UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

REVERE NATIONAL CORPORATION,

INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 96-1470

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,

MARYLAND,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Deborah K. Chasanow, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-93-2899-DKC)

Argued: June 2, 1997

Decided: July 10, 1997

Before HALL and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,

Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Stan Derwin Brown, MCCARTHY, BACON & COSTELLO, L.L.P., Lanham, Maryland, for Appellant. Maureen Epps

Webb, Acting Deputy County Attorney, Sean Daniel Wallace, Deputy

County Attorney, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Barbara L. Holtz, Acting County Attorney, Upper Marlboro,

Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Revere National Corporation (Revere) appeals from the district

court's decision upholding the constitutionality of the most recent

sign ordinance adopted by Prince George's County, Maryland

(County). Revere contends that the ordinance, on its face, violates the

first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech, made applicable

to state and local governments by the fourteenth amendment. The

County defends its ordinance as a permissible exercise of its regulatory authority.

The County adopted the current version of its sign ordinance after

the district court invalidated two previous versions. See Revere

National Corporation, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 819 F. Supp.

1336 (D. Md. 1993). Like the preceding versions, this version distinguishes between on-site and off-site signs. On-site signs advertise

products, services, or activities available on the premises where the

sign is located, while off-site signs publicize products, services, or

activities available elsewhere. The ordinance authorizes on-site commercial signs as well as temporary political and public interest signs.

However, it regulates the physical characteristics--such as the location and size--of these signs. The ordinance bans most off-site signs,

including all off-site outdoor advertising signs or billboards. Significantly, this ordinance, unlike its predecessors, makes clear that any

sign authorized by the ordinance can carry any noncommercial message as long as the sign conforms to the appropriate design parameters.

Revere contends that the ordinance infringes on its and its clients'

constitutional right of free speech. In support of its position, Revere

asserts that the County has not demonstrated, and cannot demonstrate,

that the prohibition of all off-site billboard advertising will "directly

and materially advance" the County's professed interest in traffic

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safety and aesthetics. Revere also argues that the ordinance is not

content-neutral, that it gives preference to commercial over noncommercial speech, and that it gives preference to certain types of noncommercial speech.

As the district court recognized, the outcome in this case is dictated

by circuit precedent. This court previously has reviewed and upheld

ordinances with the same salient characteristics as the one at issue

here. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d

172 (4th Cir. 1988); Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v.

Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1987); Major Media of the Southeast v. Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986). In doing so, we have

rejected arguments essentially identical to those raised by Revere. As

the district court explained, in this circuit it is beyond question that

a municipal government may prohibit all off-site billboards without

offending the first amendment. Georgia Outdoor Advertising, 833

F.2d at 45-46. In addition, the district court properly held that the

other problems Revere perceives are remedied by the provision that

allows signs within the County to carry noncommercial messages.

Because a sign owner can place any noncommercial message on an

otherwise authorized sign, the ordinance is content neutral, it does not

prefer commercial over noncommercial speech, and it does not prefer

one type of noncommercial speech over another. Since the district

court adequately addressed Revere's contentions, we affirm for the

reasons stated in its opinion, Revere National Corporation, Inc. v.

Prince George's County, No. DKC 93-2899 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 1996)

(unpublished).

AFFIRMED

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