DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina, Chairman 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

KEN CALVERT, California 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

STEPHANIE GUPTA, JEFF ASHFORD, JIM HOLM, 

KARYN KENDALL, WILL PAINTER, and MIKE BIRSIC, 

Staff Assistants 

PART 4 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Page 

Transportation Security Administration: Are We 

Making Smart Investments for Real Transportation 

Security? ................................................................................. 1 

Biosurveillance: Smart Investments for Early Warning 115 

United States Secret Service FY 2011 Budget .................. 273 

Coast Guard FY 2011 Budget ................................................ 351 

FEMA—Preparing for Disasters and Minimizing 

Losses ...................................................................................... 453 

DHS Cyber Security Programs—What Progress Has 

Been Made and What Still Needs to be Improved? ..... 755 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


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PART 4—DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011 


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USSS 

OHA 

TSA 

NPPD 

FEMA 

USCG 


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina, Chairman 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

KEN CALVERT, California 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

STEPHANIE GUPTA, JEFF ASHFORD, JIM HOLM, 

KARYN KENDALL, WILL PAINTER, and MIKE BIRSIC, 

Staff Assistants 

PART 4 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Page 

Transportation Security Administration: Are We 

Making Smart Investments for Real Transportation 

Security? ................................................................................. 1 

Biosurveillance: Smart Investments for Early Warning 115 

United States Secret Service FY 2011 Budget .................. 273 

Coast Guard FY 2011 Budget ................................................ 351 

FEMA—Preparing for Disasters and Minimizing 

Losses ...................................................................................... 453 

DHS Cyber Security Programs—What Progress Has 

Been Made and What Still Needs to be Improved? ..... 755 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

57–185 WASHINGTON : 2010 


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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE

 ́

E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

BEVERLY PHETO, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011 

THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 2010. 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: ARE 

WE MAKING SMART INVESTMENTS FOR REAL TRANSPORTATION SECURITY? 

WITNESS 

GALE D. ROSSIDES, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID PRICE

Mr. PRICE. The Committee will come to order. This afternoon we 

are pleased to welcome Acting Assistant Secretary Gale Rossides to 

her second hearing on transportation security issues before this 

Subcommittee. You have been the Transportation Security Administration’s Acting Assistant Secretary for much longer than any of 

us anticipated. We all look forward to having some certainty about 

the long-term leadership of the agency, but in the meantime you 

have stepped up admirably to the demands of your role and we appreciate your strong and diligent leadership, which I am confident 

has made air travel in our country more secure. Thank you for 

serving your country with distinction in what is sometimes a 

thankless job. 

Created in the wake of the attacks of September 11th, the initial 

focus of the TSA was securing the aviation sector in this country. 

But soon thereafter, attacks in London, Madrid and Mumbai pointed to other transportation vulnerabilities, especially in transit systems. Based upon the threat environment, this Subcommittee has 

worked diligently over the years to fill security gaps in all of our 

transportation networks. 

Since 2003, we have appropriated over $8 billion to give TSA 

screeners better tools to detect weapons and explosives in luggage 

and on people. We have appropriated over $400 million for TSA to 

vet passengers for links to terrorism in order to prevent certain individuals from boarding an aircraft. Additionally, Congress has set 

an August 2010 deadline for screening all cargo on passenger aircraft, appropriating $468 million to date to accomplish this task. 

To address threats outside the aviation environment, Congress 

has provided $1.8 billion in grants to help local transit agencies 

and Amtrak secure rail and transit networks. We worked with the 

new Administration last year to place additional emphasis on surface transportation security with new special response teams, or 


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VIPRs, and funding to better coordinate security efforts in nonaviation modes, such as pipelines, highways, motor carriers, mass transit, rail and shipping. 

This Subcommittee has also encouraged research and development of technologies to thwart threats that have yet to materialize. 

Well before the Christmas Day bomb plot, TSA had been working 

to field a solution to the nonmetallic explosives threat by testing 

and evaluating advanced imaging technology which this Subcommittee supported. 

On December 25th, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate an explosive device on board a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, our fears about this threat 

were materialized. As a result, TSA ramped up its procurement 

and deployment plan for the new screening capacity. For that, you 

should be commended. 

However, the failure of Dutch screeners to detect the explosive 

on Christmas Day was just one piece of the breakdown in our intelligence and aviation security systems that permitted the would be 

bomber to get as far as he did. After ordering a top-down review 

of all the aviation security procedures, President Obama initiated 

a number of reforms, including enhanced screening for passengers 

flying into the United States from, or flying through, nations on 

our list of state sponsors of terrorism and other countries of interest; the deployment of additional law enforcement at airports, air 

marshals on flights, and explosives detection canine teams to keep 

our air traffic safe; ramped-up deployment of passenger screening 

technologies that can better detect hidden explosives; and importantly, improvements to the terrorist watch list system, including 

placing more individuals on the no-fly list. We will want to discuss 

your efforts since the announcement of these reforms and of course 

how your 2011 budget builds on these measures to create lasting 

security solutions for the American people. 

The high threat environment that we face makes plain the need 

to close critical gaps in the aviation sector. The 2011 request, 

which totals $7.87 billion overall, includes an additional $946 million above the 2010 level for increased measures to secure the Nation’s airports and flights on the heels of the Christmas Day 

botched attack. We will need to closely scrutinize your request 

today, bearing in mind that the enemy is constantly watching and 

evolving and no single tool is a foolproof solution. 

We will be watching TSA to ensure that the agency itself is 

evolving to thwart potential attackers. One thing we rely on to give 

us perspective on the agency’s strategic vision is your annual expenditure plan for checkpoint systems, checked baggage, and air 

cargo. This plan is our guidebook indicating how funds will be allocated within various programs. It is routinely updated to address 

changes in the threat environment or to revise estimates for technology development. Without knowing what you plan to procure in 

2010 for airport checkpoints, we cannot make complete sense of 

your 2011 budget request for such items as advanced imaging technologies and portable explosive trace machines. We need to know 

if what you are requesting for 2011 is the best use of resources, 

and not just a response to the latest incident. 


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Today, I look forward to learning more about this cohesive strategy. As part of this discussion, we expect you to be able to answer 

not only why a 9 percent increase in aviation security is a smart 

investment in 2011, but also whether we are devoting the correct 

amount of resources to domestic versus international activities. 

After all, aviation security does not start at our borders. We need 

to work across the globe to make sure that the threats are identified at their originating point, not when a terrorist boards an aircraft headed to the United States. So we will also want to hear 

about how TSA and the Department are cooperating with foreign 

authorities to secure air travel worldwide as well as discuss the optimal mix of manpower and screening technology for the 2011 fiscal 

year. 

I want to thank you again for your service to the country. I look 

forward to continuing to work with you to ensure our transportation security professionals are equipped with the resources they 

need to keep the American people safe. 

We will ask you, Ms. Rossides, to take 5 minutes to summarize 

your written statement and we will be happy to include your full 

statement in the record. 

Now before you begin, I recognize our distinguished Ranking 

Member, Mr. Rogers, for his comments. 

[The information follows:] 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER HAROLD ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome to Ms. Rossides for what is perhaps your final appearance before the Subcommittee, regrettably. 

When TSA was established in 2002, I voiced strong concerns 

about the agency’s inclination to become overly reliant on manpower as opposed to the smart use of effective technology and its 

effort to bolster aviation security. 

Today, some 8 years later, in the wake of another terrorist attack, it feels like deja vu all over again as I review TSA’s proposed 

response to the vulnerabilities exposed by the Christmas Day plot. 

Back in 2002, just as today, Congress was presented a request 

for funds to support thousands of thousands of screeners rather 

than a clearly articulated strategy for achieving meaningful aviation security. My concern back then, as it is today, is that we are 

not thinking through the proposed security enhancements in terms 

of portability, effectiveness, and adaptability for the next threat encountered. 

So as I look at the fiscal 2011 budget request for more than 500 

additional whole body imagers and more than 5,300 additional 

screeners I am apprehensive because it is unclear whether such a 

costly and manpower intensive approach is the absolute best course 

of action, especially when the initial deployment of these whole 

body imagers appears to be an interim step against the use of even 

more advanced technology. 

My position on enhancing aviation security is one of cautious urgency. Far too often government overreacts in the wake of a crisis 

and a reactionary posture is one that habitually leads us into overspending on solutions that don’t pan out. 

Let me be clear, I am not saying there isn’t some merit in what 

TSA is proposing for fiscal 2011. Rather, my concern is that this 

costly proposal appears to be a short-term fix, not a long-term sustainable solution that effectively balances legitimate travel, needed 

security, and limited resources. 

Unfortunately, these questions cannot be fully answered until we 

have a better understanding of the direction that TSA is heading 

in the current fiscal year, which is difficult to do until we receive 

TSA’s fiscal 2010 spending plans, as required by law, even though 

we are well into fiscal 2010. But don’t get me off on that subject. 

As this Subcommittee continues its oversight responsibilities, I 

intend to press DHS on the prioritization of its budget. I have 

made it very clear in previous hearings that I believe that the fiscal 2011 budget emphasizes aviation security and administration 

costs at the expense of virtually every other operational security 

program across the Department. 

While I do not dispute the need to enhance aviation security and 

to improve program management, it is important to recall that two 

very distinct al Qaeda plots were revealed this past year—the 

Christmas Day attack and the Zazi plot to reportedly detonate explosives in New York City. So what this means to me is that we 

cannot exclusively focus upon the aviation sector at the expense of 

other areas. We must remain vigilant on the entire spectrum of 

threats facing the country. 


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Now having said all of that, I would be remiss if I did not take 

a moment to recognize the notable efforts of all the TSA personnel 

that have worked tirelessly to identify solutions to very difficult 

challenges since the Christmas Day attack. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to highlight, as you 

have, Ms. Rossides’ noteworthy service since the establishment of 

TSA. She is one of the six original employees at TSA, as young as 

she is, and she has endured the full range of challenges facing 

aviation security in the post-9/11 era. She will be taking up further 

pursuits, but we want to thank you for your service to your country 

for many years in this chore. To put it mildly, this Subcommittee 

and this Nation owes you a debt of gratitude for your dedicated 

service. 

Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. Ms. Rossides, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF GALE ROSSIDES

Ms. ROSSIDES. Good afternoon, Chairman Price and Ranking 

Member Rogers. It is my great privilege to appear before you today 

to ask on behalf of the Transportation Security Administration, to 

ask for your support of the President’s fiscal year 2011 total budget 

request of $8.2 billion for TSA, an increase of $512 million over fiscal year 2010. 

I also thank you both personally for your very kind words. Having been with TSA since its first days, I have witnessed and appreciate our enduring partnership with this Subcommittee as we have 

achieved and continue to strive to meet important objectives towards securing our Nation’s vital transportation systems. 

I also greatly appreciate the work we have done with partners 

at all levels of government, industry representatives, our international partners, the privacy sector, and especially the traveling 

public we serve. 

This year, we expect to fully implement our Secure Flight program, a key security vetting measure effected before airline passengers ever arrive at the airport. GAO has now certified that we 

have generally met all 10 program certification requirements set by 

this committee. 

We will also screen 100 percent of air cargo on domestic flights 

by August and make substantial progress on screening air cargo on 

inbound international passenger flights. 

We will obligate all $1 billion provided under the Recovery Act, 

accelerating important passenger and baggage screening enhancements. 

We will further initiate over $1.3 billion in checkpoint and explosives detection systems with funds provided in fiscal year 2010. 

We will stand up 15 new VIPR teams dedicated to surface transportation security and serve as the executive agent for decisions on 

$300 million in FEMA public transportation and railroad security 

grants. 

TSA operates in a high threat environment day in and day out. 

This drives us to be ever vigilant. The attack on Northwest Flight 

253 on Christmas Day was a stark reminder that there are still 

those who wish to do us harm. They are studying our security 

measures and will exploit our social norms to their advantage. The 

men and women of TSA live with that reality every day. 

I truly appreciate the time that you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking 

Member Rogers took to visit our Transportation Security Integration Facility, the TSIF, last week to discuss many of the advancements we are seeking in fiscal year 2011, most notably our advanced imaging technology. For years, TSA has recognized the 

threat of improvised explosive devices and focused our efforts there. 

We began testing advanced imaging technology in 2007 to detect 

metallic and nonmetallic threats hidden on the body. Because of 

the 3 years we have put into this we currently have 40 machines 

already in place at 19 airports. We will field approximately 500 

units systemwide by the end of this year and our fiscal year 2011 

request of $215 million doubles that equipment capability. 


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The almost 1,000 units will allow us to screen over 60 percent 

of all airline passages with AIT. This requires also 5,000 TSOs, 

which are also requested in our budget along with supporting costs. 

I want to emphasize that TSA is the world leader in the marketplace for this advanced imaging technology, and the work we have 

done to date has paved the way for other countries to follow suit 

in the wake of the December 25th incident. 

TSA does not screen passengers in other countries, but we are 

committed to helping our foreign partners enhance the security of 

flights coming into the United States. We have built strong relationships with our international partners, proven by the high level 

of cooperation we received in December. Within 5 hours of TSA 

issuing new security directives, 95 percent of foreign partners were 

in compliance. TSA seeks an additional $40 million for our international programs. 

Our request also seeks to better equip our TSOs to better identify threats through operational intelligence by expanding our field 

intelligence officer program. We are also requesting $60 million for 

800 additional portable explosive trace detection machines which 

have been proven to be very successful at detecting a wide array 

of explosives. We propose to add 350 behavior detection officers, 

and with an additional $71 million, TSA is requesting to add 275 

proprietary canine teams. 

The President’s budget also requests an additional $85 million 

for FAMS to sustain domestic and international flight coverage on 

our highest risk flights. 

In closing, I would like to state that TSA’s core mission is one 

of counterterrorism. We continue the work we began 8 years ago 

to close vulnerabilities with new technology and with new processes in a very complex security regime. 

As this will likely be my final appearance before the subcommittee as Acting Assistant Secretary, I am extremely grateful 

for your support of TSA, for our programs, and for the everyday heroes I have been honored to serve alongside with. I appreciate your 

support in achieving our shared security goals, and I am happy to 

respond to your questions. 

[The statement of Ms. Rossides follows:] 


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ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. The first question I will ask 

is having to do with the advanced imaging technology. Over the 

past 2 years, the TSA has worked to develop and test advanced imaging technology for use in airport screening checkpoints with an 

eye toward replacing metal detectors at primary screening checkpoints. This replacement effort has been well under way, actually 

well over a year before the Christmas Day bombing. 

Because of your efforts, TSA was quickly able to develop plans 

to screen 100 percent of passengers both with AITs in primary or 

to use an equivalent method to detect nonmetallic threats after the 

Christmas Day incident. Unlike pat-downs or traditional metal detectors, DHS believes that AITs, which see beyond a passenger’s 

clothes and identifies threat objects on a body, could have detected 

the explosive powders that Abdulmutallab smuggled inside his underwear when he went through security in Amsterdam. 

The budget request notes that if funded, the 1,000 AITs purchased in 2010 and 2011 would allow this technology to be in place 

at 75 percent of the country’s largest airports. It remains unclear 

as to how you deploy these systems since they have a much larger 

footprint than metal detectors and a slower processing time. For 

example, AITs take longer to scan a single passenger than a metal 

detector, 1.3 versus 22 seconds. In a briefing with staff, TSA stated 

they do not expect increased processing times with AITs because 

current passengers have to wait on the X-ray to scan their carryon bags and shoes. Accordingly to TSA, this 22-second X-ray is 

about the same time that it takes an AIT to scan a passenger. I 

really wonder if the AITs will increase wait times. Could you help 

us figure this out? 

And if wait times begin growing, how are you going to alleviate 

the lines of passengers backing up and the potential security threat 

as they wait to be screened by an AIT? 

What is your deployment plan for the AITs? Is it your intention 

to deploy AIT equipment within the existing screening checkpoint 

footprint in all airports? Do you plan on doing a one-for-one replacement of metal detectors? How is this going to move forward? 

And then finally, let me just recall the situation we faced when 

we wanted quickly to be able to screen checked baggage after 9/11. 

You will recall TSA placed explosive detection machines in less 

than ideal locations in a number of airports on a temporary basis, 

which created a series of problems and ultimately made permanent 

solutions more costly and more time consuming. I am sure that experience is on your mind as you look forward to how we are going 

to do the AIT project. How are you going to avoid repeating these 

same mistakes as you begin to deploy the AIT equipment at existing screening checkpoints? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, sir. Let me start by talking about the work 

that has been done to date. We gained a tremendous amount of 

knowledge from the pilots that we ran over the last couple of years 

in terms of how to process the passengers through, how to measure 

the wait times. And, from the time passengers enter the queue to 

the time they actually leave the checkpoint, there are multiple 

processes going on, one of which is walking through the advanced 


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imaging technology. But the other is the screening of their carryon bags. And it is the combination of those processes working in 

parallel for the passengers that go through that tells us that we do 

not believe that deploying this AIT is going to significantly increase 

the wait times for the passengers. 

We also believe that deploying the TSOs in the right positions in 

the checkpoint to inform the passengers how to properly divest to 

go into the AIT is going to contribute to keeping those wait times 

down. 

The integration of the AIT equipment into the checkpoint has 

been something that we have looked at as part of our piloting, and 

as we are looking at this deployment. We have airports around the 

country now that have raised their hands and said they are ready 

to take this technology and put it in their existing checkpoints. We 

are confident that those that we are rolling out this year can be 

done and put in the existing checkpoints and not have to go 

through major construction issues, not have the kinds of things we 

had where we had the checked baggage technologies in lobby areas, 

et cetera. 

We are also very much focused on how do we educate the traveling public so that when they show up at the checkpoint they understand exactly what they can expect as they go through the AIT 

machines. So, it is the combination of looking at the entire process 

within the checkpoint, looking at the public education element, 

making sure that we have the TSOs properly stationed in front of 

the equipment so that they can make sure that the passengers are 

properly divested. This technology gives us such an improvement 

in the detection capability that we are looking to make sure that 

the processes, the technology and the people are all well integrated 

so that it is both a very effective screening process as well as very 

efficient. 

Mr. PRICE. The footprint of these AIT machines though is greater 

than the metal detectors? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, it is, sir. But what we have found is that in 

a lot of these airports as the checkpoints were built, they actually 

had more room in them, you know, more room within the checkpoint footprint itself. So the initial deployment is to look at those 

checkpoints that are ready right now to handle this equipment. 

Mr. PRICE. And the idea is that the carry-on baggage will still 

go down the line and be screened but the time the individual 

spends in the AIT machine will parallel or be concurrent with that 

time used for carry-on baggage screening? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Correct; right. 

Mr. PRICE. That is how you come up with very little net increase 

in time spent? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Correct. Correct. And it is something that we will 

be very focused on. Frankly, as passenger loads increase over the 

next couple of years, we will look to make sure that we are properly managing both queues. As we are setting these machines up, 

we will also have the ability to direct the passengers either through 

the advanced imaging technology or through the walk-through 

metal detector and receive alternate screening so we can manage 

the process that way as well. 


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AIT PASSENGER RESPONSE AND PRIVACY

Mr. PRICE. These pilot efforts that you have undergone in the 

last couple of years to check out this technology, has that also included extensive work on what we are talking about right now? 

The deploying of the machines? The way the passenger flow works? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes. 

Mr. PRICE. And for that matter, passenger acceptance of the new 

technology in general? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, and I am very, very pleased to be able to report to you that the passenger response to this technology has been 

overwhelmingly positive and that was part of our pilot. I believe 

that we had an over-90-percent acceptance rate by the traveling 

public when they opted to go through the equipment. This has been 

a great piece of technology for persons with disabilities going 

through checkpoints. During our pilots, we looked at the configuration, officer training requirements, passenger throughput and we 

looked at passenger acceptance. 

Mr. PRICE. And by passenger acceptance, you are also referring 

to the measures taken to protect privacy? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, sir. And we have signage up in the checkpoint area that informs the passengers that first of all this is optional. They do not have to go through the advanced imaging technology if they choose not to. It also informs them that the officer 

that is guiding them through this technology will never see the 

image that the officer in the remote location is using for detection 

purposes. And we have made sure that those privacy concerns have 

been addressed with the public. 

We have had a privacy impact statement out during this deployment of the technology in pilot phase and again we have worked 

very hard with privacy groups, as well as the traveling public, to 

ensure that they accept and understand the privacy measures that 

are in place. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. So continuing on the privacy aspect, the machine 

makes an image which is telecast, if you will, to a room where just 

one person is located; correct? And that is the only place where this 

image is shown? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. To the one person in the closed room, an employee? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. That is right. 

Mr. ROGERS. And the face is blurred? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now you say this is optional to the passenger. Suppose they say no, I don’t want to do that. What do you do then? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Then they are directed through the walk-through 

metal detector. They could be subjected to hand wanding and a 

full-body pat-down, so we are ensuring that an alternative and 

comparable form of screening applies to passengers if they choose 

not to go through the technology. 

Mr. ROGERS. So every person that refuses the whole body imager 

scan would be patted down? 


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Ms. ROSSIDES. Possibly; they could either be patted down, they 

could have a review of their carry-on luggage. There is a variety 

of alternative measures that we would have that could be applied 

depending on, again, the particular technology that is available in 

the checkpoint. 

EFFECTIVENESS OF AITS

Mr. ROGERS. Now, is this new machine, is it as effective as a patdown? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. From an effectiveness standpoint and an efficiency 

standpoint, it is better. Because it allows us to view the images 

quickly. It identifies anomalies on the body. It identifies anomalies 

that may be in sensitive parts of the body and it is much faster 

than doing a full-body pat-down on somebody. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, considering the Christmas Day bomber, would 

this machine have detected the bomb on that person? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Without going into the specifics of that, because 

of the ongoing criminal investigation, I will tell you that the experience we have had, both in the labs and in our pilots, our officers 

are identifying objects on the body that are comparable to what 

that threat was. 

Mr. ROGERS. Every time? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Our officers are doing a very good job. 

Mr. ROGERS. Every time? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I would have to get back to you, but you know, 

we have very, very good measures in place for evaluating our officers. 

[The information follows:] 

No single security technology or procedure is 100% effective. Consequently, TSA 

has instituted multilayer and dynamic threat mitigations, some of which are visible 

to the traveling public and some of which are not. However, the capability of screening technology and the ability of screeners to detect threat items are classified and 

cannot be disclosed in a public forum. TSA would be pleased to provide that information to the Committee in an appropriate environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, contrariwise, if you had patted this man 

down, would we have found the bomb? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Today we do not do a full-body pat-down that goes 

into the sensitive parts of the body where that bomb was secreted. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now, this machine is not foolproof; correct? I mean 

it is not 100 percent? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. It requires the experience of the operator as well, 

yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. And we may be getting into some confidential matters here, but what I need to do as well as you can state it in these 

circumstances, is this machine the end all? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. This machine gives us an increased detection capability that is significantly greater than what we have at the 

checkpoint today. And what we, in working with industry and 

these manufacturers, we are driving these manufacturers to continue to improve this technology because of the demands that we 

have for aviation security. 

Mr. ROGERS. And if a bomb were secreted in an article of the 

body, the machine would not detect that of course, would it? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Inside the body? 


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Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Correct. 

AIT AND METAL DETECTORS

Mr. ROGERS. On the footprint, the machine would not replace the 

magnetometers; correct? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Right now we do not have plans to fully replace 

all the walk-through metal detectors; that is correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you would have the metal detectors as well as 

the full body imager? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Correct, right now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why would you need both? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Part of it is to manage the flow of the passengers 

so that we would be able to have an alternative first. If passengers 

say they don’t want to go through the advanced imaging technology, we would have the walk-through metal detector and couple 

that with other security measures. 

But also what we are looking at right now is, as we are deploying 

these, maximize the use of the advanced imaging technology but 

also direct passengers through the walk-through metal detector in 

checkpoints. So that when a passenger shows up, the security advantage we have is that as the passenger shows up in the queue 

line they will be directed by the officer to either the advanced imaging technology or the walk-through metal detector and they 

won’t know which. And so the advantage to us is somebody couldn’t 

predict he would get in this line and go through the advanced imaging technology or get in this line and go through the walkthrough metal detector. Long term, we hope to drive the industry 

to provide us with the technology where the walk-through metal 

detector capabilities would be a part of the advanced imaging technology equipment. 

Mr. ROGERS. You would have a combined machine? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. That would be a great setup for us down the road. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why haven’t we done that? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. We are pushing the industry to do that. The industry has not gotten to that point yet. 

Mr. ROGERS. I bet if you put out a spec and asked for bids you 

would get some bids. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I believe we are asking for that in the labs, and 

we are working with the DHS science and technology lab to help 

us push the industry towards that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would that save money in the acquisition and deployment, wouldn’t it? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I am not sure that it would, sir. I would have to 

get back to you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Let me know. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I will. 

[The information follows:] 

TSA is working with vendors on adding new capability to AIT machines, including 

metal detection. Costs cannot be determined until systems have been developed and 

qualified for use at checkpoint. We will inform the Committee as soon as additional 

information becomes available. 


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Mr. ROGERS. There is the machine and then there is the separate 

room where the image is viewed by an operator, which has to be 

fairly close to the machine, but not terribly close; right? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ROGERS. Nevertheless it requires some space that is not now 

required with magnetometers or the check-in procedure; right? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Right. 

AIT INSTALLATIONS AT AIRPORTS

Mr. ROGERS. Now, does your budget request cover the costs of installing the machines and acquiring space for the room and all of 

that? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. What the budget request includes, money for constructing a viewing room, you know within the checkpoint area. 

What we are doing, for example, in a lot of places, we are taking 

a supervisor’s office. We are using other pieces of the real estate 

there close by to the checkpoint to create that alternative viewing 

room. But the budget does have some money in it to cover some 

of those infrastructure costs to build out the viewing room. 

Mr. ROGERS. What about the airports? What will be their financial involvement with this change? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. The airports’ financial involvement? Some of them 

are providing us the room. And in some cases we are providing 

them nominal amounts of money to pay for this infrastructure cost. 

But I think for the most part the investment is TSA’s that we are 

making in the checkpoint area. 

Mr. ROGERS. So, will you pay the airports for taking more of 

their space? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I don’t believe we are. I will get back to you on 

that though. I have not seen that cost factor as we are looking at 

these deployments. But I will get back to you and double check. 

[The information follows:] 

In order to carry out the statutory mandate of the Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA), it is necessary for TSA to use certain airport space and facilities 

defined under federal law as ‘‘necessary security checkpoints.’’ Pursuant to Section 

511 of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. 108–334, 118 Stat. 1317 (October 

18, 2004) airports must provide such space rent free to TSA. The space required for 

the AIT machines is the direct result of TSA’s mandate to screen airline passengers. 

In accordance with Section 511 referenced above, TSA will continue to pay for necessary services and utilities associated with such checkpoint space. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rodriguez. 

PRIVATE AIRCRAFT REGULATION

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you. Thank you very much. Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your service to our country and 

thank you for the work that you have been doing. We had a recent 

incident that occurred in Texas in Austin, the IRS facility there, 

and it could have taken a lot more lives. It did take the life of a 

wonderful individual veteran who served our country well. 

In 2008, TSA had proposed a plan to propose new rules for some 

15,000 planes, including requirements for jet operators to check the 

passengers on a watch list and those kind of things, and this proVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:47 Sep 10, 2010 Jkt 057185 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A185P2.XXX A185P2

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posal was met with a great deal of opposition in the private pilot 

industry groups and others. 

When will the TSA’s new proposal for regulating private aircraft 

be made available? 

And number two, what changes, if any, will be taken into consideration as a result of the incident that occurred in Austin at the 

IRS facility? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, Mr. Congressman, in answer to your question 

first, we are going to go out with a supplemental or a second notice 

of proposed rulemaking on the general aircraft, large aircraft security program. And we are hoping to have that through the Administration and posted by the end of the year. And we did receive a 

lot of comments on the first round and we had a terrific collaboration with the industry and with GA pilots on comments. And we 

are really looking at that. 

AUSTIN, TEXAS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE SECURITY INCIDENT

In the aftermath of the Austin, Texas, crash and that incident, 

we actually went back to the Homeland Security institute that had 

done the engineering studies for us and asked them to take a look 

at the specifics of that crash and if it should formulate any changes 

in that proposed rulemaking. And so we are waiting for the results 

of that study. And that may help us and it definitely will inform 

us as to any changes that we may need to make in the rule. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. What kind of security do we have, if any, in 

some of the small airports that we have in terms of any kind of 

assessments that we might make at the present time? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Right now in most very small GA airports we 

don’t really have any. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. We don’t have any at all? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. No, sir. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Do we have any kind of establishment, I guess 

we do have the number of flights that go out of there but we don’t 

have any way of checking to see who flies out of there, who doesn’t 

and those kind of things? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Right now—well, mostly the FAA knows who is 

flying. They would know the registration of the small plane and 

they would know generally who the pilots are. The pilots have to 

be certified by the FAA. So most of the regulation to date has been 

via the FAA’s programs. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. So not even once a year or twice a year do we 

do any spot check on any of those? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. We have done so on occasion, for national security 

events. For example, with the inauguration last year of President 

Obama we actually went and visited every general aviation airport 

on the route for the train that he took from Philadelphia to D.C. 

During the Olympics, the plan for the Olympics that just ended, we 

did work looking at the general aviation airports and we did that 

with state and local law enforcement in concert with our inspectors. Depending on national events, significant activities in an 

area, we will go and look at the general aviation airports. And if 

intel suggests something, we definitely then work in looking at 

them. 


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Mr. RODRIGUEZ. If I can just follow up on that one again. When 

you referred to intel, are you in direct contact on the border with 

Border Patrol and others? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, we have a very close working relationship 

with the Border Patrol. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. The number of flights coming over? The Canadian border also? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Mrs. Lowey. 

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act the Committee provided TSA with $25 million for airport screening machines that have been discussed rather thoroughly to be deployed at airports over the country. However, last 

Tuesday it was reported that not one of these devices has yet to 

be deployed. I was really shocked to read that because we know the 

importance of quickly deploying this technology to our most traveled airports, including Kennedy and LaGuardia in New York. 

Why did it take 7 months just to purchase 150 advanced imaging 

technology machines? You mentioned the time frame for deploying 

this technology in Boston and Chicago. What about New York? And 

if you struggled to spend the $25 million, what assurances can you 

give this Committee that you can quickly and effectively spend the 

more than $214 million being proposed by the President to deploy 

nearly 1,000 machines across the country? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Thank you. Yes, Congresswoman, we bought 150 

of the machines last September and we are in the process now of 

receiving those and they will be this first group to go out to the 

airports. The reason that it took some time is we put in the order 

in September and the manufacturer has been delivering those, we 

have made sure that they are ready and equipped in the way that 

we need them to be for the delivery to the airport. We are also in 

the process of awarding a contract, an integration contract, and 

that will be a contractor that will be—their expertise is in deploying this kind of technology and rolling this out and supporting us 

to do that. 

So we have two qualified vendors with this technology today, and 

as we make these purchases we will be able to use that vendor’s 

list. And in the meantime our lab is continuing to certify additional 

vendors. And that is why the industry is responding very quickly 

to this demand and with our integration contract we believe we 

will be able to deploy these. And it is going to take all of our energy 

and our commitment, but we are very, very committed to doing 

this. 

Mrs. LOWEY. You mentioned Boston and Chicago; how about New 

York? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I don’t have the schedule in front of me but I will 

be happy to provide it. Secretary Napolitano tomorrow will be announcing the deployment to 11 airports and our team is working 

on the deployment all 150 machines, plus those that we will be receiving this year and hopefully next. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mrs. LOWEY. I hope the decisions are made according to threat. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. They are. 

UNIONS

Mrs. LOWEY. I just wanted to check that out. Another issue, Secretary Napolitano testified last week before the authorizing committee that DHS did in fact have the authority 

to grant TSO’s bargaining rights administratively. Can you tell me what is holding up the Department from taking this action which President Obama stated many times over during 

the campaign that he supported it? I mean it seems to me that the 

threat to the traveling public is the terrorists, not the labor unions. 

And the fact that we cannot even get someone to head up the agency because of this issue doesn’t make any sense. Could you respond? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, ma’am, Congresswoman. The Secretary has indicated that she wants to get a permanent TSA Administrator in 

place before the final decision is made on collective bargaining. 

Mrs. LOWEY. That is a good excuse, but what does she—well— 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I will tell you what I have done in my tenure as the Acting Assistant Secretary. I have held meetings with both 

NTEU and AFGE in the last year where the leadership of the 

unions have brought in officers from around the country that are 

members of their respective unions and we have sat down and had 

great dialogue with those frontline officers and the leadership of 

both unions on issues of mutual concern. And I will tell you that 

if you put me in a room with a bunch of TSOs it is a great, great 

exchange. And we have had, I consider the leadership of TSA today 

to have a very good working relationship with both unions. And we 

will await the Secretary’s—— 

Ms. LOWEY. I thank you for that response, and I see the Chair- man is about to crack the whip. I want to remind you that Customs 

and Border Protection, Immigration, Customs Enforcement, Capitol 

Police and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency have collective 

bargaining rights. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, I know. 

Ms. LOWEY. You are aware of that? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, I am. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Farr. 

AIR MARSHALS

Mr. FARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I probably fly more than 

anyone on this Committee because of the distance from here and 

I go home every weekend. So I have a lot of experience with TSA. 

And frankly I have been very critical of the air marshals, wondering what the cost-effectiveness of them are. It would be like us 

having to have a marshal to take us from this room to the floor. 

After you are in the building, the building is secure, and after you 

get through the airports, it should be secure. We have locked down 

cabins and cabins that are armed. And with the Christmas bomber 

I don’t think it would have made a difference whether an air marshal was on that plane because the air marshals sit in first class 

and that incident happened in the back. 


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So the Committee last year asked for a report on the cost effectiveness of the air marshal program and we have not received anything yet. And in your request you want $85 million more for air 

marshals. I don’t think our Committee ought to give it to you until 

we get that report. 

I just wondered if you want to comment on what we are getting 

out of that program. I mean, this is a priority issue. Although I am 

a big fan of law enforcement, I don’t think this is the best. From 

what I understand talking to air marshals, they have nothing to 

do when they are not flying. They are not reviewing rosters. They 

are not helping with the no-fly list and things like that. They have 

no access to the information of who is on the plane. They are also 

shocked to find out that I am a Congress member. They only find 

that out because they sit next to me and they can read my material. And they are asking me afterwards after we get off, why didn’t 

anybody tell me? There were five other Members of Congress on 

this plane and they didn’t know who they were either. I guess that 

is what has led to this issue of wondering why we ought to keep 

beefing up this program. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. So Congressman, I would be happy to come myself 

and bring the leadership of the Federal Air Marshal Service to give 

you a briefing, including some of the issues that you questioned 

there that I don’t want to talk about in an open setting. 

I can tell you that the Air Marshal Service is a group of extremely well-trained law enforcement professionals. 

Mr. FARR. I don’t doubt that. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. When they are not in mission status they are 

doing other things, including training. They are supporting our operations in airports, and they work closely with the FBI. They are 

assigned to the JTTF in the interest of aviation security. So we do 

have a number of deployments when they are not in the air. 

But they are—— 

Mr. FARR. Why don’t you submit the report that we asked for 

and then we can have a meeting after that? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. We will do that and I will follow up on where that 

report is. 

[The information follows:] 

The draft Federal Air Marshal Service Assessment report to Congress is currently 

undergoing Executive Level review within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). After the draft report clears TSA, it will undergo review at the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of Management and Budget. Once all 

these entities clear the report it will be delivered to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. 

LANGUAGE TRAINING

Mr. FARR. The other, I wondered how the TSA is addressing the 

language barriers in their national field personnel in the Middle 

East and Africa; this is; what are you doing to train people in the 

native languages or hire host country nationals to work for you 

with field personnel in sort of the risky areas of the world? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. So one of the things that we do look for as we deploy our TSA representatives around the globe is whether or not 

they are fluent in the language to which they are being deployed. 

And if they are not, then they go through the Department of State 


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language schools so that they at least have some basic capability 

in the language. 

Mr. FARR. And who pays for the screening equipment in foreign 

countries? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. In the foreign countries, the foreign country pays 

for that equipment. 

Mr. FARR. What lessons did TSA learn from its involvement and 

cooperation with so many other agencies in other countries during 

the Vancouver Olympics? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. We are in the process of doing a lessons learned 

now. And we had great cooperation both from the general aviation 

and the commercial airports back and forth to Vancouver. We had 

a greater intergovernmental interagency cooperative effort. And the 

lessons learned are being reviewed now immediately in the aftermath of the Olympics. 

Mr. FARR. Can you report those to the Committee? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Happy to. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. FARR. And lastly, what you are doing with private aviation. 

Mr. PRICE. Very quickly. We have a vote coming up. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. As I mentioned to Congressman Rodriguez, we are in the process of preparing the supplemental notice of proposed 

rulemaking for general aviation, which will go out later this year. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Culberson. 

TERRORIST WATCH LIST

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We really appreciate your service. Thank you for the job you have been doing. There is 

a lot of concern that the Christmas Day bomber was on a terror 

watch list and was able to get on an airplane. How and why did 

that happen and what can we do in the future to make sure that 

if they are on the watch list they are not able to get on the plane? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Sir, he was not on any terrorist watch list. He was neither a no-fly nor a selectee. So we did not have any visibility 

into him. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Of course he had apparently a valid visa, but it was my understanding he was on a terror watch list. That is not 

correct? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. He was not. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Oh, he was on a British terror watch list, my colleague Mr. Kirk tells me. Are we looking at watch lists from 

other countries? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I probably shouldn’t answer that in an open ses- sion. But I will tell you that right now President Obama did direct 

that the U.S. Government, both the Homeland Security and the Intelligence Community, look at the watch list process, and that review right now is ongoing to see how we can improve that. 

Mr. CULBERSON. I am glad you are doing that. But common sense, if they are on a watch list just automatic pilot you shouldn’t 

let them on the airplane with my wife and kids, anybody’s wife and 

kids. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. One of the things that the TSA will have imple- mented by the end of this year is the Secure Flight Program which 

will ensure that no-flies and selectees are properly screened and 

no-flies are not permitted to fly. 

PROFILING

Mr. CULBERSON. One of the things that I know frustrates all Americans—I hear a lot about it and I know my colleagues do from 

their constituents—is common sense. It is very frustrating to see 

the TSA apply these restrictions to all of us. Frisking and searching 70, 80-year-old women. I remember a horrible case, a medal of 

honor winner, an 80-year-old gentleman who had served his country and was pulled aside, yet young Muslim men—this guy had 

been traveling to Pakistan—are not treated any differently. What 

statute, what Federal regulation prevents you from singling out 

young Muslim men and giving them a little more attention than an 

80-year-old medal of honor winner? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Well, sir, when I hear of circumstances like that 

as you just described, it troubles us too. We want to make sure that 

our officers are respectful of all passengers. But in reality, the law 

requires us to screen all passengers. And TSA does not profile and 


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therefore we do not single out different categories of individual passengers. 

Mr. CULBERSON. That is why I was asking. Is there a Federal 

statute that prohibits you from singling out a group of people or 

particular characteristics? Or is there an internal regulation? Is it 

a Federal regulation or a Federal statute that prohibits you from 

profiling? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I would have to get back to you, but I know as 

a matter of policy we do not profile. 

[The information follows:] 

The Transportation Security Administration adheres to ‘‘Guidance Regarding the 

Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies’’ developed by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in June 2003 that is premised upon the constitutional prohibition against selected enforcement of law based on considerations such as race. 

Under the DOJ Guidance, federal law enforcement officers may not use race or ethnicity to any degree in making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions. 

Applying that standard to TSA, Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) do not factor race or ethnicity in conducting routine screening operations at an airport security checkpoint. The DOJ Guidance also states that, in preventing threats to national security or in enforcement laws protecting the integrity of U.S. borders, federal law enforcement officers may not consider race or ethnicity except to the extent 

permitted by the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States. As an example, 

the DOJ Guidance indicates that, if U.S. intelligence sources were to report that a 

particular ethnic group was planning to use commercial jetliners in connection with 

a terrorist attack at a specific airport within a specified timeframe, then it would 

be permissible for TSA personnel to subject individuals of that ethic group to heightened scrutiny in that location during that period of time. 

ISRAELI MODEL

Mr. CULBERSON. It is disturbing. It is something that needs to 

change. It defies common sense. I got here in 2001 and was on the 

transportation authorizing committee before I joined this wonderful 

Committee. And right after 9/11 we brought in the head—I think 

you were on there with me, Mark—we brought in the head of the 

Israeli, of El Al security. He was terrific. And we heard terrific 

input from the head of Israeli security. They just don’t have this 

problem. If you are an 80-year-old grandmother they don’t bother. 

And they obviously are going to screen you and check you. But they 

have a security professional that will talk to them. And if you fit 

certain characteristics you are going to have a conversation with 

Officer Lewis here and you will have a special visit. 

It just defies common sense. What do we need to do to make that 

happen? Because we do not have a problem with Baptists or Hindus or Buddhists blowing up airplanes it is just common sense. 

What needs to happen so you can let your officers use their own 

common sense and good judgment and zero in on the population 

that is the problem? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. So let me answer that in a couple of ways. First 

of all, we have consulted with the Israelis frequently on the security measures that they have there and what we can do here. We 

have also a behavior detection officer program that has officers 

looking for behaviors that would warrant us to give somebody additional screening. 

In terms of what legislative remedy would we possibly need for 

this, I would have to get back to you. 


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Mr. CULBERSON. Please do. Specifically, where is the problem? And if I could, let me let Mr. Kirk, he is very knowledgeable as a 

naval intelligence officer. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Kirk, we will try to get your question in before 

we go to vote. 

O’HARE

Mr. KIRK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have to ask because the second busiest airport in the world is in my State. We just had 

the head of security at O’Hare, Jim Maurer, say that it was the 

least secured airport in America. This is in the front page of the 

Chicago Sun Times today. Can you comment on his charges? He 

has got some pretty specific complaints against O’Hare. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, Congressman, I am familiar with the state- ments that he made, but I will tell you that O’Hare has an airport 

security plan. TSA inspects that plan. They are in compliance with 

that plan. And any time that we have something reported to us or 

we notice in our inspections that they are not in compliance we will 

take it up with any airport authority. 

Mr. KIRK. Just one specific thing that he has here that I want to raise. He said, quote: O’Hare is the only airport in the country 

that allows private vehicles to park on the secure side of the airport. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I saw that and I am aware of the parking setup there, but basically right now they have a security plan that they 

are in compliance with. 

WORKING WITH EUROPEANS ON WATCH LISTS

Mr. KIRK. Right. Do you have regular liaison with your European 

counterparts? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, sir, we do. 

Mr. KIRK. One of the things that I would hope that you do, and maybe at the initiative of this Committee, if you are on a British 

no-fly list at a minimum you would be on the selectee list for the 

United States. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. And I believe that that is part of what we are 

looking at in terms of how we share information across governments and how we make sure that information gets to the United 

States so that we can properly act on it. 

Mr. KIRK. This may take some money, some foreign liaison, and some work, but I think especially the no-fly list of NATO allies 

should immediately trigger membership on the selectee list for the 

United States. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Thank you. I will take it back and I will add 

that—— 

Mr. KIRK. It would be expensive in liaison, but I believe the public would—— 

Mr. PRICE. The recommendation that the gentleman is making 

does not depend on this, but I am told that as a matter of fact 

Abdulmutallab was not on the British no-fly list. 

Mr. KIRK. It was actually worse, he was denied a visa. 

Mr. PRICE. He was denied a visa because of a related problem. 

Mr. KIRK. That even means that the Foreign Office even had its 

act together. 


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Mr. PRICE. He was on our TIDE list but that does not automatically translate into being placed on the terrorist watch or no-fly 

list. For the record we will straighten that out. 

Mr. KIRK. Basic point, you ought to have the resources to when they update their list they immediately go on the selectee list for 

us. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. And Congressman, I would just say TSA actually does not nominate and maintain that list. But it is something that 

I will take back to the committee that is looking at this issue exactly. 

Mr. KIRK. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. I apologize for having to take a break. We will make it as brief as possible. We will come back for one final round after 

2 votes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. PRICE. The Committee will come to order. Once again we have had a little more delay than we anticipated but we will have 

one more round of questions. We appreciate your patience, Ms. 

Rossides. 

I will have some questions for the record, following up on my first line of questioning having to do with where these AIT machines are going to be deployed, particularly with the manpower 

aspect of that request. I will not get into detail on that now, but 

we do have this request for five screeners for each machine. We 

will want to explore with you just how hard and fast that estimate 

is and what the possibilities might be for a less manpower intensive operation. 

CARGO SCREENING

I also want to ask you some questions about the plans for portable explosive trace machines. But I think in this exchange here 

to end this hearing, I want to ask you about the goal that we all 

share and that we trust will be achieved, although there are some 

significant challenges. That is the goal of 100 percent screening of 

cargo transported on passenger aircraft. 

The 9/11 Act requires that you establish a system to screen 50 

percent of cargo by February of 2009, and 100 percent of cargo by 

August of 2010. You met the 50 percent by last February yet it is 

going to be more difficult to achieve 100 percent screening and, as 

we understand it, the difficulty lies in two areas, that is international cargo and also cargo in large pallets. 

Let me ask you about the nature of both challenges and what 

you are doing to overcome them. You estimated last year, Ms. 

Rossides, that TSA may reach 75 percent for international cargo by 

August of this year. You have been working on the problem for 

over a year now in addition to the years before that. So I wonder 

if you would still stand by that estimate. What is the screening estimate for international air cargo now? Any possibility we can do 

better than that 75 percent? If not, when are we going to achieve 

this? 

Now, the other problem is the pallets. There are no machines 

qualified to screen air cargo delivered as pallets or in oversized 

containers. TSA and S+T have been working on this problem for 

multiple years. But it appears we do not have a solution at least 


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in the near term to this dilemma, well after the mandate has expired. 

So the lack of technology means that screening air cargo will be 

more person dependent and more canine dependent in the near 

term. Here, too, can you help us understand the technical challenge 

that we are facing and the likely timeline for achieving our goals? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. So with respect to air cargo 

domestically, let’s talk about that first, which is part of the requirement by August. We are confident that we will meet the domestic 

requirement to screen 100 percent, which means that all passenger 

airplanes leaving the United States, lifting off from domestic airports, that that cargo on those passenger flights will be screened. 

The challenge and the really significant challenge is the international inbound. There are 98 countries that we need to gain compliance to that requirement. And right now we are working with 

those countries, for example, the U.K., that their procedures, their 

screening methods will meet the standards that we have set. But 

in looking at those countries we have literally got to look at their 

methods, how are they screening, are they using a similar supply 

chain approach, and are we comfortable with those methods? 

I do not believe that we will get to that 100 percent by August. 

The 75 percent that I testified to last year might even be optimistic. What the staff is telling me is that it may be 65 percent 

by August. We are aggressively looking at every country and working with ICAO and looking at our global strategies office; our people that do work around the globe are working with these host governments and the air carriers to begin to address this, but it is 

going to be quite a challenge. 

We have about 20 countries that account for about 84 percent of 

the volume coming in and so those are obviously where we are focusing our attention the most so that we can get the biggest bang 

for our buck, so to speak, with those countries. We have been asked 

before what is our timeline, how much longer would it take, and 

our estimate is it could be a couple more years beyond August 2010 

that we would have 100 percent compliance in some of those foreign countries. 

Mr. PRICE. Will you turn to the pallet question? What is the nature of the issue with the most difficult cases? Is it simply or mainly the technological capability that these countries possess? The resources with which to do this? Are there more intractable problems 

of a diplomatic nature? And it does lead one to wonder, if the latter 

is the case, what is going to be taken to overcome this? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. So, most of the challenges are either their basic 

capability to do it. We have actually gotten great cooperation every 

place where we have visited and talked to the host governments 

and the foreign carriers. So it is more that they just simply lack 

the resources to make the investment in the technology or to build 

the capability. 

We are going to have to look at alternative measures if it comes 

down to that in terms of how we enable these foreign governments 

to meet this challenge. But right now we are working with ICAO, 

which has supported our supply chain approach. We are hoping 

that they too can assist at some of these locations. 


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The issue with the pallets is that these very large pallets, there 

basically is just not a very good technology to screen the huge configuration that some of these pallets are. We are looking at what 

kind of technology and our labs can look at that and how we first 

try to break down the commodity into smaller packages that we 

can use to address the compliance requirement. So we go and look 

at smaller packages versus the huge large, palletized size configuration of these shipments. 

TRANSIT SECURITY GRANTS

Mr. PRICE. Let me quickly and finally refer to an item that will 

not surprise you, given the content of last year’s hearings. In fact 

we had two hearings last year with TSA and FEMA on what solutions could be implemented to improve the timeliness of transit 

grant drawdowns for fiscal years 2006 through 2008. At that time 

93 percent of the 2006 transit grants remained unspent and 99 percent was unspent from 2007. For the 2006 grants, it took about 285 

days after DHS announced the awards for the actual projects to be 

approved. And slightly less in 2007, 207 days. 

Last spring TSA and FEMA announced that all Tier 1 projects 

would be approved at the time the awards were announced. This 

was to be a significant change allowing transit entities to the access these funds faster. Yet 1 year later, despite this change in the 

process for approving this funding, it appears the disbursement of 

these funds has really not improved dramatically. Certainly for 

grants awarded in 2006 there have been improvements, with 67 

percent of the grants remaining unspent, compared to 93 percent 

a year ago. But there have been marginal improvements at best for 

2007, with 93 percent of the grants unspent compared to 99 percent a year earlier. 

So why have these changes, which certainly on paper appear to 

be major changes to expedite the disbursement of these grants, not 

produced the results we all anticipated? 

We had intense interest in this, as you know. We had a second 

hearing. We asked you to report on your progress by August of 

2009. We know you worked hard trying to solve this problem. We 

saw some improvement, but we still haven’t seen the report. It is 

over 6 months late. 

So the main concern here is the underlying problem. But at the 

same time it is hard for us to get a handle on the problem when 

we don’t have the kind of information that we deemed necessary. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and first let me apologize that 

the report is not to the Committee yet, and we are working to get 

that through and to you. 

What we have done, though, is look at the recipients of these 

grant funds because what we know is regardless of the process between TSA and FEMA, we wanted to focus locally on the recipients 

of these funds, how were they spending those. So TSA has actually 

met with the recipients of 80 percent of these funds. And what we 

are seeing is that at the local level these funds are being managed 

well. The challenge is they do not necessarily invoice, and so the 

drawdown rates do not actually reflect the progress that is being 

made with each of the individual projects. So we are attempting to 


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work with them so that they do actually invoice us in a way that 

would show higher percentages of drawdown rates. What most of these local recipients and agencies do is they wait for the project to be completely over, and then they submit their 

invoices for payment. And so it looks like projects are not moving 

along in due course when in fact our visits with them and our work 

with them locally are showing that they are actually making some 

progress. But we will get you that report, and I again apologize it is not to the Committee. 

Mr. PRICE. What you have said really underscores, I think, the need for an accounting of this. We have no way of assessing what 

you just said of this being an artifact of an accounting method. I 

suppose on the face of it I would wonder how much of the problem 

that really explains. But to the extent some other way of accounting for this would help us understand what the real rate looks like, 

we of course would like to see that. But we do need an accounting 

and we are still very concerned about the underlying problem. 

These are funds that are not getting out to our communities for vitally needed protections. So we will look for that report in very 

short order. 

Mr. Rogers. 

ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY

Mr. ROGERS. Let me get back to the whole body imaging, or AIT, 

machines with you. Tell me, I read your statement about the schedule of deployment. Summarize that for us. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. So you asked before about our ability to deploy 

the technology and install them in the checkpoints. And TSA has 

the designs for all the checkpoints across our U.S. airports. And 

what we are looking at right now is we know what the two current 

manufacturers’ technology requirements in terms of the size of 

these units are. And we are looking at the airport configurations 

that we know and where we can deploy this technology so that it 

has minimal impact on the configuration of these checkpoints. And 

that process is ongoing between the TSA technology staff and the 

airports. 

And we are very confident that these first 500 we can deploy 

very effectively and in a fairly accelerated manner and time frame 

because we know what those checkpoints look like today. We have 

had airports volunteer because they know as well that they can 

take this technology in the checkpoint as configured. 

As we look ahead and as we continue to press the industry, we 

are not going to just stop with this technology and the advancement and the capabilities that this technology promises. We want 

to see the industry get us to a kind of technology that has both the 

walk-through metal detector capability as well as the imaging technology capability. But we are very confident right now, based on 

our planning, based on what we know about these checkpoints, and 

based upon the cooperation from the airport industry across the 

system that we can deploy these in a very, very effective fashion. 

Mr. ROGERS. On the schedule you say in your statement on page 

5 that 40 machines have been deployed at 19 airports already. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. That is correct. 


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Mr. ROGERS. Last September you bought 150 additional units and this year you expect to deploy those and at least 300 additional 

units across the country, which would be 450 additional units. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. And that the first units set to arrive at Boston 

Logan and Chicago O’Hare next week. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Right. 

Mr. ROGERS. And then as you point out, the budget requests $214-plus million to buy and install an additional 500 units at 

checkpoints to bring the total number of units to about 1,000. 

AIT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

And so you are asking then on top of the money to acquire the machines, you are asking an additional $314-plus million for 5,355 

new positions to run these machines at their accelerated deployment pace. Now assumedly, if these machines work out well, 

assumedly you will increase the number even further; correct? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. That is part of this ongoing assessment we are doing right now, is what would be the optimum full operational capability across all airports in the country beyond the thousand. But 

we have not come to a final number on that. 

Mr. ROGERS. So your initial guesstimate on the manpower to operate the 1,000 machines is 5,355 people. Five FTEs per machine. 

Is there any hope that we could get that down? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. What we are looking at is that requirement for 

this initial 1,000 machines. I believe that as we continue to deploy 

additional machines across the whole system you will have different requirements for the Cat X airports versus the smaller. And 

it is our commitment as we are going forward to get the maximum 

efficiencies and effectiveness out of both the resources of our people 

and that technology. That 5,000 FTE per machine basically really 

represents a little over 11⁄4, 11⁄2 FTEs but you are adding in 3 

shifts 24/7 operation, so that is how we get the five per machine. 

Mr. ROGERS. But some airports won’t be open 24/7. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. That is right. That is the average across the whole 

system that that represents. So as we continue to move into more 

and more airports we will be looking at what that right combination and what that FTE would be once we are at a full capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, you are asking for a 12 percent increase in 

the money for the FTEs in 1 year. Now as you recollect, when we 

first started this organization before this Department ever existed, 

when it was under the old Transportation Department, TSA, we 

capped the number of employee FTEs at 45,000. What is it now? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Today in the checked baggage and passenger 

screening we have 38,000 FTEs working in those areas. 

Mr. ROGERS. But for total screeners? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Total, it is just under 45,000. 

Mr. ROGERS. Which you would bump up with these new ones to 

plus-50,000? 

Now, I notice that there is some comment that there is some 

auto detect function which might be possible on these body scanner 

machines. What do you mean by that? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. The auto detection capability is where the machine actually identifies on the image the anomaly so that the operVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:47 Sep 10, 2010 Jkt 057185 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A185P2.XXX A185P2

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ator does not have to study the image, the machine basically tells 

the operator that there is an anomaly here that requires further 

examination. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, does that exist now? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. No, it is in our labs being evaluated right now, that kind of technology. 

Mr. ROGERS. If that works out, would that help us reduce the 

FTEs per machine? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. No, sir, it really does not because the configura- tion for the staffing right now, that staffing is to actually be in the 

checkpoint assisting with the divesting process and the anomaly 

resolution process. So it would not necessarily save on the auto detection capabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. You have the magnetometer at the checkpoint plus the whole body imager. Would the FTEs for the body imager, the 

5 FTEs, would that also cover the magnetometer work? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Well, we look at it in terms of the whole checkpoint being a cell that requires staffing, and so the additional resources that we are asking for would accommodate the checkpoint 

with the advanced imaging technology as well as if we had the 

walk-through metal detector. So we don’t really save FTEs if we 

get rid of the walk-through metal detector. It is still the number 

of people required in that checkpoint unit. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without the whole body imaging machine, what is 

the manpower requirement per checkpoint? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. I believe that the checkpoint configuration with 

the AIT in this design is 9.5 FTEs. And then you normalize it 

across the whole system. And so the request that you are seeing 

is for the increase, which is 11⁄4 to 11⁄2 FTEs per machine, and then 

you multiply that by the shifts and by the 24/7 operations in the 

major airports. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, your estimate of 5 FTEs per machine per day 

looks to me like it is going to be conservative. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Well, sir, we have looked at what we can do with 

our existing resources and with this technology, and that is a good 

faith estimate on our part of what our modeling shows. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I hope, Mr. Chairman, at some point in time 

we can talk about on the Subcommittee withholding some money 

in the later part of the year until we see a practical application 

that we actually need 5 FTEs per machine per day, because it very 

well may work out as they deploy these machines they we will find 

some efficiencies that we are not now thinking. But if we go ahead 

and hire these people then we are stuck. So I would hope that we 

could talk about staging the manpower as time goes on. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. And we will be happy to keep the committee informed as we are deploying these in terms of what we are seeing 

operationally. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. All right. Mr. Ruppersberger, you can wrap up today’s 

Subcommittee hearing. 

TRAINING FOR SCREENERS

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Excuse me. We have a lot of hearings at 

the same time. This is very important and relevant. One of the 


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issues that I want to discuss, and if I am repeating let me know, 

is your personnel, the training of your personnel, and looking at 

how there are techniques used in other parts of the world that 

might work. And Israel is a perfect example. We are not talking 

about profiling, but I think Israel talks about behavior. And that 

is what we would really like to talk about. 

But let me ask you this. From a training point of view what 

standards do you have for your average TSA person? Do they have 

to have former law enforcement experience? Any education experience? Any experience at all? What are your standards as far as hiring? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Sir, the standards for the transportation security 

officer are spelled out in law, and those require a high school degree or its equivalency. There are requirements once they are hired 

for extensive training. They must have a minimum of 80 hours of 

training, and that training runs the gamut from how to operate the 

technology that is in the checkpoint, how to deal with passengers 

properly, how to resolve alarms, how to conduct physical body patdowns. So it is a variety of training. 

The officers are also required annually to be certified, meaning 

that they have to demonstrate their proficiency to conduct those 

duties and, if they are not, they are subject to dismissal. 

We have another group of officers called behavior detection officers, and they are trained and get to what you are talking about 

in terms of the Israelis with looking for anomalous behaviors of 

passengers as they are coming through the checkpoint. And then 

based on the behaviors that they observe, they may refer the passenger for secondary or additional screening. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. This is what I want to get into. I think a 

lot of times we do repetition because we have always done it and 

yet are we really wasting our personnel’s time when they could be 

focusing in other areas that might create a better way of detecting. 

I will give you an example. I am going to use myself personally. 

I have two artificial shoulders, my back is fused, and I have five 

screws in each foot. And so I set off everything when I go through. 

So automatically I stand in line and elected officials know you don’t 

complain. You get in the back of the line. And then every time you 

go in you wait for somebody to come, and you have maybe one or 

two people that are there. 

Now, you know eventually there has got to be some judgment on 

whether it is me or somebody on a regular basis that does this type 

of thing. Because I wonder if the people that are working on me, 

because of my artificial body parts—I am bionic, by the way—but 

if they would be looking at not only behavioral but also there is the 

issue of the manifest. In port security we look at manifests. We 

look at the port of embarkation. If we are going to have airlines 

involved in this process, we have to be more open and get them 

more information and more intelligence. 

And I think that if you look at the Israel system it works. They 

are probably more exposed than any other country in the world 

from the terrorist’s point of view. And whether you would consider 

evaluating first thing, the standards of the people that you hire, do 

we need more law enforcement? And if you do hire—I am not complaining about the people that are being hired. I am not judging 


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them. I don’t know their performance records. They need to be 

trained and are we really doing the same thing over and over, 

wasting time with certain individuals even though we know that 

al Qaeda might try to find more Caucasians or whatever? Are we 

putting ourselves in a better position by that reevaluation and 

doing what really might work better? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Sir, you have actually described part of the reasons why we are moving in this direction, we are moving with the 

advanced imaging technology. One of the advantages that the advanced imaging technology is going to give us is that persons like 

yourself having metal implants will now go through the machine 

and avoid a total pat-down and the time that that takes. We have 

actually had tremendous positive response from veterans and persons with disabilities going through that technology in the pilot 

phase. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I am not talking about me or that person. 

I am talking about the system and whether the personnel that 

spend their time with someone like a veteran or people that have 

these, that they could be doing something that would be making 

the system more safer and not just doing something that makes us 

feel good but what do we really get? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. And in fact what we do do is, in addition to our 

behavior detection officers, we actually utilize our TSOs in other 

parts of the airport to look for and do random unpredictable screening procedures. And that is exactly some of the lessons we have 

learned from the Israeli models, is to have multiple layers of security. We have actually worked closely with the Israelis on the number of our programs besides behavior detection, but also our covert 

testing program and we did actually consult with them after the 

Christmas Day attack to talk about what might that have done in 

their system versus how it was carried out across the globe through 

the Amsterdam process that the suspect went through. 

So our approach to multiple layers of security and utilizing our 

officers in those multiple layers is exactly what we are trying to do 

similar to the Israelis, where it is not just focusing on the passenger that is coming through that is perfectly compliant. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I represent the BWI airport and I have 

seen, I think, a lot of advancement in your personnel, the quality 

of the personnel, the way they treat the public. But again I think 

some of the system seems that it is repetitive and redundant and 

you wonder where they are going to work and a lot of it, which I 

believe you agree with is the technology. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Ms. Rossides. Let me again thank you for 

a very useful afternoon of testimony, good exchanges that are helpful to us, and beyond that for the outstanding quality of your service. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate tremendously the engagement with this Committee. We enjoy 

and are appreciative of the support that you give to the TSA. 

Mr. ROGERS. We sort of started out together this business when 

TSA was created before the Department was created in the old Department of Transportation. So we have been laboring over these 

things for a good while, and we are going to miss your expertise. 

You have been a very competent manager. You have demonstrated 


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today again your knowledge of these subjects. And we are going to 

miss you. And we want to say thank you again for your long service. 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Thank you. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Where are you going? 

Ms. ROSSIDES. Well, right now I am waiting for the Administration to appoint a permanent Administrator, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Are you holding your breath? 

Mr. PRICE. I think we best adjourn this hearing. Thank you very 

much. 


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(115) 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2010. 

BIOSURVEILLANCE: SMART INVESTMENTS FOR EARLY 

WARNING 

WITNESSES 

DR. ALEXANDER GARZA, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

DR. TARA O’TOOLE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

DR. BERNARD GOLDSTEIN, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 

DR. DANIEL SOSIN, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID PRICE

Mr. PRICE. The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon. 

We are pleased to be welcoming this afternoon a number of witnesses to discuss the investments being made by the Department 

of Homeland Security in early warning and response for a bioterror 

event. 

In 2003, the newly formed Department of Homeland Security 

placed a priority on the quick implementation of programs designed 

to inform the Federal Government, as well as its state and local 

partners, about the potential of an attack with biological weapons. 

The two most prominent DHS programs are BioWatch and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center, the NBIC. 

BioWatch is a system of detectors which currently exist in more 

than 30 cities nationwide designed to trigger a public health response from the earliest time after the release of a biological pathogen. NBIC was envisioned to be a hub of federal information collection to identify biological events of national significance. 

Both of these programs have met significant challenges during 

the past few years, ranging from technological issues to implementation difficulties. It is my hope that we will have a robust discussion today of those challenges, as well as the possible paths forward. 

We are joined today by four very qualified experts in this subject 

matter. Testifying first will be Dr. Alex Garza, the Chief Medical 

Officer and Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Garza manages the Office Of 

Health Affairs, which oversees both BioWatch and the NBIC. 

Next we will hear from Dr. Tara O’Toole, the Undersecretary of 

Science and Technology. S&T will evaluate technological and testing decisions for the BioWatch program. Also, Dr. O’Toole is a subject matter expert on biosurveillance and other biodefense issues 

who has previously testified before this Subcommittee. 

Our third witness is Dr. Bernard Goldstein representing the National Academy of Sciences. At this Subcommittee’s request, the 

National Academy has just completed a comprehensive assessment 

of the BioWatch system and the country’s early warning capabiliVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:47 Sep 10, 2010 Jkt 057185 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\A185P2.XXX A185P2

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ties. I believe this report will greatly inform decisionmaking in this 

area going forward. Today, we will be discussing some of the conclusions of that report and asking what the implications are for the 

2011 budget request. 

We are pleased to have as our fourth witness Dr. Daniel Sosin 

from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, who will help 

us understand the work going on in the public health community 

to support the biosurveillance and response system. 

Biosurveillance involves many different environments, pathways, 

government agencies. BioWatch addresses one discrete area of biosurveillance, the introduction of an aerosolized virulent agent in a 

major city. One thing that all these different scenarios have in 

common is that they rely on our public health system for the characterization of the threat and the subsequent response. 

The BioWatch program has been plagued by difficulties which 

culminated in the removal of some detectors from a location last 

spring. Unfortunately, these problems seem to lead state and local 

partners to lose some of their faith in the validity and usefulness 

of the BioWatch program. Dr. Garza, we want to hear from you 

about how to restore and bolster confidence in the system among 

local public health officials who, after all, are the recipients of 

BioWatch warnings and who are then in charge of the response. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request nearly doubles funding for 

the BioWatch program from $89 million in 2010 to $173 million in 

2011. Most of that is to support the purchase and initial testing of 

the third generation of detectors. It is anticipated that these detectors will provide more rapid results and be more sensitive than the 

detectors currently employed. 

However, before this Subcommittee can feel comfortable recommending full funding of this program we must be sure that it is 

a well-developed proposal, both technologically, as well as from a 

risk management perspective. The National Academy of Sciences 

report makes a number of recommendations to address these concerns which we look forward to exploring in detail today and 

throughout this budget season. 

Next, the National Biosurveillance Integration Center, which 

takes a $1 million cut in the budget request from $8 million to $7 

million, has yet to fully realize its potential. Originally designed to 

be a hub for information collection and sharing of biological threat 

data to be used by all levels of government, this budget proposes 

a new strategy for the NBIC, one that seeks to integrate work 

going on in the states on biosurveillance. 

I look forward to understanding how this will provide a more 

complete surveillance picture and how it will add value to the current reporting that states already do through other Federal agencies such as the CDC, FDA and other parts of DHS. Additionally, 

we want to learn more about the Department’s longer term vision 

for NBIC. 

It is extremely important that this nation identify a biological 

event as early as possible, but we need to make sure we are making smart investments which are supported by sound planning, 

evaluation and decision making. The real goal of these programs is 

to save lives, which depends on reliable early detection, to inform 

an evaluation of the situation and ultimately successful response 


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activity. Any effort to complete the detection piece without addressing the others will fail to provide meaningful protection to the 

American people against biological threats. 

Again we look forward to hearing from the witnesses today. Each 

of you will have a written statement which we will be happy to include in full in the record, so we ask you to limit your oral remarks 

to five minutes. We will begin with Dr. Garza, then Dr. O’Toole, 

then Dr. Goldstein and conclude with Dr. Sosin. 

Before we begin let me recognize the distinguished Ranking 

Member, Mr. Rogers, for any comments he wishes to make. 

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OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER HAROLD ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to our distinguished panel. The bioterror threat is undeniably real. The 2000 

anthrax attacks brought home the chilling reality that bioterrorism 

can take lives and does instill genuine fear and panic in the American public. Moreover, al-Qaeda’s known aspirations to acquire 

WMD and pronouncements to carry out something much bigger 

and better than a chemical attack on the New York City subway 

suggests that we cannot dismiss the possibility that they will someday attempt to launch a bioterror attack in the U.S. 

But some nine years after the anthrax attacks and in spite of the 

known threat, the state of our bio-preparedness is still a work in 

progress. Sadly, it appears that we have only been nibbling around 

the edges of this daunting challenge for many years. Look no further than the H1N1 flu outbreak of the past year; an event that 

revealed stark deficiencies in our ability to respond to a major pandemic or the release of a deadly pathogen. Then just last month the 

WMD Commission gave the government an F in terms of the ability to both detect and respond to a biological attack. 

On a somewhat promising note, the Administration has produced 

a strategy for countering biological threats, but the actual response 

plan for coordinating the federal, state and local government response following a bioterror attack is still under review by DHS 

and the White House National Security Council. 

Moreover, having some high level plan is only a starting point. 

We need to be prepared in real terms to respond swiftly to an outbreak or release with vaccine and robust isolation and remediation 

measures, actions that will demand coordination among every level 

of government and perhaps most especially the actual health care 

providers and drug manufacturers in the private sector. 

These are serious, disturbing gaps, gaps that the federal government has been aware of for some time and gaps we must address. 

And that brings us to the fiscal 2011 budget, which is proposing 

to basically double down on BioWatch and investment in technology that is far from proven. It is only one piece of the biosurveillance puzzle, so today I hope to learn what steps we are taking to 

get our biosurveillance and detection systems right. 

More to the point, I hope to learn how the sprawling bureaucracy 

involved in bio-preparedness are addressing our known 

vulnerabilities, applying the lessons learned from the H1N1 flu 

outbreak and putting an effective bio-preparedness plan into action. Given the seriousness of the bioterror threat, far too much is 

at stake for us to fail. 

We want to thank the witnesses for appearing today. We look 

forward to hearing your comments. 

Mr. Price. All right. Thank you. Well, let us begin with Dr. 

Garza. 

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STATEMENT OF DR. ALEX GARZA

Dr. GARZA. Good afternoon. I want to thank you, Chairman Price 

and Ranking Member Rogers and the rest of the Subcommittee, for 

the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to testify 

here with my colleagues, Dr. O’Toole, our Under Secretary for 

Science and Technology at Homeland Security; Dr. Goldstein from 

the National Academy of Sciences; and Dr. Sosin from the CDC. 

I believe it is apparent from this collection of experts that are on 

this panel today that biosurveillance is a very complex issue, and 

it is not the sole property of a single agency and that OHA has a 

unique role that intersects many paths within this discipline. 

The Office of Health Affairs and Science and Technology Directorate have a very unique partnership in moving biosurveillance 

and detection forward from what is possible to what is operational. 

We also value the careful study and opinions of our partners at the 

National Academy of Sciences, and we strive to work well with our 

partners at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

As the Chief Medical Officer and Assistant Secretary for Health 

Affairs, I lead and coordinate the biodefense within the Department of Homeland Security, and I view biodefense and detection as 

one of our core missions. I would like to point out, however, that 

DHS does not collect health surveillance data, nor do we perform 

epidemiological analysis. We greatly defer to our partners at the 

CDC who have this professional expertise. 

The area within the mission space for DHS is to look across the 

surveillance data for a one health and whole spectrum view. Examples include the economic impacts of a pandemic influenza on critical infrastructure and looking at seemingly disparate data to see 

if there are any similarities. 

One thing that I want to relate is that biosurveillance and detection are just one part of the puzzle which I think you articulated. 

While there is value in each and every piece of this puzzle, the 

keys to the security are prevention and early detection. The combination of a covert nature and the lag time for casualties from a 

biological attack, among others, make these weapons much different than conventional nuclear and chemical weapons. Valid and 

reliable early detection of a biological release, whether through environmental sampling or through health surveillance, allow a window of opportunity for us to interdict, provide medical countermeasures and save lives. 

At the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs we operate two national biosurveillance, programs which you 

have mentioned, to support this mission, the BioWatch program 

and the National Biodefense Integration Center, or the NBIC. 

BioWatch is the only federally coordinated and locally operated biodetection program in the world. Its goal is to provide communities 

timely detection of select biological agents using strategically 

placed environmental samplers. 

However, I would like to emphasize that BioWatch is more than 

just a machine. It is a detection and response support system. 

Early detection without a strong coordinated response to the biological agent would be akin to asking the DOD to identify threats 

on a radar and then not giving them the systems to interdict. 


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While the collector is the entry point for the decision algorithm, 

the coordination with our state, local and federal partners, emergency management and pubic officials is a critical piece of the program that should not be underestimated, and it pays dividends 

well beyond BioWatch. Failure to plan and exercise the cascading 

events following a detection would be a waste of technology, science 

and resources and put the country at significant risk. 

The Administration has requested $173.5 million for Fiscal Year 

2011 for BioWatch; approximately $89.5 million for operations to 

build a comprehensive quality assurance program, expand our current exercise program and population protection models. Eightyfour million dollars will allow DHS to procure, evaluate and potentially deploy Generation 3 detection units for operational field testing. 

While we are looking forward to the future of early detection, we 

deeply value the opportunity to improve on our current capabilities. 

The recent National Academy of Sciences report lays out various 

issues that BioWatch can address to make the system that much 

stronger. 

In furtherance of this view, in recent days we have determined 

that from protracted negotiations involving the necessary diligence 

and testing that would be required for a Generation 3 contract that 

we are going to adjust our program schedule. We are evaluating 

the impacts and are immediately going to update the Congress 

once we resolve this issue. 

While a delay is disappointing given the urgent operational 

needs, I believe that we are being consistent with the NAS’s 

urgence to ensure a thorough and protective evaluation as an appropriate way to ensure that we are pursuing the acquisition with 

appropriate oversight, testing and diligence. 

Going on to the NBIC, since this was handed over to OHA two 

and a half years ago we have worked to enhance the Federal Government’s ability to rapidly identify, characterize, localize and 

track biological events of national concern through the integration 

and analysis of data relating to human health, animal health, 

plant, food and environmental monitoring systems. 

NBIC received $8 million in Fiscal Year 2010 and is requesting 

$7 million in Fiscal Year 2011 to fund the Center. Last year’s GAO 

report, ‘‘Biosurveillance: Developing a Collaborative Strategy Is Essential To Fostering Interagency Data and Resource Sharing’’, 

identified the unique mission of the NBIC. This report included 

recommendations for strengthening NBIC, and we have already 

begun to move forward on many of them. 

In addition to addressing the GAO’s recommendations, I recently 

held a meeting of our interagency partners, which included representatives from HHS, ASPR, CDC, FBI, DOT and DOD, to talk 

about these challenges outlined in the report. I then directed the 

NBIC to become more focused on its core mission of biosurveillance 

and directed them to work on a new path going forward to meet 

our desired goals of whole spectrum situational awareness using a 

new approach. 

To this end we are developing a new strategy to reach outside 

the federal systems and collaborate with state and private sector 

partners. This will begin with a demonstration project with the 


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North Carolina Collaboratory for Bio-Preparedness supported by 

funds included in the Fiscal Year 2010 appropriations bill. 

States such as North Carolina have capabilities and sophisticated practices that capture critical biosurveillance information. We 

are looking to learn from these systems and leverage their successes at the state and local level for the benefit of the Nation. I 

am hopeful that engaging in this new outreach approach we will 

improve the information sharing between public and private 

sources and provide new ways to identify and enhance biological 

surveillance data. 

In closing, I would like to thank this Committee for their invaluable work and leadership that they have provided on this important topic. I know that you share my passion for making sure the 

Nation is protected from biological incidents, whether man-made or 

natural. 

Under the leadership of President Obama and Secretary 

Napolitano, I will continue to stay focused on this issue, and I 

thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. 

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STATEMENT OF DR. TARA O’TOOLE

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. Dr. O’Toole. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. It is an honor and a pleasure to appear before you 

again now in the role of Undersecretary of Science and Technology 

at the Department of Homeland Security. In this new role, one of 

my chief responsibilities is to serve as the Department’s overseer 

of testing and evaluation for new technologies. This is a role I not 

only intend to take very seriously, but to emphasize and expand 

within DHS, and it has direct pertinence for BioWatch and for 

other technologies of which you are aware and which pertain to 

biosurveillance. 

S&T’s role and ambitions in this regard are going to be greatly 

aided by the official adoption of the new acquisition directive in 

DHS which codifies a very disciplined process for acquiring and 

testing new technology in the Department, as I will discuss. Clearly neither DHS nor the government want to pay for or deploy technology that does not work, but in addition, particularly in the case 

of BioWatch, it is critical that the technologies that Homeland Security uses be reliable and accurate because highly consequential, 

I regret, decisions are going to depend upon how this technology 

performs and we have to be confident that the results of BioWatch 

are reliable and accurate. 

Science and Technology will oversee the testing and evaluation 

of Generation 3 BioWatch. We have been working very closely with 

the Office of Health Affairs in this regard. We have charted a 

working integrated product team that consists of members of my 

staff, of Dr. Garza’s staff, BioWatch operators from states and localities that actually use the BioWatch technology, as well as representatives from the independent testing authority who will be 

conducting the operational tests in the field. 

This team has established a testing and evaluation master plan 

which is very comprehensive, very rigorous and very ambitious. I 

can describe these plans in more detail, but they do address many 

of the concerns raised by the National Academy of Sciences report. 

I want to emphasize that this report is milestone driven. We will 

not move forward on testing or on deploying BioWatch until we 

meet the milestones. 

I would like to also emphasize that Gen 3 BioWatch is an extraordinarily sophisticated and ambitious piece of technology. This 

really is cutting edge science, and though we recognize the need to 

balance the urgency of making this technology operational for the 

country, as I said, we also have to serve the imperative of ensuring 

the technology works as expected in the real world. 

We realize we have to satisfy the operational requirements that 

have been set down, and that could affect the testing and evaluation schedules. As the National Academy report points out and as 

Dr. Garza said and as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, biodefense is 

necessarily a collaborative endeavor. The Academy report emphasizes the need for S&T and OHA to work together, and Dr. Garza 

and I can assure you that will happen and in fact is happening. 

We have also been in close contact with CDC. I have had several 

conversations with Dr. Frieden, the CDC Director, about biodefense 


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and biosurveillance. Biosurveillance is actually his top priority. We 

had talked about how the Administration might collectively go forward and advance some of the nation’s capacities to respond to bioattacks. We have also been in touch with Dr. Nicki Lurie at HHS, 

as well as with DARPA and IARPA on matters concerning biodefense and how our collective efforts might be amplified by working together more closely. 

It is also important that Science and Technology search out the 

best ideas, and one of the things that we know about innovative 

science and technology is it often emerges from small companies. 

BioWatch Gen 3 is actually a success story in this regard. 

One of the final two Generation 3 BioWatch candidates which we 

will be testing was developed by a small company, Micro Politic 

Systems, with funding from S&T. This small company then joined 

forces with a larger firm to create one of the final candidates in the 

selection process, and I think this is an example of how important 

it is that we form all kinds of collaborations not just across the federal government and between the feds and the state and local users 

of BioWatch, but between the government and the private sector in 

order to get the kind of biodefense that we are going to need. 

Science and Technology is also working very closely with CDC to 

validate the assays, that is the laboratory tests, which identify the 

biothreat agents that BioWatch is designed to detect. There are 

many other collaborative endeavors in the biodefense field that the 

S&T directorate is engaged in which I would be happy to tell you 

about, but in addition I think it is important to note that the S&T 

directorate also manages for the nation a number of important national biodefense assets and capabilities. 

I particularly note the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center at Fort Detrick which is charged with responsibility of bioforensics in the case of a biological attack and has been 

running the biothreat risk assessment which forms one of the foundations for the decision about which bioagents to focus on in 

BioWatch and which medicines and vaccines to develop in response 

to the biothreat. 

I would also note that the biothreat is very dynamic, as is the 

progress in bioscience in the twenty-first century, and it requires 

constant attention and reassessment. The S&T directorate also 

manages Plum Island, a facility out on the tip of Long Island which 

is dedicated to research on medicines and vaccines against foreign 

animal diseases which are probably also an emerging biothreat 

that we need to be concerned with, and the directorate is intent on 

building a new twenty-first century facility for animal disease research. Manhattan, Kansas, has been selected as the site, and we 

are also working on doing the necessary risk assessments preparatory to beginning construction on that site. Happy to answer 

questions, Mr. Chairman. 

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STATEMENT OF DR. BERNARD GOLDSTEIN

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Dr. Goldstein. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Good afternoon, Chairman Price and Members of 

the Subcommittee. I am honored today to testify as the chair of the 

25-member Committee on Effectiveness of National Biosurveillance 

Systems, BioWatch and the Public Health System which was convened by the Institute of Medicine and the National Research 

Council. We have submitted a written statement for your review 

and for the record. My testimony is drawn from the publicly available version of the summary of our Committee’s report. 

The work that we did was done between mid 2008 and mid 2009 

in response to your Committee’s direction to the Office of Health 

Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security. There were 

three essential elements to our task. The first was to evaluate the 

current and potential capabilities and costs of BioWatch in detecting biological threats. The second was to examine the capabilities 

and costs of current and enhanced disease surveillance to detect biological threats through hospital and public health agencies, and 

the third was to consider whether BioWatch and traditional infectious disease surveillance are redundant or are complementary. 

I want to note first that certain important elements were beyond 

our study’s scope: First, examining the basis for estimates of the 

risk of bioterrorism; second, considering uses of BioWatch such as 

aiding forensic analysis that are separate from detection of biological agents; and, third, assessing the capacity in the public health 

and health care systems to deliver treatment and other services in 

response to the detection of a biological threat. 

So our report addresses matters concerning both BioWatch and 

the public health and health care at the federal, state and local levels. In my remarks today I am going to highlight certain findings 

and recommendations about BioWatch and DHS. 

Very importantly, DHS needs to conduct systematic, technical 

and operational testing and evaluation of both the current version 

of BioWatch, Generation 2, and future BioWatch technologies, Generation 3. The rapid initial deployment of BioWatch for obvious 

reasons did not allow for sufficient testing, validation and evaluation of the current system and its components. The decision not to 

deploy an interim technology known as Generation 2.5 and the 

delay in the acquisition and deployment of a Generation 3 system 

provide a needed opportunity to establish a more systematic, scientifically sound and stakeholder approved approach to all aspects 

of BioWatch. 

With the continued use of Generation 2, a clear understanding 

of it capabilities is critical. Therefore, we recommended that operational testing of Generation 2 be undertaken now. This testing 

would provide performance specifications that can be used to refine 

Generation 3 requirements. Improvements are needed in the laboratory assays as well, and we endorse the DHS collaboration with 

CDC, with EPA and the FBI to develop validated and consistent 

assays and assay platforms for Generation 2. 

From our review of the DHS plans for testing and evaluation for 

Generation 3 which were presented to us in the spring of 2009, we 

found that the technology goals for Generation 3 are appropriate, 


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but will require significant advances to meet longstanding scientific 

and technical challenges. Furthermore, the plan, test and evaluation timeline may be too short. There is little allowance for delays 

to respond to problems that often emerge during testing and limited provision for operational testing under diverse environmental 

conditions. 

We also saw a need for measures of effectiveness developed in 

collaboration with the public health community which must use the 

information BioWatch generates. The results of BioWatch testing 

need to be thoroughly documented and made available to public 

health stakeholders. 

An analysis commissioned for our study suggests that the direct 

costs for the next 10 years for continuing the BioWatch program 

in its current form—in other words in Generation 2—will average 

approximately $80 million per year, which appears comparable to 

the DHS budget request for this portion of the program. 

For the Generation 3 program, our commissioned analysis suggested an average direct cost of about $200 million per year over 

the same 10 year period for acquisition, deployment and operation 

of the next system, which included expanded coverage. However, 

examination of the fiscal year 2011 budget request suggests that it 

is based on a lower unit cost for Generation 3 detectors than we 

had available for analysis. It is about a 20 percent lower cost. 

We emphasized that DHS needs to make BioWatch planning 

risk-based and responsive to user needs. DHS should ensure that 

the BioWatch program reflects both a careful analysis of the risks 

of an airborne biological attack and the most effective ways to manage these specific tasks and specific risks. This analysis should include all the risk scenarios, each pathogen that BioWatch monitors 

and the differences between use in indoor and outdoor settings. 

DHS should work closely in all aspects of the program with key 

partners and stakeholders at the federal, state and local levels. 

We advise that the BioWatch program should not expand its coverage of biological agents or jurisdictions without a clear understanding of the contribution any such expansion would make, the 

possibility of reducing mortality or morbidity. We also recommended that DHS needs a stronger partnership with the state 

and local jurisdictions where BioWatch operates. 

Public health officials need greater assistance in developing the 

capabilities required to interpret and respond to BioWatch actional 

results. These BARs signal detection of genetic material from a target organism, but it does not automatically mean that an attack 

has occurred, that an infectious agent has been released or that 

people have been exposed. 

The apparent lack of systematic assessment of BARs that have 

occurred, none of which has been associated with bioterrorism or 

with human illness, is a missed opportunity to inform BioWatch 

program planning and development. DHS should continue it efforts 

to develop and improve decision support tools to help local jurisdictions in the synthesis and analysis of information for decision making after a BioWatch actionable result is declared. 

While mindful of various concerns, we concluded that in principle 

BioWatch and surveillance through the public health and health 

care systems are complementary. BioWatch has the potential to 


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provide a more timely alert than the public health and health care 

systems under certain specific circumstances. These circumstances 

are if a large scale aerosol attack using certain pathogens were to 

occur in the localities where BioWatch is deployed and if BioWatch 

successfully detects the pathogen. 

Disease surveillance through the public health and health care 

system certainly needs improvement. It is broader and more flexible than BioWatch. It permits detection of a wider range of infectious diseases and diseases resulting from sources of exposure that 

BioWatch is not designed or deployed to detect. With or without 

BioWatch, the public health system needs to be capable of monitoring disease trends and accessing information from multiple 

sources to identify or characterize situations that may signal a public health emergency. At best, BioWatch is one source of this information. 

Infectious disease surveillance of all types, including the 

BioWatch system, should be better linked to a broader and more 

effective national biosurveillance framework. Better approaches to 

information sharing can be expected to contribute to faster and 

more effective outbreak detection, improved communication between public health officials and clinical providers and improved 

situational awareness and response capabilities. 

Ensuring that information from BioWatch is effectively integrated into such systems will help maximize its values. Thank you 

for the opportunity to testify. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions. 

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STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL SOSIN

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. Dr. Sosin. 

Dr. SOSIN. Good afternoon, Chairman Price, Ranking Member 

Rogers and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am Dan 

Sosin, Acting Director of CDC’s Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response. Thank you for the opportunity to include a federal public health perspective in your hearing on biosurveillance. 

I want to recognize the critical role that collaborations among the 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security play in supporting strong biosurveillance capabilities across government. My testimony highlights the 

importance of a multi-layered approach to biosurveillance that 

builds on systems and relationships we use every day and the importance of creating an intergovernmental environment that values 

and supports the various layers and perspectives. 

As you are all aware, the United States is confronted by an array 

of health threats from natural, accidental and deliberate origins. 

HHS leads federal public health to respond to threats to human 

health. Within HHS, CDC provides scientific expertise and works 

with state, local and international departments of health in the 

core public health functions of surveillance, laboratory science, epidemiology and response operations that include incident management, risk communications and medical countermeasure delivery 

and guidance. 

For us, biosurveillance is the information supply chain that supports decision making to ensure our response is appropriately 

matched to the public health event or emergency. Biosurveillance 

for human health is an integral component of the DHS National 

Biosurveillance Interaction System or NBIS. In accordance with 

HSPD–21, CDC has worked closely with DHS and other governmental partners to assure that information from the human health 

component of biosurveillance is effectively shared with the broader 

response community to improve situation awareness and coordinated decision making. 

Investments in biosurveillance must be viewed with a wider lens 

than just early detection. Biosurveillance for human health includes three functional components whose goals are to one, detect 

unusual events; two, validate or rule them out as potential threats; 

and, three, guide the response if a threat is confirmed. Each of 

these three functions is vital to an informed and effective response 

and none alone is sufficient to achieve health security in the face 

of an emergency. 

The foundation of our biosurveillance capability is the national 

public health and medical system which supports disease surveillance via routine case reporting of notifiable diseases and unusual 

events. It helps with detection, investigation and response and 

takes into account when populations become sick from predictable 

or unanticipated health hazards. 

Clinical disease surveillance is supplemented by secondary surveillance layers, which may include environmental surveillance like 

the BioWatch program. Most secondary surveillance layers demonstrate their greatest value in validation of incidents and supporting response. Diagnostic-based detection systems like BioWatch 


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have the potential, when in the right place and monitoring for the 

right agent, to alert the public health system of a threat to human 

health, thereby triggering investigation and, when indicated, a 

swift response to mitigate illness and death. 

CDC partners with the BioWatch program as mentioned through 

verification of assays used in the analysis of biological agents and 

with technical assistance and guidance related to biological detections. Once an outbreak of a dangerous agent is confirmed, it is essential to track the event, to understand its impact, to determine 

whether countermeasures are needed and to provide public guidance on response to promote community resilience. 

Broad governmental and nongovernmental input has produced a 

national biosurveillance strategy for human health. The National 

Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee also provided its report titled Improving the Nation’s Ability to Detect and Respond to Twenty-First Century Urgent Health Threats in 2009. 

Both these documents and the CDC’s own Director’s priorities 

draw attention to the need for promoting leadership and intergovernmental governance structure that allows the diverse partnerships needed for effective biosurveillance to work in concert, 

strengthening global disease surveillance to protect all nations, assuring adequate skill and capacity of the workforce and, lastly, 

leveraging new technologies and policies to support the workforce 

in a multi-layered approach that builds on systems and relationships that we use every day. 

We at CDC look forward to continued collaboration with DHS to 

accelerate action and build a strong and vigilant national biosurveillance system. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

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BIOWATCH GENERATIONS 2 AND 3

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, and thanks to all of you for interesting 

and important statements. We will now proceed with questions. 

DHS has spent nearly $600 million directly on the Biowatch program in the last seven years. That does not account for resources 

devoted to the program at the state and local levels. Your fiscal 

year 2011 budget proposes $174 million for Biowatch; that is an increase of $84 million over the current fiscal year. Almost all of that 

increase is to support the operational testing and evaluation of 

Generation 3 detectors, as well as an initial procurement of detectors for a small number of cities. 

As I understand it, your budget request includes a steady state 

program for Generation 2 detectors. That is, no further testing and 

no additional deployment. We understand the Generation 3 procurement is already at least three months behind the Office of 

Health Affairs development schedule as outlined six months ago. 

We know that delay is not the fault of the Department, but it is 

still worrisome. 

The National Academy report cites challenges such as the lack 

of confidence in the system from state and local partners, insufficient support and guidance these partners, and inadequate coordination among agencies. I am sure you have taken note of those 

criticisms. 

The testing recommendations also seem slightly at variance, or 

considerably at variance. The National Academy makes a recommendation that further testing should be done on Generation 2, 

while the Generation 3 work is being done. 

So, Dr. Garza, let me just initially get a little more precise fix 

on your 2011 budget request and the kind of timetable it is assuming. What you think can be achieved in this timeframe, and what 

is the rationale for this money you have requested? Given the track 

record of the program and the factors I have just cited, can you assure the Subcommittee that your plans for the program are feasible 

within the timeframe and the significant increase in funding that 

you have requested? 

As a way of getting a longer term view, let me ask you to look 

ahead three years; what kind of mix of Generation 2 and Generation 3 detectors do you assume are deployed, how many cities are 

they deployed in, what is the annual cost? I think that would help 

us get a fix on your request and where we are headed. 

Dr. GARZA. Right, thank you very much Mr. Chairman. As far as 

the current budget request, you are right that we have asked for 

substantially more money, and most of that, or at least half of it 

is to keep our current operations underway with the Generation 2, 

and that is to make sure that we do have a sustained ability for 

environmental detection through our Gen 2 program. 

You are correct that we have had challenges in the past with integration at the state and local level, and this is an issue that we 

take very seriously and that we have aggressively pursued to correct in the last couple of years. I recently took a trip out to the 

west coast, last week to meet with the state and locals, and I feel 

confident in saying that we have improved those relationships, and 

I consider that to continue to be an important part, and we will 


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keep working on that as time goes on. The second half you rightly 

said was for Generation 3, and there has been an adjustment in 

the schedule. But I want to emphasize as well that the adjustment, 

as you rightly said, was outside of DHS control, but in a larger 

view it fits into, I think, exactly what the point of the NAS was, 

which was making sure that there was a robust testing and evaluation period. 

So quite frankly, there are reasons why the schedule moved, but 

they were for good reasons, and the good reasons were that we 

were not going to change our posture in our ability to test and 

evaluate these machines. We want to make sure that we have gone 

through a thoroughly rigorous testing period before we go and deploy these, and operating with S&T I believe we have come up with 

that schedule. And so I believe that fits in well with Dr. Goldstein’s 

opinion that we do need to have thorough testing and evaluation 

for these. 

Going forward, our plan is to increase the capacity to protect the 

country against biological threats using our BioWatch systems. I 

cannot tell you exactly how many cities will be involved, we can do 

that behind closed doors. But I believe in the years to come that 

we will increase our capacity to have detectors out in the communities, we will improve on the technology. One thing I also wanted 

to emphasize, and I believe Dr. O’Toole did a good job of this, is 

this is cutting edge technology, this has never been done before. 

And so we are essentially starting from a blank slate and trying 

to move that science forward. 

So the request, although it is doubling our money, we believe has 

been put into a robust system for testing and evaluation. And as 

Dr. O’Toole said as well, it is a milestone plan, we will not move 

into the next stage until we are confident that we have achieved 

everything that we need to achieve to make sure that this system 

is reliable and is valid before we move on to the next step. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, we will of course get whatever information we 

need in executive session. But I believe you can say a little more 

than you have about the Generation 2 and Generation 3 replacement rate. 

Dr. GARZA. Correct. During our evaluation period, part of that 

will be operational testing. So the Generation 2 will continue to 

work during that time period. If everything goes according to plan 

for Generation 3 through testing and evaluation, through field testing and operational testing, we will eventually switch out Generation 2 with Generation 3. 

Mr. PRICE. And what I am asking is, what does eventually mean? 

Dr. GARZA. So, ‘‘eventually’’ means, after our testing and evaluation period, which we figure will be six months to a year, and then 

field deployment coming after that. So what we are saying is, because of that three-month shift we are not sure if we will be able 

to actively do our field testing at the end of Fiscal Year 2011. And 

so that is where that three-month delay comes in, from our contractual issues. 

Mr. PRICE. All right, but then you would anticipate a very quick 

replacement of Generation 2 with Generation 3 equipment or is 

there some time period where we are maintaining these Generation 

2 machines in use? 


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Dr. GARZA. Correct, so it will take about three or four years to 

get all the machines out eventually. This is also not just the machines being complicated but the siting of where the machines go 

is also fairly complex as well. And so we have to study the individual environments, the individual cities, in order to assure that 

if the machines do what we ask them to do that they will be able 

to perform where we need them to perform. And it is a very complex process, depending on modeling, air flow and the different 

technical needs that we will need to make sure that these machines do what they are supposed to do. We anticipate full deployment by 2016, but we will be intending to replace all of them with 

Gen 3. 

Mr. PRICE. All right, thank you. We do want to move along here. 

I will turn to other witnesses to elaborate on the question, but let 

me turn now to Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, to follow up on that same line of questioning, 

since 2003 we have appropriated $598 million to the BioWatch program, and a recent Academy of Sciences report on BioWatch estimates that the annualized direct cost for Generation 3 acquisition 

and operation over ten years is $200 million. And for Fiscal Year 

2011, you are asking $10 million for the continued operation of the 

current system and $163 million to support the test and evaluation 

and procurement of 476 of the new Generation 3 detection systems. 

Am I accurate so far? 

Dr. GARZA. Those are not the figures that I have, sir. We have 

$89 million for continuing Generation 2 deployment and continuing 

on of that service. And then I believe it is $83 million for the testing, evaluation and potential procurement and field testing of the 

Generation 3. So I do want to address though the difference with 

the $200 million, and the reason that number is higher is because 

we will be expanding both the number of units and, as you said, 

Mr. Chairman, the number of locations for the biodetection machines. And so inherently the budget request would be higher to 

maintain those machines. There is a difference in the costing out 

of those because, if Generation 3 does what we expect it to do, 

which would be removing the laboratory piece of that and containing it all in a box, there would be a shifting of that cost. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, as I understand it, due to concerns about past 

mishandling of Generation 1 and 2, that S&T will be intimately involved in the test and evaluation of new Generation 3 systems, is 

that right, Doctor? 

Dr. GARZA. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I am told that if the Generation 3 test and 

evaluation proves accurate, that you will begin to deploy the system in multiple cities by the end of 2015? 

Dr. GARZA. I am sorry, sir, by? 

Mr. ROGERS. By the end of 2015? 

Dr. GARZA. The plan will be to have completed the deployment 

by 2016. 

Mr. ROGERS. But you will not begin to deploy until the end of 

2015? 

Dr. GARZA. The dates that I have, sir, are that we would begin 

deployment in Fiscal Year 2012. But I also want to emphasize 

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tion period. And so we have to make sure that this machine is 

going to do what we ask it to do. 

Mr. ROGERS. But in the meantime, the process has been delayed 

several months due to challenges in the contract negotiation process? 

Dr. GARZA. Correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. So we do not know when you are going to start putting these machines out there, then replacing the Generation 2 machines, which in my judgement are as useless as teats on a boar 

hog. Why? Because they have to be manually interrogated, and you 

have got to send a lab technician out there to find out whether or 

not the machine is wrongfully, mistakenly saying there is a poison 

in the air. Well, the lab technician will never get there if there is 

a problem, right? 

Dr. GARZA. If the agent was still in the air and they were collecting the agent, yes, sir. Well, let me rephrase that. So, as I said 

in my opening statements, there is a delay between release and 

clinical symptoms. And so I think the scenario you were describing 

is more in line with a chemical attack where there is a release, you 

inhale vapor and, you know, it is mustard gas World War I. The 

difference between the Generation 2 and the Generation 3 is of 

course, you are correct, there is somebody that goes out there and 

collects the filters, brings them back to the lab, it is analyzed in 

the lab. 

Which, I believe, brings us to the point of the tremendous jump 

in the technology that we are trying to make, moving to Generation 

3. And the benefit of that is bringing that time to detection from 

36 hours down from anywhere to four to six hours. That is the goal, 

is to bring that detection time down in order to do interdiction, in 

order to account—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I know, but the present system, and we are stuck 

with the present Generation 1, 2 for a while. 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. How long, we do not know. But the present system, 

the lab technician has to go out and take the measurements out 

of the machine. Well, either the agent is still on the scene, in which 

case the lab technicians do not make it back, or the agents have 

disbursed but the population has been killed off already. So why 

have the results of the machine anyway? 

Dr. GARZA. Well, again, sir, there is a time delay between exposure and clinical disease. And so that timing is what is the important thing to focus on. And so it would not be the scenario, and I 

do not want to get too much into clinical medicine, but it is not designed to do a detection of a rapid killer, it is designed for a biological agent which does take time for incubation. So what Generation 

2 does is, it collects the bacteria or the agent from the air and 

brings it back to the lab. In order to cut down that lag time between release and clinical symptom, that is the time frame that we 

are talking about, and that can be anywhere from 48 hours to extended, you know. 

Mr. ROGERS. What would it take to automate that Generation 3 

so that it works electronically real time? 

Dr. GARZA. Right, and that is exactly what we are trying to do, 

we are trying to take that person that goes out into the field and 


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collects the filter, has to drive it back to the lab, the lab technicians 

have to do their various things and run it through the PCR analysis, and they only collect this once every 24 hours. And so if the 

release was at that 24 hours, we are doing pretty good. If it was 

at hour 1, we are behind the curve. 

Mr. ROGERS. Answer my question, why cannot we develop a real 

time, automatic reporting machine out there? 

Dr. GARZA. That is what we are attempting to do with Generation 3, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, where are you with it? Dr. O’Toole. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Generation 3 is quite revolutionary, if it works. 

What it is going to do is it is going to collect the air—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I ask a question, why cannot we have an automatic, 

real time reporting machine without a person having to attend to 

it? That seems like a fairly simple thing. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We will, it is not a simple thing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why not? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. It is extremely complicated. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. It is absolutely at the far edge of available science. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Because you have to collect the air and then you 

have to analyze it—understand that Generation 3 will analyze, will 

try and detect multiple different biothreat agents—it needs to say 

with near 100 percent accuracy, bug A is here, bug B is there, and 

the different tests that you have to do for these different bugs are 

very different. That box is going to perform multiple assays, okay, 

more than a dozen laboratory tests are going to be in that box, and 

then reported—which takes some time, it is not instantaneous, it 

takes some time to do that inside the box or anywhere else—and 

then they are going to report out digitally as soon as they get that 

result to the public health authority in that vicinity. So it is not 

instantaneous, but it is pretty darn close. 

Mr. ROGERS. But does the military not already have similar type 

sensors? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. No, the military has nothing close to this. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do they not have machines that detect poison gas, 

all sorts of poisons? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes, it takes hours. They have to actually do the 

lab assays. Now, the military, when they are deploying troops, has 

the advantage of having a pretty good idea where the enemy is, 

and what they usually do is put these machines, the sniffers, out 

ahead of the troops in a kind of perimeter deployment so that they 

are always looking out ahead of the troops, and they can test for 

very specific things fairly quickly, you know, not a whole lot of 

things, but they are always manned by people right there where 

the sniffers are. So they basically have mobile labs when they are 

deployed in the field. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Goldstein, do you have a thought on this? 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Congressman Rogers, I certainly feel your frustration with this, but I will tell you that the technical experts on 

the NAS Committee felt that the original plans were unrealistic in 

that they thought that it would not occur as quickly as originally 

stated. I think I can speak for the committee to say that we are 


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much more comfortable with the milestone approach that has been 

laid out where this very difficult technical approach gets a thorough, step by step process. We see the issue, as you put it so well, as being undeniably real, but we see it real in a short term time frame, which is where the 

frustration is, but also on a long term time frame, and we as a 

committee, I think, do not want to see the mistakes that inevitably 

occurred with Generations 1 and 2 where there was a need for an 

immediate response and the systems were not as thoroughly evaluated as needed to be for the long term protection of the public. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Rodriguez. 

STANDARDS

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Garza, let me ask you a little more basic question regarding some of the labs out 

there. I know in San Antonio for example we have Southwest Research and we have Brooks, you know, Air Force Base and others. 

Do we have, and for some of these agents and these toxics, do we 

have some kind of standard that we follow throughout the country, 

and how do we check when these people are using these agents? Because I know we have had difficulties, I know, you know, we kind of laugh because I know we have, you know, I guess snow 

monkeys that took off some time back and they are in the brush 

country there in Texas and once in a while they show up. And so, 

do we have a way of, number one, are there standardize the process utilizing these agents and these toxics? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. And number two, is there a way of checking that in terms of what is actually occurring? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, so in answer to your first question, sir, we do have standards for the entire BioWatch system that all our laboratories use. So there is a standard platform, standard assays, standard way of performing the tests. So that is taken care of. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. And then how do we make sure that that is occurring? 

Dr. GARZA. We do have jurisdictional coordinators, and the labs are fairly well regulated, to make sure that they are meeting quality control measures. Just like any medical or other lab has to go 

through a series of certifications. So they are fairly well, they do 

have fairly good oversight to make sure that they are doing the 

proper procedures for the lab work. 

NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. So you do have oversight, okay. Let me ask I 

guess a following question I guess to Ms. O’Toole regarding the national bio and agro defense facility that we have been looking at. 

And I know that, I think we have held the obligating funds until 

there were certain conditions and one of those conditions revolved 

around the serious concerns regarding the risk of such a facility 

and there was also serious concerns regarding the selection process, and I know that now it is under some degree of litigation in 

terms of how that went about. Can you let me know where it is 

at? And we were one of the finalists in San Antonio. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes, sir. 


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Mr. RODRIGUEZ. And of course we felt that the Committee made 

the wrong decision, and so and we feel very strongly about that to 

this day. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I understand, Congressman. As you pointed out, 

this Committee mandated that DHS ask the National Academy to 

do an evaluation of the risk assessment that is now being conducted by DHS in association with the Manhattan, Kansas site. 

And we are not to begin construction until the Congress has a 

chance to evaluate that risk assessment. DHS has been talking 

with NAS and NAS has established a committee, and we are going 

forward as we speak with that process. I am sorry, sir, I forgot 

your second question. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. The second one is the most important, the process for selection, how political was that? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. It was not political at all. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Okay. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. It was before my time as Undersecretary, it was 

carried out by career officials in the Department. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. So how do you know it was not political if you 

were not there during that process? I do not mean to get that, but 

can you please look into that process? Because it is serious. 

[The information follows:] 

S&T has reached out to Rep. Rodriguez’s office to set up a briefing with Dr. 

O’Toole and the Congressman, to review the specific details of the site selection 

process for NBAF. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I would be happy to give you a robust review of 

that process, it was really, I have looked into the process, anticipating this question. And it was merit based, the competition was 

quite stiff. Texas has a lot of assets in this regard. Texas was just 

awarded, for example, a Co-Lead and a Center of Excellence devoted to agriculture and food health. And basically the state of 

Kansas made a very generous offer to the Federal government, it 

is a great deal for the nation, not to say that Texas does not have 

great skills in this area. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. So they made a bigger offer? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. They did. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Okay, that sounds politically terrible. Okay, 

thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Culberson. 

PRIVATE SECTOR

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Goldstein, I was 

particularly struck with your comments on the importance of working more closely with the existing hospitals, health workers, the 

public health sector, and the private sector is certainly capable of 

helping immensely. And I represent the Texas Medical Center, St. 

Luke’s Hospital I know on their own initiative and I think largely 

with their own funding, this was a couple years ago, has already 

prepared, already set up an emergency response center in the hospital and have trained their EMTs, nurses, doctors, to watch for 

certain symptoms, because the medical center, astonishing, but 

155,000 people move in and out of the Texas Medical Center every 

24 hours. 


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And so there is a great deal of expertise there that is ready, will- ing, and able to help. Could you talk a little bit more about that, 

and what specifically did your committee, would you recommend 

that we need to be doing to make sure that we are involving the 

private sector? Because I know the Medical Center is ready, willing, and able to step up and participate and they would be a great 

partner, I mean St. Luke’s did this on their own initiative. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Congressman, you are absolutely right, there is an enormous capability certainly in our emergency medical response system. There is a NAS Committee recommendation that 

better training for EMT, I mean there is an enormous difference 

between the emergency medical response folks in different locations as to how well they know about these potential issues, how 

quickly they are going to be responsive, are they going to be able 

to be the first alert system so that the informed emergency room 

doc, for instance, is the one that immediately blows the whistle and 

we all come running and look at this from a situational point of 

view and do the early detection which is so needed. But we see this 

as being uneven capabilities around the country, and the need for 

further training to improve the capabilities. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Did you all explore it, and it seems to me, Mr. 

Chairman, to the extent we can do so, when it comes to Homeland 

Security, decentralize as much as possible and rely on local talent? 

You know, we are blessed in our urban areas, New York and North 

Carolina, with your great universities as we have in Texas, you are 

right, it is uneven, you have got rural areas that are not going to 

recognize these things and be prepared. But where we are able to 

decentralize and shift responsibility back to local authorities, local 

healthcare workers, not only would we save a great deal of money, 

I think, Mr. Chairman, you would also be strengthening our ability 

to respond and the speed with which we respond. 

WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

That is America’s great strength, is the initiative of individual 

Americans and the talent of our people, and I do not know why everything has to come out of Washington. I understand the difficulty, technical difficulties certainly of developing and deploying 

this machinery. I wanted to also ask, Dr. O’Toole, to what extent 

have you looked at and participated and worked with the military 

to see, the sniffers you described, it sounds to me like they have 

already done this, and to what extent are we reinventing the wheel 

and why cannot we use some of their technology? Why do we have 

to do something completely new and different with money that is 

so precious and scarce? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Sure. We are not doing anything that DOD has already done. DOD created another version of what is essentially 

Gen 2 BioWatch, the currently deployed BioWatch, for its bases 

and its facilities. And we are very familiar with that technology, it 

is slightly different. We have worked hard in S&T to make sure 

that the assays that the DOD uses are comparable to those in the 

civilian system, but what the DOD is using now is actually quite 

comparable to the currently deployed BioWatch. 

The problem with that system is that—it is not useless by any 

means—it targets a limited number of biothreats, and one of the 


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characteristics of the biothreat is that there are a lot of bugs out 

there that could be used as weapons. And as bioscience advances, 

the likelihood that one of these weapons will be engineered, i.e. 

something that we have not seen before, grows. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Did I hear you say it is a manned mobile lab is essentially what the Army is using, the military is using? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. That is what they use to protect troops who are out in the field. They also have BioWatch type sensors at facilities such 

as the Pentagon, which are in place. 

Mr. CULBERSON. They are not automated? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Pardon me? No, they are not automated, sir. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Somebody still has to go out and pick it up. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. They have to go out and collect the filters and ana- lyze the filters over a period of time. So Gen 3 is actually quite different from what DOD is using. 

Mr. CULBERSON. And I will follow up, Mr. Chairman, but it is 

something I think for us worth exploring to what extent this can 

be done in cooperation with DOD to develop something in partnership, try to save some money and pool some talent. 

Dr. GARZA. Sir, if I could add on to that, I believe one of the true 

values as well in working with the DOD is to bring together an integrated system. So, forgetting about who owns what machines, as 

we can all testify here today, if there is a release of a biological 

agent near a military facility, it is not going to stop at the gate, 

it is going to flow to other regions as well. And so one of the beauties that we saw when we were out in Los Angeles was doing a 

multi-jurisdictional exercise, and as I am sure everybody knows, 

between L.A. and San Diego is the small military facility that is 

owned by the Marines. 

And they are very well ingrained with our local BioWatch people. 

We have agreements with DOD, they used to have to collect their 

samples and fly them all to Fort Bragg to get them all processed. 

We said, that is silly, bring them to our lab, we will do them, we 

are going to become integrated, this has to be a national defense, 

it cannot be civilian DOD installation, we have to work together on 

this. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Sounds like a good model. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

LOCAL COORDINATION

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Serrano. 

Mr. SERRANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Somewhere along the 

lines of some of the comments that Mr. Culberson made, although 

I do not mind a strong central government, but as all of this is 

going on, what relationships, if any, are taking place with local 

governments and local institutions? I come from New York, New 

York continues to be a target if not the target in the nation, its 

subway system and its mass building lend themselves to easy access to a lot of people at the same time for one of these attacks. 

So what is the relationship and how much of it gets checked, if you 

will, with local authorities before everything gets developed and 

put in place? 

Dr. GARZA. Thank you, that is an excellent question. One of the 

beauties, I believe, of the BioWatch program that probably is not 


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trumpeted enough is that, although it is federally coordinated, it is 

run by the locals. And so we rely on them heavily to help with this 

system, help run this system. And they exercise this, and so if 

there ever was or is going to be an alert on the systems, it is a local 

response. So they have to figure out what their response is going 

to look like, which I also believe is underemphasized in the 

BioWatch program, which is it brings together the individuals that 

have to make that decision. 

So it brings together the lab officials, the public health officials, 

the emergency managers, the EMS people, everybody comes together, coalesces around the BioWatch unit. So in that instance we 

are heavily engaged with our state and local partners for that system. Going forward, and I believe this was in the NAS report, is 

that we have to bring our stakeholders into the process of moving 

forward, and we have done that. We have brought them to the 

table in developing our new technology, we have asked for their 

opinion, we have brought them to the table and said, what do you 

need from us, what can we do to better serve you to make this system better and help you out with our resources? 

Mr. SERRANO. Now, I am sure that there are many communities 

that feel that they have a lot of knowledge in this area. I am sure 

in New York there are a lot of folks who probably think they know 

more than you guys about how to deal with it. So is there ever 

pushback or any problems in the relationship? 

Dr. GARZA. I will not say that it is a completely smooth process, 

there are always differences of opinion at the table, especially when 

you are dealing with very smart people. But I also view that as one 

of the beauties of the system, is we bounce ideas off each other and 

they let us know when we need to improve something. And quite 

frankly, you know, me sitting in a room with my folks in my office, 

we do not realize or cannot understand some of the challenges that 

go on at the local level and we rely on the local people to tell us 

what those challenges are so we can make a better system. So, do 

we have instances where we talk back and forth? Absolutely, but 

I think that is better for the system. 

Dr. SOSIN. Thank you, Congressman. To respond also to the decentralization, that is exactly what our health and public health 

and medical system is, it is decentralized. But around urgent 

events, catastrophic events, terrorism, and the like, those resources 

need support, and that is what we are talking about here. They are 

stretched to the limit every day with the everyday activities, 

whether they are food borne or whether they are taking care of patients who have respiratory illness or whatever it is in their communities. 

So, as it relates to that, I think there really are two pieces of this 

discussion, about BioWatch in particular, which we have had most 

of our conversation about. One is the threat piece and setting this 

as a high enough priority. That is really not a public health and 

medical sector decision. Once that decision is made, that this is 

such a critical threat that we need those extra hours of early notification before we see clinical illness and to expedite the process of 

investigation and response, then the question is, have we balanced 

our strategy in supporting those local jurisdictions to respond effectively and take the right actions in response? 


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And that take money, and that today it takes money from the Federal Government, but it also speaks to making this program in 

the period of time when we do not have attacks to be of greatest 

dual use possible to those local entities. That includes, and I think 

we have great opportunities and collaborations to do this, addressing environmental microbiology, learning more about the nature of 

these organisms in the environment so we understand human disease and the risk of human disease, whether it is around terrorism 

threat agents or all microbiological agents. It includes advancing the technology of diagnostics, driving us to points of care diagnostics for a wide range, changing the way we 

look at platforms for diagnosis. There are tremendous benefits, 

much like people often put in front of us the space program, there 

are opportunities to leverage technology here. And then the opportunity, as Dr. Garza pointed out, to exercise across sectors, so it is 

not just public health exercising within public health or medical 

programs, hospitals and the like, doing their drills within hospitals, 

but bringing the law enforcement sector, the Homeland Security 

sector, and using these as opportunities to learn how we will do 

this and be more ready to do it because we have relationships and 

a trust understanding about these in advance. There is opportunities for great advantage in this once you all have made the decision 

that this is a significant enough priority that we should be investing these dollars here. 

Mr. SERRANO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Well, first of all, it is comforting to hear 

somewhat that there is this cooperation at the local and state level 

anyway. But the concern is that it does not appear to be happening 

at the Federal level among agencies. And according to a GAO report that was issued in December of last year, the National Biosurveillance Center does not collect the kind of information that 

would enable our government to respond to a biological disaster in 

its very earliest stages. Specifically, the GAO reports that the Center must rely on publicly available data because it receives limited 

input from its Federal and state partners. 

In fact, some of the words that were used, and this is directly 

from the report based on interviews with the partners, is that GAO 

encountered widespread, and I am not going to read everything, 

but confusion, uncertainty, skepticism, lack of clarity about roles, 

responsibilities, joint strategies, and so on and so forth. So the 

question that I have is, how are you working to improve cooperation and information sharing with the National Biosurveillance 

Center so that you can get the information that you need at the 

Federal level to quickly and effectively respond in the event of 

some kind of an attack? 

Dr. GARZA. Thank you for that question, ma’am. The first thing 

is personal relationships. And so one thing that I committed to 

when I came into the office was to build those relationships with 

the various inter-agencies, both outside of the federal inter-agency 

and within DHS, and I think it speaks that Dr. O’Toole and I have 

a very strong relationship in building technology, Dr. Sosin and I 


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have a very strong relationship from DHS CDC, and I have weekly 

telephone meetings with the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 

and Response, Dr. Nicki Lurie. 

You are correct in that it is difficult to get data from the federal inter-agency, but quite frankly I believe the approach should be a 

more refined mission. And I have talked about this with our interagency partners at our regular meetings, and that includes USDA, 

HHS, Transportation, DOD. And that is, instead of trying to eat 

the horse in one bite is to take it a bite at a time, and to focus on 

what is the critical situational awareness things that Secretary 

Napolitano needs in order for her to have effective decision support? 

So a lot of that revolves around human health, animal health, 

agriculture health. And so what I have told our office, the NBIC, 

is to start focusing on our core missions but also realize that the 

federal agencies are not the sole owners of what works best. And 

I believe that plays in well with some other projects that we are 

interested in doing, and one of those is with the North Carolina 

group that does a superb job of fusing this at the state level. We 

should not assume that us at the federal level at all have ownership of how to fuse data to bring it all together. 

And so some of our goals going forward are to engage more at 

the state level, to engage more with the private sector, because 

some of those have absolutely fabulous ideas, and to engage more 

with our international partners, because as I explained before, disease does not know any boundaries and as H1N1 showed us it can 

come from anywhere around the world. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay, but I just want to make sure that I 

understand, but at the same time making sure that the Federal 

agencies still understand that they have a responsibility. 

Dr. GARZA. Absolutely. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. 

Dr. GARZA. One thing that I do want to make clear is that I want 

people to come to the table because they realize the value that we 

give them. I am not a fan of making people come to the table because they have to, I want people to come to the table because they 

are willing to work with us, and in order to do that we also have 

to show them value, and so that is another thing that we are working on as well. 

H1N1 LESSONS LEARNED

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay. The Commission on the Prevention 

of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism was exceedingly 

critical of the Federal response to the H1N1 epidemic, and the 

Commission argued that the delay in procuring sufficient quantities of vaccine was evidence that our government is, and this is 

their words, woefully behind in preparing for future epidemics. It 

was also noted that in subsequent public health emergencies we 

might have only hours, not weeks or months, to organize an effective response. What were the key lessons that were learned from 

the H1N1 epidemic and how are you applying this knowledge to 

the challenge of preparing for a biological attack? 

Dr. GARZA. Right, I will not answer the vaccine question since 

that is more of an HHS role, but I will answer the question what 


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did H1N1, what did we learn from that episode. And I think what 

we really learned is that it takes a whole-of-government approach 

to attack these problems. And so, within DHS, I can speak for a 

couple of efforts that we did, and one was standing up a crisis action team where we had representatives from the federal interagency feeding us data so that we could bring it all together into 

a common operating picture, so we could see on a more full spectrum globally what was going on out in the atmosphere. 

So that was one beauty of it. The other one, and Dr. Sosin can 

attest to this, is bringing together some of our modeling communities in order to look into the future and see what is going to happen down the road, and I believe that was the first time that we 

had ever worked together on issues such as that. And so it really 

was I think a solidifying of that relationship. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Okay, but again, inter-agency cooperation 

at the Federal level continues to be one of the keys in our ability 

to deal with these things effectively. 

Dr. GARZA. And we are committed to building those relationships. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Thank you. 

BIOWATCH DEPLOYMENT PLANS

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. Let me turn to a question that 

I will address to both Dr. Garza and Dr. Goldstein and perhaps 

bring Dr. Sosin in as well, because I want to get a better fix on 

the approach that you are taking to the eventual scope and scale 

of this BioWatch program. We of course want to base this program 

on some kind of risk management strategy rather than just some 

kind of ‘‘more is better’’ attitude. 

I understand there are plans to deploy Generation 3 technology 

to a much larger number of cities. I wonder, for example, about the 

advantages of that strategy as opposed to more concentrated work 

in a limited number of cities or other uses of funds that you might 

think of in terms of enhancing the local response capacity or complementary methods of surveillance. 

So, Dr. Garza, to the extent you can do this in a public forum, 

and I realize there is some limitations, please discuss how your decision making for deployment of this system is based on things like 

risk and threat and consequence. How are we going to decide how 

much is enough, both with respect to the capacity we need in a 

given city and the number of cities to which we eventually try to 

extend this technology? 

Dr. GARZA. Thank you, sir, and I appreciate that question and 

I would like to echo Dr. Goldstein’s comments in the NAS in that 

it does have to be based on a thorough evaluation how we are going 

to deploy these machines. And so, at Homeland Security we have 

done some extensive modeling to look at the percentage of the population that would be covered in the urban areas and what we view 

as the highest threat. Now, threat comes from Dr. O’Toole’s job, but 

she bases that threat, not she but her office, bases that on real information, on what is the highest threat to the country, and then 

we defend defense against that. And so the threat is a combination 

of different things. 


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As far as the coverage, we have done some extensive statistical 

work looking at, how can we cover a majority of the population, 

which goes into the siting of the machines as well, and then how 

much is enough around the country, as you stated. And we believe 

we have come to the right number that, again I can share with you 

afterwards, of the number of cities and where they are situated, 

and we would be happy to provide that information for you, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Dr. Goldstein, you and your panel have specifically 

told us that you were not able to assess the overall risk environment in which this system is being deployed, and we understand 

that and respect that. Nonetheless, I expect you may have some 

views about how wise it is to invest what is likely to be hundreds 

of millions of dollars to develop and deploy Generation 3 detectors 

in all current BioWatch cities and then a number of additional cities. 

Putting this in budget terms, would you allocate some of that 

funding to some of the other problems you have identified, such as 

the development of local response capacities, capacities that go beyond mere detection? And then at what point would you see more 

profitable investments going in the direction of these complementary methods of surveillance? After all, no matter how far we take 

BioWatch, no matter how ambitious it becomes or how much 

money we put into it, it is always going to remain a partial system. 

Now, as you and Dr. Sosin both have said, this is a system that 

has certain advantages in terms of the speed of detection, the ability to act on a hostile act, but it has inherent limitations, and it 

is always going to have to be complemented by public health surveillance. We are never going to be able to dispose of one system 

or the other, there is always going to be this complementarity, and 

I would think about this point of where the balance tips, where the 

tradeoff occurs. So I am asking you to reflect on a very difficult 

question, I realize but nonetheless, your central charge was to 

think about this complementarity. So I hope you have some views 

that might give us some guidance. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, let me start by saying that one can envision a public health response without BioWatch. One cannot envision BioWatch without a public health system. 

Mr. PRICE. Exactly. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. What the NAS Committee really was focusing on 

to a large extent was the importance of thinking of this holistically, 

of thinking of the system as a whole. Perhaps I can go back to 

something that Vice Chairman Serrano asked about, which was the 

pushback. There was clearly pushback originally from the public 

health system to the BioWatch. We were very encouraged as a committee to see that there was a transition in the thinking of the 

BioWatch folks to recognize that the users of the information were 

important, that it would not be just simply an automatic response, 

as soon as there was a BioWatch actionable report that there needed to be situational awareness, that there needed to be cooperation 

such that the public health authorities, who as Dr. Garza, Dr. 

O’Toole pointed out, are the local response elements, will have to 

be the people to pull the trigger on any response, that they are part 

of the system. 


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So we are very encouraged in seeing what seems to be a change in the way DHS is approaching it. I would point out there is a legacy among the public health workforce that left over from this previous approach, there is some degree of skepticism as to whether 

or not there will be in fact the very many important things that 

Dr. Garza and Dr. O’Toole talked about in terms of cooperation. 

But assuming that there will be, then it is a holistic system and 

it is a system that incorporates both. And then I go back to what 

you point out, is that we as a committee were not cognizant of 

what the threat is. 

If we understood the threat, what we did say was that there is a previous NRC report that looked at risk assessment that we felt 

had the right recommendations. One of the points we made is a 

point that Dr. O’Toole made, that it is not an unthinking risk that 

we are dealing with, it is not the risk of a meteor hitting this room, 

it is a risk that is more akin to Game Theory than standard risk 

assessment, you do this, the other guys do that, you do this, et 

cetera. So there is a lot of analysis of the threat and the changing 

threat that needs to be done that again our committee was not cognizant of, but very strongly supportive of the fact that a previous 

NRC Committee had recommended that and it should be followed. 

Mr. PRICE. I do want to turn to Dr. O’Toole and Dr. Sosin, but 

I am aware of time sensitivities, so let me turn to my colleague Mr. 

Culberson. You are on. 

NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you very much. I wanted to ask about 

the GAO report in particular and was disappointed and astonished 

to see the reaction of some of the other Federal agencies. They did 

a survey, and as you know, I know you are all familiar with the 

GAO analysis, and wanted to ask, what specific steps are you all 

taking to deal with this? I mean when you hear officials quoting 

from the GAO report, officials from, and this they said was typical 

of the response they got, officials from one component said that the 

tabletop exercise showcased Federal agencies’ reluctance to share 

information underscored that there was no role for NBIC. 

While officials from other components said during 2009 swine flu 

activities, NBIC was not able to demonstrate that it had any 

unique value to add. You know, frustrating and a source of concern, and it never ceases to amaze me how the Federal Government can generate more studies to go study more studies to go 

study more studies when it seems to me a lot of this is just common sense, we just decentralize as much as you can, rely on—all 

hospitals are not up obviously to the standards of the Texas Medical Center, but where you have got that capability is in New York, 

is in North Carolina, is in Houston. 

I had my staff double check, and the University of Texas Health 

Science Center, on its own initiative and using its own money, has 

developed a mobile response lab that is able to go out and actually, 

if someone has been exposed to a biological agent or to a weapon 

of mass destruction, some chemical, they can help decontaminate 

them. That has also been done by the Methodist Hospital, I know 

St. Luke’s has developed this. The vast amount of money that has 

already been spent on this, with all the talent that is already out 


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there at the local level, I guess a lot of frustration on my part, but 

two questions. 

One, what are you doing to try to make sure that you are able to demonstrate to these other agencies that you are adding value? 

And then number two, why are we not using the tremendous Centers of Excellence as I know there are in New York and North 

Carolina and California, all across the country, in Texas. Those are 

our best early detection, those are our best early warning systems, 

are those emergency rooms, it seems to me. And this is something 

we need to deal with now. I mean if we make a mistake and do 

not do this right people are going to lose their lives, it is not like 

any other Federal function or agency really. 

PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE

Dr. GARZA. Thank you for that question, sir. I will take that sec- ond part first. So, as I said in my opening statement, DHS does not 

perform biosurveillance, we rely on the experts at CDC to do that. 

And you are correct, that there are a lot of very good programs out 

at the state and local level that are able to collect, and we cannot 

forget that it is the local and state people that have to respond to 

that data. 

Mr. CULBERSON. They will be the first ones to see it. 

Dr. GARZA. Absolutely, and they are the ones responsible for responding. 

Mr. CULBERSON. To what extent though are you collecting that 

information? I mean have you got any kind of a system in place 

where you can monitor those emergency rooms where you are helping train the first responders and when they see something they 

report it, who do they report it to and then what is done with it? 

Dr. GARZA. Right, I believe Dr. Sosin may be better equipped to 

answer that than I am. 

Dr. SOSIN. So the local to state, state to Federal system is the 

way that we approach this. The challenge of NBIC, for example, 

managing data, nationwide volumes of data, is you cannot make 

sense of these unique local data at a national level. There are very 

severe limits to being able to interpret and respond to those data. 

First detection, the first few cases will never be found in a national 

system whether that is a CDC or whether that is at NBIC. So most 

of our resources do go out to state and local health departments in 

order to reinforce those very models and mechanisms that you 

speak of. In Texas, in North Carolina and New York, the relationships and the systems that they have in place are largely supported by Federal resources that have helped to do that. 

Mr. CULBERSON. As a practical matter, where would a doctor, for 

example, in North Carolina, who would he call, who would she call 

to report peculiar case? 

Dr. SOSIN. There are laws, local and state laws, that lay out the 

mechanisms for a clinician or a hospital to report notifiable conditions and unusual conditions. 

Mr. CULBERSON. So who would they call? 

Dr. SOSIN. And they would call their local health department or 

they would go online and they would put information to the local 

health department. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Who would then report it to who? 


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Dr. SOSIN. So, the health department would then engage to get 

more information to validate what is that and what is the basis of 

that information, do we need to gather more information to confirm 

a high threat type of event. But should there be sufficient concern 

about that or validation of those results, they would report that to 

CDC very quickly because they are looking for advice, hey we have 

never seen a case of this, what do we need to know, what do we 

need to do, how do we engage our system? They have response 

plans and protocols at the local level, the state level. But that sharing of information, which is very human based, it is not data moving, it is information moving, and that information can be enhanced by technology but it is extremely dependent on the individual relationships between health departments, state health departments, local. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Right, so really the network is already there, 

that was my point, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SOSIN. Yeah. 

Mr. CULBERSON. I think a lot of the network is already there, 

CDC is the lead agency on it, you know, I am compelled to ask, it 

seems to me Congress creates a lot of agencies, I am compelled to 

wonder, driven to ask, what is a compelling reason for having this 

information center? I do not know why we do not just do this 

through the CDC and quit trying to reinvent the wheel? Thinking 

of the vast sum of money we have already spent, my time is also 

limited which is very frustrating. But it is maddening for us as 

Members of Congress and to our constituents the vast sums of 

money that are wasted in Washington, and I appreciate the noble 

good work that you all are doing to try to fulfill the mandate that 

Congress gave you. I have a notice in the GAO report, Congress 

forgot to even include any legal requirement that these agencies 

even cooperate with you. So there is no legal requirement, Mr. 

Chairman, that the other Federal agencies provide you anything, 

which has got to make it doubly frustrating. 

Dr. GARZA. It makes it a little frustrating. 

Mr. CULBERSON. It is kind of, yes, sort of maddening. So, Mr. 

Chairman, I certainly want to help in any way that I can, but I 

do think a lot of the existing structure is already there to help us 

make sure that information gets up. 

Dr. GARZA. Right. Sir, I did want to point out what DHS does. 

HHS is concerned with the public health side, with the human 

health side. DHS, although, and this is one of my pet peeves, is 

maybe we have the wrong name of biosurveillance integration center. It should be more of a fusion center of data or of information. 

So we do not merely just look at the human health side, we also 

want to look at the animal health, at plant, at transportation data, 

at all those other streams. 

Mr. CULBERSON. That research is also already being done everywhere. You are talking integrating the data. 

Dr. GARZA. Right. It is being done mostly at the state level, 

which is why we are very excited about doing this project in North 

Carolina, to see how they integrate the data. 

Dr. SOSIN. Sir, could I? 

Mr. PRICE. All right. Yes. Certainly. 


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Dr. SOSIN. One very brief response. I do not think I could go home if I left here with the impression that we have all the resources we need to do this. This whole enterprise is underfunded 

by orders of magnitude. That we have the local resources in the 

public health sector or in the security sector already in place and 

everything we need, I would just hate to go home leaving a sense 

that everything is taken care of. 

Mr. CULBERSON. The network is there is my point. 

Dr. SOSIN. There are networks there but we are stretching the people beyond their capabilities, and we saw with H1N1 even in 

New York City in the spring that even in that context it took everybody and really good people in that city to be able to manage 

the health response and the public health actions that followed. So 

it is not a fixed problem, and I would hate to leave it with that 

thought. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. If I may just quickly follow-up. About a year ago I asked a radiologist in Staten Island, not your district but part of 

New York, a very good radiologist managing a practice, looking at 

chest x-rays, if he knew how to diagnose anthrax. He said yes, and 

he described it. I said if you did see a case, who would you report 

it to? He thought for a second and then he said, well, you know, 

I graduated Emory, it is in Atlanta, I would call the CDC. He said 

no, you know, I would probably get a clerk there. I do not know 

who to talk to there. No, I do not know who to report it to. Well, 

he should report it to New York City Health Department, and the 

law says he should. That is the reality of where we are at. It is 

a very uneven system depending upon clinical acumen and knowing how to interact with the health departments, and the health 

departments are simply too underfunded to go out and really grab 

this data in the way they should. 

Mr. CULBERSON. That is where it seems to me we ought to focus 

our energy. That is what I was driving at, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you. That would be a good illustration. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. While it may be theoretically true that, as you said, 

the networks are there, the networks do not amount to much if 

they are not—— 

Mr. CULBERSON. Educated. 

Mr. PRICE [continuing]. Educated and prepared to respond. I am 

very pleased to hear the things some of you said about North Carolina’s public health effort, and also the effort that is headed by our 

state university. One thing we learned very quickly in examining 

this is how unique it is, or you certainly cannot say it is being replicated all over this country. I understand Mr. Serrano has no further questions, but Mr. Rodriguez might. 

NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY (NBAF)

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I apologize. You know, we have scheduled all 

these hearings at the same time. I want to apologize for coming in 

and out. Let me I guess go back a little bit, Dr. O’Toole, on that 

bio national lab. Your last comment was basically that Kansas has 

sweetened up the pie a little bit better, is that correct? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well, I suppose that is one way of putting it, Congressman. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Okay. How would you put it? 


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Dr. O’TOOLE. They were among the finalists on the basis of the criteria that DHS specified for the competition, they far and away 

had the most intense concentration of researchers in animal and 

food disease in one area that was already established, and that 

critical mass of intellectual fire power was one of the key criteria 

that were used for the decision. As I said, Texas was also competitive. Both states actually made generous offers but it was the entire package that was decisive. As I said, the decision was made 

by a bunch of career officials. It was not a politically motivated decision. I would be happy to come over and talk to you about the 

specific details of how it was determined. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you. 

INTEGRATION OF BIOSURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS

Mr. PRICE. Dr. Sosin, let me turn to you and then Dr. O’Toole just to follow-up on the previous line of questioning. The National 

Academy of Sciences’ report focuses a great deal of attention on 

measures the public health community, including HHS agencies 

specifically, can undertake to increase the nation’s biosurveillance 

capabilities. Some of these recommendations include improvements 

to diagnostic and reporting tools, better cross-jurisdictional information sharing, as well as a general call, which you have echoed 

here today, to improve public health workforce strengths and competencies. 

Currently, the CDC has BioSense, the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System, global disease detection centers, disease 

specific outbreak response networks, such as Food Net, the Laboratory Response Network, the National Healthcare Safety Network, 

et cetera. Some states and some large cities have their own surveillance systems in place. Are you confident that these systems feed 

into a larger national surveillance system or that we are at least 

on the way to that kind of integration? What is the CDC doing to 

integrate these systems and to standardize public health disease 

data collection across jurisdictions? What specific gaps remain in 

public health surveillance? What steps are being taken to address 

these gaps? Then, finally, what about the question of speed? 

Dr. Goldstein and his NAS Committee have concluded, and of 

course this is accurate, that one of the advantages that BioWatch 

has is speed, assuming this Generation 3 capability can be developed. There is no way that a public health-based intake and reporting system could ever match that kind of instantaneous capability. 

On the other hand, we have not particularly had a definitive account of what kind of speed we could be talking about, whether 

there is any kind of convergence in terms of the turnaround time 

that we are talking about. It seems to me that is a fairly important 

capacity to assess when we are thinking about this 

complimentarily and where the BioWatch system will eventually 

stop and when we will rely on this broader system. 

Dr. SOSIN. So a number of very challenging and important questions you raise, Mr. Chairman, and probably not enough time here 

to be eloquent about the range of them. I do believe that the evolution over 60 years of disease specific surveillance systems and the 

opportunities to leverage new tools and new approaches as new 

threats have been prioritized over many years that the evolution 


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of technology on the efforts to bring standards to information technology, especially in the health sector, will on their own drive us 

towards stronger, more integrated systems. The question is how 

much can we spend to expedite that process and spend it in a productive and useful way. 

There are many efforts at the Department in the Office of National Coordinator to help expedite the uptake of electronic health 

records, and a lot of that work will lead to faster standardization 

and integration of these electronic health systems, but it is going 

to take many years for those systems to have wide uptake. So a 

lot of the question you ask has to do with what is the problem you 

are solving? If you are talking about healthcare hospital-related infections and what is the best surveillance system to monitor the everyday ones and stop bad practices or products that are contaminated, et cetera, you have a pretty good system in the tools working through the infection control practitioners, in the hospitals, to 

do that. 

Efforts underway that are focused on that are not necessarily efforts to address bio defense. So when we talk about a catastrophic 

exposure to anthrax spores, for example, we have not designed 

these other systems to be optimally configured to address this. We 

are now looking to what are the other ways that we can approach 

this. BioWatch is one of those ways that is very specific to a highly 

catastrophic type of event. In the health sector, though, if you have 

exposure to 100,000 people, the nature of disease is such that you 

will see some people very early on. 

They will get high exposures or they will be highly susceptible 

and they will develop disease. I mean, you will see not just one and 

are we going to pick up the one case, you will see many cases in 

the health system 36, 48 hours after that exposure. We would expect that with multiples of those, we will pick them up, we will 

have somebody suspicious in the clinical setting. If you have the 

local health capacity and the state health capacity, you will begin 

that investigation at that point in time. We see that in Connecticut 

examples of the sporadic anthrax cases, but you are not going to 

see it everywhere if you have got a very thin health sector in the 

public health sector and the medical sector. It is very workforce dependent. So technology is evolving. 

That is going to improve. There are efforts, both at CDC, to integrate the set standards. The director, as you heard earlier, has set 

a priority for doing better information management. That is the 

core and foundation of what we do at CDC. He is creating a single 

center that is bringing all of these informatics programs, the epidemiologists and the laboratories together to develop methods and 

to accelerate the standard setting. Those will help. These other investments in technology will accelerate standardization, but at the 

end of the day you need people. You need those people who have 

relationships. In your own state, having public health people sitting in your hospitals has been a major advance of connecting 

where the clinicians know now I am going to talk to so and so. It 

is not like it is an unknown health department, it is so and so who 

is in my hospital who is doing this work and just check in to see 

whether this is something they need to know about. That is going 

to lead to multiple benefits, not just for bio defense. 


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PUBLIC HEALTH

Mr. PRICE. Dr. Goldstein, do you have any further comments 

along these lines? You have already reflected on this briefly, but 

you stressed that you were not able to do a thorough assessment 

of the entire public health system. Nonetheless, you made the 

points you did about the complimentarily of the flu systems and 

you no doubt have some ideas about the eventual potential of a 

public health-based system. 

Dr. GOLDSTEIN. A few comments. One is that it is a highly 

stressed system right now. The public health system has been underfunded for quite some time and has been losing funding and losing good workforce over the past few years of the national crisis we 

are in. A second point is that there is, Congressman Obey has 

asked the National Association of Community and City Health Officers to look at this issue of the public health workforce. I think 

that is a very important study that NACCHO is undergoing and is 

one that I think would be very valuable to respond to some of the 

questions that we have heard. 

Mr. PRICE. Dr. O’Toole, finally, let me bring you in on the end 

of this because I know in your previous assignments you have 

thought a lot about the issue we are discussing at this moment, 

and in your current role, of course, you have some responsibility 

not just for the technical assessment of the capabilities of these 

various BioWatch machines, but also some responsibility for the 

risk assessment and for making some judgments about the extent 

of deployment for Generation 3, assuming it can be developed, and 

the point of intersection with other modes of surveillance that may 

be less instantaneous but more flexible. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is true I have 

spent the last 10 years thinking about bio defense and probably the 

topic I have thought about more than any other is biosurveillance 

because it is so troublesome and it is so complex. The first thing 

I would say is that, as all of my distinguished colleagues have said, 

if we cannot respond, it does not matter what we can detect. The 

foundation of response is the day-to-day public health and medical 

system in the country which, let us face it, is not just highly 

stressed, it is very fragmented and more or less in tatters. It can 

barely deal with Friday night in the emergency room. That is the 

first thing. 

The second thing is that when we talk about biosurveillance we 

need to talk about not just detection, but what Dr. Garza called situational awareness, which is really the point of NBIC. It is not to 

detect something, but to get all the information we need when 

there is events ongoing in order to make informed decisions at the 

very top of the government, which is very complicated as we saw 

in H1N1. The third thing I would say is that because response depends so critically on our routine day-to-day capabilities that are 

spread out over all our cities, and our small towns and so forth we 

constantly conflate normal healthcare and public health with these 

extraordinary events, the likes of which we have actually never 

seen, which are very hard to imagine. 


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BIO THREATS

So when we are talking about an anthrax attack, what we are 

talking about, as far as we can judge based upon available intelligence on available scientific knowledge and on the modeling, 

which the S&T directorate does, is we are talking about attacks. 

A single attack could kill upwards of 10,000 people, and it goes up 

from there, let me tell you. That is the, you know, smallest plausible event that we are talking about. So what we are contemplating here is not just an epidemic, it is a catastrophic event carried out by a thinking enemy who is looking at all of our defenses 

and trying to thwart them and basically trying to bring down the 

country. 

The question becomes what are we willing to spend to prevent 

that from happening or to at least mitigate the consequences so 

that fewer people die and it is not totally disruptive of our social 

and economic foundations? Okay? So that is the question. It is very 

difficult to answer on a fact basis, but here is what we have done 

in S&T. Three times now, every two years, we have done this thing 

called the bio threat risk assessment which takes what we know 

from intelligence data, which is not much in terms of hard intelligence because it is hard to find out about bio threats. We know, 

as you say, that Al-Qaeda had a lab in Afghanistan which we disrupted. We know they have an intent: fuse biological weapons. 

There is other intelligence out there that we can talk about in 

closed sessions. 

By the way, I would urge all of you to get a bio threat briefing 

on the top secret SCI level. So we take intelligence data, we take 

available scientific information about what we know about anthrax 

and dozens of other agents, we get experts to look at the availability of anthrax. Can you find it in the world? Could you steal 

it from a lab? Not just anthrax, but smallpox, and tularemia and 

all of these agents. We then look at how could you make it into a 

biological weapon? How hard is it to mill, or grind up, or disperse 

that bio threat into an aerosolized weapon? Then, if you do that, 

what happens in an urban area? These are all aerosolized attacks 

in high population areas. How many people could get infected? 

Based on the medicine that we know about that infectious agent, 

if infected, how many people would be likely to die, and we model 

it. So we take all of those assumptions and we see what comes out 

the other end. Then we do it again with a different agent. Then we 

do it with that agent again with different assumptions. We try to 

get a sense of what the boundaries are of how bad it could be under 

different conditions with different bugs. It is really, really terrifying. So that is the first thing we have to understand. We are not 

talking about an H1N1 epidemic, we are talking about a catastrophic attack on the United States. 

So the first thing that we have to do after all of this conversation 

about how our response, and indeed our survival, as you point out, 

Congressman, is going to depend upon our routine healthcare and 

public health delivery systems. Now we are in a space of an absolutely extraordinary unheard of event that is threatening to the 

survival of the nation. By the way, these are self-replicating organisms. So if a terrorist group has the capacity to do one attack, you 


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have to assume they can do two, or three, or 10 attacks. It is not 

like getting a nuclear weapon. Hopefully it is highly unlikely a terrorist group will get hold of a single nuclear weapons, but it is really remotely a possibility that they get hold of two or three. We are 

in a totally different ballpark when we are talking about a biological attack. 

So the question for you all and for us is how much are we willing 

to spend to mitigate the consequences of these attacks which we 

probably cannot prevent because the bugs are everywhere, they are 

easy to get, it is not so hard to carry out these attacks and it is 

very hard to get the intel to discover and interdict such attacks. So 

how much are we willing to spend, and what is the best way to deploy our resources? You are asking all the right questions, Mr. 

Chairman, and all of you are, okay? We can tell you what we have 

to do, what the end goal is, but we cannot tell you what the bug 

is that we are going to have to detect, we cannot tell you the precise likelihood of an attack with anthrax, or tularemia or plague, 

and it is basically we are placing bets with very high consequence 

results if we are wrong. 

We have to have the capacity to respond, which means not only 

a medical system and a public health system, we have to have 

countermeasures available when we need them in the quantities 

we need, which is why the President announced a new strategy towards that end in the State of the Union address, we have to be 

able to tell in the midst of this catastrophic event what is going on. 

Obviously, everybody downwind of the first person who gets sick is 

going to worry that they are infected and want medicines. Where 

do we really have to get to those medicines, and who really needs 

to be treated? 

As Dr. Sosin said, it would be very valuable, as you mentioned, 

Mr. Chairman, to have point of service diagnostic tests so I could 

tell whether or not Dr. Goldstein was infected if he comes into my 

emergency room with a cough. We cannot do that right now. That 

would be a good investment, okay? It would be very helpful to have 

BioWatch systems in other cities who do not have sick people so 

that we can assure ourselves it does not look like there is an aerosol attack here, for example. A different kind of use of BioWatch 

for situational awareness. 

There is a lot of things we would like to have, and with more 

time and an infinite budget I could list them all for you and give 

you some priorities, but the problem is very serious and very complex. We are chipping away at it. I truly believe that biosurveillance is in better shape now than it was two years ago when last 

I testified before this Committee because of this constant incremental improvement that we are making at the local level within 

CDC, and indeed, with NBIC. We learned a lot from H1N1, as Dr. 

Garza said. There is no silver bullet. Goodness knows Gen 3 

BioWatch is not a silver bullet. It is a better bullet, but we need 

an army. 

Mr. PRICE. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Culberson. 

Mr. CULBERSON. If I could, this is tremendously helpful. I want 

to thank the Chairman, for all of you, for putting this together. 


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May I say, Mr. Chairman, I think that Dr. O’Toole’s suggestion is 

an excellent one, for us to have the classified briefing. Could I ask 

that perhaps we could do that in a closed session? 

Mr. PRICE. I agree, and we will schedule that. 

Mr. CULBERSON. That would be very, very helpful and help us 

get our arms around this. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Be happy to participate in that, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 

Staff from the Department’s Office of Chief Financial Officer have reached out to 

the Subcommittee to make arrangements for the bio-threat briefing for the Members 

of the Subcommittee. 

Mr. PRICE. Good. Mr. Rodriguez, do you have anything further? 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Could I ask one more question? 

Mr. PRICE. Sure. 

BIO THREATS

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Let me ask you. I know that during 9/11 we had 

a great deal of difficulty coming to grips with the issue of a lot of 

people, and there was a lot of false, you know, about anthrax being 

here, being there, and we only had, you know, I guess the CDC and 

there was waiting periods of up to six months. We had from other 

countries, also, that so-called anthrax was in a classroom or something and had to, literally, if we were going to do it, it was going 

to take six months or so, and I guess the chaos and stuff. Are we 

anywhere close to in case we have something similar that—I know 

those poor little dogs that were well-trained, you know, and they 

do such a beautiful job. We only have so many of them. What happens if we have something similar or something happens to, does 

it all kind of basically—at one time we talked about diversifying 

the CDC and putting senders in separate areas, just like we talked 

about NSA and different areas where instead of just being one in 

case something happens there. Number one. So that said, and diversifying it and responding to such a situation again. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. In terms of where we are now versus then. First 

of all, I think it is fair to say that every state health department 

is better prepared to deal with white powder incidents and anthrax 

attacks than it was in 2001. We understand to a much greater degree what kinds of tests actually tell the truth about whether that 

white powder is anthrax or not. A lot of work has gone on at S&T 

to figure out exactly what kinds of tests are reliable and how you 

should sample a classroom or an area to figure out whether or not 

it is contaminated with anthrax. 

A lot of work has also gone on, some in S&T, some at EPA and 

at HHS to figure out how we would sample an area after an attack 

to figure out the extent of contamination, and then how to decontaminate it. Again, it is a combination of a lot more science, applying that to new technologies, making sure the word gets out so everybody understands the new technologies and the science, making 

sure the local folks have the capabilities to apply those technologies 

when they need to, and all of this requires continuous training, 

continuously advancing the edge of the science. So we are better 

off. Are we perfect? No. It will still be chaotic, but it will be less 

chaotic. 


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CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLANNING

Dr. SOSIN. So I think what you are speaking to is what we refer 

to as continuity of operations planning. The whole infusion of incident, command incident, management, not just in the usual sectors, but into public health has also been a dramatic change over 

these years that we are talking about. Continuity of operations 

plans, having offsite and plans in place that you are exercising are 

requirements for federal agencies. They are happening also at the 

state and local level. I think we are much better prepared to be 

able to deal with the consequences. If your laboratory or your primary site goes down for whatever reason, explosion or a contamination, that we have ways to adapt. The plans are never perfect, 

and, in fact, they are never the exact scenario we get, but they help 

us have thought through the measures where we are going to go, 

who is going to be critical for going, how we can work from home, 

all those different pieces. A lot of work has gone into assuring that 

continuity. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. Chairman, could I have one brief follow-up? 

Mr. PRICE. Certainly. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you. If I could, Dr. Garza, I wanted to 

ask you about the $89 million for this next generation. Now, what 

exactly would that amount support? Is that the minimum you 

need? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, sir. So that supports procuring the units for testing and evaluation. It is a step-wise process, however, so we have 

to make sure that the machines are going to do what we want 

them to do before we go out and purchase a whole bunch of machines. So step one is making sure that it is able to detect the organism that we want to detect. Although that sounds easy, it is a 

very complex process that involves a lot of time, effort and money. 

So part of the money will be spent on testing and evaluation. If it 

goes through that process, and we are confident that it will, then 

we test the subsystems to make sure the wheels turn and the widgets flip, and then we do field testing to make sure it is going to 

work in southern Florida, and in Chicago and out in arid climates. 

So it is a step-wise process, but that is what the money supports. 

Mr. CULBERSON. That is the absolute minimum level of funding 

you need in order to achieve this? There is a lot of debt in the deficit. I am always very conscious trying to find out where we can 

save money. 

Dr. GARZA. I believe so, sir. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you. 

Mr. GARZA. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. We will bring this to a close. You have been very generous with your time, and we have had, I think, a good discussion 

that will be very helpful to us. Dr. Goldstein, if we were going any 

further, I would ask you, and I will ask you to do this for the 

record to the extent you have something you think we need to hear, 

I would ask you to reflect a little more explicitly on the implications of your report for the 2011 budget submission. There are 

some apparent points of difference, such as the question of further 

Generation 2 testing. There may be other less apparent points of 


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difference that would lead you at least to suggest to us certain 

questions we should be raising, if not outright disagreements. 

So we really value the work of the Academy in putting this together, and we of course will make use of it far beyond just the current year budget consideration, but we would like to ask you to be 

as explicit as you can be about the questions your study brings to 

the budget submission as you have studied it from the Department. 

That would be very helpful. We thank all of you for your time, your 

service, your very useful testimony this afternoon. With that, the 

Subcommittee is adjourned. 

[The following information was submitted through the Questions 

for the Record:] 


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(273) 

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2010. 

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE: FY2011 BUDGET 

WITNESS 

MARK SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID PRICE

Mr. PRICE. Subcommittee will come to order. Good morning ev- eryone. Today we welcome Director Mark Sullivan of the U.S. Secret Service to the Subcommittee to discuss the 2011 budget proposal for the Secret Service which proposes $1.572 billion for the 

agency in 2011. This amount includes modest increases to fund inflationary salary growth and to continue the recapitalization of the 

Secret Service’s outdated computer system. The request also includes $17 million for the start-up cost of the 

2012 Presidential campaign. It is hard to believe, but indeed that 

marathon is already in its formative stages, and the Secret Service 

agents working on the campaign will certainly have an arduous few 

years ahead of them. The 2011 request also includes a significant and surprising re- duction in Secret Service operations, a $9.6 million cut to the budget for protective operation support personnel. These personnel were 

initially funded through 2009 emergency appropriation which the 

Congress passed just after the inauguration to respond to an increased level of threats directed at President Obama. 

Since that time, the threat level has waned to a level consistent 

with past presidents, which is to say that the threats against President Obama are probably more than likely the result of the office 

he holds rather than personal animus against the man himself. 

Still, as we are all aware, it only takes one or two deranged or impassioned individuals to create a potentially dangerous situation 

for Secret Service’s protectees. The recent party crashing incident, 

which fortunately did not result in violence against any of our 

country’s leaders, shows how nothing, not even the assumption 

that uninvited guests will not show up for a White House function, 

can be taken for granted in this day and age. So Mr. Director, we are interested in understanding how an in- crease that the Secret Service said it needed less than two years 

ago is now no longer required for the protective mission. Are you 

confident that not only the absolute volume of threats but also the 

intensity of those threats make it reasonable to decrease the budget for protective support? Is it wise for the Secret Service to be 

going into the campaign season with a lower level of support personnel than you thought necessary at the end of the last election? The other issue of note addressed in the Secret Service budget is the poor state of the agency’s information technology system. In 

a recent analysis by the National Security Agency, Secret Service 


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IT systems were found to have a reliability rate of less than 65 percent. The study also uncovered security vulnerabilities and a mainframe architecture dating from the 1980s. 

In last year’s appropriations bill, we started the process of recapitalizing the Secret Service’s hardware and software with an appropriation of $34 million. This year’s budget seeks $48.6 million 

more including $15 million for interoperability of radio systems 

with the White House Communications Agency. 

Clearly this is a project that cannot wait if the Secret Service is 

to provide the highest levels of protection necessary for the 2012 

campaign. However, it is astonishing to contemplate that this problem was seemingly ignored or deferred for so long. The budget for 

every agency at DHS includes a per-employee cost module that is 

supposed to fund regular capital replacement such as scheduled upgrades in computer infrastructure. So, Mr. Director, we do need to 

understand more about how the Secret Service allowed these system deficiencies to fester for so long especially in light of other department-wide efforts to improve Homeland Security technology. 

Mr. Director, these issues should not overshadow the excellent 

work done everyday by the agents and officers who work for the 

Secret Service. We know that these agents literally put their lives 

on the line to protect our nation’s leaders, our financial institutions, and the integrity of our currency. We are grateful for the 

dedication of your men and women in your agency in serving our 

country. I also appreciate the good working relationship we have 

maintained during my tenure as Chairman of the Subcommittee 

and your agency’s responsiveness to various Congressional concerns. It is this type of collaborative relationship that our Committee depends on to make the best investment decisions for our 

country. 

Now let me turn to my colleague and the ranking member of the 

Subcommittee, Mr. Rogers, for his opening remarks. After that, Mr. 

Director, we will ask you to summarize your written testimony in 

a five-minute oral statement and then answer the questions we 

have about your budget proposal. 

[The information follows:] 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER HAROLD ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Director, for another session at this table. You 

have been doing this for a good while, and so have we. So we hope 

to gain good information from you today toward the budget for next 

year. 

Secret Service of course has a long proud history as the nation’s 

oldest Federal law enforcement agency which is why I have found 

all the discussion about the events at last November’s Indian State 

Dinner rather disturbing. 

This incident has been an unfortunate distraction from the Secret Service’s distinguished record of safeguarding the nation’s financial infrastructure and protecting our national leaders. 

With that being said, the incident did bring to light the manner 

in which people are cleared into the White House for official events. 

Mr. Director, I firmly believe that no other third party should have 

any role in determining access to the White House. 

Secretary Napolitano testified that she wholeheartedly agreed 

with me at our recent hearing with her. Today I would like to hear 

whether the revised access protocols that you have put in place will 

prevent further slip-ups and sufficiently empower the Secret Service to perform its duties. 

With respect to your protection mission, I note that it is already 

time for you all to begin preparing for the next election. Given the 

unprecedented crowds that the last election drew and the length of 

time that the Secret Service was protecting more than two candidates, I am interested in learning how you are integrating the 

lessons from the last election into your preparations for the upcoming one in 2010. 

As always, I want to understand how you plan to strike a reasonable balance between your investigative and your protection missions in the upcoming election. 

Mr. Director, we remain aware of the challenges facing Secret 

Service, and I believe you are well aware of our Subcommittee’s expectations. But I want to reiterate to you again, as the chairman 

has, that you have our trust and our support, and we look forward 

to your testimony here today. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Director, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MARK SULLIVAN

Mr. SULLIVAN. Good morning Chairman Price, ranking Member Rogers and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. It is my 

privilege to appear before you today to discuss the President’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget request for the U.S. Secret Service. The last year and a half has been an active period for the U.S. Secret Service especially in the areas of protective travel and securing major events. Today, I would note that from January 2009 

through January 2010, the President has engaged in 31 international travel stops, a significant increase when compared to the 

previous administration’s first year in office. During the same period, the Vice-President engaged in 21 inter- national travel stops compared to one international travel stop during the previous Vice-President’s first year in office. In addition to the increased international travel for the President 

and Vice-President, the U.S. Secret Service was responsible for 

eight national special security events in Fiscal Year 2009, the most 

ever designated in a single year. This included the G–20 held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which was attended by the President and a total of 37 heads of state and 

government, along with their spouses. 

Concurrent to the G–20 in Pittsburgh, the Secret Service also 

protected 189 heads of state and government and 60 spouses for 

the 64th U.N. General Assembly, a 40-percent increase over the 

previous year. 

In addition to these protective requirements, the Secret Service 

was also successful in dismantling a number of transnational criminal groups targeting our Nation’s financial institutions. For example, the established partnerships developed throughout 29 electronic crime task forces led to the successful investigation into the 

network intrusion of the Heartland Payment Systems. This investigation revealed that data from more than 130 million credit card 

accounts were compromised and transferred to a command and 

control server operated by a transnational criminal group involved 

in other ongoing Secret Service investigations. This is the largest 

identity theft case in U.S. history. Also last year, the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police and the International Association of 

Financial Crimes Investigators recognized us for another significant investigation, TJX, which was the largest and most complex 

case of its type in U.S. history prior to the Heartland Payment Systems case. 

The President’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget request for the U.S. Secret Service totals roughly $1.58 billion and focuses on four primary areas: funding to provide the necessary training and equipment that will be needed in advance of the 2012 Presidential campaign; funding to enhance protection of the White House complex 

and other protected sites; funding to sustain critical and investigative operations in the areas of protected intelligence, cyber crimes 

directed at our Nation’s banking and financial institutions and 

counterfeit suppression; and funding to address IT and communications deficiencies that directly support the protective and investigative mission. I will highlight a few of these initiatives this morning. 


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Although the 2008 Presidential campaign and transition activities ended just last year, we are already beginning the necessary 

planning and advanced work for the 2012 campaign. This early 

preparation is critical because of the time that is required to provide advanced protective training to our employees and DHS partner agencies participating in the campaign’s security activities. In 

addition, we require start-up funds to procure equipment and preposition protective vehicles throughout the country to transport 

protectees and to purchase technical security equipment to appropriately secure their homes and sites to be visited by the candidates. 

Critical to both campaign security and day-to-day operations in 

the White House complex and other protective sites, the men and 

women who serve in the uniform division are the first line of defense against outside threats. In recent years, the uniform division 

has faced ongoing recruiting and retention challenges. This in part 

is because of current pay structure and its inability to use certain 

hiring flexibilities such as offering higher starting salaries to applicants who have prior state or law enforcement experience. While 

legislation to address these issues is currently pending before Congress, the President’s budget request provides the Secret Service 

with the resources needed to meet these ongoing recruitment and 

retention challenges. 

In support of the protective and investigative mission, the U.S. 

Secret Service must modernize our IT infrastructure and communications system. The Secret Service has been working with the 

Department for several years to address immediate infrastructure 

concerns while providing a long-term plan to replace our legacy 

mainframe IT system with a modern Web-based environment that 

can meet the demands of today’s mission requirements. One example of the need for this modernization effort is the White House 

Communication Agency interoperability project. Between 2003 and 

2008, WHCA made investments to their communication system 

that created an interoperability gap with the U.S. Secret Service. 

Thanks to the funding this Committee provided in Fiscal Year 2009 

Omnibus Appropriations Act, the U.S. Secret Service is one step 

closer to achieving interoperability and full communications parity 

with WHCA. 

Despite the demands of our mission, the men and women of the 

U.S. Secret Service remain vigilant and prepared for the challenges 

that lie ahead. At this moment, we and our partners are engaged 

in security planning for the nuclear security summit in Washington, D.C. next month which was designated a National Special 

Security Event by Secretary Napolitano on February 6th, 2010. 

We expect domestic and international travel stops to continue at 

a heightened pace consistent with what we saw during the past 

year. Further, as the complexity of cyber and other crimes directed 

at our Nation’s banking and financial institutions grows, the U.S. 

Secret Service will continue to foster relationships with our local, 

state, federal and international law enforcement partners through 

our network of electronic crimes task forces and financial crime 

task forces. 


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Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, this 

concludes my opening statement. I will be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

[The information follows:] 


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2012 CAMPAIGN BUDGET

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Director. Let me move directly to 

your budget request for $14 million in new funding for the startup cost of the 2012 Presidential campaign. 

This is significantly more than the $8.1 million in start-up costs 

for the 2004 campaign which was the last time a sitting president 

ran for election. Even after adjusting for eight years of inflation, 

this represents a 41 percent increase in costs. 

Why has the first year planning cost to prepare for the 2012 

campaign grown so much more than the rate of inflation since we 

last had this circumstance? Is the Secret Service planning a more 

robust effort for the upcoming Presidential campaign than in the 

past, or are there other circumstances that account for this? We assume that the protection budget correlates roughly to the workload, 

so why would Secret Service request such a large increase for the 

Presidential campaign but at the same time be reducing its budget 

for the regular protective mission? How does this balance out? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Chairman. As you mentioned, the 

budget for the 2004 campaign was $8 million. I believe the budget 

for the 2008 campaign was about $19 million for the first year; and 

for this campaign, it is $14 million. 

When we look at the cost associated with the 2012 campaign 

compared to the 2004 campaign, there are a couple of areas where 

there has been a significant increase. Again, I am not sure how you 

would—you know, what we are using to compare the inflation with 

back to 2004, but the cost we see that has increased is the cost of 

vehicles. 

For the campaign, the vehicles that we get are a very important 

part of our protective methodology. We have to buy these vehicles 

this coming year. 

These vehicles need to be armored. They need to have ballistic 

glass installed. They need to be equipped with radios and other 

types of equipment for the campaign, and then they need to be prepositioned around the country. But the cost of these vehicles compared to 2004 has increased, about twice the cost that they were 

back in 2004. 

Additionally, we have to buy radios and other types of technical 

equipment. Again, we look at the cost compared to 2004. This cost 

has increased about twice as much as well. 

I will tell you that one area where we have found efficiencies is 

in-training. I believe we are about a $1.5 million-and-a-half under 

where we were back in 2004 for training. 

Back during 2004, we used to do our training—we would have 

all of our people come to the Rowley Training Center to do training, and that would involve, you know, the travel cost. That would 

involve per diem. That would involve the lodging cost of all these 

people coming to DC, not to mention the fact of taking them out 

of their district for a longer period of time. 

What we found in the 2008 campaign, that it was more cost effective and, from a mission perspective, better to have our people 

trained in the field, so now we are having the trainers go to our 

people in the field. So we did realize a cost savings by conducting 

that type of training. 


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But again, I would say that two areas where we really have seen 

an increase would be in the cost of our vehicles and the equipment 

for the vehicles, as well as the radios and the other types of technology. 

INTENSITY OF THREATS AGAINST PROTECTEES

Mr. PRICE. Well, to turn to the manpower and womanpower 

question, the FTE question and the way this request dovetails with 

the reductions you are proposing for the regular protective mission, 

let me see if we cannot shed a little light on that. 

I mentioned in my opening statement, we understand that the 

number of threats made against the President have dropped, however, during the 2008 Presidential campaign, the intensity of 

threats against then candidate Obama lead to the assignment of a 

Secret Service security detail earlier than for any other candidate 

in history. Of course, we are all aware that it takes only one particularly obsessed individual to present a real threat. 

There has been a rise recently of lone-gunmen style attacks at 

Fort Hood, IRS offices in Austin, the Pentagon. So we do need to 

realize it is not only the number of threats but the fervor with 

which they are conveyed that indicate the level of risk that our 

leaders face. 

So to the extent you can express this in open session, can you 

tell us if the threats against the President or any of your other 

protectees include the hallmarks of any particular intensity that 

the Secret Service has not seen before? Have you seen any change 

in the intensity of threats against the President since the inauguration? 

Then if you could help us understand how changes in volume or 

intensity of threats translate into Secret Service manpower and 

personnel requirements? 

Do more threats require additional field investigations? Does Secret Service increase the protective forces directly when the Agency 

observes particularly aggressive threats? 

And then the underlying question, at the same time that you are 

asking for these increases anticipating the 2012 campaign, how 

does that dovetail with the decreases, the manpower decreases in 

particular, that you are looking at for the regular protective mission? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Chairman, you have brought up some great 

points, and I will try to answer them, but if I leave any of them 

out, be sure to remind me which ones I left out. You know, as far 

as the threats go, it is something that we pay a lot of attention to. 

As you know, we have one program area that is just dedicated 

to protective intelligence, and I believe that we are very aggressive 

with it, working with all of our partners there that provide us the 

best information that they have. We are a big consumer of information, and that is a big part of our protective methodology based 

upon that information we receive. 

However, we also know that we cannot just rely on the known 

information. There is a lot of unknown information there. So for 

that reason, I do not believe that there is an employee on our job 

who does not wake up in the morning or go to bed at night not 


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thinking that there is someone out there looking to harm any one 

of the individuals that we protect everyday. 

So the threat information is important to how we do our mission, 

but we still know that everyday there is somebody out there looking to harm those people that we protect. And you are right, it 

could be a lone gunman. It could be an organized group, and we 

have to look at every single one of those possibilities. 

As far as the threat level, as I have talked about before, during 

the Presidential campaign, the threat level we saw rose right about 

the time of the election. I would say that that was the highest it 

had been prior to that and since that. 

As we approached the inauguration, we saw those numbers begin 

to decline, and over the past year, little over a year, I would say 

that the number of threats we are seeing against this president are 

at the same level they were for the previous, the last two, administrations at this point in their administration. 

It pretty much goes back to, I believe what you said during your 

opening statement, that it is more about the office than anything, 

these threats that we are seeing. 

Now, going back to the hiring, you know, back two years ago we 

made a case because of heightened threats that we needed to bring 

more people into our organization, into the agent ranks, and into 

our administrative, professional, and technical ranks. 

Thanks to you, and you Mr. Rogers, we are able to get in the 

$100 million Omnibus bill. We got the opportunity to hire 150 

agents and I believe it was about 204 administrative professional 

and technical. 

These people were to go to permanent protection details. The priority was for them to go to permanent protection assignments and 

go out into the field to do some of the other protective duties that 

we need to be done in our network of field offices. 

Ultimately, the out-year funding for that was cut by about nine 

and a half million dollars, and we had to really take a hard look 

at our hiring goals here. And we had to make sure, one thing that 

all of us wanted to make sure, what I wanted to make sure of was 

that whatever people we did bring on that we would be able to 

bring them on and equip them and have the necessary funding in 

the out years to make sure that these were hires that we could 

maintain. 

With this loss of nine and a half million dollars, we had to modify our hiring goals, and we reduced it to 125 agents to be brought 

on, and I believe it was 146 or so administrative, professional and 

technical, probably about 138, somewhere around there. 

So far this year, we have hired all 125 of the agents. I will tell 

you that every one of those agents has started in a field office. 

Those people are backfilling more seasoned agents who have been 

now transferred to a permanent protective detail. 

So I can assure you that those priorities when it comes to our 

permanent protection have been addressed by the 125 that we have 

hired, and again, they were backfilled by these new hires. 

We have hired 75 of the administrative, professional and technical positions, those priority positions we needed to fill for fiscal 

year 2009 and now during fiscal year 2010, we are looking to hire 


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about another 40 or so of the administrative, professional and technical. 

So did we get exactly what we are looking for in the original Omnibus? We did not; however, have we been able to prioritize and 

put those people to the best use where they need to be and does 

that make us whole and does it get it to where we are looking to 

be? 

I believe at this point in looking at the constrained budget environment that we are operating in, I believe that we have been able 

to make this work, and I believe that—and as I have told you before—protecting the President is our number one priority, and we 

are not going to compromise on that. I believe that we have the assets in place to do that. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. 

2008 CAMPAIGN COST OVERRUNS

Mr. ROGERS. Well, in the 2008 election, the Secret Service spent 

a little over 5 million beyond the amount they were appropriated 

for in 2009, and your present request for fiscal ’11 for the protective mission of the Secret Service, you are requesting $792 million 

with $18 million of that specifically called out for preparations for 

the 2012 campaign. 

You missed the mark in 2008 by 5 million. What can you extrapolate from that about 2012, if anything? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As we have talked about before, Congressman, 

you know, it is very difficult to predict these type of events, and 

I believe we talked about this four years ago as well. 

One of the challenges we had last year was the number of protection days we ended up having, you know, and that the campaign 

did start earlier than we had originally anticipated. 

Also, at the end of the campaign or at the inauguration, we had 

a total of I think four or five NSSEs right around the inauguration, 

and that did add to the cost of the campaign. We did have to go 

back and look for reprogramming. 

But what we did learn is that they are—well, what it did reaffirm to us is that these campaigns are very unpredictable. And the 

crowd sizes that we did see did drive how we had to conduct our 

protection. 

We put, I think, nearly 5 million people through metal detectors 

during that campaign which I think is at least two times the 

amount we had had put in during the 2004 campaign. 

So we do want to make sure with this campaign coming up that 

we do—I do not believe that there will be as many candidates, but 

again, that remains to be seen. 

This last campaign was the first time I believe in 50 years that 

we did not have an incumbent running for office, so we had candidates from both political parties. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, as you say, you are unlikely to have the number of candidates in 2012 as we had in 2008, and as we all know, 

that remains to be seen at this point. But you do anticipate fewer 

protectees in the campaign in 2012 than 2008? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is what we are expecting. Yes, sir. 


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WHITE HOUSE STATE DINNER INCIDENT

Mr. ROGERS. Let me quickly jump tracks now to the White House 

access that I mentioned in my opening remarks. It seems to me 

that we do not have clear lines of responsibility about clearing who 

gets into the White House. I hope I am mistaken on that, and you 

can correct me if I am. 

But the State Department has a hand in it. The White House social secretary’s staff has a hand in it. Obviously the Secret Service, 

perhaps others, but these people who crashed the party, so to 

speak, a while back at the Indian state dinner raise this issue, and 

I think they did us a favor, frankly, because I think we need to 

clarify this. Perhaps it has been done or already has been in effect. 

What can you tell us? Should not the Secret Service be the person, agency, that clear people into the White House grounds? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Congressman, I see it as a partnership, and it is 

a very critical partnership. Just to give you a little bit of background on the procedure, what will happen when there is an event 

at the White House, these people are invited by the White House 

to come to the White House. They will give us a list of the people 

who have been invited and who have accepted, and we will do 

name checks on these individuals. So again, it is a very important 

part of the partnership. 

From that, the invitation list is generated, and in the system 

that we have in place is that—we and the White House staff will 

work together as partners at each checkpoint to ensure that those 

individuals who have been invited do get in. 

If somebody is not on that list, again us working with the White 

House staff will determine if, in fact, they should be on the list. If 

they should be on the list and they have not been name checked, 

we will name check them and then those people will be allowed to 

enter the White House. 

As far as with the State Department, we have a very healthy and 

long-standing relationship with the State Department. We have a 

long-standing partnership with them. 

On this particular night, we did not have the list. We have since 

modified that so that we and the State Department are working off 

the same list, and we are checking that list together. And this was 

at an area that was a remote location from the White House. 

But again, it is my opinion that the best way for this to work 

is for us to do it as a partnership, both of us being there together, 

both of us with the list and checking the list off together. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, the State Department is not in charge of protecting the White House from unlawful intrusions, nor is the social 

secretary. 

They may be involved in making up the invitation list of who 

should be invited and see that they are invited, but when it comes 

to gaining entry into the White House grounds, I firmly believe it 

is the Secret Service, period. Am I wrong in that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, as far as somebody getting into the White 

House who should not come into the White House, I mean, that is 

our priority. That is our job to do that. 

However, as far as the list, as far as checking that list and making sure the people that need to get in are getting in, I do believe 


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that it does have to be a partnership, whether it be with the White 

House staff or with the State Department, just to ensure that those 

right people are getting in. 

Mr. ROGERS. How did these people get in past the checkpoint? 

They were not on the list, right? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They were not on the list. As I have said from the 

beginning, Congressman, you know, this was a mistake in judgment. This was an error. They should not have been allowed to go 

by the initial checkpoint. 

We had protocols and policies in place for that evening that if 

anybody showed up at that gate and their name was not on the list 

that we were to call for assistance to help us verify whether or not 

those individuals should be able to get in. 

Mr. ROGERS. And what happened when they showed up and they 

were not on the list? What happened then? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They were allowed to proceed through that gate. 

Mr. ROGERS. By whom? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. By us. 

Mr. ROGERS. How come? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As I told you, sir, it was a mistake. They should 

not have been allowed to go through. 

Mr. ROGERS. Has anybody been reprimanded for that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Currently, we have put those people on administrative leave to testify before—we are in the middle of a criminal 

investigation, so at this point, sir, I would rather not go into anything deeper than that as far as where we are with the administrative action. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I know just from a personal reference, Mr. 

Chairman, members of Congress are invited to the White House for 

a Christmas party. Obviously a large number of members, 435 

House members and 100 senators, staff, and cabinet members and 

the like, quite a crowd of people. 

But I noticed in going through the process of getting in, we were 

met on the street outside the White House by some young staffers 

from somebody with a list in their hand, and they would check you 

off and you would go four or five steps, and another young person 

would—who represented whom, I do not know. 

And they would have a list. They would check you off, and you 

got checked off four or five times by young staffers for whom I do 

not know. Finally, you get to the gate, and people—I assume Secret 

Service people—then check you off an official list. 

But who are these other people that check you off five or six 

times? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I am not sure—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Are they assigned to social secretary or who? 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. Again, sir, I believe working with our 

partners at the White House, that would be White House staff and 

our people working together. 

You know, we do not want anyone to get into the White House 

who should not get into the White House, and we have looked at— 

you know, we put 100,000 people through the White House every 

month. 100,000 people go through the White House every month. 

Thousands of pass holders are at the White House that we expedite 


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through there. You know, I believe our men and women do a terrific job. 

What happened back in November none of us want to see that 

happen again. That is why I go back to the partnership with the 

White House or with the State Department. We believe it is very 

important to us to work as a partnership and make sure that the 

people that are invited get in and those people that are not invited 

do not get in. 

And those people that you are referring to, and I am not sure of 

the number of times, but those are the White House staff people 

and our people working together to ensure that the right people are 

getting into the White House. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I have to tell you, going to that Christmas 

party, it was a confusing process and helter skelter. It was not 

what it has been in the past, and it is probably beyond the Secret 

Service’s capability to solve, but it is not a clean clear check with 

all of those other people there. I do not blame you for them, but 

the process needs to be cleaned up some. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, sir, that process going back to November, we have taken a hard look at that, and we have worked very 

hard with that. Again with all due respect, I believe that that being 

so close to the incident back in November, I think everybody was 

trying to do the best job they can to make sure that we did get the 

right people in there and, again, to make sure that the wrong people did not get in there. 

Mr. ROGERS. Let me just put it this way, I feel completely 

checked. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is good to know, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. I think we all felt completely checked at the Christmas party, and I also think we understood at some level that this 

was reaction to the earlier incident and perhaps did not assume 

that the multiple layers, as the ranking member says, is somewhat 

apparently redundant list checking that was going on did not assume that that was necessarily the permanent state of affairs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, by the time I got through that check 

out—those checked lines, those tiered lines of checkouts—I was too 

tired to go to the party then. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Ruppersberger. 

OVERTIME AND RETIREMENT PAY

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I want to say that I think your organization does a great job. You have well-trained men and women. You 

remind me of the offensive line of a football team. You only are noticed when something goes wrong, and when things do not go 

wrong, that is when you are doing your job. 

I want to get into the issue of the overtime pay. You mentioned 

that you have a lot more resources and more man hours especially 

in the last election with the type of campaign that it was. Also it 

just gives you a lot of overtime, and yet a lot of people because of 

certain Federal cap laws cannot be paid for some of their overtime. 

I know that in some areas there is some air traffic controllers 

there is a waiver on overtime. I think anybody in the Department 

of Defense in theater there is overtime. 


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Have you looked into this? Where are you as it relates to that 

issue of a waiver for overtime in unusual circumstances for your 

men and women? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. Yes. You know—to go over the overtime 

cap. I have the ability to go to the overtime and ask her for a waiver. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Have you received those waivers? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We have not had to do that. This is the first year 

I believe that we have the—the cap is going to be on starting, I 

think, in fiscal year 2010 if I have that correct, but we have not 

had to go looking for a wavier. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay, even with all the overtime, the man 

hours that you used in this last election? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We did not, as far as I know. No. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay, well, my understanding was you had 

an issue there. 

Secondly, I know you are not a party of the Intelligence community, but I know that you are in Estonia now because of financial 

crimes and issues such as that. Do you work seamlessly with the 

Intelligence community, both military and straight Intelligence? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Congressman. They are one of our best partners, as I mentioned earlier. We are a big consumer of intelligence 

and information, and I can tell you that all of our partners in the 

Intelligence community could not be more forthcoming, and we 

have a great relationship with them. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay, well, that is good. I think Intelligence is probably one of the main issues that you deal with everyday to do your job. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As a matter of fact, just to remind you, you know, 

we are very active in the JTTFs, in the FBI, JTTFs, and those are, 

again, very critical to our operations. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. The last thing, retirement issue. For 

no fault of their own, I think, you know, about 200 Secret Service 

agents were put into the wrong retirement system 20 years ago, 

and they have lost thousands of dollars of retirement which they 

should be entitled to because everyone else in the agency has dealt 

with that. 

Senator Lieberman and I are trying to work on this issue to see 

if it can be resolved. Do you know anything about that at this 

point? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I do. I am familiar with that. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. Can you discuss it, and do you have 

any recommendations or suggestions? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sure. First of all, I am very grateful to you 

for your support. These are agents who came on the job in 1984, 

1985 and 1986 who have since risen into many of the senior leadership positions of our organization. 

As it has been reported to me, many of these people were recruited back during 1982, 1983 when the old retirement system 

was in force, and they were told that they would be in that—it has 

been told to me they were told that they would be in that retirement plan. 

I am also told that when they came on the job, whether it was 

1984, ’85, and ’86, they were lead to believe that they would be in 


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that retirement plan. I believe with the 2012 campaign coming on 

I do look at this as a retention issue. 

These are people that are highly marketable. They are people that could leave because of this current plan just does not lend 

itself to tracking them to stay. These are people who have told me they would like to remain on the job and that this bill would, I think, so a long way to maintaining these employees within the U.S. Secret Service. So any help 

you could provide with that, we would appreciate. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. Thank you. 

SECRET SERVICE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Director, let me turn to the question of information technology, another major item in your budget. The budget requests $48.6 million for information technology investments. Recent reports have highlighted how some Secret Service sys- tems such as the primary mainframe on which many critical applications run date from the 1980s. 

However, the Secret Service budget, like all budgets at DHS, in- cludes certain per-employee cost allowances for various overhead 

and capital expenses. It does raise the question why the Secret 

Service has allowed its IT infrastructure to become so outdated 

particularly when we year after year—I think without exception— 

have granted the full budget request for Secret Service, and that 

request is supposed to cover the cost of regular system recapitalization. It is supposed to be built into the budget. 

Then, of course, the question that this proposal raises, what kind 

of program are you putting in place to ensure that the base Secret 

Service budgets are appropriately aligned with the information 

technology developments you simply must make now and in the future? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Chairman, one of the priorities for me right after 

I became director was our IT infrastructure, and I had asked—this 

is going back to 2007 or late 2006, I had asked for a top-to-bottom, 

bottom-to-top review of our IT infrastructure and wanted a report 

on what the state of our IT infrastructure was. 

The report I got back—that if you were looking for a 1980s stateof-the-art IT infrastructure compatible with the U.S. Treasury Department, you know, we were your guys. 

The bottom line was that we were—we confirmed what you just 

said is that we had an IT infrastructure that was degrading and 

that was in need of repair. 

So I requested that we do an as-is—and again, let me—give me 

a full briefing on the as-is, and I also asked that we have an outside entity come in and do a review, and ultimately that was the 

NSA who came in and did a blue team. 

As you had mentioned earlier, we found that we had about a 68 

percent reliability and that our IT people were having to come up 

with, you know, work-arounds to get our IT infrastructure to just 

maintain. 

It was that point that we began working with you, and I would 

like to thank you, Chairman, and you Mr. Rogers, for all your help 

because both of you have been extremely helpful with this. And beVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:47 Sep 10, 2010 Jkt 057185 PO 00000 Frm 00301 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A185P2.XXX A185P2

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cause of your help, I believe that we are well on our way to fixing 

our IT infrastructure. 

We have worked with the Department. We worked with the, you 

know, the DHS CIO. I think that we have come up with a very 

good plan. It is a five-year plan to get our IT infrastructure up to 

where it needs to be. 

Currently right now we are stabilizing our IT infrastructure, and 

we have addressed many of the deficiencies that were pointed out 

by the NSA report. Now we are analyzing and working with the 

Department, working with the CIO to make sure that this is the 

best and most effective investment that we can and to make sure 

that 10 or 15 years from now we do not find ourselves in the same 

position. 

You know, this is something that is going to require maintenance. It is something that is going to continue to maintain attention. I believe we have a good plan, and I think that the trick here 

is going to be for us to maintain that plan and continue to keep 

the Department and you advised of the direction we are going in. 

Mr. PRICE. I appreciate your commitment to the plan going forward, and I perhaps should underscore what you just said about 

sticking to the plan. 

The question I am raising has to do with whether you may need 

some help in doing that from the way your budget is framed because there has been a lag, a serious lag, in investment in IT infrastructure despite a budget process that is supposed to guarantee 

that there is money available for this kind of work right along 

without it being specifically designated in a single line item. 

As you know, your information technology budget is included 

within a broader account within the broader salaries and expenses 

account. That does allow you some flexibility to use these funds for 

other activities as competing priorities might emerge. 

So my assumption is that the past history demonstrates some 

taking advantage of this flexibility, perhaps for what seem to be 

good reasons at the time. But given the poor condition of the Agency’s information technology infrastructure, it leads one to question 

whether maybe that flexibility over time has served us well. 

How can we make sure that the funds appropriated last year and 

requested for 2011 will not be redirected to other priorities? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, there is not too many priorities for us 

that are any more important than this IT infrastructure. You 

know, and I can tell you that I am committed to it. Senior staff is 

committed to it. All of our employees are committed to it. The people that we have working on this project are committed to it. This 

is a really important initiative within our organization. 

You know, what happened going back 10 or 15 years ago, quite 

frankly, I cannot address. All I can address is moving forward here 

and make my commitment to you that we are going to make sure 

that we keep you informed of the direction we are going in, make 

sure we continue to work with the Department. 

I can tell you that we have got 100 percent support and backing 

from the Department. We have made a presentation to them. They 

have signed off on it. There is a report, I believe, that went from 

the CIO up to your Committee. I think it spells out what our plan 

is and what our commitment is. 


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I would be more than happy to continue to come up here and pro- vide you with progress of where we are or have our IT people come 

up here and talk to your staff about where we are with it. But I really do appreciate your support on it. 

REPLACEMENT CYCLE FOR SECRET SERVICE VEHICLES AND SMALL

ARMS

Mr. PRICE. Well, and we appreciate that commitment, and we 

will follow your progress closely. Finally, let me just ask if there is perhaps more problems where this one came from, so to speak, whether when you acknowledge 

that the Secret Service has been unable to keep its information 

technology up to date, are there other analogous problems, for example, with the vehicle fleet, with weapon systems? What is the replacement cycle for Secret Service vehicles and sidearms, and can we be assured that we are on top of the game 

here? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, you know with vehicles it is something that is very important to our mission. We pay attention to that, 

both the vehicles that we put our protectees in and the vehicles 

that we put our employees in. I believe this committee has been 

very fair with us as far as the funding for these vehicles, and I can 

assure you that we are fine with vehicles. As far as weapons, we are continually looking at the type of weapons that our people carry. Right now we have two separate 

evaluations ongoing regarding shoulder weapons that our people 

use. 

I, just as a matter of fact, had a meeting last week with several of our people that I would refer to as experts in the field of weapons, and I can assure you that we want to make sure that our people have the best equipment. 

As I said, our people and our mission are our priorities, and I 

want to make sure that our people are able to carry out their mission. You know, when we look at efficiencies within our organization, when we look at ways to cut back on overtime, we look for 

those discretionary areas. However, when we look at making those efficiencies, we are ada- mant that it will not come at the expense of our mission. We do 

not look to compromise when it comes to buying equipment. We do 

not look to compromise when it comes to buying vehicles. We do 

not compromise when it comes to anything that is going to directly 

support our operational mission. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

SECRET SERVICE FINANCIAL CRIMES INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. ROGERS. Well, of course protection is one of the big missions 

of the Secret Service, but there is another big aspect of what you 

do and that is financial crimes investigations. 

After all, this is the oldest law enforcement agency in the government, formed to—and the treasury department—to look out for 

counterfeiting and financial crimes. 

And I do not want us to forget that big heavy responsibility that 

you have in that respect, especially in these troubled economic 


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times where the temptations for people to engage in huge financial 

crimes, the temptations are greater now than perhaps ever. Ever. 

I notice in the last year you uncovered a very large financial 

crime operation. Can you describe what I am talking about? Are 

you familiar with what I am talking about? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. There is a couple of them. There was 

the—there were two identity theft cases that we worked, both of 

them at the time were the biggest identity theft case in the history 

of this country. These were data intrusions where individuals were 

able to get into financial systems and were able to extract identities and credit card account numbers. 

The one you are referring to is the Heartland Payment Systems 

where 130 million credit card account numbers were compromised 

with potential of billions of dollars in fraud. This was a 

transnational investigation. I believe it included two Russians and 

one American who were involved in this particular case. 

But it does go to show that these are borderless crimes. They are 

transnational. And that is why your support on our foreign office 

initiative is so important because these are not investigations that 

are just local. These are international in scope. 

But I will tell you that these cases—or because of the support all 

of you have shown for our electronic crime and financial crime task 

forces—you know, we have 29 electronic crime task forces, 28 domestically. We just opened up our first one in Rome last year, and 

we have 38 financial crime task forces. 

It is through this partnership we have with our—we have about 

2,000 State, local, and other Federal law enforcement partners. We 

have about 300 partners from academia, and we have about 3,000 

business and financial partners. 

We are able to take advantage of this partnership, and because 

of that partnership and because of our terrific men and women, we 

are able to work investigations like the one that we are talking 

about right now, the Heartland Payment Systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. There was another one I think you—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. There was another one right before that, the TJX 

investigation. That involved nine defendants, again transnational. 

That one I believe involved about 40 million identities and credit 

card account numbers that were compromised. 

Again, this was a transnational investigation, many of these individuals over in Eastern Europe. Again, it is because of the support 

that we get from this Committee with our electronic crime task 

forces that this came to fruition. But this was a terrific investigation. 

As a matter of fact, one of the defendants—I believe we found $1 

million buried in his back yard, and because of these type of investigations what we have seen is, you know, our risk numbers are 

up by about eight percent from last year, and our asset forfeiture 

is up by about 35 percent. 

So I do believe that—and also because of what our people are 

doing, we are able to prevent further fraud. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, that scheme I am told involved 11 individuals 

from four different countries who hacked into the computer networks of nine major retailers and obtained more than 40 million 

credit card numbers and debit card numbers. Is that accurate? 


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Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you tell us the dollar amount of the crime that 

was involved? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, if you took those 40 thousand account 

numbers and you just put a minimum of $500 on each account—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Forty thousand or 40 million? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Forty million. Thank you. If you took those 40 

million accounts that were compromised and you just put a minimum of $500 on every account, the potential fraud here we are 

talking is I believe about $20 billion. 

Mr. ROGERS. Twenty billion? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Twenty billion. Right now I would—I do not know 

what the actual fraud is on that. I do not think that we have been 

able to get a final number on that, but I will tell you that it is estimated that it is a couple hundred million dollars or several hundred million dollars. I do not have an exact figure on that. I can 

get you that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, are you seeing a higher level of sophistication 

around the globe recently in the efforts to defraud banks and other 

financial institutions? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am. You know, in this particular case, what 

these defendants did—the way they were able to hack in it is called 

war driving where they drive around in their vehicle and using a 

lap top, you know, they hack into vulnerable systems that these 

companies had, and it is very, very advanced. 

That is again why our electronic crimes special agent program is 

so important. You know, we have about 1,200 agents who are 

trained up in electronic crimes, whether it has to do with basic, or 

intrusion, or forensic capabilities, but these are very smart people 

out there. They are very talented people out there, and our people 

have to be more talented and better equipped. 

Mr. ROGERS. And are the economic times a contributing factor to 

the increase? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe they are. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, then why are you proposing to cut $4 million, 

the domestic field operations component of the investigations mission? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, sir, I go back to the constrained economic 

environment that we are in. But first of all, let me just tell you 

that that cut will not involve cutting any field office. It will not involve us cutting any program we have going on. It will not involve 

us roofing any of our people. To the people out in the field, they 

should not notice this at all. 

What we have done—and we have done this across the board 

with every program area—we have asked our people to take a hard 

look at all of our discretionary spending. 

So the areas that we are looking at here would be for contractual 

services. It would be for—took a hard look at the number of vehicles we are going to purchase. As I had mentioned earlier, we take 

a hard look at our vehicles. We felt we had a pretty healthy vehicle 

fleet. 

We are going to take a look at the supplies, and we are going 

to look at every discretionary pot of money that we have out there, 


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but it is not going to impact our operational entities at all or equities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I think I differ with you on that. But more 

importantly, I have been told that leadership of the Department, 

not you, but above your head is reviewing the possibility of severely 

cutting back the investigative mission next year, next year, in 2012 

with the aim of only allowing certain aspects to continue on. 

I am told that the counterfeit and identity theft work might, 

from your perspective, die on the vine. So I look at this $4 Million 

cut this year as a possible omen of bad things to come in the future. Can you straighten me out? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. No, I can tell you from conversations I 

have had with the Secretary and with the Deputy Secretary, they 

fully support our investigative agenda and that I do not anticipate 

any cut like that, I believe, with our identity theft and with all our 

investigations. I fully anticipate them to move forward in the direction they are going right now. 

As a matter of fact, right now the Department is involved in a 

bottom-up review. We have had some very healthy conversation regarding our investigative mission, and from those conversations I 

have had with the Department regarding our investigative mission, 

I find them to be in full support of it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I for one will try to make sure that you are 

supported in that. I find it hard to believe that parsing off aspects 

of the investigation role that you have especially in these economic 

times that we are in and with the increase in financial crimes globally, and especially here, I do not want to see us degrade your 

agents’ capabilities, and skills, and quantity to thwart those financial crimes even more complicated as we go along. 

So I would like for you to keep us abreast of any even thoughts 

about cutting the investigative operation. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I appreciate that, sir. You know, one of the things 

you and I have talked about before is the ratio, and during the 

campaign, we were able to with our people in the field—— 

Mr. ROGERS. The ratio between investigations—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. And protection? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. And for the campaign, we are at 50/50 

during the campaign year. And for this past year, we are at about 

57 percent investigations and about 43 percent protection which, as 

you know, is an increase. 

So please let me assure you that it is a really important component of what we do. I think the duality of our mission makes us 

the organization we are. 

I believe we are better at protection because of what we learn as 

investigators, and I believe when we go back to investigations we 

are better at that because of what we learn in protection. 

So I think we are the organization we are because of that duality 

of mission. It is something that we are committed to maintaining, 

and I will tell you that from my conversations, just to reinforce 

with the Department, it is my belief I have 100-percent support 

from them on that as well. 


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Mr. ROGERS. Well, I am glad to hear that. Well, the protection 

aspect of what you do is the most visible, and the most glamorous, 

and attracts the most attention. 

But the investigations work that you are also charged with doing 

is terribly important to the economic well-being of the country and, 

indeed, the world. Thank you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it. 

ANTI-COUNTERFEITING INVESTIGATIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA

Mr. PRICE. And in that same vein, let me ask you a final question about another aspect of your investigations work, namely your 

anti-counterfeiting work. 

As the ranking member says, the protective work is far better 

known. Most Americans probably have no idea that your original 

function was focused on counterfeit currency from the very first 

days of the Agency. 

You have leveraged in recent years a relatively small development in overseas operations to significantly reduce production of 

counterfeit U.S. currency, particularly in Colombia, and I want to 

focus on the South American connection here for a minute. 

Previously, the criminals operating in that country made it the 

world’s number one producer of counterfeit. Colombia now ranks 

third, still not great but certainly better. 

Unfortunately, a number of those counterfeiters have simply relocated itself to Peru which has the dubious distinction now of 

being the foremost source of phony U.S. currency production. 

So I would appreciate an update this morning on what the Secret 

Service is doing to address counterfeit currency that is being produced in Peru. Have you been able to leverage your good relationship with the Colombian government or replicate that kind of relationship in dealing with Peru? 

Have you considered establishing a permanent field office in 

Lima or elsewhere in Peru, and has DHS or the State Department 

offered any resistance to the notion of expanding Secret Service operations in Peru or elsewhere in South America? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

Well, Colombia I think is a great story. And again, it goes back 

to the support we have received from this committee, but I do think 

it shows that when we put our people—when you put boots on the 

ground working with our foreign partners how much we can 

achieve. 

And over the last several years, we have developed a terrific 

working relationship with the Colombians, and we have made some 

great strides. We have made some big seizures. 

You know, when you look at the types of counterfeiting, there is 

two different types, as you know. There is the offset of the more 

traditional type of printing, and then there is the inkjet or computerized generated—computer generated type of printing. 

We do not see too much domestically of the offset printing, but 

foreign wise, we see an awful lot of it, and the majority of that 

comes from Colombia. And because of the great work of our people 

down there, we really have been able to arrest a lot of people, and 

we have been able to make significant seizures down there. 


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I did not know that they had gone from first to third, and now 

Peru is climbing. I guess we could get ourselves in trouble here because we are forcing people out of Colombia and moving them into 

another South American country. 

But I think we have another success story going here in Peru. 

We have Project Peru. Our people went down there, I believe, early 

last summer, and that so far has yielded about 31 or 32 arrests and 

about $20 million in seizures. So again, it shows that when our 

people are there on the ground working with our foreign partners, 

it does work to everybody’s advantage. 

As far as establishing a field office or an office down in Peru, you 

know, for any foreign office initiative, we want to be very strategic. 

We want to do all of our homework. We normally TDY people first 

to see, you know, exactly what the potential is and what benefit we 

are going to get out of that. 

I can tell you that we have not made a determination yet on 

Peru. I will tell you that if we do make one, your Committee will 

be one of the first ones we talk to. 

We will discuss this with the Department as well. You know, the 

Department currently is conducting a complete review of their foreign office allocation and their strategy. We are working with them, 

and I provided them with our foreign office strategy two weeks ago, 

as a matter of fact. 

But if we do believe that Peru or any other location is the best 

place for us to have an office, we will do the appropriate background information. We will present it to you in a written form 

along with the Department and to the State Department. 

Mr. PRICE. But you are saying this is still under review? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is still under review. 

Mr. PRICE. By you or by the Department, or by both? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right now by us. Right now, you know, we are 

taking a hard look at it. Right now it does appear to be a very successful initiative, and we will take a look at it and we will compare 

that to other locations that we are considering as well and we will 

make a determination, you know, what our priorities are and 

where we think we are best situated to perform our mission. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

DESIGN OF U.S. CURRENCY

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief because time is running out here, but I was just thinking the new money that is, I 

guess, fairly new, is it not? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. How old is this new $20 bill? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would say the last two or three years. 

Mr. ROGERS. Two or three years? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, that continues to be updated. I am not exactly sure. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. I am not trying to trick you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It does not take much. 

Mr. ROGERS. But we—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. If you want to give it, we can take a closer look. 


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Mr. ROGERS. We have gone to great lengths, have we not, in redesigning most of our paper money in recent years? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I think we are going 

to be unveiling the new hundred next month or so. 

Mr. ROGERS. Since we have the new money that has all sorts of 

new imprints, and paper, and secret things, and so on, have you 

noticed that counterfeiting is going down or up after that took 

place? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, again, as I mentioned earlier, domestically I do see the offset counterfeiting significantly down. We continue to see, you know, with the quality of these inkjet printers 

now, we do continue—as with all of the investigations, we see this 

computerized equipment does make counterfeiting a lot easier for 

people. 

You know, counterfeiting goes up and down. It does ebb and flow. 

I do think the countermeasures are working. I just do not—I cannot give you a definitive percentage of, you know, where it has 

gone. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, is it worth redesigning the money? Does it pay 

to do that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, I think it is. You know, when you look 

at it, I think there is about $883 billion in genuine currency out 

there. The percentage of that money that is counterfeit is, you 

know, like a fraction of one percent, like, two hundredths of one 

percent. 

Again, I go back to prevention. I think anything that we can do 

to discourage or prevent people from counterfeiting or any measure 

we can take, I think is a benefit, so I do think the redesign of the 

counterfeit is a benefit. 

And again, I do think it does show with the offset printing, I 

think it does show that that really has decreased. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I will conclude just by thanking the 

director and all of the folks under your command out there who 

risk their lives every minute of the day protecting our government 

officials, and routing out financial crime, and all of the things that 

the Secret Service does. 

So we owe you a debt and all of the folks that you represent. We 

thank you for your service. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Director, we do thank you for your appearance 

here today and for the good work you and the men and women 

under your direction do. 

We are going to need to confer with you in the weeks ahead as 

we assemble our appropriations bill, and we look forward to that 

continued collaboration. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. With that, the Subcommittee is adjourned. 


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(351) 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010. 

COAST GUARD: FY2011 BUDGET 

WITNESS 

ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID PRICE

Mr. PRICE. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

Good morning, everyone. 

We are pleased to welcome Admiral Thad Allen, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, before the subcommittee for his 

final hearing on the Coast Guard’s budget. As I am sure all of us 

know, the Commandant’s term comes to a conclusion this May 

after four dedicated and distinguished years of service, for which 

we want to thank him and express our admiration. 

Admiral Allen, as the 23rd Commandant of the Coast Guard, you have led the Coast Guard through a transitional period. During 

your tenure, you have implemented major reforms to the Coast 

Guard’s organizational structural. You have fought for additional 

personnel, for assets to close resource gaps, and for management 

reforms to help make the Coast Guard more transparent and accountable on several fronts. 

We observed with appreciation the critical lifesaving role of the men and women under your command played following the recent 

earthquake in Haiti. We also recognize the Coast Guard’s more traditional contributions, such as its search and rescue efforts, its ongoing work of keeping our ports secure, our mariners safe, and 

smugglers of illegal immigrants and drugs at bay. We thank you 

for managing these critical efforts on behalf of the American people. 

Today, you are going to have to answer some tough questions from this Subcommittee about the Coast Guard’s budget, about 

critical planning documents that are due, and about a leaked internal memo from your designated successor regarding the budget 

process. These are questions that must be answered if we are to 

make fully informed judgments on the Coast Guard’s budget going 

forward. And so we welcome the chance to talk with you about 

these and other matters here today. The work of budgeting and appropriating taxpayer resources is a regular exercise in setting priorities and making often difficult 

tradeoffs among competing priorities, especially in a year in which 

the President is laudably seeking fiscal sustainability. Nowhere is 

the difficulty of making those tradeoffs more apparent than in your 

budget. Your fiscal 2011 budget proposes significant amount reductions in manpower, and it calls for accelerating the decommissioning of 

older ships and planes while slowing the acquisition of new ones 


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to replace them. It does this without an adequate capital investment plan or a legislatively mandated comprehensive review of the 

Deepwater recapitalization effort. Now, this is information we are 

going to need to give us confidence in the Administration’s choices 

for the Coast Guard in 2011 and beyond. 

You are clearly aware of the problem this presents since you alluded to it in your annual State of the Coast Guard address, saying, and I am quoting you here, ‘‘Our acquisition baselines lack 

credibility when they are not supported by a 5-year capital investment plan provided to the Congress in a timely manner or are 

overtaken and rendered ineffective by annual adjustments that 

change basic business plans.’’ 

Now, we know the blame for this does not fall entirely on your 

shoulders, but, as Commandant, we do want to ask you and we 

hope you can answer these questions today: 

Are the Coast Guard, the Department, and the administration in 

agreement on a coherent plan for recapitalizing and funding the 

Coast Guard? 

Why have the Coast Guard and DHS failed to include a revised 

Deepwater baseline in the budget review for the coming fiscal year, 

which has been mandated annually in law since fiscal year 2006? 

Was Admiral Papp’s assertion accurate that the Coast Guard 

was forced to make asset reduction decisions without full appreciation of the impact of those reductions to operational performance 

in the fiscal year 2011 budget? 

And, taken as a whole, what does this budget proposal mean for 

the future of Coast Guard recapitalization and reform? 

Drawing on this Subcommittee’s recent hearing on major acquisition projects in which we examined the past and present of Deepwater, I am also interested in your explanation of the Coast 

Guard’s strategy to ensure good money will never again go after 

bad, that the Coast Guard is in the driver’s seat when it comes to 

acquisition decisions, and that we have the requisite number of 

professional civil servants to manage major governmental contracts. 

Admiral, we hold the men and women of the Coast Guard in the 

highest regard on this Subcommittee. We understand the great 

value of the work they do day-in and day-out. That is why we have 

asked you to come before us today, to provide answers to these 

tough questions, to critically compare the 2011 budget to the Coast 

Guard’s mission needs, and to give us your unvarnished views on 

how the Department and the Coast Guard can best make progress 

against the budgetary headwinds that are, in fact, likely to continue for some time to come. 

As is the Subcommittee’s custom, your full written statement will 

be entered in the record. I ask you to limit your oral remarks to 

5 minutes. 

Before we begin, I want to turn to our distinguished ranking 

member for his comments. 

[The information follows:] 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER HAROLD ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Admiral and your staff, again to this room. 

Admiral, there are some budgets you defend, and there are some 

budgets that are simply indefensible. And I think you know where 

I stand between those two. I think this one is indefensible. 

It cuts more than 1,100 active-duty billets; it decommissions or 

deactivates 19 operational components; it cuts acquisitions by more 

than $155 million, 10.1 percent; it fails to comply with congressional reporting mandates in the law; and includes no moneys to 

replace key assets recently lost in the line of duty. And that is notwithstanding the helicopter that sadly crashed just 2 weeks ago. 

The administration claims substantial cuts to Coast Guard operations are necessary to, quote, ‘‘make room for investments in new 

acquisitions.’’ However, the moneys that are cut from Coast Guard 

would be going, under this budget, to hire more bureaucrats in 

DHS headquarters, taking people from the front line and moving 

them to the safety of a headquarters office. 

But, as I just pointed out, the budget is proposing a sizable decrease in Coast Guard acquisitions while also pushing the funding 

and delivery of many critical investments to future years. What 

this means in real terms for fiscal 2011 and perhaps a few years 

following is that fewer drugs will be seized, fewer drug smugglers 

will be interdicted, fewer migrants will be saved, fewer ports and 

miles of coastline will be protected. 

In the wake of another terrorist attack, in the midst of a murderous drug war, and after our country once again called upon the 

Coast Guard to respond to an urgent humanitarian crisis in Haiti, 

this budget proposal for fiscal year 2011 simply does not add up. 

And I find myself as confused as I am concerned. While I wholeheartedly support the need for increased fiscal discipline by DHS, 

I do not believe severely cutting operational capabilities at the expense of increases for DHS headquarters functions and wasteful 

funds for terror trials makes any real sense. To make matters 

worse, we have yet to receive the revised Deepwater plan, as required by law, L-A-W, law. 

So, while I am not sure we will ever be able to truly understand 

what the administration is thinking with this proposal, we can at 

least shed some light on the implications of this budget. After all, 

Deepwater was supposed to be a program that aligned the phaseout of antiquated assets with the deployment of modern tools in 

such a way that the Coast Guard would only grow stronger. And 

I was around at the inception of Deepwater, before there was a Department of Homeland Security, and I remain confused. 

But as we continue to ask the Coast Guard to do more and more, 

the sea of threats and challenges only seems to grow greater and 

greater. And that means it is high time to get the Coast Guard 

budget right. We have to find a way to provide our frontline personnel the tools they need to withstand the storm while going into 

harm’s way, and do so in a way that doesn’t break the bank or 

jeopardize our Nation’s security. 

This need for perseverance in the face of mounting challenges is 

perhaps best summed up in the Breton Fisherman’s Prayer, which 


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President Kennedy prominently displayed on his desk. It humbly 

reminds us, quote, ‘‘Oh, Lord, thy sea is so big, but my ship is so 

small,’’ end quote. I would hope this administration would heed 

this perspective of Kennedy and really think hard about the ramifications of trading operations for bureaucracy and political righteousness. 

Admiral Allen, after almost 4 years at the helm of our Nation’s 

oldest continuous sea-going service and a total of 38 years of public 

service, I can’t believe that the fiscal year 2011 budget is the one 

you wanted to go out on, as you retire in just about 2 months’ time. 

And we know that these words that we are speaking this morning 

are aimed not at you but over your head. And we have the utmost 

confidence in your leadership and capabilities. 

We are deeply grateful for your years of service, whether it is the 

countless lives you have saved or the numerous drug smugglers 

you have interdicted or the legacy of leadership from 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina that you are leaving behind in the hallmark of your 

service. Your contributions to the safety and security of this great 

Nation are worthy of our highest recognition and appreciation. 

You have come a long way, and you reached the highest apex. 

And we appreciate your devoted service to your country, which you 

dearly love. And while I am still confused how a landlubber from 

the Arizona desert rose to become the Commandant of the Coast 

Guard, it is a tribute to the talent that you possess in a big way. 

And I, for one, am very sorry to see you sail off into the sunset, 

but I have a feeling we will see more of you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Admiral, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you. Chairman Price, Mr. Rogers, distinguished members of the Sub- committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. 

And I do have a written statement that will be submitted for the 

record. 

I would like to thank the Committee and especially Chairman Price and Mr. Rogers for their support over the years—Mr. Rogers, 

when you were the chairman. You are right; we do go back many, 

many years. And I want to thank you both very much for the leadership, mentorship, guidance and friendship, and the other Committee members as well, Judge Carter and Representative Kirk. As you noted, Chairman, on the 12th of February, I delivered my fourth and final State of the Coast Guard address. I described our 

current state as ready and resilient. That doesn’t mean it is perfect, but it is ready and resilient. This was clearly demonstrated following the devastating earth- quake in Haiti. One hour after the earthquake struck, three Coast 

Guard cutters had orders to proceed. Arriving on the scene the following morning, our units controlled aircraft movements until the 

tower was operational. We conducted damage assessments, provided medical care and even delivered a baby on the flight deck of 

a cutter. Our aircraft began to evacuate American citizens and the 

most critically injured Haitians. As the recovery operations ramped up, we deployed a reserve port security unit to safeguard the harbor and partnered with the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide an incident 

management team to support the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Ambassador. We continue to monitor departures 

from Haiti for any indication of mass migration. The Coast Guard was first on scene because our operational 

forces and command and control structure are agile and flexible. 

That is our operational model. We are multi-mission military, and 

we are a whole of government agency. It is unique, and it enables 

us to provide tremendous value to the American people and the 

global maritime community. Our multi-mission nature can be hard to explain, but consider 

these benefits. As we initially surged into Haiti, other Coast Guard 

assets were breaking ice in the Great Lakes and in New England, 

medically evacuating a heart attack victim 270 miles off San Diego, 

conducting fishing vessel safety patrols in the Bering Sea and detaining 12 foreign vessels around the country for violating International Maritime Organization regulations. 

The genius of our organization is our operational model that emphasizes on-scene initiative and allows our field commanders to 

move resources where they are needed the most, and we manage 

risk every day. Management of risk is going to become a recurring 

theme in some of my answers here today, and I think it is important that we understand that. 

The operational model of the Coast Guard is based on allocating 

resources to the highest need. And whether we are in a growing 


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budget environment, steady environment or declining environment; 

that risk management model is key to the way we conduct Coast 

Guard operations. 

To be able to sustain our performance, we must provide our people with the capability to safely and effectively execute the mission. 

And, as we discuss the Fiscal Year 2011 budget, it is important to 

acknowledge that we are operating in a fiscal environment that is 

constrained. In his State of the Union speech, the President said 

families across the country are tightening their belts. The Federal 

Government should do the same. Obviously, that sentiment is reflected in our 2011 budget. 

In our discussions with the Secretary, we had to make difficult 

tradeoffs between balancing our current operational capacity with 

the need for new cutters, aircraft, boats and sensors. We made a 

conscious decision to invest in our future within the levels provided. 

This budget contains nearly $1.4 billion to acquire new assets, 

while removing aging cutters and aircraft from service that are too 

costly to maintain. It also includes $13.9 million for housing units. 

And we have appreciated the First Lady’s support of our people 

and our families in the Coast Guard. 

To allow for recapitalization within a top fixed line, we are consolidating activities that will result in the reduction of 773 positions. This includes regionalizing our Marine Safety and Security 

Teams, which is the most efficient use of these vital resources. We 

will have less capacity in 2011 than we did in 2010. However, we 

will use our existing resources to prosecute all of our missions by 

allocating them to the highest-priority needs, just as we have always done. We will have to manage risk. 

Recapitalizing our fleet is my top priority. It has to be because 

our future readiness is at stake. Of the 12 cutters that initially responded to Haiti, 10 suffered severe mission-affecting casualties. 

Each passing year erodes our operating capability, putting our people at risk and endangering our ability to execute our statutory responsibility. 

I would add, however, that the Haiti earthquake was the first 

real test of our modernized support system and some of the reforms 

that we have been putting in place over the last 3 to 4 years, and 

it was highly successful. By providing product line support for the 

forward-deploying personnel and the assets throughout the chain of 

command, we were able to sustain our Haiti relief efforts while still 

executing other missions and dealing with the casualties that I just 

noted. 

To fully implement modernization—and this is more of an authorizing committee issue—I am asking the Congress to pass legislation that will give us an authorization bill in the House and the 

Senate this year, so I can have one during my tour. 

The real goal for modernization was to make the service a learning organization. The results are evident in our reformed acquisition procedures. A contract for the Fast Response Cutter was 

lauded by the U.S. Government Accountability Office for its thoroughness. And next month, we will hold a keel-laying ceremony for 

our first Fast Response Cutter. 


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The lessons from the Bertholf were rolled into Waesche, which 

will be commissioned on the 7th of May. Waesche achieved the authority to operate classified systems 1 year earlier and had 50 percent fewer trial cards after acceptance than Bertholf. These are 

signs of progress, but obviously there is more work to be done. 

I understand the Subcommittee’s frustration with the timeliness 

of acquisition-related reports. And while you said you are aiming 

over my head, sir, we are all accountable. I am accountable as the 

Commandant, as part of that system, and I understand that accountability. 

We are working at best speed to rectify the situation. We delivered the 2009 Deepwater expenditure report at the beginning of 

March. And our 2010 Deepwater Implementation Plan is under 

Coast Guard review, and I anticipate delivery in the near future. 

We will continue to work with your staffs to meet Committee reporting requirements. It is our responsibility to provide you this information so you can do your job. 

So, yes, the state of the Coast Guard is ready and resilient, but 

our fleet is fragile and approaching the limits of supportability due 

to its age. We must recapitalize our fleet to continue delivering superior service to the Nation. Our guardians deserve the best because that is what they provide us. 

After the first day of rescue operations in Haiti, a young petty 

officer e-mailed his mother: ‘‘Today I have been truly more thankful to be an American. As a country, we will stand together and 

put aside different opinions on health care, war and the economy 

to help those in need.’’ It was well said by a very young petty officer in the Coast Guard, and it is my duty to ensure our guardians 

remain strong, resilient and semper paratus. 

So I ask for your support. And, again, I am more than happy to 

have a discussion about providing the proper information and managing risk with the resources we have. 

And thank you for having me here, Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 


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DEVELOPMENT OF FY2011 COAST GUARD BUDGET

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Admiral. 

Well, Admiral, let me get to some of the questions I raised in my 

opening statement, which I think we all want to address. 

Without focusing on the leaking or not leaking of a budget memo, 

I want to talk about what was said in that memo—a remarkable 

charge, really, that cuts in the proposed fiscal year 2011 budget for 

the Coast Guard were made without consideration of their longterm operational impact. 

Now, a statement of that sort sheds light, I think, on the dilemma we all face. Congress faces the same dilemma that you do 

in putting a budget together. We are being asked to make informed 

decisions on the fiscal 2011 request without information we need 

to understand how the budget squares with the Coast Guard’s 

long-term plan. Namely, we are missing the comprehensive review 

of Deepwater and detailed capital investment plan for the next 5 

years to make our assessments from. 

The requirement for the comprehensive review of Deepwater has 

been carried in every law every year since fiscal 2006 in bipartisan 

bills passed by Congresses controlled by both parties and signed by 

Presidents of both parties. The capital investment plan requirement has been around even longer. 

So, Admiral, was the Coast Guard budget request for 2011 put 

together with cuts that were made without consideration of the 

long-term operational impacts? Is that your judgment, as well? 

If those long-term impacts were adequately considered, then the 

Coast Guard must have had forward-looking planning documents 

outlining where you plan to go on capital investment, like the new 

Deepwater baseline or capital investment plan. 

And then for this Committee, in the absence of these documents, 

how can we move forward on this budget request with any degree 

of confidence that we are doing the right thing? Why do we not 

have the basic information from the Department that we need? 

And let me stress, this isn’t merely or even mainly a question 

about documents and deadlines. What I am interested in here is 

the substance of the issues we have to decide on, the substance of 

these budget recommendations, the obligation we all have to 

square up the budget with operational needs and operational requirements. And as I said in my opening statement, it does raise 

questions about the attentiveness to the Coast Guard’s needs, the 

attentiveness to your and your team’s recommendations at the 

upper levels of the budget process at DHS and OMB. 

So, yes, we want and need and must have these planning documents in order to make our decisions, but what is at stake here 

really is not just missed deadlines but the substance, the merits of 

the proposal before us and the information we are going to need 

to do an intelligent job of writing the budget. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to talk about two things, if I could, in responding 

to your comments and your question. Number one, I would like to 

talk about the context of the 2011 budget and then the process by 

which information is provided to you. I think they are both very 

important, and I think that is where you are driving at. 


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In developing the 2011 budget, if you start with the assumption that you are going to be fiscally constrained and you are starting 

with a top line that is fixed, that creates certain assumptions that 

you have to deal with because you are trying to find cost savings 

in that immediate year. If you were looking at a long-term fiscally constrained budget and you knew it was going to be there for 2 or 3 years, you would 

do very thoughtful analysis on tradeoffs, how you would assess 

risk. If you are trying to achieve reductions in a single year, you 

have to find money that is available where you can find the cost 

reductions, and that is what you have to deal with because you 

can’t immediately generate a lot of cost savings in the first year. And if you going to get those kind of cost savings to meet a top line that is constrained, you have to go to force structure. That is 

people, operating money and operating units. That is the only way 

you can get those kind of cost savings in the short term. It is kind 

of like applying the brakes very quickly rather than slowly. You expend energy with what you have to meet that line. Given the top line that we were provided, I made very, very tough choices and tradeoffs within that context in conversations 

with the Department. And the basic assumption I had was, if that 

is the top line, I cannot stop recapitalizing the Coast Guard. Even 

though it is significantly lower than the prior-year enacted level, 

$1.4 billion keeps critical acquisition programs going. 

But to do that, we had to take a reduction in operating capability 

to sustain the $1.4 billion reduction within the top line provided. 

And, as the Commandant, in discussion with the Department, I 

thought it was better to take a near-term reduction in operational 

capability rather than mortgage our future and have a hollow force 

that would collapse on itself in several years if we did not recapitalize these cutters. 

So that was the context that I approached the budget. I don’t 

want to attribute any motives to Admiral Papp. He can speak on 

his own on this. But if you are going for what savings are available 

to meet a top line in any particular year, you are basically identifying the costs that could be reduced in that particular year, and 

that does not allow the long-term analysis implications of those reductions. They are the ones that are available, so you take them 

to meet the top line. 

CAPITAL INVESTMENT PLAN

Now, regarding process, sir, I have been working capital investment plans since I was a Commander in the Coast Guard. The best 

way to allow you to do your job is to have all the information in 

the budget when it arrives with the congressional justifications for 

you to act on our appropriations. You should have every right to 

expect that. We should be able to produce it for you. And while I 

don’t own the entire process, I have a part of it, and I am accountable with everyone else in government to give that to you. We are 

moving at best speed on that. You should not be put in a position 

to make decisions without having the proper information, and we 

are moving as fast as we can. 

One of the problems is having a 5-year plan fully fleshed out and 

developed every year that helps you develop the budget. And it is 


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really problematic when, because of external pressures, that gets 

reinvented every year. It changes our acquisition baseline, it 

changes our acquisition strategies, it adds costs and it requires us 

to kind of rewicker all of our project plans every year. It should come up with a budget, it should be there, and you should have it, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. What can we expect, and when can we expect it? 

Particularly the 5-year capital investment plans provided by the Coast Guard in years past have been useful in illuminating the 

way forward on future investments until last year. The single page 

provided in this year’s budget request clearly doesn’t satisfy the 

legal or practical requirements. What has happened here? And what kind of fuller document can 

we expect in the near term? 

Admiral ALLEN. We are working right now—in fact, I have had discussions with both the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary to 

actually work in parallel with the other parts of the administration 

that have to review these reports so we can cut down on the cycle 

time. 

One of the problems is, until the one-page capital investment plan that you got was actually published, we had no baseline numbers from which to start to develop that report, and that is what 

is being done now. If you look at the number of line items and the 

amount of work that has to be done to flesh out those plans, even 

based on the simplistic one-pager that was submitted to you, it 

takes time to do that. What we are trying to do is remove time 

from that cycle by working in parallel with the Department right 

now, and that is exactly what we are doing, sir. 

EFFECT OF FY2011 COAST GUARD BUDGET CUTS

Mr. PRICE. I am going to turn to my colleagues for questions, but 

we understand the thrust of your effort here in terms of the operations reductions and the kinds of immediate savings that gives 

you, in light of these overall constraints. 

We, of course, as a Committee, are going to want to look at the 

overall constraints, as well as the specific proposals you have made 

to meet those constraints. So we will have a chance later this 

morning to go through some of these, especially the personnel reductions, the FTE reductions, and sort out those that have widespread agreement and a solid rationale in your view and those that 

really should give us more heartburn. 

Let me turn, though, to Mr. Rogers first. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I don’t buy it. I just don’t buy it. The people 

above you say that the reason for these cuts of personnel and 

equipment is to make room, they say, for acquisitions, but they 

then in the budget don’t provide for the acquisitions, the NSC deliveries, the MPA. 

I understand your frustrations and difficulties that you have in 

trying—you are the middleman between the Budget Office at the 

White House and us. So I fully appreciate the delicate place where 

you are. 

But I don’t appreciate the OMB and the White House trying to 

flimflam this Congress on your budget request, leaving you dangling in the wind. It is unfair to you, it is disrespectful of the Coast 


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Guard, you and your staff and the men and women of the Guard, 

and equally disrespectful of the intelligence of this Subcommittee. 

Making room, they say, for acquisitions. Funds for many of your 

major assets in this budget are reduced, prolonged, or nonexistent. 

Long lead materials for the National Security Cutter number six 

are pushed to fiscal 2012. That will likely stretch out NSC deliveries. Funds for the MPA are reduced substantially, such that you 

are only buying one airplane, no funding for spare parts, no funding for unmanned aerial systems or asset replacements. 

So when they say they are making room for acquisitions and 

then don’t make acquisitions, it tells me that they wanted the 

money to go to DHS headquarters to fund bureaucrats and taking 

people off the front lines of seizing drugs and saving people’s lives 

and protecting our coastline, cutting your personnel by, what, 1,100 

or so. 

Well, we appreciate the report that we got last week. We have 

been demanding these expenditure plans for Deepwater, the annual Deepwater plan. Well, we got one last week—for fiscal 2009. 

We have no idea what you are planning for in 2010, much less the 

budget request that you are making for 2011. 

So I am mad, frustrated, disappointed, not at the Admiral and 

not at the Coast Guard, but at the people at DHS who are dictating 

the emasculation of the Coast Guard. Yes, I said that, and I mean 

it: the emasculation of the Coast Guard. 

You would be cut 1,112 active-duty billets. You would decommission and deactivate a total of 19 operational components—deactivate and decommission. Your acquisitions are cut by over 10 percent, $155 million. It takes away moneys for key investments like 

unmanned aerial systems, which we have been discussing with you 

for almost your whole career. No moneys to replace key assets like 

the C–130 that was recently lost in the line of duty and, of course, 

the helicopter that sadly crashed just 2 weeks ago. 

So, Admiral, there are not many questions that I have that you 

can answer, to be frank with you. We need to have the OMB here 

testifying, and the Secretary, about why she is slashing funding for 

Coast Guard. 

Deepwater was supposed to be a plan that would align the 

phaseout of antiquated assets with the acquisition of modern ships, 

aircraft, communications systems, and the like in such a way that 

the Coast Guard would only grow stronger as we go along. But this 

budget appears to be stretching out the time in between 

decommissionings and deactivations and the deployment of new assets. So it appears that for fiscal 2011 and maybe a few years beyond, the Coast Guard will be less capable. 

Admiral, is there any way that you can correct what I consider 

to be these gross misapplications of Federal funds, taxpayers’ dollars, to put it back to work to defend the American people on our 

coasts? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, I would tell you this. Given the budget discussions and the levels that were provided to us, I will tell you 

this. I am accountable, as the Commandant of the Coast Guard, for 

the decisions made within our budget at the levels provided regarding units decommissioned and acquisitions to carry on. 


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One of the obligations and duties I have as the Commandant is 

to make the tough choices with the resources that are provided to 

me. And while the budget is lower than it was in 2010 and everybody would like more money, I am accountable for the decisions 

that were made within that level. And, therefore, I can explain the 

tradeoffs and the decisions made within the levels that were provided. And that is my responsibility as the Commandant, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, the key phrase you just said was ‘‘with the assets given to you.’’ You will make do with what you get. I am arguing about what you get, not how you necessarily have allocated 

those funds. If you don’t have the money, you can’t spend it. You 

can’t even recommend how we spend it. They have hogtied you, 

and I regret that and bemoan it. 

Well, 2 years ago, you told us that people are the most critical 

asset the Coast Guard has, and you made an impassioned pitch to 

increase active-duty positions. We responded, increasing funds for 

watch-standers and counter-drug personnel. In fact, through an increase in counter-drug funding last year that you pushed for, the 

Congress refuted the Administration’s proposed cuts to Coast 

Guard billets for fiscal 2010. But these fiscal 2011 cuts are something much, much different. These are huge cuts. 

I understand the new assets like the National Security Cutter 

will need fewer people to operate, but since the budget is prolonging the funding and delivery of those newer assets, it appears 

as though you are being required to downsize the force as opposed 

to simply transferring personnel from aging assets to newer ones. 

Is that right? 

Admiral ALLEN. We are removing older cutters from service, yes, 

sir, before the replacements will be there. 

That is done for two reasons. Number one, they are old and getting more difficult to sustain. The maintenance costs are being 

driven up. And, again, it is a tradeoff between current capability 

and recapitalization, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. But you are still stuck with the older assets because 

the newer assets aren’t available and the older assets require more 

personnel. Right or wrong? 

Admiral ALLEN. The ones that are in service, yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, sir. And yet you are still being required to reduce your personnel. 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, we are reducing the personnel associated 

with the cutters that are being decommissioned, as well as the Marine Safety and Security Teams, yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of other questions, 

but I will yield. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Ruppersberger. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Sure. Well, first thing, Admiral, I think you 

are retiring, what, in May? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And you have had a great service, been a 

great leader, and you have done a lot for the Coast Guard. So what 

some of us are saying about this has nothing to do with you. You 

are being a good leader. You are told by your commander, this is 

what you have, and you have to make the best of it. 


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But, you know, the Homeland Security, we do their budget. I am 

getting really concerned that they have too much on their plate. 

They have 22 different agencies. They have missions all over the 

place, from what you do to cybersecurity. And sometimes when you 

have too much and you don’t focus and prioritize, you can’t do anything real well. 

I believe the Coast Guard is one of the best agencies that I have 

worked with since I have been a Member of Congress. And I really 

think the men and women who work there are outstanding. They 

do the best with what they have. 

I agree with everything Mr. Rogers said, except for the one word, 

‘‘emasculation,’’ or whatever that is. But I agree with what he said. 

The Coast Guard, what you have on your plate—and I want to go 

over this so that we can get it on the record. 

DRUG INTERDICTION

The first thing, you have responsibility for drug interdiction. 

Drug interdiction is serious. There is a lot of cocaine, and there is 

a lot coming in, either through air and through water. And a lot 

of what you do is the interdiction and to really go after the smugglers, is that correct? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. All right. Now, do you have certain goals? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. What are those goals? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, over the next couple of years, we are moving 

to try to approach a 40 percent removal rate of cocaine flowing 

from the Southern Hemisphere into the United States. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. And what did you remove in the last 

couple of years or within the last year? 

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, in the last accounting year, we removed approximately 362,000 pounds of cocaine, or more than 150 tons. Our 

drug removal rate was 15 percent. The target was 15.7 percent. 

That is going to be moving up to 40 percent over the next few 

years. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. All right. And let’s talk about that. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Based on the cuts that are before us today, 

do you believe that you will be able to reach that 40 percent? 

We talk a lot about terrorism, we talk about a lot about a lot of 

issues. But if you really look at the bottom line and some of the 

negative things that affect our citizens, it is drugs. And it is something that we have really taken our eye off the ball for a long time. 

We need to maybe put our eye back on it, and you are doing a 

great job. 

If you can answer the question, with these cuts, will you be able 

to make that 40 percent target? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, what is going to happen, sir, I mentioned 

earlier. The way we allocate our resources in a particular year is 

based on projections on migrant threats, drug threats and everything else. And certainly a lot of these assets for counter-drugs are 

actually shifted to Joint Interagency Task Force South, which does 

the detection and monitoring. 


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We will have to make decisions on how to allocate these resources with fewer cutter days in 2011. It will have to be a tradeoff 

between not only the drug mission but the fisheries mission, other 

things we do offshore with those cutters that have sustainability. 

If we have fewer cutter days down there, there will be a lower removal rate, and we may or may not meet those objectives. But we 

will have to manage the force with what we have. 

To give you a good example, during the recent operations in 

Haiti, we actually took a cutter from the West Coast, brought it 

through the Canal, to be able to provide command and control in 

and around Haiti, and basically lost a high-endurance cutter operating off Colombia for about a month. That is indicative of the type 

of choices we will have to make in 2011, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But getting back to my question, your goal 

for 2014 is 40 percent. Based on the cuts that are before us today, 

do you feel you will be able to reach that 40 percent? 

Admiral ALLEN. It will be a challenge. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. It will be a challenge. Basically I would assume by that that it is going to be awfully difficult. You can’t take 

away your manpower, but also your resources. Let’s talk about 

that. 

I have been to your headquarters and seen some of the things 

that you do in drug interdiction. How about either your ships or 

airplanes or UAVs? That is a very significant part of dealing with 

drug interdiction, is that not correct? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir, it is not just cutters, as you know. It 

is maritime patrol aircraft and sensors, intelligence and coordination with other agencies. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And what does this budget that is before us 

today, what does this do as far as those resources are concerned? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, the budget just focuses on the Coast Guard 

contribution toward that. I would add, if you are looking at the 

drug interdiction overall operation, it also includes maritime control aircrafts from Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Navy 

assets. Our allies operate with us in foreign countries down there; 

our partner nations do, as well, in addition to the increasing value 

in—— 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I only have another minute. But getting to 

the bottom line, what I am trying to get you to say—if you don’t 

say it, I will try to say it—is if you don’t have the resources, if you 

don’t have the continued resources of your ships, of your airplanes 

or the technology that you use to find these smugglers of the drugs 

that are coming in, mostly from Colombia to Mexico, then it is very 

difficult for you to do the job, is that not correct? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. So do you feel this budget today, by 

taking away those resources and those cuts, will have an impact 

on your ability to do the job that you have set a goal for, which 

is 40 percent in 2014? 

Admiral ALLEN. It will force us to make tradeoffs, and part of 

those tradeoffs could be drug interdiction, yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Okay. Well, I think that we—— 

Admiral ALLEN. I don’t want to presuppose the decisions made 

in the following year, but we will have to make tradeoffs. 


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INTELLIGENCE

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I think the Chairman understands this and 

I know the Ranking Member, and I think we really need to work 

as Americans on this issue to try to turn this around. Because it 

just doesn’t make a lot of sense here because of what is at stake, 

our national security. 

The only other question—you are more involved now in intelligence. Can you tell me just a little bit—and I only have, like, 

about 30 seconds—about your cooperation and how you are working with the intelligence agencies? Because intelligence is one of 

the best defenses for what you are doing here. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Actually, we have been able to have 

higher seizure rates with fewer assets because we are using better 

intelligence. 

As you know, the Coast Guard is a member of the intelligence 

community now. We have a service cryptographic element. We are 

involved not only here in the Western Hemisphere in drug interdiction but in support of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

as well, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Right. I understand that. And you are putting in SCIFs in a lot of your operations? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you. I have to go to another hearing. 

I am sorry. But we will be working hard, hopefully, with the Chairman and Ranking Member, to make sure that we hopefully can 

relook at this whole issue about where we are going with the Coast 

Guard. You do a great job, and so do all of your men and women 

that work there. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Carter. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Admiral, it has been my honor to work with you since I 

have been on this Subcommittee, and I am going to miss your guidance in the Coast Guard. I think you have been a great shining 

light for the Coast Guard. But I will see you in Texas, okay? And 

that will be good. 

This is just amazing, what is going on here today. I mean, within 

the last 10 days, we have had a major firefight on the Texas border 

within a hundred yards of where American citizens live where two 

State Department people were killed. And this is because the cartels have decided that they would all settle along our border and 

fight over who is going to run the show. 

Meanwhile, their supply is coming up from Colombia with those 

submersibles and the other things that I have seen in your operations when I visited your headquarters—all of which, in my opinion, are at risk. Our ability to interdict and stop that supply chain 

is going to be severely set back by the proposed cuts of the Obama 

administration. I am just shocked by this. 

If you go back to Katrina and you say, ‘‘What good things came 

out of Katrina in the Homeland Security Department?’’ there is 

only one place you can look. It is the United States Coast Guard. 

Everything else Homeland Security did failed. And that is pretty 


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much the story you have heard in Homeland Security. The one 

agency that has always been above and beyond the call of duty and 

always exceeded at their mission has been the Coast Guard. Last summer, we got the opportunity to go up to see your oper- ations in Alaska. And we now have ships that are sailing through 

what we used to call the Northwest Passage, cruise ships. And we 

realize the lack of resources means if one of those cruise ships on 

the other side, the northeast side I think it is, of Alaska were to 

have a horrible accident, your response, because of the lack of clippers available to get there, it is scary what could happen in the 

Northwest Passage from lack of resources from the Coast Guard. This is what I heard last summer. And now I am hearing we are cutting back a thousand personnel and a one-third reduction of the 

Coast Guard’s assets. This is crazy. This is insane. And I am kind of going back to what the former questioner, Mr. Ruppersberger, said about this drug war. But part of stopping this 

fight on the Texas border is stopping the supply coming in. And I 

believe it is your statement that we are going to be lacking in being 

able to fight that war down there. Admiral ALLEN. Well, sir, I was directing it at Coast Guard as- sets and the tradeoffs we will have to make. As you know, it is a 

multi-agency, multinational effort down there. And, frankly, regarding the southwest border, the border I worry about is the 

southern border of Mexico. 

If we can take down multi-ton loads before they get to the southern border of Mexico, before they disaggregate into smaller loads 

and become almost impossible to stop at the border, the best place 

to stop that and interdict that flow is before it gets to Mexico. That 

is the reason there is such a concentrated effort between not only 

the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection and Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, our Department of Defense counterparts and our multinational partners down there. 

And, again, we will allocate resources in the future on the basis 

of what is appropriated and on the basis of risk. But we do understand in the Coast Guard that the biggest bang for the buck for 

this country is stopping those drugs before they get to Mexico, sir. 

ICE BREAKERS

Mr. CARTER. And, just shifting from far south to far north, up in 

the Alaska region, we understand that the Russian trawlers are 

more and more infringing upon what we would at least call American waters north of Alaska. And we have very limited resources 

to keep a ship within that area. And, under international law, 

there is a potential for claiming portions of the North Pole region 

under a theory of international law that says whoever has the most 

presence has the most claim. We learned some of that when we 

were in Alaska. 

Now, cutting out, when we are already lacking the resources to 

keep a ship consistently in that region—and the Coast Guard is 

really our only, as I understand it, our only presence that we have 

up there, and the Canadians are not helping as much as we are— 

there is a potential for a loss of some resources up there that could 

be major. 

Would you like to comment on that, the lack of these resources? 


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Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I would discriminate the operating plat- forms we need to effectively operate up there and what is actually 

in the budget in terms of reductions. If you are going to operate 

north of the Bering Straits, you need an ice-strengthened vessel. 

And—— 

Mr. CARTER. And we have two old ice-cutters, right? Admiral ALLEN. We have three total ice-breakers in the inventory right now. The Polar Sea and the Healy are operational. The 

Polar Star, which I announced in Seattle, WA, last week, we are 

going to move into Todd Shipyard, and it will be reactivated. It will 

be available in 2013. 

Those three vessels are the only vessels the United States has that are capable of operating in ice-diminished or fast ice for the 

purpose of response, regardless of what the issue is, whether it is 

an oil spill or response to a cruise ship issue. Those are the only 

three vessels in the U.S. Inventory that are capable of doing that. My intent as the Commandant is not to lose the readiness of those three vessels while we have a discussion about how to replace the two oldest ones, the Polar Sea and the Polar Star. So my 

efforts have been directed at maintaining the Polar Star’s readiness 

and getting it ready for service in 2013, sir. But they are critical 

to the United States presence in the Arctic. 

Mr. CARTER. Well, Admiral, I have never figured out why we 

would punish good performance and reward poor performance, but 

somehow common sense doesn’t seem to prevail sometimes in the 

government. I, for one, am opposed to these cuts and will do what 

I can in my small part to hopefully have discussions to keep our 

Coast Guard ready. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Kirk. 

CLOSURE OF GREAT LAKES SEASONAL AIRSTATIONS

Mr. KIRK. Thank you. 

I obviously have said to the Admiral before that I would not be 

alive but for the Coast Guard. And so I speak as one of those few 

Americans that actually are here because of the appropriations of 

the committees in the past and the work of the Coast Guard. 

I am concerned. We currently have one HH–65C at AIRFAC 

Waukegan and one at AIRFAC Muskegon. These two AIRFACs 

during the summer have saved 23 and 27 Americans, a total of 50 

so far, in their deployments. That includes the dramatic rescue in 

2008 of the Fin Seeker, which was seven Americans saved. You 

gave the President’s Award to Lieutenant Williams, Lieutenant 

Loeb, Petty Officer Petre, and Petty Officer Bemis for their heroism 

in that rescue. 

The budget has a proposal to order the Coast Guard to retreat 

from southern Lake Michigan and move assets to Traverse City. 

That would add an additional hour’s flight time to a rescue in 

southern Lake Michigan. As you know, the average water temperature in Lake Michigan is 50 degrees Fahrenheit. Your charts show 

that a swimmer would be alive for 28 minutes if the flight time 

was from Waukegan or Muskegon, but that person would have 

been dead for half an hour if they fly from Traverse City. 


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Now, this Committee has approved, between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2007, $3.5 million for helo engines for these five HH– 

65Cs. If decommissioned, that would mean we will have wasted 

$17.5 million of taxpayer moneys to decommission this. I understand, due to a recent casualty of an H–60 coming back from Vancouver, that the plan for redeployment may no longer be feasible. Now, I think I will be speaking for Gwen Moore, Melissa Bean, Jan Schakowsky, Danny Davis, Bobby Rush, Peter Visclosky, Joe 

Donnelly, Jesse Jackson, as well as Petri, Upton, myself, Ryan, 

Sensenbrenner, Hoekstra, and Senators Feingold, Kohl, Durbin, 

Burris, Bayh, Lugar, Stabenow, and Levin, in saying that the plan 

to leave a prompt rescue capability in southern Lake Michigan may 

no longer be feasible. But can you comment, after this casualty, whether this plan can be done anymore? Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. It is going to become problematic. As you know, the original premise was to put more capable heli- copters into Traverse City that could cover all of the Lake Michigan area and the other areas up there year-round. Now, one of the 

problems is, challenges we have right now, Waukegan and Muskegon are seasonal detachments. In the winter, when we can’t get 

to the water because it is frozen and we can’t use our small boats, 

having the larger helicopters at Traverse City does make sense in 

the long run. 

Now, regardless of the merits and the demerits of Traverse City 

versus Waukegan and Muskegon, the sources of those H–60 helicopters for Traverse City were going to be two from Elizabeth City 

and two from Clearwater. One of the aircraft that would be scheduled to go to Traverse City was the one that was involved in the 

accident in Utah. 

That aircraft is being pulled off the mountain and brought into 

Elizabeth City. We don’t know whether it is repairable or not. Even 

if it is repairable, the time it is going to take to get that aircraft 

back into service is going to make any execution problematic in 

2011, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Yeah. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You will have a lot of very happy Republicans and Democrats all along southern Lake Michigan if we 

can make sure that this reemployment doesn’t happen. Having a 

helicopter show up a half an hour late just to pick up the body 

doesn’t make a lot of sense. And so I appreciate you and look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

We had votes called, but—oh, Mrs. Lowey is here. Mrs. Lowey. 

MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY TEAMS

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I am delighted, even though there are votes, I am delighted 

to see you again and thank you for your service prior to your retirement. I send best regards from my daughter to you, as well. And 

I really do appreciate the open, honest exchanges we have had on 

this Committee. So thank you again, and good luck to you. 

Let me just ask one question, because I am deeply concerned 

with the proposal to transfer the Maritime Safety and Security 


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units currently based in New York City to Boston. These personnel 

provide both harbor and port security, assist local first responders 

during major events, respond to specific threats along the New 

York waterways. 

And your written testimony does discuss deployment of these 

teams based on risk and threat. So, given the constant threat, unfortunately, faced in the New York region and the presence of numerous waterways and water-accessible landmarks, how can you 

justify eliminating a key anti-terror unit in our most targeted region? 

And what is the estimated response time for a team from Boston 

to reach lower Manhattan or the Indian Point Energy Center on 

the Hudson River? 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you for the question, ma’am. 

As we discussed earlier with the Committee Members, given the 

funding levels provided and the need to recapitalize the Coast 

Guard, we had to make some tough choices on force structure, 

which is the only place you can go to meet the top line funding levels we were provided. 

To make that happen, five Maritime Safety and Security Teams 

from around the country are being disestablished and will be covered regionally by other entities. So it is not a transfer from New 

York to Boston. The budget proposes that the function basically 

would just be eliminated and would be covered from Boston. I just 

want to be clear on that. 

Mrs. LOWEY. And also you said ‘‘covered by other entities.’’ What 

entity would take the place in New York? 

Admiral ALLEN. Ma’am, when we took a look at these teams, we 

looked at the current footprint in the local area. Separate from the 

Maritime Safety and Security Team in New York, there are about 

700 Coast Guard personnel in New York. It is our largest command 

in the country and our largest concentration of Coast Guard people. 

And so, we looked at the geography, the amount of Coast Guard 

resources that were already there and how to best manage risk 

with the reduction. We would move to a regional response. These 

are deployable specialized forces. These are not the assets that do 

search and rescue that are there every day working in the harbor; 

many times they are deployed some other place in the country. 

And so, what we would do, with the seven remaining teams, is 

come up with regional coverage for the rest of the country, and it 

would include the areas where the teams would be removed. In one 

case, the team being removed from New York would be covered. 

The next two closest would be either Boston or the Tidewater area, 

ma’am. 

Mrs. LOWEY. So you feel the 700 Coast Guard that remain, they 

could do the job of the Maritime Safety and Security units? 

Admiral ALLEN. They basically have slightly different missions, 

ma’am. The folks that are there right now are doing the everyday 

search and rescue, aids to navigation, boarding the ships and everything that the Coast Guard normally does in a harbor. 

The Marine Safety and Security Teams can do that locally, but 

they also deploy in places like Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the 

Middle East, in response to hurricanes, tsunamis or whatever. That 


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is what they are there to do. So they don’t always work in New 

York Harbor. They happen to be based there. 

So the current level of operations for search and rescue and other 

activities in New York will be undiminished, but a deployable unit 

in New York that could be available for surge will not be there, 

ma’am. 

Mrs. LOWEY. So I guess—and what do I have, a minute left. I am 

still trying to understand whether the important role of the safety 

and security unit will be performed, some of the 700 will be trained 

to do just that, or will New York, if, God forbid, there is another 

emergency, have to depend upon the Boston unit to rush down? 

Admiral ALLEN. I understand, ma’am. Immediate search capability in the harbor will be covered by the existing 700 that will remain there, yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. 

PERSONNEL CUTS

We are rushing off to a vote. Mr. Rogers tells me he has no further questions, so I would like to wrap this up. 

But I do want to ask you to drill down a bit in these personnel 

cuts. And perhaps you can furnish some of this for the record. Because I want to know about the near-term impact, and I also want 

to know about what the plan looks like eventually for personnel 

levels and the implications of that for mission capabilities. 

As virtually every Member has mentioned here today, the Coast 

Guard budget proposes significant cuts in its military ranks in fiscal year 2011. Now, about 100 of these are because military positions are becoming civilian positions. I don’t think there is much 

dispute over that. It follows the recommendations by GAO and others. 

However, the bulk of these personnel cuts are accounted for by 

asset decommissionings. It is my understanding that 850 FTEs or 

426 positions will be lost through the decommissioning of four highendurance cutters and one medium-endurance cutter. Now, these 

are not necessarily total losses because the four high-endurance 

cutters are going to be replaced with the two National Security 

Cutters that are apparently ready to go. But that is an area of controversy. I think there is less controversy over the decommissioning 

of the ACUSHNET, a medium-endurance cutter. 

Now, 200 more FTEs, as Mrs. Lowey has been stressing, are lost 

from planned decommissioning of five Maritime Safety and Security Teams, MSSTs. Additionally, to be factored into this is the personnel requirements of the replacement cutters. The high-endurance cutters, the ones that are being decommissioned, require 166 

crew members compared to 108 on the National Security Cutter, 

the NSC. There are some other offsetting factors, having to do with 

time away from the home port and the rotation of the crews and 

so forth. 

How does all of this net out? That is really what I am asking 

you. What kind of workforce plan have you developed for the recapitalized fleet, both what we will have available in 2011 and 

what we will have available long term? 


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And just to throw one additional element into the mix, our understanding in some briefings prior to these hearings, Coast Guard 

personnel indicated—and I am quoting here—that they could best 

mitigate immediate capacity gaps to a restoration of fiscal 2011 

proposed active-duty workforce reductions. In other words, the implication was that, in looking at the capacity gaps, that the focus 

should not be so much on the decommissionings as much as on, for 

example, the MSST reductions. 

Help us sort this out, the best you can give us in the way of an 

oral response here. And then I think we will want for the record 

a more precise sorting out of these personnel reductions, where 

they come from, what their implications are, what kind of replacement vessels are required, what are anticipated, what their requirements are. But the bottom line, as I said initially, is on mission capabilities. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

As far as mission impact, we will be removing 42 percent of our 

deployable specialized force capability with the decommissioning of 

the Maritime Safety and Security Teams. So that is a 40 percent 

reduction in our ability to surge and deploy. These are the forces 

that go where you need them. As I mentioned earlier, they are not 

particularly anchored to where they are. And that could be for a 

Katrina, Haiti or whatever. That is a 42 percent reduction. 

There will be a loss of about 5,000 ship hours in 2011 compared 

to 2010. And that will have to be managed by our operational commanders with the remaining ship days they have left, and they are 

going to apply that to the highest risk. 

Regarding the workforce, we have two challenges. Number one is 

to actually get down to where we can support with appropriated 

funding the pay for the number of people that are in the 2011 

budget with the workforce we already have. And that is a reduction, as you noted, of more than 1,000 people. We also have the 

added problem of a drop in our attrition from a projected 12.2 percent 2 years ago to less than 7.5 percent. So we have people that 

are staying in the Coast Guard. 

We have a challenge of how to pay for the workforce we have in 

addition to the reductions that will be coming up next year and 

how to manage the workforce to get it down to those levels. And 

that is a significant challenge, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. All right. We clearly need to sort this out. We need 

to know in a very straightforward way the implications for mission 

capabilities of the decommissionings—which, of course, some of the 

personnel reductions are a function of—together with, the new 

ships coming on-line and the MSST reductions, which, on the face 

of it, do appear to be quite substantial. We understand you are anticipating some redeployment of those forces—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PRICE [continuing]. There, too, which could mitigate some of 

the impact. But the bottom line for us is the mission capability, 

and we need to know that for next year. But we also want to know 

where this is heading. Perhaps you can provide all this for the 

record. Where is this heading? We know what you are proposing 

for next year. What is the picture going to look like 2, 3 years out, 


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both with respect to the ships that out there, the personnel that 

are out there, and the capabilities that we have? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

The 2011–2015 Capital Investment Plan provided with the Fiscal Year 2011 

President’s Budget Request shows the current funding projections for major surface, 

air, and C4ISR acquisitions over the next five years. The Capital Investment Plan 

and Deepwater Implementation Plan reflect service priorities to assure we achieve 

the capabilities defined for our recapitalization goals. In summary, it shows 2.8% 

growth in capital investments during FY 2011–2015. 

As new acquisitions come online, Coast Guard will continue the current practice 

of requesting follow-on funding under the Operating Expenses account to add new 

billets associated with crews and shoreside support for the new assets. Coast Guard 

will also continue to eliminate billets associated with legacy assets as they are decommissioned. Because new assets must be operational before legacy assets are decommissioned and because new personnel must be trained before they begin operation of the new asset, there will be periods of overlap where Coast Guard must 

maintain both new and legacy billets. Thus, until the bulk of the Deepwater program is behind us, comparisons of apparent increases (e.g., FY 2009) or decreases 

(FY 2011) in FTP levels to the prior year will not accurately reflect changes in Coast 

Guard’s capacity or capability. The Coast Guard’s performance measure results and 

future targets are the best available indicators we currently have to evaluate trends 

in capabilities. 

Mr. PRICE. Thanks very much. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thanks for your service, Admiral. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. 

The subcommittee is adjourned. 


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(453) 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010. 

FEMA—PREPARING FOR DISASTERS AND MINIMIZING 

LOSSES 

WITNESS 

W. CRAIG FUGATE, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID PRICE

Mr. PRICE. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

Good morning. Today we welcome the Administrator of the Fed- eral Emergency Management Agency, FEMA, Craig Fugate, to discuss his Agency’s role in preparing for disasters and minimizing 

losses, and how the $7.3 billion request for fiscal 2011 will assist 

in that effort. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 

Act of 2006 expanded FEMA’s responsibilities and authorities for 

disaster response and recovery and integrated preparedness functions so that FEMA was responsible for all emergency management 

functions and activities. Now, more than 3 years later, we want to 

know how far we have come in rebuilding FEMA. During my tenure as Chairman of this Subcommittee, I have made strengthening FEMA a top priority. All of our Subcommittee 

members, take seriously our responsibility to provide FEMA with 

the support the agency needs to fulfill its mission. As a representative of a disaster-prone State, I have witnessed firsthand that having an effective emergency management capacity can be a life-ordeath matter, and if disaster planning is done right, it can make 

millions, possibly billions, of dollars’ worth of difference in property 

losses. 

During the past few years, this Subcommittee has provided re- sources to enhance the professionalism of FEMA’s disaster workforce and to help clarify chain-of-command issues for disaster response. We have pushed FEMA to find solutions to the housing 

mess in the Gulf Coast by encouraging work with the Department 

of Housing and Urban Development, and we have commissioned 

studies by the National Academy of Public Administration, the 

Government Accountability Office and the Inspector General on 

topics ranging from building robust regional offices to adequately 

addressing human capital issues. 

We expected that with stronger authorities and sufficient resources, FEMA would grow to be an agency that would be quick 

and well organized in its support of States and localities in times 

of disaster or emergency. We expect an agency that has efficient 

oversight over the billions of dollars of State and local first responder grants it is responsible for each year. We expect sound 

management of the agency’s finances, logistics, human capital and 

contracting. 


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Having served now for nearly a year as the FEMA Administrator, Mr. Fugate, we look forward to hearing your thoughts on 

where improvement has been made and how we can continue to 

work together to make FEMA a stronger and more capable agency. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget does not include substantial programmatic increases or policy changes, but proposes to realign resources to more accurately reflect the agency’s workforce structure. 

My biggest concern with the budget is the request for disaster relief. With this request, it is likely, I fear, that the fund will be depleted 4 or 5 months into fiscal year 2011. That would leave us 

where we find ourselves right now, in a precarious situation in 

which the fund is running low on balances. 

I would hope the new administration would not continue the 

flawed budgeting methods of the past, ignoring the known costs of 

outstanding catastrophic events when formulating its request. So I 

trust that during our discussion today, you can add some insight 

as to whether we should believe that this request is adequate. 

Recent reports from the inspector general call into question the 

agency’s management of disaster funds. While I recognize there is 

a difficult balance between being responsive to the needs of a State 

in the midst of a disaster and being a good steward of the taxpayers’ dollars, these reports of wasteful spending do concern us, 

and we will need to discuss how we can fix this problem. 

I believe we still have some work to do when it comes to fully 

utilizing FEMA programs to ensure our communities are as resilient to disaster as possible. We want to explore how FEMA’s programs are coordinated with other Federal programs to be certain 

we are fully leveraging our support to individuals and communities. Perhaps the best opportunity for collaboration exists with 

the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and its intersection with recovery activities such as rebuilding homes and public infrastructure in the aftermath of a disaster. We all know that that interface 

hasn’t worked always as well as it should, and we want to make 

sure that we are not wasting opportunities. 

During our hearings with Secretary Napolitano two weeks ago, 

I brought up concerns with the implementation of congressional intent, as well as the award timing, for grants intended to hire and 

retain firefighters. We are facing an economic crisis at the local levels of government. We want to make sure Congress and the administration are on the same page when it comes to the urgency of 

keeping our local firefighters on the job. 

We are now discussing the fiscal year 2011 budget, but, meanwhile, we are still awaiting award of fiscal year 2009 grants for 

firefighters. The Secretary stated that measures have been put in 

place so that a lag of 18 months will not happen in the future. The 

Department has not yet identified what those measures are, so we 

hope to address the issue here today. 

While we want to support our local first responders, we also continue to seek a method to determine what we are getting for the 

billions in grant funding that we appropriate each year. The problem of defining and measuring preparedness for our first responders and State and local communities has eluded us since these 

grant programs began. The Committee provided funding in last 

year’s bill to bring stakeholders together to examine the problem 


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455 

so we can finally work toward a solution. I am hoping to hear there 

is a clear way forward regarding this issue so that we can assure 

the American public that we are more prepared to respond to a disaster than we were 10 years ago, and that we are utilizing our 

funds in a targeted and prioritized manner. 

Administrator Fugate, as someone with a distinguished background of public service in State and local emergency management, 

I am sure you are attuned to a number of these concerns. As the 

leader of FEMA, you have been tasked with a great responsibility 

to improve the country’s ability to prepare for, respond to, recover 

from, and mitigate against disasters and emergencies. 

I thank you, we all thank you, for taking on such a job at such 

an important time, and we look forward to your thoughts on what 

progress you have made in the last year, as well as the challenges 

that remain. 

We have a good turnout of colleagues this morning, indicative of 

interest on both sides of the aisle. I do want to announce that because of an important meeting at the White House with the President of Haiti, President Preval, and everyone knows that FEMA 

has been involved extensively in the emergency response efforts in 

Haiti, as well as the Coast Guard, and a number of our Homeland 

Security agencies. It is important that the Administrator be at that 

meeting, so we will adjourn this hearing at promptly 11:15. 

We will try to move things along in the meantime. We have a 

lot of interests, but I trust we can all be efficient in our handling 

of the time, and that we will have ample time here to explore a 

full range of issues. 

We will ask you to abbreviate your statement for the record. 

Your full statement will be entered, of course, but we are going to 

ask you to limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes. 

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Mr. PRICE. Before you begin, I want to recognize our distin- guished Ranking Member for his comments. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER HAROLD ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr. Fugate, for what marks your first appearance before this Subcommittee. 

Given your extensive emergency management experience at the State and local level in Florida, I look forward to hearing your insights on how FEMA is performing and how the Agency can improve. 

It was a little more than 4 years ago when FEMA was literally on life support. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and despite 

laudable efforts by many FEMA employees in the field, the organization was considered largely broken and dysfunctional. But since 

that time, Congress has provided substantial direction for reform 

as well as robust appropriations in an effort to enable the Agency 

to fulfill its mission of ensuring our Nation’s resiliency to attacks 

and disasters. 

However, FEMA still lacks fundamental processes and controls 

to properly account for its personnel and to effectively measure its 

efforts to improve our Nation’s preparedness. 

Now, I understand many people within FEMA are working hard to overcome these glaring deficiencies, but this begs the question, 

how can FEMA truly be effective at executing its mission when its 

own house is not in order? Put another way, the vital role FEMA 

plays in our Nation’s homeland security isn’t cheap. Since 9/11, we 

have appropriated more than $30 billion in first responder grants, 

and spent billions more on disaster relief. 

Considering the costs of preparedness and disaster response and recovery, how do we know whether FEMA is capable of ensuring 

every single dollar is accounted for, as well as working hard to 

make our Nation safer and more prepared? This is the fundamental question I hope to examine here today with you. FEMA must be a nimble and adaptable agency that understands and rapidly responds to the needs of local emergency managers and 

first responders, as opposed to a bloated, sluggish bureaucracy that 

fails to deliver when our Nation needs it most. After all, all response is, in fact, local, and FEMA primarily exists to augment and 

enable that local response. I think, being active on the State and 

local level, you would agree with that. This is all the more reason FEMA must be aware of the status 

of emergency management capabilities all across the country. From 

what I have read, I believe Mr. Fugate has relatively strong views 

on the roles and responsibilities throughout FEMA and the States 

in preparing for, responding to and recovering from disasters and 

attacks. 

This Subcommittee, which has earnestly set out to enhance 

FEMA’s capacity, largely thanks to Chairman Price’s insistence, 

needs to have unwavering confidence that each and every scarce 

dollar we appropriate is making a positive contribution to our Nation’s resiliency. 

Like the Chairman said, Mr. Fugate, I don’t envy you. You have 

a truly thankless job since we only call upon you when things go 


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bad. But with your familiarity with hurricanes and disasters, I 

know you have learned to stand up in the storm, and we look forward to hearing from you today. 

Finally, let me also state for the record how grateful I am to the 

men and women of FEMA who came to the aid of the citizens of 

Kentucky in the wake of horrific ice storms and floods last year. 

Their efforts made a tremendous difference in Kentucky’s response 

and recovery to that emergency, and I want to pass on my sincere 

appreciation to you and the men and women of FEMA for their 

great effort. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. 

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Mr. PRICE. Mr. Administrator, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF CRAIG FUGATE

Mr. FUGATE. Thank you, Chairman Price, Ranking Member Rogers and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Chairman 

Price, first thanks for allowing me to testify earlier because of the 

prior engagement. I will submit my written statement for the 

record, and I will keep my remarks short so that we can get to the 

questions you are raising. 

I take very serious my responsibility as a fiscal steward of dollars. I also take very serious my responsibility to ensure that, as 

a partner, that we are working as a team on behalf of the President and the Secretary of Homeland Security to support Governors 

and local governments when disaster strikes. As I like to remind 

people, FEMA is not the team, we are part of a team, and that 

team effort has to be built upon both trust, but also effective in a 

rapid response during disasters, as well as supporting recovery, 

and, as the Chairman pointed out, never to miss the opportunity 

to invest in protecting property and building back in such a way 

that we minimize future risk. It is a responsible way to manage 

our risk when we look at disasters not in just a response phase, 

but also when rebuilding or before a disaster, how we can mitigate 

that. 

Our request, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, is about $7.3 billion. Not a lot of big, major policy changes. Probably most substantially and of concern that has been raised is our effort to answer 

some questions regarding funding levels and consolidation of some 

grant programs. We are working from our budget recommendations 

from last year that support our process uses for going forward with 

our budgets. We also looked at the consolidation of grants based 

upon, in some cases, input from our users, but also my experiences 

as a state emergency manager at the state administrative agency. 

One of the things that was oftentimes a paperwork burden is 

that having to apply for each grant individually and then being 

locked into that allocation, can only be for that use, versus being 

able to prioritize across those funding streams. Now, what we are 

looking for here was not to take away from the intention of the 

grants but, again, to provide flexibility to the applicants as well as 

reducing the number of grant applications by being able to submit 

one grant for the funds in a package, and that was the effort there 

to consolidate those grants. 

I should point out, I am going to give one example, one of the 

challenges I faced, and then I would defer, Mr. Chairman, to questions. I think it would be much better in this short time to be able 

to answer questions directly. 

In my confirmation process, I was briefed on a situation that 

FEMA had found itself about $100 million over budget in salaries, 

which to me as a state administrator and a former state director, 

I ask, how do you get $100 million over what your budget is for 

salaries? That, to me, is what happened. And for a variety of reasons, what it turned out, quite simply, there was no institutional 

controls that came back and made sure that as positions were 

added, those salaries were subtracted against our salary overall, 


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and that visibility was not done at a level that could have presented that. 

Fortunately, the Acting Administrator Nancy Ward and our 

Chief Financial Officer Norm Dong had started the process, before 

I ever got there, of beginning the work to: A, deal with that over, 

but also put in the institutional controls so we don’t find ourselves 

spending more money than we have in salaries. I mean, to me, I 

couldn’t conceive, how do you get there? 

So, again, as you point out, a lot of what we are doing is selfdiscipline. I found ourselves at FEMA using the Disaster Relief 

Fund to fund a lot of ongoing activities that were not tied to a disaster. And I said, what are we doing here? Well, we have been 

doing that; it is kind of what we have done. I said, we are not doing 

that. Disaster Relief Fund has to be tied to disasters. So we have 

been working very hard. 

We found a lot of our—what we call our CORE employees, which 

are our term employees that were supposed to be tied to disasters, 

doing day-to-day work. So we have been working with Committee 

staffs. We have been working to get these positions in our budget 

moved to our authorized funding strength. If these positions were 

actually needed to do our day-to-day operations, they should be 

funded out of our budget, our M&A, not out of the DRF. That 

caused some consternation with folks because we hadn’t done that 

before. 

We also found ourselves using a lot of our disaster assistance employees to fill in gaps across a program that weren’t tied to disaster. And I shut that off to varying degrees of success as I continue to find and unearth occasional people I have missed. 

But I am trying to set the tone and the discipline that we are 

to operate within the budget we are allocated, for the purpose it 

is to be used, and if we cannot, we have a duty to come back and 

clarify and express what those needs are. So as you point out, the 

process of putting in those institutional controls at the highest 

level and then holding managers accountable has become one of 

our cornerstones. 

The other direction that we had very clear in the Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act was to empower and strengthen our regions. But in many cases many of the decision-making authorities that were previously in the hands of the regional administrators had not been delegated to them, it was done at headquarters. 

I asked Nancy Ward, who was acting as Regional Administrator 

and is returning to her position as Regional Administrator, and I 

asked a simple question: Nancy, what do you need that you are 

currently not authorized to do that you should be? And we gave her 

those authorities and gave it to the region. 

So we are very serious about this. In 10 months, as you point 

out, there are a lot of challenges. But I never lost sight of the focus 

that we have to be ready for the next disaster by building a team, 

and at the same time I am responsible as a fiscal steward for the 

U.S. taxpayer, every one of them. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. 

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DISASTER RELIEF FUND

Mr. PRICE. I certainly want to commend you on both of those efforts that you have just encapsulated, the attempt to tighten up the 

management controls, and the budget dollars going where they 

were intended, and also the regional focus. I am sure we will want 

to explore these matters more fully. 

I will start with a question, probably not surprisingly, having to 

do with that Disaster Relief Fund and the kinds of projections contained in the budget. 

You have in the budget two requests for the Disaster Relief 

Fund, for fiscal year 2011 and then a fiscal year 2010 supplemental. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. That kind of anticipates what I want to ask you 

about. 

You are continuing to rely on the 5-year average cost of disasters, excluding large events, and that approach obviously has some 

rationale. But the problem is the Department knows that it is still 

liable for costs associated with continuing recovery after these disasters. 

Just yesterday we received a letter from the OMB Director reiterating an urgent need to replenish the disaster relief account for 

the current year. So we find ourselves in this position of running 

low on balances as a result of this lack of sound budgeting in past 

years, and we really do need to break that pattern. 

Prior to running low on balances, the fund was being depleted at 

a rate of about $500 million per month during this fiscal year. If 

we continue to see obligations at this rate into fiscal year 2011, the 

budget request is going to be sufficient only for about 4 or 5 

months of funding. 

So how can you explain the rationale for this request? Why have 

you not more fully factored in the known costs associated with past 

disasters into these estimates, and have you considered alternative 

methods of budgeting for major disasters? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, my answer is going to be the one 

that I am going to defer back to further guidance to you in that 

the way that I understand we have submitted our request for the 

Disaster Relief Fund is to take the bubble of catastrophic disasters 

out and budget for what we had seen as the historical averages. 

My experience in Florida after Hurricane Andrew was we did 

what you are recommending. We actually put into the budget what 

we anticipated the full amount of authority we would need for reimbursement of federal funds. The problem with that was it created such a large bubble in our budget, it distorted everything else 

when people looked at the overall budget line. It was not seen as 

a separate line; it was looked at by total agency budget. So when 

you looked at our total agency budget, we had a disproportionate 

bubble that was moving through the system that was tied to catastrophic disasters, but not related to the day-to-day operations and 

their disasters that we would normally experience. 

Ultimately, we ended up with so much authority in the years 

when the disasters begin to spin down that we were carrying, in 

some cases, for an agency that probably had a routine budget of a 


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couple of—maybe about $20, $30 million, I was carrying in excess 

of close to $750 to $800 million in authority. 

So what our experience in Florida was was to—if we were to do 

that, was to separate out and have our core budget based on our 

expected activities, and not show a bubble of catastrophic dollars 

moving through our budgets. My understanding here at the Federal level, that has been the approach of looking at how we submit 

our budget request is not looking at the bubble, but the sustained 

requirement. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, as a matter of fact, I would have to acknowledge 

that this Subcommittee has not always been fully supported by 

other partners in this process in terms of our conviction that really 

we ought to be budgeting more adequately for the major disasters 

as well as the routine ones, and that we shouldn’t be systematically 

relying on supplementals to deal with this. It is also true, of course, 

that to fully anticipate these items makes for a much larger budget 

request, and it does have implications elsewhere in the budget. So 

as you are dealing with a tight budget and trying to do justice to 

a number of priorities, it is very tempting to kind of defer this and 

to assume that it be dealt with off budget or out of the regular 

process. 

But I appreciate your candor on this. I mean, we are going to 

need to deal with the numbers and also with the budgeting practice 

that lies behind them. 

Let me just quickly ask you on a related note, you are aware, no 

doubt, the Inspector General recently indicated some issues with 

how FEMA closes out disasters. This recent report, states that as 

of September of 2008, unobligated or unliquidated obligations for 

the 744 open disasters were approximately $16 billion; $500 million 

of that was for disasters declared prior to 1999. These go beyond 

a decade ago. So if this funding is sitting there 10 years later, and 

it may not be needed, could it be deobligated; could it be made 

available for current disaster relief opportunities, for example, to 

relieve us in our present time of need? 

I understand that your CFO may have completed an exercise in 

which they were able to identify some of these funds for 

deobligation. So, questions: How much funding in open disasters 

have you been able to identify for deobligation? Will that be available for the current shortfall that we are addressing? What permanent changes here do you think you need to put into place to ensure better control and policies for the disaster closeout process? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit the actual 

numbers in a written response so I don’t give you the overall bad 

numbers, in my memory, but I believe it was several hundred million dollars that has already been—because we went back through 

and de-obligated, and we found a lot of open missions, actually 

some of our Federal agency partners and others, that we were able 

to—it was actually dollars that weren’t spent, they hadn’t been actually drawn down, but they were on paper obligated in the mission assignment. We were able to go back through and just do that 

part of the scrub and ensure that that agency had not expended its 

funds, had not needed to draw down those dollars, and fund those 

back into the Disaster Relief Fund. 


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But it points out to one of the things that we are looking at as far as a closeout process. We put so much emphasis on getting disasters up and running, we have never focused in on the same desire to close them. And in many cases it is not so much that these 

funds are still going to be spent as much as we have not done the 

final scrub of how much was obligated, how much was authorized 

but not drawn down, and then revert that back into the DRF. 

And that is a resource issue. It is also a management issue to prioritize that as you have new disasters coming on and staff who 

are pulled to getting those disasters up and running, is to put the 

same effort into closing out disasters, particularly these older disasters where it is oftentimes a final accounting that is required. 

But until you do that, you still show in the books obligations, which 

means you cannot free those dollars back up to go into the DRF. But I will have the CFO submit for the record what we have actually done so far, and what we anticipate we will be able to do, 

and what our plan is to go forward in closing out the oldest disasters and working ourselves up to getting within, you know, about 

a 4- to 5-year process that disasters, except for the extremely large 

ones, should be fully accounted for, expended, and in the closeout 

mode unless there are some extenuating circumstances that go beyond that. But generally it doesn’t do the applicant any good to have this hanging there. It doesn’t do us any good, and it ties up allocations 

based upon those outstanding obligations that needed to be reconciled in an administrative closeout. 

[The information follows:] 

FEMA has de-obligated $760 million from open disasters in FY2010. FEMA has identified several hundred million in potential de-obligations for contracts and 

grants that could be restored to the DRF, but it will take some time to work through 

the details and ensure the funds are no longer needed. FEMA estimates that up to 

$100 million can be de-obligated within the next 45 days that could alleviate some 

of the shortfall. The additional funding that we recover through an aggressive deobligation effort might add one or more weeks of funding back into the DRF. The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has issued a FEMA-wide Directive on Managing Open Obligations that requires FEMA offices to perform a quarterly review 

and annual certification and validation of all open obligations. Invalid obligations 

will be de-obligated in a timelier manner and funds returned to the DRF. The CFO 

has a dedicated team reviewing all unliquidated obligations (ULOs) that will expedite and institutionalize the process for reviewing and de-obligating open obligations. The CFO, and OCFO senior leadership, has incorporated the reduction of 

ULOs as a performance measure in their FY2010 performance plans. The Office of 

the CFO is also working with the HQ program offices and the FEMA regions to develop standard policy, processes, doctrine, and training for a more streamlined disaster closeout process throughout the agency. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. We will await that, and we hope, in terms 

of the dollar implications for our current needs, that we can have 

an indication very soon of what we may be looking at there. 

Mr. Rogers. 

STAFFING ISSUES

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. Director, I appreciated your opening remarks, which you 

have made on the subject that is of most importance to us, and 

that is the fiscal dealings of the Agency. I noticed that you did it 

without reference to notes, which to me tells me that you have this 

in your head, and it is on your mind, and I like that. 


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However, the IG of the Department, in his audit and his report, 

covered a lot of topics that you have mentioned, summary, in your 

opening statement. 

But, anyway, the Budget Office said that the Agency lacked visibility and control over its staffing, as you have admitted. The 

Budget Office found that they did not know exactly how many employees they had on board, did not have formal billet structures per 

office, and were hiring employees at rates above what the budget 

could support, and that created what FEMA called a structural pay 

shortfall, which cost about $35 million. 

And then subsequently the Subcommittee directed the IG to do 

an audit on the issue in the fiscal 2010 appropriations bill, and it 

was not a glowing report. But it did say that the IG found that 

FEMA has reconciled the discrepancy on the 50-employee double 

hiring that took place. It is unclear whether FEMA simply reallocated those positions or looked for a cost-saving offset. 

The IG’s work on the determination of whether or not the $35 

million would close the shortfall or not was still outstanding. What 

can you tell us about that? 

Mr. FUGATE. That is probably one of the challenges. As we started looking at how many positions were in a non-disaster role, that 

was what we call a CORE position, to identify where they were, 

they were almost like rabbits. Every time we thought we got them 

counted, we found somebody had a few more that nobody knew 

about. And that went back to that original issue. Without those institutional controls, we had positions being filled at rates above 

what we could sustain, and we had positions that were being used 

that there was no way to track down and get to. 

We have been scrubbing and scrubbing and scrubbing. I know 

one of the frustrations for staff is we came up with our initial numbers. We then found more staff that were in CORE positions that 

had not been made known to us and that we had to add in. 

I think we are close to having this resolved, because our position 

is by the end of this Fiscal Year and going into the Fiscal Year 

2011 request, we will not have any known, again, I will say, that 

we are aware of. We may find somebody figured out something we 

didn’t see coming. But it is our goal to not have any positions funded out of the DRF if they are not in the disaster. And that our recommendation for the budget reconciles converting those CORES 

into full-time positions funded out of that M&A allocation for those 

costs so that they are funded appropriately, they are justified. 

But you also alluded to another issue that I found ourselves dealing with. We have a lot of positions and a lot of job descriptions, 

far more than I think are necessary. I think our job descriptions 

add to this in that so many are tailored specifically to a position 

versus looking more generically at those jobs. 

And we also have found that in many cases we have a lot of people at very high grades over time; that we want to go back, and 

when positions become vacated, before we automatically make a 

decision that we are going to refill at GS–14 or GS–15, we are 

scrubbing the job description to make sure that the grade is appropriate to the work. And when it requires it, we are going to downgrade those positions to more adequately reflect what a reimbursement should be for the work being done versus merely refilling poVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:47 Sep 10, 2010 Jkt 057185 PO 00000 Frm 00480 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A185P2.XXX A185P2

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sitions that may have been at a rate far beyond what the workload 

would have required. 

Mr. ROGERS. Good. I am glad to hear that. We are going to hold 

you to that. 

The IG—we are not through with him yet, nor are you—we are 

going to be sure that the IG can complete its audit, and that we 

have complete confidence that you have got the proper controls in 

place. So we will continue to work with the IG to help you achieve 

those goals. 

You know, it has been a feeling for a long time that due to the 

emergencies that happened, not regularly, obviously, that FEMA 

has sometimes become a place to park very expensive personnel, 

and we don’t want that to happen anymore. I hear you, I think, 

saying that it has stopped. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you say that louder? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. It is my goal to make sure that we do not— 

we found ourselves oftentimes looking at job descriptions that seem 

to have the position and the work, and what actually was being 

done did not always match up. 

So this caused me multiple problems. A lot of the staff in FEMA 

that should have been considered for promotion weren’t promoted 

because it was too great of a jump from a GS–12 to GS–13 or GS– 

15. So we wanted to come back and, A, ask, well, what was the requirement for that position to be that high in the first place? Was 

it to meet a salary requirement, or was it to actually meet the 

workload? And to be honest with you, sir, I don’t think that you 

could make a clear difference that it was based on workload in far 

too many cases that I have seen. 

So we are taking those positions, and it is our intention to make 

sure that the work justifies the position, but also, if it requires to 

downgrade those positions, to downgrade them before filling them, 

and also develop a better process to grow leadership within FEMA, 

rather than having to seek each opportunity to go outside of 

FEMA. I think there is a proper balance between bringing people 

from the outside, but also making sure that those people that have 

the skills and things that they take very seriously, that they have 

an opportunity to move up. And when you bring positions and try 

to fill them at such a high grade, you literally cut off your best and 

brightest from moving forward. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, to help you achieve that goal, I am going to 

be talking to the Chairman and urging that we perhaps withhold 

some of the funds until we see that that is being achieved. 

So in due course of time, Mr. Chairman, I may want to talk to 

you about that. 

Mr. PRICE. All right. Thank you, sir. 

Mrs. Lowey. 

URBAN AREAS SECURITY INITIATIVE (UASI)

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I must say, Mr. Administrator, it is refreshing to find someone 

of your caliber and insight and determination, and we wish you 

good luck. It is really unfortunate that the past administration left 


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you in such a difficult position, but we appreciate your honesty and 

your direct approach to straighten up the shop, shall we say. 

Let me ask you a few questions. I have been concerned about the 

high-risk urban area program. It was created to support only highrisk urban areas. Now, you actually began serving seven cities, but 

it has now ballooned to 64 potential recipients for fiscal year 2010. 

Further, the administration’s fiscal year 2011 proposal consolidates 

numerous other grant programs into UASI, which I am concerned 

will further diminish the likelihood that only the most high-risk 

areas will receive the funding they need. 

So I have a few questions related to that. First of all, Administrator Fugate, Congress does not set a floor for the number of UASI 

recipients. Is it likely that FEMA will be awarding funding to all 

64 areas that are eligible to apply? 

In previous years, I have been told that the Department’s political leadership determined the number of UASI recipients. Who decided to increase the number of fiscal year 2010 UASI recipients 

to 64, and what assurances can you give us, who represent highrisk areas, that UASI was created to serve, such as New York, that 

they will not be shortchanged by consolidating other grants into 

this program? 

So if you can explain your approach, what we can expect, where 

do we go from here. Thank you, again, for your straightforward responses. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, the first one I will answer is the commitment 

to the high risk. The list of cities is actually broken into two 

groups: Tier I, which are the highest, and Tier II, which are considered secondary or lesser threat, but, because of the population and 

vulnerabilities of that, would warrant additional financial assistance through the Urban Area Security Initiative Program. 

As I understand it, particularly with the city of New York, they 

have, since the inception of the program, been the highest recipient 

and received the most funds. And as a primary target for certain 

terrorist organizations, that warrants. However, I would caution, 

we have a tendency in this country to always prepare for the last 

event, the last attack, and assume that all future attacks will follow the same future pattern. That would be true if our adversaries 

don’t change. But the reality is, as we have seen, terrorism may 

come from offshore. It may come from home. It may be based on 

ideologies. It may not be based on a particular political bent as 

much as a disagreement or an action that an individual or a small 

group may take against some part of our communities. 

So our goal is to look at how we base our funding to support 

against the known adversaries, against those threats, but also recognize that our enemies are adaptive, they seek out our 

vulnerabilities. And if we make one area of the country protected 

and leave other parts totally vulnerable, there is no reason to suspect they wouldn’t change their tactics and take advantage of that. 

So we look and take very seriously the process. And, yes, it is a 

true statement that the political leadership makes these decisions, 

because we are the ones that the Senate confirmed. We are the 

ones that the President has appointed. It is our duty to do our best 

to reconcile the needs of an adversary that is never going to stay 

the same against our funding ability and trying to manage our risk 


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against those threats that we have had experience with, those 

threats that are emerging, and those threats that we have not yet 

anticipated, but, again, concerns being when we have large population centers, that vulnerability cannot be understated. And, 

again, we have prioritized the funding in the Tier I based on the 

historical threat we are in in this current environment, but recognizing that our adversaries aren’t all the same, and the threats 

don’t stay static. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I understand, and thank you for your thoughtful re- sponse, except I wonder what confidence can you give us that the 

high-risk areas won’t be short-changed? I am not saying there 

shouldn’t be other funding of the programs for any potential—I 

don’t want to say operation—threat, but I want to feel confident 

that in high-threat areas, areas that remain high-threat, that they 

won’t be short-changed in this program. I certainly welcome other areas getting all the assistance they need, but perhaps it shouldn’t be in the UASI program. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, the tools we are giving in the budgets we work with, we are, again, supporting those high-risk areas at levels 

that we have recommended previously. And some of the consolidation, again, it was similar to the State Homeland Security grant 

consolidation to give the locals more flexibility within those funding 

streams. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you. I think my time is up. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Carter. 

INTEROPERABILITY GRANTS

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

More than $43 billion in Federal grant money spent in 2004 and 

2008 to improve interoperability among first responders nationwide. This is more than any other DHS initiative. FEMA states 

that in 2009, they distributed 56 interoperability emergency grants 

for a total of $48.5 million. 

Are these grants still focused on purchasing equipment, or is 

there added focus on the planning and organization aspect? Equipment alone cannot provide interoperability. I am most especially interested because my district, as Williamson County and all the surrounding counties directly north, lost to the Tier II city. 

Mr. FUGATE. Sir, interoperability means if all the radios are talking, but nobody is talking together, then we haven’t solved the 

problem. You are absolutely right. A lot of the emphasis has to be 

on building who talks to whom, and how they need to communicate, and what they need to communicate before you apply a 

technology solution. 

So a good percentage of these funds have been going for planning, exercising and training, and then providing limited capitalization. Ultimately the goal is before we go off and invest large 

sums of dollars in interoperable solutions, we have to have the 

planning done, the coordination done, and including the governance, because most of these solutions are not done within a specific 

jurisdiction. They are oftentimes regional or statewide. And we 

have found, and my experience has always been, it is best governed 

when it is not directed from the top down, but the locals build their 


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governance, how they are going to operate, and then apply the 

technology solutions. 

So there has been considerable investment in this, but a lot of 

these programs are focused on developing and working with the 

plans. In fact, within DHS, we serve as the secretariat for a lot of 

the emergency communication within our 10 regions as they work 

with the states as they develop their regional communication plans. 

Mr. CARTER. Planning and organization are critical and crucial, 

and there are those who will take the bull by the horns and try 

to work with others to put together plans and solutions and organizations, and there are others who need to be taken by the hand 

and dragged across the line. And it sounds like you are moving in 

that direction, and I think that is very critical, because the first excuse you hear if something goes wrong, we couldn’t talk to each 

other. So I thank you for that, and I thank you for being on top 

of that problem. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

PREPAREDNESS

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In your prepared statement, you mention under the ‘‘Enhancing 

the Preparedness of Our Nation,’’ you say that we must start with 

our citizens, and that it is critical to response and recovery success. 

Yet, according to the Norman Lear Center at USC, a magnitude 7.8 

seismic event in downtown Los Angeles could claim close to 2,000 

lives and inflict more than $200 billion in damages. 

And although California is nationally best prepared for a disaster, a recent study published by the University of Southern California found that rates of preparedness have been stagnant over 

the past decade. Only 30 to 40 percent of California families have 

adequate disaster supplies, and most are unfamiliar with basic 

earthquake safety procedures. This lack of knowledge is especially 

acute in minority and low-income communities. 

Could you please tell the Subcommittee how FEMA is working 

with State and local authorities in California and other vulnerable 

States to educate the public about disaster preparedness in general, earthquake preparedness in particular? And also as part of 

that question, if you could also talk about how FEMA is doing outreach to—of minority communities and those that have limited 

English proficiency, because as studies have shown, and as Hurricane Katrina and Rita and California wildfires have demonstrated, 

there are significant challenges faced by Latinos and other groups 

with limited proficiency during a disaster. 

Mr. FUGATE. That is a lot of ground to cover. 

The short answer is in emergency management historically we 

have talked about the public being prepared, but then we don’t 

really follow up on what does that mean. If you read most documents, and you look at the way we look at the public in general, 

we look at the public as a liability. We look at them—I don’t say 

that in a negative way, I just say we plan for having to take care 

of everybody. Instead of recognizing that in the disaster you have 


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described—quite honestly, I don’t really care how much money you 

are authorizing me, it couldn’t get there fast enough. 

And the other part of the problem is if we have a system that 

is based on a government-centric approach of trying to meet all 

those needs, the most vulnerable citizens won’t get served. And so 

we are trying to change this dialogue when we talk about preparedness. It is not just something that is a good thing to do, it 

is absolutely necessary. 

My experience, when I went down to Haiti about a week after 

the earthquake, the Haitians were taking care of themselves, because it was that difficult getting outside aid in. And time and time 

again we underestimate what people will do and can do. And we 

often take what I must call almost a parental approach to engaging 

the public. 

I think we have to change that and stop looking at the public as 

a liability, but as a resource, because as you point out, we have a 

tendency, in emergency management, and I will say this is true 

probably in a lot of other areas of the government, to plan for what 

is easy to implement versus what the needs are in a disaster. And 

what I have found time and time again is if we don’t factor in that 

the children and the infants, the elderly and the frail, the people 

with disabilities and language barriers are not what we plan for up 

front, it fails. 

And so both changing that culture within FEMA, but within the 

emergency management community, but also recognizing that we 

have a tremendous ability, if we can figure out how to effectively 

harness tools such as social media, we have seen time and time 

again that the public actually solves the problem faster than the 

government response. 

But our tendency has been it is not official, it is not something 

we can control, and it is not something we are directing, and there 

is a fear of the public engagement. But the reality is—in this type 

of situation—we need neighbor helping neighbor. We need them 

telling us what is going on rather than us waiting for official reports. 

And we need more outreach as we already started working with 

various coalitions and constituency groups ahead of a disaster to 

establish dialog of how to get information out, preparedness information, and identify the unique needs that various communities 

have. But it is a mindset and a culture. 

You know, I am finding myself doing a lot of cultures, like being 

fiscally accountable, you know, and holding ourselves to that, but 

also changing this idea that government itself is going to solve all 

these problems. Well, the reality on a day-to-day basis, the private 

sector does a lot of things that we would depend on them to get 

back up and running. 

So we are working, particularly in earthquakes, the lessons of 

Haiti to apply into our catastrophic planning, looking at the Chilean response and factoring that in, and continuing to work with 

our partners at the state and local level as we prepare for other 

types of no-notice events of that magnitude. 

But the underlying issue has been we have got to get away from 

what I call our government-centric approach to solving this problem and work to engage the public as a resource, because if we 


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don’t, the most vulnerable citizens will not get the help they need 

because everybody else is competing when they could have been 

part of the solution. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Let me also suggest that you consider work- ing with Members of Congress. We all do all kinds of workshops 

and outreach to our constituents and could also help you in terms 

of meeting those needs. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Calvert. 

URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand you are going over to the White House later today and to thank some of the people that responded at the Haiti disaster. Part of that, of course, is the urban search and rescue teams, 

and we have a number of them in California, certainly around the 

United States. They are necessary, obviously, for domestic events, 

but obviously helpful in disasters such as Haiti. Under the budget request, there is a significant cut in what is proposed. As you know, these task forces claim that the actual cost 

to these teams are about 1.8 to 2.2 million per team, and we are 

contributing approximately $1 million per team to these teams. 

I also understand that when this program was first conceived, 

that it was supposed to be a minimal impact to these local agencies, and, obviously, that is not the case. And, as you know, many 

of these communities are strapped anyway, and they have to maintain an inventory, vehicles, keep that up to date, maintain the rest. 

I am also concerned because I understand that, talking to a number of these groups throughout the country, that the bottom line is 

that there is really not a lot of local benefit relative to the cost. But 

50/50 split may sound good in the context of most Federal mandates, but in this case the locals aren’t receiving a 50 percent benefit. At least that is what they claim. 

What do you feel about that? Is there any movement as far as 

what we can do to help these search and rescue teams throughout 

the United States? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, the request we placed into this year’s budget 

is a request based on last year’s request. 

As far as the shared responsibility, we are meeting actively with 

the chiefs of the urban search and rescue teams. As you point out, 

it was originally conceived that these teams are not standing fulltime federal teams only authorized for federal response, and there 

is no prohibition against that equipment or personnel being utilized 

on a day-to-day basis. 

And so my understanding is the program as originally created 

was a shared responsibility, the benefit of the team for that community versus the funding that the Federal Government provided 

to go outside of their community during disasters. 

During a disaster response, FEMA picks up the majority of what 

we have identified and what the teams have identified costs, including such costs as backfilling their positions while they are deployed. 

But I guess this is the fundamental question you are raising is 

what is the equitable split for a joint funding of a resource that is 


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not on a day-to-day basis federalized except during disasters? And 

we are in discussions with the chiefs of the USR teams. We are actually having an after-action with those chiefs here in the next 

week talking about the Haiti response and lessons learned. 

But, again, the program was established upon a shared funding, 

shared responsibility, as these teams were not a federal standing 

team, but rather a local team that we provide funding to that had 

the capability to deploy out of their community. 

Mr. CALVERT. Well, you know, we are in the process of working 

toward this markup on this bill here soon, and we are hearing from 

a number of these teams saying that they may not be able to sustain—some of them talking about shutting down their operation 

based upon their budget costs that they are incurring back in some 

States, especially in California. 

So if you can get back to us while we are going through this process of marking up this bill, that would be helpful, because I know 

the city of Los Angeles, San Francisco, others, Orange County, all 

these teams are under tremendous stress right now, and they want 

us to get back to them as soon as possible. 

[The information follows:] 

FEMA staff provided a briefing on the FEMA National Urban Search and Rescue 

(US&R) Program to Congressman Calvert and his staff on February 24, 2010. 

Among the issues discussed in the briefing was the funding of the US&R Program 

during disasters and day-to-day operations. A Haiti After Action Conference focused 

on US&R occurred on March 23–24, 2010. An After Action Conference Report will 

be completed and can be provided to Congressman Calvert. 

NEPA PROCESS

One other quick question regarding the NEPA process and these 

grant programs to the ports. As you know, in a State like California, we have the CEQA process, which is even more intense 

than the NEPA process, and these grants are being held up. You 

know, we have one of the largest port facilities, the largest port facility in the country in the Port of L.A.-Long Beach, and it seems, 

in my opinion, nonsensical that the Federal Government does not 

allow a State’s environmental requirements supersede the NEPA 

requirements and allow the FEMA grants to move forward. It is 

just holding up the entire program, I understand months, if not 

years, in some of these programs. 

Would you like to comment on that? 

Mr. FUGATE. I follow the law that Congress passed, which says 

I must do NEPA reviews on those types of projects, and I have no 

relief if the state has a higher standard. That is the law that I 

have to follow in those regards. 

Mr. CALVERT. Would you be willing to address or review that 

process and make recommendations to the Congress to see if we 

can’t streamline that process? 

Mr. FUGATE. I would be willing to work with the Committee. I 

think it is important that we—as long as we can achieve the original intent that Congress laid out in the NEPA process through alternative means that are less burdensome, but achieve the same 

outcome, we would be willing to provide technical advice and expertise based on our experiences. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. CALVERT. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Mr. Farr. 

Mr. FARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Congratulations on your appointment, and welcome. I think of 

you as the chief first responder in the Nation, and you are talking 

to a Congress of which all 435 Members think of themselves as 

first responders because we get calls on every human concern in 

American society in our offices, and so we have to respond to those, 

and we go home every week. 

My concern, and I think I share some of the concerns Mr. Rogers 

pointed out, is the first responders are always at the local level, 

and I hope you never forget where you came from, because you 

have moved from a State, and a big State with a $745 million 

budget and overseeing 67 counties and local governments, to a $7 

billion budget. And, frankly, I think that if we really did our jobs, 

FEMA would work itself out of a position. So I hope you kind of 

think of how can we transfer all of this sort of money in Washington to essentially the communities’ ability to want to prevent 

disasters with mitigation, and, two, to respond? Because the first 

responder is, indeed, that. And, you know, in order to get FEMA 

involved, you have got to go through the declaration process. I don’t 

want to wait around and try to figure out when my home is destroyed or something happens in my community whether it is going 

to meet a threshold that it will get a State or national disaster declaration. I want somebody there to help alleviate the situation immediately. 

And I am kind of interested in your discussion. I think what 

FEMA ought to be doing and where it failed in Katrina is the responsibility to have a check-off system, to see if, in fact, your plans 

and your local response is doable; whether you have the capable 

staff to do it, the equipment to do it; and whether you have the capacity, whether the financial capacity is there to respond. 

That is where I think your professional at the—you, FEMA, at 

the Federal level is to check off to see whether these local plans 

and all the best wishes of governments. I wonder how you did that 

in Florida with the 67 counties and how—whether you got involved—see, I don’t think you ought to give money to premitigation 

unless people will do zoning changes and retrofits and building 

codes. 

I mean, California, not because of FEMA, we responded with a 

very conservative Governor. Governor Deukmejian, after the Loma 

Prieta earthquake, went out and raised the sales taxes, a Governor 

who said he would never vote to raise taxes under any condition. 

Disaster came. He said, this is the exception to the rule. 

He raised the sales taxes, most of them being paid for in southern California—the earthquake was in northern California—for a 

number of years to retrofit everything, every structure in California 

for earthquake preparedness. So all of our bridges and highways 

and everything got—overpasses all got retrofitted paid for by local 

money. You ought to be checking off to see if the States are doing 

that, and they ought to be not getting the money without having 

integrated it. 


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PREDISASTER MITIGATION

So my question goes to why are we doing, out of a $7 billion 

budget, only keeping the program funding for predisaster mitigation at $100 million and leaving it flat? It seems to me that is 

where the action is, and that is where the money ought to be spent, 

and your background ought to know how to do that very well. 

Mr. FUGATE. Two ways you could approach that: Are we actually 

using the grants to do mitigation, or are they ending up not being 

awarded competitively; and, two, oftentimes the level of work that 

would need to be done could never be addressed by any sustained 

funding that I think Congress would be in a position to provide. 

The real effect of those predisaster dollars—— 

Mr. FARR. Part of that is to make sure that the local governments, I mean, whether the county, city or State, has put the resources into doing it. I mean, they are coming back here and relying on the Federal Government to do what is a local responsibility 

for that first responder capability. 

Mr. FUGATE. And this goes back to, I think, is why—and having 

to answer this hard question: Why is it a good investment for the 

U.S. taxpayer for $100 million of mitigation, which, quite honestly, 

is not going to significantly change a large-scale disaster impact? 

It is seed money, and it provides planning. 

Mr. FARR. But why keep it flat when it is so essential to do the 

upgrading and the preparedness? 

Mr. FUGATE. Again, we had to look at our overall budget and 

make decisions about what we would be able to continue and where 

we would have to hold funding. And our experience tells us that 

the real benefit from that mitigation program is the planning and 

efforts it takes to continue to provide seed money. 

Before this program and the wisdom of Congress to even begin 

to address this, we provided no funding before disasters. We always 

did it after the horse got out of the barn. We only did mitigation 

after a disaster struck. So this is really a tool for us, I would say, 

is sort of like some sand to try to make a pearl. It is a catalyst to 

get State and local governments who would not otherwise have the 

wisdom or the disaster to think about mitigation to at least begin 

that process. 

You also point out one other important part of this, that I don’t 

have current tools, and I am not sure I would be the appropriate 

entity to have tools. But we do know the best mitigation is often 

effective in enforced zoning, building codes that are built and enforced to the hazards, but these are primary inherent State responsibilities. Our role at the Federal level oftentimes is encouragement, not necessarily directing that as a separation of—— 

Mr. FARR. But in your commenting on disaster planning, can you 

make that comment that your zoning and your building codes are 

not adequate? 

Mr. FUGATE. I have actually gone back and pointed out that one 

of our challenges with 50 States, the territories and the District is 

the most effective way to mitigate that we have seen in your experience in California, our experience in Florida is to have building 

codes that reflect the hazards we face and build our homes and 

build our schools and build our communities stronger and better. 


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But there is, you point out, tremendous cost to that and often- times a resistance to do that, because I hear this a lot: Well, if we 

do that, homes won’t be affordable. I have also seen the other half 

where people lost their homes—— 

Mr. FARR. Won’t be insurable either. 

Mr. FUGATE. That is exactly right. I have seen far too many peo- ple who lost their homes because we didn’t spend the extra money 

to protect them. The insurance did not cover their losses. They 

were upside down on their mortgages, and they walked away 

homeless. 

Mr. FARR. I hope that you can comment to the States, as we try to assist them in checking off their plans, is that they need to do 

some work and give them examples of other communities that have 

done it. Because I think we fail to do that premitigation, we are 

going to be the Haiti rather than the Chile. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Rothman. 

FLOOD MAPPING

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Administrator, great pleasure meeting you, and thank you for your service at the State level and here at the national level. 

You have had quite a career, and we hope that this will be the 

crown jewel of your accomplishments, and we wish you well. 

Two questions. First one is about flood risk mapping contracts. 

I am told that for the last 5 years, FEMA has been working on developing updated flood insurance rate maps which try to assess the 

risk both in places that flood often and in places that could flood 

disastrously. 

FEMA has recently decided, so I am told, to revise their contract 

process for firms doing survey work on the Agency’s watershed 

studies related to digital flood insurance rate maps, transferring 

the contracts from local firms in the area affected by flooding to 

larger national firms. 

If this is so, my first question is why did FEMA decide to stop 

contracting local firms to do watershed surveys for digital flood insurance rate maps when, so I am told, in a straight-up competition, 

the national firms were beaten out by the local firms in terms of 

price and qualifications? 

Mr. FUGATE. I would like to provide a detailed written report on 

this. I will give a summation as I understand it. 

As I was briefed on this issue I encountered early in my tenure 

was that we had requirements that our staff believed that we were 

required to follow certain contracting requirements when it came 

to professional and technical services, that that process was done 

under our contracting and under federal contracting rules to secure 

those services, and part of that was a process by which we broke 

the contracts into regional contracts, and we allowed consortiums 

of contracts to come in. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Sir, if I may, I know my time is brief. If the lawyers were to tell you that under the laws that govern FEMA, it 

would be permissible to deviate from that model and go to a circumstance where local firms who were just as qualified or better 

qualified, who could provide the services for less money, were availVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:47 Sep 10, 2010 Jkt 057185 PO 00000 Frm 00492 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A185P2.XXX A185P2

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able. If your lawyers told you that your model could be changed so 

that these local small business people could get these contracts instead of the national firms who charge more, would you be willing 

to consider that, sir? 

Mr. FUGATE. I am a big fan of buy local, hire local. So in re- sponse to that, as long as the quality of the product met the requirements, was cost-effective, I have no preference on how we go 

about, you know, the contracting as much as you point out getting 

a product that meets the requirements that is cost-effective. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right. But what I heard from you, sir, is that your understanding is that the lawyers basically said you were 

locked into this regional approach. If you were to learn from the lawyers or anyone else you re- spected more, or other lawyers who you respected more, that you 

were able to do it differently, get the quality you needed at a lesser 

price and buy local, would you do that? 

Mr. FUGATE. Without having that information, and attorneys can agree to disagree, so I would, you know, be very interested in what 

my counsel says, and as long as—I mean, to me, I do not have a 

preconceived opposition to contracting with local firms. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. No, I understand that. But if you were given both 

choices and that scenario, wouldn’t you choose the local firm if you 

were allowed to by law? 

Mr. FUGATE. If we got the same quality of work that was costeffective within the contract provisions, I would not oppose it. I 

prefer to hire local, buy local whenever possible in our programs. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Great. Glad to hear that, sir. I look forward to 

your written response to flesh that out. 

[The information follows:] 

RESPONSE: The original series of contracts awarded to support the Map Mod 

Program consisted of one very large Headquarters level contract and many much 

smaller contracts in each FEMA Region. There were between two and six Regional 

contracts in each Region, depending on the level of need. 

FEMA realized that having 25–30 Regional contractors reduced the Regional and 

Headquarters staff’s ability to adequately manage this large number of contractors 

and reduced FEMA’s ability to provide consistent oversight. In anticipation of the 

expiration of the single Headquarters level contract on September 30, 2009, the decision was made to reduce the number of contractors involved in the day to day watershed surveys. This decision resulted in the award of three follow-on contracts in 

March 2009 to provide watershed surveys. Additionally, two additional contracts 

were awarded for program Management and Customer/Data Services. By separating 

the large contract into three distinct service categories, it allowed FEMA to not only 

increase management’s ability to monitor performance, but also substantially increase the amount of funding directly awarded to small business. 

All of these contracts fall under FAR Part 36.6, which deals with the acquisition 

of Architect/Engineer services. This portion of the FAR requires the selection of the 

most highly qualified firms to perform the work. In selecting the most highly qualified firms, the entire team’s qualifications, including all partners, subcontractors, 

consultants, etc., are considered. The consideration is not limited to just the firm 

responding to the pre-solicitation. The requirement to evaluate the entire team’s 

qualifications negates the assertion that a local contractor was able to beat out the 

national firms on the basis of the local firm’s individual qualifications. 

The engineering community that supports the previous contracts and the current 

Risk MAP contracts consist of approximately 12 large national level engineering 

firms and many smaller firms throughout the nation. The firms that held the previous Regional contracts consisted of various teams which in almost all cases included one or more of the large national firms as either the prime contractor or a 

substantial subcontractor. These partnership/subcontracting arrangements were 

formed to bolster the firm’s chances of being selected as one of the most highly 

qualified firms. 


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Pricing is not considered in the initial phase in determining the most highly qualified companies. Price negotiations occur after selection as most highly qualified firm. 

In fact, FAR 36.6 and the Brooks Act effectively prohibit the use of price comparison 

between firms as a selection criterion. 

OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT OF TEAMS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Finally, there was a recent article in a major 

newspaper that talked of the heroic work of FEMA in Haiti, and 

we all applaud your work and the work of those who work under 

you at FEMA in sending what the article described as, let’s see, a 

number of teams from FEMA to Haiti. It was 6 American teams, 

according to the article, out of a total of 43 international teams, 

rescue teams, 6 out of 43, but our American teams, according to the 

article, were responsible for a third of the lives saved. 

This article goes on to encourage FEMA to increase the number 

of the 28 overseas teams that we can deploy, saying that 28 is not 

enough. Lots of budget constraints. Just wondering what your response is to that kind of a request for additional, more than 28 

teams. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, the first part of this is that FEMA was 

doing—was providing support to USAID, who was the lead, so we 

were responsible to USAID, who was part of the international response. 

As far as the teams that went, there are two teams that are currently what we call dual-hatted. FEMA provides funding for the domestic response; USAID provides funding for the international response. Because of the proximity of Haiti, we actually deployed four 

more teams who were not pre-trained for international response, 

meaning they didn’t have their passports and a lot of this stuff. 

We were able to get those teams into Haiti, the Department of 

State worked with us to get those teams into Haiti, but we felt that 

there may be some opportunity to look at increasing the number 

of teams that are qualified for international response, and we are 

working with Administrator Shah now at USAID on what he would 

see that need to be. 

As far as increasing numbers of teams based upon that response 

to Haiti, we are still based upon our funding levels now, the level 

of participation now, and looking at the after-action reports of 

Haiti. 

There is oftentimes a question of how many more teams—and 

again, we should not forget that many of the funds that we provide 

in the Urban Area Security Initiative, in the State Homeland Security programs have also developed and built robust search and rescue urban teams that are not federally sponsored for deployment, 

but are part of our statewide and nationwide response. My response in Florida—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And can they be called upon for a nearby international disaster? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, again, we are able to provide mutual aid within state. We, again, at the request of USAID, are working with Administrator Shah to see how and what additional resources within 

the teams we have we could provide. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, and well done, sir. 


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POSTDISASTER MITIGATION

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. And let me echo that on behalf of all of 

us. As we said at the beginning of the hearing, we really are appreciative that you and your Agency reached out in the way that you 

did, and we know you saved lives and made a huge difference. 

Let me use the occasion also to remind Members that we are 

looking at a hard deadline of 11:15 to conclude this morning precisely because the Administrator has to meet with President Preval 

at the White House. 

Let me follow up on Mr. Farr’s line of questioning very briefly, 

because I want to get into the firefighter grant administration as 

well, but let’s turn very briefly to the postdisaster mitigation. I 

think we are all well aware of the arguments for predisaster as opposed to postdisaster mitigation. On the other hand, the experience 

in our State and, I am sure, many other places is that postdisaster 

mitigation does often find a more receptive audience, because after 

a disaster has hit, and you are looking at the recovery effort and 

rebuilding, there is often a recognition of the need to build to better 

standards and to prevent such disasters in the future. 

So in North Carolina and lots of places around the country, we 

have made very, very good use of postdisaster mitigation support. 

It didn’t work that well in New Orleans, although it does appear 

belatedly to be kicking in in New Orleans in a more positive way. 

I was back in New Orleans in January, and we saw many encouraging signs after years that some especially housing efforts were 

coming together, better coordination with FEMA and so forth, and 

postdisaster mitigation is kicking in as well, but pretty late, really, 

to have much effect on a lot of the rebuilding. 

Funding took a long time to become available. It wasn’t well coordinated, I expect you would agree, with other recovery activities. 

For example, many people have now already rebuilt their homes 

with the Road Home Program. Now they are learning that 

postdisaster hazard mitigation money is available to them to elevate those homes so they would be less prone to flooding. In some 

cases they are getting these grants and now going back in and altering their earlier construction, but it clearly would have been so 

much better if there had been a coordinated approach at first that 

had made a blending of funds available and would have resulted 

in building homes to better standards. Retroactively a lot of people 

have very little interest in the grant, although some are drawing 

on the grants. 

So, what are your thoughts on that? How can we encourage better coordination among Federal recovery programs, and in particular, is there a way to learn from the New Orleans experience 

and get these postdisaster mitigation grants available earlier in the 

recovery process and integrated more effectively with other resources that are available to individuals, business owners and so 

forth? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, I think you hit the first thing that 

was, to me, the most obvious stumbling block: You couldn’t even 

get the public assistance program up and going and getting projects 

obligated. Generally in the lifecycle of disaster, local and state governments are focused mainly on those things that were destroyed, 


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damaged or they are having to rebuild. And then they move into 

the mitigation phase as they start getting lock-ins from their allocations, which are generally about nine months to a year into that 

you finally get your final lock-in, and you know what you have to 

move forward. 

When you take up to five years to get your public assistance program going and projects, it is hard for local governments to really 

think about mitigation and the state to really think about mitigation. And so you get this natural wave of public assistance as a 

high priority, but as you get to a stabilization, now you start doing 

your mitigation. This time the gap was too far; we missed opportunities. 

The other thing that I have observed, both in my state and in 

this response, is we miss opportunities when we are rebuilding 

damaged structures. You have given us two very powerful tools in 

mitigation, section 406, which applies to those structures that are 

damaged during a disaster, that we can build them back; not just 

back to what was replacing them, but actually provide additional 

funds to build them stronger against the next hazard. And those 

funds have to be written into those projects as we are going 

through. 

We have the bad tendency, sir, to sometimes do what I call what 

is easy versus what is right. And when you are writing literally 

hundreds, if not thousands of project worksheets, sometimes people 

are more interested in production and not always taking the opportunity to come back and say, are we capturing every possibility to 

build this back in a way that reduces this impact from future disasters? 

And then the programs you are talking about in post-disaster 

mitigation, section 404, which is a percentage of the overall disaster which the state can now administer through grant programs 

to do such things as helping elevate homes, or leveraging with 

Community Block Development Grant dollars to mitigate things 

that may not have been damaged or destroyed, but are vulnerable 

in that state. 

You gave us a very powerful tool in the Disaster Mitigation Act 

of 2000 to encourage states to develop statewide and then local 

hazard mitigation plans, and if they develop an enhanced mitigation plan, provide a higher percentage of funds post-disaster. 

Something that we have to constantly reinforce is that if you 

wait for a disaster to think about what you need to do to mitigate 

against that threat, you are oftentimes going to miss opportunities. 

If you took the time ahead of time to think about it and at least 

have that plan, you would have an idea of the threats you face and 

the projects you would like to do. And that is why I think the 

predisaster mitigation plan is so important, because PDM gives 

states that don’t have any active disasters a chance to at least go 

through some of the process of applying for grants and looking at 

mitigation. 

But if we don’t build it back better, we don’t mitigate against the 

hazards, and we oftentimes in these very large disasters stay so focused on just getting things done, we are, unfortunately, at risk to 

repeat that the second time and miss opportunities when you could 


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have gotten projects done early in the process that the communities 

would have embraced and would have really changed the future. 

FIREFIGHTER GRANTS

Mr. PRICE. I couldn’t agree more, and I am encouraged to hear that with your leadership we are going to be building this kind of 

thinking and planning into our response to major disasters from 

the very first, so that it is not an afterthought, but that it is a resource that we are fully utilizing. Let me move on quickly because we have other questions. But I do want to underscore the concern this Subcommittee has had with 

the economic downturn, the recession that our communities have 

faced. Our main vehicle has been through the Recovery Act and 

also through our regular appropriations bill for the current year, 

where, as you know, we made a shift, a temporary shift, but a significant shift, in our firefighter grant program toward personnel. 

And we included waiver authority with respect to cost sharing and 

matching provisions. We also gave you additional flexibility with 

respect to the continuation of effort requirements, saying that these 

funds could be used not just for new hires, but for preventing layoffs and for rehiring people who had been laid off. In other words, we are addressing the situation that many, many 

local communities are facing and trying to make certain that whatever strains development in their budget do not result in reduced 

public protection. That is the bottom line, and congressional intent, 

I think, is fully—is clear in this respect. And we want to make sure 

that we are on the same page in terms of realizing this intent. 

In particular, I am concerned, as I said in the opening statement, 

about the time lag in getting these funds out, and we also wonder 

whether we are really applying these funds, as fully as they might 

be to prevent layoffs, to retain firefighters in place. 

I understand the COPS program, which is operating under similar, temporary, revised provisions, has been able to implement 

guidelines to allow for police officers not to be laid off. I wonder 

why we can’t do this more effectively for firefighters, or what you 

would say about how we can do it. 

The House did include precise language in the jobs bill that 

passed in December, and I, of course, have communicated with you 

and with the Secretary about these concerns. 

Do you expect more fully to utilize the waivers on cost sharing 

and other local matching provisions in this 2010 grant cycle? Will 

you fully implement congressional intent for this program to be 

used to retain firefighters? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, to the best of our ability, I hate to 

sound like a bureaucrat, but as we got additional authorities, and 

then we had the fire station construction grants coming into those 

cycles, we found ourselves having to reissue guidance several times 

and also implementing the waiver so we weren’t prohibiting what 

our language would have suggested would be supplanting for maintaining your workforce. 

As I understand it, we now have got our grants going out the 

door. We are awarding grants. We look to have, I believe, the AFG 

grants and SAFER grants pretty much complete and awarded for 

this year by May. 


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We understand the frustration in working this through, but, 

again, given the tools and the system we have, as we got additional 

changes, we had to go back and continue to update the process and 

the application, and the fire station grants in the middle of this became our priority to get those out. And we had to literally take 

staff to work on that to get those out to come back to the other 

grants. I am not offering an excuse, I am just trying to go explain 

what we did. 

The other thing I am very proud of is the Senate has recently 

confirmed our new grants administrator, who has come on board 

the past week to help us not fall back into a situation where we 

get this far behind in the grant process, and are structuring ourselves as we anticipate going forward in 2011. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, all these programs are important, but there is 

a priority clearly on the personnel issue; as important as the fire 

grants are, the facilities and the equipment grants, the personnel 

issue and making certain that stressed communities and their 

budgets don’t result in the reduction in basic protection is our priority. 

And so we know there are a variety of measures that we have 

undertaken here in the way of waivers, in the way of a stress on 

retention. Maybe not all that will work equally well. We do need 

to work with you to know what is working and how we can make 

this have its desired effect in local communities. 

Mr. FUGATE. The other part of your question was, there are probably a lot more communities that could be applying for grants that 

have not, so we are working more outreach, working back through 

the various associations, I Chiefs, International Association of Fire 

Fighters, but also through our U.S. Fire Administration, with our 

Chief of U.S. Fire Administration Kelvin Cochran, of really trying 

to get outreach and explaining to people what these grants can do. 

I sometimes think the unknown in the sense of how hard it may 

be or what the relative worth of competition would be for these, but 

this is one area that I am very proud of that in selecting grants 

is actually done by the peers, of bringing in peer review and actually going through and doing peer review. That is kind of a unique 

thing for the Federal Government is actually asking the people 

that ultimately are the people that use these programs or at the 

local level to come in and help provide the input on prioritizing 

those competitive grants. 

Mr. PRICE. Well, that kind of proactive effort to make sure that 

the communities, communities most stressed and in need, are 

aware of the opportunities, are aware of the temporary changes 

that have been made that may give them an opportunity. I think 

that is extremely important to be proactive in that regard. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, on that subject, know that there are two 

points of view on this thing. I have a real problem with using 

FEMA monies designed for emergency purposes to subsidize the 

regular operating expenses of local first responders, which is purely 

a local responsibility. By definition, Federal Emergency Management Agency is for emergencies. 

I know the stimulus bill allows those cost-sharing requirements 

to be waived temporarily, to spend stimulus funding, but the 


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Chairman has agreed that only will go through fiscal 2010, and 

that when the new appropriations bill for fiscal 2011 takes effect, 

that will not be a part of the law. 

So I do have a real reservation about becoming the sponsor and payer of regular, local firefighting or other types of first responder 

operations, which everyone admits and agrees is a State and local 

responsibility. 

MEASURING GRANTS EFFECTIVENESS

Now, Mr. Farr, brought this up, and let me go ahead with it a bit further, and that is the administration of the grants programs. 

You know, we have spent $31.7 billion for first responder grants 

since 9/11, and we began to question what sort of requirements 

surround the awarding of those grants and whether or not we can 

say that those grants have contributed to the capability of States 

and local communities to respond to all hazards. In other words, 

can we effectively, objectively evaluate whether or not these grants 

are doing what we intended that they do, and that is improve the 

capability of local communities to respond, because, absent any 

kind of objective measurement, these grants are no more than a 

cost-sharing program for local operations. Can you tell us—well, and in fiscal year 2009, we provided $5 

million to, quote, develop tools to measure the achievement and effectiveness of certain grant programs, including how grants increase the capability of States and local communities to respond to 

all hazards, and that resulted in the cost to capabilities, so-called, 

process, C-to-C. In fiscal 2010, we raised concerns about whether 

that truly, really was measuring the impact of these grants. We 

asked the GAO to continue to push FEMA to follow through on the 

congressional direction. The Administration has now put a hold on 

that initiative. So where are we? 

Mr. FUGATE. The short answer is if we were looking for a measurement to judge against, the cost to capabilities was not taking us 

there. We found ourselves going into widget counting and not really 

being able to demonstrate real capability. 

We took the direction, we have heard the issues and concerns, 

and we think that a better way to develop this is to go back out 

to the community itself, ask them to come in and help us design 

how we do this. 

I can tell you with absolute certainty that you have built capability that has been demonstrated, but most people don’t know 

about it. 

I had the opportunity to be part of the team from the State of 

Florida that went to provide, under emergency management assistance, compact assistance to the State of Mississippi in Katrina. The 

communication, the search and rescue teams, interoperability, I 

would say almost 99 percent of all the things we were able to take 

were leveraged against our Homeland Security dollars and the investments that the State of Florida had been making to build capability for all hazards. 

While many people could not talk, from the coast to anywhere 

else, we had direct communication with our folks on the field and 

the most impacted communities on the coast of Mississippi directly 

back to our State EOC; one of our former staff members back here 


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developing maps in GIS from data that Mississippi sent us on their 

system, that we sent back out of our interoperable solution to county EOCs that couldn’t even get dial tone out to the their EOCs. 

So we do know that we have built that. What we cannot do is 

provide that in such a way that we can look at that investment 

strategy and those outcomes based upon a real capability that we 

need to demonstrate, how much of that capability have we built up, 

and the most important thing, as you point out, that it is a shared 

responsibility. Again, 4,500 folks responded from Florida, about 

6,000 over the life of that disaster. 

The funding did not pay for the people, but they gave us tools 

we would not otherwise have had and capabilities that we built 

and we used. And nobody had ever anticipated or ever thought we 

would send that many people to another state in a hurricane mutual aid response, but those capabilities were strictly because of the 

funding we got from Homeland Security dollars and the Urban 

Area Initiative Security dollars to build that capability, including 

sending urban search and rescue teams that were not the federal 

teams, sending interoperable communication that we built for our 

in-state response, that we were able to deploy a lot of incident 

management teams to join—just the planning process of getting 

law enforcement, fire, EMS to plan and talk about how we were 

going to spend grant dollars, build a robust capability to respond 

that would not have otherwise been there without the catalyst of 

those dollars. 

KATRINA ARBITRATION

Mr. ROGERS. Now, let me switch gears on you real quick here. 

I am running out of time, and you are, too. 

The 2011 budget request was originally accompanied by a 2010 

supplemental request for $3.6 billion to cover known costs for disasters for the balance of 2010, in addition to the 1.6 billion appropriated in the 2010 Appropriations Act. 

But in the meantime, FEMA has recently lost several arbitration 

rulings pertaining to household liabilities on damage from Katrina. 

Central among the arbitration rulings was the January 27 decision 

on Charity Hospital in New Orleans. The Federal arbitration panel 

ruled that FEMA should provide $474.8 million to replace the hospital, substantially more than your $126 million repair estimate. 

That three-judge panel ordered you to award the amount to Louisiana for the State-owned hospital since the cost of repairing the 

hospital would be more than 50 percent of the replacement cost. 

What is striking about the unanimous ruling is that the panel 

said, and I quote, FEMA did not present a sound basis for challenging Louisiana’s Office of Facility Planning and Control, and 

that FEMA reps who performed the damage estimates did not have 

the necessary experience and expertise to perform costs and repair 

assessments. So this could get pretty doggoned expensive real 

quick, as the ruling has demonstrated. 

You have submitted a 2010 supplemental request for $5.1 billion, 

which is $1.5 billion more than the original supplemental of 3.6-, 

but that includes an estimated $1.2 billion to cover the cost of arbitration findings. 


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Now, what can we do about this? They said that you do not have 

adequate experience and expertise to perform assessments. What 

do you think? 

Mr. FUGATE. I read the report, and unfortunately validated a lot 

of my concerns about some of the things we are sending up for arbitration. We have since in some cases settled, because I disagreed 

with what positions we have taken. 

We have also gone back and looked at—and I was very fortunate 

to have part of our team a former State public assistance director, 

Beth Zimmerman, to join our team to help us. 

And you get to a point that to me is of great concern, and that 

is we should have been—whatever that arbitration tells us, we 

need to take that to heart of what went wrong and why it went 

wrong and how do we fix it to make sure that in future disasters 

we have the right expertise—a hospital is a very complex building. 

It is not like I am going out and surveying a warehouse—and to 

make sure we have the right expertise and right competencies in 

complex projects. 

And I think, lesson taken to heart, that when we are out with 

our contract support doing public assistance, and we have a complex project like a hospital, it should be a no-brainer to us that we 

have to solicit expertise far beyond what you would normally see 

in other types of public assistance processes. 

But I read that report, and I drew the conclusion, unfortunately, 

that each one of these arbitrations is probably, unless there is a 

technical reason—we went ahead and went back on our budget request and said we need to factor in the full awards. In some cases 

we have been able to settle. And we also have the Recovery School 

District of Louisiana, which is an aggregation of all the school 

projects, finally coming to a proposed settlement there, which is not 

an arbitration, but it was—instead of treating each school as a 

project looking at the entire school district, that estimate is about 

$1.1 billion. 

Mr. ROGERS. But they said that you did not have adequate assessments, didn’t have the expertise to do adequate assessments. 

What are you doing about that? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, again, we are going back to look at who would 

you contract with and having contingency contracts for subject 

matter experts to come in when we deal with those types of technical responses. If we do not have that core competence, sir, then 

it is our duty to identify where we would get that, whether it would 

be from another Federal agency, or whether that would be contract 

support to give us that information, so when we do those assessments on those complex structures, we have the right experts to do 

that assessment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I mean, you have already been hit with almost a half a billion dollars on one building, so this could get expensive real quick. 

Mr. FUGATE. Based upon the existing outstanding arbitrations, 

that was factored into our request for the supplemental, and we 

have, in some cases, already settled some of those or are working 

to settle some of those based on a consensus that we are not going 

to be able to, in our cases, win these arbitrations. And we had actually in our initial supplemental, we are figuring about middle-ofVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:47 Sep 10, 2010 Jkt 057185 PO 00000 Frm 00501 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A185P2.XXX A185P2

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the-road settlements. So we took that and we came back and said, 

we need to assume that if these are all lost, what does that look 

like, and make that the request for the supplemental versus the assumption that they weren’t going to go against FEMA and that we 

had factored too low. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 

Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Fugate, I would like to ask you a little 

bit about our Federal Government’s ability to communicate with 

the public in a national crisis. A report by GAO in September of 

2009 said that the Emergency Alert System was ineffective and unreliable, and that it had—it lacked redundancy. There were gaps 

in coverage and a lack of testing and training, among other shortcomings. 

The GAO analysis also found that the Integrated Public Alert 

and Warning System Program, which FEMA envisions as an alternative to EAS, has been grossly mismanaged, and that little 

progress has been made since 2007. 

Can you inform the committee as to what progress is being made 

in regards to the alternative program, and what is it that is being 

done to address the weaknesses of the current system in the event 

that we have a disaster prior to the completion of this new program? 

Mr. FUGATE. I would like to submit a full answer in writing due 

to the time. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. FUGATE. But, briefly, we have taken to heart those recommendations moving forward. Two key milestones was the publication of the Common Alerting Protocol, latest version. That is the 

standard for integrating the systems. It is an XML standard, allows us to not be type-specific, but allows us to use a lot of different 

types of devices. 

The second piece is the Cellular Alert System, that the FCC publish rules on that. We are working with the industry to implement 

that. That will move into that. 

And, finally, the third part is we had nationally, which is kind 

of surprising, the first national test of the national activation of the 

Emergency Alert System in Alaska. We did have some technical 

issues with some stations; however, overall, the system from the 

origination here in Washington did reach Alaska, did trigger the 

system, did go out. 

There were some stations that had technical difficulties that we 

are working on, and we will provide a full report on the status of 

what we have done based upon that report and how we are moving 

that program forward. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. I appreciate it. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Carter. 

LEON RIVER FLOODPLAIN

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I realize we are running out of time, 

so I am just going to ask you to do me a favor. There is an issue 

in Texas on the Leon River, and it looks like to me that multiple 

branches of the Federal Government have come into the Leon, and 

they are proposing to put it—to try to take a river, which was 

moved into a fast-flowing river, so it ultimately goes into a waterstorage lake where we get drinking water. 

Now somebody has decided they needed more wetlands, so the 

engineers are going to reengineer that river to put it back into its 

original banks. Then FEMA is coming in, based on that, and writing new floodplains, which is putting a huge community all inside 

the floodplain. In addition, quite honestly, the Corps is probably 

going to flood all these communities, because they are redoing the 

river for some environmental group that wants to change it back 

to wetlands. It has kind of got people thinking that the government 

is insane. 

Take a look at the Leon and see what you can do to help. I appreciate it. I know your time has run out. I am not going to ask 

for an answer, because I doubt if you know about the Leon. But 

if you do, I am glad to hear it, and I would sure appreciate your 

taking a look at it. 

Mr. FUGATE. We will take a look at it, sir, and we will have our 

staff get with your staff, follow up. 

[The information follows:] 

FEMA is currently working with the Member’s staff to schedule a meeting to discuss the matter further. 

Mr. CARTER. I am going to be all over the engineers, I can promise you. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. 


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Mr. Administrator, we thank you for your good work, for the energy and experience you brought to this job, and your continued cooperation with this Subcommittee. 

Mr. FUGATE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. PRICE. With that, we will adjourn the hearing and go with 

you to greet our friends from Haiti. 

Mr. FUGATE. My honor, sir. We are trying to be green and carpool. 


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smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 252 here 57185B.134
540 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 253 here 57185B.135
541 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 254 here 57185B.136
542 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 255 here 57185B.137
543 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 256 here 57185B.138
544 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 257 here 57185B.139
545 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 258 here 57185B.140
546 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 259 here 57185B.141
547 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 260 here 57185B.142
548 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 261 here 57185B.143
549 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 262 here 57185B.144
550 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 263 here 57185B.145
551 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 264 here 57185B.146
552 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 265 here 57185B.147
553 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 266 here 57185B.148
554 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 267 here 57185B.149
555 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 268 here 57185B.150
556 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 269 here 57185B.151
557 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 270 here 57185B.152
558 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 271 here 57185B.153
559 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 272 here 57185B.154
560 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 273 here 57185B.155
561 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 274 here 57185B.156
562 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 275 here 57185B.157
563 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 276 here 57185B.158
564 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 277 here 57185B.159
565 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 278 here 57185B.160
566 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 279 here 57185B.161
567 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 280 here 57185B.162
568 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 281 here 57185B.163
569 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 282 here 57185B.164
570 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 283 here 57185B.165
571 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 284 here 57185B.166
572 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 285 here 57185B.167
573 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 286 here 57185B.168
574 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 287 here 57185B.169
575 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 288 here 57185B.170
576 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 289 here 57185B.171
577 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 290 here 57185B.172
578 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 291 here 57185B.173
579 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 292 here 57185B.174
580 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 293 here 57185B.175
581 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 294 here 57185B.176
582 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 295 here 57185B.177
583 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 296 here 57185B.178
584 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 297 here 57185B.179
585 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 298 here 57185B.180
586 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 299 here 57185B.181
587 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 300 here 57185B.182
588 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 301 here 57185B.183
589 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 302 here 57185B.184
590 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 303 here 57185B.185
591 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 304 here 57185B.186
592 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 305 here 57185B.187
593 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 306 here 57185B.188
594 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 307 here 57185B.189
595 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 308 here 57185B.190
596 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 309 here 57185B.191
597 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 310 here 57185B.192
598 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 311 here 57185B.193
599 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 312 here 57185B.194
600 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 313 here 57185B.195
601 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 314 here 57185B.196
602 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 315 here 57185B.197
603 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 316 here 57185B.198
604 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 317 here 57185B.199
605 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 318 here 57185B.200
606 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 319 here 57185B.201
607 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 320 here 57185B.202
608 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 321 here 57185B.203
609 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 322 here 57185B.204
610 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 323 here 57185B.205
611 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 324 here 57185B.206
612 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 325 here 57185B.207
613 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 326 here 57185B.208
614 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 327 here 57185B.209
615 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 328 here 57185B.210
616 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 329 here 57185B.211
617 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 330 here 57185B.212
618 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 331 here 57185B.213
619 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 332 here 57185B.214
620 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 333 here 57185B.215
621 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 334 here 57185B.216
622 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 335 here 57185B.217
623 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 336 here 57185B.218
624 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 337 here 57185B.219
625 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 338 here 57185B.220
626 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 339 here 57185B.221
627 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 340 here 57185B.222
628 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 341 here 57185B.223
629 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 342 here 57185B.224
630 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 343 here 57185B.225
631 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 344 here 57185B.226
632 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 345 here 57185B.227
633 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 346 here 57185B.228
634 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 347 here 57185B.229
635 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 348 here 57185B.230
636 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 349 here 57185B.231
637 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 350 here 57185B.232
638 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 351 here 57185B.233
639 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 352 here 57185B.234
640 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 353 here 57185B.235
641 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 354 here 57185B.236
642 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 355 here 57185B.237
643 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 356 here 57185B.238
644 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 357 here 57185B.239
645 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 358 here 57185B.240
646 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 359 here 57185B.241
647 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 360 here 57185B.242
648 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 361 here 57185B.243
649 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 362 here 57185B.244
650 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 363 here 57185B.245
651 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 364 here 57185B.246
652 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 365 here 57185B.247
653 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 366 here 57185B.248
654 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 367 here 57185B.249
655 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 368 here 57185B.250
656 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 369 here 57185B.251
657 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 370 here 57185B.252
658 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 371 here 57185B.253
659 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 372 here 57185B.254
660 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 373 here 57185B.255
661 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 374 here 57185B.256
662 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 375 here 57185B.257
663 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 376 here 57185B.258
664 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 377 here 57185B.259
665 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 378 here 57185B.260
666 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 379 here 57185B.261
667 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 380 here 57185B.262
668 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 381 here 57185B.263
669 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 382 here 57185B.264
670 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 383 here 57185B.265
671 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 384 here 57185B.266
672 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 385 here 57185B.267
673 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 386 here 57185B.268
674 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 387 here 57185B.269
675 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 388 here 57185B.270
676 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 389 here 57185B.271
677 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 390 here 57185B.272
678 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 391 here 57185B.273
679 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 392 here 57185B.274
680 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 393 here 57185B.275
681 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 394 here 57185B.276
682 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 395 here 57185B.277
683 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 396 here 57185B.278
684 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 397 here 57185B.279
685 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 398 here 57185B.280
686 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 399 here 57185B.281
687 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 400 here 57185B.282
688 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 401 here 57185B.283
689 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 402 here 57185B.284
690 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 403 here 57185B.285
691 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 404 here 57185B.286
692 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 405 here 57185B.287
693 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 406 here 57185B.288
694 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 407 here 57185B.289
695 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 408 here 57185B.290
696 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 409 here 57185B.291
697 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 410 here 57185B.292
698 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 411 here 57185B.293
699 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 412 here 57185B.294
700 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 413 here 57185B.295
701 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 414 here 57185B.296
702 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 415 here 57185B.297
703 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 416 here 57185B.298
704 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 417 here 57185B.299
705 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 418 here 57185B.300
706 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 419 here 57185B.301
707 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 420 here 57185B.302
708 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 421 here 57185B.303
709 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 422 here 57185B.304
710 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 423 here 57185B.305
711 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 424 here 57185B.306
712 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 425 here 57185B.307
713 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 426 here 57185B.308
714 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 427 here 57185B.309
715 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 01 here 57185B.310
716 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 2 here 57185B.311
717 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 3 here 57185B.312
718 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 4 here 57185B.313
719 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 5 here 57185B.314
720 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 6 here 57185B.315
721 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 7 here 57185B.316
722 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 8 here 57185B.317
723 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 9 here 57185B.318
724 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 10 here 57185B.319
725 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 11 here 57185B.320
726 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 12 here 57185B.321
727 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 13 here 57185B.322
728 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 14 here 57185B.323
729 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 15 here 57185B.324
730 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 16 here 57185B.325
731 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 17 here 57185B.326
732 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 18 here 57185B.327
733 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 19 here 57185B.328
734 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 20 here 57185B.329
735 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 21 here 57185B.330
736 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 22 here 57185B.331
737 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 23 here 57185B.332
738 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 24 here 57185B.333
739 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 25 here 57185B.334
740 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 26 here 57185B.335
741 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 27 here 57185B.336
742 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 28 here 57185B.337
743 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 456 here 57185B.338
744 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 457 here 57185B.339
745 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 458 here 57185B.340
746 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 459 here 57185B.341
747 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 460 here 57185B.342
748 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 461 here 57185B.343
749 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 462 here 57185B.344
750 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with HEARING-P1Insert offset folio 463 here 57185B.345
751 


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THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2010. 

DHS CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS—WHAT PROGRESS 

HAS BEEN MADE AND WHAT STILL NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED? 

WITNESSES 

PHIL REITINGER, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE 

REAR ADMIRAL MICHAEL BROWN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR CYBER SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID PRICE

Mr. PRICE. The Subcommittee will come to order. Today we wel- come to the Subcommittee the Deputy Undersecretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate, Phil Reitinger, and the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Communications, Rear Admiral Michael Brown. We will be discussing the 2011 

budget for cyber security programs at NPPD and the DHS role implementing the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. 

Gentlemen, we thank you for joining us for this unclassified portion of our hearing. I would like to note for Members and staff who 

just arrived that since we are now in open session we will not be 

able to discuss the specifics of particular threats or technologies, 

since much of that information remains classified. 

The open network architecture that makes the internet such a 

powerful and transformative force in our modern world simultaneously creates vulnerabilities for exploitation by those who seek 

to disrupt contemporary life or to inflict damage on our country. 

The internet is an awe-inspiring, borderless community connecting 

the most far flung reaches of the globe. However, enemies that 

were once safely kept at a great distance from our country can now 

find their way directly onto the desk of the Secretary of Defense, 

for example. 

In a similar way, with so much of our contemporary life now on 

line, sensitive information that used to be kept safely locked in a 

bureaucrat’s filing cabinet can now be stolen with little more than 

a few mouse clicks. Thirty ton steel vault doors are no longer effective at securing deposits when cyber bank robbers execute virtual 

stickups that generate million dollar hauls. 

Much of our nation’s infrastructure is now managed through sophisticated web-based control systems and could be at risk of takeover or destruction by weaknesses in the very systems that make 

it run so efficiently. 

The DHS role in our nation’s cyber defense is explicitly defined 

under the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative or the 

CNCI. DHS is responsible for securing the online presence of our 

government’s civilian agencies. This is no small challenge. 


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Part of the strategy to strengthen federal cyber defense is to consolidate literally thousands of internet connection points across 

agencies into a more manageable number of Trusted Internet Connections. DHS is also responsible for implementing data traffic 

monitoring systems to detect nefarious activity and stop it before 

cyber attacks get out of control. 

The 2011 budget proposes $379 million for the National Cyber 

Security Division, an $18 million or 4.6 percent cut from the 2010 

enacted level. Most of this reduction is attributable to one-time 

2010 costs not repeated in 2011 and projected savings that will result from hiring federal employees to work on DHS cyber security 

programs in place of government contractors. There also are large, 

unobligated 2010 balances that are likely to carry into 2011, given 

the time it takes to acquire and install the network hardware that 

DHS is deploying. 

This is not to say, however, that proceeding at DHS’ proposed 

pace will suffice to close the security gaps in our federal system. 

A recent survey of information technology professionals in government, the Federal Cyber Security Outlook for 2010, found that 74 

percent of federal IT administrators expect a cyber attack from a 

foreign nation within the next year. Perhaps even more troubling, 

59 percent of those surveyed—this is information technology professionals in government—said that their agencies had already been 

attacked by viruses or malware in the past year, while 22 percent 

reported attacks by foreign governments or terrorist organizations. 

Furthermore, a recently published GAO analysis of civilian cyber 

security activities raised troubling questions about the effectiveness 

of cyber security collaboration across government agencies. The 

budget proposes a $5 million initiative to increase federal cyber security collaboration, but we have to question why several years 

after the CNCI was initiated it takes new funding to make government agencies work together better. 

I am also concerned about what I see as a growing leadership 

vacuum in efforts to defend our nation’s privately owned cyber assets. Both the public and we in Congress recognize that shoring up 

government networks will not be enough to protect private computers from a theft of valuable intellectual property, from real financial losses or severe disruption that would ensue if essential 

services like electric power or wireless communications are compromised. 

Many now realize that a sophisticated, coordinated and sustained 

cyber attack is a serious threat to our nation’s economic vitality. 

Unfortunately, DHS has taken limited initiatives in this area, not 

much beyond promoting best practices and encouraging private 

companies to implement their own cyber security solutions. 

We all know that interconnected computer networks are only as 

safe as their weakest security links and so today we need to examine closely what role DHS should play helping the private sector 

secure the critical assets without which our modern society simply 

cannot function. Given the breadth of these topics and their relevance to nearly every aspect of contemporary life, we will clearly 

have an interesting discussion today. 

Mr. Deputy Secretary, please summarize your written testimony 

in a five minute statement so that we will have time for a direct 


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exchange of questions and answers. Your full statement of course 

will be entered in the hearing record. 

Before you begin, I would like to recognize our Subcommittee’s 

Ranking Member, Hal Rogers, for his opening remarks. 

[The information follows:] 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER HAROLD ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today. Deputy Undersecretary Reitinger, 

welcome for what marks your first appearance before our Subcommittee. Given your combination of government and private sector experience, we look forward to hearing your views today. 

As the Chairman noted, the threats to our cyber infrastructure, 

including military, governmental and private networks, are as dynamic as any threat that is presently confronting our nation. It is 

not exactly a state secret that our country is behind the curve in 

countering those threats. Our networks are simply not as resilient 

as they need to be in order to respond to what is a constantly 

evolving enemy. 

But perhaps more than any other critical Homeland Security 

issue, I am concerned that cyber security is largely misunderstood. 

Cyber threats reach far beyond IT networks. They have the potential to impact virtually all aspects of our critical infrastructure 

from military hardware to Wall Street’s financial systems, from our 

electric power grids and the control of dams to our personal computers and handheld devices, so there is a genuine urgency to address our numerous cyber security needs. 

But far too many pundits and so-called cyber experts use this urgency to simply clamor for more government, more staffing, more 

coordination, as opposed to asking more tangible questions like 

what specific tools, resources and legal authorities are needed, 

what tasks need to be done in both the near and long terms and 

what technologies need to be developed in order to better meet our 

cyber security needs. 

So what I want to know today is what we are doing to get our 

cyber security right. More to the point, I do not want to get lost 

in vast IT jargon and reams of data. We must wrestle this monstrosity known as cyberspace down to where mere mortals can understand it because you are looking at mere mortals up here. I 

want to better understand how DHS is applying the taxpayers’ dollars to develop and deploy the necessary skills and capabilities to 

effectively wage this cyber security fight. 

That brings us to the status of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, CNCI, the government’s overarching effort to 

shore up our network vulnerabilities and improve our cyber security capability that was lost in January of 2008. 

Today, more than two years after the CNCI was launched, I 

would like to gauge DHS’ progress in meeting some of the most 

pressing goals and objectives of this effort, including shoring up our 

network vulnerabilities by reducing and consolidating the government’s internet connections, establishing better defenses through 

the development and deployment of modern network intrusion detection and monitoring systems and improvement of the government’s collaboration with the private sector who owns more than 

85 percent of our nation’s critical infrastructure. 

And in addition to a progress report on these key tasks, we need 

to better understand how DHS is approaching the numerous technological, legal and policy changes that may be inhibiting critical 


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progress on moving our nation’s cyber security forward. After all, 

far too much is at stake to fail. 

As I said at the opening of my remarks, we are way behind in 

this fight with what is an extremely nimble and cunning set of adversaries. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, please begin. 

[The information follows:] 


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STATEMENT OF PHIL REITINGER

Mr. REITINGER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear 

before you today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s 

cyber security mission and related budget request. 

The Fiscal Year 2011 budget is geared toward increasing the 

cyber security posture of the Nation and lays the foundation to improve our capability to respond to cyber threats. The Under Secretary regrets that he could not be here today himself because he 

is absent in order to attend a funeral. 

As a nation, it is essential that we are aware of and focused on 

the cyber threat. Just as important, the government must move 

quickly and purposely to address cyber threats in technology, and 

malicious actors change rapidly. As you know, Mr. Chairman, 

threats are becoming more targeted, more specific and more serious. For example, system information is routinely stolen through 

cyberspace from government and private sector networks. 

Perhaps more ominously, malicious cyber activity can instantaneously result in virtual or physical consequence that can threaten 

national and economic security and public health and safety. Thus, 

while we strive to prevent the loss of intellectual capital through 

our networks, we are also working to ensure that the systems that 

operationally control our critical infrastructure, the power grid or 

communications infrastructure, for example, remain accessible and 

reliable in terms of crisis. 

The nexus between physical and cyber worlds is an essential mission area for the Department and one that must remain closely 

linked. Thanks in large part to the support of this Committee, the 

Department has made significant progress in the cyber mission, 

and I would like to highlight a few of these points. 

First, we continue to work with OMB on reducing and consolidating the number of external connections federal agencies have to 

the Internet through the Trusted Internet Connections initiative. 

This effort allows us to focus on monitoring and, eventually, prevention efforts into limited and known avenues through which traffic must flow while also establishing baseline security capabilities 

and validating agency adherence to those security capabilities. 

Second, DHS is deploying Einstein 2 to these trusted internet 

connection points. Einstein 2 uses passive sensors to identify when 

unauthorized users attempt to gain access to those networks. Einstein 2 already provides us with visibility into nearly 180,000 

events a month. 

Third, building upon enhanced situational awareness, we are 

testing the technology for the third phase of Einstein, an intrusion 

prevention system that will provide the Department of Homeland 

Security with the ability to automatically detect malicious activity 

and disable attempted intrusions before harm is done to our critical 

networks and systems. 

For all these deployments, it is important to note that Einstein 

capabilities are being carefully designed in close connection with 

privacy experts. Protecting civil rights, civil liberties and privacy 

remains foundational to our efforts. 


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Fourth, we also recognize that our efforts on federal networks 

must be coupled with strong private sector and nonfederal partnerships. Here we are focused on implementation, finding things that 

work and expanding them. To that end, this year NPPD wants a 

pilot program that enables the mutual sharing of cyber security information working with our private sector partners in the financial 

sector, the Department of Defense and the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center. 

We are also working on a pilot that brings together State fusion 

centers and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure to provide secret-level classified cyber security information. 

Fifth and last, as strong as the technological successes of the 

past year are, these accomplishments are reliant upon our ability 

to obtain an increasing number of dedicated and skilled people. To 

this end, the National Cyber Security Division tripled its federal 

workforce in Fiscal Year 2009, and we hope to more than double 

that number this year to 60 by the end of the fiscal year. 

Going forward, we are moving aggressively to build a world class 

cyber security team, and we are focusing on key priorities that address people, processes and technology. These include continuing 

development of the Einstein systems capabilities, developing the 

National Cyber Incident Response Plan in full collaboration with 

the private sector and other key stakeholders so we can respond as 

one nation to a significant cyber event, and increasing the security 

of automated control systems that operate elements of our national 

critical infrastructure. 

Chairman Price, Ranking Member Rogers and distinguished 

Members, let me thank you for the strong support you have provided the Department and express my willingness for both myself 

and Rear Admiral Brown, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, to answer any questions you might have. 

[The information follows:] 


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EINSTEIN 3 DEPLOYMENT

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, and we will proceed with those questions 

and I will ask the first one having to do with the CNCI deployment 

schedule. 

The Einstein system of course we know is a key element in the 

DHS Cybersecurity Initiative. It is an internet traffic monitoring 

technology which records data flows in and out of federal networks, 

helping analysts identify irregular data patterns. Current Einstein 

technologies require significant analytical support, but DHS plans 

eventually to release a third generation Einstein deployment that 

would automate the system’s data pattern analysis. 

Given delays releasing the first and second generation Einstein 

systems, it is not clear that DHS can remain on schedule to have 

Einstein 3 deployed by its own deadline of 2013. As you know, furthermore, on Monday the GAO released a report noting that Einstein 2 has not yet been deployed to all of the nondefense agencies, 

indicating delays even with the current network traffic monitoring 

technology, so obviously that frames my question. 

Last year we were told that Einstein 3 would be deployed by 

2013. Our latest information shows that deployment contracts are 

not even likely to be awarded until the second quarter of 2011. 

That raises doubts about whether the system can be fully built and 

deployed in under two years. 

So what is the current schedule for Einstein 3 deployment? When 

can we be assured that Einstein 3 will be fully deployed to federal 

networks? And then just as a follow up I will anticipate in asking 

the question what happens in the meantime? What vulnerabilities 

will remain in federal networks until Einstein 3 is deployed, and 

how are you planning to mitigate those vulnerabilities in the meantime? 

Mr. REITINGER. Thank you, Chairman. Let me answer the third 

question first, and then I will answer the first and I will probably 

ask Mike to talk about the Einstein 3 deployment schedule. 

First, in the meantime it is important to note that Einstein, either as deployed or as Einstein 3, is not a silver bullet. We need 

a broad spectrum of capabilities that help to protect federal networks. 

So all of the things that I talked about are relevant to helping 

to secure those networks, including ensuring that we have robust 

instant response processes, we are adding the people to U.S.-CERT 

to be able to analyze the traffic that we are already getting and 

providing appropriate alerts, advice and assistance to federal agencies. So there are significant efforts across the enterprise in order 

to help secure them in the environment we are in right now. 

I would like to say on the first point that we were ahead of 

schedule on Einstein 2, the deployment of the Einstein 2 capabilities, at the close of Fiscal Year 2009, and we plan to complete and 

fulfill the schedule this year. So at present we are deployed to 12 

federal agencies and to four Internet service providers under the 

MTIPS, the Managed Trusted Internet Protocol Service, to provide 

service to federal agencies, and we are on schedule to deploy to the 

21 designated federal agencies and those four ISPs by the end of 

this year. 


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As I mentioned, we are already getting valuable data off the sen- sor arrays to the effect of 180,000 events per month, and we going 

forward will increasingly be able to use that data to provide effective advice to federal agencies. With regard to the deployment schedule for Einstein 3, Mike, I would ask you to address that, please. Admiral BROWN. Right now we are in the midst of completing the third phase of the test of the technology. That will be completed in 

May. That test is extremely important to the deployment schedule 

for Einstein 3. 

As you mentioned, we do expect, after working with the five Internet service providers, to be able to award the contract in the 

second quarter of Fiscal Year 2011 and based upon that to complete our deployment schedules by Fiscal Year 2013 for Einstein 3, 

sir. 

Mr. PRICE. So you are saying it is feasible even with an awarding of the deployment contract being delayed until the second quarter 

of 2011, it is still feasible to meet the 2013 deadline that you set 

for yourself? Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir. Two major reasons that we are taking as part of the risk mitigation piece. One is the fact that the exercise demonstration of the technology is proving thus far that it 

works in the operational environment it is intended, and the second piece was the decision to employ the technology that the Department of Defense uses. That also significantly reduces the risks 

associated with technology and the deployment strategy. 

TRUSTED INTERNET CONNECTIONS AND CYBER SECURITY THREATS

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Secretary, let me make sure I heard you right 

about the Trusted Internet Connection aspect of the program. The 

GAO report also focused on that, which of course is a key aspect. 

GAO found that none of the 23 nondefense agencies covered by 

the TIC program have completed all the requirements to ensure 

safe and secure Internet connections so I want to see what the 

schedule is for getting that TIC aspect implemented. 

Are there complications you have uncovered that we should know 

about that have generated delays, and can you assure us that this 

is back on schedule? 

Mr. REITINGER. Yes, sir. When I spoke about being ahead or on 

schedule, I was speaking about the deployment of the Einstein 2 

capability. 

Obviously as we have gone through the overall Initiative 1, the 

Trusted Internet Connection Initiative, there have been a number 

of things that have been uncovered. In addition, we have had essentially to create that team from the very start so that the initial 

projections probably were too aggressive. 

That said, we have staffed up the team. We have the right people 

on board. We are continuing to build that team, and I think we are 

being particularly thorough in our efforts on compliance validation 

building, the capability to more aggressively work with agencies, 

respond to their requirements, get them the information they need, 

and ensure we are moving forward on the initiative. 

In terms of future projections for the initiative, again I will ask 

Mike to supplement. 


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Admiral BROWN. The vast majority of the high-priority items that are not being met by the departments and agencies deal with 

their ability to reduce their Internet access points behind the trusted Internet connection. 

The vast majority of departments and agencies say that they will complete those efforts in Fiscal Year 2010 and Fiscal Year 2011, 

and that is part of the ongoing process that we are using with 

those departments and agencies to make sure that they maintain 

their plan of action and milestones to be able to meet that. 

Mr. PRICE. By vast majority do you mean approximately like what number? 

Admiral BROWN. Sir, I will have to get back to you on the specific numbers. 

[The information follows:] 

RESPONSE: Among the 20 agencies designated as Trusted Internet Connection Access Providers (TICAPs), 14 provided forecasts for migrating their network bandwidth from current non-TIC external connections to approved TIC connections, as 

well as their anticipated bandwidth requirements through 2014. This helps DHS’s 

planning capacity for EINSTEIN sensors and analysis systems. TICAP agencies provided the following forecasted completion dates: FY 10 and earlier—seven TICAP 

agencies; FY 11—one TICAP agency; FY 12 and later—six TICAP agencies. Additionally, 21 TIC seeking service agencies provided forecasts for migrating their network bandwidth from current non-TIC external connections to approved 

TIC connections, as well as their anticipated bandwidth requirements through 2014. 

Agencies seeking service provided the following forecasted completion dates: FY 10 

and earlier—nine seeking service agencies; FY 11—five agencies; FY 12 and later— 

seven agencies. EINSTEIN 2 (E2) is currently installed at a total of 12 departments and agencies (D/As), and US–CERT has conducted an operational evaluation of 11 of these 

D/As—these sites are now recognized at Initial Operating Capability (IOC). E2 has 

also been installed at the four GSA Networx Managed Trusted Internet Protocol 

Services (MTIPS) vendors. The NCPS Program Office still requires signed Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) from eight D/As (for a total of 20 D/As) to complete required Initiative 2 deployments to support the President’s Comprehensive National 

Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). The NCPS Program Office expects the remaining 

eight deployments will be completed by the end of FY 10. 

Mr. PRICE. All right. We would appreciate that for the record. I want to make sure I understand the relationship of this question 

to what you earlier said about the timeframe for 21 of the 23 agencies in your answer to the first question. Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir. Two different things that we are talking about. 

Mr. PRICE. Yes. That is right. Can you clarify that? 

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir. The first with respect to Einstein 2 deployment. We are ahead of schedule. That schedule calls for DHS 

to deploy Einstein 2 intrusion detection capability at the 21 departments and agencies that are going to have that capability installed. 

We are ahead of schedule, 12 operational. The rest will be completed this fiscal year. 

The other aspect of the initiative is how the departments and 

agencies are reducing their Internet access points at the same 

physical location where they will be monitoring their network operations and ensuring the security, including the use of our Einstein 

2 system. That is what is taking a longer time in the deployment 

of Einstein 2. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. That is helpful. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Correct me on these 

numbers. I am told that there is 210 billion emails sent per day 


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equating to more than two million emails per second, 32,000 cyber 

attacks occur worldwide each day and that there are more than 

4,000 active terrorist websites. Are those numbers correct roughly? 

Mr. REITINGER. I could not say about the last. I would say that 

certainly in terms of the number of emails it is vast and I am surprised that the number of attacks is that low. There is a significant 

amount of traffic and a significant number of attacks and events. 

Mr. ROGERS. As I understand it, there are really three categories 

of cyber security threats. One is criminal cyber threats such as 

identity data theft, service disruptions and so forth; then there are 

homeland security threats such as penetration of networks that 

support critical infrastructure, including government nonmilitary 

computer systems; and then thirdly national security threats, espionage, theft or unauthorized disclosure of defense related data, disabling of weapons systems and the like. 

And I gather in this setting that we are in today we cannot talk 

about that third category, but we do want to talk to you about the 

other two. There are I am told more than a hundred foreign intelligence organizations attempting to hack into U.S. networks and 

that the U.S. was the country most frequently targeted by denial 

of service attacks in 2008, which accounts for 51 percent of the 

worldwide total. 

Getting back to those three categories—criminal, homeland security and national security—which one is getting the most threats? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, I do not know if I can say the most threats. 

We actively need to defend against the full spectrum. In point of 

fact, the same capabilities to attack are for the most part available 

to less sophisticated attackers as to more sophisticated attackers. 

With the tools that are available now, an unsophisticated 

attacker, a script kiddie who just downloads a tool from the Internet and runs an attack, can launch a fairly sophisticated attack, so 

we need to be able to defend against the most sophisticated and 

dedicated adversaries down to the lowest level criminal, if you will. 

And in point of fact, they are all increasingly targeting attacks 

and after things of value. We are well beyond the world where 

somebody wants to hack into a Webpage and put up a particular 

point of view or simply embarrass you. Criminals, foreign intelligence services, the full spectrum of entities, want access to valuable information or actual digital money to finance what they want 

to do. 

And even if they are doing something like building a botnet, 

breaking into computers and assembling lots of compromised computers together in what amounts to Internet artillery, then they 

are still going to use that to make money, either to steal personal 

information or perhaps to rent it or sell it to someone else so that 

they could use it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now, 85 percent of infrastructure is privately 

owned, right, so we are talking 15 percent of the nation’s infrastructure, IT infrastructure, is governmental owner controlled. 

Now, you are attempting to channel all governmental communications through certain channels that you call Trusted Internet Connections. Am I on track so far? 

Mr. REITINGER. Absolutely. 


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Mr. ROGERS. And you are trying to reduce the number of governmental points of contact so that you can more effectively police 

what goes through these TICs. You stop me when I get off track, 

will you? 

Mr. REITINGER. I will do that, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I am trying to understand this. But according to the 

Department, as of March 31 you are only 40 percent of consolidation into those TICs. Is that right? 

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir. I would say the number is 12 of 21 departments and agencies have their actual trusted internet connection sites physically identified and stood up. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you are less than halfway to your goal of consolidating the TICs. When do you anticipate you will have that work 

done? 

Mr. REITINGER. Well, the deployment to the 21 agencies and to 

the Internet service providers will be done by the end of this year. 

Full activation will extend to the next year, and we will be in the 

process of working at that point I think with smaller agencies to 

get them to move to obtaining service either from one of those federal agencies or through the networks. 

I apologize if I get jargonistic, sir. As you know, we are deploying 

to some internet service providers, getting them to obtain Internet 

service from those internet service providers so they get access to 

that TIC, Trusted Internet Connection, service. 

Mr. ROGERS. So what is holding us up? 

Admiral BROWN. Sir, it is two things. All of the departments and 

agencies by the end of this year will know and have identified 

where their physical locations for network traffic will be located. 

What is holding us up is the fact that all of the departments and 

agencies have to route all of their traffic to those physical locations 

and so it is time and effort that they have to put in to make sure 

that they are behind those Trusted Internet Connections. That is 

the biggest hurdle that they have to come over. 

Mr. ROGERS. Obviously this is critically important and is the 

path to cyber security for the government. However, in spite of the 

obvious need to move and make this complete, your budget request 

for next year cuts cyber security by $18.4 million, well below the 

current year funding level. 

At a time when you are trying to complete the installing of Einstein 2 and simultaneously develop and install Einstein 3, how can 

you justify coming to us with a budget request, knowing these 

kinds of bold goals that you are after, and cut funding? How can 

you do that? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, I would say the following. We are trying to 

be judicious in our request to make sure that we can appropriately 

spend the money that this Committee and the Congress gives us 

and spend the people’s money appropriately. 

Second, the cut that you referred to is primarily both a transfer 

of some funding, the National Cyber Forensic Institute money, to 

a different part of the Department of Homeland Security, an elimination of a set of one-time expenditures—for example, movement to 

data centers—and also reduction in certain dedicated expenses that 

we did not request be continued into this fiscal year. 


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So the actual program related funding that we have requested year over year has not gone down to nearly that degree, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, can you achieve the goals you have set for yourself and for us with this reduced funding? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, what I would say is when the budget was built, we built it on the information that was available to us and 

we made the best request available. We are in an environment 

where every day we learn something new. As with the ongoing exercise, we are learning new things. Therefore, it is highly dynamic. If we believe that additional re- sources are called for to enable to execute our mission we will work 

those processes within the Administration and come back to this 

Committee and other appropriate Committees to request the funding to accomplish that. 

CYBER SECURITY BUDGET STRUCTURE

Mr. ROGERS. Let me just make one final point, Mr. Chairman, on this point. The Cyber Security Division has told the Subcommittee that its current budget structure is inhibiting operations 

and clouding the execution of funds. Can you explain how the revised budget structure you are proposing will improve the execution of funding for cyber security? 

Mr. REITINGER. I would say, sir, that the budget structure, the PPA structure that we are operating under, is one that is not 

aligned with the current organizational structure, and what we had 

proposed to this Committee was that we have a budget structure 

that aligns with the organization and initiatives we have going forward that would enable in our view easier management and allocation on our end and perhaps better oversight and transparency for 

this Committee and so that is the proposal that we have made. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, Einstein 2 is a passive operation that tells us 

when we have been hacked. Einstein 3, when you perfect it, will 

hopefully prevent hacking. So these are very important obviously 

goals, and what I want to finally ask you is can you achieve those 

goals with the funding requests that you have made? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, we believe that the funding request that we made is appropriate to the data we had when the budget was built. 

As I said, if we believe we can make more progress and there is 

a good justification for it, we will have those discussions with the 

Administration and come back to this Committee with the additional data and the justification for that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Rodriguez. 

DHS LEAD FOR PREPARATION AND PREVENTION

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you very much, and let me thank you for 

being here with us today and indicate to you that in San Antonio, 

and I had been on the Armed Services Committee before and prior 

to 2000 we had done an exercise. We called it Dark Screen in San 

Antonio. A local exercise. No federal money, by the way. 

We did it on our own, and from a local perspective we got the 

utilities. We worked on it for a couple of years and came up with 

some items there and some recommendations. We saw some pretty 

good things with the universities there locally. 


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But I wanted to ask you. I know that it is important for us to 

move forward on the 23 agencies on the federal level, but what concerns me is that we are looking at it from top down. With Dark 

Screen we looked at it from bottom up and we are still working on 

that. 

What agency within Homeland Security is engaged in the preparation for first responders to deal with cyber attacks? I know 

FEMA responds to the disasters, but as far as I know they are not 

doing anything in the area of cyber unless you tell me otherwise. 

But who in DHS is responsible for preparing the States and the 

local communities in these areas? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, for the most part in terms of the preparation 

and prevention we would be the lead. Obviously FEMA would be 

the lead in terms of preparedness, consequence management after 

any sort of event, physical or cyber, and we would work closely 

with them, but we actively work now with our state and local partners. 

We have a strong relationship with Multi-State ISAC, with the 

National Association of State CIOs, and we work directly with 

them on state-specific issues. Moreover, a lot of our effort, broader 

efforts, specifically include state and local involvement. For example, our efforts to raise awareness in this last year. 

We raised the game significantly, I think, on National Cyber Security Awareness Month, which occurs in October of every year. It 

was very gratifying at the launch for the first time to have the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

stand up together and give the same message. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Do we have a team in case of either a manmade 

disaster or any time we have a hurricane or anything? Do we have 

a team that operates? 

I just had a situation in two counties, Maverick and Hidalgo, 

where we could not communicate with our office for a whole day. 

By the way, during that period of time people could not get any 

money from their banks or anything. We never knew actually what 

actually happened. Do you have a team that responds to a situation like that when they happen? 

Mr. REITINGER. Yes, sir, we do. We have a group of people. We 

have several groups of people that do telecommunications and information technology incident response. For information technology—— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. And that is under who under DHS? 

Mr. REITINGER. That reports up through Admiral Brown and 

then Greg Schaffer too, sir, so that would be a part of U.S.–CERT. 

They would be responsible for coordinating. 

We brought all of those teams together in the National Cybersecurity and Integration Center, which we opened in October and 

Chairman Price was present for, and we are building out the plans, 

as I suggested in my testimony, that will enable us to respond as 

one nation, which is the National Cyber Incident Response Plan. 

I would say that state and localities, particularly through the 

MS–ISAC, are directly participating in the development of that 

plan. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Now, let me follow up a little bit better as it 

deals also in this same area with local communities. Have we come 


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up with any collaboratives with universities for training and other 

purposes? 

I know we created in San Antonio and I know in other communities a Bachelor’s and Master’s and Ph.D. in this area, and I know 

we have also some universities that have been looking at the legal 

aspects of it. Are we working and reaching out to these institutions 

throughout the country? 

Mr. REITINGER. Yes, sir. We have robust collaboration with universities. As part of our work on education and awareness, we are 

devoting increasing tallies to that. We are also working with universities to make sure we are providing our own people with the 

training that they need through, I believe, Carnegie Mellon. We get 

some role-specific training for some of our employees. And we are working directly with the Naval Postgraduate School at the moment to find the right way to perhaps develop additional 

technology expertise. So we are working broadly across the spectrum with players, including academia. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I do not want to lose sight of the fact because I know we are working from top down, but those natural disasters 

and things occurred locally and so in terms of looking at it also 

from the local and State, from the bottom up, as we move forward. 

Mr. REITINGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Ms. Roybal-Allard. 

COORDINATION AMONG AGENCIES

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. During your testimony you talked about the 

importance of coordination, partnerships with the private sector, 

team building and so forth, yet according to a GAO report in March 

of this year it says that agencies have overlapping and uncoordinated responsibilities for cyber security activities that have not 

been clarified by the Cybersecurity Initiative. 

A key example is the lack of agreement regarding which agency 

is responsible for leading efforts of cyber information sharing and 

situational awareness, and then it goes on to give examples. It also 

cites that a former Acting Director of the NCSC said that due to 

a lack of coordination among the top level agencies and the White 

House has not been fully operational, and it was unclear what responsibilities it was to assume for the federal government as a 

whole. 

The conclusion by GAO was that CNCI is unlikely to fully 

achieve its goal of reducing potential vulnerabilities, protection 

against intrusion attempts and anticipating future threats to federal information systems unless roles and responsibilities for cyber 

security activities across federal government are more clearly defined and coordinated. They also cited a lack of measurement for 

effectiveness to gauge progress. 

So my question is what progress is being made to address these 

concerns so that you can be successful in meeting your goals? 

Mr. REITINGER. Thank you, ma’am. So let me say a couple of 

things and then I am going to ask Mike to add anything he would 

care to. 

I would say that defining roles and responsibilities is an area 

where we need to do further work. I think significant progress has 


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been made over time, and in particular with the creation of the 

Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative roles and responsibilities among the different agencies, who is the lead for different 

initiatives, was much more clearly defined. 

That process is moving forward, and one of the specific outcomes 

of the Cyberspace Policy Review, which the President initiated 

upon election and came out in May of last year, was the need to 

have a new national strategy that I think would go even farther, 

given what we have learned heretofore, better defining roles and 

responsibilities. 

I think that is going to be a key action item for the new cybersecurity coordinator at the White House, Howard Schmidt, and I 

know he is heavily focused on that. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Well, can you just tell me what is preventing you or what are the obstacles that are in front of you that 

prevent you from clearly defining a role so that we continue to 

have this overlapping of activities? 

Mr. REITINGER. I am not sure if it is a set of obstacles. It is simply that things come up and they have to be addressed. The events 

change. What we need to accomplish changes, and we need to keep 

the roles and responsibilities current so we are actively working 

those and better defining roles and responsibilities as we go forward. 

Within our particular mission space, for example, we have a specific effort, as I mentioned when I was giving my oral testimony, 

the National Cyber Incident Response Plan. Perhaps the most essential part of the National Cyber Incident Response Plan is to 

make sure that we have got a clearly defined set of roles and responsibilities for all of the Federal Government players and the private sector in the event of an incident that affects national security. 

And so there are a lot of people who are interested in how that 

pie looks and what piece of it they are responsible for. So that is 

a fully collaborative process that we are driving. We brought the 

private sector in at the very start. We brought the government 

agencies in at the very start. It is a long-term process that will lead 

to a draft that we intend to test in a Cyber Storm exercise at the 

end of this year. 

So I guess all of that is to say I think we can continue to define 

roles and responsibilities and clarify them, but we are likely never 

to be done with that. We will probably need over time to keep those 

roles and responsibilities current as capabilities and the threat environment we live in changes. 

Mike, did you want to add anything to that? 

Admiral BROWN. The only thing is the fact that over the past 

several months to support that development of the Incident Response Plan we have had multiple exercises, including the private 

sector participants, so that we can clearly understand under different scenarios everybody’s responsibility with respect to cyber security. That is the biggest thing. Everybody does have specific responsibilities. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. So are you disagreeing then with the GAO 

reports that there is a lack of clearly defined and coordinated responsibilities? 


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Admiral BROWN. I think the answer is what we needed to have, 

which is what the Cyberspace Policy Review stated, was a National 

Cyber Incident Response Plan, and that is what we have all been 

working on since August to develop. 

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. And when will you be finished with that plan? 

Mr. REITINGER. As I said before, ma’am, we intend to have a fullfledged draft that is executable in time for Cyber Storm III, which 

will be in September or October of this year. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much. We will turn to Mr. Farr. 

Mr. FARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me see if I totally un- derstand. Your role with Homeland Security is .gov. Is your role as 

an Admiral with .mil, or are you—— Admiral BROWN. No, sir. I am Department of Homeland Security. I am assigned to the Department of Homeland Security to conduct 

its mission. I just happen to be a Department of Defense Navy officer. 

Mr. REITINGER. Admiral Brown is an example of the collaboration between the civilian side and the Defense side. He is effectively detailed to the Department of Homeland Security and serves 

as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Communications. 

BUDGET FOR CYBER ACTIVITIES

Mr. FARR. What is the total budget that you can disclose? What is our budget for cyber activities? 

Mr. REITINGER. The budget for the National Cyber Security Divi- sion request for Fiscal Year 2011 is I think $378 million. 

CONTRACT EMPLOYEES AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERS

Mr. FARR. Okay. And how much of the cyber security workload is performed by contractors? 

Mr. REITINGER. Well, we spend program funds on contractors. We have increasingly worked to have more and more of our work 

performed by government employees. My thoughts on that—— 

Mr. FARR. So taking that back from contractors, or we grow that into federal employees? 

Mr. REITINGER. It really, sir, is making sure that we build out the expertise of our government employees. As I am sure you know, 

it is difficult to hire in this environment. Cyber security experts are 

still few in number, and hiring them is a highly competitive activity. We have been very successful in the last year in getting people 

on board, and we intend to continue to grow the federal workforce. 

I like to say when I came on board roughly a year ago we were 

down to about somewhere between 20 and 25 people, government 

employees in U.S.–CERT. Through the great efforts of Greg Schaffer and Mike Brown, we have raised that to around 50 now, and 

we are trying to get that to 100 government employees by the end 

of the year. So during the course of the last year we have converted 

roughly 100 positions, if you will, from contractors to government 

employees. 

Mr. FARR. That is the right direction. I would like to invite you 

to come out and see what our cyber capabilities are on the Monterey Peninsula because Homeland Security has its school where 


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you are getting Masters’ and Ph.D.’s, and I think we can expand 

that training capability with the linkages that we have there. Could you also give us who are some of your private sector partners? 

Mr. REITINGER. Excuse me? 

Mr. FARR. Who are some of your private sector partners? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, we work with private sector partners across 

the entire spectrum under the National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan framework, so that includes multiple sectors, including communications and information technology and what you might think 

of as more traditional sectors like electric power and financial services. 

So we have, and work with both directly, with those sectors and through the Cross-Sector Cyber Security Working Group companies 

in all of those sectors. For example—— 

Mr. FARR. This is under your Incident Response Plan? 

Mr. REITINGER. Well, we work directly with the sectors. Some of the lead work would be done by the IT and communications sectors. With regard to the IT sector, the former chair of the IT sector 

was Juniper. Now the chair of the IT sector is Microsoft. So it 

changes over time, but that is representative. A number of companies from CSC—not CS&C, but CSC. There 

are multiple companies that are involved in that work. I know that 

the first call which involved the private sector to work to develop 

the national cyber incident response process had over a hundred 

people on it, many of them from the private sector, and so there 

is a fairly broad level of participation. 

INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN

Mr. FARR. I am just curious because the whole Incident Response Plan has essentially been developed out of the public sector, actually out of CalFire in California. It is a disaster response plan, and 

yet to develop the Incident Response Plan for cyber disasters is 

more of a private sector it seems. I am just curious about it. 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, that goes back to Mr Rogers’ comments. We are dealing with an environment where the vast majority of critical 

infrastructure is owned by the private sector. As Admiral Brown 

said before, everybody has a role here. We need to make sure when 

bad things happen that everybody knows what they need to do and 

how they can work together to respond to bad things. One thing about a cyber incident is it is unlikely to be geographi- cally limited. Certain consequences may be, but it could easily be 

nationwide, and so we will need the right capabilities to bring together all those players from the Defense Department to the Department of Homeland Security to multiple states and localities 

and private-sector partners across the country to be able to respond 

effectively. 

BROADBAND EXPANSION

Mr. FARR. Just the last part of that. Is there in that analysis the 

ability to—you know, we have the big broadband expansion in the 

stimulus package, and I have been very curious because I represent 

a real rural area of California, and yet right down the main of that 

we have fiber optic cable to come to the Naval Postgraduate School, 


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but within 25 miles of that you cannot get a cell phone. You cannot 

even in fire incidents. We cannot even get satellite communication. 

We have to park a communication ship offshore; usually not a military ship, but a civilian ship. 

So it seems to me that they are in one of those gaps that 

broadband is not addressing and I do not know whether you are 

addressing it. Is there some dialogue between what we are giving 

in our grant and the need to do broadband expansion and cyber security planning? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, I would say the big topic of broadband expansion is probably outside my mission space, as critical as I recognize that it is. 

We, however, are very concerned with broadband expansion. How 

do we ensure that the people who are involved are secure as they 

increasingly connect to high bandwidth connections? And there is 

a part of what works, a part of DHS that reports up through Admiral Brown and Greg Schaffer to me, that looks specifically at how 

do we ensure that we have things like priority communications 

across Internet base networks and telephone networks, so that is 

something we are concerned about, how we can make sure that we 

can get through to everybody in the event of an emergency. 

Mr. FARR. But not necessarily a geographical isolation or anything like that? That would not be part of it? 

Mr. REITINGER. The actual broadband expansion is something 

that would be done by other agencies like NTIA, sir. 

2010 CYBER SECURITY EXPENDITURE PLAN

Mr. PRICE. We appreciate both of you being here for what has 

turned out to be a fairly long morning with the classified briefing 

and then this public hearing. I think we do have some further 

questions, and I know we will submit more for the record, so I 

would like to proceed with the final fairly quick round of questions. 

I will lead off with a reference to the 2010 expenditure plan. The 

Subcommittee received this plan for the National Cyber Security 

Division last month. In this document DHS has substantially reorganized the program’s plan from six goals in the 2009 plan to 47 

separate initiatives in 2010. Now, of course it is not just the numbers that matter, but what those numbers signify, but it is fair to 

say that the Cybersecurity Initiative has grown, has matured, and 

has become more complex. 

I wonder if the increasing number of action items in this expenditure plan may represent a challenge to the orderly execution of the 

program, especially since, as a number of Members have mentioned, we are dealing overall in the 2011 budget with a modest cut 

to the Cyber Security Program. 

So I want to ask you a question for your oral response and then 

you may well want to elaborate for the record. What is the relationship between the apparent increasing complexity of the Cyber Security Program and the 2011 budget? How closely was the 2011 

budget based on the achievements that DHS plans for 2010? Of 

course, this is an expenditure plan that arrived in Congress well 

after the 2011 budget arrived, so there is a question I suppose of 

synchronization here. 


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Is the budgeting cycle for cyber security efforts synchronized with the program’s implementation? We are looking for not just assurance, I think, but perhaps further details about the way the 

more detailed expenditure plan, which we awaited for some 

months, the way that that is reflected. The question is is it faithfully reflected in the 2011 budget request? [The information follows:] 

RESPONSE: The apparent increased complexity of the National Cyber Security Division’s (NCSD’s) program structure reflects the Department’s multi-layered approach to the Nation’s current and future cybersecurity posture. The Department’s 

cybersecurity budgeting cycle is synchronized with cybersecurity program implementation. The Department’s FY 2010 NCSD expenditure plan and FY 2011 NCSD 

budget justification were developed based on the FY 2010 NCSD budget request. 

NCSD’s planned FY 2010 achievements were identified based on the FY 2010 budget and are consistent with the FY 2011 budget request. As such, the FY 2011 budget 

is fully informed by DHS’s planned FY 2010 cybersecurity achievements. The decrease in the NCSD budget request for FY 2011 was caused by many fac- tors, including the elimination of one-time or non-recur investments and DHS’ 

prioritization of spending across the department. However, core cybersecurity programs such as EINSTIEN will continue in FY 2011. 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, let me briefly say, and I would be happy to supplement in a question for the record, that I believe we are. 

I personally apologize to you and to the Committee for the length of time it took to get you the expenditure plan. That is a matter 

of focus for us, and we got it to the Committee more rapidly this 

year than we did last year, and we will do it more rapidly next 

year than we did this year if that is a requirement. I apologize, and 

we will work to make sure that that does not recur. 

Second, I believe that the efforts are synched. We are planning in the out years. We are planning long term for what we need to 

accomplish, and I think the reason you see an increasing complexity in our expenditure plans is we are having more people. We 

are bringing on the people, the human capital that we will need to 

be able to execute on a broader mission space. 

I think you will increasingly see a greater strategic focus in what we do because just earlier this year for the first time the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the interagency, 

released a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which says this 

is what we are trying to accomplish. These are our mission areas. 

These are our top line goals. One thing I would point out for this Committee is that for the 

first time cyber security was identified as one of the top five mission areas on a par with securing the borders with the entire 

Homeland Security enterprise, which is an interagency enterprise. 

So you will see an increasing focus and priority on this area and 

alignment of budgeting and initiatives with that strategic direction. 

CYBER SECURITY COORDINATION

Mr. PRICE. Let me just quickly follow up on a related area of 

questioning which Ms. Roybal-Allard pursued; that is the coordination among federal agencies that you are striving for. 

Your budget does address that very directly with a single funding 

item doubling the cyber security coordination funding from $5 million to $10 million. What specifically is that all about? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, that is about the National Cyber Security 

Center, which was established under HSPD–23/NSPD–54. That orVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:47 Sep 10, 2010 Jkt 057185 PO 00000 Frm 00790 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A185P2.XXX A185P2

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ganization was not funded until FY 2010, except through some 

transfers, and received its initial funding of $5 million thanks to 

this Committee and to the Senate for FY 2010, which is creating 

an initial operating capability. 

The National Cyber Security Center is dedicated to enabling collaboration across the six cyber centers such as both U.S.–CERT 

and the NCIJTF, which is run by the FBI for law enforcement purposes. All of that collection of centers to enable them to collaborate 

effectively together to be able to share information amongst themselves and to enable common situational awareness across all of 

the different areas of data and knowledge that the U.S. Government has. 

The $10 million request is to move out of an Initial Operating 

Capacity into a broader scope of responsibility. It is an expansion 

from, I believe, 14 federal FTP in this year to 40 FTP next year. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. What can you say in this setting about where the 

attacks are originating? 

Mr. REITINGER. I think I would say in this setting, sir, that attacks can occur from anywhere to anywhere and that we need to 

be mindful and protect against the full spectrum of threats. 

One of the things that is important to note is one can appear to 

see an attack coming from a particular place where that just is the 

location of a computer system that an attacker has routed his or 

her communications through, so actually attributing conduct and 

finding the ultimate source of attack remains a significant item of 

work, demonstrated by how difficult it is to bring criminal prosecutions for criminal elements that are involved in this activity. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, obviously some of the attacks are from States, 

are they not? 

Mr. REITINGER. There is a full spectrum of threats, sir, and it 

goes up to the State level. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Including military? 

Mr. REITINGER. I think I would rather not characterize that in 

this context, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Can you tell us some of the States that 

are involved? 

Mr. ROGERS. Again, I would rather do that in closed session, sir. 

Mr. REITINGER. All right. 

Mr. FARR. Foreign States or domestic States? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, is Kentucky involved? [Laughter.] 

Mr. REITINGER. I can neither confirm nor deny that. [Laughter.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I plead the Fifth, too. How far behind are we on 

Einstein 3? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, I would say that our deployment schedule is 

about—with regard to where we are right now, as opposed to when 

we intended to deploy, about a year behind where we would like 

to be given the barriers that we faced. 

Mr. ROGERS. Barriers like what? 

Mr. REITINGER. The barriers include the need to develop the contracts, and the need to work with our agency partners to ensure 

that all of the right legal and oversight structures are in place, a 

wide collection of activities. 


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EINSTEIN 3 CAPABILITIES

Mr. ROGERS. Well, how would you characterize the vulnerability 

of government networks to some damage or penetration without 

the real time intrusion detection and monitoring capability of Einstein 3? 

Mr. REITINGER. I think all networks, Federal Government or otherwise, are subject to significant threats and significant risks, sir, 

but as we deploy, or as we now test Einstein 3, and work towards 

deployment of operational capability, we are in the process of deploying other protections, working with our agency partners to 

make sure that they have the information that they need, and taking a series of actions. 

There is simply, sir, no silver bullet here, and Einstein 3 is not 

a silver bullet. We need to make sure that we build defense in 

depth and have multiple ways in order to help protect both government and private networks. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, the goal, of course is to prevent penetration 

in real time of our networks. Can you assure us that Einstein 3 

will achieve that goal? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, I can assure you that the technology when 

deployed will significantly enhance our security posture, and enable 

us to do things that we cannot currently do in the .gov domain. 

But it again will not be a silver bullet. It will not stop all intrusions. We will be looking for particular indicators of malicious activity, and attackers’ techniques change over time. Plus, there are 

different spectrums of threats. 

Someone could simply walk into—you know, take a government 

computer home, a laptop home, and plug it into their network, 

have it compromised when they do that because they have got an 

infected machine on their home network. 

So we are going to have to be vigilant and continue to build multiple protections in defense in depth as we are doing right now. 

Mr. ROGERS. So, Einstein 3 will not be the final answer? 

Mr. REITINGER. Oh, no, sir. There will be an Einstein 4 and other 

parallel protections that go along with it. It is an old saying if you 

will, and cyber security is not a destination. It is a journey. 

And it is a little tired, but it is true. We are dealing not with 

a set of static threats, like is there going to be an earthquake or 

not, but an adaptive and reactive set of adversaries that are going 

to see what we do, and change what they do, across the full spectrum, and we are going to need to keep responding to what they 

do in order to ensure protection. 

Mr. ROGERS. Finally, we have not talked much about the private 

sector here today, although we should because it is 85 percent owners of critical infrastructure. What can you tell us about how you 

are working with the private sector in this regard? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, we are working again with the private sector 

across the spectrum. We are sharing information with them. And 

as I mentioned in my testimony, things like the pilot that we are 

sharing information with the financial services sector, three different financial services, ISAC. 

We are working and we have private sector participants already 

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nating center, and we are going to be working to add additional 

private sector representatives from other sectors, including IT and 

perhaps additional ones, at the national cyber security and communications integration center, because we want to have a joint operation center that will enable us with the private sector to work 

jointly. 

We are working with them on exercises, and making sure that 

we have got the right processes as I said before in the National 

Cyber Incident Response plan to be able to work together as one 

nation. 

We have worked with them on specific initiatives under Initiative 

12 or Project 12 of the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative, and in particular under the National and Infrastructure 

Protection Plan framework, for example, last year released the first 

ever risk assessment of the IT sector, in full collaboration with the 

IT sector coordinating council. 

The last thing that I would point out is that we are working with 

them in particular, if you will, technological silos. So we are working directly with control systems vendors and other entities worried 

about control systems, to help increase the security of control systems. 

So one could talk about our work with the private sector, and 

nearly everything that we are doing, we are doing something in 

that space with the private sector. 

Mr. ROGERS. Could you apply an Einstein 2 tech system to the 

private sector on a voluntarily basis, and afford them some of the 

protections that Einstein 2 and 3 gives to the government techs? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, I would say that one could deploy an intrusion prevention system in order to protect part of the private sector. We right now are focused on deploying that to protect the .gov 

domain. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much for your testimony and your 

work. 

Mr. REITINGER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Rodriguez. 

PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS AND TRAINING EXERCISES

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you very much, and let me go back a little bit on this discussion. Have we done any exercises with the private sector or do we have any projects going on that you are aware 

of now? 

Mr. REITINGER. Oh, absolutely, sir, particularly in cyber. Over 

the course of the last few years, we have done big exercises, like 

Cyber Storm I and Cyber Storm II. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes. 

Mr. REITINGER. And just in the last few months working on the 

National Cyber Incident Response Plan, we have done three table 

top exercises that involved the private sector. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. One of the things that concerns me is with universities. Have any incidents occurred that are less likely to be 

publicized because they hurt the universities, especially if a crime 

is occurring? 


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And in the area of crime, I would presume the same thing ap- plies to banks. I am concerned that we do not know what is occurring in the private sector, or what might be occurring. You mentioned in terms of when we find out. I would presume 

that some attacks we have not found out about yet. So do we 

have—is there a need there to do some additional work with the 

private sector, and also in the area of crime, and with the police 

and preparing them as to how to deal with these issues through 

cyber in the area of crime in the local communities? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, you are taking me back not to my current role, which is more cyber security focused, than in the former role 

that I had as a prosecutor in the Department of Justice. I think 

that your questions are spot on, sir. Even back then, back to 1995 and before, the questions were 

raised about are we getting enough reporting, because people can 

be very reluctant to report cyber intrusions because it could adversely affect their reputation. And that has been an item of work not only in our community to make sure that people and companies know that we can provide 

assistance to them, but in law enforcement so that they can take 

appropriate action. 

Companies over time have gotten more used to reporting, and 

things like breach disclosure laws have certainly helped in that regard. But we need to continue to develop that. We still have to 

make too many decisions in cyber security based not on data, but 

based on religion. 

And I do not mean that in the technical sense, but people make 

decisions based on what they believe and what they think to be 

true, rather than based on what the data shows. So we need to continue to build those relationships to get that data, and that is a significant item of work for us to make sure. 

For example, with the financial services sector, the whole point 

behind the pilot that we are conducting is that that is not how we 

push information to the sector. It is bilateral information sharing. 

How do we share information so that we give them relevant data, 

and they give us relevant data, so we can all have the information 

that we need both to generate situational awareness and to allow 

us to protect our systems? 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. And you hit the nail on the head, because I 

know that with the universities we had to create legislation to require them to report any assaults, or anything against women, because they were not forthcoming. 

I assume that the private sector is not going to be forthcoming 

either unless we require that information, or allow some umbrella 

of protection for us to follow through on that. I am really concerned 

whether our local police are also capable of following through on 

some things that might be occurring through cyber, of if we are not 

there yet in terms of the training that is required. 

And so you are also telling me that we are providing training in 

the local community? Who was doing that once again? 

LOCAL COMMUNITY TRAINING

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, training the local communities is done, I 

think, by primarily in a distributed way. Through our efforts under 


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National Cyber Security Awareness Month, and more generally 

around awareness, make active efforts to inform everyone, including critical infrastructure, but down to individual end-users about 

the way they can protect themselves. And we make a very focused effort during Cyber Security Aware- ness Month. I mean, just one case in point. During Cyber Security 

Awareness Month this last year, I sat down in a local station, or 

in a satellite studio and did over 20 local interviews with different 

local TV stations around the country to help raise cyber security 

awareness in their community, and that sort of activity is continuing. One other thing that I wanted to mention. There are mechanisms that enable us to protect information that the private sector shares 

with us. In particular, the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information program, the PCII program, which is run under DHS, provides protection to voluntarily share vulnerability information. So 

we have mechanisms to go forward in that space. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you. Mr. Farr. 

EINSTEIN DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

Mr. FARR. I want to follow up Mr. Rogers’ question. How far be- hind is Einstein, or how far behind do you think .gov is from .mil? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, that is hard for me to compare because the 

environments are so very different. The .gov environment is far 

more complicated, and far more distributed, and has far more 

connectivity, and more owners than operators. I really do not know 

how to answer that question. 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINANCIAL EXCHANGE SECURITY

Mr. FARR. Well, let me follow up Mr. Rodriguez’s question, and following up on who is responsible for the exchanges, the commodity exchange and the stock exchanges for cyber security? I 

would think of all the energies that would be hacked, and jammed, 

and manipulated, would be the exchanges, because that is there 

24–7, and global, and a lot of international players are involved in 

the exchanges, because you can do the whole thing over the Internet. 

So it seems to me to be one of the most massive cyber security items would have to be in that area. Is that our government’s responsibility, or is that all just the cyber section? 

Mr. REITINGER. Sir, you raise a very good question. This is an important point. The ultimate responsibility for cyber security is 

going to lie with the owners and operators of the networks. So it 

is important to us to not fully own the security of .gov. 

It is the Department of Homeland Security’s responsibility to secure its own networks. It is the Defense Department’s responsibility to secure its networks. It is the—pick an agency. It is the Department of Interior’s responsibility to secure its networks. 

Similarly, the same is true in the private sector. So what we 

have got to do is get into a world where cyber security is a part 

of the DNA of every entity, and we in government, particularly in 

the parts of the government that report up to me, the National 

Cyber Security Division, are both making that easier providing the 

data that those companies, or government entities, need to protect 


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796 

themselves, and provide certain technologies or capabilities to deal 

with issues that are hard to deal with on a one-by-one basis. 

Mr. FARR. It also seems that we have to stay ahead of the curve, 

the intellectual curve. We have got to have the brightest people in 

the world working for us. 

Mr. REITINGER. Absolutely. 

Mr. FARR. And do we? 

Mr. REITINGER. We have some very incredible people both in the 

government and in the private sector, sir. You would be amazed at 

some of the expertise that exists both in the private sector and in 

government to address some of these issues. 

But if we do not maintain a focus on developing the capabilities 

in our universities, and in hiring people, and making sure that people know being a deepest pool, a cyber security pool, we are going 

to have a lot of trouble. 

We have got to start getting kids when they are six and seven 

years old thinking about programming, and getting them involved 

in security, and doing end-to-end work so that when they graduate 

from a university, they are ready to go to work for a private-sector 

company, or a government agency, and they are the world experts. 

Mr. FARR. And Silicon Valley is very cool and very rich, and very 

profitable. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, and let me thank both of our witnesses 

for very helpful testimony, and for the good work that you are 

doing in a very challenging area, and one that we are going to be 

paying careful attention to in the weeks ahead as we draw up the 

2011 budget. But you have been a great help to us this morning 

and we thank you. 

Mr. REITINGER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PRICE. With that the Subcommittee is adjourned. 


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(i) 

W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Allen, Thad W .......................................................................................................... 351 

Brown, Michael ........................................................................................................ 755 

Fugate, W. Craig ...................................................................................................... 453 

Garza, Alexander ..................................................................................................... 115 

Goldstein, Bernard .................................................................................................. 115 

O’Toole, Tara ............................................................................................................ 115 

Reitinger, Phil .......................................................................................................... 755 

Rossides, Gale D ...................................................................................................... 1 

Sosin, Daniel ............................................................................................................ 115 

Sullivan, Mark ......................................................................................................... 273 


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(iii) 

I N D E X 

Transportation Security Administration: Are We Making Smart 

Investments For Real Transportation Security? 

Page 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 1 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 7 

Statement of Gale Rossides, Acting Assistant Secretary, TSA ............................ 13 

Advanced Imaging Technologies....................................................................... 29, 50, 59 

Advanced Imaging Technology Deployment .......................................................... 36 

Air Cargo Security ................................................................................................... 79 

Air Marshals ............................................................................................................ 39 

AIT and Metal Detectors ......................................................................................... 33 

AIT Installations at Airports .................................................................................. 34 

AIT Passenger Response and Privacy .................................................................... 31 

AIT Manpower Requirements ................................................................................. 51 

Austin, Texas, Internal Revenue Service Security Incident ................................ 35 

Aviation Regulation and Other Enforcement ........................................................ 89 

Bonuses ..................................................................................................................... 103 

Cargo Screening ....................................................................................................... 47 

Checkpoint Technologies ......................................................................................... 58 

Contracts .................................................................................................................. 96 

Effectiveness of AITs ............................................................................................... 32 

Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) ....................................................................... 66 

Federal Flight Deck Officer and Flight Crew Training ........................................ 90 

Federal Flight Deck Officer Program ..................................................................... 114 

General Aviation ...................................................................................................... 83 

Hiring ........................................................................................................................ 95 

Israeli Model ............................................................................................................ 45 

Language Training .................................................................................................. 40 

Large Aircraft Security Program ............................................................................ 82 

Liquid Detection Technologies ................................................................................ 62 

Maintenance and Utility Costs for Screening Technologies ................................. 72 

O’Hare ....................................................................................................................... 46 

Portable Trace Machines ......................................................................................... 63 

Private Aircraft Regulation ..................................................................................... 34 

Profiling .................................................................................................................... 44 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price .......................... 58 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Ranking Member Harold Rogers ......... 112 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard ... 114 

Reception and Representation ................................................................................ 94 

Screening Partnership Program ............................................................................. 88 

Secure Flight ............................................................................................................ 83 

Screening Partnership Program ............................................................................. 112 

Standards for Incoming International Flights ...................................................... 113 


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iv 

Standoff Detection Technologies ............................................................................. 64 

Standoff Detection ................................................................................................... 112 

Surface Transportation Security ............................................................................ 90 

Terrorist Watch List ................................................................................................ 44 

Training for Screeners ............................................................................................. 52 

Training Mandates for Transit Workers ................................................................ 114 

Transit Security Grants .......................................................................................... 49 

Transportation Security Officers ............................................................................ 74 

Transportation Security Support ............................................................................ 91 

Travel ........................................................................................................................ 110 

Unions ....................................................................................................................... 39 

Unobligated Balances .............................................................................................. 110 

Working with Europeans on Watch Lists .............................................................. 46 

Biosurveillance: Smart Investments for Early Warning 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 115 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 121 

Statement of Dr. Alexander Garza, Assistant Secretary, OHA ........................... 125 

Statement of Dr. Tara O’Toole, Under Secretary, S&T ........................................ 137 

Statement of Dr. Bernard Goldstein, Chair Committee on Effectiveness of 

National Biosurveillance Systems ...................................................................... 150 

Statement of Dr. Daniel Sosin, Acting Director, OPHPR, CDC .......................... 165 

Assessment of BioWatch Enhancements ............................................................... 259 

BioThreats ............................................................................................................ 200, 202 

Biosurety .................................................................................................................. 261

BioWatch Deployment Plans .................................................................................. 191 

BioWatchGeneration 1/2 ......................................................................................... 207 

BioWatch Generation 3 ........................................................................................... 268 

BioWatch Generation 2 and 3 ................................................................................. 179 

Bonuses ..................................................................................................................... 238 

Border Officer Tools and Safety Program .............................................................. 211 

Centers of Excellence ............................................................................................... 212 

Chemical Programs—Detection .............................................................................. 226 

Command, Control and Interoperability ................................................................ 226 

Continuity of Operations Planning ........................................................................ 203 

Contracts .................................................................................................................. 230

Cyber Security Assessment Project ........................................................................ 226 

Demonstrations and Pilot Programs ...................................................................... 212 

Generation 2 Testing ............................................................................................... 207 

Generation 3 Procurement ...................................................................................... 209 

H1N1 Lessons Learned ........................................................................................... 190 

Hiring ........................................................................................................................ 230 

Increased Management and Administration Personnel ....................................... 210 

Insider Threat Protection ........................................................................................ 227 

Institute of Medicine Recommendations ................................................................ 267 

Integration of Biosurveillance Systems ................................................................. 197 

Local Coordination ................................................................................................... 187 

NAS Recommendations vs. Administration Plans ................................................ 256 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)............................................... 184, 196 

National Biosurveillance Integration Center............................................. 189, 193, 209 

NBAF ........................................................................................................................ 262 

Plum Island Animal Disease Center ...................................................................... 228 

Private Sector ........................................................................................................... 185 

Public Health Response ........................................................................................... 194 


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v 

Public Health Surveillance ..................................................................................... 266 

Public Health ........................................................................................................... 199 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price....................... 207, 256 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ciro D. Rodriquez................................................................................................................. 261, 262

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable John R. Carter .............. 265 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ken Calvert............... 268, 269 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Mark Kirk ..................... 266 

Reception and Representation ................................................................................ 229 

Resilient Social Networks Project .......................................................................... 227 

Standards ................................................................................................................. 184 

Substantial Investment in the Biowatch Program? .............................................. 265 

T&E for Generation 3 .............................................................................................. 208 

Technical Questions Regarding BioWatch ............................................................. 269 

Travel ........................................................................................................................ 251 

University Programs ............................................................................................... 228 

Unobligated Balances .............................................................................................. 252 

Working with the Department of Defense ............................................................. 186 

United States Secret Service: FY2011 Budget 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 273 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 277 

Statement of Mark Sullivan, Director, U.S. Secret Service ................................. 281 

2008 Campaign Cost Overruns ............................................................................... 296 

2012 Campaign Budget ........................................................................................... 293 

2012 Campaign ........................................................................................................ 349 

Anti-Counterfeiting Investigations in South America .......................................... 307 

Bonuses ..................................................................................................................... 326 

Contracts .................................................................................................................. 312

Design of U.S. Currency .......................................................................................... 308 

E Street Barricades ................................................................................................. 349 

Hiring ........................................................................................................................ 312 

Intensity of Threats Against Protectees ................................................................ 294 

Overtime and Retirement Pay ................................................................................ 299 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price .......................... 312 

Reception and Representation ................................................................................ 317 

Replacement Cycle for Secret Service Vehicles and Small Arms ........................ 303 

Secret Service Financial Crimes Investigations .................................................... 303 

Secret Service Information Technology .................................................................. 301 

Staffing and Overtime ............................................................................................. 318 

Travel ........................................................................................................................ 328 

Unobligated Balances .............................................................................................. 328 

USSS Field Offices .................................................................................................. 329 

USSS Investigations ................................................................................................ 335 

White House State Dinner Incident ....................................................................... 297 

Coast Guard: FY2011 Budget 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 351 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 355 

Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard ............ 361 

Acquisition Workforce ............................................................................................. 401 

Aids to Navigation ................................................................................................... 430 

Aircraft Maintenance Backlog ................................................................................ 429 


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vi 

Alteration of Bridges ............................................................................................... 446 

Automatic Identification System ............................................................................ 431 

Backup to GPS ......................................................................................................... 396 

Capital Investment Plan ......................................................................................... 377 

Closure of Great Lakes Seasonal Airstations ........................................................ 385 

Coast Guard Reserves ............................................................................................. 433 

Collective Bargaining .............................................................................................. 451 

Contracts .................................................................................................................. 428

Cost Growth ............................................................................................................. 397 

Development of FY2011 Coast Guard Budget ....................................................... 376 

Drug Interdiction ..................................................................................................... 381 

Effect of FY2011 Coast Guard Budget Cuts .......................................................... 378 

Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) ................................................................................ 449 

FY2009 DHS Financial Systems Audit .................................................................. 395 

Haiti .......................................................................................................................... 451 

HH–65C Helicopters ................................................................................................ 448 

ICE Breakers ........................................................................................................... 384 

Independent Life Cycle Cost Estimates ................................................................. 394 

Intelligence ............................................................................................................... 383

Management ............................................................................................................. 405 

Marine Debris .......................................................................................................... 403 

Maritime Safety and Security Teams .................................................................... 386 

Military/Civilian Mix ............................................................................................... 432 

Mission Effectiveness Program ............................................................................... 449 

Mission Readiness ................................................................................................... 452 

National Capital Region Airspace Security ........................................................... 431 

National Security Cutter ......................................................................................... 401 

NSC Schedule .......................................................................................................... 448 

Overseas Contingency Operations .......................................................................... 396 

Past GAO Recommendations .................................................................................. 404 

Performance Measures ............................................................................................ 394 

Personnel Cuts ......................................................................................................... 388 

Polar Operations ...................................................................................................... 393 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price .......................... 393 

Questions for the Record Submitted Ranking Member Harold Rogers ............... 448 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable C.A. ‘‘Dutch’’ 

Ruppersberger ...................................................................................................... 449 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Nita M. Lowey .............. 450 

Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation ................................................. 432 

Shore Maintenance Backlog .................................................................................... 428 

Slowing Acquisitions of Key Assets ........................................................................ 393 

Small Boat Threats .................................................................................................. 450 

Unobligated Balances .............................................................................................. 434 

USCG as Systems Integrator .................................................................................. 398 

Vessel Maintenance Backlog ................................................................................... 429 

FEMA—Preparing for Disasters and Minimizing Losses 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 453 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 459 

Statement of W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, FEMA ......................................... 464 

American Samoa Disaster ....................................................................................... 524 

Bonuses ..................................................................................................................... 717 

Contracts .................................................................................................................. 526

Disaster Housing Assistance Program ................................................................... 523 


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Disaster Recovery Strategy ..................................................................................... 513 

Disaster Relief Contracting ..................................................................................... 512 

Disaster Relief Fund ............................................................................................ 477, 512 

Disaster Support ...................................................................................................... 525 

Emergency Alert System ......................................................................................... 502 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact ...................................................... 523 

FEMA Staff .............................................................................................................. 518 

FEMA Trailers ......................................................................................................... 748 

Fire Grants ............................................................................................................... 750 

Firefighter Grants ................................................................................................... 497 

Flood Insurance ....................................................................................................... 521 

Flood Mapping ......................................................................................................... 492 

GPD/NPD ................................................................................................................. 522 

Hiring ........................................................................................................................ 526 

Indian Point Energy Center .................................................................................... 749 

Individual and Community Preparedness ............................................................. 519 

Interoperability Grants ........................................................................................... 483 

Katrina Arbitration ................................................................................................. 500 

Leon River Floodplain ............................................................................................. 508 

Measuring Grants Effectiveness ............................................................................. 499 

National Flood Insurance Program ........................................................................ 753 

NEPA Process .......................................................................................................... 487 

Nuclear Terrorism Response ................................................................................... 750 

Operation Stonegarden ........................................................................................... 746 

Overseas Deployment of Teams .............................................................................. 494 

Port Security Grants ............................................................................................... 515 

Postdisaster Mitigation ........................................................................................... 495 

Predisaster Mitigation ............................................................................................. 491 

Preparedness Measurement .................................................................................... 520 

Preparedness ............................................................................................................ 484 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price .......................... 512 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Alan Mollohan .............. 748 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ciro D. Rodriguez ......... 745 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Ken Calvert .................. 752 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Nita M. Lowey .............. 749 

Reception and Representation ................................................................................ 526 

Staffing Issues .......................................................................................................... 479 

State and Local Preparedness ................................................................................ 745 

Streamlining Port Security Grant Process ............................................................ 752 

Transit Security Grant Program ............................................................................ 749 

Travel ........................................................................................................................ 728 

Unobligated Balances .............................................................................................. 742 

Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) ................................................................ 481 

Urban Search and Rescue ....................................................................................... 486 

DHS Cyber Security Programs—What Progress Has Been Made and What 

Still Needs to be Improved? 

Opening Statement of Chairman David Price ....................................................... 755 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers ...................................... 760 

Statement of Phil Reitinger, Deputy Undersecretary, NPPD .............................. 766 

Statement of Rear Admiral Michael Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Cyber Security and Communications ................................................................. 766 

2010 Cyber Security Expenditure Plan ................................................................. 789 

Authentication and Malware .................................................................................. 846 


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Baseline Information on Attacks ............................................................................ 848 

Bonus ........................................................................................................................ 833 

Broadband Expansion ............................................................................................. 788 

Budget for Cyber Activities ..................................................................................... 787 

Chemical Security Regulation ................................................................................ 810 

Contracts .................................................................................................................. 828

Control Systems ....................................................................................................... 804 

Coordination Among Agencies ................................................................................ 785 

Cyber Security Budget Structure ........................................................................... 783 

Cyber Security Coordination ............................................................................... 790, 799 

DHS Lead for Preparation and Prevention ........................................................... 783 

Einstein 3 Capabilities ............................................................................................ 792 

Einstein 3 Deployment ............................................................................................ 778 

Einstein Among Security Operations Centers ...................................................... 844 

Einstein Deployment Schedule ............................................................................... 795 

Federal Protective Service (FPS) ............................................................................ 815 

Governance, Risk and Compliance ......................................................................... 845 

Hiring ........................................................................................................................ 827 

Incident Response Plan ........................................................................................... 788 

Local Community Training ..................................................................................... 794 

Next Generation Networks (NGN) ......................................................................... 805 

NPPD Field Offices .................................................................................................. 837 

Office of Bombing Prevention ................................................................................. 814 

Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) ........................................................ 808 

Private Sector Partnerships and Training Exercises ............................................ 793 

Protective Security Advisors ................................................................................... 810 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price .......................... 799 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Alan B. Mollohan ......... 849 

Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable C.A. ‘‘Dutch’’ 

Ruppersberger ...................................................................................................... 844 

Reception and Representation ................................................................................ 833 

Responsibility for Financial Exchange Security .................................................... 795 

Supercomputing Sensor Technologies .................................................................... 849 

Travel ........................................................................................................................ 836 

Trusted Internet Connections and Cyber Security Threats ................................. 779 

Unobligated Balances .............................................................................................. 835 

User Authentication ................................................................................................ 802 


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