UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 

 Plaintiff, Criminal Action No. 14-20610 

 Honorable Victoria A. Roberts 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

 

OTIS LEE MORGAN, JR., 

 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY DEFENDANT’S AMENDED 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE [21] 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

 Before the Court is Otis Lee Morgan, Jr.’s (“Morgan’s”) motion to suppress illegally 

seized evidence. [21]. The government filed a response. [24]. The motion has been referred to 

this Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the 

following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Morgan’s motion [4] be DENIED. 

II. REPORT

A. Background 

 In August and September 2014, a lone assailant robbed three separate Family Dollar 

Stores at gunpoint in Detroit, Michigan. [21, Ex. A ¶¶ 7-9]. Eyewitnesses described the suspect 

as a 6’2”-6’3” African-American male with dreadlocks and facial hair weighing approximately 

280-320 pounds. [Id.]. During each incident the suspect brandished what appeared to be a Tech9 nine-millimeter handgun and stole cash along with store merchandise, including a DVD player 

and household items such as soap, a toothbrush and laundry detergent. [Id.] With the aid of store 

video footage and the photo line-up identifications of several eyewitnesses, the FBI eventually 

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identified Morgan, a convicted felon, as the prime suspect and, on September 22, 2014, FBI 

Special Agent Stephen Haug applied for a search warrant to search his residence. [Id. at ¶¶ 10-

15]. In his supporting affidavit, Special Agent Haug recounted the details of the robberies and 

the subsequent investigation, and proffered that: 

Based on my training and experience, individuals who are prohibited from 

possessing firearms and rob commercial institutions commonly store the 

instrumentalities of their crimes (i.e. firearms and other stolen goods) at a 

secure location such as their residence or their vehicles. In other words, 

felons who are not permitted to [possess] firearms commonly use their 

residence or vehicle to hide or store prohibited firearms or other stolen 

property. 

[Id. at ¶ 18]. The agent listed a number of items that he expected would be seized from the 

residence, including firearms, ammunition, stolen merchandise and several articles of clothing 

that the suspect wore during two of the robberies. [Id. at 37]. Thereafter, Magistrate Judge 

Donald A. Scheer approved the search warrant on September 22, 2014. [Id. at 34]. 

 The following day, on September 23rd, task force agents executed the search warrant at 

Morgan’s home and recovered a DVD player and a container of nail polish that had been stolen 

during one of the robberies. [15 at ¶ 10]. The agents also seized 203 rounds of ammunition, 

including 32 bullets that are compatible with the Tech-9 nine-millimeter handgun. [Id.]. The 

agents then arrested Morgan and searched his person, discovering two packets of heroin. [Id. at ¶ 

11]. 

 After initially being charged in a criminal complaint, Morgan was indicted on charges for 

interference with commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), using a firearm during and in 

relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), being a felon in possession of ammunition, 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). [9]. 

 On December 10, 2014, Morgan filed his instant suppression motion arguing that the 

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search warrant in question was not supported by probable cause. [21]. More specifically, 

Morgan argues that the warrant’s supporting affidavit did not contain sufficient information that 

would have led the magistrate judge to reasonably believe that items sought therein would be 

located at his residence. Assuming the search warrant was invalid, Morgan maintains that the 

government may not rely on the exclusionary rule’s “good-faith” exception to gain admittance of 

the seized evidence since the task force agents should have known that the warrant was legally 

deficient. 

B. Analysis 

As a preliminary matter, the Court has declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing with 

respect to the instant motion because there are no “contested issues of fact going to the validity 

of the search [that] are in question.” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 577 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Since Morgan challenges the sufficiency of the 

allegations supporting the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination, the instant motion 

strictly poses a legal question that can be appropriately resolved by evaluating “the information 

presented in the four corners of the affidavit.” United States v. Jackson, 470 F.3d 299, 306 (6th 

Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Knowledge, 418 F. App’x 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating 

that “[a] defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing where his arguments are entirely legal 

in nature.”). 

 Turning to the merits, the Court finds that the search warrant is supported by probable 

cause. The Fourth Amendment ensures “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .” U.S. Const. amend. 

IV. The warrant requirement is the most effective safeguard of this right, and provides that “no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation . . .” Id. The 

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Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals defines probable cause: 

“as reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof 

but more than mere suspicion,” United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 

934 (6th Cir. 1990), and is found to exist when there is “a ‘fair probability’ 

that evidence of a crime will be located on the premises of the proposed 

search.” United States v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 930 (6th Cir. 1990)). [In 

this regard, s]earch warrant affidavits must be judged based on the totality 

of the circumstances, rather than line-by-line scrutiny. United States v. 

Woosley, 361 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004) . . . “In order for a judicial 

officer to issue a warrant, law enforcement officials must present evidence 

from which the magistrate judge can conclude from the totality of the 

circumstances, ‘including the “veracity” and “basis” of knowledge of 

persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” 

United States v. Williams, 224 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). 

Jackson, 470 F.3d at 306. 

 

 Notwithstanding the FBI agent’s statement that, in his experience, robbery suspects 

“commonly store the instrumentalities of their crimes (i.e. firearms and other stolen goods) at a 

secure location such as their residence . . .” [21, Ex. A ¶ 18], Morgan correctly contends that the 

supporting affidavit fails to directly connect the presence of the handgun and the stolen 

merchandise to his home. The problem with this argument, however, is that Morgan construes 

the probable cause requirement too narrowly. In the absence of a direct nexus between weapons, 

stolen items, and a suspect’s residence, “an issuing judge may [still] infer that a criminal suspect 

keeps the ‘instrumentalities and fruits’ of his criminal activity at his residence.” United States v. 

Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 690 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Thompson, 263 F. App’x 

374, 378 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[T]his court has observed that it is reasonable to assume 

that individuals store weapons in their homes.”). Again, the Court must evaluate the “totality of 

the circumstances,” Woosley, 361 F.3d at 926, and determine whether “there is a fair probability” 

that the items specified in the warrant would be found in Morgan’s home. Williams, 224 F.3d at 

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532. 

 Here, the warrant’s supporting affidavit established reasonable grounds to believe that 

Morgan committed the robberies because the FBI agent attested that Morgan matched the 

suspect’s physical description, that two eyewitnesses identified Morgan as the suspect during a 

photo line-up, and that the agent could himself identify Morgan based on video footage he 

reviewed of the robberies. Having provided the magistrate judge with probable cause to that 

effect, it was entirely permissible for him to infer that the handgun, ammunition, clothing and 

stolen merchandise (all of which were household-type items, such as a DVD player, toothbrush, 

and detergent) would be found at Morgan’s residence. See Williams, 544 F.3d at 688 (reasoning 

that “[m]uch like a bank robber would keep the proceeds and instrumentalities of his robbery in 

his home, so too could Williams [himself a robbery suspect] be expected to keep the 

instrumentalities of his criminal activity at his residence.”). 

 Even assuming the warrant was in fact deficient, the seized items should not be 

suppressed because the task force agents acted with a good-faith belief that the warrant contained 

sufficient probable cause to search Morgan’s home. In general, the Fourth Amendment’s 

“exclusionary rule” provides that evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant must be 

suppressed. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 

(1961). However, because “the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter police 

misconduct, will not be served by excluding evidence seized by an officer acting in good faith,” 

United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 533 (6th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 

U.S. 897, 916 (1984)), a “good-faith” exception to that rule exists. Thus, even if a search 

warrant is later held to be constitutionally deficient, evidence seized as a result of the search will 

not be suppressed if the officers executing the warrant had an “objectively reasonable” good2:14-cr-20610-VAR-DRG Doc # 37 Filed 03/04/15 Pg 5 of 8 Pg ID 256
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faith reliance on the magistrate judge’s determination that probable cause existed. Frazier, 423 

F.3d at 533; Leon, 468 U.S. at 905, 922. “In making this determination, all of the circumstances 

... may be considered.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23 n. 23. However, the United States Supreme 

Court has highlighted four situations where this “good faith” exception is inapplicable: 

first, if the issuing magistrate “was misled by information in an affidavit 

that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for 

his reckless disregard for the truth;” second, if “the issuing magistrate 

wholly abandoned his judicial role;” third, if the affidavit was “so lacking 

in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 

entirely unreasonable,” or in other words, where “the warrant application 

was supported by [nothing] more than a ‘bare bones’ affidavit,” and, 

fourth, if the “warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e., failing to 

particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized.” 

United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1380 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Leon, 

468 U.S. at 914-15, 923). 

 Morgan asserts that Special Agent Haug’s supporting affidavit falls within the third 

category because it constitutes a “‘bare bones’ affidavit with regard to the likelihood that 

firearms or proceeds from the robberies” would be located at his home. [21, at 7]. Concerning 

this issue, the Sixth Circuit has noted that “whether an affidavit is so bare bones as to preclude 

application of the good-faith exception is a less demanding inquiry than the one involved in 

determining whether an affidavit provides a substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion of 

probable cause.” United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 367 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal citation 

omitted). Such an inquiry “requires examination of the affidavit for particularized facts that 

indicate veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge and that go beyond bare conclusions and 

suppositions.” Id. (internal citation omitted). This analysis is limited to “the four corners of the 

affidavit” without regard to the subjective mindset of the officers executing the warrant. Id.

(internal citation omitted). The standard is satisfied where “the affidavit at least contained a 

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minimally sufficient nexus between the alleged illegal activity [] and the places to be searched to 

support an officer’s good faith belief in the warrant’s validity.” United States v. Carney, 675 

F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 and United States v. Carpenter, 

360 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2004)).. 

 A review of the instant warrant’s supporting affidavit demonstrates that it satisfies the 

foregoing test. As the Court stated above, the FBI agent attested that Morgan matched the 

suspect’s physical description, that two eyewitnesses identified him as the suspect during a photo 

line-up, and that he himself identified Morgan after watching surveillance videos depicting the 

robberies. This was clearly ample information to find the requisite nexus between Morgan and 

the robberies. The fact that all of the items being sought in the warrant, including a firearm, 

clothing, and stolen household goods, are ones likely to be kept in a person’s home, provides an 

adequate nexus between those items and Morgan’s residence to support the executing officers’ 

good-faith belief in the warrant’s validity. See, e.g., Williams, 544 F.3d at 690; Carney, 675 F.3d 

at 1012. 

 Accordingly, Morgan’s amended motion to suppress based on an allegedly invalid 

warrant lacks merit and should be denied. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the aforementioned reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Morgan’s amended 

motion to suppress illegally seized evidence [21] be DENIED. 

Dated: March 4, 2015 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as 

provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific 

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir.1981). The filing of objections which raise some issues, but fail 

to raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this 

Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir.1991); 

Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir.1987). Pursuant to 

E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this magistrate judge. A 

party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Any such response should be concise, and 

should address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue presented in the objections. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

via email addresses the court has on file. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager

Dated: March 4, 2015 

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