UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 

September 13, 2007 

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2007-30: RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS CREATE 

CRITICALITY SAFETY ACCIDENT SCENARIO 

FOR FISSILE SOLUTION CONTAINER 

TRANSPORT AT FUEL CYCLE FACILITY 

ADDRESSEES

All licensees authorized to possess a critical mass of special nuclear material. 

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform 

addressees of a criticality safety concern regarding wrapping fissile solution filled vessels with 

plastic, for radiological control, while transporting the vessels within fuel cycle facilities. NRC 

expects that licensees will review this information and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid 

similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no 

specific action nor written response is required. 

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

An NRC licensee operates a fuel cycle facility that processes and stores high-enriched uranium 

(HEU) in both solid and solution form. To clean floors in contaminated areas of the facility, the 

licensee typically places cleaning solution on the floor, scrubs the floor with an orbital scrubber, 

and then removes the solution with a large workshop-type vacuum cleaner. The vacuum 

cleaners have a volume of approximately 52 liters (14 gallons) and are filled with raschig rings, 

to allow any solution in the facility to be vacuumed from the floor. The raschig ring-filled vacuum 

cleaners are occasionally used to recover from large spills when collection of solution with 

sponges would be too slow. Concentrated HEU solutions containing up to 400 grams per liter of 

Uranium-235 (U-235) are allowed in raschig ring-filled vessels in the facility and such solutions 

have been transferred into the raschig ring-filled vacuum cleaners. 

The licensee uses forklifts to transport the raschig ring-filled vacuum cleaners to various 

locations in the facility for floor cleaning. Most areas of the facility do not have equipment to 

remove and process floor cleaning solutions, so the licensee transports filled vacuum cleaners 

to another area to remove and process the contents. The licensee procedure for moving the 

raschig ring-filled vacuum cleaners involved: (1) removing the vacuum pump; (2) covering the 

vacuum cleaner vessel; (3) wrapping the vacuum cleaner vessel with two 55-gallon plastic bags; 

and (4) moving the wrapped vacuum cleaner with a fork lift by means of brackets welded to the 

vacuum cleaner frame (see Figure 1). Some of the raschig ring-filled vacuum cleaners in the 

licensee facility had the lifting brackets, some did not have the brackets, and the lifting brackets 

were not required to move the vacuum cleaners. 

ML072500291
IN 2007-30 

 Page 2 of 4 

Figure 1 

Rashig Ring-filled Vacuum Cleaner Vessel with Lifting Brackets

A raschig ring-filled vacuum cleaner was requested to be moved to a specified location for a 

cleaning operation. The vacuum cleaner selected and wrapped for transport did not have the 

lifting brackets. During the operation to move the vacuum cleaner without lifting brackets, a 

licensee forklift operator picked up the vacuum with one forklift tine. The vacuum cleaner was 

removed from one area and carried to another area while another licensee operator balanced 

the vacuum cleaner on the single tine. At a doorway ramp near the destination, the vacuum 

cleaner fell off the forklift. A large fraction of the raschig rings spilled from the vacuum cleaner 

vessel and were retained by the inner wrapper. Most of the HEU solution in the vacuum cleaner 

vessel, approximately 18 liters (5 gallons), spilled from the vessel and was captured between 

the inner and outer wrappers, effectively separating the solution from the raschig rings. The 

risk-significance of the resulting upset condition was low because the concentration of the HEU 

solution was less than one gram per liter. 
IN 2007-30 

 Page 3 of 4 

Figure 2 

Dropped Raschig Ring-filled Vacuum Cleaner Final Position

Figure 2 shows the position of the dropped vacuum cleaner vessel. The vessel is halfway up 

the entrance ramp to the destination, with the top edge of the vessel lying at the edge of the 

ramp. The raschig rings and solution have spilled from the vessel out over the edge of the ramp 

which is approximately 3 to 4 inches high in that area. The double wrapped configuration and 

the final resting position hanging over the edge of the ramp have combined to create an 

unfavorable geometry vessel for the solution. Hanging downward allows a plastic bag or 

wrapper to assume a more unfavorable geometry than would be likely if the final resting position 

were a flat floor. 

Subsequent investigation of the event revealed that: (1) no controls limited the concentration of 

solution in the vacuum cleaners; (2) raschig ring-filled vacuum cleaners were commonly 

transported while full of HEU solution; (3) licensee criticality safety staff did not routinely review 

radiological control procedures; (4) licensee criticality safety staff were unaware that the vacuum 

cleaners were transported while filled with solution; and (5) the licensee had not analyzed or 

controlled the transport process with respect to criticality safety. 
IN 2007-30 

 Page 4 of 4 

DISCUSSION

Licensee criticality safety engineers indicated that, had they known that the raschig ring-filled 

vessels were being transported while filled with solution, they would have implemented controls 

to limit the uranium content of the vessels. Such controls might have included placing limits on 

solution concentration during transport, sampling the vessels before movement, or requiring a 

specific transport configuration. 

The NRC is concerned that licensees recognize and completely analyze all potential accident 

sequences at their facilities. To this end, fuel cycle licensees typically require that criticality 

safety staff review procedures associated with movement of fissile material, including 

radiological control procedures. 

The failure to review in-plant transport procedures and radiological controls can lead to the 

creation of an unanticipated accident sequence. NRC criticality safety inspections typically 

include review of the licensee criticality safety audit program, to ensure that analytical 

assumptions are regularly reviewed in all areas. NRC criticality safety inspections routinely 

review licensee facility operations to ensure that credible accident sequences have been 

identified, analyzed, and controlled. 

CONTACT

This information notice does not require any specific action or written response. Please direct 

any questions about this matter to the technical contact below. 

 /RA/ 

 

 Robert C. Pierson, Director 

 Division of Fuel Cycle Safety 

 and Safeguards 

 Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

 and Safeguards 

Technical Contact: Dennis Morey, NMSS 

 301-492-3112 

 E-mail: dcm@nrc.gov

Enclosure: 

List of Recently Issued FSME/NMSS Generic Communications 
IN 2007-30 

 Page 4 of 4 

DISCUSSION

Licensee criticality safety engineers indicated that, had they known that the raschig ring-filled 

vessels were being transported while filled with solution, they would have implemented controls 

to limit the uranium content of the vessels. Such controls might have included placing limits on 

solution concentration during transport, sampling the vessels before movement, or requiring a 

specific transport configuration. 

The NRC is concerned that licensees recognize and completely analyze all potential accident 

sequences at their facilities. To this end, fuel cycle licensees typically require that criticality 

safety staff review procedures associated with movement of fissile material, including 

radiological control procedures. 

The failure to review in-plant transport procedures and radiological controls can lead to the 

creation of an unanticipated accident sequence. NRC criticality safety inspections typically 

include review of the licensee criticality safety audit program, to ensure that analytical 

assumptions are regularly reviewed in all areas. NRC criticality safety inspections routinely 

review licensee facility operations to ensure that credible accident sequences have been 

identified, analyzed, and controlled. 

CONTACT

This information notice does not require any specific action or written response. Please direct 

any questions about this matter to the technical contact below. 

 /RA/ 

 

 Robert C. Pierson, Director 

 Division of Fuel Cycle Safety 

 and Safeguards 

 Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

 and Safeguards 

Technical Contact: Dennis Morey, NMSS 

 301-492-3112 

 E-mail: dcm@nrc.gov

Enclosure: 

List of Recently Issued FSME/NMSS Generic Communications 

ML072500291

OFC FSCC/TSB Tech ED FSME FCSS/TSB FCSS FCSS 

NAME DMorey Ekraus: fax AMcIntosh DJackson JGiitter RPierson 

DATE 9/ 7 /07 9/ 6 /07 9/ 7 /07 9/ 11 /07 9/ 11 /07 9/ 13 /07 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Enclosure 

IN 2007-30 

Page 1 of 3 

Recently Issued FSME/NMSS Generic Communications

Date GC No. Subject Addressees 

02/02/07 IN-07-03 Reportable Medical Events Involving 

Patients Receiving Dosages of 

Sodium Iodide Iodine-131 less than 

the Prescribed Dosage Because of 

Capsules Remaining in Vials after 

Administration 

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

medical use licensees and NRC Master 

Materials Licensees. All Agreement State 

Radiation Control Program Directors and 

State Liaison Officers. 

02/28/07 IN-07-08 Potential Vulnerabilities of Timereliant Computer-based Systems 

Due to Change in Daylight Saving 

Time Dates 

All U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

licensees and all Agreement State 

Radiation Control Program Directors and 

State Liaison Officers. 

03/13/07 IN-07-10 Yttrium-90 Theraspheres® and 

Sirspheres®

 Impurities 

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) Medical Licensees and NRC Master 

Materials Licensees. All Agreement State 

Radiation Control Program Directors and 

State Liaison Officers. 

04/04/07 IN-07-13 Use of As-Found Conditions to 

Evaluate Criticality-related Process 

Upsets at Fuel Cycle Facilities 

All licensees authorized to possess a 

critical mass of special nuclear material. 

05/02/07 IN-07-16 Common Violations of the Increased 

Controls Requirements and Related 

Guidance Documents 

All licensees who are implementing the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) Order Imposing Increased Controls 

(EA-05-090), issued November 14, 2005 

and December 22, 2005. 

05/21/07 IN-07-19 Fire Protection Equipment Recalls 

and Counterfeit Notices 

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear 

power reactors and fuel cycle facilities; 

except those licensees for reactors that 

have permanently ceased operations and 

who have certified that fuel has been 

permanently removed from the reactor 

vessel; and except those licensees for 

decommissioned fuel cycle facilities. 

06/11/07 IN-07-20 Use of Blank Ammunition All power reactors, Category I fuel cycle 

facilities, independent spent fuel storage 

installations, conversion facility, and 

gaseous diffusion plants. 
Enclosure 

IN 2007-30 

Page 2 of 3 

Date GC No. Subject Addressees 

 IN-07-23 Inadvertent Discharge of Halon 

1301Fire-suppression System from 

Incorrect and/or Out-of-date 

Procedures 

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear 

power reactors, except those who have 

permanently ended operations and have 

certified that fuel has been permanently 

removed from the reactor vessel. All 

holders of licenses for fuel cycle facilities. 

07/19/07 IN-07-25 Suggestions from the Advisory 

Committee on the Medical Use of 

Isotopes For Consideration to 

Improve Compliance With Sodium 

Iodide I-131 Written Directive 

Requirements in 10 CFR 35.40 and 

Supervision Requirements in 10 

CFR 35.27 

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) medical-use licensees and NRC 

Master Materials Licensees. All Agreement 

State Radiation Control Program Directors 

and State Liaison Officers. 

08/13/07 IN-07-26 Combustibility of Epoxy Floor 

Coatings at Commercial Nuclear 

Power Plants 

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear 

power reactors and fuel cycle facilities 

except licensees for reactors that have 

permanently ceased operations and who 

have certified that fuel has been 

permanently removed from the reactor 

vessel. 

03/01/07 RIS-07-03 Ionizing Radiation Warning Symbol All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

licensees and certificate holders. All 

Radiation Control Program Directors and 

State Liaison Officers 

03/09/07 RIS-07-04 Personally Identifiable Information 

Submitted to the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission 

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear 

power reactors and holders of and 

applicants for certificates for reactor 

designs. All licensees, certificate holders, 

applicants, and other entities subject to 

regulation by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) of the use of source, 

byproduct, and special nuclear material 

03/20/07 RIS-07-05 Status and Plans for Implementation 

of NRC Regulatory Authority for 

Certain Naturally-occurring and 

Accelerator-produced Radioactive 

Material 

All NRC materials licensees, Radiation 

Control Program Directors, State Liaison 

Officers, and NRC’s Advisory Committee 

on the Medical Uses of Isotopes 

04/05/07 RIS-07-07 Clarification of Increased Controls 

for Licensees That Possess 

Collocated Radioactive Material 

During Transportation Activities 

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) licensees issued NRC’s Order 

Imposing Increased Controls and all 

Radiation Control Program Directors and 

State Liaison Officers 
Enclosure 

IN 2007-30 

Page 3 of 3 

Date GC No. Subject Addressees 

05/04/07 RIS-07-09 Examples of Recurring Requests for 

Additional Information (RAIs) for 10 

CFR Part 71 and 72 Applications 

All holders of, and applicants for, a: (1) 10 

CFR Part 71 certificate of compliance 

(CoC) for a radioactive material 

transportation package; (2) 10 CFR Part 72 

CoC for a spent fuel storage cask; and (3) 

10 CFR Part 72 specific license for an 

independent spent fuel storage installation 

(ISFSI). 

06/27/07 RIS-06-27, 

Suppl. 1 

Availability of NRC 313A Series of 

Forms and Guidance for Their 

Completion 

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) medical-use licensees and NRC 

Master Materials licensees. All Radiation 

Control Program Directors and State 

Liaison Officers. 

05/15/07 RIS-07-10 Subscriptions To New List Server 

For Automatic Notifications Of 

Medical-Related Generic 

Communications, Federal Register 

Notices And Newsletters 

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) medical-use licensees and NRC 

Master Materials licensees. All Radiation 

Control Program Directors and State 

Liaison Officers. 

Note: A full listing of generic communications may be viewed at the NRC public website at the following address:

http://www.nrc.gov/Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections/Generic Communications