UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

NUA GJOKAJ, 

 Plaintiff, Civil Case No. 14-14151 

 Honorable Linda V. Parker 

v. 

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, 

 Defendant. 

_________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

REHEARING OR RECONSIDERATION

 This lawsuit arises from Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff, after Plaintiff 

partially amputated his finger in a work-related accident and then failed to follow 

directives instructing him to report to the medical department and misrepresented 

the condition of his finger. In an Opinion and Order entered August 23, 2016, this 

Court granted summary judgment to Defendant. (ECF No. 56.) In that decision, 

the Court also addressed Plaintiff’s motion to strike certain exhibits Defendant 

offered in support of its summary judgment motion. Presently before the Court is 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing or Reconsideration Pursuant to Eastern District of 

Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h), filed September 6, 2016. (ECF No. 58.) With the 

Court’s permission, Defendant filed a response to the motion on September 21, 

2016. (ECF No. 60.) 

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 Local Rule 7.1 provides the following standard for motions for 

reconsideration: 

Generally, and without restricting the court’s discretion, the 

court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration 

that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the court, 

either expressly or by reasonable implication. The movant must 

not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and 

the parties and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion 

have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will 

result in a different disposition of the case. 

E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). Palpable defects are those which are “obvious, clear, 

unmistakable, manifest or plain.” Mich. Dep’t of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F. 

Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 2002). “It is an exception to the norm for the Court 

to grant a motion for reconsideration.” Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp. 

2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2010). “[A] motion for reconsideration is not properly 

used as a vehicle to re-hash old arguments or to advance positions that could have 

been argued earlier but were not.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. 

Sch., 298 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of 

Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.1998)). 

 Plaintiff first argues that the Court committed palpable defects when it 

concluded that Defendant’s Exhibit 32 to its summary judgment motion was 

admissible. Plaintiff maintains that the Court erred in failing to recognize that the 

purpose of the “grievance” meeting summarized in Exhibit 32 is to settle (i.e. 

compromise) a dispute and that, therefore, the document is inadmissible under 

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Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Plaintiff also argues that the Court erred in finding 

that the hearsay statements within the document are admissible under the business 

record exception and as admissions of a party opponent. According to Plaintiff, 

the Court also erred in finding that Jennifer Hickey, the Manager of Defendant’s 

Labor Relations Department, could lay the proper foundation for the document’s 

admissibility. 

 Plaintiff merely restates the arguments made in support of his motion to 

strike Exhibit 32. The Court considered and rejected those arguments in finding 

the exhibit admissible. For the reasons previously stated in the August 23, 2016 

decision, the Court continues to find that the exhibit does not reflect an offer to 

compromise and does not contain inadmissible hearsay. 

 Plaintiff next contends “[t]he Court committed palpable error in accepting 

the facts proffered by the Defendant without recognizing a factual dispute.” (Pl.’s 

Mot. at 8, ECF No. 58 at Pg ID 1645.) Plaintiff misconstrues what the Court did in 

its decision when summarizing the facts. While the Court may have stated what 

Defendant’s evidence showed, it expressly pointed out where that evidence was 

disputed or contradicted by Plaintiff’s evidence. The Court did not accept 

Defendant’s proffered facts as true where that evidence was disputed by Plaintiff’s 

evidence. This is evident in the sections of the Court’s opinion analyzing 

Plaintiff’s claims. 

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 Plaintiff also argues the Court’s decision contains a palpable error to the 

extent the Court concluded Plaintiff was not eligible for FMLA protections 

because he was not incapacitated for three consecutive days. Again, the arguments 

Plaintiff raises here are the same arguments he raised in response to Defendant’s 

summary judgment motion. For the reasons already stated, the Court rejects those 

arguments and continues to find that “Plaintiff’s health condition was not the 

reason he did not return to work. Rather it was because of his suspensions and 

subsequent termination that Plaintiff was unable to return to work ... after his 

injury.” (See Op. & Order at 28, ECF No. 56 at Pg ID 1629.) 

 Lastly, Plaintiff contends the Court erred in failing to recognize his right to 

ignore Defendant’s orders to report to its medical department and seek treatment 

from his own doctor. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant’s orders were 

unreasonable. Plaintiff made the same argument in response to Defendant’s 

summary judgment motion and cited the same case in support of his argument: 

Cuddington v. United Health Services, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2012). The Court already rejected Plaintiff’s argument and found Cuddington

distinguishable. 

 In short, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a palpable defect in this Court’s 

August 23, 2016 decision, much less a defect the correction of which results in a 

different disposition of the case. 

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 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for rehearing or reconsideration 

(ECF No. 58) is DENIED. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: November 28, 2016 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, November 28, 2016, by electronic and/or 

U.S. First Class mail. 

 s/ Richard Loury 

 Case Manager 

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