UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4908

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NANCY ELIZABETH DYAL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:09-cr-01169-CMC-1)

Submitted: May 8, 2013 Decided: May 21, 2013

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

H. Wesley Kirkland, Jr., KIRKLAND & RUSH, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States 

Attorney, Nathan S. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Nancy Elizabeth Dyal appeals her nine-month, belowGuidelines sentence imposed following remand for convictions of 

conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act and to engage in an 

illegal gambling business and two counts of conducting an 

illegal gambling business and aiding and abetting the same. On 

appeal, Dyal argues (1) that the district court erred by 

sentencing her to an active term of incarceration when the court 

sentenced her co-defendants, Wayne and Sheri Hutto, to terms of 

probation; and (2) that her sentence is greater than necessary 

to comply with the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) 

(2006). Finding no error, we affirm.

This court reviews a sentence, “whether inside, just 

outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range[,] under 

a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review requires 

consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining 

procedural reasonableness, this court examines, among other 

factors, whether the district court considered the § 3553(a) 

factors. Id. at 49-51. When reviewing a sentence for 

substantive reasonableness, this court examines “the totality of 

the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the 

Guidelines range.” Id. at 51. If the sentence is below the 
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properly calculated Guidelines range, this court applies a 

presumption on appeal that the sentence is substantively 

reasonable. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 

2012). Such a presumption is rebutted only if the defendant 

shows “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against 

the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 

F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

One of the factors a court must consider when imposing 

a sentence is “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 

found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). This 

court has recognized, however, that this sentencing factor is 

aimed primarily at eliminating national sentencing inequity, not 

differences between the sentences of co-defendants. United 

States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1149 (4th Cir. 1996); see also

United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623-24 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(collecting cases). Moreover, a “district court[] ha[s] 

extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be 

given each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 

631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011).

Here, although not obligated to do so, the district 

court took into account the disparity between Dyal’s sentence 

and the Huttos’ sentences but found that the disparity was not 
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“unwarranted” due to Wayne Hutto’s terminal illness and Sheri 

Hutto’s role as his primary caregiver. See Simmons, 501 F.3d at 

624 (giving sentencing court discretion to consider sentencing 

discrepancies between co-defendants). Moreover, we conclude 

that the court gave due consideration to the other § 3553(a) 

factors and Dyal’s own unique circumstances when imposing her 

below-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Carter, 564 

F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (“When rendering a sentence, the 

district court must make an individualized assessment based on 

the facts presented.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by 

sentencing Dyal to an active term of incarceration when her codefendants were sentenced to terms of probation. 

Moreover, Dyal contends that a term of probation would 

better serve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2), but she fails to 

overcome the appellate presumption of reasonableness afforded 

her sentence. See Susi, 674 F.3d at 289; Montes-Pineda, 445 

F.3d at 379. The district court carefully considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors and determined that, while Dyal had a fairly 

significant role in the offense, her lack of prior criminal 

history and physical infirmities warranted the downward 

variance. Thus, we conclude that Dyal’s carefully crafted 

sentence was not greater than necessary to accomplish the goals 

of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED