UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 The Government maintains that a carjacking took place on August 27, 2014 and that 

Bijan Woodley is responsible. Woodley moves to dismiss the two counts of the superseding 

indictment based on this event because he believes the Government has failed to preserve 

material exculpatory evidence. (See generally Dkt. 127, Woodley’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts I & 

II.) Upon reviewing the parties’ briefs and listening to oral argument, the Court will deny 

Woodley’s motion. 

 In January 2015, law enforcement personnel interrogated Woodley about a different 

carjacking that occurred in December. (Woodley’s Mot. at 6.) According to an FBI agent, the 

following occurred during the interrogation: “Woodley . . . admitted that [one of the cell phones 

he possessed] likely contained the number for the scrap yard where he sold another car in the 

summer of 2014. [Woodley] believed that the car’s previous owner may claim that he obtained 

the car via carjacking.” (Woodley’s Mot. A, Pennisi Aff. ¶ 28.) Woodley adds that, “[u]pon 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

 

D-1 BIJAN WOODLEY, 

D-2 KANEE GOODE, 

D-3 JATEESHA TAYLOR, 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 15-cr-20007 

Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 

WOODLEY’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I AND II [127] 

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information and belief,” he further stated during the interrogation that he bought the car that he 

later sold at the scrap yard. (Woodley’s Mot. at 6.) 

Woodley asserts that the Government has “fail[ed] to preserve” an audio recording of 

these “exculpatory” statements in violation of his due-process right to present a complete 

defense, thereby necessitating dismissal of Counts 1 and 2. (See Woodley’s Mot. ¶¶ 9, 10.) 

Woodley says his statements “were not preserved” because he said them during the last hour of 

his interrogation, which is when the recording equipment was not functioning. (Woodley’s Mot. 

¶ 9.) 

Woodley has not established a necessary premise of his argument: that the Government 

“fail[ed] to preserve” evidence. See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 589 (6th Cir. 2008) 

(“The failure to preserve material exculpatory evidence violates the defendant’s right to due 

process regardless of whether the government acted in bad faith.”). 

In reviewing the recordings of Woodley’s interrogation, it has become apparent to the 

Court that Woodley’s statements about buying a car in August 2014, selling it for scrap, and his 

belief the seller may claim he obtained the car via carjacking, were never captured on an audio 

recording. Two cameras recorded the interrogation. While both camera 1 and camera 2 were 

recording video of the interrogation, only camera 2 was recording audio. And after a break in the 

interrogation, camera 2 did not continue to record in any fashion—either it was not restarted or it 

malfunctioned. Thus, only camera 1 captured the last 51 minutes of Woodley’s interrogation—

the camera that had never been recording audio. 

At oral argument, the Government confirmed the Court’s understanding of what occurred 

with the audio and video of the interrogation. And Woodley offered nothing to rebut it. 

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Thus, this is not a situation where the Government possessed an audio recording of a 

defendant’s allegedly exculpatory statements and then failed to preserve that recording or 

intentionally destroyed it. Rather, this is a situation where no such recording ever came into 

existence. Woodley has cited no authority that the Government breaches the Constitution’s 

guarantee of due process by failing to record an interrogation. And the decisions the Court has 

found appear to be to the contrary. See United States v. Boston, 249 F. App’x 807, 810 (11th Cir. 

2007) (“Although a rule requiring the government to record statements made during custodial 

interrogations might be sound policy, we agree with other circuits that have concluded that the 

Constitution does not require us to adopt such a rule.” (citing cases)).1

Accordingly, the Court finds that Woodley has not carried his burden in showing that the 

Government failed to preserve exculpatory (or potentially useful) evidence. See United States v. 

Aldaco, 201 F.3d 979, 982 (7th Cir. 2000) (“When, as in this case, the failure of the prosecution 

to preserve evidence is at issue, due process requires that the defendant demonstrate [the 

following elements . . . .]” (emphasis added)); cf. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 300 

(6th Cir. 2010) (providing that to show a Brady violation, “the defendant has the burden of 

establishing that the prosecutor suppressed evidence” (emphasis added)). Woodley’s motion to 

 

1

 The Department of Justice’s memorandum “establish[ing] a presumption that [certain 

federal agencies] will electronically record statements made by individuals in their custody” does 

not help Woodley either. (Dkt. 114-3.) For that memo also provides, “[t]his policy . . . does not, 

and may not be relied upon to create any rights or benefits, substantive or procedural, 

enforceable at law or in equity in any matter, civil or criminal, by any party against the United 

States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or any other person[.]” (Id.) 

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dismiss Count I and Count II of the superseding indictment (Dkt. 127) is thus DENIED.2

SO ORDERED. 

s/Laurie J. Michelson 

LAURIE J. MICHELSON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 Dated: April 28, 2016 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on the attorneys 

and/or parties of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on April 28, 2016. 

 s/Jane Johnson 

Case Manager to 

 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

 

2

 Although the Court’s opinion does not rest on it, it is worth noting that Woodley has not 

persuaded the Court that if a recording of his statements existed, he would be able to use it at 

trial. At oral argument, Woodley suggested that if he testified about what he said during his 

interrogation and the Government then attacked his credibility on cross examination, he could 

introduce the recording as a prior consistent statement. But the Government responded at oral 

argument that it would not attempt to show that Woodley did not tell agents that he bought the 

vehicle, sold it for scrap, and that the former owner might claim a carjacking. And if that is so, 

then the rehabilitative value of the recording would be marginal and the recording would also be 

cumulative of Woodley’s testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 801 advisory committee note (2014) 

(“[T]he trial court has ample discretion to exclude prior consistent statements that are cumulative 

accounts of an event”). 

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