DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Review of the 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement’s 

Compliance Enforcement Unit 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

OIG-05-50 September 2005
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared by the OIG as 

part of its DHS oversight responsibilities to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within 

the department. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement’s Compliance Enforcement Unit operations. It is based on interviews with employees 

and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable 

documents. 

The recommendations have been developed to the best knowledge available to the OIG, and have 

been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this report will 

result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all of 

those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Contents 

Executive Summary.......................................................................................... 3 

Background................................................................................................... ...5 

Source Systems........................................................................................... 8 

 CEU Lead Processing................................................................................... 11 

Field Processing of CEU Leads....................................................................... 14 

Results of the Review........................................................................................16 

Efforts to Identify Visa Violators and Overstays Result in Few Apprehensions................16 

Significant Number of Leads Remain Unprocessed.................................................17 

Leads Are Not Processed in a Timely Manner....................................................... 22 

CEU Procedures Need Improvement ................................................................. 25 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis...................................................... 30 

Appendices 

 Appendix A: Compliance Enforcement Unit Workflow ......................................................... 33 

Appendix B: Average and Median of Leads Closed by CEU HQ........................................... 34 

Appendix C: Average and Median of Leads Sent to ICE Field Offices.................................. 35 

Appendix D: ICE Memoranda Distribution Matrix ................................................................. 36 

Appendix E: Support Systems ................................................................................................. 37 

Appendix F: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ..................................................................... 40 

Appendix G: Management Response to Draft Report ............................................................. 42 

Appendix H: Major Contributors to This Report..................................................................... 45 

Appendix I: Report Distribution............................................................................................. 46 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Contents 

Abbreviations 

ADIS Arrival and Departure Information System

ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge 

CBP Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 

CEU Compliance Enforcement Unit 

CEU HQ Compliance Enforcement Unit Headquarters 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOS Department of State 

DOJ Department of Justice 

FTE Full Time Equivalent 

FY Fiscal Year 

HSA Homeland Security Act of 2002 

ICE Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

NIIS Non-Immigrant Information System

NSEERS National Security Entry Exit Registration System

OIG Office of Inspector General 

P.L. Public Law 

POE Port of Entry 

RAC Resident Agent in Charge 

ROI Report of Investigation 

SAC Special Agent in Charge 

SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 

SEVP Student and Exchange Visitor Program 

SOP Standard Operating Procedures 

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communication System 

US-VISIT United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

VWP Visa Waiver Program 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

We conducted this review to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the 

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Compliance 

Enforcement Unit (CEU) in identifying, locating, and apprehending aliens 

who have violated the purpose and terms of their admission into the United 

States. Based on our review of the number of cases referred to CEU and the 

procedures and systems used to collect, analyze, and process these referrals, 

we identified several deficiencies in the CEU process.1 

CEU depends on systems that are incomplete. The most ambitious, USVISIT, does not have an established exit control capability at this time.

2 

These systems produce many “leads” that are incomplete or inaccurate; i.e., 

are not actionable. In our test sample of leads closed by CEU HQ, 96 percent 

of the leads proved to be invalid. 

The sum of deficiencies in the systems, in CEU’s output, and other factors in 

the apprehension and removal process result in a minimal impact in reducing 

the number of overstays in the United States. From January 2004 to January 

2005, CEU received 301,046 leads from US-VISIT, SEVIS, NSEERS, and the 

Department of State. CEU processed 142,816 of these leads. CEU closed 

138,652 because it determined the alien had left the United States, was “in 

status,” or no address information was available to make an apprehension 

likely. 

Of the 142,816 leads, CEU referred the remaining 4,164 to the field. These 

resulted in 671 apprehensions. Once an apprehension is made, the 

responsibility to detain, adjudicate, and remove visa violators is transferred to 

other offices within ICE, including the Office of Detention and Removal and 

the ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor. Additionally, the Executive 

Office of Immigration Review within the Department of Justice (DOJ) 

presides over these immigration cases. Studies suggest that very few of the 

1 We evaluated the procedures and systems CEU used as of June 2004. Any changes or enhancements to those 

procedures and systems since that time are not reflected in this report unless used to address specific findings and 

recommendations. 2

 US-VISIT, SEVIS, and NSEERS are acronyms for different systems used to track various categories of foreign visitor 

to the United States. Each system’s full name and its coverage is described later in this report. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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671 aliens apprehended will actually be removed unless they also have a 

criminal history and are detained.3 

Nevertheless, we identified business practices that CEU can improve. Of the 

14,495 US-VISIT, SEVIS, and NSEERS referrals that we examined, CEU had 

not completed the processing of 7,053 (49 percent) of these leads in a twomonth period. This situation exists because CEU is unable to keep pace with 

the large volume of lead referrals and because not all referral data was 

actionable. 

CEU did not process all violator leads that it did complete in a timely manner 

due to vague performance measures and processing inefficiencies. As a 

result, violators have a greater chance to avoid apprehension and disappear 

into the U.S. population because addresses and other locator information for 

aliens can be perishable. 

Finally, two procedural issues hinder CEU’s ability to adequately document 

and consistently process violator leads: (1) The need to establish the basis for 

closing over half of the leads in our test sample; and, (2) inefficiencies in 

distributing policies to ICE field offices. The absence of effective policy 

dissemination is illustrated by the need for investigative guidelines for the ICE 

field offices on how to document the various actions taken on CEU cases. 

We are recommending that CEU: 

• Ensure that data quality issues are addressed, in conjunction with 

officials from the various lead referral systems, and that validity 

checks are performed to increase the number of “actionable” leads 

referred to CEU. 

• Assess the CEU workflow process, establish and closely monitor 

processing performance measures to ensure that CEU staff is working 

efficiently, and determine when staffing adjustments are needed to 

ensure timely processing of all violator leads. 

• Ensure that adequate justification exists for lead closure and that this 

justification is documented. 

3

 INS only removed 13 percent of nondetained aliens under final orders. Office of the Inspector General, Department of 

Justice, “The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Removal of Aliens Issued Final Orders,” Rep. No. I-2003-004, 

12 February 2003. 

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• Redistribute policy and guidance documents to ICE field offices and 

consolidate current policy memoranda into a set of Standard Operating 

Procedures (SOPs) for distribution to all ICE field offices; and, 

establish an ICE-wide resource for access to the CEU SOPs, as well as 

other current information regarding CEU activities. 

Background 

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that there were 

seven million illegal aliens living in the United States in January 2000 and 

that this estimate would grow by 350,000 a year.4 At the same time, the 

United States Census Bureau estimated that there were eight million illegal 

aliens living in the United States and estimated a growth rate of half a million 

a year. Using these 2000 estimates and projections, the illegal-alien 

population in 2004 would approximate nine to ten million. Another study, 

based on the March 2004 Current Population Survey, estimated an 

undocumented population of 10.3 million in March 2004 and nearly 11 

million as of March 2005.

5 

Undocumented aliens customarily are divided into two categories: those who 

enter without inspection, usually by clandestine entry; and those who are 

permitted entry based on a visa or other legal basis and then violate the terms 

of their permission, called “overstays.” Estimates of the number of overstays 

vary from 33 percent6 to 50 percent7 of the total undocumented alien 

population. Applying the smaller percentage (33 percent) to the most current 

undocumented alien population estimate (11 million) suggests that there may 

be over 3.6 million overstays in the United States today. 

On November 25, 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) was 

signed into law, creating DHS.8

 Effective March 1, 2003, the functions of 

INS were transferred to DHS. With the establishment of DHS, the functions 

and jurisdictions of several border and security agencies were merged into the 

4

 Office of Policy and Planning, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, “Estimates of the Unauthorized 

Immigration Population Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000,” 6 (January 2003) 5

 Jeffrey S. Passel, “Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population,” 1, Pew Hispanic Center 

(March. 21, 2005). 6

 “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigration Population Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000,” supra note 1,

at 6 (January 2003). 7

“Foreign Visitors Who Violate the Terms of their Visas by Remaining in the United States Indefinitely,” Hearing

Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Session, 

Serial No. 2, 21 (February 24, 1995) (testimony of Executive Associate Commissioner James A. Puleo). 8

 P.L. 107-296.

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate within DHS. ICE is the 

investigative arm of BTS. 

In an effort to reduce the number of illegal aliens residing in the United States 

who had violated the terms of certain types of visas, ICE established the CEU 

in June 2003. Primarily the National Security Entry Exit Registration System 

(NSEERS), the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), 

and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (USVISIT) identify visa violators. These three systems are designed to track a 

specific segment of the non-immigrant population and provide CEU with 

information concerning visa overstays. Additionally, CEU supports 

enforcement actions necessary as a result of visa revocation actions taken by 

the Department of State (DOS). Between early January 2004 and early 

January 2005, CEU HQ received over 300,000 violator leads from these 

programs. 

The CEU Headquarters (CEU HQ) Office is the interface between program 

offices (source systems) that identify potential visa violators and ICE field 

agents who attempt to locate and apprehend those whom CEU determined 

have violated the terms of their stay in the United States.9 There are 27 ICE 

Special Agent in Charge (SAC) offices located nationwide, many of which 

have sub-offices (Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) offices), which are tasked 

to investigate leads forwarded to them by CEU HQ. 

A substantial part of CEU’s work is to check various governmental and public 

(support systems) databases to determine if potential violators have departed 

the United States; have changed, or are in the process of changing, their 

immigration status; have reestablished program compliance; or can otherwise 

be accounted for (in custody or removal proceedings).10 CEU HQ closes as 

many cases as possible based on information in the support systems. While 

performing these checks, CEU also collects information that is useful to ICE 

field agents in locating the violator should the lead be forwarded to the field 

for investigation.11 In short, much of the work CEU HQ performs depends on 

the accessibility and reliability of data in both source and support data 

systems. 

9

 Source systems refer potential visa violator leads to CEU. US-VISIT, NSEERS, SEVIS are source systems. Visa 

revocation and biometric referrals are also considered source systems. 10 See Appendix E for a description of relevant support systems. 11 This includes information such as visa numbers, driver’s license numbers, and addresses. 

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CEU HQ has 11 permanent and 7 detailed staff members and is managed by a 

CEU Chief. Key to CEU operations is the support provided by a contractor. 

To expedite the contracting process, ICE used an existing Blanket Purchase 

Agreement to secure the contractor’s services. The contract between ICE and 

the contractor is a fixed labor rate contract with a performance end date of 

September 30, 2005. There are 26 contract personnel assigned to CEU HQ 

and, with the exception of one computer programmer and one contractor 

supervisor, all are research analysts. Under the contract, the contractor 

conducts records checks to determine if aliens are in violation of their 

immigration status and, if they are in the United States, uses the visa violator 

information to generate investigative leads for ICE field offices. 

CEU HQ uses Leadtrac, a software program developed by the contractor, to 

collect, catalog, process, and track visa violator data. Leadtrac imports data in 

a Microsoft Excel format. Leadtrac serves as an interface between data 

provided from the various source systems and data ultimately inputted into the 

Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) to transmit leads to 

the field for investigation. 

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2004, CEU was authorized 51 full-time equivalent (FTE) 

positions. Sixteen positions were assigned to CEU HQ and 35 were 

distributed among 22 ICE field offices. A CEU HQ official said that not all 

ICE field offices have designated CEU agents, but that those field offices still 

investigate CEU cases with existing resources. It is the goal of CEU to have 

at least one CEU agent assigned to each ICE field office. Both CEU HQ and 

ICE field office management officials agreed that there are more than 51 

agents working CEU cases, although we were unable to confirm this at the 

time we performed our field visits.12 

CEU has been authorized 130 agents in FY 2005 but has been unable to hire 

authorized personnel due to a hiring freeze. Additionally, CEU has requested 

funding for 79 FTEs to process SEVIS cases. Funding for these 79 FTEs will 

come from recently imposed SEVIS (student and school) fees. 

12 Although TECS can be used to track an ICE agent’s case hours, TECS was not used to transmit CEU cases to the field 

until April 2004. When we performed our field visits, only one of our test sample periods encompassed cases 

transmitted to the field using TECS. Therefore, ICE field office personnel could only provide us with estimated CEU 

work hours. Additionally, TECS was new to ICE personnel who were not from the legacy U.S. Customs Service. 

Therefore, at the time of our field visits, many ICE agents were still learning how to use TECS. Finally, ICE field agents 

were not consistently tracking their work hours by individual CEU case but rather by type, such as NSEERS, SEVIS, or 

US-VISIT or other general categories. 

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Source Systems 

Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) 

In 1996, Congress directed INS to develop an electronic system to collect 

information on foreign students and the schools that they attend.13 In October 

2001, U.S. authorities discovered that several of the September 11, 2001, 

terrorists had entered the United States on student visas. Thereafter, Congress 

directed the INS to fully implement SEVIS by January 1, 2003. 

SEVIS is an automated, web-based system used to maintain information on 

international students and exchange visitors in the United States and to 

identify foreign students and exchange visitors who have violated the terms of 

their visas. SEVIS is managed by the Student and Exchange Visitor Program 

(SEVP) office, part of ICE. SEVP receives leads on SEVIS violators from a 

variety of sources, such as participating U.S. educational institutions. 

Participating educational institutions enter and update SEVIS records via 

internet access. Currently, more than 7,300 U.S. schools and 1,400 exchange 

visitor programs are registered in SEVIS. More than 770,000 student and 

exchange visitors (F-1, M-1, and J-1 visa categories) were registered in 

SEVIS as of July 2004.14 SEVP relies on schools to put forth a “good faith 

effort” when entering student data into SEVIS, especially student termination 

notifications. These institutions must be certified for SEVIS compliance 

every two years. 

Foreign students can violate immigration status by failing to enroll in the 

participating institution or not maintaining a sufficient academic course 

load.15 U.S. schools and exchange visitors program sponsors are required to 

notify the SEVP office about foreign students or exchange visitors who do not 

comply with requirements; such as maintaining a full course load. Those 

students’ or exchange visitors’ records should be terminated by school or 

program officials in SEVIS. Foreign students have five months to apply for 

reinstatement after violating SEVP regulations. Students are considered 

terminated in SEVIS and subject to arrest and removal until officially 

13 P.L. 104-208; U.S. Code, Title 8, Section 1221 note. 14 Within these categories, F-1 visas represent academic students, M-1 visas represent vocational students, and J-1 visas

represent exchange visitor students. SEVIS also maintains records on dependents who accompany a primary SEVIS 

participant into the United States. According to a SEVP official, over 120,000 such dependents are registered in SEVIS. 

Each SEVIS dependent’s record is "linked" to the primary SEVIS participant’s record and if the primary SEVIS 

participant is terminated, all of the dependents’ records are automatically terminated. 15 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 8, Section 214.2(f). 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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reinstated. The SEVP office refers an average of 500 termination leads per 

week to CEU in 2004. 

National Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS) 

Initiated September 11, 2002, by the Department of Justice (DOJ), NSEERS is 

an entry-exit system for certain temporary foreign visitors (non-immigrant 

aliens). Visitors admitted under certain types of visas and from specific 

countries were required to register, be fingerprinted through NSEERS, and 

provide DOJ with detailed information relating to the visitors’ background 

and purposes of their visits. Visitors staying in the United States for more 

than 30 days were initially required to re-register every 30 days, while visitors 

who remained in the United States for more than one year were required to reregister on a yearly basis. Since most of the visitors registered in NSEERS 

are students, on business travel, or visiting relatives in the United States, the 

re-registration process was developed to verify locations, activities, and 

confirm departures. 

When DHS was created, NSEERS was transferred from DOJ to DHS and 

placed within ICE. In December 2003, NSEERS 30-day and annual reregistration requirements ceased. Individuals registered in NSEERS are now 

only required to appear for re-registration when deemed necessary by DHS. 

Aliens who fail to register their departure with NSEERS or fail to comply 

with DHS re-registration requests are referred to CEU. NSEERS referred an 

average of 358 leads per week to CEU in 2004. 

U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology (US-VISIT) 

US-VISIT is a result of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data 

Management Improvement Act of 2000. The system is an automated entryexit system intended to record the arrival and departure of certain temporary 

foreign visitors crossing U.S. borders.16 US-VISIT enrollment requires 

foreign visitors to have both index fingers scanned and a digital photograph 

taken to verify identity. The exit feature of US-VISIT is still being piloted at 

only select ports of entry (POE), making it difficult to track visitor departures. 

Those who do not register their departure with US-VISIT are deemed 

unconfirmed overstays. US-VISIT referred 2,405 unconfirmed overstay 

records per week to CEU in 2004. 

16 P.L. 106-215, Section 110; U.S. Code, Title 8, Section 1365. 

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Biometric Referrals 

US-VISIT also generates leads termed biometric referrals. Biometric referrals 

typically originate from warrants created by local law enforcement agencies, 

which are monitored by ICE through the National Crime Information Center 

(NCIC).17

 NCIC attempts to match the fingerprints of aliens who are wanted 

by law enforcement officials or have committed crimes with those who have 

already entered the United States. If a match is confirmed between NCIC and 

US-VISIT, a biometric referral lead is generated and processed by CEU. 

When the lead is sent to an ICE field office for investigation, ICE field agents 

can either pass the information to local law enforcement agencies or they can 

attempt to locate and apprehend the individual. Between January 23 and July 

20, 2004, CEU received a total of 68 biometric referrals. 

Visa Revocations 

Another source of violator leads is visa revocations from DOS. Unlike 

NSEERS, SEVIS, and US-VISIT (including biometric referrals), visa 

revocation leads derive from an agency external to DHS. DOS issues visas at 

consular posts abroad to allow nonimmigrants to travel to the United States 

for a specific purpose and for a specified amount of time. After the issuance 

of a visa to an alien, DOS may at any time revoke the visa for reasons such as 

prior U.S. immigration orders for exclusion, deportation, or voluntary 

departure that were entered against the alien, or criminal conviction for an 

offense involving moral turpitude.18 

Until recently, a lawfully admitted alien in possession of a revoked visa was 

not necessarily in violation of immigration law. An alien with a revoked visa 

could remain lawfully in the United States if the visa was valid at the time of 

admission. CEU processed visa revocation leads for ICE field agents to 

investigate to determine whether the subject aliens had violated any 

immigration laws. With the passage of the National Intelligence Reform Act 

of 2004, in December 2004, an alien with a revoked nonimmigrant visa is 

illegally present in the United States.19 An alien with a revoked visa is now 

subject to removal whether the visa was revoked before, on, or after the 

effective date of the law. 

17 See Appendix E for a description of support systems. 18 U.S. Code, Title 8, Section 1182; Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 212. 19 P.L. 108-458, Section 5304; U.S. Code, Title 8, Section 1227. 

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DOS notifies DHS when it revokes a visa. Upon revocation, a DOS consular 

officer completes and forwards a Certificate of Revocation, including a 

statement of the reasons for revocation, to CEU.20 Between December 8, 

2003, and July 6, 2004, DOS referred a total of 344 visa revocation leads to 

CEU. Of these 344 leads, 207 (60.2 percent) derived from visas revoked 

generally for “National Security” reasons. Of the 207 leads, 162 were for 

visas revoked on “Security and Related Grounds”, 28 were for visas revoked 

for connections to terrorist activities, and 17 were for visas revoked for 

nonspecified "National Security" reasons.21 Conversely, 126 of the 344 leads 

(36.6 percent) were for visas revoked for “Non-National Security” reasons, 

such as misrepresentation of facts on immigration applications.22 Eleven of 

the 344 leads were revoked for unspecified "Visa Revocation" reasons. 

 CEU Lead Processing 

SEVIS, NSEERS, and US-VISIT program offices electronically provide 

potential visa violator leads to CEU on a weekly basis.23 These leads are 

provided in a Microsoft Excel format that CEU HQ imports into the Leadtrac 

system. Visa revocations and biometric referral leads are provided to CEU as 

those cases are identified by the DOS and the US-VISIT program office 

respectively. Visa revocation and biometric referral information is manually 

entered into Microsoft Excel by CEU personnel and then imported into 

Leadtrac in the same manner as leads from the other three source systems. 

From these five sources, CEU receives an average of 5,789 leads on a weekly 

basis. At this point, CEU requests only the necessary information from source 

systems for Leadtrac to: 

• Detect and eliminate duplicate records from within a system or 

duplicate information on the same individual across systems; 

• Ensure the import process was successful by matching the number of 

records in the Microsoft Excel file with the number of records 

imported; and 

20 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 22, Sections 41.121 and 41.122. 21 U.S. Code, Title 8, Section 1182; Immigration and Nationality Act, Sections 212 (a)(3) and 212 (a)(3)(B). 22 U.S. Code, Title 8, Section 1182; Immigration and Nationality Act, Sections 212(a)(6)(C). 23 Refer to Appendix A for a workflow diagram.

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• Prioritize the files based on programmed criteria established by 

CEU.24 

Once leads are imported into Leadtrac, they are designated as either Priority 

or Non-Priority. Priority leads consist of those aliens from countries of 

national security concern and other designated priority criteria, while NonPriority includes all other generated leads.25 

Leads are then checked by contract analysts against support systems to 

determine if the lead is valid and viable. Valid leads are those confirmed by 

CEU HQ during the workflow process to have violated the condition of their 

stay in the United States, and for which there is no information available to 

determine if the violator has (1) departed the United States; (2) has changed, 

or is in the process of changing, immigration status; (3) has reestablished 

program compliance; (4) is in custody or proceedings; or, (5) has otherwise 

been accounted for. Viable leads are those for which there is adequate 

information to attempt to locate the violator, such as a specific address, 

school, or other contact information available from the various source and 

support systems. Contract analysts perform these checks and CEU staff 

review the analysts’ work and determine the appropriate course of action. 

In late April 2004, the SEVP office and CEU instituted an additional review to 

validate leads derived from SEVIS. SEVP officials wanted to ensure accurate 

analysis and thorough investigation of leads were being performed so that 

foreign students, who were paying school tuition and SEVIS fees, were not 

wrongly subjected to unnecessary investigation, detention, or deportation 

based on incomplete or faulty data in SEVIS. This review was also designed 

to conserve CEU field investigative resources by resolving as many SEVIS 

leads as possible before forwarding them to the field for investigation.26 The 

SEVP review process takes place after the contract analysts process the 

SEVIS violator leads. 

If CEU determines that the leads are not valid or not viable, they are closed. 

If CEU determines that the leads are valid and viable, they are first entered 

24 For example, of the numerous fields contained in SEVIS, NSEERS and US-VISIT databases, only 29, 30, and 15

fields respectively are sent to CEU to be imported into Leadtrac. These fields include information such as name, birth 

date, country of birth, country of citizenship, gender, date of entry, class of admission, and travel document numbers. 25 Special interest countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 

Jordon, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 

Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and other countries based on national security concerns. 26Although the SEVP office records the number of cases resolved by SEVP, we did not evaluate these cases to determine 

the basis for SEVP resolution. 

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into the National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS) for the 

purpose of alerting U.S. immigration officers at U.S. POEs, for example, of 

immigration violators who may attempt to enter the United States while the 

lead is being investigated.27 Afterwards, these leads, along with the 

investigative research performed by CEU HQ, are transmitted via TECS to the 

appropriate ICE field office for investigation. Using TECS allows CEU HQ 

and ICE field office personnel to monitor case progress.28 Leads are 

transmitted to ICE field offices with one of three priority designations: 

Urgent, Immediate, and Priority.29 

Once assigned to an ICE field office, the SAC assigns the lead to the Assistant 

Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) who forwards the lead to a designated group 

supervisor for action.30 The supervisor assigns the lead to a case agent for 

investigation. The process of opening a CEU case in TECS requires the 

investigation to be acknowledged and an initial status report, termed a Report 

of Investigation (ROI), to be filed within a specified amount of time 

depending on the designated priority level. Thereafter, the case agent submits 

a status report to the supervisor on each open CEU case every 30 days, or as 

otherwise directed, in TECS. Field investigations result in one of the 

following: 

1. The violator is located and arrested. 

2. The violator is located but found to be in compliance. Due to delays in 

updating source or support data systems, as well as the time to process 

cases to the field, there are occasions when documents provided by the 

alien and verified by appropriate officials reveal that an alien has reestablished program compliance. 

27 NAILS is a database containing past immigration law violators who may be inadmissible to the United States and is 

checked during primary border inspections. SEVIS is a secondary border inspection system that may not always be 

checked by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Inspectors. Therefore, to better ensure that student or exchange visitors 

are properly screened before being admitted into the United States, CEU enters SEVIS leads directly into NAILS using 

SEVIS lead data that was imported into Leadtrac. 28 Another advantage to using TECS is the “call up” feature. A “call up” is essentially an electronic notification or 

reminder that some action is required on a case. For example, a “call-up” will be initiated if ICE field office personnel 

do not acknowledge receipt of a case within a specified timeframe or if a status report is due on an open case. This 

notification is transmitted to appropriate ICE field office management officials and CEU HQ officials. Although CEU 

HQ officials said that performance measures have not yet been established, TECS does provide a means for CEU HQ or 

ICE field office management personnel to monitor agent performance and establish office performance measures. 

29 Leads are prioritized as: Urgent – Action should be taken without delay, Immediate – Action should commence 

within 24 hours of receipt, and Priority – Action should commence within seven days of receipt. Of the 128 leads sent 

to the field in our test sample, only seven leads were transmitted to the ICE field offices as either Immediate or Urgent. 30 ICE RAC office procedures may differ slightly. 

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3. The violator is located and status is adjusted to achieve compliance. 

Generally, if compliance can be achieved, the violator is directed to 

take the necessary action to do so.31 

4. The violator is not located but departure from the United State is 

verified through contacts made during the investigation or subsequent 

source or support data system checks. 

5. The violator is not located but leads exist within another ICE field 

office’s area of responsibility. This normally results in the lead being 

returned to CEU HQ for reassignment to another ICE field office. 

6. An ICE case agent determines that all leads have been exhausted. 

Procedures vary between ICE field offices, but generally, initial leads 

are pursued and if a subsequent re-check of available databases 

provides no additional lead information, the case is recommended for 

closure. 

When the ICE case agents conclude cases, they prepare closing ROIs in TECS 

and submit them to their supervisors. The supervisors review the case agents’ 

reports and, if they agree with their conclusions, forward the ROIs to CEU 

HQ.32 

Field Processing of CEU Leads 

We visited five ICE field offices to examine files and interview ICE officials. 

Based on a detailed review of leads assigned to the field, 76 of the 128 cases 

(59 percent) had been closed.33 ICE field offices took, on average, 61 days to 

close those investigations.34 Of the closed cases, 

31 Most cases in our sample indicated that the alien had applied for a change in immigration status or extension of current 

status or stay before being contacted by an ICE agent. 32 Although the SAC or ASAC can monitor case progress in TECS, they are not required to be involved in the case 

closure process. 33During our review, we received case status information at three different points in time, (1) at the time we initially 

received general lead status information, (2) the time we received detailed reports on leads that were sent to the field, and 

(3) during our field visits. Therefore, leads that were initially listed as “Open” may have been subsequently closed 

between these points in time. When we received information indicating that a lead had been closed (from our field 

visits), we updated the spreadsheet we used to track these leads. Leads closed by ICE field offices we did not visit after 

we received the detailed reports are not included in this count. Therefore, 76 leads is the minimum number of leads in 

our sample that were closed. In fact, a CEU’s workload activity from January 6, 2004, to January 14, 2005, reports that 

ICE field agents had closed 95 percent of assigned cases. 34 See Appendix C. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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• 10 resulted in arrests; 

• 19 determined that the violator was in compliance; 

• 10 were adjusted to achieve compliance; 

• 21 verified that the subject had left the country; 

• One identified the subject as being in another ICE field office’s area of 

responsibility; 

• 14 were returned to CEU HQ noting that all leads had been exhausted; 

and 

• One subject was noted as processed for removal from the United 

States. 

Due to a large number of variables in handling CEU cases in the field, we did 

not form an opinion on whether this processing time was reasonable. For 

example, the average 61-day timeframe to close a CEU investigation included 

processing times for leads that were sent to ICE field offices that received a 

high volume of leads, such as the New York field office. Both CEU HQ and 

field office officials acknowledged that these offices were not adequately 

staffed to investigate such a high number of leads in a timely manner. As 

noted earlier, cases were also sent to ICE field offices that did not have 

designated CEU agents assigned requiring that those offices investigate these 

cases with existing resources.35 An ICE field office official said that if the 

initial investigation of a lead was unsuccessful, they would allow the case to 

“go cold” and, at a later date, reinvestigate the case to try and locate the 

subject. This would extend the time to close the case. 

Some ICE field offices, such as the Washington, DC office, were frequently 

directed to support other federal law enforcement agencies, such as the 

Federal Air Marshals Service and U.S. Secret Service, thereby delaying the 

investigation of CEU cases. Other offices had local, long-term ICE field 

office investigative priorities that competed with CEU case investigations, 

including marriage fraud and human rights violations. 

Additionally, in April 2004, CEU began transmitting CEU cases to the field 

using TECS. For most ICE field offices that were legacy INS offices, TECS 

was a new system. Consequently, many ICE field office personnel had to 

become proficient with TECS as well as with the other programs or databases 

that they needed to check during the course of an investigation, such as 

SEVIS. 

35 We noted that six of the 128 cases sent to the field in our sample were sent to ICE field offices that did not have an 

assigned CEU agent. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Results of the Review 

Efforts to Identify Visa Violators and Overstays Result in Few

Apprehensions 

The U.S. government invigorated its efforts to manage the population of nonimmigrants coming to the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001. The existing non-immigrant entry-exit control 

system, which was never very effective,36 was augmented with additional 

measures intended to improve national security. These measures included 

enhanced security background checks by DHS and DOS when an alien 

applied for a visa; additional screening of in-bound passenger manifest data 

against terrorist databases and watch lists; additional checks and reviews at 

POEs, which include the collection and entry of a considerable volume of data 

into various databases; monitoring compliance with visa terms; and, 

identifying and apprehending visa violators. This process, which included the 

development and deployment of US-VISIT, SEVIS, and NSEERS, was 

implemented at considerable expense and for the specific purpose of tracking 

the arrival, activities, and departures of non-immigrants. The newly 

established CEU is one part of this much larger system designed to ensure that 

non-immigrants comply with the terms and conditions of their stay in the 

United States. In order for the system to function as intended, all of the 

components must operate effectively. 

The initial screening functions are preventative and seek to identify those nonimmigrants who should not be admitted into the United States. Once admitted 

into the United States, various programs monitor non-immigrant compliance. 

When compliance violations are identified, enforcement functions, including 

those performed by CEU, must identify, locate, and apprehend violators. 

Once apprehended, violators must be detained, adjudicated, and removed. 

However, the data strongly suggest that this overall effort yields a small 

number of apprehended or removed non-immigrants. 

36 See the following reports from the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General: The Immigration and 

Naturalization Service’s Automated I-94 System, Rep. No. 01-18 (August 2001) (reviewing INS subsequently abandoned 

$31 million effort to acquire an automated system to track entry and exit reports); [INS] Monitoring of Nonimmigrant 

Overstays, Rep. No. I-97-08 (September 1997) (finding INS often could not identify overstays and did not have an 

effective enforcement strategy to apprehend overstays); Follow-Up Report on INS Efforts To Improve The Control of 

Nonimmigrant Overstays, Rep. No. I-2002-006 (April 2002) (reporting that departure records still were incomplete and 

INS failed to ensure airline production of accurate and complete records). 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Between January 2004 and January 2005, CEU received 301,046 leads 

(potential visa violator/overstays) from US-VISIT, SEVIS, NSEERS, and 

DOS (visa revocations). CEU processed 142,816 (47 percent) of these leads. 

The other 158,230 leads (53 percent) had not been processed and were 

pending with CEU, either assigned to an analyst or waiting to be assigned to 

an analyst. 

With respect to the leads CEU had finished processing, 138,652 were closed 

because CEU determined the alien had left the United States, was “in status,” 

or no address information was available to make an apprehension likely. CEU 

referred 4,164 leads to ICE field offices for investigation. These referred 

leads resulted in 671 apprehensions. 

Despite the considerable expenditure of time and resources and the 

government’s emphasis on controlling U.S. borders, the non-immigrant entryexit control system has not significantly improved DHS’s ability to manage 

the non-immigrant population. A DOJ study estimated that only 13 percent of 

non-detained aliens were removed after apprehension, completion of 

immigration proceedings, and issuance of a final order of removal.37 

Applying this percentage to the 671 apprehensions resulting from CEU leads, 

derived from SEVIS, NSEERS, US-VISIT, and visa revocations for a oneyear period, suggests that the actual removal of visa violators identified by 

CEU is miniscule.38 

Significant Number of Leads Remain Unprocessed 

Of the 14,495 US-VISIT, SEVIS, and NSEERS referrals we examined, 7,053 

(49 percent) had not completed the workflow process in at least two months.39 

37 Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Removal of 

Aliens Issued Final Orders of Removal, Rep. No. I-2003-004, 12 (February 2003). INS removed a much higher 

percentage of detained aliens (92 percent), but aliens who committed only an overstay violation seem less likely to be 

detained than other categories of violators. 38 DHS reports that it removed 186,151 aliens in FY 2003, a total for all administrative reasons and operations. Office of 

Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security, “2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics,” 160 (Sept. 2004) 

(Table 42). The 671 apprehensions total is based on the statistical report CEU furnished the OIG covering the period 

January 2004 to January 2005. The number of apprehensions should increase as CEU continues to investigate leads that 

originated during that period. 39 For the purposes of our analysis, the workflow process begins after leads are imported into Leadtrac, as discussed 

previously, and concludes when CEU HQ closes the lead without sending it to the field or when CEU HQ transmits the 

lead to the field. The workflow process itself includes two subcategories, leads that have been imported into Leadtrac 

and are waiting to be worked (Pending), and those that were actually being worked but had not completed the workflow 

process (In Progress). 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Specifically, 5,875 leads (of which 787 were designated as Priority) were 

waiting to be processed and the remaining 1,178 were in the workflow process 

but had not completed it at the time CEU provided us with the lead data.40 

This time lag is significant because the longer it takes for a lead to complete 

the workflow process, the greater the chance for perishable locator 

information to become obsolete, thereby reducing the chances of 

apprehending visa violators. Although CEU has a work prioritization 

criterion based on national threat intelligence, it receives a new list of 

violators every week. Our concern is that many lower priority leads of 

potential visa violators may never be processed. 

This situation exists because CEU could not keep pace with the large volume 

of lead referrals. In addition, not all lead referrals were actionable. 

Consequently, we question CEU’s effectiveness in identifying, locating, and 

apprehending potential violators. 

Large Volume of Leads 

The following table summarizes the status of US-VISIT, SEVIS, and 

NSEERS leads at four selected points in time. 

14,495 

7,053 

7,374 

68 

14,495 

December 

2003 

February 

2004 

April 

2004 

June 

2004 Total 

Leads beginning the 

workflow process 793 6,291 5,569 1,842 

Not completed 80 2,524 3,703 746 

Closed by CEU HQ 691 3,751 1,865 1,067 

Assigned to Field 22 16 1 29 

Total 793 6,291 5,569 1,842 

Table 1: US-VISIT, SEVIS, and NSEERS Lead Status41 

40 For the 787 Priority leads waiting to be processed, the first step in this process took at least four months for 382 leads, 

three and a half months for 241 leads, and two months for 164 leads. For the 5,088 Non-Priority leads waiting to be 

processed, the first step in this process took at least six months for 80 leads, four months for 1,649 leads, and two months

for 3,359 leads. 41 Data from the early December 2003, February 2004, and April 2004 weekly test periods were received on June 15, 

2004. Data for the June 2004 weekly test period was received on September 17, 2004. In both instances, the status of 

the leads on the date we received the sample data, June 15, 2004, and September 17, 2004, respectively, was the basis for 

our analysis. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Of the 14,495 US-VISIT, SEVIS, and NSEERS referrals that were received, 

7,053 leads (49 percent) were not completed. A significant number and 

percentage of leads remained incomplete for an extended period of time. 

The following table summarizes the status of biometric referral and visa 

revocation leads CEU received between December 1, 2003, through July 20, 

2004. 

Biometric 

Referrals 

Visa 

Revocation Total 

Leads beginning the workflow 

process 68 344 412 

Not completed 8 97 105 

Closed by CEU HQ 41 204 245 

Assigned to Field 19 43 62 

Total 68 344 412 

Table 2: Biometric Referral and Visa Revocation Lead Status 

For biometric referral and visa revocation leads, 105 of the 412 leads (25 

percent) that were received had not been completed. As of July 22, 2004, this 

included: 

• Two biometric referrals and seven visa revocation referrals that CEU 

received four months earlier; 

• Twenty-six visa revocation referrals that CEU received three months 

earlier; 

• Twenty-one visa revocation referrals that CEU received two months 

earlier; 

• Nine visa revocation referrals that CEU received a month earlier, and 

• Six biometric referrals and 34 visa revocation referrals that CEU had 

received within the same month. 

Not all leads are actionable 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Based on our interviews with CEU and US-VISIT program officials as well as 

our analysis of the processing of SEVIS and Visa Revocations leads, 

incomplete or inaccurate data is being referred to CEU. 

US-VISIT referrals are based on a list of unconfirmed overstay records 

generated weekly from Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Arrival and 

Departure Information System (ADIS).42 These unconfirmed overstay 

records are a result of comparing expired arrival records to departure records. 

When there are no matching records, subject aliens are considered 

unconfirmed overstays in ADIS and are presumed to be illegally present in the 

United States. US-VISIT program officials acknowledged that a large 

percentage of unconfirmed overstay records identified in ADIS are a result of 

incomplete or inaccurate data. According to an internal US-VISIT 

memorandum, dated May 5, 2004: 

“From 5 January 2004 through 22 April 2004, ADIS provided 

approximately 60,000 unconfirmed overstay records to ICE CEU. Of 

the approximately 18,000 records that were processed by the CEU, 

only 40 were found to be sufficient for assignment to the field. To 

date no arrests have resulted from these leads.” 

In the June 2004 test period the US-VISIT office referred 8,683 leads to CEU, 

however, only 712 (8.2 percent) were imported into Leadtrac. A CEU HQ 

official responded to our inquiry for an explanation that due to the excessive 

volume of records and the data integrity issues from leads received from USVISIT, the majority of these leads are not put into Leadtrac. 

Critical to ADIS’ ability to match records is the accuracy of the data and the 

record matching criteria programmed into the system. A January 2005 ADIS 

Data Quality report lists capturing sufficient data at the POE, ensuring carriers 

are providing accurate manifests, and minimizing typographical errors as 

priorities for greater ADIS accuracy. According to ICE agents in field offices 

we visited, the data quality of NSEERS and US-VISIT leads is problematic 

because CBP inspectors fail to collect the necessary information to track down 

overstays or input incorrect information into border systems due to pressures 

to speed up POE processing. Highlighting the need to ensure adequate 

information is collected at the time an alien enters the United States was an 

example shared by an ICE field office official. This official said that one case 

they received involved an alien whose address was listed as a “Hyatt” in the 

San Francisco area. There are six Hyatt hotels in the San Francisco area. 

42 See Appendix E for a description of support systems. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Additionally, ADIS data is received after being exchanged with several other 

electronic systems, including systems used by the commercial carriers. As a 

result, errors can occur as data is transferred between systems. This can cause 

incomplete or inaccurate data being populated into ADIS, thereby minimizing 

the probability of matching inbound and outbound data. Finally, effective 

record matching criteria directly affects how successfully ADIS is in 

identifying incoming and outgoing passengers. According to the US-VISIT 

program office, an enhanced version of ADIS’s record matching criteria is 

being tested.43 

Further, ADIS receives more arrival records than departure records. Two 

reasons given for this is that POE inspection officials do not verify departures 

and ADIS only addresses air and sea travel, not land travel through land 

POEs. Additionally, although ADIS stores entry, exit, and status management 

data captured by some legacy systems, it does not interface with the NonImmigrant Information System (NIIS) or contain all of the departure 

information found in the Advance Passenger Information (API) departure 

records in TECS. 

Consequently, until data quality enhancements are full implemented, record 

matching criteria are optimized, the “Exit” portion of the US-VISIT “EntryExit” system is fully developed and implemented at all POEs, and ADIS is 

integrated with all systems that track arrival and departure records, a 

significant amount of CEU’s limited resources will continue to be spent on 

investigating potential visa violators who have, in fact, already left the 

country. 

The US-VISIT program office and CEU have recognized this situation and 

have suggested several ways to address it. Some recommendations include 

establishing a predictive analysis capability to help identify “true” 

unconfirmed overstays, establish a data assurance unit, and further examine 

the causes for incomplete departure data in ADIS. 

SEVIS leads are generated based on records that school and university 

officials terminate. On a weekly basis, the SEVP office extracts all the 

records that have been terminated since the last extraction and transmits that 

data to CEU. ICE field agents from different SAC offices expressed concern 

43 Gender information is currently not included as a field in the ADIS matching algorithm. However, this information is 

often used to evaluate possible false positives or false negatives within ADIS. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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that SEVIS access by school officials would result in inaccurate and outdated 

SEVIS records, thereby resulting in extra investigative work. 

The fact that aliens have up to five months to apply for reinstatement after 

their SEVIS record is terminated means that compliance enforcement action 

may be delayed or even unnecessary because a SEVIS violation does not 

necessarily constitute an immigration violation. Although students can take 

this opportunity to evade federal authorities, until a cause for removal is 

established, the reinstatement of an alien’s student status is primarily an 

immigration services issue. 

As mentioned earlier, the SEVP office does not review terminated leads 

before they are sent to CEU for processing. Only after CEU has completed its 

initial processing does the SEVP review take place. Consequently, CEU’s 

limited resources are spent processing SEVIS violators whose records may 

have been improperly terminated or who are in the process of being reinstated. 

SEVP officials said that this review sequence was established because the 

SEVP office did not have the staff to evaluate terminated records before 

sending them to CEU. 

Since SEVP is part of ICE, ICE could reverse the SEVP review process and 

require SEVP to perform at least a cursory review of terminated leads before 

they are referred to CEU. This modification would reduce the amount of time 

CEU spends reviewing improper SEVIS lead referrals. 

Finally, visa revocation leads were not always actionable. Before the 

December 2004 passage of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, a 

lawfully admitted alien in possession of a revoked visa had not necessarily 

committed an immigration violation. Therefore, unless it was established that 

the violator was not in the country, CEU’s limited resources were expended to 

investigate visa revocation leads to determine whether the alien was in 

violation of any immigration laws. Now that all visa revocation leads are 

actionable, ICE field agents can take immediate action on visa violators who 

they locate. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement: 

Recommendation 1: Ensure that data quality issues are addressed with 

officials from the various lead referral systems, and that validity checks are 

performed to increase the number of “actionable” leads referred to CEU. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Leads Are Not Processed in a Timely Manner 

Of those leads that were closed, CEU HQ does not process all received 

violator leads in a timely manner nor did they have specific processing goals. 

Based on our 10 percent testing, it took CEU HQ an overall average of 47 

days to close leads after they were received from source systems.

44 Leads that 

on average took longer than 47 days to process included: 

• SEVIS leads that took on average 78 days to close, 

• Visa Revocations leads that took on average 51 days to close, and 

• NSEERS leads that took on average 49 days to close. 

Delays in processing leads resulted from CEU HQ’s vague performance 

measures and inefficiencies in the workflow process. 

Vague performance measures 

Even if only “actionable” leads were referred to CEU, there is no indication 

that CEU could keep pace with such a refined caseload based on the time that 

it took a contract specialist to process a lead, the number of leads to be 

processed, and the number of contract personnel available. Based on a review 

of CEU’s workload activity from January 6, 2004, to January 14, 2005, the 

average number of leads CEU received per week from all sources was 5,789. 

The average number of leads closed by CEU HQ per week was 2,666 and the 

average number of leads assigned to ICE field offices was 80 per week. 

Consequently, 47 percent of CEU’s weekly caseload is being closed or sent to 

the field. Therefore, staffing adjustments or enhanced processes are needed to 

address these workload demands. 

The CEU operation is supported by a fixed labor rate contract with. Since a 

fixed rate contract does not provide the contractor with incentives to 

maximize efficiency, performance measures are needed to evaluate whether 

the contractor is working efficiently and to determine if resource levels are 

adequate. A CEU official said that contract performance measures, regarding 

the time to process leads from source systems, are vague and that CEU 

44 See Appendix B. These timeframe are for leads that were closed by CEU HQ without being sent to an ICE field 

office. For similar timeframes for leads that were sent to the field, refer to Appendix C. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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primarily monitors the numbers of leads processed per month by the 

contractor. According to the Statement of Work within the Blanket Purchase 

Agreement (BPA) states that the contractor is prepared to incrementally offer 

as required contract labor resources in support of this project in quantities 

needed to support the project and provide, where possible, volume 

discounts.45 Nevertheless, additional contractor staff has not been added. 

Consequently, until a workflow analysis is performed, CEU is unable to 

accurately determine whether existing resources are working efficiently or if 

additional staff is needed to keep pace with the volume of leads referred to 

CEU. 

Inefficiencies Within the CEU HQ Process 

We identified significant inefficiencies within the CEU HQ workflow process 

and several points in the CEU workflow process in which unexplained delays 

occurred.46

 These inefficiencies can provide visa violators more time to avoid 

apprehension because important data in the violator leads, especially address 

information of the alien, are perishable. 

While CEU HQ took an average of 47 days to close all leads after they were 

received from source systems, the most significant process delay was the 

average of 25 days between the time the leads were imported into Leadtrac 

and the time they were assigned to the contract analysts for research. Given 

that, on average, it only took an contract analyst 19 days to research and 

forward leads to CEU personnel for review and disposition, the 25 day delay 

in assigning the lead to the contract analyst after importation into Leadtrac is 

significant to the overall processing time. According to the BPA’s scope of 

work, CEU’s SOP, and processing data fields in Leadtrac, the contract 

personnel are responsible for importing leads into Leadtrac, assigning them to 

a contract analyst, and forwarding the resultant information to CEU 

permanent staff for lead disposition. According to CEU’s SOP for “Violator 

Lead Processing”, the “contract team leader will assign all Priority leads 

immediately after importation to a validation team.” 

The time it took contractor staff to perform this step varied by source system. 

It took an average of 58 days to assign the 26 SEVIS leads to the contract 

analysts.47 CEU HQ officials could not explain why this step took almost two 

45 The BPA for FY 2005 has an estimated value of $4,020,130.80, with incremental funding of $902,532.70. 46 Most internal processing date fields in CEU's Leadtrac system were blank. Therefore, we could only evaluate certain 

steps in the process. Since most of the leads in our sample were Priority or national security leads, the processing 

timelines reflect the most expeditious lead processing. A complete description of our analysis is in Appendices B and C. 47 See Appendix B. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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months to complete because workflow processing timeframes were not 

monitored. 

There were also significant delays in assigning NSEERS leads to the contract 

analysts. This is especially troubling because these potential violators are 

from countries that the United States has designated as national security 

concerns. For the 117 NSEERS leads in our sample, it took the contractor an 

average of 33 days to assign those leads to contract analysts after they were 

imported into Leadtrac. In addition, for the 14 NSEERS leads in our sample 

that were sent to the field, it took the contractor an average of 65 days to 

assign the leads to the contract analysts. Again, CEU HQ officials could not 

explain why the assignment process took over two months to complete, 

primarily because they did not monitor processing times for individual steps 

within the workflow process. 

The delay in accomplishing this administrative step is critical because the 

contract analysts cannot begin researching visa violator leads until they are 

assigned. These delays allow visa violators to avoid apprehension and to 

“disappear” into the U.S. population. Reducing the amount of time to assign 

leads to the contract analysts would maximize CEU’s ability to locate visa 

violators before the lead data become obsolete. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement: 

Recommendation 2: Assess the CEU workflow process, establish and 

closely monitor processing performance measures to ensure that CEU staff is 

working efficiently, and determine when staffing adjustments are needed to 

ensure timely processing of all violator leads. 

CEU Procedures Need Improvement 

CEU policies and procedures do not include a requirement for justifying lead 

closure and are not always distributed to ICE field offices. 

No Basis for Lead Closures 

Of the 255 closed cases that we reviewed, 134 leads (53 percent) were closed 

by CEU HQ with no justification, with questionable justification, or without 

being adequately documented. Additionally, it appeared that departure 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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verifications of aliens possessing certain types of visas were not being 

performed.48 

• Seventy-five leads, 61 of which were NSEERS leads, were closed 

without any information or basis provided from the support systems 

checks. According to 73 leads, the alien had departed, but there was 

no information to support this conclusion. According to the two other 

leads, there was no indication that the subjects had departed the United 

States. Nevertheless, the leads were closed. 

• Twenty-seven leads had a questionable basis for closure. For example, 

leads indicated that they were reported in error but provided no further 

explanation. Other leads provided general information such as 

“Departure,” “subject has an EAD valid until 2006,” “I-129 Valid,” or 

“attending Howard University,” but did not specify when those entries 

were made or identify the sources of those statements.49 Of the 27 

leads, 15 were NSEERS leads. 

• Twenty-seven leads confirmed the entry of an individual as a ship or 

airline crewmember, but were closed as "Not Valid - Crewmember" or 

"Not Valid-Lead Reported in Error." Seventeen of these leads were D1 visa holders. The remaining ten leads had B-1, B-2, or C-1 visas.50 

According to applicable federal regulations, nonimmigrant 

crewmembers with D-1 status are exempt from reporting "to an 

inspecting officer of the Department of Homeland Security at any portof entry" prior to departing the United States.51 Therefore, closing 

leads belonging to the 17 D-1 visa holders was appropriate. However, 

no similar exemptions extended to crewmembers possessing B-1, B-2, 

or C-1 visas. Consequently, we question why these leads were closed 

48 The 255 leads in our sample included 26 leads from SEVIS, 117 from NSEERS, 20 from visa revocations, 87 from 

US-VISIT, and 5 biometric referrals. The 134 leads without verifiable information included 11 leads from SEVIS, 99 

from NSEERS, 1 from visa revocations, and 23 from US-VISIT. 

49 EAD refers to an employment authorization document. I-129 refers to a petition for a nonimmigrant worker to come 

to the U.S. temporarily to perform services or labor, or to receive training. Employers may also use this form to petition 

for an extension of stay or change of status for an alien. 50 A B-1 visa is issued to an alien having residence in a foreign country, for which they have no intention of abandoning 

and who is visiting the United States temporarily for business or pleasure. A B-2 visa is issued to an alien having a 

residence in a foreign country who will be visiting the United States temporarily for pleasure. A C-1 visa is issued to an 

alien in immediate and continuous transit through the United States. The alien has to possess a common carrier ticket or 

other evidence of transportation arrangements to the alien's destination; have sufficient funds to complete the transit 

journey; and have permission to enter a country, other than the United States, following the transit through the United 

States. 

51 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 8, Section 264.1(f)(8). 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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using the same justification as for those aliens possessing D-1 visas. 

We also question whether these aliens adjusted their reason for being 

in the United States and remained in the country after their ship or 

airline departed the country. Finally, since all 27 leads were 

summarily closed as "Not Valid - Crewmember" or "Not Valid-Lead 

Reported in Error", we question whether there is any assurance that 

any of these aliens departed the United States. Thirteen of the D-1 

visa holders and all ten B-1, B-2, and C-1 visa holders were NSEERS 

leads. 

In response to examples of these leads that we provided to CEU HQ, a CEU 

HQ official said that, in several instances, the information justifying closure 

was not in Leadtrac. However, the CEU official provided specific departure 

information from systems that had been checked before closing the lead. 

Based on this additional information, the subject aliens had departed the 

United States up to eleven months prior to the lead being closed. 

Consequently, we question why the specific departure information was not 

cataloged in Leadtrac at the time the lead was closed. In response to other 

examples we provided, CEU reiterated the basis for closure (“Not Valid – 

Crewmember”, “Not Valid-Lead Reported in Error”, “In Compliance”) 

without providing a more detailed explanation. Therefore, we continue to 

question the basis for closing these leads. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement: 

Recommendation 3: Ensure that adequate justification exists for lead closure 

and that this justification is documented. 

Inconsistent Availability of Policies and Procedures 

We determined that CEU policies and procedures governing ICE compliance 

enforcement activities are distributed to ICE field offices in an ineffective 

manner. From July 2003 to April 2004, CEU HQ distributed 13 memoranda 

to all ICE SAC offices.52 These memoranda covered CEU operations 

including guidance on processing CEU violator leads, NSEERS interview 

procedures, student violator leads, and the degree of investigative discretion 

that ICE Special Agents can use in resolving CEU violator leads. None of the 

ICE field offices were able to verify the receipt of all 13 memoranda. Only 

four memoranda were available at all of the ICE field offices we visited. The 

52 See Appendix D. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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incomplete distribution of key CEU policy memoranda could result in 

inefficient or unreliable handling, closing, or reporting of CEU cases. 

CEU HQ was unaware that ICE field offices had not received all documented 

changes to policies and procedures on compliance enforcement activities. To 

address this shortcoming, on November 18, 2004, CEU HQ said they would 

compile a complete list of all policy memoranda to be re-distributed to all ICE 

field offices. 

Furthermore, ICE field office officials had conflicting, inconsistent views on 

the degree of guidance that CEU provides in conducting compliance 

enforcement investigations. Some ICE field office officials said they received 

adequate, complete, and clear guidance from CEU on how to process 

investigations. When CEU HQ developed new policies, the ICE field offices 

received the new policy via email, CEU HQ confirmed the receipt, and 

conference calls were held so that ICE field offices could address any related 

questions. 

Conversely, a majority of ICE field offices highlighted the lack of 

consistent, available information on how to conduct CEU cases. For 

example, we identified three cases where ICE field agents verified that 

SEVIS violators were attending school and therefore filed closing 

ROIs indicating that the violators were in compliance. However, a 

subsequent SEVP office review of these cases indicated that, unless 

the schools incorrectly terminated these records and were in the 

process of rectifying the errors, it did not appear as if steps had been 

taken to correct the SEVIS violations. According to the SEVP office, 

the subjects did not have active SEVIS records and therefore still 

appeared to be out of status. While the violations could have resulted 

from actions outside of the SEVP office’s control, such as the student 

failing to submit a request for reinstatement, these examples 

emphasize the need for procedural guidance to address the students’ 

status in a timely and appropriate manner. 

ICE field agents said that a centralized CEU resource, such as an online 

information clearinghouse, would improve the dissemination of CEU 

investigative SOPs. A resource containing updated CEU SOPs would also 

assist ICE field offices in resolving CEU cases by providing easy access to 

user manuals, “best practice” procedures, and policy directives. This 

centralized resource would define which policies are currently applicable and 

which were superceded by new policies. Standardized availability of 

information and reports used by ICE field offices, from a centralized resource, 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

Page 28 
would greatly enhance the field’s ability to consistently investigate and close 

CEU cases. These actions will ensure that ICE personnel who handle CEU 

leads have the most current and complete policy and procedural information 

available. 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement: 

Recommendation 4: Redistribute policy and guidance documents to ICE 

field offices, consolidate current policy memoranda into a set of Standard 

Operating Procedures (SOPs) for distribution to all ICE field offices, and 

establish an ICE-wide resource for access to the CEU SOPs as well as other 

current information regarding CEU activities. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We issued our draft report on June 16, 2005, and met with ICE officials on 

July 13, 2005, to discuss the report. They provided us with technical 

comments and we made changes to the draft report, as appropriate. We 

received ICE’s formal written comments on September 14, 2005. Below is a 

summary of ICE’s responses to the report’s recommendations and our analysis 

of ICE’s responses. 

Recommendation 1: Ensure that data quality issues are addressed, in 

conjunction with officials from the various lead referral systems, and that 

validity checks are performed to increase the number of “actionable” 

leads referred to CEU. 

ICE said that CEU would continue to work with the NSEERS, SEVP, and USVISIT programs to address data quality issues and ensure that the most 

accurate, actionable information is available to CEU. ICE’s response did not 

address what steps will be taken to increase the number of “actionable” leads 

from Department of State (DOS). 

According to ICE, SEVP and US-VISIT have taken steps to strengthen system 

interfaces to reduce the number of non-actionable leads reviewed by CEU. 

However, specific examples of the steps taken were not provided. Further, 

ICE stated that until US-VISIT’s exit component is fully deployed, CEU will 

continue to receive non-actionable unconfirmed overstay leads from USVISIT but efforts to mitigate this problem will be addressed by US-VISIT’s 

Data Integrity Group. US-VISIT created the Data Integrity Group to address 

data integrity issues and identify valid overstay leads for investigative action. 

However, we are not clear if the Data Integrity Group is actually serving to 

identify valid leads generated by the US-VISIT or if it is only prioritizing 

leads before forwarding them to CEU. 

ICE’s actions are responsive to this recommendation but we require further 

clarification to explain what steps are being taken to increase the number of 

“actionable” leads from DOS, describe the specific steps taken by SEVP and 

US-VISIT to increase the number of actionable leads referred to CEU, and 

identify what specific action US-VISIT’s Data Integrity Group is taking to 

identify actionable US-VISIT leads. Please provide us this additional 

information regarding this recommendation. 

Recommendation 1 – Resolved - Open 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Recommendation 2: Assess the CEU workflow process, establish and 

closely monitor processing performance measures to ensure that CEU 

staff is working efficiently, and determine when staffing adjustments are 

needed to ensure timely processing of all violator leads. 

ICE stated that CEU has refined how it prioritizes leads that pose the greatest 

potential threat to national security and public safety. We agree with this 

process but we need to clarify that our analysis of the workflow process was 

based on leads already closed by CEU, most of which were designed as 

“Priority leads”, the highest priority designation used by CEU at the time of 

our test sampling. The project manger overseeing the contract has taken steps 

to monitor and improve employee performance. CEU will make staffing 

adjustments to address increased workloads by adding additional research 

analysts and when necessary, may use detailed ICE investigators. This will 

facilitate research of additional leads. CEU has a SEVP liaison assigned to 

review SEVP leads before they are transmitted to the field for investigation. 

ICE’s actions meet the requirements of this recommendation. Therefore, we 

are closing this recommendation and no further action is required. 

Recommendation 2 – Resolved - Closed 

Recommendation 3: Ensure that adequate justification exists for lead closure 

and that this justification is documented. 

ICE stated that it discovered that a major contributor to this problem was that 

several large groups of leads that were batch closed were missing closure 

justifications. CEU has addressed this deficiency. CEU is in the process of

upgrading the Leadtrac database to better account for each lead, and will 

ensure enough information is contained in the Leadtrac record to support the 

closure reason. 

ICE’s actions meet the requirements of this recommendation. Therefore, we 

are closing this recommendation and no further action is required. 

Recommendation 3 – Resolved - Closed 

Recommendation 4: Redistribute policy and guidance documents to ICE field 

offices, consolidate current policy memoranda into a set of Standard 

Operating Procedures (SOPs) for distribution to all ICE field offices, and 

establish an ICE-wide resource for access to the CEU SOPs as well as other 

current information regarding CEU activities. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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ICE stated that CEU policy and guidance memoranda are either currently 

available through ICE’s proprietary website or are in the process of being 

added. Additionally, CEU will make field managers responsible for CEU 

operations aware that CEU related policy memoranda are available online. 

ICE also provided two agents from each SAC office with training on CEU 

operations and how to access SEVIS and US-VISIT information. As many 

CEU leads are sent directly to RAC offices, we believe that agents assigned to 

ICE RAC offices would also benefit from this training. 

ICE’s actions are responsive to this recommendation. Please inform us when 

all CEU policy and guidance memoranda are available on ICE’s proprietary 

website and describe the steps that ICE intends to take to provide CEU 

training to agents in RAC offices 

Recommendation 4 – Resolved – Open 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix A 

Compliance Enforcement Unit Workflow (updated December 21, 2004)

Import Leads into LEAD-TRAC 

SEVIS NSEERS Visa Revocation 

(Dept of State) 

Biometric 

Referrals 

1. Eliminate duplicate records/ individuals 

2. Auto validated (data integrity check) 

3. Auto prioritization 

US-VISIT 

SEVIS Leads to NAILS 

Backlog 

(ADIS Checks) 

Support Systems used for 

Validation and Viability Checks 

ADIS, Arrival Open and Public Records NIIS, Non-Immigrant ENFORCE/IDENT DACS, 

Departure (Choicepoint, Autotrak, Postal Information System (NSEERS source) Deportable 

Information System address, Telephone, Governmental) Alien 

(US-VISIT source) Control 

Orion Tool Utility NAILS System 

NLETS TECS -ENFORCE -SITS 

CLAIMS, Computer Linked -No Fly list -“Selectee List” 

Application Information -SEVIS 

Management System Source Systems Double Check CIS, Central Index System 

NAILS weekly export 

(non-SEVIS lead) Field Assigned

 Valid & Viable 

Non-Viable Leads 

Or 

Not Valid Leads 

Or 

Action has been taken 

Violator Located 

or Accounted for 

Leads 

exhausted 

Disposition 

Leads Closed 

(Removed from NAILS)

 Backlog 

(ADIS Checks) 

CEU 

INBOX 

Final SEVIS 

Program Check 

(TIER III) 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix B 

Average and Mean of Leads Closed by CEU HQ - Not Sent to ICE Field Offices 

ICE CEU HQ Office 

 Average CEU Processing Time Frames 

Number in 

test sample 

Days to 

assign lead 

to contract 

analyst 

Days 

between 

contract 

analyst and 

CEU 

Decision 

Days 

required to 

close 

No basis 

for closure 

Questionable 

Basis for 

Closure 

SEVIS 26 58 11 78 8 3 

NSEERS 117 33 7 49 60 38 

Visa Revocations 20 7 49 51 0 1 

USVISIT 87 27 11 42 6 17 

Biometric Referrals 5 0 16 16 0 0 

Total/Average 

Median 27 11 49 

255 25 19 47 74 59 

ICE CEU HQ Office 

 Median Processing Time Frames 

Number in 

test sample 

Days to 

assign lead 

to contract 

analyst 

Days 

between 

contract 

analyst and 

CEU 

Review 

Days 

required to 

close 

No basis 

for closure 

Questionable 

Basis for 

Closure 

SEVIS 26 64 6 80 8 3 

NSEERS 117 22 5 43 60 38 

Visa Revocations 20 3 44 53 0 1 

USVISIT 87 20 7 35 6 17 

Biometric Referrals 5 0 15 15 0 0 

Total/Average of Medians 

Median of Medians 

255 22 15 45 

20 7 43 

74 59 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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of Medians

Appendix C 

Average and Median of Leads Sent to ICE Field Offices 

ICE Field Office 

 Average Investigative Time Frames 

Source System 

Number 

in test 

sample 

Total 

closed of 

test 

sample 

Days to 

assign lead 

to contract 

analyst 

Days 

between 

assignment 

to contract 

analyst and 

SAC 

Days for 

SAC to 

investigate 

Total days 

required to 

close 

SEVIS 31 22 4 37 73 114 

NSEERS 14 9 65 14 51 132 

Visa Revocations 41 17 3 20 57 74 

USVISIT 23 18 27 23 36 85 

Biometric Referrals 19 10 10 17 89 105 

Total/Average 

Median 

128 76 22 22 61 102 

10 20 57 105 

ICE Field Office

 Median Field Investigative Time Frames 

Source System 

Number 

in test 

sample 

Total 

closed of 

test 

sample 

Days to 

assign lead 

to contract 

analyst 

Days 

between 

assignment 

to contract 

analyst and 

SAC 

Days for 

SAC to 

investigate 

Total days 

required to 

close 

SEVIS 31 22 1 33 50 89 

NSEERS 14 9 73 12 41 125 

Visa Revocations 41 17 1 17 63 73 

USVISIT 23 18 1 19 27 70 

Biometric Referrals 19 10 0 20 81 107 

Total/Average of Medians

Median of Medians 

128 76 15 20 52 93 

1 19 50 89 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix D 

ICE Memoranda Distribution Matrix - June 2003 to May 2004 

Date Subject 

Field 

Office A 

Field 

Office B 

Field 

Office C 

Field 

Office D 

Field 

Office E 

4/9/2004 Use of TECS II in Compliance 

Enforcement Cases X X X X X 

4/8/2004 

Policy and Procedures for Notification 

of NSEERs Special Registration 

Interviews 

X X X X X 

3/12/2004 NSEERS Special Registration 

Interviews X X X 

1/7/2004 US-VISIT Rollout X X X X 

12/10/2003 

National Security Entry Exit 

Registration System (NSEERS) Policy 

Update 

X X X X X 

11/28/2003 Changes to the National Security Entry 

Exit Registration System (NSEERS) X X X X X 

10/17/2003 

Notification of Changes to National 

Security Entry Exit Registration 

System (NSEERS) Interview 

Procedures 

X X X X 

9/16/2003 Field Agent Discretion in Compliance 

Enforcement X X X 

8/13/2003 Supplemental Guidance of Action Lead 

Referral (ALR) X X X 

7/17/2003 

Additional Guidance of Special 

Registrations, or National Security 

Entry Exit Registration System 

(NSEERS) Discretionary Waivers 

X X X X 

Undated Student Violators Leads (on DHS 

Letterhead) X X X 

Undated August 1, 2003 Deadline for SEVIS X 

Undated 

Policy Update to National Security 

Entry Exit Registration System 

(NSEERS) Interview Procedures 

(Supercedes September 5, 2002 SOP) 

X X X 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix E 

Support Systems 

When leads are generated through the SEVIS, NSEERS, US-VISIT, visa 

revocation or biometric referral processes, CEU uses 14 different support 

systems to validate information provided in the leads and to collect additional 

information that will assist ICE field agents in locating the visa violators. 

CEU uses these support systems to find recent addresses, name variations, and 

the most current, up-to-date, information on aliens who have entered the 

United States with a visa. 

1. Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) – matches arrival 

and departure information for reporting purposes. ADIS sends all 

available arrival information on students to SEVIS, enabling ICE to 

notify the schools that a new foreign student has arrived and should be 

at their school within 30 days. In practice, the arrival and departure 

records are based on passenger manifest information that carriers 

transmit to CBP. 

2. Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) - the DOS namechecking system for visa and passport applications. Instituted in 

March 1991, CLASS is accessed by DOS diplomatic posts to check 

the names of all passport and visa applicants. CLASS contains a visa 

database with the names of aliens who have applied for a U.S. visa, 

including aliens who were refused visas. DOS consular posts must 

check each visa applicant’s name through CLASS before a visa is 

issued. 

3. Central Index System (CIS) - the master records management system 

that collects and distributes automated biographical information on 

aliens. The system contains the physical status of alien files (A-file) 

and provides tracking capability for files that are transferred to various 

INS locations. CIS provides automated information regarding certain 

classes of aliens and identifies the location of an alien’s A-file. CIS 

also provides information for Federal and state entitlement programs 

and is a source of data for many DHS mission functions. 

4. Computer Linked Application Information Management System 

(CLAIMS) - provides the information systems infrastructure to support 

the processing and maintenance of applications and petitions for 

immigration benefits. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix E 

Support Systems 

5. Deportable Alien Control System (DACS) - a mainframe system that 

tracks the status of illegal aliens under removal proceedings, including 

detention status. The system provides an automated database that 

assists in the deportation or detention of aliens in accordance with 

immigration and nationality laws. It also serves as a docket and 

control system concerning the status and/or disposition of deportable 

aliens. Information is maintained on the alien’s entry and departure 

status until the alien is either granted a stay, deported, or relief is 

granted. If the alien is detained or is jailed for criminal actions, 

additional information pertinent to the offense is maintained. 

6. Enforcement Case Tracking System (ENFORCE) - an event-based 

case management system that is used to track and manage the 

reporting of enforcement cases. It integrates and supports functions 

including alien processing, biometric identification, allegations and 

charges, preparation and printing of appropriate forms, data repository, 

and interface with the national database of enforcement events. 

ENFORCE supports alien apprehension processing for both Voluntary 

Return and Notice to Appear actions 

7. National Automated Immigration Lookout System II (NAILS) - a 

central mainframe computer system that identifies past immigration 

violators who may be inadmissible to the United States. NAILS II 

facilitates the inspection and investigation processes by providing 

retrieval of biographical or case data on individuals who should not be 

permitted to enter the United States. 

8. National Crime Information Center (NCIC) - a nationwide information 

system that supports U.S. criminal justice agencies (local, state, and 

federal). Established in 1967, NCIC is accessible by U.S. law 

enforcement agencies around the country, with services extending to 

the patrol car and mobile officer. NCIC allows users to search the 

active databases and access the system’s historical data. The system’s 

capabilities include identifying persons convicted of a crime in the 

United States; a mug shot file; records of individuals who are 

convicted sexual offenders or violent sexual predators; and, an index 

of individuals incarcerated in the federal prison system. 

9. NetLeads –a database program, developed for the former INS, which 

performs multiple system checks simultaneously. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix E 

Support Systems 

10. Non-Immigrant Information System (NIIS) - provides information on 

arrivals and departures, to support the controlled admission of nonimmigrants to the United States through ports of entry, and to track 

non-immigrant departures for identifying potential overstays. NIIS 

provides automation support for tracking non-immigrant foreign 

nationals’ arrivals and departures. 

11. Open Records (Autotrack/Choicepoint) – private companies construct 

databases of public and private information on individuals. This 

information includes credit card, child support, housing, and 

healthcare history. The private companies sell access to their 

databases. 

12. Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) - the principal 

information system supporting the border management and law 

enforcement mission of CBP and other federal law enforcement 

agencies. TECS screens incoming persons, vehicles, vessels, and 

aircraft; provides investigative and prosecution support for agents; 

tracks resource utilization for the Office of Investigations; tracks 

seized assets, fines, penalties and legal cases; identifies and analyzes 

patterned behavior for agency intelligence analysts; and provides 

logistics support. 

13. Secondary Inspection Tool (SIT) – a part of US-VISIT, SIT captures 

an individual’s initial enrollment overseas during the visa issuance by 

DOS, and the entry encounter during the individual’s inspection by 

CBP. Information available through SIT includes name, date of birth, 

dates of entry, document number, and photograph. 

14. United States Postal Service (USPS) – a federal mail delivery system, 

USPS maintains records of last known addresses and current addresses 

for all individuals living in the United States. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix F 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We conducted this review to evaluate the effectiveness of CEU in identifying, 

locating, and apprehending aliens who have violated the purpose and terms of 

their admission into the United States. Specifically, we examined the systems, 

processes, performance measures, and procedures used to accomplish this 

mission. We interviewed CEU HQ, NSEERS, SEVIS, US-VISIT, and DOS 

program staff. We collected and analyzed organizational, procedural and 

statistical information. We examined how NSEERS, SEVIS, US-VISIT, visa 

revocations, and biometric referral data is used in this process. 

We examined CEU data from all source systems to assess the volume of leads 

generated by these systems and determined the status of leads in the CEU 

process. Specifically, we analyzed data from the NSEERS, SEVIS, and USVISIT source systems at four different points. The four time periods 

representing these points, which we judgmentally selected for testing, were 

from early December 2003 and early February, April, and June 2004.53 Due 

to a relatively low number of visa revocation and biometric referral leads, and 

because these leads are sent to CEU as they are identified, we requested all 

leads originating from these two source systems since December 1, 2003. 

Using the lead data CEU provided from the NSEERS, SEVIS, and US-VISIT 

source systems for the February, April and June 2004 time periods, and all 

visa revocation and biometric referral leads provided, we judgmentally 

determined that 10 percent of the leads closed by CEU HQ would constitute a 

reasonable sample to perform a more detailed analysis of internal workflow 

processing. We used appropriate statistical techniques to randomly select our 

10 percent sample of closed leads. We randomly sampled violator leads from 

each source system, but these results cannot be projected to the universe of 

CEU violator leads. With this information, we (1) established a timeline of 

processing activities; (2) identified steps in the process that took a significant 

amount of time to complete or steps that could be taken to close more leads at 

the CEU HQ level; (3) identified any additional or redundant steps in the 

53 December 1, 2003, represents the early stages of CEU HQ operability. We intentionally selected a period when the 

major contributor to the CEU workload (US-VISIT) was not providing lead information to CEU. This sample was pulled 

to review the overall case workload and not for the test sampling of leads. February 1, 2004, represents the early stages 

of office operability shortly after US-VISIT began referring leads to CEU. April 1, 2004, represents current office 

operability, but allowed enough time for leads to be closed or sent to the field. We received the detailed sample data for 

these three test periods in mid-June. We received the detailed sample data for the early June 2004 test period in midSeptember 2004. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix F 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

process; and, (4) analyzed the justification used to close leads at the CEU HQ 

level.54 

We reviewed all leads sent to the field for investigation during periods we 

selected for testing to identify CEU HQ case processing time frames and 

determine the status of each case. For cases assigned to the ICE field offices 

that we visited, we also examined the basis for case closures.55 

We performed our fieldwork between May and December 2004. Our 

fieldwork was conducted at CEU HQ in Washington, D.C. and at ICE field 

offices in Los Angeles, CA; New York, NY; San Francisco, CA; Santa Ana, 

CA; and Washington, D.C. Our interviews with officials from the NSEERS, 

SEVIS, and US-VISIT program offices took place in Washington, D.C. 

This review was scheduled as part of our annual work plan. Our work was 

conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the 

President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

54 Instead of performing any further review of leads for the early December 2003 timeframe, we chose to review sample 

data from the June 2004 timeframe because this was more representative of current processing timeframes and 

procedures. 55 The test sample data for the June 2004 data from SEVIS, US-VISIT, and NSEERS were received after we had 

completed our field visits. Therefore, leads from this timeframe were not discussed with field office personnel. Field 

offices selected were based on those that received the higher number of leads during the initial test periods we selected. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix G 

Management Response to Draft Report 

Office of the Assistant Secretary 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

425 I Street, NW

 Washington, DC 20536 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Skinner 

Inspector General 

Department of Homeland Security 

THRU: Randy Beardsworth 

 Acting Under Secretary 

Border and Transportation Security 

FROM: Michael J. Garcia 

 Assistant Secretary 

SUBJECT: OIG Draft Report: Review of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Compliance 

Enforcement Unit (CEU), ISP Draft Report 34 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) submits the following comments regarding the 

Office of the Inspector General Draft Report on the subject above. 

Recommendation 1: Ensure that data quality issues are addressed, in conjunction with officials 

from the various lead referral systems, and that validity checks are performed to increase the number 

of “actionable” leads referred to CEU. 

ICE Response: CEU will continue to work with the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) 

and the United States Visitor Indicator Status Technology (US-VISIT) program to address data 

quality issues and ensure that the most accurate, actionable information is available to CEU. SEVP 

and US-VISIT have taken steps to strengthen system interfaces to reduce the number of nonactionable leads reviewed by CEU. In addition, SEVP provides CEU with information on completed 

data fix requests that have been approved and now reflect the corrected status in SEVIS. This action 

allows CEU to close such leads, thereby saving investigative resources. Until US-VISIT is fully 

deployed on exit, CEU will continue to receive 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix G 

Management Response to Draft Report 

non-actionable unconfirmed overstay leads from US-VISIT. To help mitigate this, US-VISIT has

created a Data Integrity Group to address data integrity issues and identify valid overstay leads for 

investigative action by CEU. 

CEU will also review the information received from NSEERS to determine what, if any, additional 

coordination efforts can be taken to increase the number of actionable leads. 

Recommendation 2: Assess the CEU workflow process, establish and closely monitor processing 

performance measures to ensure that the CEU staff is working efficiently, and determine when 

staffing adjustments are needed to ensure timely processing of all violators. 

ICE Response: CEU utilizes its resources to identify the highest threat leads and processes those 

leads for field assignment. In October 2004, CEU changed the priority criteria used to determine 

which leads are worked and in what order. CEU uses a threat matrix to focus on leads that pose the 

greatest potential threat to national security and public safety, does not follow the 

“first in, first out” model, and may process some leads that were received after others, based on the 

threat matrix. As an example of the dynamic nature of lead receipt and referral, CEU received a 

biometric referral from US-VISIT on an individual wanted for the rape of a 14-year-old. CEU 

received, reviewed and assigned the lead to the appropriate Special Agent in Charge (SAC) office on 

the same day, due to the serious nature of the offense. As this example demonstrates, CEU does not 

process a lead based on how long ago it was received, but rather, on its threat or public safety 

potential. 

The project manager for SRA/Orion, which contracts with CEU, has instituted several measures to 

track the performance of the research analysts. Each analyst is required to review a minimum of 20- 25 leads per day. The number of leads reviewed is tracked by the project manager and periodically 

reviewed by CEU staff. In addition, CEU will make staffing adjustments when necessary. CEU has 

brought additional detailed agents to work when warranted, and is planning to increase its number of 

research analysts. This will facilitate research of additional leads. 

The report also suggests that SEVP review leads prior to referral to CEU. SEVP is a program office; 

CEU is responsible for the enforcement of SEVIS and as such is responsible for reviewing 

terminated records to determine if there is a violation and if it warrants field assignment. SEVP has 

assigned a liaison to CEU to assist in the review process prior to the assignment of leads to the field 

for investigation. 

Recommendation 3: Ensure that adequate justification exists for lead closure and that this 

justification is documented. 

ICE Response: One of the main points raised in this report is that 53 percent of the 255 leads 

reviewed did not have a reason for closure. CEU previously identified this as a problem in 

May 2004 and adjusted the process so that a lead could not be closed without indicating a reason for 

closure. Additionally, CEU discovered several large groups of leads that were batch closed and 

missing closure reasons. CEU has addressed this deficiency. CEU is in the process of upgrading the 

Leadtrac database to better account for each lead, and will ensure enough information is contained in 

the Leadtrac record to support the closure reason. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix G 

Management Response to Draft Report 

Recommendation 4: Redistribute policy and guidance documents to ICE field offices, consolidate 

current policy memos into a set of SOP’s for distribution to all ICE field offices, and establish an 

ICE wide resource for access to the CEU SOP. 

ICE Response: ICE Office of Investigations (OI) policy and guidance memoranda are available to 

the field on the OI proprietary Web site. All memoranda related to CEU field operations are on this 

Web site or in the process of being added. CEU again will ensure that field managers responsible 

for CEU operations are aware that these memoranda are available online. In addition to policy

memoranda, Headquarters (HQ) CEU provides information and guidance to field offices via e-mail, 

and specific case instructions are provided in the Report of Investigation sent to the field. CEU 

cases are administrative immigration investigations and do not require any additional standard 

operating procedures (SOPs) from CEU. HQ CEU SOPs are for HQ processing and not applicable 

to field operations. Recently, CEU arranged for two agents from each SAC office to receive training 

on CEU operations and how to access SEVIS and

US-VISIT information. 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix H 

Major Contributors to this Report 

David Hiles, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

Moises Dugan, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

Andrew Hoffman, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

Megan McNeely, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Appendix I 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Under Secretary, Border and Transportation Security 

Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

DHS Chief Security Officer 

DHS Audit Liaison 

BTS Audit Liaison 

ICE Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS Program Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees as Appropriate 

Review of the ICE’s Compliance Enforcement Unit 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG 

web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of 

Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, Attn: Office of Inspector 

General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG seeks to protect the 

identity of each writer and caller.