UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

VINCENT THOMAS and ALAN QUEEN, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. Civil Case No. 15-10055 

 Honorable Linda V. Parker 

RIGHT CHOICE STAFFING GROUP, LLC, 

ADEPT SERVICES GROUP, INC., 

DOWNRIVER STAFFING GROUP, LLC, 

AUTOLINE TRANSPORTATION, INC., 

TIMOTHY SCHULTZ, and TRACY SHAFFER, 

 Defendants. 

_______________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD IN FAVOR OF 

PLAINTIFF VINCENT THOMAS

 Plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit against Defendants asserting 

violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. 

Defendants thereafter moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in 

an agreement signed by Plaintiffs. In a decision issued July 6, 2015, this Court 

granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 27.) Finding the 

arbitration agreement effective as of December 16, 2013, the Court held that 

Plaintiffs could be compelled to arbitrate only their FLSA claims arising after that 

date. (Id. at Pg ID 13.) The Court stayed Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims arising before 

that date until arbitration was concluded. (Id. at 30.) The matter is presently 
2 

before the Court on Defendants’ motion to vacate the arbitration award, filed 

March 19, 2018. (ECF No. 32.) The motion has been fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 

33, 34.) Finding the facts and legal arguments sufficiently presented by the parties, 

the Court is dispensing with oral argument with respect to Defendants’ motion 

pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f). 

Background

 Sometime after the Court issued its July 6, 2015 decision compelling 

arbitration, Plaintiff Vincent Thomas (“Thomas”) and Defendants proceeded to 

arbitration through the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).1

 The parties 

subsequently agreed to consolidate the arbitration case for hearing with another 

case in which the Honorable Judith E. Levy had ordered arbitration of FLSA 

claims brought by Gary Conner, Jr. (“Conner”) against Right Choice Staffing 

Group, LLC (“Right Choice”) and Adept Services Group, Inc. (“Adept”): Gary 

Conner, Jr. v. Right Choice Staffing Grp., LLC, et al., Civil Case No. 14-12887 

(E.D. Mich. filed July 23, 2014). The parties subsequently selected Michael R. 

Blum as the arbitrator. 

 On October 27, 2016, Arbitrator Blum submitted a General Arbitrator Oath 

Form to AAA, answering “yes” in response to the question: “Have you had any 

 

1 Plaintiff Alan Queen’s claims were subsequently dismissed by the arbitrator due 

to his failure to appear at the arbitration hearing. (See Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. 

at 3 n.1, ECF No. 32 at Pg ID 345.) 
3 

professional or social relationship with counsel for any party in this proceeding or 

the firms for which they work.” (Defs.’ Mot., Ex 10, ECF No. 32-11 at Pg ID 

478.) Arbitrator Blum explained that he is a member of the Macomb County Bar 

Association (“MCBA”) Labor and Employment Committee and that Conner’s 

counsel, Heidi Sharp, also is a committee member and served at the time as its 

Chairperson. (Id.) Arbitrator Blum submitted a supplemental disclosure on 

October 31, 2016, adding that he had not been particularly active in the MCBA 

Labor and Employment Committee in the past few years and had not attended 

committee meetings for the past year. (Id., Ex. 11, ECF No. 32-12.) Arbitrator 

Blum included that he did not believe his relationship with Sharp would affect his 

ability to act fairly and impartially. (Id.) He then submitted a second supplemental 

disclosure on May 1, 2017, stating that he appeared opposite another lawyer in 

Sharp’s firm, Joseph Golden of Burgess Sharp & Golden, in an ongoing matter and 

that they attended an EEOC conciliation in the matter on that date. (Id., Ex. 16, 

ECF No. 32-17.) 

 The consolidated arbitration hearing regarding Thomas’ and Conner’s 

claims was held on August 9 or September 8, 2017.2

 On October 6, 2017, 

 

2 Defendants indicate that the hearing occurred on the earlier date and the 

arbitrator’s interim decision provides the same date. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. at 

11, ECF No. 32 at Pg ID 353; Id. Ex. 20 at 1, ECF No. 32-21 at Pg ID 591.) The 

arbitrator’s final award, however, states that the hearing occurred on the latter date. 
4 

Arbitrator Blum issued a Decision and Interim Award. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 20, ECF 

No. 32-21.) Arbitrator Blum first found that Thomas and Conner were employees, 

not independent contractors, and thus entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. 

(Id. at 5, Pg ID 595.) Arbitrator Blum next found that Conner suffered damages in 

the form of unpaid overtime totaling $6,170.63, and that Thomas’ damages totaled 

$5,409.63 (which included a credit of $661.00 previously paid pursuant to a 

Department of Labor investigation). (Id. at 5-6, Pg ID 595-96.) In the “Award” 

section of the decision, however, Arbitrator Blum listed Conner’s damages as 

$9,459.00. (Id. at 7, ECF No. 597.) 

 Arbitrator Blum additionally awarded Conner and Thomas liquidated 

damages under the FLSA in the same amounts as their actual damages and 

concluded that they were entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 

6, 7, Pg ID 596-97.) Finding insufficient documentation to determine the 

appropriate award of attorneys’ fees or costs, Arbitrator Blum retained jurisdiction 

and instructed the parties to file submissions regarding the issue. (Id.) Lastly, 

Arbitrator Blum dismissed Thomas’ and Conner’s claims against Adept and 

Downriver Staffing Group, LLC, finding that they never worked for these 

companies, and concluded that there was no basis to hold Tracy Shaffer personally 

 

(Id., Ex. 21 at 3, ECF No. 32-22 at Pg ID 601.) The discrepancy is irrelevant with 

respect to the pending motion. 
5 

liable. (Id. at 7, Pg ID 597.) He found Right Choice, Autoline, and Timothy 

Schultz jointly liable for the arbitration award. (Id.) 

 Right Choice and Schultz subsequently filed a motion for modification, 

noting the discrepancy in the amounts awarded to Conner in the interim award and 

arguing that Conner was entitled to a much lower award, $1,532.07 or less. See

Resp. to Mot., Ex. 1, Conner v. Right Choice Staffing Grp., LLC, et al., No. 14-

12887 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2018), ECF No. 30-2. On December 20, 2017, 

Arbitrator Blum issued a Final Award of Arbitration, awarding Thomas $9,459.00 

in damages, the same amount in liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees totaling 

$25,650.00 against Right Choice, Autoline, and Schultz.3

 (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 21, 

ECF No. 32-22.) Arbitrator Blum awarded Conner $6,170.63, the same amount in 

liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $24,271.00. (Id) 

 On March 19, 2018, Defendants filed the pending motion to vacate the 

arbitration award in favor of Thomas.4

 Defendants indicate in their motion that 

“[f]ollowing the arbitration hearing, [they] discovered that the arbitrator had not 

disclosed pertinent information regarding his relationship to Conner’s attorney and 

 

3 In the final award, Arbitrator Blum states that upon review of the damage 

calculations in response to the motion for modification, he found an error in the 

amount he had awarded to Thomas in his interim decision. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 21 at 

8 n.4, ECF No. 32-22 at Pg ID 606.) 

4 On the same date, Right Choice and Adept also moved to vacate the award in 

favor of Conner in the case pending before Judge Levy. See Mot., Conner, No. 14-

12287 (E.D. Mich. filed Mar. 19, 2018), ECF No. 27. The motion is scheduled for 

hearing on August 16, 2018. 
6 

other partners in her firm.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 4, ECF No. 32 at Pg ID 346.) 

Specifically, Defendants identify that Arbitrator Blum failed to previously disclose 

the following: 

(1) [H]e was apparently a founding member of the Macomb County 

ADR Committee, together with Joseph Golden, a partner at Burgess, 

Sharp, and Golden and, at that time, a director of the Macomb County 

Bar Association. (Exhibit 13, at 12-14); 

(2) Sharp was also a member of the Macomb County ADR Committee 

at the same time as Arbitrator Blum (Exhibit 14, at 20)[;] 

(3) [H]e organized a presentation on November 4, 2013 on ADR 

techniques with Golden, which featured Sharp as one of the event’s 

speakers. (Exhibit 15, at 2; Ex. 13, at 13-14[.]) At the time, the ADR 

Committee consisted of just 26 members. (Ex. 13, at 14)[;] 

(4) Sharp, Blum, and Golden were all members of the ADR 

Committee as of at least February 2015, after [Judge Levy] entered an 

Order compelling arbitration of Conner’s claims on January 16, 2015. 

(Ex. 14, at 20) 

(Defs.’ Mot. at 8-9, ECF No. 32 at Pg ID 351-52, footnotes omitted.) Defendants 

contend that Arbitrator Blum’s relationship with Golden and Sharp caused him to 

be biased in favor of Sharp’s client, Conner, as demonstrated by his award to 

Conner of nearly twice the maximum damages he sought, an award against Schultz 

and Autoline where Conner never named them as defendants in his federal 

complaint, and allowing Sharp to file pleadings beyond set deadlines. 

 
7 

Discussion

 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) expresses a federal policy favoring the 

enforcement of arbitration clauses negotiated between parties to a contract.5

 See 

Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989). To encourage 

parties to agree to arbitration in the first place, the FAA ensures that “arbitration 

awards are both fair and final.” Solvay Pharm. Inc. v. Duramed Pharm, Inc., 442 

F.3d 471, 475 (6th Cir. 2006). The act promotes finality “by substantially limiting 

the occasions for judicial review,” id., and expressing “a presumption that 

arbitration awards will be confirmed.” Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 

F.3d 308, 328 (6th Cir. 1998). At the same time, however, fairness is achieved “by 

requiring courts to intervene when arbitrators so improperly execute their 

responsibilities as to discourage others from arbitrating in the future.” Solvay, 442 

F.3d at 475. 

 Pursuant to the FAA, a court may intervene and vacate an arbitration award 

upon application of any party to the arbitration: 

(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 

means; 

(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, 

or either of them; 

 

5 When they moved to compel arbitration, Defendants contended that the arbitration 

agreement was subject to the FAA. (See Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot at 9-11, ECF 

No. at Pg ID 116-18.) Plaintiffs did not dispute this contention in response. (See 

Pls.’ Resp., ECF No. 21.) 
8 

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 

postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 

hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any 

other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 

prejudiced; or 

(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 

executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the 

subject matter submitted was not made. 

9 U.S.C. § 10(a). In this case, Defendants argue that vacatur is necessary because 

Arbitrator Blum exhibited evident partiality. (See Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. at 

14, ECF No. 32 at Pg ID 356.) 

 An arbitration award may be vacated on the basis of evident partiality only 

where “a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to 

the other party to the arbitration.” Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 

1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted). As a result, “[t]he alleged 

partiality must be direct, definite, and capable of demonstration, and ‘the party 

asserting evident partiality must establish specific facts that indicate improper 

motives on the part of the arbitrator.’” Andersons, Inc., 166 F.3d at 329 (quoting 

Consol. Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers of Am., 48 F.3d 125, 129 

(4th Cir. 1995)). Defendants fail to satisfy this standard. 

 First, Defendants do not identify facts from which “a reasonable person 

would have to conclude that” Arbitrator Blum was partial to one party to the 

arbitration. Arbitrator Blum’s professional involvement with Golden in forming 
9 

the MCBA ADR committee and organizing a brown bag lunch to present ADR 

techniques—both which occurred at least four years before the arbitration—would 

not necessarily render him biased in favor of Conner, who was represented in the 

arbitration by someone with whom Golden later formed a partnership.6

 See Uhl v. 

Komatsu Forklift Co., 512 F.3d 294, 307 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a reasonable 

person would not be forced to conclude that the arbitrator was partial toward the 

plaintiff or counsel of intervening insurance company based on fact that the 

arbitrator previously worked as co-counsel on two cases with intervening 

plaintiff’s attorney and had appeared in other cases in which this other attorney had 

represented an intervenor); Apperson, 879 F.2d at 1360 (declining to vacate 

arbitrator’s award where arbitrator adjudicated a case that involved his former law 

partners whose practice he left two-and-a-half years earlier). As the Sixth Circuit 

has stated: “Certainly, arbitrators and attorneys frequently participate in activities 

that result in communication unrelated to the subject matter of litigation before the 

arbitrator, ... and it would be unreasonable to suggest such contacts in unrelated 

matters are prohibited.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 

649 (2005) (internal citation omitted) (finding that arbitrator’s previous service in 

six matters as arbitrator for one of the parties and social engagements with party’s 

 

6 In response to Defendants’ motion, Thomas indicates that Golden and Sharp 

became business partners a year after the November 2013 ADR presentation. 

(Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 4, ECF No. 33 at Pg ID 622.) 
10 

attorneys at events that did not involve any communication about the arbitration 

did not require vacatur of his award). Moreover, Arbitrator Blum’s previous 

professional involvement with Conner’s attorney, Sharp, and Sharp’s law partner, 

Golden, certainly do not suggest partiality in favor of Thomas. 

 Second, Defendants fail to identify concrete actions in which Arbitrator 

Blum appeared to actually favor Conner or Thomas. “An adverse award in and of 

itself is no evidence of bias absent some evidence of improper motivation.” 

Andersons, Inc., 166 F.3d at 330. As evidence of partiality, Defendants also point 

to Arbitrator Blum’s holding Autoline and Schultz jointly liable where Conner did 

not name them as defendants in his federal lawsuit suit and Arbitrator Blum’s 

award of damages to Conner that exceeded the amount he sought in his 

specification of claims. 

 Autoline and Schultz were included as named respondents in the 

consolidated arbitration matter, however. (See, Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 21 at 1 n.2, ECF 

No. 32-22 at Pg ID 599.) Moreover, Arbitrator Blum specifically explained why 

he found them jointly liable under the FLSA. 7 (Id. at 10, Pg ID 608.) With 

respect to the amount of damages, there are several explanations other than bias for 

why the award exceeded the amount stated in Conner’s specification of claims. 

 

7 Arbitrator Blum found that Schultz owned or partly owned Right Choice, who 

Conner did include in his federal complaint, and Right Choice was Autoline’s 

successor after it shut down in April 2013. (See, e.g., Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 21, ECF 

No. 32-22 at Pg ID 601.) 
11 

For example, it may have resulted from a miscalculation, an error of fact, or a 

determination by Arbitrator Blum that Conner was due the amount awarded.8

 

Defendants cite no authority for their contention that the arbitrator may not award 

damages greater than those stated in a claimant’s specification and they did not 

raise this as an argument when seeking modification of the interim award. See 

Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 1, Conner, No. 14-12887 (E.D. Mich. filed Apr. 2, 2018), ECF No. 

30-2. 

 Finally, the fact that Arbitrator Blum may have allowed Thomas to file his 

specification of claims beyond the original deadline is not evidence of his 

partiality. Thomas sought leave for his delayed filing. Judges routinely extend 

deadlines to parties and their doing so is not evidence of bias. 

 In short, Defendants fail to demonstrate that Arbitrator Blum was partial to 

Conner or Thomas. As such, they do not establish a basis for vacatur. 

 

 

8 A factual error does not, on its own, empower a district court to vacate an 

arbitration award. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 

29, 36 (1987) )“The courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award 

even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on 

misinterpretation of the contract.”). 
12 

Attorney’s Fees

 In response to Defendants’ motion to vacate the arbitration award, Thomas 

asks the Court to award him the reasonable attorneys’ fees he has incurred 

defending against the motion. 

 The FLSA mandates an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff. 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b). As such, the Court concludes that Thomas is entitled to an award 

for the reasonable attorneys’ fees he incurred responding to Defendants’ motion to 

vacate the arbitration award. Within fourteen (14) days of this decision, Thomas 

shall file documentation supporting the amount sought. Defendants shall submit 

objections to the requested amount within fourteen (14) days of Thomas’ filing. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award 

in favor of Plaintiff Vincent Thomas (ECF No. 32) is DENIED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Thomas 

is awarded the reasonable attorneys’ fees he incurred in responding to Defendants’ 

motion. At a later date, the Court will issue a separate order setting forth the 

amount awarded. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: June 18, 2018 
13 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, June 18, 2018, by electronic and/or U.S. 

First Class mail. 

 s/ R. Loury 

 Case Manager