UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PAULLETO ROGERS,

Plaintiff, Case No. 14-13163

Hon. Gerald E. Rosen

v.

PHILLIP J. SHEFFERLY,

Defendant.

_________________________________/

ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

At a session of said Court, held in

the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, Michigan

on November 5, 2014 

PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen

Chief Judge, United States District Court

In his pro se complaint in this case, Plaintiff Paulleto Rogers evidently seeks to

challenge an August 5, 2014 ruling by the Defendant bankruptcy judge, the Honorable

Phillip J. Shefferly, dismissing Plaintiff’s most recent Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and

barring Plaintiff from filing any further Chapter 7 petitions until April 1, 2017. In so

ruling, the Bankruptcy Court found (i) that Plaintiff’s most recent bankruptcy petition was

“filed in bad faith,” in light of Plaintiff’s filing of six prior cases seeking bankruptcy

relief, and in light of his failure to “list any assets on his schedules that could be

administered” in a Chapter 7 proceeding, and (ii) that Plaintiff was not eligible for a

Chapter 7 discharge “due to the fact that [he] previously obtained a Chapter 7 discharge

2:14-cv-13163-GER-MKM Doc # 5 Filed 11/05/14 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 14
in case no. 09-50145.” (Bankr. Case No. 14-51469, 8/5/2014 Order at 1.) Through the

present suit filed with this Court, Plaintiff requests, among other relief, that the

Bankruptcy Court’s ruling be set aside and that his Chapter 7 case be reinstated.

Plaintiff’s complaint in this suit was accompanied by an application to proceed in

forma pauperis, which the Court has now granted. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),

upon permitting a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court nevertheless is

directed to “dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that (i) the suit is

“frivolous or malicious,” (ii) that the plaintiff’s complaint “fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted,” or (iii) that the plaintiff “seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” As discussed briefly below, Plaintiff’s complaint runs

afoul of each of these grounds for summary dismissal.

First and foremost, this Court lacks any freestanding jurisdictional authority to

review or disturb the rulings of a bankruptcy court. Rather, if a litigant is dissatisfied

with a bankruptcy court’s ruling, his recourse is to pursue an appeal from this ruling. See

28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Plaintiff clearly is aware of this statutory avenue of appeal to the

district court, as he filed a notice of appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s August 5, 2014

ruling on August 15, 2014, the very same date he commenced the present suit. This

appeal has been designated as Case No. 14-13769 and assigned to U.S. District Judge

Paul D. Borman, and any desired relief that Plaintiff might seek from the Bankruptcy

Court’s ruling may be pursued through this appeal pending before Judge Borman. 

Against this backdrop, it is clear that Plaintiff’s present suit is wholly duplicative and

2

2:14-cv-13163-GER-MKM Doc # 5 Filed 11/05/14 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 15
frivolous, and that Plaintiff has failed to identify a jurisdictional basis upon which this

Court could grant relief from the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of his Chapter 7 petition.

Next, Plaintiff’s complaint in this suit also appears to seek relief from a defendant

who is immune from any such award. While Plaintiff indicates on the civil cover sheet

accompanying his complaint that he seeks an award of $100,000 in damages from the

Defendant bankruptcy judge, “[i]t is a well-entrenched principle in our system of

jurisprudence that judges are generally absolutely immune from civil suits for money

damages.” Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997).1

 To the extent that

Plaintiff’s complaint is construed as seeking injunctive rather than monetary relief — i.e.,

an order setting aside the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings and reinstating Plaintiff’s Chapter 7

petition — as redress for purported due process violations, bias, or misconduct in the

bankruptcy proceedings, the statutory vehicle for such relief presumably would be 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and this statute itself generally precludes any such grant of injunctive

relief “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity.” See Massey v. Stosberg, No. 04-5344, 136 F. App’x 719, 720

(6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2005); Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti, 458 F. Supp.2d 439, 447-48 (E.D.

Mich. 2006).

Accordingly, for these reasons,

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED

1

Although there are two limited exceptions to this rule, see Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116,

nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that either of these exceptions would be applicable here.

3

2:14-cv-13163-GER-MKM Doc # 5 Filed 11/05/14 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 16
that Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous,

for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and as seeking relief against a

defendant who is protected by judicial immunity.

s/Gerald E. Rosen 

Chief Judge, United States District Court

Dated: November 5, 2014

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on November 5, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Julie Owens 

Case Manager, (313) 234-5135

4

2:14-cv-13163-GER-MKM Doc # 5 Filed 11/05/14 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 17