UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

BURTON CANFIELD, JR., 

 Plaintiff, 

v.

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 2:15-cv-10195 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

REMAND PURSUANT TO SENTENCE FOUR (DE 15) AND DENYING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 16) 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff, Burton Canfield, Jr., brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§405(g) 

and 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance 

benefits. On March 12, 2012, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for 

disability insurance benefits, alleging that he has been disabled since February 3, 

2012. (R. at 19.) Plaintiff’s application was denied and he sought a de novo

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). ALJ James Kent held a 

hearing on August 6, 2013 and subsequently determined that Plaintiff was not 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 19-58.) On 

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November 25, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. 

at 1-4.) ALJ Kent’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. Plaintiff 

then timely commenced the instant action. 

II. THE INSTANT MOTIONS 

 In his motion for remand, Plaintiff asserts that ALJ Kent committed 

reversible error by violating the treating source rule, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2) 

and S.S.R. 96-8p. (DE 15.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to 

provide good reasons for discounting the March 11, 2013 opinion of his treating 

physician, Dr. Wiggins.1

 The Commissioner opposes the motion and has filed a 

motion for summary judgment, noting that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

decision.

 The parties have consented to my authority. (DE 14.) A hearing was held 

on January 7, 2016, at which Plaintiff’s counsel (Lewis M. Seward) Defendant’s 

counsel (AUSA Sean Santen) appeared by telephone. Having considered the 

motion papers and oral arguments of counsel for the parties and for the reasons 

stated on the record, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED, Defendant’s motion is 

DENIED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner and the ALJ for 

 

1

 Although Plaintiff initially challenged the ALJ’s treatment of several of Dr. 

Wiggins’ opinions, after receiving the Commissioner’s response and participating 

in oral argument Plaintiff significantly narrowed the focus of his appeal in his reply 

brief (DE 17 at 2) and yet further at the hearing, and agreed that the only issue 

remaining was Dr. Wiggins’ opinion dated March 11, 2013. (R. at 289-292.)

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rehearing under Sentence Four of § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with 

the following: 

1. ALJ Kent assigned “little weight” to Dr. Wiggins’ March 11, 2013 opinion 

because he found it inconsistent with Dr. Wiggins’ clinical findings, other 

medical evidence of record, and the claimant’s testimony, specifically, his 

“testimony that he had no difficulty with foot controls or gross 

manipulation.” (R. at 29, 41-42.) On remand, if the ALJ makes the same 

conclusion, he or she must explain, specify, and identify the inconsistencies 

he or she finds with respect to: 1) Dr. Wiggins’ clinical findings; 2) other 

medical evidence in the record; and 3) Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his 

ability to push and pull.

2. If the ALJ does not give Dr. Wiggins’ opinion controlling weight, he or she 

must address the length of the treatment relationship between Dr. Wiggins 

and Plaintiff, as well as the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, in 

accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii), 

3. ALJ Kent found Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain to be less than 

credible, in part because he had “not generally received the type of medical 

treatment one would expect for a totally disabled individual,” specifically 

noting that all of Plaintiff’s care “has been rendered by his primary care 

physician,” Dr. Wiggins. (R. at 27.) However, the record is replete with 

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evidence that Plaintiff lacked insurance during the relevant period and was 

“self-pay” with Dr. Wiggins. (See R. at 217 (“When he gets insurance we’ll 

discuss other possibilities such as a neurosurgery consult . . .”), R. at 276 

(“he has no insurance and cannot afford an MRI”), and R. at 205, 208, 210, 

and 212, where it is noted that he is “self pay”)). On remand, the ALJ must 

explain and re-assess any discounting of Plaintiff’s credibility on the basis 

that he failed to seek specialized treatment in light of his well-documented 

lack of insurance 

4. Similarly, the ALJ must explain whether he or she has discounted Dr. 

Wiggins’ opinion because Dr. Wiggins is not a specialist, and, if so, assess 

that factor in light of Plaintiff’s lack of insurance. 

5. ALJ Kent did not address the fact that Dr. Wiggins’ March 11, 2013 opinion 

was made after Plaintiff’s date last insured (“DLI”) of December 31, 2012.

Nor did Dr. Wiggins indicate that the opinion related back to the relevant 

period. Upon questioning at the hearing, Defendant conceded that, on 

remand, the ALJ could possibly find that the opinion related back to the 

relevant time period. The Court agrees and concludes that the weighing of 

Dr. Wiggins’ opinion and fact-finding with respect to the DLI is a task 

reserved to the ALJ. Accordingly, on remand the ALJ must further evaluate 

Dr. Wiggins’ March 11, 2013 opinion in light of Plaintiff’s DLI of 

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December 31, 2012 and determine whether it relates back to the relevant 

period.

III. CONCLUSION 

 Due to the errors stated on the record and outlined in part above, and in 

order for this Court to have an appellate record which would “permit meaningful 

review of the ALJ’s application of the [treating physician] rule,” Wilson v. 

Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004), Plaintiff is entitled 

to an order remanding this case to the Social Security Administration pursuant to 

Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for remand is 

GRANTED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2016 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on January 11, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

 Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

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