[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. Vega, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4002.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-4002

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. VEGA, APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Vega, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4002.] 

Criminal law—Fourth Amendment—Police officer had probable cause to search 

car from which strong odor of marijuana emanated—After finding 

marijuana and other drug paraphernalia in car, police officer had probable 

cause to open sealed envelopes found in the car, based on his reasonable 

belief that they could contain marijuana. 

(No. 2017-0618—Submitted June 12, 2018—Decided October 3, 2018.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 104058, 2017-Ohio-651. 

_______________ 

O’DONNELL, J. 

{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Eighth District Court 

of Appeals that affirmed the trial court’s suppression of 150 individually wrapped 

pieces of marijuana infused candy contained in two sealed Priority Mail envelopes 

located inside an open box on the back seat of Edwin Vega’s car during a traffic 
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stop. The issues presented on this appeal concern the legality of the search of the 

sealed envelopes located in Vega’s vehicle and the duration of the traffic stop. 

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On March 28, 2015, Officer Jeffrey Madej, of the Cleveland State 

University Police Department, observed Vega turn left at a red light at E. 18th Street 

and Euclid Avenue in Cleveland. He initiated a traffic stop, and while approaching 

the car, he smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. He asked 

Vega to exit the vehicle because he intended to search it based on the strong smell. 

{¶ 3} During the search, Madej recovered three cell phones, several raw 

buds of marijuana, a small amount of what Madej called “shake weed,” and an open 

package of fruit flavored SweetStone candy in the console. He also found several 

cases of rolling papers, aerosol canisters containing an odor masking agent, and a 

partially opened U.S. Postal Service box containing two sealed Priority Mail 

envelopes. Madej felt the packages and believed that they contained individually 

packaged drugs. Vega told him that they contained stickers, but Madej did not 

believe the contents felt like stickers and wanted to open them, but Vega refused to 

consent. 

{¶ 4} Madej contacted his supervisor and other officers in an attempt to 

determine whether he had probable cause to open the envelopes and to secure a 

drug-detecting dog but he could not do so. He then wrote Vega tickets for making 

an illegal turn and possessing marijuana. After explaining the tickets to Vega, 

Madej decided to open the sealed envelopes based on the odor of marijuana coming 

from the car and the discovery of three cell phones, the aerosol canisters, the large 

quantity of rolling papers, the marijuana buds, and the shake weed. 

{¶ 5} Madej opened one of the envelopes and found three large Ziplock 

clear bags containing 75 packages that indicated that they contained marijuana 

infused candy. Madej realized that the packaging was the same as the packaging 

of the candy he had seen in the center console and that it also was marijuana infused. 
January Term, 2018 

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He then arrested Vega for drug trafficking. The arrest occurred one hour and 12 

minutes after the initial traffic stop. Later testing confirmed the candy contained 

marijuana. The second sealed envelope was later opened and also contained 75 

packages of marijuana infused candy. 

{¶ 6} On September 9, 2015, a grand jury indicted Vega for drug 

trafficking, drug possession, and possession of criminal tools. Vega moved to 

suppress the marijuana candy found in the mail envelopes, arguing a lack of 

probable cause to open the envelopes and a violation of his constitutional rights 

based on the duration of the stop. 

{¶ 7} On January 25, 2016, the trial court granted Vega’s motion to 

suppress the marijuana candy recovered from the envelopes, holding that the smell 

of marijuana coming from the vehicle did not provide probable cause to open the 

envelopes because Madej agreed at trial that they did not smell like marijuana. The 

court also held that the police had detained Vega for an unreasonable length of time. 

{¶ 8} A divided Eighth District Court of Appeals panel affirmed the trial 

court’s judgment. The majority explained that the police had probable cause to 

search Vega’s vehicle based on finding a small amount of marijuana and on the 

smell of marijuana but that they did not have probable cause to open the envelopes, 

because they did not smell of marijuana and the trial court did not believe that 

Madej opened them with the belief that they contained marijuana. Lastly, the 

majority concluded that Madej should have released Vega after issuing the 

misdemeanor citations, since “the search of the car revealed no further 

incriminating evidence.” 2017-Ohio-651, 79 N.E.3d 600, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 9} The dissenting jurist explained that the trial court’s ruling of probable 

cause to search meant that Madej could open the envelopes because he reasonably 

believed they could contain marijuana, and the delay in opening them was 

immaterial because Madej had probable cause to open them. 
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{¶ 10} The state appealed to this court, and we accepted the following 

proposition of law: 

The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 

searches and seizures is not violated when police extend a traffic 

stop based on probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband. 

Officers may extend the traffic stop and detain the driver for as long 

as necessary to reasonably complete the search of the vehicle and its 

packages and containers without a showing of individualized 

probable cause for each one. Rodriguez v. United States, [ ___ U.S. 

___,] 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) and United States v. 

Ross, 456 U.S. 798, [102 S.Ct. 2157,] 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) 

explained. 

Positions of the Parties 

{¶ 11} The state urges that Madej lawfully opened the envelopes in Vega’s 

car because he had probable cause to believe they contained marijuana. It further 

justifies the extended traffic stop based on the probable cause to search the vehicle 

and Madej’s reasonable efforts to obtain a canine unit to assist in the search. 

{¶ 12} Vega agrees that Madej had probable cause to search but Vega 

asserts the police lacked probable cause to open the envelopes because they did not 

smell like marijuana. He also claims the infused candy should be suppressed 

because of the length of his detention. 

Law and Analysis 

Search and Seizure 

{¶ 13} In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 

572 (1982), the court held that the automobile exception to the Fourth 

Amendment’s warrant requirement permits the warrantless searches of containers 
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5

that could contain items for which officers have probable cause to search. In Ross, 

the Supreme Court examined whether the search of a brown bag found in the trunk 

of a vehicle was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The 

court held that “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, 

it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal 

the object of the search.” Id. at 825. 

{¶ 14} Nearly two decades later, the court revisited warrantless searches of 

containers under the automobile exception. In Wyoming v. Houghton, during a 

traffic stop, an officer observed a syringe in the driver’s shirt pocket, so he searched 

the car and the purse of a passenger and found more drug paraphernalia in the purse. 

526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999). Although the Wyoming 

Supreme Court suppressed the evidence, the United States Supreme Court reversed, 

explaining that “neither Ross itself nor the historical evidence it relied upon admits 

of a distinction among packages or containers based on ownership. When there is 

probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers 

* * * to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized 

probable cause for each one.” Id. at 302. 

{¶ 15} This court has recognized that “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a 

person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to 

search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant 

requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 48, 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000). 

{¶ 16} In this case, Madej testified that he smelled a strong odor of 

marijuana which could not be accounted for by the small amount of marijuana that 

he found in the center console. He also found other indicia of trafficking, to wit, 

three cell phones, odor masking agents, and cases of rolling papers. Based on the 

probable cause to search and the holding in Ross, Madej lawfully opened the sealed 

envelopes. 

 
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Extension of Traffic Stop 

{¶ 17} In Rodriguez v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held 

that absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the extension of a traffic stop 

to allow a drug-detecting dog to sniff the vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment. 

___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). When an officer has 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, however, nothing in Rodriguez limits his 

ability to prolong the stop for a reasonable time in order to conduct an investigation. 

See id. at 1615 (“An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks 

during an otherwise lawful traffic stop * * * [but] he may not do so in a way that 

prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify 

detaining an individual”). We have held that a traffic stop may be prolonged if 

there is “reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances [to] justif[y] 

the ongoing detention.” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 

865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 22. 

{¶ 18} Vega claims that his detention became unlawful after he received the 

traffic citations, because no reasonable suspicion existed to prolong the stop to 

conduct further investigation. He ignores that probable cause existed to detain him 

and open the envelopes based on the strong odor of marijuana coming from the car 

and other evidence of trafficking. Even though Madej could not locate a canine 

unit, the length of the detention was reasonable because probable cause existed to 

search the vehicle and its contents. See Rodriguez and Batchili. And based on 

Ross, Madej acted lawfully when he opened the envelopes because he had probable 

cause to search the vehicle and he reasonably believed they could have contained 

marijuana. 

{¶ 19} The length of the stop was extended based on probable cause to 

believe that the vehicle contained contraband, and we therefore reject his claim of 

unlawful detention. 

 
January Term, 2018 

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Conclusion

{¶ 20} After finding marijuana and other drug paraphernalia in Vega’s car, 

Madej had probable cause to open the envelopes because it was reasonable to 

believe that they could contain marijuana. Further, based on Rodriguez and 

Batchili, Madej had the right to detain Vega for as long as reasonably necessary to 

complete the search of the vehicle. 

{¶ 21} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and 

remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and ZAYAS, JJ., concur. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 

MARILYN ZAYAS, J., of the First District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

DEGENARO, J. 

_________________ 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 

T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 

Henderson, Mokhtari & Weatherly and Justin M. Weatherly, for appellee. 

_________________