Court must still read plaintiff’s pro se

complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and accept

plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly

incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992); Erickson, 551 U.S. at

93-94 (The Court of Appeals improperly departed “from the liberal pleading

standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2)” and failed to liberally construe” the pro se

complaint at issue.). 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against MDOC are Barred by the Eleventh

Amendment

Plaintiff amended his complaint to assert a § 1983 claim against MDOC,

rather than the originally-identified CMHP, an unrecognized division of the

MDOC. Nevertheless, as discussed in this Court’s earlier adopted report and

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recommendation (Dkt. 26), the Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal court

against a state and its departments or agencies unless the state has waived its

sovereign immunity or unequivocally consented to be sued. See Pennhurst State

Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). This jurisdictional bar

applies to claims for injunctive relief, as well those for money damages. See id at

100-101. Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. See

Johnson v. Dellatifia, 357 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2004). Nor does the language

of §1983 permit suits against a State or its agencies. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)(neither a State nor its officials acting in their

official capacities are “persons” under §1983). Given these facts, plaintiff’s §1983

claims against the MDOC should be dismissed. 

C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Viable Eighth Amendment Claim

1. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that medicating him involuntarily

violated his Eighth Amendment protection against deliberate indifference to a 

serious medical need. (Dkt. 34). There is a recognized Eighth Amendment

protection for prisoners against “deliberate indifference” to a serious medical

need, but that indifference generally involves the failure to provide medical care.

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). In

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cases such as this, where the medical personnel are treating a prisoner protesting

the unwanted care, claims are generally unsuccessful. Kramer v. Wilkerson, 302

Fed. App’x 396, 401 (6 Cir. 2008)(citing Davis v. Agosto, 89 F. App'x 523, 529

th

(6th Cir.2004) (denying Eighth Amendment claim on summary judgment where

defendant argued that the unwanted treatment of a head wound unnecessarily

inflicted pain upon him). To advance a viable Eighth Amendment claim for

deliberate indifference related to unwanted medical treatment, a plaintiff must

allege that he received “grossly inadequate care” and that the treatment provided

was so medically unsound as to violate the law. Kramer, 302 Fed. App’x at

401(citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 844-47

(6 Cir. 2002)). Grossly inadequate medical care is defined as medical treatment

th

“so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to

be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Terrance, 286 F.3d at 844(quoting

Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir.1989)). In contrast, not “every

claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. 285. “[A]

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth

Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation

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merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Id. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285. 

Plaintiff here fails to allege any facts to demonstrate the named prison

doctors provided “grossly inadequate care” or that the treatment provided was so

medically unsound as to be deemed unlawful. See Kramer, 302 Fed. App’x at

401. To the contrary, plaintiff alleges only that the unwanted medication is being

administered as a result of a “misdiagnosis,” and that the harm he suffers from the

side-effects of the unwanted drugs are nightmares, insomnia, headaches, low white

blood cell count and high blood pressure. (Dkt. 34). Even if these claims were

proven at trial, they would not amount to the “grossly inadequate care” standard

applied to these types of deliberate indifference cases. See id. Accordingly,

plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference on which relief could

be granted and his allegations relating to the defendants’ deliberate indifference

should be dismissed.

2. Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain

In addition to plaintiff’s identified claim of deliberate indifference, the

undersigned reads plaintiff’s allegations regarding the force employed in

administering the unwanted medical treatment (as opposed to the treatment itself)

to raise a distinct Eighth Amendment claim for unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain. See Davis, 89 Fed. App’x at 529 (citing Whitley v Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

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319 (1986)). These allegations pertain to the actions of prison officials identified

by plaintiff only as “Officers” and “Nurse” (Dkt. 34, ¶¶ 28, 29), whereas the only

individuals named in the amended complaint are identified as psychiatrists

(defendants Garlapati and Pozios ) and a psychologist (defendant Beauvais). 1

Accordingly, because the allegations do not relate to any named defendant, they

are subject to dismissal. See Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6 Cir.

th

1983)(a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the

alleged violation of federal right). The undersigned recommends that the

allegations against unnamed Officers and Nurse be dismissed without prejudice.

D. Plaintiff Fails to State a Viable Claim for Violation of Due

Process

The Sixth Circuit has recognized that individuals in state custody enjoy a

protectable liberty interest to refuse medical treatment. Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d

157, 161 (6 Cir. 1996)(citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990)). th

But that interest is often subject to regulation in the prison setting because of the

“legitimacy, and the necessity, of considering the State's interests in prison safety

and security....” Harper, 494 U.S. at 223. A policy of involuntary medication,

determined to be necessary by prison doctors, “is an accommodation between an

Defendant Pozios has yet to be served. (Dkt. 41, 46, 48) 1

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inmate's liberty interest in avoiding forced administration of ... drugs and the

State's interests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger

that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or

others.” Id. at 236. Specifically, 

the risks associated with antipsychotic drugs are for the most part medical

ones, best assessed by medical professionals. A state may conclude with

good reason that a judicial hearing will not be as effective...as

administrative review using medical decisionmakers...[D]ue process

requires no more. 

Id. at 233; see also Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 751 n. 16 (6th

Cir.2004) (“In cases involving constitutional challenges to the actions of prison

administrators, the Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly that the decisions of

administrators are entitled to substantial deference.”). 

The plaintiff does not expressly allege that the decision to medicate him

involuntarily was made without constitutionally sufficient process. Moreover, the

undersigned notes that plaintiff repeatedly alludes to panel hearings conducted

relative to his medical treatment. (Dkt. 34, 46). These referenced hearings are

presumably the administrative reviews, contemplated by Harper, wherein medical

decision makers assess the medical necessity of treating plaintiff despite his

objections. As noted by Harper, due process requires nothing more than this type

of administrative review. Hence, plaintiff has not stated a valid claim for

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deprivation of liberty without due process of law. See Kramer, 302 Fed. App’x at

400; see also, Harper, 494 U.S. at 233.

E. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue plaintiff’s amended complaint should be dismissed

because they are entitled to qualified immunity from liability. (Dkt. 44). The

doctrine of qualified immunity means that “‘[g]overnment officials performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Caldwell

v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1992), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Defendants bear the burden of pleading qualified immunity,

but plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defendant’s conduct violated a

right so clearly established that a reasonable official in his position would have

clearly understood that he or she was under an affirmative duty to refrain from

such conduct. Sheets v. Mullins, 287 F.3d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted) (explaining that “[t]he ultimate burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show

that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity”). 

The Supreme Court had established a two-part test in order to determine

whether qualified immunity is applicable to a particular situation. Saucier v. Katz,

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533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The first part of the test involves a determination of

whether the facts of the case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

“show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Id. If the first

question was resolved in the affirmative, then the court would decide “whether the

right was clearly established.” Id. If both questions are resolved in the

affirmative, then the doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply and the case

can proceed. 

The Supreme Court revisited its decision in Saucier and concluded that

mandatory order of the two part test for determining if qualified immunity applied

was no longer sound based on several factors, including judicial economy. 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009). While not modifying the factors

that should be considered in such a decision, the Court held that sometimes it

makes sense to allow the second part of the test to be decided first and that such a

decision may resolve the controversy without having to address the first part of the

test. Id. In Pearson, the § 1983 claim of the plaintiff was based on an allegedly

unlawful search conducted by the defendant police officers. Without having to

engage in the perhaps more complicated decision of determining whether

plaintiff’s constitutional rights had been violated, the Court found that the

constitutional right claimed by plaintiff was not clearly established where lower

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court case law was consistent with the conduct of the officers and “principles of

qualified immunity [should] shield an officer from personal liability when an

officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.” Id. at

244-45. “This generally means that ‘we are free to consider those questions in

whatever order is appropriate in light of the issues before us.’” Jones v. Byrnes,

585 F.3d 971, 975 (6th Cir. 2009), quoting Moldowan v. City of Warren, 570 F.3d

698, 720 (6th Cir. 2009).

Under the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity test, the

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “A clearly established constitutional violation requires

on-point, controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive

authority.” Ortega v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 737

F.3d 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2013). Without on-point authority, only in the

most obvious of cases can an official’s conduct be held to be clearly unlawful.

Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2005). 

Moreover, defendants are not required to affirmatively disprove the

existence of clearly established law, because “[t]he burden of convincing a court

that the law was clearly established rests squarely with the plaintiff.” Key v.

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Grayson, 179 F.3d 996, 1000 (6th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff “bears the ultimate burden

of proof to show that the individual officers are not entitled to qualified

immunity.” Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir.

2005).

As plaintiff acknowledges in his amended complaint, the medical treatment

dispensed by defendants was subject to the oversight of the administrative review

process. Under these circumstances, reasonable prison medical professionals

would believe dispensing treatment according to their professional judgment

complies with the law. Because plaintiff has not demonstrated that his right to

refuse medical treatment in this instance was clearly established, defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity on his claims.

 IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

defendant’s motion to dismiss should be GRANTED, plaintiff’s complaint should

be DISMISSED.

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service,

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right

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of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health and

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health

and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.

Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,”

etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the

objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), Local Rule 72.1(d). 

The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the

same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection

No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may

rule without awaiting the response.

Date: August 22, 2016 s/Stephanie Dawkins Davis

Stephanie Dawkins Davis

United States Magistrate Judge

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August 22, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing paper

with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will send electronic

notification to all counsel of record, and I certify that I have mailed by United

States Postal Service the foregoing pleading to the following non-ECF

participant(s), at the following address(es): Nathaniel Hines #452677, Macomb

Correctional Facility, 34625 26 Mile Road, New Haven, MI 48048.

s/Tammy Hallwood

Case Manager

(810) 341-7887

tammy_hallwood@mied.uscourts.gov

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