Filed 3/13/13 M.V. v. J.V. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

M.V., Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. J.V., Defendant and Respondent. D061474

(Super. Ct. No. DS41687)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Roderick W. Shelton, Judge. Reversed.

Appellant M.V. (Mother) appeals fro m a postjudgment order modifying and eliminating certain child support obligations of the child's fath er, respondent J.V. (Father). Those obligations were originally es tablished by a stipulated judgment in this paternity action that referred to Father's ow nership of substantial assets from which the2 support would be paid, without regard to his monthly income. (Fam. Code, 1 §§ 3587, 4053 et seq., 7600 (the Uniform Parentage Act ).) In the initial phase of this proceeding, the family court denied Father 's request to set aside the stipulated judgment, and that order has not been challenged and is well supported by the record. Mother appeals the family court's order that (1) granted the motion by Father to modify and decrease his stipulated support obligations in several respects, i.e., the duration (from age 21 to age 18) and amount of the monthl y payments (from $3,000 to $928) and educational expenses, and (2) denied Mother's informal a nd formal motions to continue the hearing for discovery of the valu e and existence of his assets, as they had been referenced in the stipulated judgment. In its ruling, the court stated its view that the parties' agreement was unfair, because it was different from the usual support orders, and it should not be enforced. (§ 3901, subd. (a) [support obligation ordi narily runs until age 18 or high school completed].) On appeal, Mother contends the family court abused its discretion, acted without sufficient support in the eviden ce, or exceeded its jurisdiction when it reduced the amount and duration of the mo nthly support, and set aside or modified several educational expense provisions in the stipulated judgment . She contends she showed ample grounds for a continuance of the hearing to seek disc overy about Father's assets, because he did not file an income and expense declarati on (I&E declaration) until shortly before the April 6, 2011 hearing, to put his assets at issue.

1 All further statutory references ar e to the Family Code unless noted.3 Representing himself on appeal, Father re sponds that Mother failed to supply credible proof that he had any significant assets , as referred to in the stipulated judgment, and the court was justified in denying her re quested continuances for discovery. He points out that his motion was originally file d in November 2010 and then continued, so that Mother could have sou ght discovery earlier. He also claims the family court correctly concluded on the ava ilable evidence that he had su fficiently shown a change of circumstances regarding his m onthly income and disability st atus, with respect to both the monthly support and the educational expenses. We conclude Mother's challenges to th e order are well taken, and the record demonstrates that the family court lacked any adequate basis in the evidence to exercise its discretion in the manner it did on the child support issues, and under all the relevant circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the requested continuance to allow further discovery about Father's assets. Mo reover, the family court misinterpreted the terms of the parties' agreement with respect to the duration of child support ordered and the educational expense issues , and it erred in altering th at agreement through these modification proceedings, whic h constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the stipulated judgment, but without a proper showing. (See In re Marriage of Stanton (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 547, 5 54.) We reverse the order.4 I
BACKGROUND A. Stipulated Judgment on Paternity and Support We set forth only those facts that are rele vant to the issues on appeal. The record shows that the parties, who were never marri ed, entered into a May 2010 stipulation for entry of judgment establishing paternity of their daughter, born in 2006 (the stipulated judgment or SJP, which resembles a marita l settlement agreement (MSA) confirmed by a judgment). The stipulation provides for sole legal and physical cu stody in Mother and for Father to pay specified ch ild support and expenses, and pr ovides for a reservation of jurisdiction to the court to re solve any disputes arising out of the agreement. Notice of entry of judgment was given in May 2010. Although the stipulated judgment covers a number of topics, this appeal concerns only the provisions for monthly child supp ort, clothing expenses, and for support payments for private high school, university expenses and possibly graduate school. Regarding monthly child support, the SJP stat es that Father shall pay to Mother $3,000 per month for child support, as well as bear ing all clothing, scho ol uniform and shoe

expenses. 2 The duration of this oblig ation was stated to be un til the child reached the age of 21 and is no longer a full-time student, or when she marries, di es, or completes her university studies. The SJP states, "It is the parties' mutual desire that child support

2 The parties' agreement that Father woul d pay additional child support consisting of the child's clothing expenses, including shoe s and any school uniforms, does not mention private elementary school, and the precollege agreement apparently was limited to the child attending private high school.5 continue until the child has completed her univ ersity Baccalaureate and any postgraduate degrees." Next, the agreement states that the pa rties had agreed upon the child support amounts and expenses stated above, in light of Father's refusal in these proceedings to provide any completed I&E declaration. Ho wever, Father represented by signing the agreement "that he has the ab ility to pay all support and e xpense payments set forth in this agreement and that he an ticipates that he will have su fficient assets and income to pay all of the child support and expenses," as had been set forth. "Father further represents that the income fro m his current or future employm ent is not necessary for him to meet the obligations set fort h in this Agreement because th e Father has sufficient assets and other sources from which to pay the support and expens es," as above, and Father represented himself to be a high income earn er within the meaning of section 4057. The agreement accordingly sets forth a presumption, based on Father's representations, that he cannot request a downward modification of ch ild support, "absent a very strong and specific showing of changed circumstances. " The parties acknowledged their rights under California child support guidelines, along with their agre ement to change that level of child support. Regarding private high school expenses , paragraph 10A of the SJP states the parties' mutual desire that the child would attend private high sch ool and university, and that Father would pay as add itional child support 100 percen t of private school tuition, book costs, fees and associated expenses.6 Regarding university expenses , paragraph 10C of the SJP states the parties' mutual desire that the child attend college, "and po ssibly graduate school," after graduating from high school, and that absent any other inde pendent funding source, Father shall pay 100 percent of the cost of books, tuition, room, board, and fees for co llege or university, "in the [child's] conscientious pursu it of an initial Baccalaureate a nd/or postgraduate degree." B. April 2011 Motion to Modify Support Amount; Denial of Motion to Set Aside In November 2010, Father filed a motion to set aside the SJP, or in the alternative to modify custody and support. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) After a stipulated continuance, he filed an I&E declaration two days before the April 6, 2011 hearing. Both parties had legal representation, and Mo ther filed opposition papers. At the first hearing, the trial court denied his request to set aside the SJP, an d deferred the financial issues for further hearings. At four days of hearings over several months, the court took declarations and heard testimony from several witnesses, includi ng the parties. Father sought to decrease his monthly support obligation from $3,000 per month, because he stated he had voluntarily resigned his job as a deputy attorney general with th e Baja California office in Mexico, and reduced his income from abou t $14,500/month to $0 (all in U.S. dollar amounts). As of March 2011, he was on temporary disability for finger surgery. His I&E declaration stated he had $150,000 in personal property, $2,500 cash, but no real property. His 2009 tax return show ed he had income of $172,513.50. In Father's I&E declaration of May 13, 2011, he stated that his monthly gross income was now $4,652 per month, with total expenses of $3 ,860. A revised declaration7 dated May 17, 2011 showed a further reduc tion in income and expenses. He had obtained a new job, district attorney s upervisor, and was livi ng in Tijuana in a condominium for which his employee (Attorne y Marcos Valenzuela) held title. Father paid $350 monthly maintenance co sts, not rent. He stated th at he did not own any real property or businesses, although his fath er Jorge Rodriguez-Pacheco (Grandfather) and family owned several. In rebuttal, Mother filed declarations and her own I&E declaration, stating that Father had resigned his position to obtain a higher position within the federal attorney general system. She said Father owned or pursued a money lending business called Auto Money, and he had five offices for this business and earned about $20,000 per month from it, for a total monthly in come of about $80,000 from his work and properties. According to Mother, Father bought real esta te in his mother's name and his brothers' names. He had income from an inheritanc e from his grandmother, a tire warehouse in Mexico City. Mother received some rental payments from Father for a warehouse that Mother owned in Mexicali, that Father managed fo r her, although it was unclear whether those payments were also in the natu re of child support, as Father had reported them differently to United States and Mexican authorities. Mother, also an attorney, operated a law practice at a loss and she owne d $200,000 in real and pers onal property. Her 2010 taxes showed an income of $9,950. She was livi ng in section 8 low income housing in the San Ysidro area with the child and her other children. She claimed Father paid child support to her up until February 2011.8 C. May 2011 Mother's Motion for Continuance; August 2011 Ruling In May 2011, Mother provided a copy of a January 2010 real property purchase agreement for a Coronado house, priced at $8 85,000, with Father and a friend listed as the purchasers, and showing a cash deposit of $2 6,550. Mother orally requested that the hearing be continued so that she could take discovery of th e income and expenses that Father listed, and others, a nd a ruling was deferred. Moth er filed a written motion to continue the financial issues on June 2, 20 11, supported by her declaration about the extent of her knowledge of assets that Father held in the name of others in Mexico. The court denied any continuanc e at the June 17 hearing. Father filed further responses and lodged recent pay stubs. He testified that by April 2011, he was using his savings to pay Mother the monthly $3,000 child support,
and the assets he held were the same both in May 2010, when the stipulated judgment was entered, and in May 2011, at the time of the hearing. In July 2011, Mother lodged translat ed declarations from Fa ther's half-sister and from Grandfather, about their resp ective knowledge of assets that Father held in Mexico. Mother updated her I&E declaration in August 2011. At the hearing, Mother testified about her limited knowledge of the real pr operties and businesses that Father was operating, as well as stating that he often received valuable gifts in the course of his legal work for favors he gave. He drove cars that were registered in the names of others, obtained gasoline subsidies from work, and di d not pay rent. Father filed a rebuttal declaration from Grandfather, denying he told Mother anything about Father's assets. Father stated that he was not a corrupt official, and the gifts were not improper.9 At the close of the August 5, 2011 hearin g, the court issued a tentative and then a final ruling, as an oral statement of decision. The court ordered that Mother and Father should share joint legal custod y, and Father had a 25 percent timeshare. The court stated its belief that the stipulated agreement regard ing child support past age 18 was not fair, and the duration of the support obligation was reduced from age 21 to age 18, as the court stated that was customary under section 3901. In explaining its support ruling, the co urt stated, "I'm going to only look at evidence I have in front of me , and that's going to be payment stubs. With that being said, when [Father] ma kes more money, [Mother] can always come back and ask for an increase in child support, and th at's just how it works. But for right now, I'm going to use the income that I do have." The court next inquired wh ether Father's income on the pay stubs was in pesos or dollars, and counsel discussed th e income and deductions. Couns el for Mother stated that the only recent tax return (2009) showed th at Father had income of $172,513.50, averaging out to $14,376.21 per month, from employment. She therefore argued he had the ability to earn $14,000 per month, but due to the deni al of her motion for discovery, Mother had been unable to take his deposition to learn what his income was in 2010 and to inquire into his ba nk accounts and other assets, includi ng houses in Cor onado, Tijuana, and Mexico City. In response, the court sa id, "That's based upon [Mother's] testimony, though, no physical evidence . That's only based on testimony." Counsel for Mother responded, "Your Honor, the physical evidence exists, but since I haven't been able to do10 discovery" (due to Father's su rgery schedule and lack of in formation about his assets), she continued to object that no sufficient changed circumstances had been shown. The court then determined th at Father had a gross salary of $5,180 per month (net adjusted $4,629), and Mother's net income was $1,257. Th is calculation resulted in a child support guidelines award of $928 per m onth, because the court said Father had met his burden as far as a change of circumstances (being on disability si nce Mar. 2011), and this was a temporary order, until he was back to wo rking full time. Next, the court's order altered and decrea sed the stipulated educational expenses obligations, regarding (1) private high schoo l, from all expenses per month to $0; (2) college, from all expenses to one-half of the expenses, (3) postcollege schooling, from all expenses to $0. Other or ders were made regarding insu rance and attorney fees (not contested here). Mother appeals.
II
APPLICABLE STANDARDS A. Duty of Support "A parent's duty of suppor t continues as to an unmarri ed child who has attained age 18, is a full-time high school student, and is not self-supporting until the child completes the 12th grad e or reaches age 19, whichever occu rs first." (§ 3901, subd. (a); 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. La w (10th ed. 2008) Parent & Child, § 422, p. 528.) "[Section] 3901[, subdivision] (a) does not limit a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support or the court's power to in quire whether such an agreement has been made. (§ 3901[, subd .] (b).)" (10 Witkin, supra , § 422, p. 528; § 4053 [each parent11 should support child to extent of ability]; M.S. v. O.S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 548, 553- 557 [support principles applied in paternity case].) The Supreme Court has long recognized: "T here is nothing in the law to prevent a parent from contracting to support a child, mi nor or adult, married or unmarried. And when the agreement . . . is founded upon su fficient consideration, the contractual obligation is not measured by legal duties ot herwise imposed. No principle of public policy intervenes to prev ent such a contract and the courts have no right by a process of interpretation to release one of the cont racting parties from disadvantageous terms actually agreed upon." ( Kamper v. Waldon (1941) 17 Cal.2d 718, 721.) A comparable written, signed agreement by married parents to increase courtordered child support payments is enforceabl e under ordinary contract law or through an enforcement motion under Code of Ci vil Procedure section 664.6. ( In re Marriage of
Armato (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 10 30, 1045-1047; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 20 12) ¶¶ 17:25-17.25.5, pp. 17-10 to 17-11 (Family Law).) Any modification of such an agreement, and likewise of this paternity settlement agreement, requires an evidentiary hearing on c ontested factual issues, and a resulting judicial determination based on admi ssible evidence that showed a material change of circumstances at the ti me the modification is sought. ( In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App. 4th 269, 298-299 ( Cheriton ).)12 B. Basic Rules of Review; Discretion of Family Court Appellate courts apply these standards of review to orders that modify statutory child support obligatio ns, as set forth in In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221 ( Williams ): " '[A] determination regarding a re quest for modification of a child support order will be affirmed unl ess the trial court abused its discretion, and it will be reversed only if prejudicial error is found from examining the record below.' [Citations.] Thus, '[t]he ultimate determination of whether the indivi dual facts of the case warrant modification of support is within th e discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The reviewing court w ill resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial cour t's determination. [Citation.]' [Citation.] [¶] '. . . Furthermore, "in reviewing child support orders we must also recognize that de termination of a child support obligation is a highly regulated area of the law, and the only discretion a trial court possesses is the discretion provided by statute or rule. [Citations.]" [Citation.] In short, the trial court's discretion is not so broad that it "may ignore or contravene the purposes of the law regarding . . . child support." ' " ( Id . at pp. 1233-1234.) In considering if an abuse of discreti on has occurred, the appellate court reviews the record to determine if the court's factua l determinations are su pported by substantial evidence: "Our review is limited to determining whether the court's factual determinations are supported by substan tial evidence and whet her the court acted reasonably in exercising its discretion. [Citati on.] We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but confine ourselves to determining whether any judge could have reasonably made the challenged order." ( In re Marriage of De Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1360 ( De Guigne ).) For modification of a final child support order, the moving party (Father) had the burden of showing change d circumstances. ( Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249,13 256; Williams, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234.) At the appellate stage, Mother bears the burden of showing that a prejudici al abuse of discretion occurred. ( Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 12 91.) Regarding her claims about the denial of her continuance request, for purposes of discovery, the issue on ap peal is whether the tr ial court abused its discretion. "A motion for continuance is ad dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] However, ' "[t]he trial judge must exercise his discretion with due regard to all interests involv ed, and the refusal of a continuance which has the practical effect of denying the applicant a fair heari ng is reversible error. [Citations.]" ' " ( Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395, citing In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169.) C. Effect of SJP Father's formal child su pport obligations originated in a paternity settlement agreement and stipulated judgment confirmi ng the agreement. Su ch an obligation is "law-imposed" within the meaning of secti on 3585, because it requires payments arising out of the parental relati onship as confirmed by court order. (See Family Law, supra , ¶ 18:118-120, pp. 18-36 to 18-37.) 3 Such an agreement may alter the usual statutory child support obligation, that a parent is released from the legal duty of support of a minor child when the child turns 18, graduates from high school or becomes

3 Section 3585 provides, "T he provisions of an agreement between the parents for child support shall be deemed to be separate and severable from all other provisions of the agreement relating to property and support of the wife or husband. An order for child support based on the agreemen t shall be law-imposed and shall be made under the power of the court to order child support."14 emancipated. (§ 3901, subd. (a); 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Parent & Child, §§ 421, pp. 527-528 [und er § 3587, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court has authority to (1) approve a stipul ated agreement by the parents to pay for the support of an adult child or for the continuation of child su pport after a child attains age 18; and (2) make a support order to effectuate that agreement."].) 4 It is well established that parents can make an agreement to the contrary of statute, to voluntarily assume a greate r obligation of support: "Upo n sufficient consideration the parent may agree and be boun d to do more than the statut e requires, so long as the additional obligation is not contrary to nor in consistent with the st atutory prov ision." ( Kamper v. Waldon, supra , 17 Cal.2d 718, 720.) Although Father objects that this authority is distinguishable simp ly because it arose out of a marr iage case, it is clear that this paternity judgment is equivalent to a dissolution judgment for our purposes, the analysis of support principles and interpretation of an incorp orated settlement agreement. As a matter of law, the stipulation was merged into the terms of the judgment, similar to a marital property rights adjudication. (See In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1220-12 21; see Family Law, supra , ¶ 17:340 et seq., pp. 17-86 to 17- 87 [stating, inter alia, that the parties cannot re litigate the division of property disposed of by a final judgment].)

4 No issues exist here about the separate statutory scheme for support of a disabled indigent adult child. (See 10 W itkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Parent & Child, § 423, pp. 528-530 [discussing § 3910].)15 To interpret the order and the parties' ag reement regarding child support in light of these principles, we will first address those pr ovisions applicable to Father's statutory and contractual obligations of m onthly child support until age 18 or the completion of high school (which remained modi fiable by the court; part III, post ). "When a child support agreement is incorporated in a child support order, the obligation created is deemed court-imposed rather than contractual, and th e order is subsequently modifiable despite the agreement's language to the contrary." ( Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 947.) Following that discussion, we will tu rn to the arguments about the other contractual provisions of the SJP, regarding educational e xpenses and support after age 18. As with a marital settlement agreement that is incorporated into a judgment of dissolution, this appellate court will inde pendently interpret the questions of law presented by the parties' agreement. (Part IV, post ; In re Marriage of Davis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1017-1018 ( Davis ).)
III MONTHLY SUPPORT; DENI AL OF CONTINUANCE Mother contends the family court abused its discretion, or acted without sufficient support in the evidence, when modifying and decreasing the amount of Father's monthly child support obligation, as well as reducing to zero his obligation to pay the pre-age 18 expenses for clothing, such as school uniform s. Since the SJP does not expressly cover private elementary school tuition, we will de fer discussion of the private high school issues until part IV, post . For this child who was five year s old at the time of the hearing,16 all the support issues are closely intertwine d with the denial of Mother's requested continuance for the purpose of obtaining discovery about Fa ther's assets, to supplement the information that he had prov ided about his monthly income.
A. Standards for Setting Child Support Obligations: Income Section 4058, subdivision (a) outlines th e components of a parent's "annual gross income" for support purposes, as meaning "income from whatever source derived," except as otherwise specified in the section, and income can be imputed based on earning capacity. ( Cheriton, supra , 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 301; In re Marriage of Rocha (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 514, 516-517.) Such attribution of income is allowe d where necessary to protect the child's best intere sts. (§ 4058, subd. (b); De Guigne , supra , 97 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1363.) On appeal of a child support award, the fam ily court's interpretation of statutory definitions (e.g., inco me) will be reviewed de novo. ( In re Marriage of Pearlstein (2006) 137 Cal.App.4t h 1361, 1371-1372.) Where a stipulated order has been made for child support above the guidelines amount, the court is without authority to change that order, unless a showing of materially changed circumstances is made. ( Williams, supra , 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234-1235; In re Marriage of Laudeman (2001) 92 Cal.App.4t h 1009, 1015; Family Law, supra , ¶ 17:30, pp. 17-13; In re Marriage of Stanton , supra , 190 Cal.App.4th 547, 553.) Absent such a change of circum stances, a modification motion would be " ' "nothing more than an impermissible colla teral attack on a prior final order." ' " ( Id . at p. 554; Family Law, supra , ¶ 17:25, pp. 17-10 to 17-11.)17 At the time the SJP was confirmed, Father admitted he had a hi gh earning capacity within the meaning of section 4057, and ove r the relevant time period in 2010-2011, he had held several positions in the Mexican fe deral legal system, had resigned, and had been rehired. At the time the court ruled, Father had recently changed jobs and was on temporary disability, which affected his mo nthly income, as the court acknowledged when relying upon his pay stubs as the cont rolling evidence before it. However, that was not the only potentially relevant and reasonably available evidence to be factored into the support calculation, as we next discuss.
B

. Child Support Obligations; Effect of Assets, Investments, and Gifts In calculating child support, the courts take into account both parents' " 'net monthly disposable income,' " as well as the parents' " 'annual gross income.' " ( In re Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.Ap p.4th 718, 731 ( Alter ).) " 'Income from other sources . . . should properly be factored into the "annual gross income" computation. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 285.) "The judicially recognized sources of income cover a wide gamut." ( Ibid. ) In the context of computing child support, the assets ow ned by a parent "may enter indirectly into the calculation in two ways: (1) In assessi ng earning capacity, a trial court may take into account the earnings from inve sted assets [citation] ; and (2) a court may deem assets a 'special circ umstance' [citation] that may justify a departure from the guideline figure for support payments [citation]. But these are excep tional situations; the child support obligation is based primarily on actual earnings and earning capacity."18 ( Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 671; see Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 292; § 4057, subd. (b)(5).) In assessing earning capacity, the court in Cheriton determined that the trial court had erred in failing to include the father's stock options proceeds and proceeds from the sale of stock in determining his income. ( Cheriton , supra , 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 289- 292.) There, the court concluded that "the tr ial court's refusal to consider [the father's] substantial wealth in setting child support may ha ve resulted in an order that is too low to be in the best interests of his children, base d on an assessment of th eir reasonable needs." ( Cheriton , supra , at p. 292.) The trial court was required to determine whether to impute reasonable income to th e father's assets. ( Ibid .) Even where the supporting party has "non -income-producing assets, the trial court has discretion to impute income to those asse ts based on an assume d reasonable rate of return." ( In re Marriage of Pearlstein , supra , 137 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1373-1374, fn. omitted; County of Kern v. Castle (1999) 75 Cal.App. 4th 1442, 1453-1454 [a trial court may impute income based on interest that c ould be earned from investment of a lump sum inheritance].)
In Williams , supra , 150 Cal.App.4th at page 1241, th e court determined that a trial court acted within its discretion under se ction 4058, subdivisi on (b) in "implicitly determin[ing] that the childre n's best interests would be served by an increase in guideline child support, calculated in part by attributing an assumed 3 percent rate of return on [father's] investment assets." A court may have great latitude in applying the statutory scheme to individual cases. ( Williams , supra , at p. 1240.)19 Likewise, where a supporting parent can reasonably expect to receive cash or easily valued or negotiable gifts on a consistent basis, they may be deemed a regular part of income, and the trial court is permitted to in clude such gifts in the income calculation. ( Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 718, 734-737.) This can include free rent received by a parent. ( Id . at p. 734.) C. Respective Showings: Pre-age 18 Support As the moving party seeking modifica tion downward to a guidelines amount, Father brought forward evidence about his recent earnings at his job. His 2009 tax return (the most recent one available) showed that he made appr oximately $172,500 in U.S. dollars, or $14,500 per month. At the time of the hearings in 2011, his declaration and testimony stated he was on four to six months of disability leave, at a reduced salary level. He provided pay stubs from the April through May 20 11 period, showing a current income of around $5,000 per month. Mother attempted to rebut this showin g by arguing she was unduly hampered in obtaining information about Fath er's assets, by Father's prac tice of putting his various real property and business assets in the names of friends and relatives. These included a tire store in Mexico City that was in the name of his grandmother, the residence in Coronado, the condominium in Tijuana, an d several income producing pr operties in Mexico, held in the names of Father's relatives or employees . During their relationship, Mother had participated with Father in managing some of his assets, and she gave testimony about the Mexicali warehouse that she owned and he managed in the course of running his lending business. Mother also owned a house for her mother to live in, and an office20 condominium. She testified that she lear ned during their relationship that Father regularly received valuable gifts in connectio n with his work dutie s within the federal Mexican legal system, a gasoline subsidy and bonuses. D. Order; Evident Abuse of Discretion The family court made a guidelines calcula tion solely based on Father's recent pay stubs that were readily available, and ruled that Father had showed changed circumstances for a modification of support be cause Father was curre ntly on disability. The court stated that Mother had presente d only undocumented tes timony about Father's assets, other than his salary, and the cour t would therefore rely only on the salary evidence before it. A ccording to Father, that ruling s hows only that the court thought Mother was not a credible witne ss. Alternatively, Father argue s that if inco me should be imputed to his assets, it should also be imputed to Mother's assets. The problem with Father's position is that under accepted family law principles, the evidence about his earnings le vel at the time of the ruling was only part of the overall required guidelines calculation under sections 4055 and 4058 , and the court disregarded the terms of the stipulated child support or der and judgment, by ignoring Father's assets that formed the basis of the monthly amount, and thus it improperly failed to permit relevant evidence to be adduced on the main alleged change of circumstances before the court. The stipulated judgment was grounded in the substantial assets that Father owned, that were identified as sup porting the fulfillment of his support payment obligation, without any need for his work income. The SJP anticipated th at no such disclosure of Father's substantial assets would ever be necessary, because of the stipulation.21 When a litigant requests a continuance, last minute or otherwise, the court should take into consideration the degr ee of diligence in his or her efforts to bring the case to trial or hearing, including pa rticipating in earlier court hearings, conducting discovery, and preparing for trial. ( Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles, supra , 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1396.) When a court decides whether to gr ant a continuance or extend discovery, its decision must be directed toward achieving s ubstantial justice, by de ciding whether " 'the strong public policy favoring disposition on the merits outweighs the competing policy favoring judicial efficiency.' " ( Ibid .) Moreover, admissible eviden ce of materially changed circumstances is required " 'as a necessary predicate' " for modification. ( Williams, supra , 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234.) The court had to adhere to the principles set forth in section 4053 that each parent should support the child according to his or her ability, and imputa tion of income, even from assets, is permitted where necessary to pr omote the child's best interests. (§ 4058, subd. (b); De Guigne , supra , 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1359, 13 63.) This reco rd supports an inference that Father may have been using fa mily members and employ ees to hold title to assets on his behalf, and this may have pr evented Mother from acquiring relevant asset information. ( In re Marriage of Hoffmeister, supra , 161 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1170-1171.) Although Father was normally a high ear ner, who had ch anged positions within the Mexican governmental legal system and was employed at the time of the hearings (on temporary disability), he coul d not, without a more comp lete showing about his net worth, repudiate his prior agreements that a particularly strong showing of a change of circumstances would be needed to modify child support, and that his earnings were22 deemed not to be essential to the payment of the agreed amount. This strong showing was not made here. To the extent that Fath er was relying on his claimed disability and reduced monthly income, the court failed to take into account wh at length this work restriction would have, and whether it was a mate rial factor that made any difference in light of the assets he previously possess ed. Additionally, in ruling on Father's modification requests and stating it was a temporary order, the court erroneously placed the burden on Mother to bring another motion to modify later. It was accordingly an abuse of discretion fo r the family court to discount Mother's testimony about the extent of her knowledge or lack of knowledge with regard to those referenced, existing assets, in light of its prev ious rulings that had denied her requests for a continuance to obtain such documentation. Although more discove ry could have been sought earlier by Mother's counsel, even befo re Father's I&E declaration was provided, that is not a reasonable requirement here. Wh en Father's unsuccessful motion to set aside was filed in November 2010, he did not provi de an I&E declaration, and his admissions about his possession of extensive assets re mained in place. Mo ther subsequently presented an adequate showin g that she needed to and might be able to obtain more documentation about the assets, and that she ha d not done so previously because she was not put on adequate notice until the filing of Father's April 2011 I&E declaration that he apparently had divested himself of such asse ts. Mother's continuance requests were at least reasonably timely, in light of the court's decision to sche dule several days of trial to address the financial issues, after the motion to set aside the SJP was denied.23 On this record, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mother's request for continuance to conduct discovery about the value of Father's assets, because the evidence provided about Fath er's current earnings and work di sability was not su fficient, without more, to make an appropriate "law-imposed " support calculation under section 3585.
IV TERMS OF SJP: DURATION OF SUPPORT; EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES Mother next contends the family court misinterpreted the SJP, or abused its discretion, or exceeded its jurisdiction, in granting the motion to modify and decrease Father's support obligation, regarding (1 ) support until age 21 (reduced to 18 or graduation from high school); (2) payment of all college expenses ( only 1/2 payable) and (3) private high school or post college schooling (none payable). As outlined above, the family court deni ed Father's motion to set aside the entire SJP, and it proceeded to hear the remaining fi nancial issues, and inte rpreted the parties' SJP on child support after age 18, and on ed ucational expenses. Section 3587 provides authorization for the court to approve a "stip ulated agreement by the parents to pay for the support of an adult child or for the continuation of chil d support after a child attains the age of 18 years and to ma ke a support order to effectua te the agreement." However, the power of the court to set aside such a stipulat ed agreement, that was confirmed by a judgment, is not expressly provided for in the statutes. Father is essentially seeking to collaterally attack those provisions of the stipulated judgment, but in the guise of modifying such contractual terms. (See In re Marriage of Stanton, supra , 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 554.)24 "A support order based on the parties' st ipulated agreement to pay for the support of an adult child is enforceab le by contempt, even though there is no applicable statutory support obligation apart from th e stipulation. Having been approved by the court and entered as a court order, the obligation is deemed law-imposed (not a 'debt'). [Citations.]" (Family Law, supra, ¶ 18:120, p. 18-37.) We are required to interpret independentl y the questions of law presented by the statutorily authorized support agreement, as it was incorporated into the judgment, including its provisions on changed circumst ances. Such agreements are construed utilizing the general rules governing the interpretations of contracts. ( In re Marriage of Iberti , supra , 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439.) We give effect to the eviden t mutual intention of the parties, and " '[i]f c ontractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.' " ( People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767; Davis , supra , 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018; E.M.M.I. Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 465, 470.) First, with regard to the duration of the support obligation, section 3901, subdivision (b) provides that a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support, past age 18 or until the completion of high school, is not limited by this section, and the court retains the power to inquire wh ether an agreement to provide additional support has been made. Such an agreement fo r child support is deemed to be separate from all other provisions of the agreement, and "[a]n or der for child support based on the agreement shall be law-imposed and shall be made und er the power of the court to order child support." (§ 3585.) Since there was no marriage here, there are no other severable,25 relevant property or spousal support provisi ons. This child was born in 2006, and only the issues litigated at these hearings in 2011 are now before us. All of the child support provisions in the stipulated judgment are premised upon Father's statement in it that he would not provide an I&E declaration, but instead represented that he will have sufficient assets and income to pay all of the expenses and support provided for in the agreement, and any current or future employment was not necessary for him to meet those obligations. Father further agreed that he would not request a downward modification of child su pport, "absent a very strong and specific showing of changed circumstances." His I&E declarations omitted any information about real property or business assets, such as Mother's testimony in dicated that he had previously owned at various times, and she ha d some basis in her personal knowledge to make those claims. As discussed above, more information ab out his assets was potentially available and necessa ry for the court to make an informed exercise of discretion. Likewise, although the stipul ated judgment provides that Father shall pay all of the child's college expenses, the court reduced that by half, and omitted the private high school and postcollege schooli ng expense entirely. The cour t stated its personal views that the public schools in Chula Vista were very good and Mother's two other children seemed to be doing well there. However, the parties had previously set forth their agreement that their child sh ould attend private high school and that Father would pay additional child support consisting of the child 's clothing expenses , including shoes and any school uniforms, without re gard to the amount of his monthly income. On this26 record, the court did not have an adequate ba sis to disregard and v acate those portions of the judicially confirmed agreement. When counsel for Mother pointed out th at these rulings were a total departure from the parties' agreement, the c ourt stated as justification, "I think this is more fair than what was in the agreement, to be honest with yo u. I think this is what is normally done in every family law case. The 21- year age was totally different from -- in my short period of being in family law and in talking to othe r people, and I'm going to go back to what is normally done on Family Code s ection 3901." However, this re cord does not show that a "very strong and specific showing of chan ged circumstances," as required by the stipulated agreement, and by case law, was ma de at these hearings. The family court was not authorized, in these modification procee dings, to disregard the language of the agreement by stating that it was more custom ary to end child support at age 18. The parties had statutory authoriza tion under section 3585 et se q. to agree otherwise on the duration and nature of child sup port, and they did so. Father failed to show adequate or material grounds to modify those obligations, with regard to provid ing child support up until age 21 and the agreed-u pon educationa l expenses. We need not discu ss Mother's additional arguments about abuse of discretion, and express no opinion on whether Father can show the relevant material change of circumstances at a later time. The reversal is an open reversal, ex cept as specified above (the unchallenged denial of Father's moti on to set aside the stipulated judgment).27 DISPOSITION The order modifying the stipulated judgmen t is reversed. Appellant is to recover all costs on appeal.

HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

McDONALD, J.