UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CARLOS COLLINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL H. HEYNS, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 14-14105

Robert H. Cleland

United States District Judge

Michael Hluchaniuk

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT HEYNS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. 21]

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 23, 2014, plaintiff Carlos Collins (a.k.a. Abdul-Karim AbdurRahim), pro se, filed a prisoner civil rights complaint against defendants Michigan

Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) director Daniel Heyns and Dr. Rhodes,

alleging that they acted with deliberate indifference to his objectively serious

medical condition in violation of the Eighth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. (Dkt. 1). This matter was referred to the undersigned for all pretrial

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proceedings. (Dkt. 5). Following the referral, defendant Heyns filed an almost

immediate motion for summary judgment, to which plaintiff asked the court to

defer. (Dkt. 10, 12). Plaintiff also filed a motion to amend the complaint (Dkt.

 On July 23, 2015, this court granted plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. 26) to extend the date for service of the

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summons on defendant Dr. Rhodes. 

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14) which the court struck without prejudice because it did not comply with Local

Rule 15.1. (Dkt. 15). On March 3, 2015, plaintiff filed a second motion to amend

the complaint, which was granted on April 17, 2015. (Dkt. 17, 20). Following

this amendment, on May 1, 2015, defendant Heyns filed a renewed motion for

summary judgment based on the amended complaint. (Dkt. 21). On June 3, 2015,

plaintiff responded. (Dkt. 24). This motion for summary judgment is now ready

for report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned

concludes that defendant Heyns’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 21) should

be GRANTED and that he should be DISMISSED from this action.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Amended Complaint

In this prisoner civil rights action, plaintiff Carlos Collins alleges that

defendants Heyns and Dr. Rhodes, denied him appropriate medical care for a

hernia in violation of his § 1983 rights. In his amended complaint, Collins alleges

that he wrote a letter in early February 2014 to the Director of the Michigan

Department of Corrections (MDOC), Daniel Heyns, complaining about the lack of

health care services, that he was suffering from a hernia, and that it was affecting

his quality of life, but he received no response. (Dkt. 17, Am. Comp., ¶ 4). 

Plaintiff also alleges that Heyns entered into a contractual agreement that Corizon

would not correct reducible hernias as a money saving policy, displaying

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deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs. (Id. at ¶ 5). Plaintiff indicates

that only Heyns can order corrective surgery for plaintiff, therefore, plaintiff is

suing director Heyns in his official capacity solely for injunctive relief purposes. 

(Id.) Those are the only allegations with respect to Heyns in the amended

complaint.

III. ARGUMENTS

A. Heyns’ Arguments

Heyns argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff has

failed to establish that he was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 

(Dkt. 21, at 5). “[A]n Eighth Amendment inquiry has two components, one

objective and one subjective. A plaintiff satisfies the objective component by

alleging that the prisoner had a medical need that was sufficiently serious.”

Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014). Heyns does not

deny that a hernia is an arguably serious medical condition. Heyns claims,

however, that plaintiff fails the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test. 

That is, plaintiff must show that Heyns was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s

serious medical needs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Heyns

argues that this standard requires more than proof of mere negligence, or even

“gross negligence.” McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1988);

Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1454 (6th Cir. 1990). Rather, deliberate

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indifference is more equated with “subjective recklessness” in criminal law. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40. 

For liability to attach, therefore, actual knowledge of harm is required. An

“official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In addition, Heyns contends that claims must be based

on direct, personal involvement, and not on a theory of respondeat superior. The

acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based

on the mere failure to act. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002);

Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004).

In sum, Heyns argues that plaintiff has failed to establish that he was

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs or that he had the requisite

personal involvement under § 1983 to establish liability. Heyns avers that plaintiff

has presented no evidence that he was aware of plaintiff’s medical condition, and

there is no evidence--other than plaintiff’s conclusory allegations--that Heyns

could have ordered surgery. Because plaintiff has failed to establish that Heyns is

liable under § 1983, Heyns asks this court to summarily deny plaintiff’s claim for

injunctive relief and to enter summary judgment in his favor.

B. Plaintiff’s Response

Plaintiff argues that Heyns has done little more than claim no direct

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knowledge of his medical condition. However, plaintiff argues that since the

filing of his complaint, Heyns has taken no corrective action regarding plaintiff’s

serious medical needs. Indeed, Heyns has admitted that plaintiff’s medical

condition is serious, he only argues that Heyns has not met the standard for

summary judgment. Heyns claims that factual issues remain in dispute because

Heyns has not addressed the issue of whether he entered into a contractual

agreement that Corizon (plaintiff’s medical provider) would not correct reducible

hernias as a money savings policy, or whether Heyns was the only person who can

order corrective surgery for plaintiff. For these reasons, plaintiff claims that

summary judgment is not appropriate.

IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriately rendered “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Redding v. St. Edward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001). The standard for

determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is

so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” State Farm Fire &

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Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005), quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Furthermore, the evidence and

all reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986).

Where the movant establishes the lack of a genuine issue of material fact,

the burden of demonstrating the existence of such an issue shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). That is, the

party opposing a motion for summary judgment must make an affirmative showing

with proper evidence and must “designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions,

or other factual material showing ‘evidence on which the jury could reasonably

find for the plaintiff.’” Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (6th Cir. 2004).

In order to fulfill this burden, the non-moving party need only demonstrate the

minimal standard that a jury could ostensibly find in his favor. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248; McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).

However, mere allegations or denials in the non-movant’s pleadings will not

satisfy this burden, nor will a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the

non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 251.

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B. Legal Argument

In the context of medical care, a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment is violated only when the prisoner can

demonstrate a “deliberate indifference” to his serious medical needs. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976). “Where a prisoner has received some

medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of treatment, federal courts

are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize

claims that sound in state tort law.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th

Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). Moreover, mere negligence in identifying or

treating a medical need does not rise to the level of a valid mistreatment claim

under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.

A viable Eighth Amendment claim has two components, one objective and

the other subjective. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Comstock v.

McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2002). A court considering a prisoner’s

Eighth Amendment claim must ask both if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively

harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation and if the officials acted

with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992).

In this case, there is no disagreement that plaintiff’s medical need, a hernia,

is sufficiently serious. The subjective component requires that the defendant act

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with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834. To establish the subjective component, “the plaintiff must allege facts which,

if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from

which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the

inference, and that he then disregarded the risk.” Id. at 837. In other words, this

prong is satisfied when a prison official acts with criminal recklessness, i.e., when

he or she “consciously disregard[s] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Brooks v.

Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40).

“Basically, there must be a knowing failure or refusal to provide urgently needed

medical care which causes a residual injury that could have been prevented with

timely attention.” Lewis v. Corr. Med. Servs., 2009 WL 799249, at *2 (E.D. Mich.

Mar. 24, 2009).

Defendant’s brief assumes, for purposes of the motion for summary

judgment, that plaintiff’s hernia is a serious medical condition and thus primarily

maintains that plaintiff has not satisfied the subjective prong of the Eighth

Amendment test. The second element of Farmer requires a showing that Heyns

acted with deliberate indifference, which plaintiff has not done. “Deliberate

indifference” has been variously defined by the federal courts that have considered

prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims, but all agree that it is more than mere

negligence and less than actual intent in the form of “malicious” or “sadistic”

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action. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 861 (1994); see also Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 105-06 (a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim under the Eighth

Amendment; “medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation

merely because the victim is a prisoner”); Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 154

(6th Cir. 1995) (deliberate indifference is the equivalent of “criminal recklessness,

which requires a subjective showing that the defendant was aware of the risk of

harm”); Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Obduracy or

wantonness, not inadvertence or good faith error, characterizes deliberate

indifference.”). As noted in Estelle, “[i]n order to state a cognizable claim, a

prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. An allegation of mere

negligence in diagnosis or treatment is not actionable under § 1983. Estelle v.

Gamble, supra ; Byrd v. Wilson, 701 F.2d at 595 n.2. A delay in access to medical

attention, however, can violate the Eighth Amendment when it is “tantamount to

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Det.

Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (6th Cir.1994), quoting Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533,

1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Further, a claim of inadequate medical

treatment may state a constitutional claim if the treatment rendered is “so woefully

inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857,

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860-61 (6th Cir. 1976). “A defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to respond

to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need in order for deliberate indifference to

be established.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992). The

deliberate indifference standard requires knowledge of the particular medical

condition in order to establish an intent (“a sufficiently culpable state of mind,”

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298) to deny or to delay purposely “access to medical care” or

intentionally to interfere “with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at

104-05. Thus, “[k]nowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances

clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate

indifference.” Horn ex rel. Parks v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660

(6th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff claims that Heyns was deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs because after writing a letter to Heyns complaining about the lack

of health care services, and specifically about his hernia, he did not receive a

response, and no corrective action was taken. Plaintiff also claims that Heyns

entered into a contractual agreement that Corizon (plaintiff’s medical provider)

would not correct reducible hernias as a money savings policy. Plaintiff further

alleges that only Heyns has the authority to order corrective surgery for plaintiff,

and he did not take any corrective action. The undersigned is troubled that these

are the only allegations that plaintiff makes to support his claim against defendant

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Heyns, or that in response to Heyns’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has

not offered additional evidence to support his claims. 

The court notes that where a prisoner’s claim is based on a defendant’s

supervisory authority over others, a mere failure to act does not give rise to a

§ 1983 claim. It is well-settled that government officials may not be held liable

for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat

superior or vicarious liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d

484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). Rather, a claimed constitutional violation must be based

upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th

Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover,

§ 1983 liability cannot be established simply because a supervisor denies an

administrative grievance or fails to act based upon information contained in a

grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). In other

words, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through

the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 676. In this case, as discussed more fully below, the undersigned

concludes that plaintiff fails to show that Heyns actively engaged in any

unconstitutional conduct. 

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With respect to plaintiff’s skeletal allegations, the allegations infer, but do

not specifically state that Heyns was even aware of plaintiff’s medical condition. 

Certainly, plaintiff alleges that he sent a letter to Heyns, but Heyns testifies via his

affidavit:

I am not personally involved in receiving, processing, or

responding to any mail sent by prisoners, including

Plaintiff, in general or to me in particular. Due to the

large volume of mail addressed to me, the tasks of

receiving, processing, and responding to that mail are

delegated to subordinate staff. Specifically as to health

care issues, such mail would be delegated to staff in the

Bureau of Health Care Services for processing and

response.

(Doc. 21-2, at 1). Heyns further indicates that he “had no personal involvement

with Plaintiff [and did not have] any personal knowledge of letters Plaintiff alleges

were sent to [him].” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff does nothing to rebut this evidence in his

response to Heyns’ motion. With respect to plaintiff’s claim that Heyns is the only

person with authority to order corrective surgery for plaintiff, Heyns provides no

evidence for this assertion, just this conclusory statement. Again, Heyns’ affidavit

belies this assertion:

As Director, [Heyns is] not directly or indirectly

involved in prisoner’s medical care. In accordance with

Policy Director 03.04.100 Health Services, under

organization, it states “ . . . all medical, psychiatric, and

dental matters involving medical judgment are the sole

province of the responsible physician, psychiatrist, or

dentist, under the direction of the CMO or CPO, as

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applicable.

(Tr. 21-2, at 2).

With respect to plaintiff’s claim that Heyns adopted a policy regarding not

correcting reducible hernias that affected plaintiff’s long-term health, the court

finds that plaintiff’s claims are too vague and conclusory and are unsupported by

specific facts to set forth a plausible claim. For example, plaintiff does not set

forth a policy directive that his doctors were following for denying a request for

surgery or any grievance that he may have filed. Further, plaintiff does not

indicate any specific facts that he was denied care based on a specific policy that

MDOC had implemented. Nor does he allege facts of an unwritten policy or

custom that this court could attribute to Heyns which impacted his hernia care. 

According to plaintiff’s complaint, Corizon is responsible for providing his

medical care. And, according to Heyns’ affidavit, Heyns is not responsible for the

independent medical decisions that physicians are required to make about a

prisoner’s medical condition–indeed, those decisions are within the “sole province

of the responsible physician, psychiatrist, or dentist, under the direction of the

CMO or CPO . . . .” (Dkt. 21-2, at 2). 

 To the extent plaintiff suggests in his response that Heyns violated Mich.

Comp. Laws §§ 791.203 and 791.206, plaintiff does not state a federal claim.

Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v.

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Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162,

1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Moreover, if Plaintiff is attempting to raise a state law claim

against Heyns, the court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over

such claims. The Sixth Circuit has routinely held that, where a district court has

exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental

jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the state-law claims

should be dismissed without reaching the merits. Landefeld v. Marion Gen.

Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993); Faughender v. City of N.

Olmsted, Ohio, 927 F.2d 909, 917 (6th Cir. 1991)).

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the above stated reasons, the undersigned recommends that defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 21) be GRANTED and that defendant Heyns

be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service,

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health and

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a

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party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health

and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.

Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,”

etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the

objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), Local Rule 72.1(d). 

The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the

same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection

No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may

rule without awaiting the response.

Date: September 24, 2015 s/Michael Hluchaniuk

Michael Hluchaniuk

United States Magistrate Judge

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on September 24, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing

paper with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will send

electronic notification to all counsel of record, and I certify that I have mailed by

United States Postal Service the foregoing pleading to the following non-ECF

participant(s), at the following address(es): Carlos Collins #182427, G. Robert

Cotton Correctional Facility, Central Complex, 3500 N. Elm Road, Jackson, MI

49201.

s/Tammy Hallwood

Case Manager

(810) 341-7887

tammy_hallwood@mied.uscourts.gov

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