UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RODNEY HAMPTON, Civil Action No. 14-13943

Plaintiff, 

HON. R. STEVEN WHALEN 

 v. U.S. Magistrate Judge

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Rodney Hampton (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §405(g),

challenging a final decision of Defendant Commissioner denying his applications for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under the

Social Security Act. Both parties have filed summary judgment motions. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dock. #11] is GRANTED and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dock. #9] is DENIED. 

1

1

At the time Plaintiff filed his summary judgment motion, he was represented by

counsel. Docket #9. After the withdrawal of counsel, Plaintiff was permitted to file an

amended motion. Docket #16. While Plaintiff, now proceeding pro se, declined to file an

amended motion, the undersigned has independently reviewed the record for possible

grounds for remand. In Social Security cases, the failure to submit a brief or a full blown

legal argument "[is] not a prerequisite to the Court's reaching a decision on the merits" or a

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging disability as

of January 10, 2011 (Tr. 146-152, 153-159). After the initial denial of the claim, he

requested an administrative hearing, held June 28, 2013 in Mt. Pleasant, Michigan (Tr. 38). 

Administrate Law Judge (“ALJ”) Kendra S. Kleber presided. Plaintiff, represented byAaron

Lemmens, testified (Tr. 44-59), as did Vocational Expert (“VE”)DavidHolwerda (Tr.59-65). 

On August 12, 2013, ALJ Kleber found that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. 31-33). On

August 14, 2014, the Appeals Council denied review (Tr. 1-4). Plaintiff filed for judicial

review of the Commissioner’s decision on October 13, 2014. 

BACKGROUND FACTS

Plaintiff, born August 22, 1968, was just short of his 45 birthday when the ALJ th

issued her decision (Tr. 33, 146). He completed a GED and worked previously as a

construction worker, retail shop owner, and painter (Tr. 175). His application for benefits

alleges disability as a result of bipolar disorder, depression, hypertension, Gastroesophageal

Reflux Disease (“GERD”), and “memory problems” (Tr. 174). 

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff’s attorney prefaced his client’s testimony by conceding that the conditions

of hypertension, GERD, and diabetes did not create work-related limitations (Tr. 44). He

finding, sua sponte, that grounds exist for reversal. Wright v. Commissioner of Social Sec.,

2010 WL 5420990, *2 -3 (E.D.Mich December 27, 2010)(Friedman, J.).

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stated that the “main focus” of the disability claim was “mental issues” (Tr. 44). 

Plaintiff then offered the following testimony: 

He had not worked since 2008 or 2009 (Tr. 45). He last worked at a placement

agency doing industrial painting (Tr. 45). The job did not require him to lift more than five

pounds (Tr. 45-46). He was not sure whether he could return to the job due to symptoms of

Carpel Tunnel Syndrome (“CTS”) (Tr. 46). His physician had prescribed hand splints

several years earlier (Tr. 48-49). Symptoms of CTS included hand numbness caused by

painting, hammering, and driving (Tr. 47). Plaintiff “called in sick” several times a month

when he did not “feel like doing” his job, attributing his poor motivation to depression (Tr.

48). His former work as a roofer required him to lift up to 80 pounds (Tr. 49). He would be

unable to return to the roofer work due to leg and low back pain (Tr. 50).

Plaintiff stood 6' 1" and weighed 300 pounds (Tr. 51). He had diabetes causing

chronically high blood sugar spikes (Tr. 51-52). He took daily medication for the condition

and had a checkup every three months (Tr. 52). He also experienced memory problems

characterized by difficulty memorizing shopping lists or comprehending the gist of a

newspaper article (Tr. 52). He experienced bipolar disorder with more “lows” than highs

(Tr. 53). His depressive episodes were characterized by the need to “get away from

everything” and the failure to take showers or change his clothes regularly (Tr. 53-54). He

did not perform any household chores and dined out only “[o]nce in a great while” (Tr. 54-

55). He also experienced anxiety attacks around twice each week characterized by agitation

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and anger (Tr. 53). His anxiety attacks were triggered by unremarkable events such as

interaction with his wife or his children running through the house (Tr. 54). On a scale of

one to ten, he typically experienced level “three or four” energy (Tr. 54). He experienced

frequent sleep disturbances (Tr. 55).

Plaintiff denied ever using marijuana (Tr. 55-56). He completed his GED in

September, 2010 and went on to complete college courses in web design (Tr. 56). He

stopped attending classes after experiencing memory problems (Tr. 57). He also performed

volunteer work installing ramps for handicapped individuals (Tr. 58). He acknowledged that

he could return to his past work as an installer if required (Tr. 59). 

 B. Medical Evidence2

1. Treating Sources

August, 2010 treating records state that Plaintiff wanted to lose weight but had no

other health complaints (Tr. 277, 329). The same month, Plaintiff reported that he had been

“under a lot [of] stress lately” due to “legal issues” (Tr. 274). December, 2010 imaging

studies of the right wrist were unremarkable (Tr. 294). January, 2011 psychiatric intake

records note Plaintiff’s report that he lost his temper easily (Tr. 259). Plaintiff also reported

overeating and difficulty sleeping (Tr. 259). He admitted to former marijuana use but denied 

any other drug use (Tr. 260, 355). Plaintiff reported a happy marriage (Tr. 261). He

Treating records predating the January 10, 2011 alleged onset of disability are 2

included for background purposes only. 

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appeared well-dressed and was fully oriented (Tr. 261). He was assigned a GAF of 70 (Tr. 3

261). Medical treatment notes from the same month state that Plaintiff reported ongoing

shooting pain in the right arm and wrist and the use of wrist splints (Tr. 317). The following

month, he reported good results from Abilify but continued having problems sleeping (Tr.

258). 

In March, 2011, Plaintiff reported feeling good but unmotivated (Tr. 257). He was

assigned a GAF of 57 (Tr. 247). The following month, he reported a panic attack where the 4

“walls [were] closing in,” but denied sweating (Tr. 255-256). In June, 2011, Plaintiff

reported that his condition was stable and that he was sleeping eight hours a night (Tr. 254). 

His depression was characterized as “mild” (Tr. 245, 364). The same month, a nail was

removed from his left forearm (Tr. 292). August, 2011 records state that he was doing well

and sleeping “just fine” but reported “small panic attacks” (Tr. 253-254). Plaintiffstated that

he did not “get angry anymore” (Tr. 242). Glucose readings from the same month were

elevated (Tr. 337). 

A January, 2012 medication review states that Plaintiff was sleeping well but

continued to experience anxiety (Tr. 251). In March, 2012, Plaintiff reported depression

3

GAF scores in the range of 61-70 indicate ‘some mild [psychological] symptoms or

some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning.‘ American Psychiatric

Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders--Text Revision, 34

(“DSM-IV-TR”) (4th ed. 2000).

A GAF score of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms (occasional panic attacks) or 4

moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning., DSM-IV-TR at 34.

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because he had to drop classes due to memory problems (Tr. 238). A June, 2012 medication

review states that Plaintiff had experienced one “bad day” in which he had a memory lapse

but was otherwise doing well (Tr. 237, 250). He was prescribed a smaller dosage of

psychotropic medication (Tr. 250). An undated assessment includes a GAF of 47 (Tr. 235). 5

A December, 2012 ultrasound showed fatty infiltration of the liver (Tr. 344). The

same month, Plaintiff reported memory problems including forgetting his own name while

signing a paper and forgetting where he was going while driving (Tr. 342). Therapy notes

state that Plaintiff was still experiencing memory problems (Tr. 358). April 2013

psychological treating records state that Plaintiff’s condition was stable (Tr. 371). 

2. Non-Treating Sources 

In September, 2012, psychologist Michael Brady, Ph.D. performed a consultative

examination, noting Plaintiff’s report of depressive symptoms for the past several years

including low self esteem, social isolation, concentrational problems, sleep disturbances, and

irritability (Tr. 303). Plaintiff reported that he enjoyed playing computer games and working

on woodworking projects (Tr. 304). He reported that he shared the “cooking and cleaning” 

chores with his wife (Tr. 304). Dr. Brady observed a normal thought process with a

depressed mood (Tr. 304-305). Dr. Brady found that Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others

was impaired and that his work effectiveness would “likely be limited and slowed” due to 

A GAF score of 41-50 indicates ‘[s]erious symptoms ... [or] serious impairment in 5

social, occupational, or school functioning,‘ such as inability to keep a job. DSM-IV-TR

at 34.

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depression (Tr. 306). He assigned Plaintiff a GAF of 58 (Tr. 306). 

The same month Bruce G. Douglass, Ph.D. performed a non-examining review of the

treating and consultative psychological records, finding that Plaintiff experienced mild

limitation in activities of daily living and moderate limitation in social functioning and

concentration, persistence, or pace (Tr. 71). He concluded that Plaintiff could perform

routine, two-step tasks on a sustained basis (Tr. 74). 

C. Vocational Expert Testimony

VE David Holwerda classified Plaintiff’s former work as a house repairer as skilled

and exertionally heavy (mediumas performed) and painter, unskilled/medium (Tr. 61). The 6

ALJ then described a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff’s age, education and work

experience: 

He is able to perform work that is limited to simple, routine, or repetitive tasks,

with only rare interaction with the public is less than occasional, and that

interaction should be superficial. Can involve occasional and superficial

interaction with coworkers, and the work should be low stress that is routine

and predictable defined as involving no more than occasional changes in the

work to be performed in the work setting. Now, first of all would such a

6

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a-d) defines sedentary work as “lifting no more than 10 pounds

at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small

tools; light work as “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or

carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds;” medium work as “lifting no more than 50

pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds;” and

that exertionally heavy work “involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds. Very Heavy work requires

“lifting objects weighing more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of

objects weighing 50 pounds or more. § 404.1567(e). 

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person be able to perform Mr. Hampton’s past work? (Tr. 62). 

The VE replied that given the above limitations, the individual could perform Plaintiff’s past

relevant work as a brush painter as well as the “other” unskilled work of a janitor or building

cleaner, commercial cleaner, and a machine operator (Tr. 63). 

 D. The ALJ’s Decision

Citing Plaintiff’s medical records, ALJ Kleber found that Plaintiff experienced the

“severe” impairment of an “affective disorder,” but that the condition did not meet or

medically equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 21-

22). She found that the conditions of CTS, hypertension, GERD, and diabetes were “nonsevere” impairments, finding that none of the conditions caused more than minimal

limitations in Plaintiff’s work-related activity (Tr. 21-22). The ALJ found that Plaintiff

experienced mild limitation in activities of daily living and moderate limitation in social

functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace (Tr. 23-24). The ALJ found that Plaintiff

had the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) for “a full range of work at all exertional

levels” with the following additional non-exertional limitations:

[H]e is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. He can have only rare

and superficial interaction with the public. He can have occasional and

superficial interaction with coworkers. He is limited to low stress work that

is routine and predictable, defined as involving no more than occasional

changes in the work to be performed or in the work setting (Tr. 25). 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a painter (Tr. 31). 

Citing the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could also perform the unskilled work

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of an industrial cleaner, commercial cleaner, or machine operator (Tr. 32). 

The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling limitation. She noted that

Plaintiff was able to interact with his family and did not experience problems getting along

with friends, neighbors, or authority figures (Tr. 30). She noted further that Plaintiff’s

volunteer work building ramps approximately 30 hours each week supported the finding that

“his symptoms and limitations may have been overstated (Tr. 30). The ALJ observed that

while Plaintiff denied marijuana use at the hearing, he told a treating source in January, 2011

that he used marijuana in “his younger days” (Tr. 30). 

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court reviews the final decision ofthe Commissioner to determine whether

it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Sherrill v. Secretary of Health and

Human Services, 757 F.2d 803, 804 (6 Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is more than a

th

scintilla but less that a preponderance. It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401,

91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.

197, 229, S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed.126 (1938)). The standard of review is deferential and 

“presupposes that there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which decision makers can go either way,

without interference from the courts.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6 Cir. 1986)(en th

banc). In determining whether the evidence is substantial, the court must “take into account

whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Wages v. Secretary of Health &

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Human Services, 755 F.2d 495, 497 (6 Cir. 1985). The court must examine the administrative th

record as a whole, and may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has

been cited by the ALJ. Walker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 884 F.2d 241, 245

(6 Cir. 1989). th

 FRAMEWORK FOR DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS

 Disability is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). In

evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner is to consider, in sequence,

whether the claimant: 1) worked during the alleged period of disability; 2) has a severe

impairment; 3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment

listed in the regulations; 4) can return to past relevant work; and 5) if not, whether he or she

can perform other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a). The Plaintiff has

the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at

step five to demonstrate that, “notwithstanding the claimant's impairment, he retains the

residual functional capacity to perform specific jobs existing in the national economy.” 

Richardson v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir.1984).

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ANALYSIS

 Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Decision

“To meet the burden of showing that [Plaintiff] could perform work that is available

in the national economy, the Commissioner must make a finding ‘supported by substantial

evidence that [Plaintiff] has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs.’” Howard

v. Commissioner of Social Security, 276 F.3d 235, 238 (6 Cir. 2002)(citations omitted). th

Considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, work experience, and the testimony of the VE,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the ability to perform his former work as a brush painter (Tr.

31). 

Substantial evidence supports the RFC. At Step Two of the analysis, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff’s “severe” impairment was an affective disorder (Tr. 21). The ALJ supported

her finding that diabetes, high blood pressure, obesity, and GERD were “non-severe”

impairments by noting that the conditions were well controlled with medication (Tr. 21). She

found correctly that the record did not contain a diagnosis of CTS (Tr. 22). 7

My own review of the record supports the finding that the physical limitations were

non-severe. March, 2011 records state that Plaintiff felt “good” (Tr. 257). August, 2011

7

 While the ALJ is technically correct that the record does not contain a diagnosis of

CTS, October, 2010 and January, 2011 treating records make reference to “tendonitis” of the

right wrist and arm requiring the use of a wrist splint (Tr. 316-317). However, assuming that

Plaintiff experienced some degree of upper extremity limitation, none of the treating records

created before October, 2010 or after January, 2011 make reference to wrist or armproblems. 

As such, he is unable to show that the condition lasted for the 12-month period required to

show impairment or disability. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). 

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records state that he was sleeping “just fine” and doing well overall (Tr. 253-254). June, 2012

records state that he was generally doing well (Tr. 237). Neither the medical nor

psychological treating records suggest that Plaintiff experienced significant physical

limitations. 

In addition, the ALJ noted, the RFC for “simple, routine, and repetitive tasks;” “rare

and superficial interaction with the public;” “superficial interaction with coworkers” and “low

stress work” is consistent with Dr. Douglass’ September, 2012 findings (Tr. 23-24, 30-31, 71)

and Plaintiff’s own testimony. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was able to volunteer building

ramps for approximately 30 hours each week (Tr. 30, 58). The psychological treatment

records show that Plaintiff interacted with family members and had sustained a happy

marriage for many years (Tr. 261). Plaintiff completed his testimony by acknowledging that

he could return to work if required (Tr. 59). The Step Four findings are likewise well

supported. Consistent with the VE’s testimony, the DOT lists the occupation of brush painter

as exertionally medium and unskilled. DOT Code 740.684-022. The RFC for work at all 8

exertional levels would allow Plaintiff to perform the brush painter position both as actually

performed (heavy exertional level) or, as generally performed in the national economy at the

medium level. Id.; SSR 82–61, 1982 WL 31387, *2 (1982)(Step Four determination can be

8

The DOT classifies the brush painter position as an “SVP 2” position. Specific

Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) 2, requiring “up to and including one month” training is

classified as unskilled work. http://www.occupationalinfo.org. (Last visited March 20,

2016); SSR 00–4p, 2000 WL 1898704, *3 (December 4, 2000)

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supported by the finding that claimant can perform past relevant work as “actually

performed,” or, “as generally required by employers throughout the national economy”). 

Because substantial evidence supports the finding that Plaintiff can perform his past relevant

work as actually or generally performed, the Step Four findings should remain undisturbed. 

Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003)(at Step Four, claimant “bears

the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by [the] impairments

and . . . that []he is precluded from performing [the] past relevant work” either as previously

performed or as generally required in the national economy). 

The ALJ’s alternative Step Five conclusion is also supported by substantial evidence. 

The hypothetical question to the VE, mirroring the limitations found in the RFC, generously

accounts for Plaintiff’s psychological restrictions (Tr. 25, 62). In response to the hypothetical

question, the VE testified that limitations posed therein would not prevent the performance

of a significant range of exertionally medium, unskilled work (Tr. 63). Because the question

to the VE accurately reflected Plaintiff’s limitations, the ALJ did not err in adopting the

corresponding job testimony. Varley v. Secretary of Health &Human Services, 820 F.2d 777,

779 (6th Cir.1987)(“Substantial evidence may be produced through reliance on the testimony

of a vocational expert in response to a hypothetical question,” so long as the question

“accurately portrays [the] plaintiff's individual physical and mental impairments” (internal

citations omitted). 

I appreciate that Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s conclusions. However, this Court’s

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review under the “substantial evidence” standard is highly deferential, and it is not our

function to re-weigh the evidence or make our own, independent (de novo) disability

determination. Furthermore, the Commissioner’s findings are not subject to reversal merely

because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion. Mullen v.

Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6 Cir. 1986)(en banc). In this case, both the RFC and the ALJ’s th

ultimate non-disability decision are supported by substantial evidence.

For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dock. #11] is

GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dock. #9] is DENIED. 

Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/R. Steven Whalen 

R. STEVEN WHALEN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Date: March 31, 2016

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record on

March 31, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. mail.

s/C. Ciesla 

Case Manager

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