SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

423 

CA 15-01526 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND NEMOYER, JJ.

 

BRENDA C. BROWN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DEBORAH A. HALL, MICHAEL HALL AND CANINE & 

COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

 

KENNEY SHELTON LIPTAK NOWAK LLP, BUFFALO (ANDREW D. DRILLING OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

WILLIAM C. BERNHARDI LAW OFFICES, PLLC, BUFFALO (JOSEPH NICASTRO OF

COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Deborah

A. Chimes, J.), entered June 10, 2015. The order denied the motion of

defendants to dismiss the amended complaint. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, and the matter is

remitted to Supreme Court, Erie County, for further proceedings in

accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this

negligence action seeking to recover damages for injuries she

sustained when she was attacked by a dog on the premises of her

employer, defendant Canine & Company, Inc., which is owned by

defendants Deborah A. Hall and Michael Hall. Plaintiff is uncertain

whether the dog is owned by the corporate defendant or the individual

defendants but, according to the individual defendants, the dog is

owned by the corporate defendant. Defendants moved to dismiss the

amended complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, on the

ground that workers’ compensation benefits were plaintiff’s exclusive

remedy. Supreme Court denied the motion, and defendants appeal.

We conclude that the court erred in entertaining the motion. It

is well settled that “primary jurisdiction with respect to

determinations as to the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation

Law has been vested in the Workers’ Compensation Board [(Board)] . . .

[I]t is therefore inappropriate for the courts to express views with

respect thereto pending determination by” the Board (Botwinick v

Ogden, 59 NY2d 909, 911; see O’Rourke v Long, 41 NY2d 219, 227-228;

Davis v Erie County Dept. of Social Servs., 133 AD3d 1373, 1374). 

Here, whether plaintiff was injured within the scope of her employment

and whether the individual defendants acted within the course of their

employment in having the dog on the premises are matters that “ ‘must

in the first instance be determined by the [B]oard’ ” (O’Rourke, 41
-2- 423 

CA 15-01526 

NY2d at 228; see Ferguson v Davis Auto World, 207 AD2d 991, 991; Ralph

v Oliver, 186 AD2d 977, 977). Thus, the court “should not have

entertained [defendants’] motion at this juncture, and the case should

have been referred to the Board for a determination . . . whether

. . . plaintiff[] [has] a valid cause of action for damages or whether

[she] is limited to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law”

(Gullo v Bellhaven Ctr. for Geriatric & Rehabilitative Care, Inc., 114

AD3d 905, 906-907). We therefore reverse the order and remit the

matter to Supreme Court to determine the motion after final resolution

of a prompt application to the Board to determine plaintiff’s rights,

if any, to workers’ compensation benefits (see Davis, 133 AD3d at

1374).

Entered: May 6, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court