Filed 2/26/14 P. v. Alvarez CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
RAMIRO ALVAREZ et al.,
Defendants and Appellants. B245768
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA086838)

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Ronald S. Cohen, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. Deborah L. Hawkins, under appointmen t by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ramiro Alvarez. John Steinberg, under ap pointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Rodney Coronel Perez. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorn ey General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Connie H. Kan, Deputy Attorneys Gene ral, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________ _______________ ______________2 The court sentenced Ramiro Alvarez and Rodney Perez to life without possibility of parole after a jury found them guilty of first degree murder with the special circumstances that (1) the victim was a witn ess to a crime and (2) the defendants were active gang members who committe d the murder for the benefit of their gang. Appellants argue their convictions should be reversed based on insuff iciency of the evidence and instructional errors. They also seek correction of alleged sentencing errors. We affirm the judgments except for the parole revocation fines.
FACTS AND PROC EEDINGS BELOW A. The 2009 Mother’s Day Murder In 2008, Roberta Romero testified ag ainst two Azusa 13 gang members charged with murder. The two gang members were c onvicted and one received the death penalty. After the trial, police placed Romero and he r six-year-old son in a witness protection program outside the area but Romero frequently returned to the Azusa area with her son to visit Romero’s mother, Barbara Garcia, and her sister, Vanessa Medina, who lived together in West Covina. On Mother’s Day 2009, Ro mero and her son visited Ga rcia and Medina at their home. Medina was dating defendant Al varez, an Azusa 13 gang member. After dinner, Romero left her son asleep at Garcia’s home and went to visit a
friend who also lived in West Covina. Ar ound midnight Alvarez and defendant Rodney Perez, also an Azusa 13 gang member, arrive d at Garcia’s house and for the next three hours Medina, Alvarez and Perez stoo d outside the house drinking beer. At approximately 3:00 a.m., Perez said he needed to use the bathroom and went
inside the house. He came out of the ho use carrying Romero’s son. Medina heard Alvarez tell Perez to put the boy back inside the house and say to Perez: “You’re not going to kill any kid.” Perez walked to his car and told Medina to call Romero and tell her “if she wants her baby [then] she needs to go with [Perez].” Me dina refused to call Romero. Perez took Medina’s cell phone and texted Romero: “I need to pick you up3 ASAP. [Your son] is sick.” Perez also called Romero on th e cell phone and left a similar

message. After Perez delivered his messages he, Alvarez and Medina drove to Romero’s friend’s house bringing the boy with them. When they arrived at the friend’s house, Romero came out to the car and asked, “What’s wrong with the baby?” Medina answered, “Nothing.” Perez to ld Romero that “if she wanted the baby she needs to come
with him.” Romero did as she was told and Perez drove back to Garcia’s house. When they arrived, Perez and Medina took the boy inside the house and put him to bed. While they were inside Medina asked Perez “What’ s going on?” and Perez told her he was just going to take Romero “to talk to somebody .” He assured Medina “nothing’s going to happen” to her or her sister. She no ticed that Perez was carrying a gun. As Medina got back into Perez’s car she heard her sister tell Alvarez: “Por favor, not in the head, in the chest.” The four then drove off in Pe rez’s car. During the drive Medina heard Romero say to Perez and Alvare z that “she knew what she did; that she fucked up, but she wasn ’t the only one [who testified ag ainst the gang members].” Perez replied: “The homie’s going [to] die for this.” Alvarez comme nted, “We shouldn’t do [this].” After approximately 20 minutes Perez stoppe d in a dark field but when he saw a security guard he drove on. Af ter another 15 or 20 minutes, Perez stopped in a residential area of Pomona. It was quiet, dark and no on e was outside. Romero started to smoke a cigarette but before she finished Perez came around the car, opened Romero’s door and said, “Get out of the car, bitch. ” Perez took her by the arm and pulled her out. Perez and Alvarez were wearing ye llow plastic gloves.
Alvarez walked Romero into a cul-de-sac and a few minutes later Perez joined them. Medina saw Romero kneeling on the gr ound. Perez was standing at her side. Medina testified she saw a “gunshot light” and heard three shots—first one and then
“two more shots at the same time.” A witness who lived in the area testified she was awakened by gunfire. She heard a shot followed by two “consecutive, quick ones.”4 After hearing the shots, Medina saw Romero lying on the ground. She ran to her
sister but Perez ordered her back in the car and she obeyed. As th ey drove away Alvarez apologized to Medina fo r killing her sister. Perez told her “they had to do it because a homie was going to die[.]” Later that morning Perez, Alvarez and Me dina visited Alvarez’s cousin Rodarte at his home in Fontana. After they left, Roda rte contacted the police and recounted what
Alvarez had told him. Rodarte testified at trial and his recorded statement to the police was played to the jury . According to Rodarte, Perez a nd Alvarez wanted him to sell their .45 and .357 caliber guns for them. Roda rte asked the men what happened and Alvarez
confessed to the murder. Alvarez told him th at he and Perez both shot Romero but that
he shot her first. “He said , you know, that he shot her two times, bam bam, then when she was on the ground he shot he r again, bam. . . . Then [Per ez] came with the other gun and he did her up too. Tat tat tat.”
Rodarte further testified that Alvarez and Perez were “doing lines of crystal meth”
at his house. He described the two men as “nervous” and “they seemed very like I was talking to a ghost, like they seemed real pasty. ” “I knew they were up all day. And I just know that drugs played a big role in this situation.” According to Rodarte, Romero’s killing had been given the “g reen light . . . by someone in the Mexican Mafia[.]” Romero’s autopsy showed that she su ffered gunshot wounds to her head, chest and back. Two of the wounds were approximat ely one-quarter of an inch in diameter and were caused by bullets fired from a .357 caliber gun. Th e third wound was slightly larger and could have been caused by a bullet from a .45 caliber or a .357 caliber gun. A .45 caliber bullet casing was found at the s cene of the murder un der Romero’s body. The jury could infer from Rodarte’s test imony that defendants possessed both guns immediately after the murder. A forensic pat hologist testified that any one of the wounds
would have caused death within a minute or two.5 B. The Defendants’ Gang Involvement The information charged the defendants w ith the special circumstance that they
murdered Romero while they were active participants in a criminal street gang and
the murder was carried out to further the activities of the gang. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(22).) Defendants did not deny that they were members of the Azusa 13 gang. The prosecution’s gang expert, an Azusa police lieutenant, testified that between 2002 and 2006 he was assigned as the depart ment’s “gang detective.” Before and after that assignment he was familiar with the Az usa 13 gang because it is the only gang in Azusa. Asked to describe the gang’s “p rimary activities,” the lieutenant responded: “They range from petty . . . graffiti to theft, breaking into vehicles, assaults, simple batteries, assault with a deadly weapon . . . all the way up to homicides.” He named five
Azusa 13 members who had recen tly been convicted of murder. He further testified that “if someone from Azusa 13 were told by a hi gher up Azusa 13 gang me mber to take care of a witness, to kill a witne ss, and they did not do so” the person who dis obeyed the order could be executed. Finally, he testified th at Alvarez and Perez were Azusa 13 members and Romero’s murder benefited the gang beca use it showed what happens to people who testify against their gang. C. The Verdict and Sentencing The jury found Perez and Alvarez guilty of first degree murder with the special
circumstances that the victim was a witness to a crime, that the defendants were active participants in a criminal street gang and they carried out the mu rder to further the activities of their gang. The ju ry also found true the enha ncement allegations discussed
below.
The court sentenced each defendant to a te rm of life without possibility of parole plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life under Penal Code section 12022.53,6 subdivision (d) [personal use of a firear m causing death or great bodily injury]. 1 The court imposed and stayed the remaining fire arm enhancements including the vicarious firearm enhancements that appl y only to principals in the commission of certain crimes for the benefit of a gang (§ 12022.53, su bds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1)). The court also
sentenced Perez to an add itional five-year term under sec tion 667, subdivision (a)(1) for his prior conviction of a serious felony. Fina lly, the court imposed and stayed a $10,000 parole revocation fine as to each defendant. 2
DISCUSSION
I. THE FIRST DEGREE MURDER CONVICTIONS
Defendants contend that their convicti ons for first degree murder should be reversed because (1) the ev idence was insuffi cient to establish premeditation and deliberation; (2) the court should have inst ructed the jury to consider defendants’ voluntary intoxication on the issue of specific in tent to kill; and (3) th e court should have instructed the jury to consider whether the defendants were unde r duress when they
committed the murder. None of these contentions has merit. A. Sufficiency Of The Evidence Of Premeditation And Deliberation First degree murder is a murder that is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated[.]” (§ 189.) A murder is prem editated when it is “considered beforehand;” it is deliberate
when it is formed or determin ed after “careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.” ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767.) Put another way, a murder is prem editated and deliberate “if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rath er than unconsidered or rash impulse.” ( People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543.)

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The Attorney General concedes and we agree that this fine must be reversed in light of defendants’ senten ces of life without parole. ( People v. Carr (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 475, 482, fn . 6.) We will order the court to strike that fine.7 The evidence was sufficient to establish that Alvarez and Perez premeditated and
deliberated Romero’s murder. Romero was killed in reve nge for her testimony against two members of the Azusa 13 gang who we re convicted of murder, one of whom received the death penalty. Th e jury could reasona bly infer that Alvarez and Perez, members of Azusa 13, decided to kill Romero in retaliation for her testimony and as a warning to others who might consider testifying against members of the gang. Alvarez and Perez brought guns and plastic gloves with them on their visit to Romero’s mother’s house. When they learned that Romero was not there, they devised a plan to lure her into Perez’s car by using her young son as bait. When Alvarez saw Perez with the boy he admonished Perez: “You’re not going to kill any kid;” indicating a plan existed to kill
Romero but not her son. Shor tly after arriving at a secluded residential area, they put on their gloves, took Romero out of the car and walked her to a cul-de-sac where they forced her to kneel on the ground and shot her execu tion style—at close range in the head, heart
and back. B. Request For Instruction On Voluntary Intoxication
Defendant’s contend the court erred in de nying Alvarez’s request that the jury be instructed that defendants’ voluntary intoxi cation may be considered in determining their intent to kill and their premeditati on and deliberation. (CALCRIM No. 3426.) The court ruled correctly because no evidence supported defendants’ claim of alcohol and methamphetamine intoxication. ( People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal. 4th 203, 246.)
Medina testified that Alvarez and Pere z arrived at her home around 12:30 a.m. and brought an 18- or 24-pack of beer. She testified th at she drank beer with the
defendants but she did not te stify how much beer defenda nts drank. (Contrary to Alvarez’s contention on appeal, Garcia did not testify that she saw the defendants and Medina drinking beer in her fro nt yard at approximately 3:17 a.m.) Merely showing that the defendants drank alcohol before committing the murder is not suffi cient to warrant an
instruction on voluntar y intoxication. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 716.)8 There was no evidence that Alvarez or Pe rez used methamphetamine prior to the murder. Alvarez misinterprets the record in claiming that Me dina testified that she and the defendants used methamphetamine while dr inking beer before th e murder. No such testimony is found in the record. Furthermore, contrary to Alvarez’s contention, Rodarte did not testify that Alvarez “appeared to be on meth when he arrived at his house.” Although Rodarte testified “I knew they were on drugs,” the court sustained the prosecution’s objection to that testimony and neither defendant challenges that ruling on appeal. This leaves Rodarte’s speculation that “drugs played a big role in this situation.” Although this speculative lay op inion came in without objecti on, it is not sufficient to support an instruction on voluntary intoxication. C. Request For Duress Instruction Duress is not a defense to murder ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 421) but it may negate premeditation and thus lead a jury to convict the defendant of second degree rather than first degree murder. ( People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 784.) An instruction on duress require s evidence that the defenda nt acted under the threat of immediate death or great bodily harm. ( People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 900 [threat of death]; People v. Otis (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 124 [threat of great bodily harm].) A fear of future harm will not suffice. ( People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 676.) Here, the court properly denied the defe ndants’ request for a duress instruction
because there was no evidence that either of them was acting under the threat of immediate death or great bodily harm when th ey murdered Romero. Defendants point to the testimony of the gang expert that a gang member who refuses to carry out an order to
kill someone could be killed himself. There was no proof, however, that anyone ordered
Alvarez or Perez to kill Romero. Alvarez’s cousin, Rodarte, tes tified that Romero’s murder had been given the “g reen light . . . by somebody in the Mexican Mafia” but
evidence that someone in the Mexican Mafia approved of killing Rome ro is not evidence that someone gave Alvarez or Perez the task of carrying it out. In any case, there is no9 evidence that either Alvarez or Perez was in any immediate danger if they failed to kill Romero. (Cf. People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 125 [defendant’s claim that the
“Columbian Mafia” threatened to kill him and hi s family if he did not kill two others did
not warrant a duress instruction because ther e was no “substantial evidence of immediacy of the threatened harm”].)
II. THE GANG-RELATED SENTENCES The jury found that (1) the defendants mu rdered Romero while they were active participants in a “criminal street gang;” (2 ) they committed the mu rder “for the purpose of furthering the activities of the gang” and “a t the direction of, or in association with” the gang; (3) the defendants ca rried out the murder by “personally and intentionally discharg[ing] a firearm . . . within the meaning of Penal Code Section 12022.53(d); and (4) in the commission of the murd er “a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm . . . within the meaning of Pena l Code Section 12022.53(d) and (e)(1).” Based on these findings, the court sentenced each defendant to a term of life without possibility of parole and a consecutive term of 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The court imposed and st ayed sentences under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) & (e)(1)(A ). The court also imposed and stayed 10-year sentence enhancements under section 186.22, subdiv ision (b)(1)(C), altho ugh the information charged, and the jury found true, enhancemen ts under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4), not (b)(1). Defendants argue that these enhancements should be stricken because (1) there
was insufficient evidence that Azusa 13 was a “criminal stre et gang”; (2) the term “active participation” in a gang is unconstituti onally vague; (3) th e vicarious firearm enhancements that apply only to a principal in the commissi on of certain crimes for the benefit of a gang (e.g., § 12022.53, s ubds. (d) & (e)(1)) deny those defendants due process and equal protection of the law; (4) the 10-year gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), which the court imposed, does not apply to a defendant sentenced to a life term, includi ng life without possibility of parole.10 A. Evidence That Azusa 13 Is A Criminal Street Gang Section 186.22, subdivision (f) defines a “cr iminal street gang” as an “ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons , whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts” enumerated in subdivision (e) of the statute. (Emphasis added.) Defendants
contend the evidence wa s insufficient to sup port the “primary activ ities” element of the criminal street gang test. We review the whol e record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether substantia l evidence supports that finding. ( In re Alexander
L. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 605, 610.) The “primary activities” test is satisfied by a showing th at the gang “consistently and repeatedly” committed one or more of the crimes listed in section 186.22, subdivision (e), including mu rder (subd. (e)(3)). ( People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 323.) The expe rt on the Azusa 13 gang, tes tified that the gang had only “10 to 15 actual active gang members in the community that are committing gang-related crime[.]” He further testifie d that one of the gang’s prim ary activities was murder and that from approximately 2004 to 2009 five members of the gang had been convicted of
that crime. Eviden ce that five members of a 10 to 15 member gang committed five murders over a five-year period is sufficient to show that murder is one of the “primary activities” of the gang. Defendants argue that the gang expert ’s testimony was deficient because it contained no specifics as to the circumstances of these crim es, or where, when, or how the expert obtained th e information. (See In re Alexander L.
, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 614.) Such details are not necessary to establish the “prima ry activities” element
and In re Alexander did not so hold. In any case, th e record contains ample evidence of the expert’s personal knowledge concerning the Azusa 13 gang and the murders the gang
members committed.11 B. “Active Participation” In A Criminal Street Gang The street gang special circumstance also requires the defendant’s “active participation” in a gang at the time of the mu rder. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22).) Alvarez and Perez contend the term “active participation” is unconstitutionally vague. Our Supreme Court disagrees. ( People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751-752.) We are bound by its decision. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
C. Vicarious Gun Enhancem ents In A Gang Case Ordinarily sentence enhancements for fire arm discharge apply only to a defendant who personally discharges the weapon. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) As to certain crimes however, including murder, subdivisions (d ) and (e)(1) of section 12022.53, read together, permit a defendant to be sentenced to a term of 25 years-to-life if the crime was
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and a principal in the crime personally and intentionally discharged a firearm a nd proximately caused death or great bodily injury. 3 Thus in gang cases the sentence enhanc ement applies to aiders and abettors as well as to those who actually fire the weapon. Defendants do not dispute this interpretation. Rather, they contend that si ngling out aiders and abettors for increased punishment only in gang cases violates th e guarantees of equal protection and due process of law. We do not reach this issue because, as we discuss in Part III below, there was
substantial evidence that both Alvarez and Perez personally and intentionally shot

3 Subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) of section 12022.53 state: “(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any pe rson who, in the commission of a [specified] felony . . . personally and intentionally discharges a fi rearm and proximately causes great bodily injury . . . or death, to any person other th an an accomplice, sha ll be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life. [¶] (e)(1) The enhancements prov ided in this section shall a pply to any person who is a principal in the commission of an offense if both of the following are pled and proved: [¶] (A) The person violated subd ivision (b) of Section 186.22 . [¶] (B) Any principal in the offense committed any act specifie d in subdivision (b), (c), or (d).”12 Romero. Thus, aider and abettor liability wa s not a factor in their sentencing under
section 12022.53. D. The Gang Enhancement Under Section 186.22, Subdivision (b)
Defendants maintain that the cour t erred in imposing the 10-year gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdiv ision (b)(1) because this enhancement does not apply when the defendant is sentenced to life in prison. ( People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002, 1004.) Furthe rmore they claim the court e rred in imposing a sentence under subdivision (b)(1) when the informa tion charged, and th e jury found, an enhancement under subdivision (b)(4). As we explain more fully below, the
sentence was correct. The factual findi ngs required under subdivision (b)(1) and subdivision (b)(4) are the same. Based on those findings the court properly sentenced defendants under subdivision (b)(1), not (b )(4). As we further explain, the Lopez decision is inapplicable here because Lopez’ s life sentence carried the possibility of parole, thus subdivision (b)(5) trumped subdi vision (b)(1). The defendants in this case received a sentence of life without possibility of parole, making subdivision (b)(1) the applicable enhancement provision. 1. Statutory background Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) im poses a sentence enhancement on a defendant who commits a felony for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The term of the enhancement depends on the nature of th e felony. The subd ivision states: “ Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5) , any person who is convict ed of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in a ssociation with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or atte mpted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be punished as follows: . . . (C) If the felony is a violent felony [including murder] the person shall be punished by an additional term of 10 years.” (Emphasis added.)13 Paragraphs (4) and (5) provide excepti ons to the sentence enhancement under paragraph (1). Paragraph (4) provides that the 10-year enhancement under paragraph (1) does not apply if the felony is a home i nvasion robbery, carjacking, shooting at an inhabited or occupied building, aircraft or vehicle, a drive-by shooting, extortion or threatening a victim or a witne ss to a crime. Instead, the de fendant shall be sentenced to
an indeterminate term of life in prison with a minimum term set according to the nature of the crime. Paragraph (5) provides that if paragraph (4) is not applicable and the felony is punishable by life imprisonment, the defenda nt shall not be paroled for a minimum of 15 years. 2. The jury’s factual findin gs support an enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) As we noted above, the court sentenced the defendants under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) instead of subdivision (b)(4) as alleged in the information and found true by the jury. This discrepancy did no t prejudice the defendants, however, because both subdivisions (b)(1) and (b )(4) require the same findi ng: the defendant committed the crime “for the benefit of, at the direction o f, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.” The sentence to be imposed based on that factual finding is a question
of law for the court. 3. The court properly impo sed the sentence enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) unamb iguously requires the court to impose sentence under its provisions “[ e ] xcept as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5).” (Emphasis added.) The exceptions in para graphs (4) and (5) do not apply to this case in which the defendants were convicted of first degree mu rder and sentenced to life without possibility of parole. Paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) applies to home invasion robbery, carjacking, shooting at an inhabited or o ccupied building, aircraft or vehicle, drive-by shootings, extortion and threatening a crime victim or witness. It does not apply to murder. Paragraph (5) states that if paragraph (4) is not applicable and the felo ny is punishable by14 life imprisonment the defendant shall not be paroled for a minimum of 15 years. The
court in Lopez noted that paragraph (5) has alwa ys been “understood to apply to all lifers,
except those sentenced to life without possibility of parole.” ( People v. Lopez
, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1010; first it alics in original, second italics added.) This makes sense because paragraph (5) presuppo ses parole eligibility. The legislature surely did not intend the court to set a minimum time for paro le eligibility for someone who is ineligible for parole.
III. EVIDENCE THAT EACH DEFENDANT PERSONALLY AND INTENTIONALLY DISCHARGED A FIREARM The jury found that each defendant pers onally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing Romero’s death. Base d on those findings the court sentenced
each defendant to an additional and cons ecutive term of 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Substan tial evidence supports the jury’s finding. 4 Medina testified that she heard one shot, a pause, “then the other two at the same
time.” A witness who lived in the area testified that sh e heard a gun shot followed by two “consecutive, quick ones.” Rodarte to ld police that Alvarez reported: “They [meaning Alvarez and Perez] fu cking shot her[. H]e said th ey shot her three times.” The testimony of these three witnesses, the crime scene evidence and the forensic
evidence are consistent with the conclusion that Romero suffered three bullet wounds from two different caliber guns. The jury co uld reasonably conclude from this evidence
that one of the defendants shot Romero onc e and the other defendant shot her twice. Perez argues that the evidence would also support a finding that Alvarez inflicted all three fatal wounds. He points to Rodart e’s trial testimony that Alvarez told him “that he shot her two times, bam bam, then when she was on the ground he shot her again, bam. . . . Then [Perez] came with the other gun and he did her up too. Tat tat tat.”

4 For this reason we need not decide whether the evidence would support a finding that one of the defendants proximat ely caused Romero’s death even if he did not inflict one of the fatal wounds. (See People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 335; CALCRIM No. 3149.)15 Assuming Rodarte’s trial testim ony would have supported a finding that only Alvarez
shot Romero it is not our role to subs titute our judgment for the jury’s. ( People v. Guzman (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1027.) Where, as here, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict it does not ma tter that substantial evidence might have supported a different verdict.
DISPOSITION We reverse the orders imposing parole re vocation fines and instruct the court to forward an amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation showing the cha nge in sentencing. In all other respects the judgments
are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. We concur:

CHANEY, J.

JOHNSON, J.