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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RANDLE GRIFFIN, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 14-cv-14290 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

PAUL KLEE et al., 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________________________________________/ 

ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF #39) TO 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF # 35); ADOPTING REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION IN PART; GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #32); AND DISMISSING 

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF #22) WITH PREJUDICE 

INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff Randle Griffin (“Griffin”) is an inmate in the custody of the 

Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). Griffin alleges that several 

MDOC employees – Defendants Paul Klee (“Klee”), Roy Vest (“Vest”), Joe 

Barrett (“Barrett”), and Michelle Parsons (“Parsons”) (collectively, “Defendants”) 

– retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Griffin has 

brought an action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Amended 

Compl., ECF #22) 

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 Defendants jointly filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 15, 2015 

the “Motion”). (See ECF #32.) Griffin filed a response opposing the Motion on 

July 6, 2015. (See ECF #33.) The assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and 

Recommendation (the “R&R”) on September 28, 2015, recommending that the 

Court grant Defendants’ Motion. (See ECF #35.) Griffin has filed timely 

objections to the R&R (the “Objections”). (See ECF #39.) The Court has 

carefully reviewed the Objections and, for the reasons explained below, 

OVERRULES Griffin’s Objections. 

BACKGROUND OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS

The Court sets forth a summary of only the essential facts that are relevant to 

a determination of the Objections. 

In December 2011, Griffin was elected to the Warden’s Forum at the 

Lakeland Correctional Facility (“LCF”). According to Griffin, the Warden’s 

Forum “raised serious issues on behalf on [sic] uneducated prisoners whom [sic] 

otherwise could not seek redress without plaintiff’s assistance.” (See Amended 

Compl., ECF #22 at ¶ 23, Pg. ID 128.) On January 9, 2012, Griffin was 

permanently removed from the Warden’s Forum. Griffin alleges that he was 

removed from the Warden’s Forum because LCF’s warden, Klee, wrote a 

memorandum recommending his removal. (See id. at ¶ 32, Pg. ID 129.) Griffin 

contends that Klee had him removed from the Warden’s Forum because Griffin 

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had filed a grievance against Klee. (Id.) Defendants counter that Griffin was 

removed from the Warden’s Forum because an investigation by Investigator 

Goldberg revealed that Griffin had threatened members of the Warden’s Forum 

and threatened to kill another prisoner. (See Investigation Report, ECF #32-2, Pg. 

ID 233.) 

On January 10, 2012, Vest, an MDOC Inspector at LCF, recommended that 

Griffin be transferred to another correctional facility. (See Vest Affidavit, ECF 

#32-5 at ¶ 12, Pg. ID 272.) Griffin alleges that Vest recommended the transfer 

based on Klee’s memorandum and in retaliation for “assisting uneducated inmate’s 

[sic] seek redress of their grievances . . . .” (See Amended Compl., ECF #22 at ¶ 

51, Pg. ID 132.) Vest denies that allegation and says that he recommended the 

transfer because he received multiple complaints from other inmates indicating that 

Griffin, among other things, intended to take control of the Warden’s Forum and 

stage an assault against a prison official. (See Vest Affidavit, ECF #32-5 at ¶¶ 6-

10, Pg. ID 270-71.) On January 20, 2015, Griffin was transferred to the G. Robert 

Cotton Correctional Facility (“JCF”). 

When Griffin arrived at JCF, he was housed in a security Level II unit. But 

shortly after his arrival, Griffin was reclassified to security Level IV – a more 

restrictive security level. Griffin alleges that Barrett, a former deputy warden at 

JCF, reclassified Griffin to Level IV “because of a March 22, 2011 memorandum 

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issued by . . . Klee and a January 10, 2012 Notice of Intent issued by [LCF] 

Inspector Vest.” (Barrett Affidavit, ECF #32-6 at ¶ 4, Pg. ID 278.) Barrett denies 

that allegation and says that Griffin’s security level was raised “due to a lack of 

bed space at Level II.” (See Barrett Affidavit, ECF #32-6 at ¶ 5, Pg. ID 278.) 

Griffin also alleges that Parsons, an Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor 

(“ARUS”) at JCF, improperly authorized his (Griffin’s) placement in Level IV and 

refused to reclassify Griffin to Level II “in retaliation for complaints he filed 

against . . . Deputy Warden Barrett . . . .” (Parsons Affidavit, ECF #32-7 at ¶ 4, Pg. 

ID 293.) Parsons, however, asserts that she did not have the authority to determine 

Griffin’s security level and that she did not cause his placement or retention in 

Level IV. (See id. at ¶ 5, Pg. ID 293.) 

Griffin asserts the following claims against Defendants. First, Griffin asserts 

that Klee recommended his removal from the Warden’s Forum in retaliation for his 

(Griffin’s) filing a grievance against Klee and for his (Griffin’s) providing an 

eyewitness account that Klee allegedly assaulted a fellow prisoner. (See Pls.’ 

Response Br., ECF #33 at 1, Pg. ID 317.) 

Second, Griffin alleges that Vest recommended that Griffin be sent to 

solitary confinement and eventually transferred from LCF to JCF “due to Warden 

Paul Klee’s memo permanently prohibiting plaintiff’s participation in any 

Warden’s Forums.” (See Amended Compl., ECF #22 at ¶ 32, Pg. ID 129.) 

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Third, Griffin alleges that when he was transferred to JCF, Barret improperly 

increased Griffin’s security level from Level II to Level IV in retaliation for 

alleged rumors that he (Griffin) was “trying to take over the Warden’s Forum.” 

(Id. at ¶ 39, Pg. ID 130.) 

Fourth (and finally), Griffin alleges that Parsons refused to lower Griffin’s 

security level in retaliation for filing inmate grievances and a lawsuit against 

MDOC officials. (See id. at ¶ 55-56, Pg. ID 132-33.) 

THE R&R

 The Magistrate Judge evaluated Griffin’s claims against each Defendant 

individually. The Magistrate Judge first identified the three elements of Griffin’s 

First Amendment retaliation claim: that (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; 

(2) Defendants took an adverse action against him that would deter a person of 

ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a 

causal connection between the allegedly-protected conduct and Defendants’ 

adverse actions. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). 

The Magistrate Judge concluded that each of Griffin’s claims against Defendants 

failed because he had not established that Defendants took any retaliatory action 

against him for engaging in protected conduct. (See R&R, ECF #35 at 14, 17, 19, 

20, Pg. ID 396, 399, 401, 402.) Specifically, the Magistrate Judge determined that 

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each Defendant would have taken the same action even in the absence of the 

allegedly-protected activity. (See id.) 

 The Magistrate Judge also assessed whether Defendants Klee and Parsons 

had the decision-making authority to authorize the allegedly retaliatory actions 

taken against Griffin. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Griffin did “not 

[provide] sufficient evidence to dispute Defendant Klee’s sworn statement that he 

was not the decision maker and therefore did not have authority to permanently 

prohibit Plaintiff from being a member of the Warden’s Forum.” (R&R, ECF #35 

at 13, Pg. ID 395.) Likewise, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Griffin did “not 

provide any evidence to indicate that Defendant Parsons was a decision maker 

capable of increasing or decreasing his security level.” (Id. at 20, Pg. ID 402.) As 

a result, the Magistrate Judge concluded that neither Klee nor Parsons took 

retaliatory action against Griffin because they did not have final decision-making 

authority. 

 Griffin’s Objections to the R&R (ECF #39) are described in detail below 

with respect to each Defendant. 

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD 

This Court reviews de novo the portions of the R&R to which a party has 

have. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 

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A movant is entitled to summary judgment when it “shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact....” SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services, Inc.,

712 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)) (quotations omitted). When reviewing the record, “the 

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 

and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. “The mere existence of a 

scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for 

[that party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Summary judgment is not appropriate 

when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury.” Id. at 251-52. Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the 

evidence, and the drafting of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge...” Id. at 255. 

ANALYSIS 

A. Warden Paul Klee 

Griffin alleges that his participation in the Warden’s Forum was protected 

conduct under the First Amendment and that Klee had him (Griffin) permanently 

removed from the Warden’s Forum in retaliation for exercising his First 

Amendment rights. Klee denies this allegation, and he has submitted an affidavit 

in which he states, among other things, that he recommended that Griffin be 

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removed from the Warden’s Forum based entirely upon the results of an 

investigation into Griffin’s alleged misconduct by Investigator Goldberg. (See Klee 

Affidavit, ECF #32-2 at 2-7, Pg. ID 223-28.) Goldberg reported that Griffin had 

coerced and threatened another inmate and that Griffin had been involved in a 

violent attack on another inmate. (See Investigation Report, ECF #32-2 at 12, Pg. 

ID 233.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that in light of Klee’s sworn statement 

that he acted against Griffin based upon the Goldberg report, Griffin could not 

establish that his allegedly-protected activity played any role in the adverse action 

taken against him. (See R&R, ECF #14 at 14-15, Pg. ID 396-97.) 

 Griffin objects that the Magistrate Judge should not have considered 

Inspector Goldberg’s report because it was “self serving hearsay.” (Objections, 

ECF #39 at 3, Pg. ID 418.) Griffin complains that the record does not contain any 

affidavits from any person with first-hand knowledge of his alleged misconduct 

that was described in the Inspector Goldberg’s report. (Id. at 4, Pg. ID 419.) 

But the relevant question with respect to the causation element of Griffin’s 

First Amendment retaliation claim against Klee is not whether Investigator 

Goldberg’s report was reliable, trustworthy, or admissible into evidence. Instead, 

the question is: did Klee rely entirely on the report when he recommended that 

Griffin be removed from the Warden’s Forum? Simply put, if Klee relied entirely 

on the report, then Klee did not recommend Griffin’s removal based in part upon 

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Griffin’s allegedly-protected activity, and Griffin’s claim against Klee fails. 

Griffin’s insistence that the Goldberg report was untrustworthy hearsay simply has 

no bearing on the dispositive question of whether Klee acted against Griffin based 

on that report. 

Griffin has not presented sufficient evidence to counter Klee’s sworn 

statement that he based his recommendation to remove Griffin from the Warden’s 

Forum on the Goldberg report and that he did not act against Griffin, even in part, 

based upon Griffin’s protected conduct. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge 

properly concluded that Klee is entitled to summary judgment and Griffin’s 

objection is overruled. 

B. Inspector Roy Vest 

In the Motion, Vest asserts that his recommendation to transfer Griffin to a 

different facility was not in retaliation for engaging in protected conduct. In Vest’s 

sworn affidavit, he explains that he conducted an investigation into Griffin after he 

(Vest) received information that Griffin was planning to engage in disruptive 

behavior, including a possible assault against prison staff. (See Vest Affidavit, ECF 

#32-5 at 1-5, Pg. ID 269-73.) Vest says that his investigation corroborated some of 

the information he had received concerning the potential threat posed by Griffin. 

(Id.) Vest also says that during his investigation, he reviewed a memo from Klee 

explaining that Griffin had been permanently barred from serving on any Warden’s 

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Forum. (Id.) Vest says that based upon his investigation, he concluded that Griffin 

posed a security risk, and he recommended to the Security Classification 

Committee (the “SCC”) that Griffin be transferred to another facility. (Id.) The 

SCC thereafter decided to transfer Griffin to JCF. (Id.) Prior to his transfer, 

Griffin was placed into administrative segregation. (Id.) 

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Vest was entitled to summary 

judgment because Griffin had not countered Vest’s showing that he (Vest) took 

action against Griffin based upon the results of his investigation, not based upon 

any of Griffin’s allegedly-protected conduct. In other words, the Magistrate Judge 

concluded that Griffin had failed to create a material factual dispute on the 

causation element of his retaliation claim. 

Griffin objects that Vest’s investigation relied upon unsubstantiated hearsay 

and that Vest lacked sufficient reliable and admissible evidence to support his 

conclusion that Griffin posed a threat to institutional security. (See Objections, 

ECF #39 at 6-8, Pg. ID 421-23.) But like his objection with respect to Defendant 

Klee, this objection misses the mark. The issue with respect to the causation 

element of Griffin’s claim against Vest is not whether Vest’s investigation and 

conclusions were reliable and based upon admissible evidence. Rather, the 

question is: did Vest act against Griffin based upon the results of his investigation? 

If Vest took action based upon his investigative work, and not based upon Griffin’s 

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allegedly-protected activity, then Griffin’s retaliation claim against Vest fails even 

if Vest’s investigation was deficient in some respects. Griffin has not presented 

evidence to rebut Vest’s sworn statement that he acted against Griffin based upon 

his investigation and not based upon any allegedly-protected conduct by Griffin. 

Thus, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Griffin’s retaliation claim 

against Vest fails. 

C. Deputy Warden Joe Barrett 

Barrett concedes that he was responsible for reclassifying Griffin from Level 

II security to Level IV security. But Barrett has submitted a sworn affidavit in 

which he says that he did not know about Griffin’s prior alleged protected activity 

when he made the decision to place Griffin in Level IV. (See Barrett Affidavit, 

ECF #32-6 at 2-3, Pg. ID 278-79.) Barrett added that Griffin was assigned to 

Level IV due to a lack of bed space in Level II. The Magistrate Judge concluded 

that Barrett was entitled to summary judgment because this statement showed that 

Griffin’s allegedly-protected conduct did not in any way cause Barrett to act 

against Griffin and because Griffin did not offer any evidence to contradict 

Barrett’s claimed lacked of knowledge. 

Griffin objects on the ground that he has offered evidence that Barrett knew 

about his allegedly-protected activity. He has not. Griffin directs the Court to 

allegations in his sworn Amended Complaint, but those allegations do not properly 

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establish Griffin’s alleged knowledge. The allegations recount hearsay statements 

from Defendant Parsons to the effect that Barrett knew about Griffin’s allegedlyprotected conduct. (See Amended Compl., ECF #22 at ¶ 39, Pg. ID 130.) But 

such hearsay cannot be used to create a material factual dispute on the issue of 

Barrett’s knowledge. See Sperle v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrections, 297 F.3d 483, 495 

(6th Cir. 2002) (party cannot rely upon hearsay to create a genuine issue of 

material fact).1

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Barrett 

is entitled to summary judgment and Griffin’s objection is overruled. 

D. ARUS Michelle Parsons 

As noted above, when Griffin arrived at JCF, he was placed in Level IV 

housing at the direction of Defendant Barrett. Defendant Michelle Parsons was the 

ARUS assigned to Griffin’s Level IV housing unit at the Cotton facility. Griffin 

alleges that Defendant Parsons declined to place him on the “move-down list” – a 

list of prisoners to be moved to a lower security level when appropriate – and that 

 

1

 The Court’s ruling that Griffin cannot rely on hearsay statements to create a 

material factual dispute is not at all inconsistent with its ruling above that Klee and 

Vest are entitled to summary judgment even though the Goldberg investigation 

allegedly contains out of court statements by a group of declarants. The Court did 

not consider the Goldberg report or any of the statements therein for the truth of 

the matter asserted. Instead, as explained above, the sole relevant question with 

respect to that report was: did Klee and Vest rely upon it. In contrast, Griffin 

offers the statements identified above to prove the truth of an essential element of 

his retaliation claim. In this context, the statements are inadmissible hearsay. See 

Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). He may not use this hearsay to create a material factual 

dispute. 

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she did so in retaliation for his prior allegedly-protected activity. Griffin insists 

that this misconduct by Defendant Parsons prevented him from being transferred to 

a less restrictive, Level II housing unit. 

Defendant Parsons has submitted a sworn affidavit in which she states that 

she did not have the authority to override Defendant Barrett’s decision to house 

Griffin in a Level IV setting. (See Parsons Affidavit, ECF #32-7 at 3, Pg. ID 293.) 

This affidavit negates Griffin’s claim that he was harmed by Defendant Parsons. 

Simply put, because Defendant Parsons could not have moved Griffin to a lower 

security level in contravention of Defendant Barrett’s decision to place Griffin in 

Level IV housing, Defendant Parsons could have not retaliated against him in the 

manner he alleges. 

Griffin has submitted two sworn statements – his own statement in the 

Objections and a declaration from his wife – that, he says, create a material factual 

dispute as to whether Defendant Parsons had the authority to place him on the 

move-down list. The Court concludes that these statements do not create a 

material factual dispute on the authority issue. 

First, Griffin states under oath that Defendant Parsons did have the authority 

to place him on the move-down list (see Objections, ECF # 39 at 11, Pg. ID 426), 

but he offers no factual basis for that assertion. He does not aver that he has 

knowledge about the MDOC’s chain of command, nor does he identify any facts 

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that would suggest that Defendant Parsons had the authority to override the express 

decision of her superior, Defendant Barrett (a deputy warden) concerning the level 

of housing in which Griffin should reside. While an MDOC employee in 

Defendant Parsons’ position may generally have the authority to place inmates on 

the move down list, Griffin has not identified any evidence that could support a 

finding that she had the authority to do so here – in contravention of a directive 

issued by her superior. 

Indeed, Griffin’s own grievances concerning his custody level confirm that 

Defendant Barrett, not Defendant Parsons, was responsible for Griffin’s continued 

confinement in Level IV. As Griffin remained in Level IV, he complained to 

Barrett and then filed a grievance against Barrett when Barrett did not cause him to 

be transferred to Level II. (See Grievance, ECF #33, Pg. ID 354.) Even five 

weeks in to his stay in Level IV, Griffin was complaining that Barrett, not Parsons, 

caused his confinement in the higher level. (See Grievance Appeal, ECF #33, Pg. 

ID 357.) 

Second, the declaration of Griffin’s wife does not support Griffin’s claim 

that Defendant Parsons had authority over Griffin’s custody level placement. 

Griffin’s wife complains about Defendant Parsons, but she does not say that 

Parsons had the authority to move Griffin. On the contrary, Griffin’s wife 

highlights Defendant Parsons’ repeated statements that (1) Defendant Barrett 

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“ordered” that Griffin be placed in Level IV and (2) Griffin would have to remain 

in that level “per Deputy Joseph Barrett.” 

In sum, Griffin has not shown that there is a material factual dispute with 

respect to Defendant Parsons’ denial that she played any role in Griffin’s continued 

detention in Level IV. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that 

Defendant Parsons is entitled to summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Griffin’s Objections to the portions of the R&R addressed above are 

OVERRULED; 

2. The portions of the R&R addressed above are ADOPTED and the 

suggestion in the R&R that summary judgment be granted in favor of all 

Defendants is ADOPTED; 

3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; 

4. All claims asserted by Griffin in the Amended Complaint are 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: February 23, 2016 

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 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 

parties and/or counsel of record on February 23, 2016, by electronic means and/or 

ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5113 

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