CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

CBO

An Analysis of the 

Navy’s Amphibious 

Warfare Ships for 

Deploying Marines 

Overseas

NOVEMBER 2011
Pub. No. 4172
The Congress of the United States O Congressional Budget Office

A

STUDY

CBO

An Analysis of the Navy’s 

Amphibious Warfare Ships for 

Deploying Marines Overseas

November 2011
CBO

Notes

Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in this study are fiscal years and all dollar 

amounts are in 2011 dollars.

On the cover—top left: the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp and the amphibious transport 

dock ship USS San Antonio during a training exercise (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Arif Patani); top right: sailors aboard the amphibious dock landing 

ship USS Whidbey Island in the Gulf of Aden (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication 

Specialist 1st Class Rachel L. Leslie); bottom: sailors disembark a landing craft utility assigned 

to the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp in Virginia Beach, Va. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass 

Communication Specialist 2nd Class Paul D. Williams).
Preface

CBO

Today, the U.S. Navy’s fleet numbers 284 ships, including 29 amphibious warfare ships 

that are designed primarily to carry marines and their equipment into combat but that perform other missions as well. This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, requested in the 

report of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2011, reviews the size, missions, and use of the Navy’s amphibious warfare 

ships and related expeditionary forces under the Navy’s 2012 shipbuilding plan. In keeping 

with CBO’s mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, this report makes no 

recommendations.

Eric J. Labs prepared the report under the general supervision of David Mosher and Matthew 

Goldberg. Raymond Hall of CBO’s Budget Analysis Division prepared the estimates of 

acquisition costs under the general supervision of Sarah Jennings. Philip Webre and Steven 

Weinberg of CBO provided comments on the report. Francis Hoffman of the National 

Defense University also reviewed the report. (The assistance of an external reviewer implies no 

responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.)

Christine Bogusz edited the report, and Chris Howlett proofread it. Maureen Costantino 

designed the cover, and Jeanine Rees prepared the report for publication. Monte Ruffin 

printed the initial copies, and Linda Schimmel coordinated the print distribution. The report 

is available at CBO’s Web site (www.cbo.gov).

Douglas W. Elmendorf

Director

November 2011

Contents

CBO

Summary and Introduction 1

Measuring the Size of the Amphibious Force 2

Meeting the Demand for Amphibious Ships 3

Amphibious Ships Used in Today’s Expeditionary Warfare Forces 3

Missions of Expeditionary Warfare Forces 5

Assaults or Forcible-Entry Operations 5

Raids 5

Demonstrations 6

Withdrawals 6

Support to Other Operations 6

Amphibious Warfare Ships Under the Navy’s 2012 Shipbuilding Plan 6

Inventory 6

Available Amphibious Ships 7

Deployable and Deployed Amphibious Ships 8

Meeting the Demand for Amphibious Ships 9

Appendix: Annual Purchases, Retirements, and Costs for Amphibious Ships 

Under the Navy’s 2012 Shipbuilding Plan 15
VI AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS

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Tables

1. Measures of Amphibious Force Size Under the Navy’s 2012 

Shipbuilding Plan, Selected Years 2

2. Purchases, Commissionings, and Retirements of Amphibious 

Warfare Ships Under the Navy’s Plan, 2012 to 2041 6

A-1. Purchases and Retirements of Amphibious Warfare Ships Under the 

Navy’s 2012 Shipbuiding Plan 16

Figures

1. Types of Amphibious Warfare Ships in the Navy’s Fleet 5

2. Inventory of Amphibious Warfare Ships 8

3. Available Amphibious Warfare Ships 9

4. Demand for Amphibious Warfare Ships by U.S. Military Commanders 

Compared with the Number Deployed 12

5. Deployable and Deployed Amphibious Warfare Ships and Demand for 

Them by U.S. Military Commanders 13

6. The Amphibious Warfare Force Under Different Peacetime 

Deployment Scenarios 14

A-1. Annual Procurement Costs of Amphibious Warfare Ships, by Class 15

Boxes

1. The Maritime Prepositioning Force 4

2. The Operating Cycle for Amphibious Warfare Ships 10
CBO

An Analysis of the Navy’s Amphibious Warfare 

Ships for Deploying Marines Overseas

Summary and Introduction

The Navy’s latest 30-year shipbuilding plan (known as 

the “2012 plan”) has a force of 33 amphibious warfare 

ships as its objective. The primary purpose of those ships 

in wartime is to carry Marine Corps units overseas and to 

support and sustain them as they deploy ashore. In peacetime, amphibious ships perform various missions, such as 

engaging in routine patrols overseas, reassuring allies, 

responding to crises, and providing humanitarian relief. 

Amphibious forces represent a significant investment of 

taxpayer dollars. Over the next 30 years, the Navy plans 

to purchase 20 new amphibious ships at a total cost of 

about $50 billion (in 2011 dollars), the Congressional 

Budget Office (CBO) estimates.1

 That total does not 

include the personnel costs and annual operating costs—

for fuel, maintenance, and training—the Navy will face 

to use its amphibious warfare force.

A force of 33 ships represents a fiscally constrained 

compromise from the Marine Corps’ objective of having 

38 amphibious ships.2

 That 38-ship goal represents the 

number of ships the Navy and Marine Corps would like 

to have in the fleet in order to execute an opposed 

amphibious assault using two Marine expeditionary brigades in the event of war.3

 Under the 2012 plan, the 

Navy’s inventory of amphibious ships would reach at least 

33 ships for 15 of the next 30 years—between 2017 and 

2031. The rest of the time, from 2012 to 2016 and from 

2032 to 2041, the amphibious force would fall below 

that objective. Over the next 30 years, the force would 

never reach 38 ships.

The Navy also uses its amphibious force to meet combatant commanders’ peacetime goals for overseas presence. 

(Combatant commanders are the four-star generals or 

admirals who head the regional commands responsible 

for all military operations within their geographic areas.) 

CBO’s projections indicate that the Navy’s 2012 plan 

would enable the service to provide overseas presence 

throughout the next 30 years that would be similar to or 

exceed the presence it provided in 2007. However, the 

Navy would not be able to meet the 2010 goals of combatant commanders, which are “fiscally unconstrained,” 

for peacetime amphibious capabilities around the globe.4

Moreover, CBO’s projections indicate that the Navy’s 

2012 plan would not provide enough amphibious ships 

for the Marine Corps to prepare and train for all of the 

missions it might be called on to perform over the next 

three decades. 1. See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal 

Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan (June 2011).

2. See the letter from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral G. 

Roughead, Commandant of the Marine Corps General James T. 

Conway, and Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter to the 

Honorable Ike Skelton, Chairman, House Committee on Armed 

Services, January 7, 2009. See also Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Report to Congress on 

Naval Amphibious Force Structure (December 2008); and Department of the Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan 

for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011 (February 2010).

3. CBO uses the terms inventory “goal” and inventory “objective” 

interchangeably. 

4. The term “unconstrained” means that the combatant commanders were asked how many amphibious ships they needed on 

deployment to meet their mission goals, regardless of fiscal 

resources. In 2007, in contrast, the commanders offered their 

“constrained” demand, which was based on the number of ships 

that could be expected to be on routine deployment given the 

existing fleet.
2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS

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Table 1.

Measures of Amphibious Force Size 

Under the Navy’s 2012 Shipbuilding 

Plan, Selected Years

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: Ship counts represent rounded averages and assume that 

the Navy does not change its Fleet Response Plan. 

Inventory represents the total number of amphibious ships 

in the fleet. Available ships includes all ships not in longterm maintenance, or about 90 percent of the inventory. 

Deployable ships are ones whose crews are sufficiently 

trained to conduct the full range of amphibious missions, 

or about 74 percent of the inventory. Deployed ships are 

those that are overseas on routine deployment, or about 

30 percent of the inventory. 

The inventory goal of 38 ships is the number the Marine 

Corps says it needs to implement an amphibious assault 

using two Marine expeditionary brigades. The inventory goal 

of 33 ships is the number the Navy and Marine Corps have 

agreed is the minimum needed in light of fiscal constraints. 

The lower number accepts some risk with respect to the 

arrival of some support elements to the brigades. 

Measuring the Size of the Amphibious Force

In this report, CBO uses four different measures of the 

size of the Navy’s force of amphibious warfare ships in 

their role as the primary mode of transportation for the 

Marine Corps expeditionary warfare forces that are 

deployed ashore. The first measure is the total inventory 

of amphibious ships. The Navy is projected to have 

30 amphibious ships at the end of each of the next four 

years.5

 Of that total, 26 ships will be based in the United 

States and 4 will be based in Japan.

The second measure of force size is the number of “available” amphibious ships. That number is calculated by 

subtracting from the total inventory the number of ships 

in long-term maintenance, which usually averages about 

10 percent of the total. Thus, the Navy aims to have 

90 percent of its amphibious force—or 27 ships over the 

next four years—available at any given time for at least 

some missions (see Table 1). 

The third measure is “deployable” ships—those that are 

available and in good enough condition, with crews that 

are sufficiently trained, to deploy for a variety of potential 

missions for as long as six months. Although all ships not 

in long-term maintenance are theoretically available, 

some of them are not considered deployable because their 

crews are not sufficiently trained. Specifically, ships that 

are considered available but not deployable could be 

pressed into service to transport marines and their equipment for an amphibious operation, but their crews would 

not be sufficiently trained to perform the full range of 

missions that might normally be required of an amphibious ship if it were ordered to deploy. 

In terms of readiness to deploy, there is a difference 

between the amphibious ships based in the United States 

and those based in Japan. The Navy’s goal under its Fleet 

Response Plan (the framework for how the Navy maintains and uses its ships and trains the ships’ crews) is for 

amphibious ships based in the United States to be in satisfactory material condition, and their crews sufficiently 

trained, to deploy 72 percent of the time. That means 

that about 19 out of the 26 amphibious ships based in 

the United States should be deployable at any point in 

time. The Navy’s goal for the 4 ships based in Japan is for 

those ships to be deployable 89 percent of the time—

which amounts to about 3 ships. Thus, in a 30-ship 

amphibious force, about 22 ships would be deployable at 

any given time.

The last measure of force size used in this report is the 

number of ships that are actually deployed at any time. 

That number averages about 9 ships out of 30. The 

remaining 21 ships may be undergoing maintenance or 

may be at sea near their home ports conducting training 

exercises. For ships based in the United States, a deployed 

ship is one that has been sent overseas for up to six 

months to perform missions. For ships based in Japan, a 

deployed ship is one that is not undergoing maintenance; 

such ships are considered deployed even if they are in 

5. At any time, the Navy may have more or less than 30 amphibious 

ships because of the schedule of ship retirements and commissionings. The Navy’s 2012 shipbuilding plan projects that there will be 

30 amphibious ships in the fleet at the end of each of the next four 

fiscal years.

Marine

Navy's Corps'

2012 2021 2031 2041 Goal Goal

Inventory 30 34 34 30 33 38

Available 27 31 31 27 30 34

Deployable 22 25 25 22 25 26

Deployed 9 10 10 9 10 11

Memorandum
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS 3

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their Japanese home port, because that home port is 

located overseas. 

Meeting the Demand for Amphibious Ships

In 2007, the combatant commanders generally aligned 

their reported demand for deployed amphibious ships 

with the number of ships available for routine deployment. By 2010, the combatant commanders’ requests 

were no longer limited to the number of ships available 

but were intended to be unconstrained by that consideration. The commanders’ reported unconstrained demand 

for deployed amphibious ships in 2010 was about 18, an 

80 percent increase over their constrained 2007 demand. 

If policymakers decide to keep the number of amphibious 

warfare ships at 30 but try to meet the commanders’ 

unconstrained demand for more deployments and overseas presence, then those ships will need to deploy more 

often. CBO analyzed the implications of a greater frequency of deployment for those ships. The Navy’s goal is 

to have its ships in their home port at least 50 percent of 

the time (so that crews may spend time with their families and to conduct maintenance, among other purposes). 

Under the Navy’s current plan, the fraction of time that 

amphibious ships spend in their home port is 58 percent. 

If average deployment increased from 9.3 ships out of 30 

(its currently planned level) to 13.4 ships out of 30 (the 

average level of deployment based on demand in 2007 

through 2010), then the fraction of time that amphibious 

ships would spend in home port would fall to 47 percent, 

CBO estimates.6

 If average deployment increased to 17.6 

ships out of 30 (the level of demand in 2010), then CBO 

estimates that amphibious ships would spend only 36 

percent of their time in home port—a circumstance 

that would put enormous strain on those ships and 

their crews. However, it is unclear how useful an 

unconstrained measure of demand is for force planning: 

Without constraints, the desire for any asset usually 

exceeds its supply.

The rest of this report describes the main missions of the 

Navy’s amphibious warfare ships, their availability for 

major operations as well as for routine overseas deployments during the 30 years of the 2012 shipbuilding plan, 

and the ability of the amphibious force to meet the 

requests of the nation’s combatant commanders. The 

report does not address the strategic and operational 

implications of different ship purchases.

Amphibious Ships Used in Today’s 

Expeditionary Warfare Forces

The purpose of the Navy’s expeditionary warfare forces is 

to transport, deploy, and support Marine Corps units 

organized into Marine air-ground task forces (known as 

MAGTFs). Those task forces, which include all of the 

combat and support units necessary for an operation, can 

be scaled in size from as little as a few hundred troops to 

more than 50,000. However, three generic types of 

MAGTFs are common: Marine expeditionary units 

(MEUs), which are normally the size of a battalion, or 

about 2,200 troops; Marine expeditionary brigades 

(MEBs), with about 14,000 troops; and Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs), with 40,000 to 50,000 troops. 

The Navy uses two types of ships to deploy those Marine 

Corps units: amphibious warfare ships and maritime 

prepositioning ships. Amphibious warfare ships provide 

the Navy’s capability for opposed amphibious assaults 

(also known as forcible-entry operations)—the most 

demanding mission a MAGTF may face—as well as for 

many lesser types of missions (which are discussed 

below). If an opposed amphibious assault was required, 

the first wave of attackers would come from amphibious 

warfare ships. Equipment and supplies for reinforcements, or what the Marine Corps calls the “follow-on 

echelon,” would arrive on maritime prepositioning ships 

(essentially floating warehouses; see Box 1) and would 

“marry up” with marines for those units who were flown 

in by transport aircraft. The aviation component (fighter 

jets and helicopters) also would be flown in from the 

United States. Not all marines would arrive at their area 

of operations by amphibious ship, however. Many of the 

marines involved in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over 

the past 10 years did not arrive via amphibious ship but 

instead were transported to those countries with their 

equipment in the same way in which Army troops are 

deployed.

The Navy has 30 amphibious warfare ships in its main 

fleet, or battle force: 9 LHA or LHD amphibious assault 

ships (sometimes called helicopter carriers), 9 LPD 

amphibious transport docks, and 12 LSD dock landing 

ships (see Figure 1). Those ships vary in size and 

6. An increase in the number of deployed ships does not result in a 

proportional reduction in the amount of time spent in home port 

because ships not on deployment still spend some time at sea on 

training operations.
4 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS

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capability, but they all carry troops, cargo, and vehicles 

for Marine expeditionary units as well as landing craft to 

ferry troops and equipment to shore.7

 Some of those 

ships also carry short take-off and landing aircraft or helicopters for use in expeditionary operations. Amphibious 

warfare ships are larger than most other Navy vessels. 

Their displacement (weight) varies from 16,000 to about 

45,000 tons, compared with 3,000 to about 10,000 tons 

for current surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and littoral combat ships). But their displacement is 

much smaller than that of aircraft carriers, which displace 

about 100,000 tons.

The Navy’s two types of amphibious assault ships—the 

Tarawa class LHA-1s and Wasp class LHD-1s—are the 

second-largest ships in the fleet after aircraft carriers. The 

new LHA-6 America class is replacing the LHA-1s and 

eventually will replace the LHD-1s. The first LHA-6 is 

still under construction and will displace about 45,000 

tons. One amphibious assault ship forms the centerpiece 

of an amphibious ready group and can carry about half 

the troops and equipment of a Marine expeditionary 

unit. It also can carry as many as 30 helicopters and 6 

fixed-wing Harrier jump jets, or up to 20 Harriers (which 

are slated to be replaced by the short take-off and landing 

version of the Joint Strike Fighter).

The Navy’s other four classes of amphibious warfare ships 

are divided into two types: amphibious transport docks 

(LPDs) and dock landing ships (LSDs). Two of those 

ships together provide the remaining transport capacity 

for a Marine expeditionary unit in an amphibious ready 

group. Although LPDs and LSDs are quite similar, the 

LPDs have a hangar (to embark helicopters), whereas the 

LSDs have a helicopter landing area but no hangar. The 

Navy’s 12 LSDs are divided into two classes—the LSD41 Whidbey Island and the LSD-49 Harpers Ferry—

and displace 16,000 to 17,000 tons each. The LSD-49 

has a smaller well deck, so as to carry more troops and 

equipment than the LSD-41, which has a larger well deck

Box 1.

The Maritime Prepositioning Force

In addition to its amphibious warfare ships, the Navy 

has 16 maritime prepositioning vessels, which are 

organized into three squadrons of five or six ships 

apiece. Each squadron carries enough vehicles, equipment, and supplies to equip and sustain a Marine 

expeditionary brigade for 30 days. The ships are 

operated by the Navy’s Military Sealift Command 

and are forward deployed at ports in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the western Pacific 

Ocean.

Unlike amphibious warfare ships, maritime prepositioning ships do not have any defensive capabilities, 

do not carry troops, and do not have a forcible-entry 

capability. They require a secure port at which to 

unload and prepare equipment and an airfield where 

the marines of expeditionary brigades can fly in from 

the United States, meet up with their equipment, and 

assemble into a fighting force. In the absence of an 

available port, small amounts of light equipment and 

supplies could be transported to an austere environment with the use of small transport craft, if some 

operation required it. 

Although maritime prepositioning ships participate 

in various operations, they are intended primarily to 

provide the follow-on forces that deploy to a theater 

after the assault troops on amphibious warfare ships 

have secured an area. Maritime prepositioning ships 

are not counted as amphibious warfare ships and are 

not represented in the Navy’s inventory objective of 

33 ships. However, with two brigades of marines and 

their equipment transported on amphibious ships 

and three brigades of equipment shipped by the 

maritime prepositioning squadrons to support 

marines who are airlifted to a theater, the Navy is able 

to muster a total of about 80,000 marines for an 

amphibious operation.

7. For a recent analysis of the relative costs of using nuclear versus 

conventional propulsion for amphibious assault ships and 

amphibious dock landing ships, see Congressional Budget Office, 

The Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Power for Navy Surface Ships

(May 2011).
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS 5

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Figure 1.

Types of Amphibious Warfare 

Ships in the Navy’s Fleet

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: LHA and LHD = amphibious assault ships; LPD = amphibious transport dock; LSD = dock landing ship.

for conducting amphibious operations. (A well deck is a 

large opening in the stern of the ship for the egress of 

amphibious vehicles and craft.) The Navy plans to build 

one more LPD in 2012 and then a replacement for its 

LPDs beginning in 2041.8

 The Navy also plans to build a 

new class of LSDs, designated the LSD(X), beginning in 

2017 to replace the existing LSDs as they retire. The 

design and capabilities of that new class are unknown at 

this time, although the Navy’s 2012 shipbuilding plan 

implies that they will be similar to those of existing LSDs.

Missions of Expeditionary 

Warfare Forces

Marines are the main armament of amphibious ships. 

Those ships are capable of delivering marines ashore to 

perform a variety of missions, which can be categorized 

into five types: assaults, raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and support to other operations. The missions are 

listed here in order of importance to the Marine Corps 

and the Navy. Most activities performed by amphibious 

ships fall into the last mission category, however, because 

combat operations involving those ships (as well as most 

naval forces) have been relatively rare over the past 30 

years. Amphibious ships may also perform activities that 

do not conform to the Marine Corps doctrine—meaning 

that Marine Corps forces are not intended to be used 

ashore in those activities—such as maritime interdiction, 

mine countermeasures, and strike operations. 

Between 1990 and mid-2010, amphibious forces conducted 107 separate operations. Of that total, 4 were 

categorized as assaults, 1 was a raid, 3 were demonstrations, 1 was a withdrawal, 78 were support to other 

operations, and 20 did not fit any of the five types of 

missions conforming to the Marine Corps doctrine.

Assaults or Forcible-Entry Operations

In this type of operation, made famous by the invasion 

and conquest of Japanese-held islands in the Pacific during World War II, Marine Corps forces attack a hostile 

shore. The initial objective is to seize an area of ground—

a lodgment—that will enable follow-on forces to arrive 

in a relatively secure environment and build up a force 

sufficient to achieve other military or political objectives 

farther away. 

The forces that conduct the invasion usually require 

intensive preparation and support. Preassault operations 

include activities such as intelligence gathering, and 

support on the ground includes activities such as adequate mine detection and clearing, air and gunfire 

support, and immediate access to supplies and munitions. Preparing for the forcible-entry mission determines 

the force-structure goals for the amphibious force. A 

recent example of this type of operation occurred during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, when a Marine expeditionary unit conducted a ship-to-shore assault in the 

Basra area.

Raids

In an amphibious raid, forces are swiftly put ashore to 

destroy a particular objective (such as a structure, port, or 

airfield) or to temporarily occupy the objective. Forces 

may also be used to gather information or conduct a rescue. Unlike the forces used for an amphibious assault, the 

forces used for a raid tend to be much smaller, and they 

are intended to be withdrawn quickly. 

In 1975, when the U.S. freighter Mayaguez was seized by 

Khmer Rouge guerillas, it was retaken by marines in a 

Tarawa Class (LHA-1)

Wasp Class (LHD-1)

San Antonio Class (LPD-17)

Whidbey Island Class (LSD-41) 

Harpers Ferry Class (LSD-49)

8. The first LPD-17 class ship will reach the end of its service life 

in the late 2040s, so a replacement for that ship will need to be 

purchased in 2041. The specifications for that replacement class 

are unknown today.
6 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS

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quick strike; marines were also involved in an unsuccessful landing on the island of Koh Tang off the coast of 

Cambodia in search of the crew for that ship. In January 

1991, during Operation Desert Storm, a Marine expeditionary unit conducted a raid to destroy some Iraqi 

installations at Umm Al Maridim Island.

Demonstrations

An amphibious demonstration is a show of force conducted to deceive an opponent into an unfavorable 

course of action or, perhaps, to signal presence or an 

intent to perform an amphibious landing. During the 

1990–1991 Gulf War, the Marines mustered a large 

amphibious force off Kuwait as a decoy to lure forces of 

Saddam Hussein’s regime away from the main operation, 

which would come through western Iraq. In addition, 

during Operation Desert Storm, Marine Corps forces 

were used to conduct several demonstrations.

Withdrawals

An amphibious withdrawal is the removal of forces by sea 

from hostile or potentially hostile shores. Perhaps the 

most famous amphibious withdrawal is the evacuation of 

British troops from Dunkirk after the fall of France in 

World War II. Another example that relates directly to 

U.S. amphibious forces took place during the Korean 

War: After the Chinese counteroffensive in 1951, 

major elements of U.N. forces retreated to the port of 

Hungnam in eastern North Korea, where 193 Navy ships 

evacuated more than 200,000 soldiers and civilians and 

more than 17,000 vehicles. In a more recent example, 

amphibious ships and marines were used to withdraw 

U.N. forces from Somalia in 1995.

Support to Other Operations

The most common amphibious operation in the post–

Cold War era has been providing support to other 

operations—generally those that contribute to preventing 

a conflict or alleviating a crisis. Specific activities include 

responding to humanitarian crises, engaging in security 

cooperation with other countries, providing support to 

civil authorities in other countries, and evacuating civilians from areas of conflict. One of the most prominent 

examples of that type of operation was the disaster relief 

and humanitarian assistance provided to Indonesia in the 

wake of the tsunami that struck that country in 2005.

Table 2.

Purchases, Commissionings, and 

Retirements of Amphibious Warfare 

Ships Under the Navy’s Plan, 

2012 to 2041

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Navy data.

Note: LPD = amphibious transport dock; LSD = dock landing ship; 

LHA and LHD = amphibious assault ships.

Amphibious Warfare Ships Under the 

Navy’s 2012 Shipbuilding Plan

The size and utility of the Navy’s amphibious warfare 

force can be measured in four ways: total inventory, 

available ships, deployable ships, and deployed ships. 

The inventory is the total number of ships in the fleet. 

Available ships are all amphibious ships that are not in 

long-term maintenance; according to current Navy practice, available ships represent about 90 percent of the 

inventory. Deployable ships form the portion of the force 

that is sufficiently trained and ready to perform all types 

of potential missions; according to current practice, 

deployable ships are about 74 percent of the inventory. 

Deployed ships are the portion of the force that is on routine peacetime missions; they currently represent about 

30 percent of the inventory.

Inventory

The Navy’s inventory of amphibious ships is determined 

by the number of ships purchased, when those ships enter 

the fleet, and the number of ships retired each year (see 

Table 2). The Navy plans to purchase 20 amphibious 

ships between 2012 and 2041 at a total cost of about 

$50 billion (in 2011 dollars), according to CBO’s 

estimates. (See Appendix A for a year-by-year list of ship 

purchases, retirements, and costs, by class.) That total 

represents about 10 percent of the $539 billion CBO 

LPD-4 2

LSD-41/49 12

LHA-1/LHD-1 8

LPD-17 1 6

LPD-17 Replacement 1

LHA-6 7 7

LSD(X) 11 10

Total 20 23 22

Purchases Commissionings Retirements
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS 7

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estimates is required to buy all 275 ships the Navy 

includes in its 2012 shipbuilding plan.9

 The purchases of 

amphibious ships would comprise:

 1 LPD-17 amphibious transport dock,

 1 LPD-17 replacement,

 7 LHA-6 amphibious assault ships, and 

 11 LSD(X) dock landing ships.

Because the first two LHA-6s, ordered in 2007 and 2011, 

are optimized for aviation operations, they do not have 

a well deck. In contrast, all LHA-6s ordered after 2011 

would include a well deck to give future military commanders a range of options to maneuver forces via 

aviation or surface craft. In that way, commanders would 

have the flexibility to adjust for a range of contingencies 

(including bad weather) that might limit air assault 

options, and they could ensure more-efficient transit of 

heavy equipment and logistics ashore during combat 

operations by surface means.

The number of amphibious ships the Navy would commission into the fleet under its shipbuilding plan is a bit 

higher, at 23, and the mix of ships differs slightly: 

 6 LPD-17s,

 7 LHA-6s, and

 10 LSD(X)s.

The reason for the discrepancy between purchases and 

commissionings is that it takes the Navy about five years 

from the time the Congress authorizes the purchase of a 

ship to that ship’s commissioning into the fleet. Thus, 

5 LPD-17s and 1 LHA-6 that were purchased before 

2012 will enter the fleet in this decade; but 1 LPD-17 

replacement, 1 LHA-6, and 1 LSD(X) scheduled to be 

purchased in the late 2030s would not enter the fleet 

until after 2041.

The third component in projecting the Navy’s inventory 

is the decommissioning, or retirement, from its fleet over 

the next 30 years of the following ships:

 2 LPD-4s,

 8 LSD-41s,

 4 LSD-49s,

 1 LHA-1, and

 7 LHD-1s.

The net result of building new ships and retiring old ones 

on the Navy’s planned schedule would be an amphibious 

force that would not meet the Navy’s objective of 33 ships 

between 2012 and 2016 and again between 2032 and 

2041 (see Figure 2). At no point between 2011 and 2041 

would the force reach the Marine Corps’ objective of 

38 amphibious ships.

Available Amphibious Ships 

The number of amphibious ships in the Navy’s inventory 

is not the number available for operational use. At any 

given time, approximately 10 percent of the amphibious 

force would not be able to be deployed because those 

ships would be undergoing extensive maintenance. The 

other 90 percent of the force could deploy, although 

some ships would be ready to go more quickly than 

others when called for by commanders and some ships 

would be able to perform only a few limited tasks. (See 

Box 2 on page 10 for a more detailed discussion of the 

operating cycle for the Navy’s amphibious ships.) The 

Navy characterizes that situation as a 90 percent availability rate. Thus, a force of 30 amphibious warfare ships 

provides an average of 27 that are available. Likewise, the 

inventory objective of 38 amphibious ships preferred by 

the Marine Corps would yield a force of 34 available 

ships, and the Navy’s fiscally constrained inventory 

objective of 33 ships would yield 30 available amphibious 

ships. 

The availability rate is lower—at 83 percent—for the 

new class of LPD-17 amphibious transport docks (5 of 

which have already been commissioned, 5 of which are

9. The Navy’s 2012 shipbuilding plan comprises a set of tables the 

service provided to the Congress that update the Navy’s written 

2011 shipbuilding plan. For the 2012 plan, see Department of 

the Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for 

Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011 (February 2010). See also 

Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 

2012 Shipbuilding Plan (June 2011).
8 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS

CBO

Figure 2.

Inventory of Amphibious Warfare Ships

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: LPD = amphibious transport dock; LSD = dock landing ship; LHA and LHD = amphibious assault ships.

under construction or have been ordered, and 1 of which 

will be purchased in 2012). That lower rate stems from 

the many problems in the construction and design of the 

ship that have proved difficult for the Navy to fix.10 Navy 

officials expect to resolve the problems with the LPD-17 

class so that it will ultimately achieve the same average 

90 percent availability rate as the rest of the amphibious 

force.

The Marine Corps’ objective of having 34 available 

amphibious warfare ships would not be met in any year 

under the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan. If all current 

and future amphibious ships achieved a 90 percent 

availability rate, then success in achieving the goal of having 30 amphibious ships would mirror success in achieving the overall inventory objective: The Navy could 

essentially meet the objective from 2017 through 2031 

but would fall short in other years. If, however, the LPD17 class was unable to achieve a higher rate of availability 

than the current 83 percent, then the Navy would meet 

its 30-ship objective only from 2021 to 2029 (see 

Figure 3).

Deployable and Deployed Amphibious Ships

The Navy maintains about 74 percent of its amphibious 

warfare force as deployable (22 ships out of a total of 30), 

and it deploys roughly 30 percent of its amphibious force 

(9 ships out of 30) on routine peacetime missions. There 

is a difference in deployment rates between ships based in 

the United States and ships based in Japan (see Box 2). 

For ships based in the United States, the Navy aims to 

have the ships and their crews sufficiently trained to perform the full range of amphibious missions and ready to 

deploy 72 percent of the time. Given the current inventory of 26 amphibious ships based in the United States, 

that means having an average of about 19 ships deployable. For ships based in Japan, the Navy aims to have the 

ships and their crews sufficiently trained and ready to 

deploy 89 percent of the time. Given the current inventory of 4 amphibious ships based in Japan, that means 

having an average of about 3 ships deployable.

For U.S.-based ships, the Navy computes statistics that 

measure the stress on the ships and their crews; those 

statistics are determined by the Navy’s rules governing 

operations tempo (optempo) and personnel tempo 

(perstempo). Optempo refers to the amount of overseas 

presence a ship provides during its 117-week (or 27-

month) operating cycle. Perstempo assesses the stress on a 

ship’s crew using three measures:11

2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041

0

10

20

30

40

50

Marine Corps' 38-Ship Goal

Navy's 33-Ship Goal

LSD(X)

LHA-6

LPD-17 LHA-1/LHD-1

LSD-49

LSD-41 LPD-4

10. See Ronald O’Rourke, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, RL34476 

(October 28, 2010).

11. Technically, these measures indicate the tempo of ship operations, 

not the tempo of the personnel on board. Ship operations may 

overstate to some degree the tempo of the personnel because some 

of the crew may leave the ship during its 27-month cycle to attend 

school or begin a job on shore.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS 9

CBO

Figure 3.

Available Amphibious Warfare Ships

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: The Marine Corps’ objective represents the inventory goal of 

38 ships minus 10 percent in long-term maintenance. The 

Navy’s objective represents the inventory goal of 33 ships 

minus 10 percent in long-term maintenance.

LPD = amphibious transport dock.

 The length of the ship’s overseas deployment. The Navy 

aims to keep deployments to six months or less. 

 The amount of time the ship spends in its home port. The 

Navy wants a ship to spend a minimum of 50 percent 

of its time in its home port. Time spent away from a 

home port would include overseas deployments as well 

as relatively short training exercises if the ship was out 

to sea overnight.

 The amount of dwell time, which the Navy defines 

as the ratio of the number of days since a ship was 

last deployed to the number of days in the last 

deployment. The Navy’s goal for this measure is 2:1 

or higher—in other words, for every day spent on a 

deployment, the ship would spend at least two days 

in nondeployed status before being deployed again.

Under the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan, amphibious ships 

based in the United States would deploy for 26 weeks at a 

time; their dwell-time ratio would be 3.5:1. Those ships 

would spend 58 percent of their time in home port and 

the remaining 42 percent either deployed or undergoing 

at-sea training. Those statistics all meet or exceed the 

Navy’s goals outlined above. 

Meeting the Demand for 

Amphibious Ships 

Since 2007, the stated demand for amphibious ships on 

routine peacetime deployments by the major overseas 

commands of the U.S. military has increased by more 

than 80 percent. According to the Navy, that increase has 

more to do with the way demand is calculated than with 

an underlying change in demand. The demand for 

amphibious ships—which is CBO’s characterization of 

what the Marine Corps reports as its force-in-readiness 

requirements—is a sum of the assignment of existing 

forces under the Global Force Management Allocation 

Plan and the requests for additional forces by the combatant commanders. (The Global Force Management Allocation Plan is a document prepared by the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary 

of Defense that authorizes force allocations and deployment of forces in support of the regular—peacetime—

rotational force requirements of the combatant commanders.) In 2007, that demand indicated a desire for 

the overseas deployment of about 10 amphibious ships. 

By 2010, that number had nearly doubled (see the upper 

line in Figure 4 on page 12).

In a briefing to CBO, officials from the Navy stated that 

the apparent increase in the “demand signal” for amphibious ships over the past four years was not an increase as 

such but a redefinition of what constitutes the demand 

for amphibious ship deployments. Through 2007, the 

combatant commanders aligned their demand for 

amphibious ships closely with the number of available 

ships—in other words, they submitted a resourceconstrained demand. After 2007, however, guidance from 

the Department of Defense changed, and the combatant 

commanders were asked to submit their full demand for 

amphibious ships based on mission need (an unconstrained demand), which raised the desired number of 

deployed amphibious ships from about 10 in 2007 to 

18 in 2010.12 Although the specific reasons why the combatant commanders would use amphibious ships 

are classified, they fall into the categories of providing 

humanitarian relief, responding to crises, and engaging 

in exercises with the naval forces of other countries.

2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041

0

20

25

30

35

40

Marine Corps' Objective

Navy's Objective

Rate Assuming

90 Percent

 Availability

Rate Assuming

83 Percent

Availability for

LPD-17s and

90 Percent for

All Other Ships

12. Navy briefing to CBO staff, February 10, 2011.
10 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS

CBO

Continued

The Navy’s ability to meet the demand for amphibious 

ships fluctuates slightly from year to year depending on 

how many ships are available for deployment. The Navy 

provided an average of 9.2 ships per year from 2007 to 

2010—approximately 30 percent of its amphibious 

force—to the regional commanders (see the lower line in 

Figure 4 on page 12). 

By the mid-2020s, assuming the Navy does not alter the 

way it trains, maintains, and deploys its amphibious 

forces, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan would lead 

to a larger inventory of amphibious ships, which would 

permit the deployment of an average of 10.5 ships to 

overseas commands each year. However, by the 2030s, 

the number would fall back to about where it is today.13

According to CBO’s projections, the Navy would be 

able to meet 90 percent or more of the combatant commanders’ constrained demand for deployed ships 

throughout the 30-year period (based on the demand 

reported in 2007) but a much smaller share of the commanders’ unconstrained demand (based on the demand 

reported in 2010) (see Figure 5 on page 13).

Box 2.

The Operating Cycle for Amphibious Warfare Ships

The number of amphibious ships available for operations is not the same as the number of ships in the 

Navy’s fleet. At any given time, some ships will be 

deployed, while others will be in various stages of 

maintenance or training. Under the Navy’s Fleet 

Response Plan—the service’s road map for maintaining many of the Navy’s ships in a condition to deploy 

quickly, if needed—an amphibious ship based in 

the United States operates according to a planned 

117-week (27-month) cycle. That cycle is divided 

into five phases: a maintenance period, basic training, 

integrated training, deployment, and sustainment 

(see the table below). After those five phases are complete, the cycle repeats throughout the life of the ship. 

The actual amount of time spent in each phase may 

vary depending on the condition of the ship, the state 

of the crew’s training, and the mission for which the 

ship deploys.

During the maintenance phase, the crew or a repair 

yard (or both) make the physical condition of the 

ship ready for training and deployment. Basic training prepares the crew to operate the ship. Integrated 

training engages the ship in training exercises with 

other ships to prepare it to deploy in an amphibious 

ready group or, possibly, a carrier strike group. On 

deployment, ships overseas come under the purview 

of the combatant commanders, who assign them 

various tasks and responsibilities. During the sustainment phase, the ship has returned from deployment, 

but its physical condition and the crew’s readiness are 

maintained at a relatively high level, in case the ship 

is needed to deploy again. (The ranges in the categories of maintenance and sustainment occur because 

some ship classes require more maintenance than 

others. The ships that require more maintenance 

spend less time in the sustainment phase, so all 

U.S.-based amphibious ships have a 117-week 

operating cycle.)

117-Week Operating Cycle of Amphibious Ships Based in the United States

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Maintenance Basic Integrated Deployment Sustainment

10–17 weeks 20 weeks 14 weeks 26 weeks 40–47 weeks

13. The Navy’s inability to meet the demand for amphibious ship 

deployments overseas is mirrored by a similar shortfall in meeting 

the Marine Corps’ desired amount of time for training aboard 

those ships. In 2010, the Navy’s amphibious forces were able to 

meet 57 percent of the days requested for training in shipboard 

operations. Furthermore, the Marine Corps has not been able to 

conduct a large amphibious exercise in more than 10 years because 

of the difficulty in assembling a sufficiently large number of ships 

for a credible exercise.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS 11

CBO

The unconstrained demand articulated by the combatant 

commanders for any asset usually exceeds the supply of 

that asset, sometimes to a much greater degree than for 

amphibious ships. For example, the demand for 

unmanned aircraft systems greatly exceeds the available 

supply.14 The combatant commanders do not have 

responsibility for budgeting or long-term planning for 

future military forces. Nor do they have to consider the 

demands for military forces in other theaters. It is 

the responsibility of the services and, ultimately, of lawmakers to decide which military systems and activities 

should be funded. 

In the event of a crisis, amphibious ships (along with 

other naval and military forces) might be deployed for a 

larger percentage of the time than they are today. Longer 

deployments, less time in home port, and less dwell time 

would typically be required if, for example, the United 

States were to fight a war that included the extended use 

of naval forces. Over the past eight years, the Army and 

Marine Corps have maintained much higher perstempo 

rates than peacetime doctrine would dictate because of 

their heavy involvement in the land wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. A desire for greater routine presence overseas with amphibious ships would require either revisions 

to the Navy’s optempo and perstempo goals or an 

increase in the size of the amphibious force. Using the 

existing force, the Navy could provide greater presence—

but only at a higher cost, including greater stress on the 

force. 

CBO considered two cases—a medium-stress case and 

a high-stress case—to illustrate the effects on the amphibious force if the Navy attempted to meet more of the 

unconstrained peacetime demand signaled by the combatant commanders with a fixed inventory of deployable 

Box 2. Continued

The Operating Cycle for Amphibious Warfare Ships

The operating cycle for the four amphibious ships 

based in Japan is 104 weeks, or 24 months. Those 

ships spend 11 to 15 weeks performing maintenance 

and the remaining 89 to 93 weeks on deployment or 

ready to deploy (see the table below). The Japanbased ships have a less specific training regimen 

because they are expected to maintain a high state of 

readiness at all times. Even during the maintenance 

phase, the physical condition of the ship must be 

maintained so that the ship could get under way 

within 30 days, if necessary.

Under the Fleet Response Plan, an amphibious force 

composed of 30 ships would have about 9 ships 

deployed, 10 ships ready to deploy within 30 days, 

and about 3 ships capable of deploying within 

90 days. Another 5 ships could emerge from their 

basic training period and, with a substantial investment of resources, be made ready within 90 days to 

perform the limited mission of amphibious lift. 

Those 5 ships would not be qualified to deploy to 

perform the full range of missions conducted by 

amphibious ships, but in a moment of great need, 

they could be used to carry marines overseas to contribute to a forcible-entry operation. In short, at any 

given time, about 30 percent of the amphibious force 

is on routine deployment, 74 percent of the force 

could be mustered within 90 days to respond to a 

variety of crises (and thus is considered deployable), 

and 90 percent of the force could be mobilized and 

made available to provide amphibious lift.

104-Week Operating Cycle of Amphibious Ships Based in Japan

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Maintenance Deployment

11–15 weeks 89–93 weeks

14. For a discussion of those systems, see Congressional Budget 

Office, Policy Options for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (June 2011).
12 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS

CBO

Figure 4.

Demand for Amphibious Warfare 

Ships by U.S. Military Commanders 

Compared with the Number Deployed

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Navy data.

Note: As discussed in the text, the Department of Defense’s 

definition of demand changed over this period, such that 

constraints on ship availability became less important.

ships. The medium-stress case would increase the number 

of deployed amphibious ships from the current average 

of about 9.3 under the Fleet Response Plan to 13.4, the 

average unconstrained demand for those ships from 

2007 through 2010. To achieve that objective with the 

30-ship fleet that the Navy will have in 2012, deployment time for ships based in the United States would 

increase from 26 to 44 weeks over a 117-week cycle (see 

Figure 6). Deployment time for ships based in Japan 

would remain the same. That longer period of deployment for U.S.-based ships would not have to be one long 

deployment, however; two shorter deployments would be 

equally effective. Dwell time would be determined by 

whichever deployment plan was selected. With one long 

deployment, the dwell-time ratio would be 1.66:1, below 

the Navy’s goal of 2:1. With two shorter deployments, 

the dwell-time ratio would be slightly lower still, because 

ships would spend more time transiting back to their 

home ports. In addition, the share of time spent in home 

ports under either scenario would fall to 47 percent, just 

below the Navy’s goal of 50 percent.15

The high-stress case would meet the unconstrained 

demand for 17.6 ships in 2010 (with a 30-ship force) 

only by generating even more unfavorable perstempo 

measures. Deployment time for U.S.-based ships would 

increase to about 62 weeks, or more than half of the 117-

week operating cycle for amphibious ships. The ratio for 

dwell time would be 0.88:1, less than half of the Navy’s 

goal. Also, the share of time spent in home ports would 

fall to 36 percent over the 117-week period. (A 33-ship 

force would improve those numbers, but the effect of 

trying to meet the unconstrained demand would still be 

severe.) As those statistics show, this scenario could not be 

achieved without putting enormous strain on the crews of 

the ships as well as on the physical condition of the ships. 

Although that pace might be possible to sustain for a 

short period during a crisis, it would be difficult to sustain for many months or years.

Operating costs under the medium- and high-stress cases 

would be higher than costs under the Fleet Response 

Plan, although the size of the increase would depend on 

how long the stress persisted. As the ships and crews were 

used more aggressively, costs for ship maintenance, fuel, 

and sea pay would all rise. In addition, if the ships wore 

out faster because they were operating more often, that 

could lead to a shorter service life. In that case, the ships 

would require replacement on a schedule faster than what 

the Navy assumed under its 2012 shipbuilding plan. 

2007 2008 2009 2010

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Demand

Deployed Ships

15. If the Navy had 33 amphibious warfare ships, as its shipbuilding 

plan calls for, then under the medium-stress and high-stress 

scenarios, the deployment time for the average amphibious ship 

would be about 10 percent shorter, and the time spent in home 

port about 10 percent longer, than for the average ship that is part 

of a 30-ship force.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS 13

CBO

Figure 5.

Deployable and Deployed Amphibious Warfare Ships and Demand for Them by 

U.S. Military Commanders

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: CBO projected the number of deployed ships using the normal peacetime deployment rate of about 30 percent of the amphibious ship 

inventory. Crises could cause an increase in the number of deployed ships for short periods of time.

Deployable ships are ones that are in good enough material condition and whose crews are sufficiently trained to perform any of the 

amphibious missions that may be needed. Deployed ships are the subset of deployable ships that are actually overseas performing

missions. Constrained demand refers to the relatively close alignment between the number of ships requested by U.S. military commanders for routine deployment overseas and the number of ships available to go on routine deployment. Unconstrained demand is 

the number of ships requested for routine deployment overseas without reference to the number of ships that might actually be 

provided.

2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Deployable Ships

Deployed Ships

2010 Unconstrained Demand

2007 Constrained Demand
14 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS

CBO

Figure 6.

The Amphibious Warfare Force Under Different Peacetime Deployment Scenarios

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Navy data.

Notes: The medium-stress case represents the 2007–2010 average unconstrained demand for routine overseas presence of amphibious 

ships by U.S. military commanders. The high-stress case represents the 2010 unconstrained demand for those ships. 

If the Navy had 33 amphibious warfare ships, as its shipbuilding plan calls for, then under the medium-stress and high-stress scenarios, the deployment time for the average amphibious ship would be about 10 percent shorter, and the time spent in home port about 

10 percent longer, than for the average ship that is part of a 30-ship force.

Fleet Response Plan Medium-Stress Case High-Stress Case

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Deployed, from the United States

Deployed, from Japan

Available or Deployable, from the United States

Not Available, in the United States

Not Available, in Japan

Fleet Response Plan Medium-Stress Case High-Stress Case

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

(Number of amphibious ships)

Amphibious Ship Activity

(Weeks) (Percent)

Time on Deployment and in Home Port Over a 117-Week Cycle

Deployment Length

(Left scale)

Time Spent in Home Port

(Right scale)
CBO

Appendix: 

Annual Purchases, Retirements, and Costs for 

Amphibious Ships Under the Navy’s 

2012 Shipbuilding Plan

The figure and table in this appendix provide yearby-year data for the Navy’s plan for the amphibious force. 

Figure A-1 shows the costs of buying new ships over the 

next 30 years. Table A-1 lists the ship purchases and 

retirements planned for that period. 

Figure A-1.

Annual Procurement Costs of Amphibious Warfare Ships, by Class

(Millions of 2011 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: Navy ships are authorized in a given year, but they may be paid for over several years. Some money may be spent before a ship is 

authorized, in order to acquire items that need long lead times to build or have ready.

LHA = amphibious assault ship; LSD = dock landing ship; LPD = amphibious transport dock.

2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

LHA-6 LSD(X) LPD-17 and Replacement
16 AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY’S AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS FOR DEPLOYING MARINES OVERSEAS

CBO

Table A-1. 

Purchases and Retirements of Amphibious Warfare Ships Under the 

Navy’s 2012 Shipbuiding Plan

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Navy data.

Note: LPD = amphibious transport dock; LHA and LHD = amphibious assault ships; LSD = dock landing ship.

LPD-17 and

Replacement LHA-6 LSD(X) LPD-4 LHA-1/LHD-1 LSD-41/49

2012 1 1

2013 1

2014 1

2015

2016 1

2017 1

2018

2019 1

2020

2021 1 1

2022

2023 1

2024

2025 1 1 1

2026 1

2027 1 1

2028

2029 1 1 1 1

2030 2

2031 1 1

2032 1 1

2033 1 1 1

2034

2035 1 1 2

2036 1

2037 1 1 1

2038 1 1

2039

2040 1

2041 1 1

Total 2 7 11 2 8 12

Ship Purchases

Ship Retirements



INSIDE MAIL

WASHINGTON, DC 20515CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICECONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES