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i 

71–446 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–75] 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE 

COMPONENT ACQUISITION 

AND MODERNIZATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, October 12, 2011, National Guard and Reserve Component Acquisition and Modernization ..................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, October 12, 2011 ................................................................................. 31 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT ACQUISITION AND 

MODERNIZATION 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Carpenter, MG Raymond W., USA, Acting Director, Army National Guard ..... 7 

Stenner, Lt. Gen. Charles E., Jr., USAF, Chief, U.S. Air Force Reserve ........... 11 

Stultz, LTG Jack C., USA, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve .......................................... 4 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III, USAF, Director, Air National Guard ................. 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G. .................................................................................. 35 

Carpenter, MG Raymond W. ........................................................................... 72 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre ....................................................................................... 38 

Stenner, Lt. Gen. Charles E., Jr. .................................................................... 105 

Stultz, LTG Jack C. .......................................................................................... 40 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III .......................................................................... 97 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Chart of ‘‘Army Reserve: Indispensable Capabilities of the Operational 

Force,’’ Submitted by LTG Jack C. Stultz ................................................... 117 

‘‘Dip Chart’’ Showing U.S. Army Reserve End Strength, Fiscal Years 

2002 through 2011, Submitted by LTG Jack C. Stultz ............................. 118 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 121 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 129 

(1) 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT 

ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 12, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. BARTLETT. Our subcommittee will come to order. 

Today, the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets to 

receive an update on the equipment status and requirements of the 

Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve Components. 

Given the significant change in the budget outlook for fiscal year 

2012 and beyond, we believe it necessary to obtain the current 

views of the Guard and Reserve senior leaders for the potential impact on their programs. We will also hear from the military services in two subsequent hearings later in the month. 

We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: Major General 

Raymond Carpenter, the Acting Deputy Director of the Army National Guard; Lieutenant General Harry Wyatt, Director of the Air 

National Guard; Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief, U.S. Army 

Reserve; and Lieutenant General Charles Stenner, Jr., Chief, U.S. 

Air Force Reserves. 

Major reductions in the Federal budget need to be an element of 

correcting the Federal deficit. The Department of Defense must 

share in a fair and balanced way in those reductions. That process 

is already taking place under the Budget Control Act of 2011, with 

nearly $500 billion in cuts planned for DOD [Department of Defense] over the next 10 years. However, cuts beyond that, up to approximately $1 trillion over 10 years, are possible under what Secretary Panetta called the ‘‘doomsday mechanism’’ sequestration 

provision of the Budget Control Act. 

Secretary Panetta and Director Lew of the White House Office of 

Management and Budget have stated that budget cuts to the Department of Defense as a result of the sequestration provision 

‘‘could impose a significant risk to national security. DOD would 

most certainly be forced to furlough large numbers of civilian workers. Training would have to be curtailed, the force reduced, and 

purchases of weapons systems would have to be cut dramatically.’’ 
2 

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn recently stated that ‘‘the imposition of the sequestration provision of the Budget 

Control Act on our Armed Forces could be catastrophic. Sequestration would give us the smallest Army and Marine Corps in decades, 

the smallest Air Force in history, and the smallest Navy since 

McKinley was President. The debate is not whether sequestration 

would wound our military; it is about whether sequestration is 

equivalent to shooting ourselves in the foot or the head.’’ 

Against the backdrop of the Budget Control Act for 2011, today’s 

hearing is to get an assessment of the modernization needs and 

equipping challenges of the Army National Guard, Air National 

Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve. We recognize the Department is making major improvements and progress in providing 

adequate funding to equip the National Guard and Reserve Components to enhance its role as an operational reserve. Sustaining this 

funding, however, will continue to be a major issue, given the acute 

national economic challenges we currently face. 

During the April hearing, the subcommittee learned the importance of equipping and resourcing the Reserve Component as an 

‘‘operational reserve’’ rather than the Cold War model of a strategic 

reserve. We also heard our witnesses testify that, since 2001, the 

Department has made significant strides in providing adequate resources to equip the Reserve Component as an operational reserve. 

The Guard and Reserve Components have proven to be an invaluable asset during Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn. These past 10 years 

have justified the need for an operational Reserve Component force 

that must be adequately manned, trained, and equipped. 

Since September of 2001, almost 600,000 guardsmen and reservists have deployed in support of combat operations, representing 40 

percent of the total Reserve force of 1.4 million troops. All 34 Army 

National Guard Component brigades have deployed to either Iraq 

or Afghanistan, and more than half of the force has combat experience. There are reservists operating in over 100 countries. 

Over the past decade, the majority of modernization funding for 

the Reserve Components has come from supplemental overseas 

contingency operation funding requests, meaning funding that is 

not part of the base budget request. What happens when these socalled ‘‘OCO’’ [Overseas Contingency Operation] requests are no 

longer requested or funded? How will we continue to sustain the 

operational reserve and equip them for their missions? 

Congress has not hesitated in trying to address the equipmentreadiness needs that we have noted in many Guard and Reserve 

units over the years. National Guard and Reserve Component procurement from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2011 has totaled approximately $47 billion, averaging almost $6 billion per year. Since 

2004, Congress has authorized approximately $7.7 billion in the 

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. The National 

Guard and Reserve Equipment Account helps maintain combat capability and should help to guarantee that equipment is relevant 

and upgraded in a timely manner. This funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support, both on this committee and throughout 

Congress. 
3 

The Department of Defense and Congress have made substantial 

progress in terms of adequate funding for and reorganization of the 

Reserve Components. But I am concerned that these anticipated 

budgetary challenges we currently face could potentially negatively 

impact the current operational status of the Guard and Reserves. 

The ability to maintain a sustainable operational Reserve force 

with sufficient operational capability is predicated on having sufficient manpower and adequate resources. I want to express how 

much the subcommittee appreciates the contribution of the Guard 

and Reserve Components and want to recognize that they are 

maintained at a fraction of the cost of the regular military. We, as 

a nation, clearly cannot fight without them, because there is no 

way a 19-year-old can have the skill set and experience of a 39- 

year-old. 

Before we begin, I would like to welcome—well, the subcommittee’s newest member is not here, but let me tell you that we are 

very pleased to have Kathy Hochul from New York. And when she 

comes, we will welcome her officially to our subcommittee. 

I would like now to turn to my good friend and colleague from 

Texas, Silvestre Reyes, for any comments that he might like to 

make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would like to add my welcome to the panel and most especially to the three young men in the front row that recently returned from Afghanistan. We appreciate your service, and thank 

you for joining us here today. 

Mr. Chairman, this past April, the subcommittee received testimony from the leadership of the Army and Air Force Reserve Components. Today, we have these same leaders back for an update on 

the equipment needs of the Army and Air Force Reserve. 

During the April hearing, we heard that our Reserve Components remain as busy as ever; that the proposed FY [fiscal year] 

2012 budget request would allow us to maintain the high-quality 

Reserve forces that we have today. We also heard that there were 

additional equipment needs for all of our Reserve Components. As 

a result, the full Armed Services Committee bill included $325 million in additional funding in the National Guard and Reserve 

Equipment Account. The House appropriators went even further, 

proposing an additional $1.5 billion for the same account, with the 

Senate appropriators proposing $500 million. 

So the good news is that it appears that Congress will continue 

to provide support to the Guard and Reserve equipment needs over 

and above the budget request. 

On the other hand, however, the Budget Control Act of 2011 will 

likely result in a substantial cut to the DOD base budget in FY 

2012, perhaps as much as $26 billion. In addition, the Budget Control Act mandates approximately $450 billion in additional DOD 

cuts over 10 years when it is compared to the current DOD projec-
4 

tions. And, finally, if the so-called ‘‘super committee’’ [Joint Select 

Committee on Deficit Reduction] does not reach its goal of $1.5 trillion in additional reductions, the DOD could face additional significant cuts starting in FY 2013. 

However, at this point, we don’t know how DOD will propose 

dealing with these budget restrictions. What we do know, however, 

is how similar cuts have been applied in the past. In previous 

budget reductions, DOD has often taken an across-the-board approach to making cuts, rather than a more focused, more thoughtful path. 

Today, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that if an across-theboard, cookie-cutter approach to funding reductions takes place 

across the entire force, including our Reserve Components, they 

will incur significant damage. For example, if the Air Force further 

reduces fighter aircraft fleets in the Active Duty Force, will similar 

cuts flow down to the Reserve Components? If Active Duty Forces 

are reduced by DOD, are there plans to increase the size of the Reserve elements to compensate for those cuts? If DOD is seeking 

budget efficiencies, does it make sense to strategically expand some 

elements of the Reserve forces? I certainly hope that those questions are being asked as part of the ongoing DOD strategic review. 

The Nation has invested billions of dollars in additional funding 

to create the highly effective Reserve forces that we have today. As 

you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, they have been more active than 

ever in the history of this country. With this subcommittee adding 

additional billions to that investment every year, to us it just 

makes good and common sense. 

Beyond the immediate needs of our Reserve Components, I think 

it is also critical that we focus on the long term. If we get this 

right, we can end up with a high-quality Reserve force that also 

saves the Nation billions of dollars which in today’s budget system 

desperately may be needed elsewhere. 

So I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ thoughts on these 

major issues facing the entire DOD, but in particular the Reserve 

Component is most critical to get your input. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I relinquish my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

We will proceed with the panel’s testimony at this point. Without 

objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be included in the 

hearing record. 

General Stultz, please proceed with your opening remarks. 

STATEMENT OF LTG JACK C. STULTZ, USA, CHIEF, U.S. ARMY 

RESERVE 

General STULTZ. Thank you, Chairman Bartlett, Congressman 

Reyes, and other members of the committee. It is truly an honor 

to be here today before you to testify. 

And I didn’t plan this or orchestrate this, but I did find out that 

one of my units was at Fort Dix, New Jersey, just arriving back 

from Afghanistan, and some of the soldiers asked if they could 

come down, just to sit in and listen to what goes on in the halls 
5 

of Congress. And so I am going to use them as an illustration of 

why we have to do what we have to do, us and you together. 

I put one chart up here in front of you, and I think there are copies on your tables in front of you. But this question of whether or 

not we need an operational reserve to me is not a question. We 

have to have the Reserve Components as part of the operational 

force, and the reason we have to is because the Army is dependent 

on us. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 117.] 

General STULTZ. The chart there shows you that, over time, as 

we have grown the Active Force from 480,000 to 569,000, we have 

continued to push more of the combat-support/service-support capability into the Guard and Reserve. Today, as the chart shows, 83 

percent of the transportation capability of the Army is in the Reserve; 75 percent of the engineer capability of the Army is in the 

Reserve; 70 percent of the medical capability is in the Reserve. And 

I can go on and on. 

So it is not a matter of, do we want to make the Reserve an operational force? We have to. We have to make it part of the operational force, because we know the end strength of the Army is 

going to come down. And as the end strength of the Active Army 

comes down, currently projected to come from 569 [569,000] to 520 

[520,000], the Army is going to be even more dependent on the 

Guard and Reserve, which means we have to resource the Reserve 

Component as an operational force. 

And as you have indicated in your opening statements, it is a 

great return on investment. For what you would give us to invest 

in the Reserve, we give you a great return. These soldiers sitting 

behind me are evidence of that. 

The soldiers here are out of the 744th Engineer Company of 

Ogden, Utah. First Lieutenant Tovey, I first met him in 2006 because I went out to Ogden, Utah, to welcome home this unit when 

they came back from Iraq. They had been out doing route clearance 

in the Anbar Province. They had taken a beating, lost soldiers in 

action, had a number of Purple Hearts that we handed out, Senator Bennett at the time and myself. And Sergeant Tovey helped 

me hand out coins. Sergeant Tovey got a direct commission to lieutenant. He is continuing his education today at Idaho State University, making a contribution back in his community, and now coming back from his deployment in Afghanistan. 

Sergeant Lissy, you look at him and you say, he is in a different 

uniform. Well, he is in a different uniform because during this deployment he was severely wounded, shot through the leg, and the 

bullet traveled up and almost through the spine. So he has been 

back home recovering, but he wants to keep serving his country. 

And then Corporal Pratt. Corporal Pratt hasn’t been in the Army 

very long. He enlisted in February of 2009, finished his training in 

2010, and now he is a combat veteran, back home in Utah. 

They have been doing route clearance. They remove the IEDs 

[Improvised Explosive Device]. They detect; they get out there. 

They are the lead in harm’s way. The equipment they use in Afghanistan is the best the Army has. The training they got before 

they went to Afghanistan is the best the Army can give. 
6 

The challenge we have is, that equipment is not setting back in 

Ogden, Utah. The equipment setting back in Ogden, Utah, is not 

modernized equipment. The training we do on that equipment back 

in Ogden, Utah, is not going to be the same level of training that 

we need to do for them to go back to Afghanistan or wherever we 

need them in the future. 

And the fact of the matter is, 75 percent of the Army’s capability 

sets right here behind me and in the National Guard. It is not as 

if we have another force out there to go to if we don’t give them 

the equipment and the training they need. And so what we together, you and I, have to do is we have to band together, use the 

investments you give us wisely, modernize where we have to modernize, train where we have to train. And, by God, we can’t waste 

it; we can’t afford to. 

Now, I have one other chart I would like to show you that I think 

is on your desk, and that is—this is what I call the ‘‘dip chart.’’ 

And these soldiers here illustrate what is on this chart. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 118.] 

General STULTZ. You see, when we first went to war in 2003, in 

the Army Reserve we were almost 10,000 over-strength in soldiers. 

We were fat and happy. But we weren’t trained and ready. And as 

we started trying to call the soldiers to the front, we found out we 

had a lot of holes in our formation. We had a lot of medically unready soldiers, we had a lot of morally unready soldiers, we had a 

lot of soldiers on the rolls that we couldn’t find. And then we had 

a lot of soldiers who said, ‘‘This is not what I signed up for.’’ 

And so, by 2006, when I first came into this job, we were down 

to almost 20,000 under-strength. And we lost that 10,000 over to 

20,000 under while we recruited another 25,000 every year during 

that time period. So it wasn’t just like we lost 30,000 soldiers. 

And then we started growing back, and we grew back to over 

206,000 soldiers. And that was the Sergeant Lissys, the Corporal 

Pratts, the Lieutenant Toveys that joined our force. They joined our 

force to say, ‘‘I want to go be something. I want to go do something.’’ And they tell me three things: Give me some predictability, 

because I have another life and I have an employer or a school. 

Don’t waste my time; train me, and train me to the standard I 

need to be trained to, and hold me to that standard. And, thirdly, 

use me. I didn’t sign up to go back to strategic reserve that is one 

weekend a month, two weeks in the summer. I want to be utilized. 

And that is what we are building the Reserve of today around. 

And all we ask of Congress is, help us get the resources we need 

to maintain this operational readiness we have, to maintain that 

national treasure. Because if we don’t, we will repeat that dip chart 

one more time because these young men won’t stick with us, because they want to do something, they want to be something, they 

have too much invested, and they have too much pride in what 

they are doing. So my commitment to you, sir, is, the resources you 

give me I will invest in them, I won’t waste. 

So I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in the 

Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 
7 

General Carpenter. 

STATEMENT OF MG RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, USA, ACTING 

DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 

General CARPENTER. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, 

it is an honor and a privilege to again appear before this committee 

and represent the 360,000-plus soldiers of the Army National 

Guard. 

Currently, we have almost 40,000 Army guardsmen mobilized 

and deployed, and, as you know, more than half of that force has 

combat experience. The sacrifice of our soldiers, their families and 

employers has been tremendous, and they deserve our deepest 

gratitude. 

And I, too, would like to acknowledge the service of the three soldiers that General Stultz has accompanying him today. Coincidentally, I am an engineer officer. These three soldiers are engineers. 

I got to tell you, my connection with them as an engineer is a very 

strong connection. And I think those three soldiers could just as 

easily be from the Army National Guard, they could just as easily 

be from the Active Component, because we are seamless now as an 

Army. 

And so, thanks for your service, gentlemen. 

As I have noted before, the Army National Guard has been there 

from the start of this decade, from the very beginning. The New 

York National Guard was among the first on the scene at the 

World Trade Center on 9/11, as was the Maryland and Virginia 

Guard in the days after the Pentagon was attacked. 

Beginning with the 9/11 response, the Army National Guard has 

continued to shoulder our responsibilities in the overseas fight in 

Afghanistan and Iraq while simultaneously responding to events in 

the homeland, the largest of which was Hurricane Katrina. And 

the service of your Army National Guard continues. 

Let me illustrate with a snapshot in time, the weekend of August 

26th through the 29th. During that weekend, the National Guard 

had more than 63,000 National Guardsmen on duty protecting this 

country at home and abroad. Over 47,500 National Guardsmen 

were deployed in support of overseas contingency operations and 

partnership-building missions. Almost 10,000 members of the National Guard from 24 States were responding to then-Hurricane 

Irene. Another 1,000 National Guardsmen provided security on our 

Nation’s southwest border, and an additional 4,000 National 

Guardsmen responded to a range of domestic emergencies across 

this country. 

The experience of the past decade has transformed the Army National Guard into an operational force, ‘‘a national treasure,’’ in the 

words of a recently retired four-star Active Duty general. 

As an operational force, the Army National Guard represents the 

best value for America. Force structure and military power can be 

sustained in the Army National Guard for a fraction of the regular 

cost. The Army National Guard is one-third of the total Army but 

accounts for approximately 10 percent of the total Army budget. 

Supporting capability in the Army National Guard is not only the 

right thing to do, it makes good business sense. 
8 

The Army National Guard could not have evolved into the operational force without the support of Congress. Our Nation has invested over $37 billion in equipment for the Army National Guard 

in the past 6 years, much of that from the NGREA [National 

Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation] account. The delivery of that equipment has increased Army National Guard equipment-on-hand rates for critical dual-use equipment by 14 percent. 

Because the Army National Guard is a full partner with the Active Component, it is vital for the Guard to continue modernizing 

its equipment. Modernization and interoperability are essential for 

training during the Army National Guard pre-mobilization periods 

and critical for deployments, as General Stultz has pointed out. 

I know this committee is interested in what has changed since 

our appearance here last spring. Simply put, it is the budget. Inside the Army, we have worked through multiple iterations of 

budgets based upon the latest proposed budget reduction. Secretary 

Panetta said on Tuesday that we would face difficult choices. He 

also cautioned that we should make budget choices based on strategy rather than expediency. He also suggested that modernization 

of weapons systems and maintenance programs were being examined as part of spending cuts and, specifically, contracts were being 

reviewed for savings. 

We in the Army Guard understand that future funding will be 

less than in the past, and, frankly, we are prepared to shoulder our 

proportional share of the burden. To that end, we have already set 

about garnering efficiencies and developing new strategies that will 

allow us to continue to meet our dual-mission responsibility with 

less funding. 

Those two missions have required an Army National Guard of 

360,000 soldiers, 54 joint force headquarters, 8 combat divisions, 28 

brigade combat teams, 8 combat aviation brigades, and over 70 enabling brigades over the past 10 years. 

We are reminded regularly that we live in a very dangerous and 

unpredictable world, and it seems like the predicted 100-year natural-disaster events are coming closer and closer together. We have 

built a capability to respond to the needs of our citizens, home and 

abroad. We ought to fully understand the risk associated with reducing that capability, because, in the words of a combat commander in Afghanistan, sometimes all it takes is all you have. 

The Army National Guard is a force forward deployed in our 

area of operation, the homeland. We have built great capacity in 

the National Guard by establishing forces specifically designed to 

deal with emergencies, disasters, and potential terrorist attacks. 

Those units include Guard Civil Support Teams, CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives] 

Emergency Response Forces, Homeland Response Forces, and Domestic All-Hazards Response Teams. By one estimate, 96 percent 

of the events that happen across our country on a daily basis are 

handled by the local first responders—the policemen, the firemen, 

and the National Guard. Only 4 percent require Federal support. 

It has taken years to build these organizations. We should not 

rush to reduce the size, structure, or capability of the Army National Guard without significant analysis and thorough deliberation. I think it is very important to note that eliminating a soldier 
9 

from the Army National Guard is a double hit because you not only 

take a soldier out of the warfight, you also take a soldier out of the 

emergency response team at home. 

In the end, we have asked that the Army Guard’s share of the 

budget reductions be given to us, the Army National Guard, and 

let us figure out where to pay the bill. Don’t direct reductions in 

Guard brigade combat teams or end strength, because when that 

happens we will be forced to close armories, move out of communities, and be driven to a lower readiness level. Consistent with 

Secretary Panetta’s comments, we think we can examine our contracts and our programs and become more efficient while maintaining our end strength and our force structure. 

In closing, the Army National Guard is battle-tested and well 

equipped for both of our missions. And this committee has been 

critical in building and sustaining the best-manned, best-trained, 

and best-equipped National Guard I have seen in my career—truly 

a best value for America. 

Again, it is my privilege and honor to appear before this committee today, and I look forward to your questions and comments. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found in 

the Appendix on page 72.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

General Wyatt. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF, 

DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

General WYATT. Chairman Bartlett and Ranking Member Reyes, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf 

of the 106,700 Air National Guardsmen—combat-proven, dedicated, 

professional men and women—serving around the world. I thank 

you and all members of the committee for your support, continuing 

support, in these challenging times. 

As we sit here today, over 6,000 Air National Guardsmen are deployed around the world in helping to defend U.S. interests on 

every continent, including Antarctica. In addition, nearly 3,500 Air 

National Guard men and women are helping to protect our homeland by protecting the air sovereignty of the American airspace, flying the Aerospace Control Alert mission; also by assisting civil authorities in the protection of life and property in the United States, 

including assisting flood and hurricane recovery efforts in the Midwest and in the Northeast. Air Guard members are currently helping the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol secure our southern borders. And this summer, Air National Guard aerial firefighting units 

dropped over 360,000 gallons of fire retardant on wildfires across 

the Southwest in support of the National Forest Service. 

For the last 20 years, the Air National Guard has been at war 

alongside our Air Force Reserve and regular Air Force brothers and 

sisters. When the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm began 

in January of 1991, 11 percent of the U.S. Air Force aircraft were 

flown and maintained by Guard airmen. And the men and women 

of the Air National Guard have continued to answer the call to 

service ever since, adapting rapidly to the changing demands of the 

post–Cold War security environment. Today, the Air National 
10 

Guard provides approximately 34 percent of the total Air Force capability, at a fraction of the Air Force total budget. 

As we look to the many challenges ahead, my goal is to lay the 

foundations for an Air Force that has the capability and the capacity to meet tomorrow’s challenges within the constraints that we 

can foresee. 

As you know, the Air National Guard relies on the Air Force for 

major modernization initiatives and weapons systems procurement. 

However, we work with the air staff to encourage them to equip 

the Air Guard in a manner that is concurrent and balanced with 

the Active Component, because I believe that if the Air National 

Guard is going to continue to be a reliable partner, able to integrate seamlessly into Air Force joint operations, it must have the 

equipment that is equal to the task and compatible with our Air 

Force Reserve and Active Duty partners. 

The funds that Congress provides directly to the Air National 

Guard via the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations, the NGREA account, have made a significant impact on our 

ability to support both the warfighter and civil authorities. We 

strive to use these funds as efficiently as possible by pursuing 

lower-cost, 80-percent solutions to the immediate needs of our 

warfighters at about 25 percent of the cost—needs that are identified directly by our warfighters and first responders out of our 

weapons and tactics classes. 

Your investment through NGREA has been a critical component 

to the Air Guard increased readiness. For example, without 

NGREA, the Block 30 F–16, the backbone of protecting America’s 

skies, would be irrelevant today. Given the future budget uncertainty, we have shifted NGREA focus in FY ’12 to ensure we finish 

as many existing modernization initiatives as possible to avoid expensive and disruptive production breaks should the amount of 

NGREA be substantially reduced. 

Ladies and gentlemen, you have created the most professional, 

combat-ready force in the history of the Air National Guard. Today’s Guard airmen understand that the Nation needs more of 

them than one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer, 

and they are willing to answer the call. All that they ask is that 

we continue to provide them with the equipment, training, and resources they need to accomplish the mission. 

If I could share with you an experience this morning that kind 

of puts all of this in perspective, I had the honor and privilege of 

going to Arlington and attending the services of Specialist Christopher Horton, a sniper with the 45th Infantry Brigade Combat 

Team, Oklahoma Army National Guard. I knew this young man because he signed up to join the 45th when I was the adjutant general in the State of Oklahoma. He was killed in action in Afghanistan on September 9th this year, along with two other members of 

the Oklahoma Army National Guard, when they were caught in an 

ambush. 

I thought about other Oklahomans that were serving in harm’s 

way today. My old 138th Fighter Wing, F–16 wing out of Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, currently flying combat missions in Iraq, trying to prevent what happened to Specialist Horton and his compatriots, trying to prevent that from happening. That F–16 unit would not be 
11 

able to do the combat operations that it is doing today, protecting 

people on the ground, had it not been for the NGREA accounts that 

allowed us to develop the targeting pods that those aircraft carry 

today. That is the importance of the NGREA account. 

We have a tendency, as we meet here today, to talk about resources and talk about modernization and talk about funds and 

talk about equipment, talk about stuff. But when it comes down to 

it, what we are really talking about is providing the equipment, the 

training, the resources that our young men and women, regardless 

of service and regardless of component, need when they go into 

combat. That is the importance of why these gentlemen are here 

today and why all of you are here today. 

It is an honor and privilege to be here, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the 

Appendix on page 97.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Now General Stenner. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CHARLES E. STENNER, JR., USAF, 

CHIEF, U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE 

General STENNER. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, 

committee members, thank you for inviting me to appear before 

you today. 

I am here to report that the Air Force Reserve continues to be 

seamlessly integrated with the Active Component and the Air National Guard to complete all of the Air Force missions we are assigned. We accomplish this while continuing to provide a cost-effective and combat-ready force available for strategic surge and ongoing daily operations. 

My written testimony outlines our modernization strategy and 

priorities. Today, I would like to discuss the profound impact 

NGREA funding has on our force readiness. 

But, first, let me take the opportunity to introduce and thank 

Chief Master Sergeant Dwight Badgett. As the Air Force Reserve 

Command Chief for the past 21⁄2 years, Chief Badgett has served 

as my senior enlisted advisor. He will be departing Air Force Reserve Command to join Northern Command’s Joint Task Force 

North as the senior enlisted leader. There is no better example of 

jointness and total force than the selection of this highly capable 

and well-qualified chief to this post. 

Chief, thank you for your continued service. 

The Air Force Reserve has never had a more seasoned and capable force equipped to support missions around the globe. Our contributions range from the training of our institutional forces in associations and basic military training and pilot and navigator 

training to our continued involvement in joint and coalition combat 

operations and humanitarian airlift operations abroad. 

Just a quick outline: To the left here on this chart is, as a percentage of what the total Air Force does, is what we as an Air 

Force Reserve bring to this fight. And I know my partner in the 

Air National Guard has a chart similar to that. And when you put 

those two Air Reserve Components together, you have a very powerful piece of what the Air Force brings to this Nation’s defense. 
12 

We have also expanded our efforts in cyber, remotely piloted aircraft, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance based on Air 

Force and combatant commander requirements. The Nation depends on us, and it is therefore crucial that we continue to provide 

that force with the equipment, the training, and the resources they 

need to accomplish the missions that we have been asked to execute. 

The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account is absolutely vital to the way the Air Force Reserve operates today. It impacts every facet of our operational readiness and is the primary 

means of ensuring the Air Force Reserve is equipped with the most 

relevant, modern, and compatible fielded technologies, preserving 

our combat capability on a cost-efficient basis. 

Since 1982, NGREA has allowed the Air Force Reserve to upgrade our operational equipment with better targeting, self-protection, and communication capabilities, all of which have proven to 

be critical, time and again, to supporting operations wherever we 

are called to serve around the globe. For more than 29 years, 

NGREA-funded programs tested and recommended for fielding by 

the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command Test Center have resulted in multiple weapons systems and equipment 

being fielded to frontline operators through system program offices 

that support the total force warfighter. 

Current levels of NGREA and supplemental funding have allowed the Air Force Reserve to make significant strides in meeting 

urgent warfighter requirements. For example, NGREA made possible state-of-the-art avionics upgrades unique to the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard F–16 Block 30 weapons systems, a 

highly sought-after capability during Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Today, as another example, with NGREA funding, we are saving 

lives. A tool called the Smart Multi-Function Color Display provides air combat search and rescue helicopters, the HH–60Gs, Pave 

Hawks, with enhanced data link and situational awareness capabilities. In less than 20 months from contract award, the display 

was in use by tactical units in Afghanistan. This NGREA effort directly contributed to saving 331 lives with 268 assists during Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Air Force Reserve NGREA funding of at least $100 million per 

year will permit us to start modernization initiatives vital to maintaining our combat edge and to complete ongoing efforts that are 

essential to continuing our effective contributions to the total force 

and its wartime missions. 

Properly equipping the Air Force Reserve preserves our capacity 

to continue providing forces as an operational reserve. The work of 

this committee, especially its consideration of Reserve Component 

modernization efforts, is essential to our support of joint and coalition operations. 

Thank you for your work. And, again, thank you for asking me 

here today to discuss these important issues affecting the readiness 

of our airmen and our equipment. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Stenner can be found in the 

Appendix on page 105.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much. 
13 

As is my usual policy, I will reserve my questions until the end, 

hoping that they will all have been asked by my colleagues. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for your testimony here this afternoon. 

In your written testimony, all four of you mention that Reserve 

Components offer a more cost-effective way to maintain and deploy 

military capabilities. In fact, some of the percentages that you cited 

were very impressive. But from time to time on the Active Duty 

side, others say otherwise, specifically pointing out to the high 

training cost for deploying Reserve forces. 

So I have three questions for all of you: Does the DOD have an 

agreed-upon baseline to use in comparing the cost of Reserve 

versus Active Duty Forces? The second question is, what is your 

view of the right numbers that should be used to compare? And 

then, should we look at the—third one—should we look at the overall cost per service member or compare similar units to each other? 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir, I will lead off. 

To answer your first question, no, sir, I don’t think we have an 

agreed-to number. I know there are a number of studies out there, 

and part of the challenge we have in identifying what is the 

agreed-to number are, it is not just pay and allowances and it is 

not just training days associated with it. We have to pay into accruals for medical and retirement. And because our retirement system is deferred—we don’t draw retirement and don’t become eligible until age 60—it is a lower accrual rate, which, in fact, says a 

Reserve soldier on active duty actually costs less than an Active 

Duty soldier on active duty because the accruals are lower. Not everyone agrees with—‘‘Well, we don’t count it that way.’’ 

My Reserve soldiers don’t live on an installation, and all the 

costs associated with funding an installation and everything that 

goes with that. They drill in a Reserve center, which is a much 

lower cost facility to operate. But, again, a lot of the cost models 

say, ‘‘Well, we don’t consider that when we are looking at it.’’ 

So I think part of the challenge we got is trying to get everybody 

to agree as to what really does a soldier cost us and what are all 

the things that go with it. So, no, we don’t have. 

Now, the second thing I would tell you is, in the cost analysis we 

have run on the Army Reserve, the cost of an Army Reserve soldier 

today, to get him deployed to Afghanistan—I will tell you, the cost 

of deploying the 744th today versus the cost of deploying the 744th 

back in 2004 and 2005 is much lower. And the reason is the chart 

right here. In 2003–2004, we weren’t ready. And so, most the units 

mobilizing in the Army Reserve took 60, 90, 120 days just to get 

trained, which only left us 6 or 7 months of boots-on-the-ground 

time. And so, in the cost analysis, when you use those figures, you 

say, ‘‘Oh, yeah, I need two of these for every year because I only 

get 6 months out of them.’’ 

The cost of deploying this unit today is much less because I am 

able to train and deploy most of the Reserve units in the Army Reserve in 30 days or less because they are combat-seasoned, they are 

already trained in a lot of their skill sets, and they come together 

very quickly and we are able to push them out. So now we get 10 
14 

to 11 months of boots-on-the-ground time out of them versus 6 or 

7 that we used to. 

So that reflects the right side of that chart that says, here is a 

trained and ready force, and once you get it trained and ready, it 

is much more cost-effective because you don’t have to invest as 

much up front as long as you maintain what you have already got. 

And so, our figures come out somewhere around a third of the cost. 

And then the third thing we have said is, if we are going to train 

and get this force as an operational force, we don’t necessarily have 

to utilize it in the future for 12 months at a time and 100 percent 

of the force. We can take an engineer battalion and I can go to a 

combatant command like AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] or 

SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] and I can say, let me give 

you the battalion that the 744th belongs to, but here is what I 

want you to do: Just use one company at a time for 90 days, and 

go do humanitarian—build schools, build medical clinics, do things 

like that. 

And these gentleman back here go to El Salvador or Panama or 

Ethiopia or Uganda or Kenya for a 90-day rotation, followed on by 

their sister company out of Pocatello, followed on by their sister 

company out of Crater Lake. And we use the entire battalion during the year, but we only pay 25 percent of it at a time. 

So the model I have for the use of the Reserve for the future is 

very cost-effective. And I think we are still going to have challenges 

on coming to the right number, what is the right number. But I 

can tell you, whatever the right number is, it is much lower in the 

Reserve Components than our Active counterparts. 

General CARPENTER. Congressman, first of all, I would like to 

point out that each one of the three components has a role to play 

in the total Army. We, in the National Guard, have two missions: 

The homeland mission and the Federal mission. The Active Component has a primary mission for being the first response in terms 

of a national requirement, and General Stultz’s force is providing 

the majority of enablers, in most cases, as that Active Force goes 

downrange. 

So nobody should think that there is a cost savings to be had 

across the entire force by turning us into a purely Reserve or purely a National Guard organization. That is not the discussion at all. 

On the surface of it, though, you have to accept the fact that 

when the National Guard only takes up 10 percent of the budget, 

we are definitely a lesser-cost organization from a Reserve standpoint. One-third of the cost is the calculation that we have as we 

look across the pay and allowance and the costs associated with 

having a unit in the Reserve in the National Guard. 

There is no question, as we go toward mobilization, that that cost 

rises and we get close to 100 percent, close to the same parity as 

our Active Component counterparts. But to General Stultz’s comment about the operational force, for a very modest investment we 

can sustain the combat edge, sustain the training and proficiency 

that we have garnered here in this operational force courtesy of the 

last 10 years of war. 

And so, our pitch to the Active Army and to the Department of 

Defense is, it would make good sense to invest in this operational 

force and, for a modest amount, to be able to sustain that. 
15 

In terms of the right numbers, I think that in the discussions we 

have had with the Army, the Army recognizes the metric that I 

just described to you. 

Overall, the cost per service member in comparison, you know, 

in some cases it depends on whose figures you are relying on and 

what all is factored into it. But in the final analysis, there is no 

question that the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are 

a great investment for this country and provide a huge bang for the 

buck. 

General WYATT. Congressman Reyes, the question you asked is 

an interesting one. And I would agree with my contemporaries here 

that I don’t think the Department of Defense has an agreed-upon 

computation. There are lots of studies out there. 

I would suggest that it would behoove all of us to ask questions 

of the analysts that try to answer that question and to consider the 

source of those analysts. I gave up a long time ago trying to outanalyze the Active Duty in the United States Air Force, because 

they outnumber me. They have a lot of Ph.D.’s and they are A9 

[Analysis Directorate]. I don’t even have an A9, you know? 

We have 98 percent—98.5 percent of Air National Guardsmen 

are in warfighting UTCs [Unit Training Code]. Our core competency is not analysis. Our core competency is not weapons development. Our core competency is not acquisition. Those are all core 

competencies of the United States Air Force that adds to the cost 

of the Active Component. I recognize that. 

But when you compare the cost of a warfighter to the cost of a 

warfighter, Active and Reserve, I prefer to look to sources of information that are not Active Duty and not Air National Guard. 

If you consider the Government Accountability Office on Military 

Personnel, they say the relationship is one-sixth the cost—an Air 

National Guardsman costs one-sixth as much as an Active Component. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense says about onefourth. The Heritage Foundation says about one-sixth. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserve said that they looked 

at all the studies that were out there, and while they all varied a 

little bit, they were all consistent, in that guardsmen and reservists 

cost less, especially if you consider the lifecycle. 

Now, if you took all 106,700 of my Air National Guardsmen and 

you called them to Title X service and you put them all on active 

duty at the same time, yes, they would cost as much and perhaps 

maybe a little more than the Active Component, because we do 

need to train up a little bit—not much, because the Air Force already funds the Air National Guard to organize, train, and equip 

to the same standards as the Active Duty Air Force. So we don’t 

need the boost in training to get to that level that the Air Force 

expects us to have. 

Our DOC statements, our description of capabilities statements, 

in the Air National Guard for our units requires the same response 

time, the same level of response as the Active Component. 

So when we say that the Air National Guard provides 34 percent 

of the Air Force warfighting capacity, that is what we are talking 

about. And if you look at our budget compared to the total Air 

Force budget, it is about 6 percent. We think that is cost-effectiveness. 
16 

General STENNER. Congressman, I do have an A9. They do analysis. But I quit doing dueling data. It doesn’t help. 

My baseline—and your first question went to, what is the 

agreed-upon baseline, do we have one? Mine is intuition. First of 

all, if you are only paying somebody when they are actually being 

used, intuitively they are cheaper than somebody that is being paid 

100 percent of the time. So the next trick is, is it a third, is it a 

quarter? Doesn’t matter; it is less. 

And to your next question, what are the right numbers, it goes 

to balance. Every single mission has got to be looked at, in my 

opinion. What is the requirement for strategic depth? How much do 

you need in Reserve? And then how much is the combatant commander requiring of you? How much, then, do we need for the Active Force? And we put the rest of it in, in the Air Force anyway, 

the Guard and Reserve as appropriate by mission set. 

So there a balance in each mission. And there is no real template 

that you can go to across all the missions and say, this is right. 

The mobility air forces, we have a significant portion of that, both 

the Guard and Reserve, on a daily basis. And we are paid for when 

we operate those airplanes around the world and not paid for when 

we are not operating those airplanes around the world. 

Lastly, it is by mission set with the balance, and Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, in my opinion, are the catcher’s mitt 

for folks who, in fact, make a life-changing decision and decide that 

they need to move to a Reserve or Guard Component, and I want 

to give them the opportunity to serve in a part-time capacity, because there are huge costs included in retraining somebody. It 

takes how long to replace a 10-year staff sergeant? Ten years. Huge 

training costs. I want to keep that trained individual in our Reserve Component to ensure that they are there when the Nation 

needs them. 

Capture them, comparing that to the training costs, we are definitely a cheap and effective and efficient—I don’t want to say 

‘‘cheap’’—effective and efficient, cost-effective way to do business. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much for a good question and 

good responses. 

Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and thank you all for your 

service to our country. 

General Wyatt, we have had some discussions in the past. And 

I was hoping you could provide us with your best professional military opinion on the issue of replacing F–16 Block 30 fighter jets 

within the Air National Guard. 

I understand that the Air Force has always stated their commitment to ensuring that the Air National Guard has the iron necessary to perform critical missions. However, has the Air Force presented you with a formal plan for dealing with the timeline and the 

numbers that you can expect to recapitalize your fighters over the 

next 5 to 10 years? 

And I ask this question because I believe, you don’t have a plan 

unless it is on paper. So people can talk about a lot of different 
17 

things, but that changes. And this committee, I think, really needs 

to have a better understanding of the path going forward, because, 

as we enter a new climate of defense spending, we really need to 

understand the justification for decisions before they happen, not 

after they happen. 

And, additionally, as the F–35 keeps slipping to the right, I think 

this is going to have a huge effect on swapping out our aging Air 

National Guard fighters. 

And I would really appreciate your comments on this. 

General WYATT. Thank you, sir. 

You know, we have had a discussion before about the age of the 

Block 30 F–16s in the Air National Guard. The Air Force has committed some money for structural sustainment that will buy 2 to 

3 more years of life. But you are correct; in the next 10 years, these 

aircraft will age out. Some of them will start aging out before then. 

There are a lot of different options: Flowdown of Block 40 F–16s, 

flowdown of Block 50 F–16s from the Active Component to the 

Guard as the F–35 is bedded down on active duty. Bedding down 

the Active Duty with F–35s in those units that performed ACA 

[Aerospace Control Alert] so that they could do not only the air sovereignty, the Aerospace Control Alert mission, but also the AEF 

[Air Expeditionary Force] rotations overseas, as they do. 

But I think your question went to, has the Air Force shown you 

a written plan that shows you the numbers of aircraft, the types 

of aircraft, and the years that they will flow to the Air National 

Guard to replace the old Block 30 F–16s? Was that your question? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Yes, sir. 

General WYATT. The answer is, no, sir, they have not. I have not 

seen that plan yet. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. So, this is kind of troubling. Have you requested—have you made a request for a formal plan? 

General WYATT. Yes, sir, I have. We began requesting a couple 

of years ago when I first—well, a little over 2 years ago when I 

first became the director, and we have been making some progress. 

I have seen some general plans but nothing that would show me, 

for example, how many jets may be coming to the Air National 

Guard in the next 3 or 4 years to replace an aging-out aircraft. 

That is the type of detail that we would really need to be able 

to go forward to determine whether or not we are going to be recapitalized. But I have not seen that plan yet, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, Mr. Chairman, you have been good on this, 

Chairman Bartlett. And I would like to think that this is a critical 

issue for the entire committee, but especially this subcommittee. 

And I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that we could find ways to address directly with the Air Force leadership. We have been posing 

this question now for a number of years. We keep getting sort of 

a dodge-and-weave on this. And, at a certain point, we are going 

to run out of time to be able to make accommodations, if we need 

to do that. 

I think it is critical, given the integration that the Air Guard has 

had with the full Air Force, what they are doing, being deployed 

in the war against terrorism. And I would hope I could work with 

you directly on this matter to get a more substantial answer that 
18 

we could put our arms around and decide whether they actually 

have a plan or they are just giving us lip service. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I concur with your concerns, and I will be happy to join you in a request for clarification 

of this to the appropriate people. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all for your testimony and for your 

service. 

I represent a district in which many members of the Guard and 

Reserve have gone to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq, and see their 

extraordinary professionalism, the tremendous training that you 

have put in place so that they can do the tasks they are handed, 

and the various wounds that they sustain as a result of their deployment. So I just want to thank you and the fine young men who 

are with you today for your great work on behalf of our country. 

And we are all looking at the budget cuts that we are facing as 

a Nation, and the Defense Department obviously having to absorb 

a significant portion of them, but we also want to be very thoughtful and careful. And so I appreciate your testimony today. 

I have a question about the Quadrennial Defense Review. I am 

curious as to whether or not it provides a constructive template for 

future employment of the operational force that you have worked 

so hard to develop. And what impact will the Budget Control Act 

of 2011 and the possibility of sequester if we cannot come to an 

agreement have on some of the QDR’s [Quadrennial Defense Review] underlying assumptions with regard to the Guard and Reserve? 

And I will take an answer from any and all of you. 

General STULTZ. I will lead off, and I will try to make it concise. 

I think the QDR provides a framework for the Army, in terms 

of the role of the Army or the land component. And that, in turn, 

if you want to call it trickle-downs, but it shapes what kind of capability we need to have in the Reserve to support the role of the 

land component. And then I think the QDR also defines what we 

need to protect our Nation back home, our own soil, and respond 

to our disasters back here. 

And I know there is legislation that is being put in place today 

to allow the Title X Reserve to be more of a homeland capability, 

not to get involved with the National Guard, because they do—and, 

as Ray indicated, 90, 95 percent of the time, everything is fine and 

handled at the State level. But when it comes to we need the Federal force to help us, today we revert to the Active Component, 

when, in many cases, there is a Reserve unit, Army, Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine Corps right there in your State with the capability you need, but legally we can’t touch them. 

So we are pushing that, and we appreciate your support to say, 

let us be part of the solution and let the QDR help us shape that. 

Now, for the second part of your question, I think it could be devastating, ma’am. I think it could be devastating if we go forward 

into the sequester, because it is going to force cuts across the military. And I think it could lead, one, to parochialism, because they 

are going to be fighting for aircraft while I am fighting for soldiers, 

because we are all in it. And we are not fighting because we are, 
19 

you know, too protective or jealous. We are fighting because we say 

our Nation’s security is at risk. And if we allow that to go forward, 

in the cuts we have, can I do what needs to be done to protect this 

Nation? Can I produce the 205,000 soldiers that the Army needs 

with all the capabilities I listed before, or am I going to not have 

the equipment, not having the training days, not having anything, 

and we go back to a 9/11/2001 stance with our Reserve, which is 

a hollowed-out strategic force? 

So I think if we let these budget cuts go forward to the level that 

they could, it could have a devastating impact on our national security. 

General CARPENTER. Congresswoman, a couple of observations. 

The 2010 QDR was actually a study that was done in 2009 reported out in 2010. We find ourselves now in 2011 about ready to 

go into 2012. The reason why we do a Quadrennial Defense Review 

every 4 years is because things change. And, as Secretary Gates observed, our ability to predict the future—we have been 100 percent 

wrong across the board. And so, what we saw in the analysis in 

2009 in terms of what the world looked like pre–Arab Spring, prebudget issues, those kinds of things, are not factored into the QDR 

that we see now in 2010. 

One of the things that the QDR did represent, however, was the 

building of Homeland Response Forces, which we are currently in 

the process of doing. And we validated 2 of those 10 last year, and 

we are about ready to validate another 8. It did recognize the responsibility to minimize the risk in the homeland and to try and 

make sure that we would prevent and deal with any terrorist attacks on our own soil. That is an enduring requirement. 

I think that as you look at where we are at right now with regard to the relationship that we have inside the Army, the three 

components of the Army, and the budget issues that are out there, 

I agree with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the 

Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army in their observation that 

if we end up having to take the reductions that are out there, it 

will decimate the Department of Defense. 

And as you take a broader view, even if you dedicated the entire 

Defense Department budget against the requirement we have out 

there, it wouldn’t solve—it wouldn’t be the solution, because it is 

a much larger problem than inside the Department of Defense. It 

is going to take a shared sacrifice here to get us back into a configuration where we can sustain the economy we have right now. 

And so, to Secretary Panetta’s comment about we ought to take 

a strategic view of this rather than be expedient, I think that is 

exactly the right course. 

General WYATT. You know, we talk about efficiencies, we talk 

about doing more with less, we talk about being lean and mean 

and moving tail to tooth—all these expressions. I would submit to 

you that the Air National Guard has been lean and mean before 

lean and mean was cool. We were efficient before efficiency was 

cool. 

We had to because of the nature of our force. We often fall below 

the resourcing line—and I understand that—because the demands 

of our Air Force are such that a lot of times the resources aren’t 

enough to pay for what the country expects the Air Force to do. 
20 

The Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard play a big part 

of that. 

So all this talk recently about, ‘‘Well, we need to become more 

efficient,’’ I agree, we need to continue trying to find efficiencies. 

But in the Air National Guard I think we have squeezed just about 

all the blood out of this turnip that we can squeeze. We are at the 

point now that any further reductions, cuts, drawbacks, will adversely affect our readiness. You know, I am committed not to 

sending airmen into harm’s way unless they are fully trained, fully 

equipped, very capably led, and we won’t back off that standard at 

all. 

So when you combine the two of those, the only thing I can say 

is that we may need to start taking a look at not doing some of 

those missions that the QDR laid out for the United States Air 

Force to do. That is a decision that will be made way above my pay 

grade, but as far as the Air Guard is concerned, I think we are at 

that point right now. 

General STENNER. Your first question was, did the QDR provide 

a template? And, ma’am, no such thing. 

There were several different scenarios, different sets of conditions that we were looking at and attempting to understand. And 

as General Carpenter has said, we have moved on to something 

that now is a fiscal reality. And regardless of which piece of QDR 

you look at, the Air Force Reserve needed to be and must be, would 

have been, a part of every single one of those and solution set in 

force-sizing. 

And that is the real trick, is what is the force-sizing construct 

that we are looking at right here? And how do we handle that 

major combat operation and still be able to do the rotational force 

we are doing on a daily basis with the contingencies around the 

world and make sure we continue to be able to train and continue 

to be ready for either of those other two conditions? That now is 

couched in fiscal reality. 

And to your second question, your second comment, sequester, 

when I go back to what I just said and I apply sequester to the 

force-sizing that we are trying very hard to figure out and the balance we are trying to figure out, there is no strategic look at sequester. And we will absolutely destroy some piece of the mission 

that we didn’t intend to do without a strategic discussion, and not 

just within the Air Force but likely across the Services. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Runyan. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony, and thank you for your service. 

A question for all of you. Specifically, I know on the Army side 

we have talked a lot about personnel, but from an equipment perspective and the ability to do all your missions, compare equipment-wise pre-9/11 to now. Because we know that Active Duty, a 

lot of times, is taking the equipment you have and your ability to 

train your troops to the level they need to be trained. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. We have—thanks to Congress giving us 

the appropriations they have and the NGREA funds that we have 
21 

been able to get and apply, our equipping posture in the Army Reserve is better than it has been in history. 

However, it is not where we need it to be. And the challenge we 

have is, you can look and say, we are at 91 percent of our authorized equipment on hand; we are in pretty good shape. The problem 

is, we are at about 67 percent modernized. It is equipment that is 

a substitute for the modern equipment. And, more importantly, 

when you get into some of the critical pieces of equipment, the figure says you are at 90 percent on hand, but actually it is 29 percent modernized or 25 percent modernized. 

And why is that important? Well, the importance is what I said 

earlier about this route clearance unit. They need that modernized 

equipment back home to train on because that is what they are 

going to be expected to operate when they get to Iraq, Afghanistan, 

or wherever the next call is. 

We need the modernized equipment because the modernized 

equipment has the ability to put add-on armor. You see, I have 

probably 90 percent of my Humvee [H164 Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle] fleet, but only 15 percent of it can have add-on 

armor. So it is not really practical for use in an IED environment 

that we can counter. I would have to be dependent of somebody 

else giving me the equipment. 

A lot of my 915 line-haul trucks that I have that haul all the containers that moved everything into Iraq and move a lot of stuff 

around Afghanistan are the old models that aren’t add-on-armorcapable. We use what we call ‘‘ghetto armor’’; we just slap what we 

can on there to protect them. We need the 915 A5s, which are the 

modernized cab that allows you to put an A or a B kit, depending 

on what level of threat is out there. 

And just as you know in your district, sir, Fort Dix, New Jersey, 

is one of our premier training platforms. That is where all the soldiers we have—Active, Guard, and Reserve, in a lot of cases—go 

through there in their training getting ready to go to theater. And 

we need that equipment sitting there at Fort Dix as a training set 

so that I don’t have to pay to transport a piece of equipment up 

there for the unit to train on and then transport it back home to 

them to be back in their motor pool. 

So, to me, the bill out there, it is the modernization effort. To get 

the Army Reserve today to 100 percent modernized, 100 percent of 

everything we have and 100 percent modernized, is about an $8.9- 

billion bill that is still out there. And that is because equipment 

has continued to change and that is because units have continued 

to change, but we can’t stop. 

We have to be effective and efficient in how we use it. If I am 

going to outfit a heavy transport truck company with 96 HETs 

[Heavy Equipment Transporters], I don’t need 96 sitting in their 

motor pool back in Las Vegas, Nevada, but I need 96 setting at 

Fort Hunter Liggett, probably, so they can train on them, and for 

sure I need 96 modernized HETs to go with them where they go 

in theater. 

So the modernization, to me, is much more important than the 

on-hand figure that we quote. 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Wyatt, do you have anything? I am sure 

you have a similar concern in the Air Force. 
22 

General WYATT. I do, sir. You know, we face the same issue in 

the Air National Guard that General Stenner does in the Air Force 

Reserve and the Active Duty does, and that is that we have a lot 

of old stuff out there—you know, fighters that are 25 going on 30 

years old, tankers that are over 50 years old. And so we have this 

recapitalization challenge. 

We know in the Air National Guard that unless we go and the 

Air Force goes with concurrent and balanced recapitalization across 

the total force, that we are in the Air National Guard looking at 

obsolescence of equipment here before we see replacement equipment. 

In the meantime, we can make that legacy equipment last a little 

longer with some modernization funds. Thank goodness for NGREA 

money because we use a lot of that to modernize our equipment. 

Although we look to the Air Force to modernize and equip us, we 

know that a lot of our needs fall below the funding line, and that 

is why NGREA is so important. 

Our equipping levels are steadily dropping. We are losing the effectiveness of our equipment. And I am not necessarily talking 

about the aircraft. We have adequate aircraft to do the mission 

right now. We have weapons sustainment moneys. We will be able 

to fly the missions for a little while longer, but it is getting more 

difficult because these jets and our rolling stock is getting older 

and older, more difficult to maintain. A lot of the parts are not in 

production anymore. A lot of our radar systems are old mechanical 

scanned array, as opposed to the new electronically scanned array. 

And all that affects our combat capability and our readiness. It is 

getting more and more difficult and more and more expensive to 

maintain these legacy platforms. 

So we face the same problem that the Air Force does, except our 

stuff is just a little bit older and a little bit more in need of modernization. 

General CARPENTER. Congressman, if I could make a quick comment—— 

Mr. RUNYAN. Sure. 

General CARPENTER [continuing]. Relative to New Jersey and the 

recent floods that were sustained in New Jersey because of Hurricane Irene. 

The New Jersey National Guard was in a lot better shape to respond to that hurricane because of the modernized FMTVs [Family 

of Medium Tactical Vehicles] that were available for use to respond 

to the requirements of the citizens of New Jersey. And I think, as 

you look at that, if they hadn’t had the modern equipment that 

they did have on hand, the response would have been a little bit 

more difficult and probably a little slower. 

So, courtesy of this committee and the National Guard and Re- serve Equipment Account and the $37 billion that has been plowed 

into our equipment over the last 6 years, it not only benefits the 

warfight but it benefits people in the homeland. 

General STENNER. Congressman, if I could just put one more 

point on this particular discussion, because NGREA is hugely important. 

The modernization pieces have all been talked about, but I think 

that there is one perhaps unintended positive consequence of 
23 

NGREA, and that is that it is execution-year dollars. It meets the 

urgent operational needs that come from combatant commanders. 

And, in several cases, the Guard and Reserve Test Center has responded to these urgent operational needs with commercial-off-theshelf kinds of hardware and software that are able to be put on 

some of the airplanes, not only on Guard and Reserve, but started 

on Guard and Reserve airplanes and migrated to the Active Force. 

We can get that quicker with NGREA dollars than you can get 

programmatically putting it into the funding streams. And it ends 

up migrating that direction, to the Active Force as well. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you all very much. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Generals, for being here. Thank you for your service. 

For those in the audience, thanks so much for being here with 

us, and thank you for your service. 

General Carpenter, I just have one quick question for you, is that 

the Department of the Army is going to divest itself of the ‘‘Sherpas,’’ the C–23s. And, from my understanding, they have been used 

pretty extensively in theater. And I am just curious as to what the 

plan is, going forward, and what the impact will be to the Army 

National Guard. 

General CARPENTER. Because of the resource management decision that was made last year, we are directed to divest ourselves 

of the C–23s ending in FY ’15. We have actually parked four of 

them on the ramp in Texas right now, and they are no longer available for our use. 

There is, in my estimate, a gap that is created by parking those 

C–23s both in the homeland and in the overseas operations. As I 

mentioned before a different committee recently, when we were in 

Iraq there were 10 Sherpas that were deployed to Balad. Nine were 

on the ramp that evening, and all nine flew operations. And the information that I got was that the combatant commander was actually looking for more Sherpas to be able to use in that mission. 

We have two Sherpas now that are flying observations in MFO 

[Multinational Force and Observers] Sinai, in terms of the peacekeeping force there. They are, in the words of the Ambassador and 

the officials on the ground, the best aircraft that you could possibly 

have for that mission. 

In the homeland—I am a South Dakota guardsman. Our C–23s 

flew pilots from North Dakota back and forth as they carried out 

the CAP [Combat Air Patrol] mission—the CAP mission in the east 

coast. And they ferried—not only that, but they ferried parts and 

various supplies to New York as they dealt with 9/11. 

I think they provide a critical—a critical—part of the homeland 

mission and do great service in the overseas mission. We are concerned about what does that leave in terms of the effect after we 

have divested ourselves of all 15 of those—or, excuse me, all 42 of 

those. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you. 

General Wyatt, one thing that I just learned is that, you know, 

we are hearing that the Active Air Force is planning—may be plan-
24 

ning significant retirements of Air National Guard aircraft—all C– 

5As; 3 F–16 wings; 72 C–130s, many of which were at the Guard; 

and some number of A–10s—and then terminating acquisition of 

the C–27J aircraft as a possible response to budget cuts. 

Has the Guard been actively involved or consulted regarding 

these cuts? And, if so, how would the loss of these aircraft affect 

the Air National Guard? And then what alternative missions will 

those men and women who operate those platforms—what other 

missions will they be able to do with the loss of those aircraft? 

General WYATT. The platforms that you have referenced, a lot of 

those are flown exclusively by the Air National Guard, C–27 being 

one of those. C–5As—we have two C–5A wings remaining in the 

Air National Guard. I believe General Stenner has some C–5As in 

his fleet. 

When the Air Force leadership says that everything is on the 

table, I believe what the Air Force leadership says. I think it is too 

early in the budgeting process to reach any conclusion as to what 

may or may not survive. And we are still looking at, you know, 

what is the total budget bogey going to be. 

But, you know, if those platforms were removed from service for 

whatever reason, budgetary or whatever, in essence what you 

would have is you would have the ‘‘Air’’ being taken out of the Air 

National Guard. 

Mr. CRITZ. Yeah. 

General WYATT. There are other missions out there that we could 

certainly roll into, and we are already doing that. Remotely piloted 

aircraft, we already provide about 20 percent of the total Air Force 

capability in remotely piloted aircraft. We would look to see if we 

could get more of that mission. 

Cyber, I believe, is one of the areas identified where the Department of Defense needs to enhance its cyber capabilities. And we believe Air National Guardsmen are ideally suited for this role because a lot of our citizen warriors already work for some of the big 

IT [Information Technology] and computer firms across the country. They are already cyber-warriors in their civilian capacities. 

And those are the type of individuals that would find cyberwarfighting a patriotic thing to do. 

So there are some things that we could do to step into other mission sets. We haven’t talked about, you know, RED HORSE [Rapid 

Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers] engineering, communications, security forces. There are 

some other things that we could do. But if we lost those airframes, 

in essence you are taking the ‘‘Air’’ out of the Air National Guard. 

Mr. CRITZ. And we are just—we are hearing about this, and that 

is why I am curious, too, are you part of any discussions about targeting certain airframes for possible retirement or lack of use? 

General WYATT. Well, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary have 

both said that there are some difficult decisions that we will have 

to make. The Air Force does include the Air National Guard and 

the Air Force Reserve into decisionmaking processes. And General 

Stenner and I have cast our votes. I don’t know what the final verdict is going to be. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
25 

General STULTZ. Sir, if I could just add also, from the Army’s or 

at least from my perspective, that has a huge impact on us. Because, originally, we had part of the C–27 program designed to 

take the load off our CH–47s, and then we handed it over entirely 

to the Air Force. Our CH–47s, our aviation are some of the highest 

OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo]; we are flying the blades off of 

those things. And if we don’t get the C–27s to take the load off of 

it, it is going to have a significant impact on our CH–47 fleet. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Platts. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will be brief. A number of my questions have been addressed, 

and especially the one regarding the impact on all the military and 

especially our Guard and Reserve units if sequestration of $1.2 trillion or more occurs come January. And your frankness in assessing 

that is, I think, critically important to this committee and the full 

House and Senate in understanding the importance of avoiding 

that, and that the $400-billion-plus already taken out of defense is 

going to create some hardships as is, let alone more, another $600 

billion. 

The other, just a comment of gratitude. I certainly interact with 

the Guard and Reserve units in my district; we are close by a lot. 

With the 193rd Special Ops, I don’t have the privilege of hosting 

the base, but many of their pilots and aircrews, support personnel 

are in my district. And with the Guard and reservists, in my 11 

visits to Iraq and 8 to Afghanistan I see firsthand the amazing 

work they are doing. 

And your leadership and advocacy for those men and women is 

so important and, I think, all the more important because of the 

fiscal challenges facing us. And, you know, whether it is one-third, 

one-sixth, a quarter, whatever that savings number is, we know we 

have an absolute professional soldier or airman out there at a fraction of the cost, but when we need them. So what you and your officers and soldiers and airmen are doing is much appreciated, and 

we, as a Nation, are indebted to you. 

So, with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

General Carpenter, what percent of the Army fighting capability 

is represented by the Army National Guard? 

General CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, 40 percent of the operational 

force of the Army is resident in the Army National Guard. Inside 

of the Army National Guard formations, 51 percent of our formations are combat brigades and combat aviation brigades, combat organizations. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

General Wyatt, a similar number for the Air National Guard? 

General WYATT. Mr. Chairman, we have about 34 percent of the 

combat capability of the Air Force. You can break that down. Tankers are around 43 percent; C–130 lift, about 30 percent, perhaps 

29, just a little bit below that; fighter aircraft, about 32 to 33 percent; RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] I mentioned, about 20 percent. 

Cyber is kind of hard to count because we are still in the early 

stages in the Air Force of standing up cyber units and the capabili-
26 

ties that the Air Force needs to lend its support to national defense. But a large portion, depending upon how you count combat 

communications, perhaps up to 10 to 11 percent of our total force, 

could be interpreted of being in cyber already. So we see that as 

an opportunity to contribute to the defense of this country. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

General Stultz, U.S. Army Reserve, what percent? 

General STULTZ. Sir, we have a relatively small percentage of the 

combat force, because I have one light infantry battalion, which is 

out in the Pacific—Guam, Saipan, Samoa—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. Overall, what is your percentage, would you say? 

General STULTZ. But our percentage of—we have 205,000 soldiers in the Army Reserve out of the 1.1 million force. And of the 

combat support/service support, on average I would say we are a 

full third of that force. 

But we also have another force that we really never talk about 

very much, and that is in the generating force. I have 48,000 soldiers that are part of the Army’s generating force. I have the training divisions that do the basic training mission at places like Fort 

Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri; the drill sergeants that are down there training 

Active Duty Guard and Reserve soldiers. I have the AIT [Advanced 

Infantry Training] battalions that are training them in their MOS 

[Military Operation Specialty] skills. I have the 75th Battle Training Division that does the mission command training for the Army 

in the warfighter exercises. 

So a huge piece of the Army’s generating force is coming from my 

force, as well as the operational force. So you start putting those 

together and it gets somewhere around 33 to 40 percent, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. General Stenner, a similar number for the Air 

Force Reserve? 

General STENNER. Yes, sir. If you break it down by mission set, 

it is as I have depicted it here on this board. But as an overall 

number, very briefly, I would have to say it is approaching 20 percent. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Twenty percent. 

Okay, I would—these numbers are pretty big for the Army. 

Something like 73 to 80 percent of the total fighting force is represented in the Guard and Reserve. Since it is very much less expensive to maintain capabilities in Guard and Reserve, obviously, 

the bigger percentage the Guard and Reserve is of the total fighting force, the less it is going to cost us. But there are limits to that, 

and I just wanted to get a number from each of you. And I would 

like for you to write that number down so you are not influenced 

by your neighbor’s response. And I will ask you for that number. 

With due consideration to training and integration, what total 

percent of our fighting capability could be resident in Guard and 

Reserve if we are up against tight budget constraints and wanted 

to get the most for our dollar? If you would just write that figure 

down. 

I know you are either in the Guard or the Reserve, but if you 

will for now combine the Guard and Reserve in your answer. And 

I will give you a moment to write that down, then I will just go 
27 

down the line and ask you for the number that you have written 

down. 

Okay. General Stultz, what number have you written down? 

General STULTZ. I wrote down 65 percent, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, you already had 73 to 80 percent. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. And what I am taking into account is 

that we right now, out of a 1.1-million-man force, the Guard and 

Reserve make up a little over 50 percent of that force in the total 

force. So if you were to say what could we be, I would say more 

along a 60/40, 65 percent. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Are you talking about only the Reserve now or 

Guard? Because the answers I got—— 

General STULTZ. No, sir, I am talking about Guard and Reserve 

combined. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Because General Carpenter told me that 40 percent of the fighting capability is represented by the Guard, and you 

told me 33 to 40. If I add those up, it is somewhere between 73 

and 80 percent already is represented by Guard and Reserve. 

General STULTZ. But I am talking about the combat support/service support. And I am not sure if he is talking about the combat 

arms. See, that is where you—when you start talking about the 

fighting force and what I make up of that, I make up the servicesupport side of it, not the combat side of it. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. And that is how much bigger than the current number? You are 63 percent—— 

General STULTZ. Well, currently, today, between the Guard and 

Reserve, we make up a little over 50 percent of the Army’s force. 

Mr. BARTLETT. And you think that could grow from 50 to 65? 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir, 60 to 65 percent. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. 

General STULTZ. And I think part of that is going to happen as 

we come down from 569 [569,000] to 520 [520,000] to whatever 

number. If we just stay the same, it is going to change that balance. 

Mr. BARTLETT. General—let’s see—General Carpenter, what 

number did you write down? 

General CARPENTER. I feel like I am taking an open-book test 

here a little bit. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, you know the total already that you gave 

me was 64 percent, 34 and—I am sorry, 54 percent, 34 and 20, 54 

percent. 

General CARPENTER. And let me qualify this a little bit. It goes 

back to Secretary Gates’ comment about being able to predict the 

future. And part of the discussion here has to be, what risk are we 

willing to take as we look at a very unpredictable and very dangerous world? 

Post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan, the number I wrote down is 70 percent. But I have to tell you, you need to make sure you understand 

the risk associated with that. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand. The higher that number is, the 

higher the risk is. 

General CARPENTER. Absolutely. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand that. Okay. And that is something 

you would have to factor—we would have to factor in. 
28 

General Wyatt, what was your number? 

General WYATT. Well, at the risk of sounding greedy, I had 100 

percent, but I thought that probably—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. That would be nice. 

General WYATT. I think a lot would depend upon the particular 

mission set that you are talking about. Certainly, there are some 

mission sets in the Air Force that are better suited to the Guard 

and Reserve, other mission sets where the Active Duty is more 

suitable. 

And I touched on this a little bit earlier when I was talking 

about warfighting UTCs. That is our specialty, is warfighting 

UTCs. We don’t do very good acquisitions. We don’t do very good 

research, development, test, and evaluation. We do some special operations. We do some special operations with the 193rd SOW, a 

special operations wing in Pennsylvania. But that is not our forte. 

Those folks are very, very good, but we don’t have large numbers 

of those types of special forces. Space, we do some space, but a lot 

of those space missions are 24 hours a day, 365; that really doesn’t 

fit the Guard construct. 

So I think you have to—you know, if you asked me, you know, 

how much higher headquarters research and development acquisition should the Guard do, I would say probably zero. But when we 

are talking about the type of capability that the country needs to 

ramp up for a fight and then ramp down for a fight and then ramp 

up for a fight, you are talking about combat unit training codes in 

the United States Air Force. And I think that the appropriate answer, in my mind, would be 60 to 65 percent of that capability. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. Good. Thank you very much. 

General Stenner. 

General STENNER. Yes, sir. If I could qualify this by saying I 

need to go find my A9 analyst and see if we can’t come up with 

a—but I will qualify with some assumptions. 

First of all, if we continue with the same concepts we have within the Air Force right now—we are trained to the same standards, 

we are seamlessly integrated, we can deploy within 72 hours— 

maintaining those kinds of assumptions, maintaining a baseline 

number of MPA [Military Personnel Appropriation] dollars that we 

can in fact access—and that is a big concern of our Active Force 

compatriots, is the access to the Guard and Reserve, and I read 

‘‘access’’ to mean military personnel appropriation dollars that get 

us into the exercises, into the theater security packages—doing all 

those kinds of things and getting it right in the baseline and, 

again, with the qualifiers on the institutional force, I threw 50 percent on the table. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Thank you all very much. 

I wanted to note my appreciation for the questions and answers 

relative to the C–27J. I have been concerned for a number of years 

that that was an airplane which the Army wanted and had considerable need for. In their wisdom, the Pentagon gave that plane to 

the Air Force and then asked the Air Force to please be Johnnyon-the-spot when the Army needed them. That was not anticipated 

to work very well. I am not sure that it is working very well. I do 

not believe that this program has been adequately resourced. And 
29 

I am very appreciative that we got that question and answer without me asking the question to get the answer. 

Thank you all very much. 

Because we want to make sure that we have all the information 

that may be necessary to make certain that we make the best possible case for making sure that you have all that you need in the 

future, there may be questions that we will need to ask for the 

record. So if you could respond to those, we would be very appreciative of that. 

Thank you all very much for your testimonies. 

Thank you, members of the subcommittee, for coming. 

The subcommittee now stands in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 

(35) 

Statement of Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces 

Hearing on 

National Guard and Reserve Component Acquisition 

and Modernization 

October 12, 2011 

Today, the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets to 

receive an update on the equipment status and requirements of the 

Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve Components. 

Given the significant change in the budget outlook for fiscal year 

2012 and beyond, we believe it necessary to obtain the current 

views of the Guard and Reserve senior leaders for the potential impact on their programs. We will also hear from the military services in two subsequent hearings later in the month. 

We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: 

• Major General Raymond W. Carpenter, the Acting Deputy 

Director of the Army National Guard, 

• Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III, Director of the Air 

National Guard, 

• Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, and 

• Lieutenant General Charles E. Stenner, Jr., Chief, U.S. Air 

Force Reserve. 

Major reductions in the Federal budget need to be an element of 

correcting the Federal deficit. The Department of Defense must 

share in a fair and balanced way in those reductions. That process 

is already taking place under the Budget Control Act of 2011, with 

nearly $500 billion in cuts planned for DOD over the next 10 years. 

However, cuts beyond that, up to approximately $1 trillion over 

10 years are possible under what Secretary Panetta has called the 

‘‘Doomsday Mechanism’’ sequestration provision of the Budget Control Act. 

Secretary Panetta and Director Lew of the White House Office of 

Management and Budget have stated that budget cuts to the Department of Defense as a result of the sequestration provision 

‘‘could pose a significant risk to national security’’ and ‘‘DOD would 

almost certainly be forced to furlough large numbers of its civilian 

workers. Training would have to be curtailed, the force reduced, 

and purchases of weapons would have to be cut dramatically.’’ 

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn recently stated that the imposition of the sequestration provision of the Budget 

Control Act ‘‘on our Armed Forces could be catastrophic. . . . Seques-
36 

tration would leave us with the smallest Army and Marine Corps 

in decades, the smallest Air Force in history, and the smallest 

Navy since McKinley was President. . . . The debate is not whether 

sequestration would wound our military. It is about whether sequestration is equivalent to shooting ourselves in the head or the 

foot.’’ 

Against the backdrop of the Budget Control Act for 2011, today’s 

hearing is to get an assessment of the modernization needs and 

equipping challenges of the Army National Guard, Air National 

Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve. 

We recognize the Department is making improvements and 

progress in providing adequate funding to equip the National 

Guard and Reserve Components, to enhance its role as an operational reserve. Sustaining this funding, however, will continue to 

be a major issue given the acute national economic challenges we 

currently face. 

During the April hearing the subcommittee learned the importance of equipping and resourcing the Reserve Component as an 

‘‘operational reserve’’ rather than the Cold War model of a strategic 

reserve. We also heard our witnesses testify that since 2001 the 

Department has made significant strides in providing adequate resources to equip the Reserve Component as an operational reserve. 

The Guard and Reserve Components have proven to be an invaluable asset during Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn. These past 10 years have 

justified the need for an operational Reserve Component force that 

must be adequately manned, trained, and equipped. 

Since September 2001, almost 600,000 guardsmen and reservists 

have deployed in support of combat operations, representing 40 

percent of the total reserve force of 1.4 million troops. All 34 Army 

National Guard combat brigades have deployed to either Iraq or 

Afghanistan and more than half of the force have combat experience. There are reservists operating in over 100 countries. 

The Army Reserve Components also comprise roughly 74 percent 

of all medical units, 80 percent of all transportation units, 75 percent of engineer units, and 70 percent of military police units in the 

Army. These are critical combat enablers for any type of combat operation. 

The National Guard also has a dual-role responsibility and has 

to be mission-ready to rapidly respond to local, State, and Federal 

emergencies. 

For example, for the Air National Guard, one of their more important missions is protecting the homeland through the Aerospace 

Control Alert mission. This mission has not been without its challenges—primarily because it was not adequately resourced, programmed or budgeted for by the active Air Force. 

Since 2001 the majority of modernization funding for the Reserve 

Components has come from supplemental, overseas contingency operation funding requests, meaning funding that is not part of the 

base budget request. What happens when these so-called OCO requests are no longer requested or funded? How will we continue to 

sustain the operational reserve and equip them for their missions? 

Congress has not hesitated in trying to address the equipment 

readiness needs we have noted in many Guard and Reserve units 
37 

over the years. National Guard and Reserve Component procurement from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2011 has totaled approximately $47.0 billion, averaging almost $6.0 billion per year. Since 2004, Congress has authorized approximately $7.7 billion 

in a National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account helps maintain combat capability and should help to guarantee that equipment is relevant and upgraded in a timely manner. 

This funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support both on 

this committee and throughout Congress. 

The Department of Defense and Congress have made substantial 

progress in terms of adequate funding for and reorganization of the 

Reserve Components, but I am concerned that these anticipated 

budgetary challenges we currently face could potentially negatively 

impact the current operational status of the Guard and Reserve. 

The ability to maintain a sustainable operational reserve force 

with sufficient operational capability is predicated on having sufficient manpower and adequate resources. 

I want to express how much the subcommittee appreciates the 

contribution of the Guard and Reserve Components and want to 

recognize that they are maintained at a fraction of the cost of the 

regular military. We, as a Nation, clearly cannot fight without 

them because there is no way a 19-year-old can have the skill set 

and experience of a 39-year-old. 
38 

Statement of Hon. Silvestre Reyes 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land 

Forces 

Hearing on 

National Guard and Reserve Component Acquisition 

and Modernization 

October 12, 2011 

This past April, the subcommittee received testimony from the 

leadership of the Army and Air Force Reserve Components. Today, 

we have those same leaders back for an update on the equipment 

needs of the Army and Air Force Reserve Components. 

During the April hearing, we heard that our Reserve Components remain as busy as ever, and that the proposed FY 2012 

budget request would allow us to maintain the high-quality Reserve forces we have today. We also heard that there were additional equipment needs for all the Reserve Components. As a result, the full Armed Services Committee bill included $325 million 

in additional funding in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. The House Appropriators went even further, proposing an additional $1.5 billion for this same account, while the 

Senate Appropriators proposed $500 million. 

So, the good news is that it appears that Congress will continue 

to provide support for Guard and Reserve equipment needs over 

and above the budget request. 

On the other hand, the Budget Control Act of 2011 will likely result in a substantial cut to the DOD base budget in FY 2012—perhaps as much as $26 billion. In addition, the Budget Control Act 

mandates approximately $450 billion in additional DOD cuts over 

10 years, when compared to current DOD projections. And finally, 

if the so-called ‘‘super committee’’ does not reach its goal of $1.5 

trillion in additional reductions, the DOD could face additional significant cuts starting in FY 2013. 

However, at this point we don’t know how DOD will propose 

dealing with these budget reductions. We do know, however, how 

similar cuts have been applied in the past. In previous budget reductions, DOD has often taken an ‘‘across-the-board’’ approach to 

making cuts, rather than a more focused, thoughtful path. 

I am concerned that if an across-the-board, cookie-cutter approach to funding reductions takes place the entire force—including 

the Reserve Components—will suffer significant damage. For example, if the Air Force further reduces fighter aircraft fleets in the 

Active Duty force, will similar cuts flow down to the Reserve Components? If Active Duty forces are reduced by DOD, are there plans 

to increase the size of the Reserve elements to compensate? If DOD 

is seeking budget efficiencies, does it make sense to strategically expand some elements of the Reserve forces? I certainly hope those 

questions are being asked as part of the ongoing DOD ‘‘strategic review.’’ 
39 

The Nation has invested billions in additional funding to create 

the highly effective Reserve forces we have today—with this subcommittee adding additional billions to that investment every year. 

Beyond the immediate needs of our Reserve Components, I think 

it is also critical that we focus on the long term. If we get this 

right, we can end up with a high-quality Reserve force that also 

saves the Nation billions of dollars desperately needed elsewhere. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ thoughts on these major 

issues facing the entire DOD, but the Reserve Component in particular. 
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 

(117) 
118 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 12, 2011 

(121) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the Department of 

Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these anticipated cuts would 

impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve Components. 

General STULTZ. The Army Reserves is currently resourced at a lower per capita 

rate than any other Army component. While the Army expects the Army Reserve 

to be capable of conducting Full Spectrum Operations that capability will not exist 

if additional investments are not made in equipment, personnel and training. 

Additional days for any schooling, professional development, combatant command 

support, exercises and overseas training are over and above the statutory level. The 

statutory requirement for training is 39 days for the Army Reserve. The current 

structure of the Army is dependent upon the Combat Support and Combat Service 

Support capabilities predominantly resident in the Army Reserve. That capability 

cannot be built and sustained with 39 days of training per Soldier per year. The 

Army Reserves has proven itself in every contingency, manmade or natural, for the 

last two decades. It has done so by using limited resources and applying them in 

an efficient and cost effective manner. It must continue to have resources to man, 

equip and train its Soldiers and Units. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and the amount of equipment 

needed to fill out the brigades and other units? If so, to what extent will that help 

to balance the equipment capabilities between the active and Reserve Components? 

For example, I have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall 

will be reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMs in the Army National 

Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component. 

General STULTZ. The Army will have to reduce force structure in response to the 

pending budget cuts. The extent of the overall cut and the specific units to cut has 

not been decided yet. The Army is addressing these decisions as part of the ongoing 

Total Army Analysis 2014–2018 process. Once the specific reductions are decided 

the equipment requirements will be analyzed to determine what equipment can be 

moved from the Active Component to fill Reserve Component shortages. Equipment 

on-hand levels are similar across the Army Components; however, the Army Reserve 

remains the least modernized at 67%. We are hopeful that cascaded equipment from 

the Active Component will displace older equipment in the Army Reserve resulting 

in improved modernization levels. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions? 

General STULTZ. Other Army initiatives (e.g. Reset) currently have minimal to no 

impact on Army Reserve Training and Mission execution. However, as theater provided equipment is returned, reset and redistributed to all components, both equipment on-hand and modernization levels should improve. This will enhance our ability to train with modernized and compatible equipment. 

Mr. BARTLETT. As the Services down-size their inventories of older model 

HMMWVs, is that expected to impact the Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

more than the Active Component? 

General STULTZ. No. The Army Reserve supports the acquisition strategy for 

HMMWVs. The AR is 94% equipment on hand for HMMWVs. 

The Army Reserve is 17% armored capable and 83% of non-Armored capable. As 

we divest of these older non-Armored capable models, we will work with Army to 

fill the shortfall with Reset HMMWVs as they return from theater. We anticipate 

that the USAR HMMWV armored-capable and reset fleet will increase. 

The Army’s tactical wheeled vehicle investment strategy is to balance the quantity, quality, and sustainment of the fleet through new production, rebalancing and 

fleet Recapitalization (RECAP). We are working with Army to rebalance our fleet 

and to send older vehicles through RECAP programs to provide the AR with the 

more armored capable vehicles to support full spectrum operations. 

AR HMMWV Required: 21,624 On-Hand: 20,334 or 94% On-Hand. 

• Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH)—3,051 (15%) of On-Hand 

• Extended Capability Vehicle (ECV) (armored)—406 (2%) of On-Hand 
122 

• Legacy—8,541 (42%) of On-Hand 

• M1097R—8,336 (41%) of On-Hand 

The M1097R is non-armored capable. The RECAP extends the life of vehicle. All 

future RECAP distributions will be Armored Capable. The last M1097R was delivered to the AR in FY 10. HMMWV Production was FY 05–10. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the Department of 

Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these anticipated cuts would 

impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve Components. 

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard is capable of executing the full 

spectrum of operations, given the appropriate time and resources, and consistently 

found to be an affordable, effective, and efficient component of the Army’s Operational force. Major budget cuts would adversely impact the Army National Guard’s 

capabilities across a broad spectrum of functional areas. Below are the immediate 

capability concerns: 

Personnel: The Army National Guard has refined its capacity to provide ready, 

trained, and equipped forces to the Army since 9/11 by recruiting and retaining a 

quality campaign force. The Army National Guard continues to provide the Army 

a vehicle by which critical force structure and personnel are retained at a significant 

savings (the Army National Guard operating budget is pennies on the dollar when 

compared to the Active Component). However, major budget cuts will reduce capabilities across every personnel management sector, which in turn adversely affects 

the depth and breadth of the Army National Guard’s domestic and global capabilities in support of the Operational Force. 

Medical: Medical readiness is a critical component of attaining the personnel readiness status required by the Department of the Army for deployable units. Without 

appropriate levels of medical readiness funding, the Army National Guard will not 

be able to provide medically ready Soldiers or units to support State and Federal 

operations in accordance with Department of Defense requirements and regulations 

in the following areas: 

1. The Army National Guard will be unable to reach regulatory goals for mandated dental and medical requirements, which then decreases the number of 

fully medically ready Soldiers and units the Army National Guard can provide 

for Federal or State missions. 

2. Lack of funding will significantly and negatively impact important occupational health requirements. 

3. Major funding cuts will directly impact the ability of the Army National 

Guard to provide specialized Case Management to mitigate service connected 

injuries sustained by the force following the previous ten years of sustained 

war. 

4. Funding cuts will impact the ability of the Army National Guard to maintain medical readiness data repository and reporting systems. 

5. The ability of the ARNG to train for and meet the recently proven domestic 

standard of trauma and critical care will be eliminated. Fifty-six percent of 

Army medical evacuation assets reside in the Army National Guard. 

Family Support: Army National Guard Soldiers and families face unique challenges in accessing services due to the geographic dispersion unique to this service 

component. Budget cuts to existing Soldier and Family Support programs will further impair the capability of the Army National Guard to provide baseline services 

in support of State and Federal roles. In addition to adversely affecting support to 

geo-dispersed Army Soldiers outside the footprint of the Active Component installations, the following capabilities will significantly degrade by cuts across these programs: 

1. Family Assistance Centers: a vital resource to National Guard families. 

They are the Reserve Component equivalent of the installation-based Army 

Community Services and these locations (more than 380) cover the gap in services between an active duty installation and the 2,900 Army National Guard 

communities. 

2. Family Readiness Support Assistants: support traditional, drilling Army National Guard units with full-time support, assistance to unit Family Readiness 

Groups, and enhanced family readiness throughout the Deployment Support 

Cycle. 

3. Resilience programs: improve the abilities of Citizen-Soldiers to train, deploy, and reintegrate effectively by applying enhanced coping skills and the 

awareness of post-deployment challenges. 
123 

4. Risk reduction and mitigation programs: suicide prevention, substance 

abuse prevention/response, and sexual assault prevention remain underfunded 

for the Army National Guard and are vital to readiness. In many cases, the 

minimal expense for prevention and basic substance abuse or behavioral 

health treatment options provides a significant return on investment when 

compared to the training and replacement costs for Soldiers with service-related issues. Resource reductions in these areas will increase recruiting and 

training costs because quality Soldiers will not be retained. 

Aviation: All Army National Guard rotary-wing airframes are being replaced or 

upgraded. Reduced funding may cause aircraft fielding delays or cancellations, 

which increases long-term fleet costs for the aging airframes maintained in our inventory. Major budget cuts will result in a decreased ability to support Army National Guard aviation missions and readiness reductions for fiscal year 2012 and beyond. 

Training: Army National Guard unit readiness is predicated on trained Soldiers. 

(Individuals are qualified in their military occupational specialties, critical functional skills, and for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers, timely completion of 

required professional military education). Major budget cuts to the Army National 

Guard will cause the number of Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualified Soldiers in the Guard to fall potentially impacting unit mobilizations without additional post mobilization time and resources. In fiscal year 2012, Army National 

Guard requirements for individual training were funded at only 64 percent (Army 

National Guard received $496 million to meet a $771 million training requirement). 

The current funding gap results in critical skills training shortfalls, increased backlogs for professional military education, and military occupational specialty qualifications. Further budget cuts could impact the Army National Guard’s ability to 

provide ready units in support of operational requirements at home and abroad, 

placing the Nation at risk. 

Logistics: Cuts in Ground Operations Tempo funds impact the day-to-day operations of all Army National Guard units, as well as the collective training for units 

designated in upcoming rotations for the Army Force Generation Model strategy. 

Major budget cuts would result in the degradation of mission execution across numerous logistics venues: depot-level maintenance, reset operations, the National 

Maintenance Program, unit Readiness Reporting, calibration monitoring for sensitive equipment, repairing tactical wheeled vehicles to fill critical shortages, and 

tracking Army ‘‘payments’’ back to the Army National Guard for equipment the 

Army requested to remain in theater after national Guard deployments (Department of Defense Directive 1225.6). Further budget cuts impact the Guard’s ability 

to purchase repair parts. For example, many weapons systems fall below required 

readiness levels if repair parts are not in place in a timely fashion. Overseas Contingency Operations Reset funding cuts can be highlighted by the following: 

1. A 15 percent reset budget reduction equates to five Army National Guard 

Brigade Combat Team equivalents failing to achieve Field Level Reset in 365 

days. 

2. A 30 percent reset budget reduction equates to nine Army National Guard 

Brigade Combat Team equivalents failing to achieve Field Level Reset in 365 

days. 

3. A 40 percent reset budget reduction equates to eleven Army National Guard 

Brigade Combat Team equivalents failing to achieve Field Level Reset in 365 

days. 

The Army National Guard brings a broad array of capabilities to the Nation’s defense—all for a minimal cost—at home and abroad. We understand each component 

must continue to provide services at the highest level even with planned budget decreases. However, major cuts to the already proportionally smaller Army National 

Guard budget would slice deep into our dual-mission capabilities and adversely affect the Nation at home and abroad. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and the amount of equipment 

needed to fill out the brigades and other units? If so, to what extent will that help 

to balance the equipment capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components? 

For example, I have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall 

will be reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMs in the Army National 

Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component. 

General CARPENTER. The Army is currently examining force structure changes, 

and anticipates releasing a complete analysis in the second quarter of fiscal year 

2012. The Army analysis will determine the proper mix of organizations required 

to comprise a balanced and affordable force necessary to meet the guidance issued 
124 

by the President, Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Army leadership. 

Once the Army Analysis is complete, the Army will then determine any potential 

equipment modernization impacts, to include the Combat Vehicles for the Army National Guard. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions? 

General CARPENTER. Since 9–11, the Army National Guard operates at a pace unlike any other time in its history. The current strategic environment places high demands on both personnel and equipment. The Army National Guard continues to 

be a resilient and committed professional component in the Army’s Operational 

Force. Unfortunately, the Total Force is out of balance and must Reset to restore 

personnel and equipment capabilities for future missions. Reset establishes a balanced process after an extended deployment. It systematically restores deployed 

units to a level of personnel and equipment readiness that permits the resumption 

of training for future missions. The fully implemented Reset model will accelerate 

reconstitution of the force, increase unit readiness, and improve preparation for 

next-to-deploy units. Reset improves the readiness of the force, increases training 

time on unit equipment prior to deployment, and demonstrates good stewardship of 

funding. Equipment readiness is key to the Army National Guard’s Reset Strategy 

and vital to the Army’s efforts to build sufficient strategic flexibility and operational 

depth to deal with unforeseen contingencies. In a strategic environment of uncertainty and unpredictability, it is imperative that the Army National Guard supports 

these efforts by accurately tracking and reporting equipment repair, replacement, 

recapitalization, and expenditures to ensure the Army sustains equipment readiness 

at a rate that meets or exceeds operational demand. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Earlier this year, the Army announced the cancellation of the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM) program. 

The SLAMRAAM program was scheduled to replace the old Norwegian Advanced 

Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), which is currently being used in defense 

of the National Capital Region (NCR). What impact, if any, does the cancellation 

have on the National Guard units conducting the NCR mission? 

General CARPENTER. The impact of Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range 

Air-to-Air Missile program cancellation on the Army National Guard is that a replacement for the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System for the National Capital Region Mission is still undetermined. The contract for the Norwegian 

Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System ends in fiscal year 2017. The Army National Guard Avenger rebuild program is scheduled through fiscal year 2015; while 

Avenger sustainment concludes in fiscal year 2018, and currently no decision to extend either program. There are only small levels of modernization planned for the 

Avenger platform and no planned replacement currently identified. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Army National Guard operates more than 800 Black Hawk 

helicopters for both domestic and overseas missions. However, as you know, more 

than 500 of these are the older ‘‘A’’ models, which are quickly becoming obsolete. 

The active Army is slated to receive funding for at least 75 new UH–60M and HH– 

60M Black Hawk helicopters in FY2012, and only 4 of those 75 will go to the Guard, 

despite the fact that they fulfill 40 percent of the missions. Can you talk about the 

current state of the Black Hawk fleet and the impact that using older Black Hawks 

and not receiving the newer ‘‘M’’ models will have on the Army Guard? 

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard is programmed to receive six (6) 

HH–60M Black Hawk aircraft to complete a twelve (12) aircraft company requirement in fiscal year 2012. The Army National Guard’s position with the Army states 

that sourcing and deployments guide fielding plans to ensure units operating in 

combat areas are equipped with the newest and most capable aircraft. In terms of 

costs, the UH–60A is more expensive to operate per flight hour, less modern, and 

more difficult to maintain than the HH–60M. Conversions of UH–60A aircraft to 

UH–60L models, a cascade of UH–60Ls from the Active Component, and fielding of 

the newer UH–60Ms will retire most of the remaining UH–60A model aircraft in 

the Army National Guard. As long additional budget cuts do not reduce the number 

of UH–60A to UH–60L conversions or UH/HH–60M procurements, the current plan 

to retire Army National Guard UH–60As will conclude roughly in 2023. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The current Department of the Army plan is to divest all Army 

National Guard C–23 Sherpas by 2015. What impact will this have on the ability 

of the Army National Guard to respond to domestic situations, as well as the overseas mission, where the Sherpa has been heavily used to provide intra-theatre airlift? 

General CARPENTER. The current Army plan will reduce the number of Army National Guard fixed wing aircraft available for domestic operations from 114 aircraft 

to 64, or potentially as low as 48 aircraft. This plan also includes the divestiture 
125 

of 42 C–23 Sherpas. The Army approach to domestic fixed wing requirements is one 

in which the Army National Guard utilizes those Army National Guard fixed wing 

assets not deployed in federal service. 

These facts, coupled with the Air National Guard fielding of C–27J aircraft to replace Army National Guard C–23s, the likelihood of Air National Guard deployments with their C–27Js, and the extensive equipment training requirements for 

this aircraft will limit routine Army National Guard logistical support requirements, 

as well as Army Service-specific missions. Airframe inventory reductions and diminished access to fixed wing capabilities decreases Army National Guard capabilities 

for future domestic operations and catastrophic incidents. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In 2010, Army Materiel Command outlined a plan for the drastic 

reduction/elimination of the National Guard’s participation in the National Maintenance Program by 2013. Do you agree with this decision? Do you believe the National Guard’s participation in the National Maintenance Program offers the potential for further cost savings, enhanced performance and mission accomplishment? 

General CARPENTER. National Maintenance Program is a reimbursable, requirements driven program designed to save the Army money by using excess maintenance capacity. Since requirements vary annually based on Army Working Capital 

Fund supply requirements, the Army National Guard’s participation would fluctuate 

as well. Therefore, it is advisable to view the Army National Guard’s participation 

on a percentile basis of the total annual National Maintenance Management program. The fiscal year 2010 Army National Guard share was 18.2 percent. The fiscal 

year 2011 Army National Guard share is at 24.97 percent (as of 31 May 2011). The 

fiscal year 2012 projection ranges from 19 to 25 percent. The Army National Guard 

has not received fiscal year 2013 National Maintenance Management program projections. 

Army Materiel Command seeks to maximize their efficiencies through increased 

work at depots, and repeatedly stated that this will occur when economically prudent. The Army National Guard has a collaborative relationship with Army Materiel 

Command, one built on quality service and products at reasonable prices. The Army 

National Guard, through the National Maintenance Program, has a proven surge 

capability for Army Materiel Command. 

Mr. BARTLETT. To what extent do Guard and Reserve units get to operate and 

train with Up-Armored HMWWVs and MRAP class vehicles? Other than when they 

deploy overseas, do they have any need for tactical wheeled vehicles with high levels 

of protection? 

General CARPENTER. Units do not have Up-Armored HMWWVs or MRAPs in the 

continental United States, and most of the actual vehicles are in theater. The Army 

National Guard does, however, use simulators which focus on how to survive vehicle 

rollovers, and driver trainers which simulate multiple vehicles to include MRAP 

variants, Tanks and Strikers. The driver trainers focus on driving and maneuvering 

through cities and off-road as part of convoys, route clearance missions etc. 

Mr. BARTLETT. As the Services down-size their inventories of older model 

HMMWVs, is that expected to impact the Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

more than the Active Component? 

General CARPENTER. No, the down-sizing of older model HMMWV inventories will 

not impact the Army National Guard more than the Active Component Army. The 

Army National Guard achieved 100 percent Equipment On Hand during fiscal year 

2011 and the Army National Guard up-armored HMMWV rate is commensurate 

with the Active Army. However, the Army National Guard will still retain approximately 4,000 legacy HMMWVs after downsizing. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the Department of 

Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these anticipated cuts would 

impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve Components. 

General WYATT. The Air Force plans and programs for its components as a Total 

Force and ensures the same level of readiness across the entire force. Any major 

budget cuts have a potential of greatly affecting the equipping and readiness of the 

Air Reserve Components. The Air National Guard is deeply concerned that any additional budget demands have the potential to severely degrade of its overall capability. Due to an already lean business model, the Air National Guard is able to operate with less than 6-percent of the Total Air Force Budget, while representing 

more than 34-percent of overall capability. 

For perspective, for 2011, the Air National Guard has supported worldwide contingencies with more than 6,000 deployed per month. In addition, on October 1, 

2011, there were 3,434 Guard Airmen actively engaged in homeland defense and 

support to civil authorities including protecting American skies through Aerospace 

Control Alert, assisting with critical infrastructure protection, and assisting their 
126 

local communities with disaster recovery in North and South Dakota, Missouri, and 

Nebraska. This also includes 578 Guard Airmen supporting local and national 

counterdrug programs and 121 Airmen assisting the US Border Patrol on our southwest border. Air National Guard Modular Aerial Fire Fighting units dropped 20,000 

gallons of fire retardant supporting the National Forestry Service in the Southwest. 

This level of contribution is provided with less than two-cents on every dollar spent 

on defense. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and the amount of equipment 

needed to fill out the brigades and other units? If so, to what extent will that help 

to balance the equipment capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components? 

For example, I have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall 

will be reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMs in the Army National 

Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component. 

General WYATT. The Secretary of the Air Force has produced plans to reduce the 

number of weapon systems throughout the Air National Guard (ANG). While this 

reduces the number of aircraft and support equipment in the ANG, it does not create any sort of equipment equity between the Active Component and the ANG, rather it will reduce the ANG’s overall capability. Furthermore, the plan creates potential barriers for the National Guard to support its domestic requirements. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions? 

General WYATT. The House Armed Services Committee was recently briefed on 

the status of Aviation Assets for the National Guard on 1 June 2011 in accordance 

with House report 111–49–257. In addition, concerns from the Chief, National 

Guard Bureau that Department of Defense programmatic decisions may have degraded National Guard aviation capabilities to adequately support Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA) missions prompted the Chief 

to request a Capabilities Based Assessment to analyze the National Guard aviation 

capability and its support for Domestic Operations. Air National Guard staff is guiding the assigned Capabilities Based Assessment, but because of the sheer size and 

scope of the study, it has been outsourced for commercial contract. The Capabilities 

Based Assessment to analyze the National Guard aviation capability is currently in 

the contracting process and is expected to be completed 240 days from contract signature. Once the Capabilities Based Assessment is complete, the National Guard 

should be able to provide the House Armed Services Committee a clearer picture 

of the National Guard’s capability to support Domestic Operations. The following observations have been made: 

• Programmed changes to domestic airlift present the most eminent impact for 

successful completion of current and future domestic operations missions. 

Since 2005, and with current programmed reductions in FY11 and FY12, the 

Air National Guard will have lost 22% of its C–130 fleet, 226 aircraft, down 

to 175. 

• Mission requirements and demands levied on the NG routinely are difficult 

to codify as to which missions are requirements and which are demands. The 

NG has requirements that are federally recognized, defined by joint and service doctrine and demands only defined by National Guard Regulation. 

• A New Madrid Earthquake scenario could create an estimated need of 1000 

C–130 sorties for aero-medical evacuation alone. This is in addition to moving 

our CBRN Enterprises, supplies and equipment. 

• National Guard Aviation assets currently available to supply major military 

support to civilian authorities are stressed to meet all emergency response requirements and scenarios. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Recently, the Air Force has concluded that its requirement for 

fighter aircraft has been reduced from 2,200 in 2008, to 2,000 in 2010. How will that 

reduction of 200 aircraft affect the Air National Guard’s ability to perform the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) mission? 

General WYATT. The reduction in fighter aircraft does not directly affect the Air 

National Guard’s ability to perform the ACA mission. The Air National Guard has 

the ability to manage the reductions to prevent ACA locations from losing aircraft 

and making the reductions at non-ACA locations. 

Mr. BARTLETT. We understand that the Air National Guard operates 16 of 18 

Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) sites and that by 2013, retirements of F–16 aircraft 

will affect 10 of 18 ACA sites. Are plans in place to replace the retiring force structure for all of the Air National Guard’s ACA sites? 

General WYATT. The Air National Guard (ANG) operates 17 of 18 ACA sites. Currently, there are no ANG programmatic retirements of F–16 aircraft in 2013; how-
127 

ever the F–15s and F–16s executing the mission at these sites are the oldest in the 

in Air Force’s inventory. The F–22s that replaced the F–15Cs at Hickam AFB, HI, 

and the F–35s scheduled to replace the F–16s at Burlington, VT are the only two 

planned 5th generation ANG bases. Analysis indicates there will be sufficient ACA 

capable aircraft to accomplish the ACA mission for the foreseeable future; however, 

presently there is not a specific plan to recapitalize ANG ACA units with 4th and 

5th generation aircraft. 

If in the future, there are fighter force structure changes that affect ANG ACA 

units, the Air Force needs to produce a well articulated recapitalization plan. The 

ANG requires a concurrent and balanced recapitalization approach if America is to 

maintain air dominance over our sovereign skies. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The recent Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study identified an 

overmatch in C–130 tactical airlift force structure. How will future reductions affect 

ANG units? Have you, the Adjutants General, and Governors been consulted on potential future force reductions? 

General WYATT. If the Air Force C–130 fleet is reduced, there will be a reduction 

to the ANG C–130 units as well. To further complicate C–130 reductions, the Active 

Component vs. Reserve Component C–130 distribution, or ‘‘AC/RC mix’’ debate continues. 

Due to the sensitive and pre-decisional nature of future program deliberations, 

Adjutants General and Governors are not consulted. However, consistent with the 

National Guard Bureau’s statutory responsibility of providing advice on the federalized and non-federalized National Guard, I was consulted on the Air Force’s FY13 

POM position. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the acknowledged importance of the Aerospace Control Alert 

(ACA) mission, why do the readiness ratings of ACA units not reflect their ACA 

mission? What is being done to insure that readiness assessments and inspections 

include the ACA mission? 

General WYATT. The readiness ratings of ACA units are not directly shown due 

to the lack of a formal and complete tasking process to account for this combatant 

command requirement in the Global Force Management/Joint Operations Planning 

and Execution System process. The ACA mission does not have the manpower and 

equipment specific details normally used in the process Combatant Commanders 

use to request forces. This missing information hides the level of effort for this 

tasking and makes ACA specific accounting difficult. Currently, an effort to garner 

this specific information from the combatant command through the force providers 

is underway. Once accomplished, the level of effort necessary for this tasking will 

be reflected in the already existing readiness system. By formalizing this process, 

we will have the ability to show each ACA unit’s level of commitment to the mission 

and also provide information about the remaining capacity at each unit for additional tasking. 

Mr. BARTLETT. O&M costs (flying hour costs) vary by aircraft type as do the overall costs to operate any given aircraft between the Active Air Force and the Reserve 

Component. If an aircraft costs more to fly but is flown less by more experienced 

pilots in the Reserve Component, wouldn’t it make fiscal sense to put those aircraft 

in the Air National Guard rather than the Active Air Force? And, wouldn’t we get 

a longer lifetime out of those aircraft this way? 

General WYATT. This is a scenario based question based upon the aircrew readiness of the fleet’s aircrews and the pilot management of the fleet and therefore, out 

of the Air National Guard’s purview. However, given that the Reserve Component 

could squeeze aircrew training efficiencies out of its Rated Aircrew Program (RAP), 

then the weapon system would ultimately be cheaper and last longer in the Guard 

or Reserve. Historically, the Reserve Component has enjoyed more experienced aircrew than the Active Component and has been able to schedule fewer training sorties to maintain flying qualification. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Air Force ‘‘Strategic Basing’’ Process (AFI 10–503) is used to 

make basing and bed down decisions for current and future weapon systems. There 

are 21 representatives who sit on this steering group, including representatives from 

Air Force Public Affairs and Air Force Legislative Liaison . . . but only ‘‘one’’ representative from the Air National Guard (NGB/CF). Considering the fact that the 

Air National Guard represents 43 percent of the air-refueling mission, 33 percent 

of the fighter mission, 30 percent of the cargo and transport mission, 20 percent of 

the remotely piloted aircraft mission, and 20 percent of the distributive common 

ground station mission, in your opinion, does the Air National Guard have an equitable voice in this process? 

General WYATT. Yes. Each member of the Air Staff has a single representative 

on the steering committee. Numbers of representatives are not proportional to mission percentages, however no voting takes place. The current system makes it im-
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perative that one builds a consensus among the other members of the steering group 

in order to get basing action approval. As a force provider, the Air National Guard 

normally gains major command (MAJCOM) support for the missions that are in the 

best interest of the MAJCOM. As a result, the Air National Guard is able to obtain 

appropriate and sufficient support to obtain approval for necessary Air National 

Guard basing actions. 

Mr. BARTLETT. We often hear from the Air Force that the Air National Guard is 

not ‘‘accessible.’’ What do they mean by this? Has the Air National Guard ever 

turned down a request from the Air Force to fulfill a mission? And, on average, how 

many aircraft does the Air National Guard provide to combatant commanders compared to the Active Air Force? 

General WYATT. Accessibility is often misunderstood and we continue to educate 

Air Force senior leaders on how to access the Air National Guard. In our view, there 

are three components to accessibility: 

• Law: Voluntary mobilization—the ANG has historically fulfilled more than 

85% of requests through volunteerism. Involuntary mobilization—full or partial—allows for unencumbered access. 

• Policy: Currently established through SECDEF memorandum and places 

minimal restrictions on access. 

• Funding: The ANG is funded to train and prepare for its federal mission; 

therefore access to the ANG requires allocation of resources through Military 

Personnel Appropriation Days. 

The Air National Guard is accessible. To date, we have answered every request 

for forces with more than 85% volunteerism. On average, we provide 25% of Air 

Force capability used to meet Combatant Commander requirements. Some examples 

Air National Guard accessibility: within six minutes of the terrorist attacks on 9/ 

11 Air National Guard aircraft were airborne protecting America’s skies. On 17 

March 2011, the United Nations passed the no-fly resolution for Libya. Air National 

Guard tanker aircraft were the first on station, and within 48 hours, Air National 

Guard tankers were flying missions and provided 14 of the 24 tanker aircraft involved in the effort. 

Mr. BARTLETT. We are hearing that the Active Air Force may be planning significant retirements of ANG aircraft (all C–5As, 3 F–16 wings, 72 C–130s—many of 

which are in the Guard, and some number of A–10s) and terminating the acquisition of C–27J aircraft as a possible response to proposed defense budget cuts, especially if the cuts exceed the $400 billion mark over 10–12 years. Has the Guard been 

actively involved or consulted regarding these possible cuts? And, if so, how would 

the loss of these aircraft affect the ANG, and what alternative missions is the Air 

Force offering to ensure the highly trained men and women who currently operate 

these aircraft have a new mission? 

General WYATT. Air Force budget deliberations are ongoing. We are hopeful that 

the Air National Guard’s proven lean business model, the age of its equipment and 

its contribution to the Total Force will be considered as the Air Force seeks solutions in this greatly constrained budget environment. Any major budget cuts have 

a potential of greatly affecting the equipping and readiness of the Air Reserve Components. The Air National Guard is deeply concerned that any additional budget demands have the potential to severely degrade of its overall capability. Due to an already lean business model, the Air National Guard is able to operate with less than 

6-percent of the Total Air Force Budget, while representing more than 34-percent 

of overall capability. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the Department of 

Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these anticipated cuts would 

impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve Components. 

General STENNER. Depending on where cuts were targeted in the language of the 

NDAA and Defense Appropriations, major budget cuts could impact the capability 

of the Air Force Reserve. Cuts to reduce manpower costs would result in lower participation in military airlift, combat air forces, space and ISR missions. It could also 

potentially eliminate Air Force Reserve contributions in entire mission areas. Force 

structure reductions to aircraft would immediately affect the targeted mission area 

(airlift, combat, etc.) and drive personnel cross-training and relocation costs. 

Lower ‘‘life cycle costs’’ achieved through part-time duty, a delayed points-based 

retirement system, and lower healthcare costs ensure combat capability at reduced 

costs. 

Rebalancing the Active Component/Reserve Component mix toward the Reserve 

Component would reap immediate savings. The Citizen-Airman model has served 
129 

the Air Force well for over 60 years, and expanded use of this construct will provide 

more combat capability for lower cost in this fiscally constrained environment. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and the amount of equipment 

needed to fill out the brigades and other units? If so, to what extent will that help 

to balance the equipment capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components? 

For example, I have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall 

will be reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMs in the Army National 

Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component. 

General STENNER. With regards to Air Force Reserve (AFR) readiness and equipment modernization—any budget-driven force structure reductions will be accomplished through the Air Force corporate process and will balance the needs of warfighters, combatant commands, the national military strategy, and the AFR. The Air 

Force corporate process takes into account the vast experience of our Citizen-Airmen 

and ensures the cuts do not disproportionally benefit one component to the detriment of another. AFR Airmen provide the same capability as Active Component 

Airmen, and we will continue to do so as the USAF maps out its modernization and 

recapitalization plans. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions? 

General STENNER. In order to Recapitalize Infrastructure, meet Emerging Mission/TFI Requirements, and meet the Air Force’s 20/20 by 2020 Facilities and Energy Goals, the Air Force Reserve requires $125M in MILCON per year. Additionally, $200M in O&M per year is required for Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and 

Modernization to recapitalize infrastructure and support new missions through 

adaptive re-use of existing facilities. 

In these economic times, we fully understand that difficult budgetary decisions 

must be made. In 2007, AFRC instituted a program we call FOCUS (Facilities Operational Capabilities Utilization Survey) to independently validate our real facility 

requirements and guide decisions on where to get the greatest return on investment. This program has validated $1.24 Billion backlog in unfunded MILCON requirements supporting on-going AFRC missions, as well as improved resource utilization through Total Force Integration initiatives with our Active Duty and Air National Guard partners. 

Underfunding AFRC MILCON has increased our average facility recapitalization 

rate for FY11–15 to 376 years, a 33 percent increase above last year’s projection. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. I know you are given your equipment by Army and Air Force, so with 

this in mind: 

With the Reserve Components taking on a huge volume of deployments, weekend 

training is crucial. If our warriors are being asked to deploy into the fight, and they 

were trained on anything other than the exact same equipment they will use in theater (other than minor differences), this is an unacceptable situation. If this is the 

case, I have to wonder how valuable their training really is. Granted not every UTA 

involves operational training, but when operational training does occur, are we giving them the best, most applicable training that we can give them? There is no argument that they deserve our very best. 

We all know that the Reserve Components are vital to the success of our national 

defense efforts, but I ask you are we setting our warriors up for failure if we are 

training them on sub-standard equipment? 

General STULTZ. No, we are not setting our Soldiers up for failure. 

The Army Reserve equipment modernization rate is currently at 67% and with 

funding in the base POM and through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment 

Appropriation we are working towards reaching the 100% modernization goal. 

Training on exactly the same equipment we’ll use in theater is certainly the optimal solution. Soldiers use the most up-to-date equipment available to the Army Reserve at Annual Training exercises just prior to mobilization. In conjunction with 

US Army Forces Command and the Army Service Component Commanders, the 

Army Reserve ensures that our Soldiers receive training on the most up-to-date, but 

limited supply, items at the post-mobilization sites or in theater prior to assuming 

their operational mission. 

The Army Reserve continues to improve its use of both low and high fidelity simulators to train Soldiers on the latest equipment available. Low-fidelity simulators 

focus on operator controls and generic safety procedures while high-fidelity simulators allow multiple simulators to work together in a virtual world allowing equip-
130 

ment operators and their leaders to plan and execute missions. These simulators are 

cheaper than actual equipment, are generally available as Commercial off the Shelf, 

and can be used at Unit Training Assembly sites/Reserve Centers without major facility improvements. As with actual equipment, funding shortfalls hinder our fielding of simulators to each unit. 

Mrs. ROBY. I know you are given your equipment by Army and Air Force, so with 

this in mind: 

With the Reserve Components taking on a huge volume of deployments, weekend 

training is crucial. If our warriors are being asked to deploy into the fight, and they 

were trained on anything other than the exact same equipment they will use in theater (other than minor differences), this is an unacceptable situation. If this is the 

case, I have to wonder how valuable their training really is. Granted not every UTA 

involves operational training, but when operational training does occur, are we giving them the best, most applicable training that we can give them? There is no argument that they deserve our very best. 

We all know that the Reserve Components are vital to the success of our national 

defense efforts, but I ask you are we setting our warriors up for failure if we are 

training them on sub-standard equipment? 

General CARPENTER. Training on the exact equipment used in an operational situation absolutely enhances the Army National Guard training experience. When the 

Army National Guard lacks the modernized equipment used during deployments, 

pre-mobilization readiness and ‘‘boots on the ground’’ time can be affected. The recent increase in both quality and numbers of Army equipment transferred to the 

Army National Guard greatly aid in rapidly building and maintaining pre-deployment readiness standards—consistent with a fully operational force. However, tactical training on similar equipment still has value and the Army National Guard 

trains on any and all available equipment. 

Mrs. ROBY. I know you are given your equipment by Army and Air Force, so with 

this in mind: 

With the Reserve Components taking on a huge volume of deployments, weekend 

training is crucial. If our warriors are being asked to deploy into the fight, and they 

were trained on anything other than the exact same equipment they will use in theater (other than minor differences), this is an unacceptable situation. If this is the 

case, I have to wonder how valuable their training really is. Granted not every UTA 

involves operational training, but when operational training does occur, are we giving them the best, most applicable training that we can give them? There is no argument that they deserve our very best. 

We all know that the Reserve Components are vital to the success of our national 

defense efforts, but I ask you are we setting our warriors up for failure if we are 

training them on sub-standard equipment? 

General WYATT. In order to Recapitalize Infrastructure, meet Emerging Mission/ 

TFI Requirements, and meet the Air Force’s 20/20 by 2020 Facilities and Energy 

Goals, the Air Force Reserve requires $125M in MILCON per year. Additionally, 

$200M in O&M per year is required for Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization to recapitalize infrastructure and support new missions through adaptive 

re-use of existing facilities. 

In these economic times, we fully understand that difficult budgetary decisions 

must be made. In 2007, AFRC instituted a program we call FOCUS (Facilities Operational Capabilities Utilization Survey) to independently validate our real facility 

requirements and guide decisions on where to get the greatest return on investment. This program has validated $1.24 Billion backlog in unfunded MILCON requirements supporting on-going AFRC missions, as well as improved resource utilization through Total Force Integration initiatives with our Active Duty and Air National Guard partners. 

Underfunding AFRC MILCON has increased our average facility recapitalization 

rate for FY11–15 to 376 years, a 33 percent increase above last year’s projection. 

Mrs. ROBY. I know you are given your equipment by Army and Air Force, so with 

this in mind: 

With the Reserve Components taking on a huge volume of deployments, weekend 

training is crucial. If our warriors are being asked to deploy into the fight, and they 

were trained on anything other than the exact same equipment they will use in theater (other than minor differences), this is an unacceptable situation. If this is the 

case, I have to wonder how valuable their training really is. Granted not every UTA 

involves operational training, but when operational training does occur, are we giving them the best, most applicable training that we can give them? There is no argument that they deserve our very best. 
131 

We all know that the Reserve Components are vital to the success of our national 

defense efforts, but I ask you are we setting our warriors up for failure if we are 

training them on sub-standard equipment? 

General STENNER. Air Force reservists train and deploy with the same equipment. 

In some instances our equipment is older than the Active Component’s. However, 

it is well maintained due to the highly experienced Citizen-Airmen who often work 

on the same equipment their entire career. This personal investment pays off with 

Air Force Reserve mission-capable rates among the highest in the Air Force. 

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