IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-51072

Summary Calendar

RODOLFO IBARRA MUNOZ,

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

CLAUDE MAYE, Warden, Bastrop Federal Correctional Institution, Bastrop,

Texas,

Respondent-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:10-CV-960

Before KING, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Rodolfo Ibarra Munoz, federal prisoner # 00556-079, was sentenced in

2009 to 108 months in prison for interstate transportation in aid of racketeering,

aiding and abetting, and using a communication facility to facilitate the

distribution of marijuana. He filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, arguing that the

time that he spent in a community corrections center (CCC), or halfway house,

prior to sentencing, and the time that he spent in the CCC after sentencing but

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 13, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 11-51072

prior to the date that he reported to the designated Bureau of Prisons (BOP)

facility, should be credited against his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). 

The district court denied the § 2241 petition, reasoning that Munoz’s claim was

vitiated by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 57-65 (1995), in which the Supreme Court

held that time spent while released on bail subject to restrictions, including

confinement in a community treatment facility, does not constitute official

detention for purposes of § 3585(b) and is not credited toward the sentence

imposed.

On appeal, Munoz again challenges the BOP’s sentence calculation, and

he argues that the district court failed to recognize that his request for credit

comprised two different time periods: (1) the time spent in a halfway house prior

to the oral pronouncement of sentence, and (2) the time spent in a halfway house

after he was sentenced. He also maintains that the Department of Justice’s

(DOJ) opinion, set forth in a memorandum dated December 16, 2002, that a CCC

constitutes a penal or correctional facility, undermines the reasoning in Koray

and mandates credit for pre-sentencing time served in a CCC.

Munoz’s arguments are without merit. Prior to reporting to the BOP

facility, Munoz was released on bail, subject to the restriction that he maintain

residence in a halfway house or CCC; he was not “committed to the custody of

the Attorney General” or otherwise “subject to BOP’s control.” Koray, 515 U.S.

at 57-58 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Munoz

was not in “official detention” for purposes of § 3585(b), and the district court did

not err when it held that the BOP correctly denied Munoz’s requested credit. 

See id. at 58-65. Additionally, any challenge by Munoz to the district court’s

failure to make findings about the purportedly restrictive nature of the time he

spent in the halfway house is foreclosed by Koray, in which the Court specifically

rejected the “jail-type confinement” test as being “sufficiently vague and

amorphous.” Id. at 63-64. Finally, Munoz’s reliance on the DOJ memorandum

of December 16, 2002, is misplaced. Even if a CCC may constitute a place of

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imprisonment, Munoz cannot show that he was in the custody of the BOP. See

id. at 58, 63.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED. Munoz’s motion to supplement the record on appeal is DENIED.

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