UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WALTER PERRY,

Plaintiff,

Case No.14-cv-14819

HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant.

_______________________/

ORDER ACCEPTING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION (#12), OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS 

(#13), GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (#11), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (#10), AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

I. INTRODUCTION 

This matter is before the court on the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiff Walter Perry’s claim for judicial review of Defendant

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance

benefits. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford, who

issued a Report and Recommendation on February 1, 2016, recommending that

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Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be denied, Defendant Commissioner’s

Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed. 

Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on February 15, 2016.

Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Objection on February 19, 2016. For the

reasons discussed below, the Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation and concludes that the findings of the Commissioner are supported

by substantial evidence warranting entry of judgment in favor of the Commissioner. 

II. ANALYSIS 

The standard of review to be employed by the court when examining a report

and recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636. This Court “shall make a de

novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This court

“may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate.” Id. 

A district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision,

with or without remand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Findings of fact by the

Commissioner are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. The court

must affirm the decision if it is “based on [an appropriate] legal standard and is

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Studaway v. Sec’y of

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Health and Human Servs., 815 F. 2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence

is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on December 9, 2011, alleging

a disability onset date of August 29, 2006. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

determined that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of history of aortic dissection,

hypertension, high cholesterol, anemia, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine

with mild lexoscoliosis, depression with alcohol dependence and dysthymic disorder. 

The ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, either alone, or in combination,

met or medically equaled the severity of the listed impairments. The ALJ concluded

that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work. 

The ALJ specifically opined that:

Because of his pain, emotional symptoms, and side effects of medication,

he is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive work that requires only

occasional contact with the general public and supervisors and allows

him the ability to control the pace of the work. 

The ALJ further determined that while Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant

work, Plaintiff could perform jobs in the region, including addresser, systems monitor

and assembler. 

Plaintiff first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the ALJ had no

duty to re-contact Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Kimberly Wisniewski, for

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clarification of her opinion that Plaintiff had substantially lost his ability to respond

appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations. The ALJ found

Wisniewski’s conclusion was inconsistent with her treatment notes that Plaintiff was

mildly limited in some areas, including the ability to accept instructions and respond

appropriately to criticism from supervisors, and moderately limited only in his ability

to interact with the general public. The ALJ therefore gave Wisniewski’s opinion that

Plaintiff had substantially lost his ability to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and usual work situations “appropriate, but not great weight.” 

The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the ALJ had no duty to recontact Wisniewski because the record contained sufficient evidence to assess

Plaintiff’s mental RFC. The applicable regulation states that the ALJ “may recontact

your treating physician, psychologist, or other medical source.” Hollis v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 13-13054, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181241 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2015)

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c), 416.920b(c). “[T]he decision to recontact is driven

by the inadequacy of the evidence in the record. Thus, if the record contains sufficient

evidence, recontacting sources is unnecessary.” Hollis, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *63

(citations omitted). 

The Magistrate Judge thoroughly discussed the record evidence that permitted

the ALJ to assess Plaintiff’s mental RFC, including but not limited to Plaintiff’s

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Global Assessment Functional (“GAF”) scores of 55 and 65 and his treatment records

revealing unremarkable mental status examinations. In any event, the Magistrate

Judge also found that the ALJ deferred to Wisniewski’s opinion by giving Plaintiff an

RFC that limited Plaintiff to occasional contact with supervisors and allowed him to

control the pace of his work. 

Here, Plaintiff’s objection is devoid of the requisite specificity required for

objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion. Plaintiff merely argues that the

inconsistency with Wisniewski’s opinion was not resolved with the other medical

record evidence. However, Plaintiff fails to address the evidence that the Magistrate

Judge found to be sufficient for the ALJ to assess Plaintiff’s mental RFC. Plaintiff’s

objection is therefore without merit and is overruled.

Next, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the ALJ’s decision

is supported by substantial evidence. This objection lacks any specificity with respect

to the Magistrate Judge’s claimed error and is devoid of any substantive analysis. 

Rather, Plaintiff merely cites case law and a federal regulation. This objection is

without merit. Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that general

objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that are “summary in

nature, with no specificity at all,” are insufficient); Miller v. Colvin, No. 14-11225,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37444, *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2015) (concluding that the

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plaintiff’s objections were insufficient because the plaintiff failed to “specify which

medical evidence was misconstrued, nor . . . explain how the ALJ and the MJ erred

in this respect.”). Plaintiff’s objection is overruled. 

Lastly, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the ALJ’s

mental and physical RFC were sufficient. The gist of this objection is really a

continuation of Plaintiff’s first objection, namely Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ

improperly rejected Wisniewski’s opinion that Plaintiff substantially lost his ability

to respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have accepted Wisniewski’s opinion

because she was a treating physician. However, the treating relationship between a

medical source and a claimant is only one factor that an ALJ considers when weighing

an opinion from the source. See 20 C.F.R. § 1527(c)(2). An ALJ also considers the

extent to which the opinion is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings, and

consistent with the medical evidence as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 1527.(c)(3)-(4). As

previously noted, the ALJ was permitted to reject Wisniewski’s opinion because it

was inconsistent with her own treatment notes and contrary to the record evidence as

a whole. Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported

by substantial evidence and the decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability

insurance benefits must be affirmed. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection [#13] is OVERRULED. The Court hereby

ACCEPTS AND ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford’s February 1, 2016

Report and Recommendation, GRANTS Defendant Commissioner’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [#11], DENIES Plaintiff Walter Perry’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [#10] and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 21, 2016

/s/ Gershwin A. Drain 

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of

record on

March 21, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary

mail.

/s/ Tanya Bankston 

Deputy Clerk

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