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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DIANA JOINER, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF JACKSON, ET AL., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 14-13388 

SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

ARTHUR J. TARNOW

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

MONA K. MAJZOUB

 / 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [48] 

Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [48] on January 3, 2017. 

Plaintiff responded on February 14, 2017 [51] and Defendants replied [53] on 

March 6, 2017. A hearing has held before the Court on June 6, 2017. For the 

reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part, dismissing 

Plaintiff’s federal claims of excessive force against Defendant Lewis and 

constitutional violations against Defendant County of Jackson. The Court declines 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claim of false arrest. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On September 4, 2012, Jackson County dispatch received a call from 

security guards at Reed Manor Apartments that there were shots fired across the 

street from the apartments in Jackson, Michigan. Plaintiff states that her grandson 

Shatai Brown, and his friend Andre Welch, were at her home that evening. [48-2 at 
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43-44]. Shatai went outside to take a cell phone call. Shatai was speaking loudly on 

his phone, and Plaintiff yelled for him to quiet down. As she came back into the 

house, Plaintiff heard a gunshot. Plaintiff ran outside because her grandson was 

there, and there had been rumors that a man was looking to shoot him because of 

his girlfriend. Id. 

 Plaintiff saw Shatai sitting in her truck in the parking lot. Plaintiff entered 

her truck and took the keys from the ignition to prevent her from leaving the area 

until the police arrived. Plaintiff was seated in the front seat next to Shatai, and 

shortly thereafter, Andre entered the truck in the back. Plaintiff asked Shatai what 

had occurred, and he stated that he gave Mercedes a warning shot because she was 

trying to damage the truck. Plaintiff states that she was aware that Shatai had a 

gun, and that there was a long gun in the back seat where Andre was sitting. 

 Plaintiff stated that she believes that about five police cars arrived on the 

scene. Defendant Lewis and Officers Galbreath and Lillie were at the scene. 

Defendant Lewis was a Jackson County Sherriff’s Department officer called in for 

backup to City of Jackson police officers Galbreath and Lillie. The police officers 

requested Plaintiff, Shatai and Andre to put their hands up. Andre was told to exit 

the truck first. He was ordered to get out with his hands up and turn backwards. 

Andre got out, walked backwards, was handcuffed and placed in the back of the 

police car by an officer. A gun was retrieved from the person of Andre. Next, 
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Shatai was ordered out of the truck, and the same procedure occurred. Shatai also 

was found to have a gun on his person. Plaintiff states that Andre and Shaitai both 

followed the directions of the police officers. 

 Plaintiff was next called to exit the truck. Officer Galbreath testified that 

Plaintiff was asked to get off her phone and to extinguish her cigarette before being 

ordered to exit the vehicle. Plaintiff did not respond to those requests, continuing to 

talk on her phone and to smoke. Officer Galbreath ordered her to get out of the 

vehicle. When she initially exited the vehicle, she was still smoking and speaking 

on her cell phone. After Galbreath asked her again to get off the phone and put her 

cigarette out, she complied. Officer Galbreath then instructed Plaintiff to put her 

hands up, turn around, and walk backwards. Plaintiff testified that she was scared 

of walking backwards because she has a bad back. 

While walking backwards, Defendant Lewis took control of the situation 

while Officers Galbreath and Lillie approached the car to ensure that there was no 

one left inside the truck that might be a danger. Defendant Lewis testified that 

Plaintiff pulled away from him, and took three or four steps toward the car when 

Defendant Lewis made initial contact with Plaintiff. It is undisputed that Plaintiff 

never made any threatening comments or gestures to the officers. 

It is further undisputed that Plaintiff ended up falling backwards onto the ground. 

Plaintiff testified that she was tackled and body slammed to the ground. Defendant 
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testified that he gained control of Plaintiff’s hands behind her back and assisted 

Plaintiff in walking backwards. As they were walking backwards, Plaintiff 

stumbled, fell and landed on her derriere, and Defendant Lewis went down as well 

as he assisted her from the ground. Plaintiff alleges that she sustained injuries to 

her knee and back as a result of the fall. 

After falling onto the ground, Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed in the 

back of the Jackson City police department vehicle, detained as a result of her 

involvement in a felony investigation. The last contact that Defendant Lewis had 

with Plaintiff was placing her in the police car. After being placed in the police car, 

Plaintiff was questioned about what she knew of the gun shot, and the officers tried 

to learn why she was at the scene. After her identity was verified, Plaintiff was 

released, about ten minutes after being placed in the car. No charges were brought 

against Plaintiff, and she was not arrested. 

ANALYSIS

1. EXCESSIVE FORCE

In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim alleging excessive force, the 6th Circuit 

requires an objective-reasonableness standard be met, which depends on the “facts 

and circumstances of each case viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer 

on the scene and not with 20/20 hindsight.” Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 236 (6th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989)). When 
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determining whether an action is objectively reasonable, factors enumerated in the 

Graham decision are taken into consideration, including the “severity of the crime 

at issue, whether the suspect posts an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 

or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest 

by flight. Id. 

Defendant alleges that he is entitled to qualified immunity, because there 

was no constitutional violation that a reasonable person would have understood. 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Defendant relies on the video 

evidence to support this assertion. Defendant also highlights the fact that he was 

responding to a shots fired call, that Plaintiff had not followed orders, and that 

multiple weapons were found on the scene and on the person of the other two 

occupants of the truck. As a result, he argues, his actions were reasonable. Further, 

he asserts that the DVD will show that Plaintiff stumbled backwards, and that he 

did not impermissibly tackle Plaintiff to the ground. 

 The DVD footage clearly supports Defendant Lewis’ testimony. There is no 

evidence that Plaintiff was tackled or body slammed in any way. Rather the 

footage shows Plaintiff stumble while walking backwards, and Defendant Lewis 

helping her to the ground. Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to this 

claim. 
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2. MONELL CLAIM

A municipal party may only be sued under § 1983 if a Plaintiff is harmed by 

execution of a municipal party’s unconstitutional policy or custom. Monell v. Dep't 

of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To make out a showing of 

an illegal policy or custom, Plaintiff must demonstrate one of the following: “(1) 

the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an 

official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the 

existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a 

custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. 

Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). 

To prevail on a failure to train or supervise theory, Plaintiff must establish 

that: “(1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) 

the inadequacy was the result of the municipality's deliberate indifference; and (3) 

the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Ellis ex rel. 

Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006). The 

Sixth Circuit recognizes two ways to demonstrate deliberate indifference in claims 

of inadequate training. “One is failure to provide adequate training in light of 

foreseeable consequences that could result from a lack of instruction.” Id. at 700-

01 (citing Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir.1999)). “A second type of . 
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. . deliberate indifference is where the city fails to act in response to repeated 

complaints of constitutional violations by its officers.” Id. at 701. 

In her response, Plaintiff alleges that the “training as it relates to the writing 

of incident reports is deficient” and that the municipality “is deliberately 

indifferent to ensuring that all uses of force are properly documented,” effectively 

preventing an adequate review to ensure that the officer acted properly. 

Additionally, Plaintiff also alleges that there is an inadequacy of training as it 

relates to the use of force. 

Plaintiff does not point to any evidence establishing that the training with 

respect to either of the claimed deficiencies was inadequate. To prevent summary 

judgment, there must be some genuine dispute of fact. Without any deposition or 

other evidence to support the claim, Plaintiff cannot prevail. See Nallani v. Wayne 

Cty., 665 F. App'x 498, 513 (6th Cir. 2016) (deposition evidence that deputies and 

corporals working on the fourth floor of the jail did not receive any formal training 

on how to deal with psychological problems may be sufficient to establish a 

genuine issue of fact). Plaintiff does not present any evidence whatsoever that 

Defendant Jackson County failed adequately to train officers in issuing reports 

following physical contact, was deliberately indifferent, or, alternatively, that it 

had reason to foresee that harm would result from any inadequacies. Further, 

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts about existing training concerning the use of 
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force, but rather seems to be proffering a claim under a respondeat superior

liability theory, which is not available for § 1983 claims. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. 

Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to the Monell claim against Jackson 

County. 

3. FALSE ARREST

The Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Monell claims. 

Plaintiff also brings a state law claim of false arrest before the Court over which 

the Court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

Supplemental jurisdiction need not be exercised over a claim “. . . if . . . the district 

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(a). “[A] federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff's federal-law claims 

should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff's state-law claims.” Moon v. Harrison 

Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also 

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the 

federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as 

well.”). In this case, because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims so 

the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claim 

of false arrest. 

 Accordingly, 
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 IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [48] is 

GRANTED.

SO ORDERED. 

s/Arthur J. Tarnow 

 Arthur J. Tarnow 

Dated: September 26, 2017 Senior United States District Judge