## NOS. 12-07-00429-CR 12-07-00430-CR
IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

KEV IN MARK

BROWN, § APPEAL F ROM THE 294TH APPELLANT
V . § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF
TH E ST ATE OF TEX AS, APP ELL EE § V AN ZAN DT CO UN TY, T EXAS

OPINION Kevin Mar

k Br own appe als from his t wo convictions for intox ication manslaug hter. Ap pe lla nt r a ise s si x issu e s o n a

pp e a l. We a ff

ir m.

B ACKG ROUND On April 14, 2004, Appe llant’s L incoln Navig ator c ollided w ith the Honda Acc ord driven by Amy Be th Anderson on Hig hway 47, outside of Wil ls Point, Texas. Appellant was intox icated, and Ande rson was killed. Ande rson was pr eg nant, and he r unborn ch i l d wa s also killed. Two individuals s aw t h e ev en ts leadingup to the wre ck. Kirk B urns was w orkingat his weldingshop when he saw Appe llant’s vehicle tr avelingat a hig h rate of spee d. He did not see the wre ck, but he hear d it and went to gi v e ai d

. J ustin Nation was followingAnder son’s vehicle at a distanc e and observe d the wre ck. Nation thought the wr eck occur red in A ppellant’s lane, with Anderson having

crosse d over the cente r line. Wil ls Poi nt police offic er D onny Oliver wa s the fi rs t p o l i ce office r on the sce ne. The investigation was taken over shortly there afte r by Texas D epar tment of Public Safety

Trooper J ason2

Matur a
. O li v e r a

n d M a tu r a d e te r mi n e d th a t th e w r e c k h a d o c c ur r e d in A n d e r s o n ’ s la

n e and that Appellant wa s intox icated. A Van Z andt County

g rand jury

indicted Appellant f

or the fe lony

o ff enses of intox ication manslaug hter for

the deaths of Anderson and her unborn child. At trial, Appellant pre sented e x pert testimony from Ga ry J ernig an, a me chanic al eng ineer , about the w re ck

. J ernig an testified that he ha d c on du c te d a

c omp ute r sim

ulatio n of the a c c ide nt and that the wr e c k c ou ld no t ha ve oc c ur re d in Anders o n ’s l an e o f trave l. I nstead, it was his opinion that Anderson w as trave ling in Appe llant’s lane of tr ave l w he n th e c oll isi on oc c ur re d. Th e po lic e of

fi c e rs te sti fi e d th a t th e wr e c k o c c ur re d in Ander son’s lane. The jury found Appe llan t gu i l t y and assessed punishment in eac h case at imprisonment for ten y ear s and a f ine of $7,500. This appe al followed.

S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E VI DE NCE In his first and sec ond issues, Appellant ar g ues that the e vidence is insufficient to support the verdic t. Specifica lly , he ar g ues that the wr eck oc curr ed in his lane a nd that th e ac ci d en t was An de rs on ’s fa

ult

. Stand ard of Review The due proce ss gua

rante e of the Four

teenth Amendme nt require s t h at a conviction be supported by

leg ally sufficie nt evidence

. See Ja c ks on v . V irg inia , 4 43 U. S. 307 , 315 –1 6, 99 S. Ct

. 27 81 , 27 86 –8 7, 61 L

. Ed . 2 d 5 60 (1979) ; Ros s v . St ate , 133 S.W .3d 618, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Wil

lis v . St ate , 192 S.W .3d 585, 592 (Tex. Ap p
. – T y l er 2006, pet. re f’d) . Evidence is not leg ally sufficie nt if, when viewing the evidenc e in a light most fa vorable to the verdic t, no rational trier of fac t could have found t he essential elements of the offense bey ond a re asonable doubt. See Jackson , 4 43 U. S. a t 31 9, 99 S. Ct . at 27 89 ; se e als o Rol le rso n v . St ate , 2 2 7 S. W. 3 d

7 1 8 , 7 2 4 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2007). Whil e leg al suffic iency

revie w is all that is require d by the U.S. Constit ution, the Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls has deter mined that the Texas Constit ution r e q u ires fur ther re view of the fac tual sufficie ncy

of the e vidence

. C

l e w i s v . St ate , 9 2 2 S.W .2d 126, 129–30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Fa ctual suff

iciency revie w diffe rs from leg al suffic iency revie w only

slightly

. See Ma rsh all

v . St ate , 210 S.W .3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). I n a fa ctual suff i ci en cy revie w, we r eview the3

evidenc e without the light most favorable to the ve rdict and w e ar e author ized, “albeit to a ver y limit ed degree ,” to disa g ree with the jury ’s resolution of conte sted fac tual issues. See id. ; Watson

v . St ate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). I n a re view of the fac tual sufficie ncy of t h e evidence, w e will conclude that the evidenc e is insufficient only if the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e contra dicts the jury ’s verdic t or the verdic t is clearl y wr o n g and manifestly

unjust. See Rollerson , 227 S.W .3d at 724; Watson , 204 S.W .3d at 417. Under either standa

rd, our r ole is that of appe llate re view, and the fac t finder is the princ ipal j u d g e o f th e w e i g h tan d

c r e d i b i l i ty o f

a w i tn e s s ’ s t e s t i m o n y. We sb ro ok v . St ate , 29 S.W .3d 103, 111–12 (Tex. C ri m
. App. 2000). The fac t finder may choose to be lieve all, some, or none of a

w i tn e s s ’ s t e s t i m o n y. Shar p v . St ate , 707 S.W .2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The State wa s require d to prove that Appe llant opera ted a motor ve hicle in a public plac e, was intox icated, a

nd, by rea son of that intox ication, ca used the de ath of a n o t h er b y ac cident or mistake. T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 49.08(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). Ana lys is Th e c e ntr a l iss ue in thi s c a se a t tr ia l, and wi th re sp e c t to the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , is wheth er th e wr e c k o c c ur re d in Ap pe lla nt’ s la ne of tr a ff ic or in A my An de rs on ’s lane . T he on ly dis int e re ste d p e rs on

wh o w itn e sse d th e wr e c k te sti fi ed th at it o c c ur re d in Ap pe lla nt’ s la ne , w ith Ander son havingcrosse d into Appellant’s lane. The State attacke d this testim ony by pointing out that the witness admitted he wa s adjusting the r adio in his car at t h e t i m e of the wr eck a nd was wrongabout the location of the wre ck and the striping on the r oadwa y
. The State’s e vidence as to the location of the wre ck ca me principa lly

from Jason Ma t u ra. Matura’ s conclusion that the wre ck occur red in Anderson’ s lane was based on his evaluation of the restingposition of the vehicles a s well as the mar ks made to t he roa dway

by the ca rs af ter the collision. Matur a testified that there wer e a numbe r of mar ks in the roadwa

y that wer e the r esult of An de rs on ’s lig hte r v e hic le be ingc omp re sse d o nto the ro a dw ay a t th e po int

of imp a c t. M a tur a

a lso testified that he c ould approxim ate the point of impact based on those marking s. Additionally , he testified there wer e tire marks that we re c onsistent with the collisi on havingoccur red in Ande rson’s lane. Matura’s the ory

was that Appe llant was unable , due to his intox ication, to maintain his lane as he be g an to enter a g entle rig htward c urve in the r oadwa y . Instead he drifted into Ander son’s lane4

and w a s a tt e mp ti n g to c o r r e c t b a c k to h is la

n e w h e n h e s tr

u c k A n d e r s o n ’ s v e h ic le in an offse t he a d– on c oll isi on. Th e wr e c k c a

us e d h is L inc oln

Na vig a tor to r oll on to i ts s ide and

c ome to r e st back in his orig inal lane. Offic er Donny Oliver also testified that the wre ck occur red in Anderson’ s lane. He had less training than M atura , but his conclusion was base d on the marks in the r oadwa y as well as vehicle fluids he observe d in the roadw ay . He obse rved the fluids in Anderson’s lane , and he theor ized that the fluid was dischar g ed at or near the point of impact. Appell an t h i re dGar

y J ernig an of SEAL

Corporation in Tyler, Te x as to rec onstruct the

acc ident. Unlike Matura , who base d his c onclusions on the phy sical evidenc e of the wre ck on the roadw ay , J ernig an used a computer prog ram to simulate the wre ck. The computer pr og ram a cce pted

a ra ng e of inputs including the weig hts of t he vehicles and the phy sical m arke rs from the scene and allowed Jernig an to manipulate the simulation base d on unknown varia bles, such as the speed of the vehicles. Jernig an conc luded, base d on his simul ation, that the wre ck could not ha ve occur red in the

wa y Matur a sa id that it did

. Ins te a d, he c on c lud e d that the wr e c k o c c ur re d in Ap pe lla nt’ s la ne wi th An de rs on havin g c ro sse d o ve r int o his lane
. Jer nig an the or ize d that the sc ra pe s to the ro a dw ay

c ou ld have oc curr ed some time af ter the point of initial impact, after the car s had moved into Ander son’s lane . H e c on c lud e d th a t on e of the tir e mark s re lie d up on by Matur a wa s n ot f ro m th is wre c k at a ll but a markingthat had bee n on the roa d prior to the wr eck. Th e re wa s a lso the te sti mony of the e y e wi tne ss, wh o te sti fi e d th a t th e wr e c k o c curr e d in Appellant’s lane . As the State points out, there we re pr oblems w ith his t estimony . Although he te sti fi e d th a t A nd e rs on

c ro sse d a c e nte r l ine and

the la ne s w e re div ide d o nly

by te mpo ra ry mark e rs , both sides ag ree d that his assessment of w h at happene d afte r the wr eck w as inac curate, and the witness was a djusting his radio at the time of the wre ck. F ina lly , th e State c a lle d Jef f Wi mbe rl y , a

De pa rtme nt o f Pub lic Sa fe ty

se rg e ant, wh o is Matura’ s supervisor and who re viewed his re port. Wim berly did not do an acc ident rec onstruction, but he had view ed the sc ene of the wreck and revie wed Matura’s work. He concluded that the wrec k

occur red in Ande rson’s lane , and that the tire mark wa s fr o m An d er son’s ca r. He speculated that J ernig an’s simulation was wr ong beca use the c ollisi on that J ernig an simul at ed was more of a head–on c ollisi on than the p hy sical evide nce, that is the wrec ked vehic les, indicated. Instead, Wim berly

said, the ac tual wre ck wa s more of a n offse t head–on, with the l eft front of Appe llant’s5

truck strikingthe left fr ont of Ander son’s ca r. He also testified that the point o f i mpact wa s very close to the scr apes a

nd the fluid in the roadw ay . Those we re w ell into Anderson’s lane

. The two sides used dif

fer ent methods to expl ain what ha d happene d. Both had criticisms of the work o f t h e o ther side. The resolution of these kinds of issues is primar ily for the jur

y , and a rational jury

could have conclude d that the wre ck occ urre d in Anderson’ s lane. We h o l d that the evidenc e is leg ally

sufficie nt to support the verdict. We also hold that the evidenc e is fa ct u al ly sufficie nt. When consideringthe evidenc e without the light most favora ble to the ver dict, we a

re not pe rsuade d that the evidenc e is so weak that the ver dict is wrongor manife stly unjust. The phy sical evidence a naly zed by the offic ers wor

king on the ca se indicate s that the wreck occurr ed in Ander son’s lane. The ir conc lusions drawn fr om the p h y s i ca l ev i d en ce co u l d

h av e b ee nwr o n g i f t h e t ro o p er s i n a cc ura t el y i n cl u d edro ad wa y

m ark i n gs that wer e not from this wre ck. The simulation d o n e b y Appellant’s e x pert shows that the wrec k

occur red in his lane a s does the testimony of the e y ew i t n es s
. T h e si mulation may have be en inacc urate beca

use of an incorrec t assessment of how t he vehicles met, and the e y ewitness may have been mistake n about what he thought he saw. This wa s a question of fac t f or the jury , and the jury ’s resolution of t hese issues is not clea rly wrong or aga inst the gre at weight and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e and doe s not repre sent a manife st i n j u s tice. We over

rule Appe llant’s first and sec ond iss ue s.

D OU BLE J E OP ARDY In his third issue, Appellant argues that two convictions in this case, one for the ma nslaug hter of Amy An de rs on

and on e fo r h er un bo rn c hil d, vio late d th e Do ub le Jeop ard y Cla us e of the F if th Amendment of the United States Constit ution. Appli cable Law The Double J eopar dy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United S t at es C onstitut ion prohibits multiple prosec utions or multipl e punishments f or the “same offe nce.” See U. S. C O N ST
. ame nd V; Li ttre ll v . St ate , 2 71 S.W. 3d

27 3, 27 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ). Th is c a se inv olv e s a sin g le p ro s ecution and so only

the protec tion ag ainst multi ple punishment is at issue. See V il la nu e v a v. Sta te , 227 S.W .3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).T he R a th m e ll case i nvo l ved an i nt o xi cat ed dri ver. I nt o xi cat i o n m ansl aught er was p art of t he i nvo l unt ary 1

m a n sla u g h te r sta tute p rio r to it s b e ing e n a c te d a s a d isc re te o ff e n se in 1 9 9 3

. See A c t o f M a y 2 9 , 1 9 9 3 , 7 3 rd L e g ., R. S. , c h

. 900, § 1. 01, s ec
. 49. 08, 1993 T ex
. G en
. La ws 3586, 3697. 6 B e c a us e the le g isl atur e ha s w ide ra ng ing a uth or ity to se t puni sh me nt fo r c ri min a l of fe ns e s, the multiple punishm ents proscr iption is violated onl y if a defenda nt is punished, or at risk of being punished, more times that the leg islature intended. See Whalen v. Unit ed States , 445 U.S. 684, 688, 1 0 0 S

. C t

. 1 4 3 2 , 1 4 3 6 , 6 3 L

. E d

. 2 d 7 1 5 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ( “

. . . qu e s t i o nw h e th e r p un i s h m e n t s i mp o s e d

b y a court a fter a

defe ndant’s conviction upon criminal charg es are unconstit utionally multipl e ca nnot be resolved w ithout determining what punishments the L eg islative Branch has authorized.”). The leg islature has spe cifica lly allowed multiple punishments for ea ch death cause d by intox ication manslaug hter. SeeT EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 3. 03 (b )( 1) (A ) ( Ve rn on Sup p. 20 08 ); see also Ex p arte Rat hmell , 717 S.W .2d 33, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (Death of ea ch indivi d u al, as de fined by statut e , r e su lti ngfr om i nv olu nta ry mans la

ug hte r is d ist inc t and

se pa ra te of fe ns e , mu lti ple 1 prosec utions not barred by prohibition ag ainst double jeopar dy .). Ana lys is Appellant does not dispute that the le gi s l at u re intended to allow multipl e punishment for multipl e manslaughters. See Phi lli ps v . St ate , 7 87 S.W. 2d 39 1, 39 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ) ( “ Th is Court has consistently held defe ndants, while operating a motor vehicle and committing an unlaw ful act, may be convic ted for e ach pe rson injured a nd/or murder ed, in violation of a sing le s t at u t e.”). Nor doe s he cha lleng e the state ’s prerog ative to criminalize the ki lling of an unborn c hild. See T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1.07(a) (26), (4 9 ) (V ernon Supp. 2008) ( including unbor n children in the definition of “indiv i d u al” and defining“dea th” so as to include unbor n children who are not born alive). Instead, Appe llant argues that his prosec ution and punis hment for c ausingthe death of the child is not permissible under the spec ific facts of t his case . The spec ific fa cts relate to the manner in which the child died. Ande rson died fr om blunt force tr auma f rom the wre ck. The wre ck did not kill Anderson’s unborn c hild dire ctly , but r ather the child died as a result of the mother ’s dying a nd not being able to provide ox yg enate d blood to the child. Appellant arg ues t hat he did only one ac t, that is cause the de ath of Ande rson, and that the death of the child i s, for double jeopar dy purposes, a

lesser inc luded offe nse of the ma nslaug hter ofB l ockb ur ger v. Uni t ed St at es , 28 4 U

. S. 29 9 , 52 S. C t

. 18 0 , 76 L. E d

. 30 6 (19 3 2 ). 2

In Wa tso n v . S ta te , 900 S. W

. 2d 60, 61– 62 ( T ex. Cri m. Ap p. 199 5), t he cour t us ed t he B l o ck b u rg er t est 3 f o r t wo vi o l at i o ns o f

a s i ngl e co nt roll ed s ub st ances s t at ut e. T he t wo vi o l at i o ns were f o r di f f erence subst ances, and the c o u rt c o n c lud e d tha t t h e y w e re d iff e re n t o ff e n se s. I d. a t 62. 7 the mother. This ar g ument is flawed be cause a double jeopa rdy analy sis d o es n o t d ep end on the number of a cts committed. For a time, the Supreme Court foc used i ts double j eopar dy analy sis on the “same conduc t.” See Grad y v . Co rb in , 495 U.S. 508, 522–23, 110 S. C t. 2084, 2094, 109 L . Ed. 2d 54 8 (1 99 0)

. B ut i t so on

a ba nd on e d th a t st and ard

and re ve rt e d to the pr e vio us Blockburger ru le 2 or test, which is a me thod of g aug ing le g islative intent. United Stat es v. D ixon , 509 U.S. 688, 70 3– 04 , 1 13 S. Ct . 2 84 9, 28 59 –6 0, 12 5 L . E d. 2d 55 6 ( 19 93 ); see also Bigon v . St ate , 252 S.W .3d 360, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Under the Blo c kb urge r test, the eleme nts of the offe nse as a lleg ed in t h e i ndictment are compar ed to see if the ele ments of one of fense encompa ss the other. See Bign on , 252 S.W .3d at 370. The test for

whether one off ense is a lesser included off ense of the other is similar. A lesser inc lud e d o ff

e ns e is o ne that is e sta

bli sh e d b y

pr oo f o f t he g re a te r o ff

e ns e , o r whic h d if

fe rs on ly wi th

re sp e c t to the se ve ri ty

of inj ur y or ri sk of inj ur y to t he same pe rs on , or wh ic h dif fe rs wi th r e sp e c t to the culpabilit y

of the re quired menta l states or the off ender

. SeeT EX
. C ODE C R IM
. P R OC
. ANN . a rt

. 37 .0 9 ( Ve rn on

20 06 ); Hal

l v . St ate , 2 25 S.W. 3d

52 4, 53 5– 37 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). Th is i s imp or tant b e caus e th ere i s a

pr e sumpt ion

in T e xas t

hat th e le g isl a tur e did

no t in te nd

mul tip le punishments for both g reater a nd lesser inc luded offe nses. See Pa tte rso n v . St ate , 152 S.W .3d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The court of criminal appea ls ha s held that the Blo c kb urge r test is not appropr iate whe n two violations of the same statute a re be ing c ompare d. See Rat hmell , 7 1 7 S.W .2d at 35. Instead, a 3

c ourt sh ou ld use oth e r too ls of statut or y c on str uc tio n to det e rm ine the numbe r o f “ a llo wa ble un it[s] of prose cution” author ized by the fac ts a nd the statute. Id. In Rat hmell , the cour

t concluded that

eac h death of an i ndividual, as define d by statute, as a r esult of involuntary manslaug hter wa s an allowable unit of pr osecution. Id. a t 36 ; se e als o Ex p a rte Cavazos , 203 S. W. 3 d 3 3 3 , 3 3 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2006) (F or assa ultive offense s, eac h complainant re pres ented one allowable unit ofIn E rv in v . S ta te , 99 1 S.W

. 2 d 80 4 , 81 4 (T ex. C ri m
. A p p
. 19 9 9 ), t he co urt of cri m i nal ap p eal s set f o rt h a 4 t ho rough t est f

o r whet her t wo off

enses t hat are not t he same und er B l ockb ur ger ma y n e v e r t h e l e s s be t h e s a me o f f ense f o r do ub l e jeop ardy purp o ses
. T he co urt co ncl ud ed , co nsi st ent wi t h R a th m e ll , t hat t he l egi s l at ur e i nt ended o ne uni t of p rosecut i o n pe r death, al t ho ugh i n t hat case i t was l i m i t i ng t he num b er of co nvi ct i o ns rat her t han al l o wi ng an ad d i t i o nal pro secut i o n.

T h e L o u isian a S u p re m e C o u rt h a s re c e n tly re iter a te d tha t i t m a inta ins the “sa m e c o n d u c t t e st.” T h is is 5 si m i l ar t o t he t est ad o p t ed bri ef l y by t he U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt i n G ra d y v . C o rb in , 495 U

. S. 508, 510, 110 S. C t. 2 0 8 4 , 2 0 8 7 , 1 0 9 L . E d . 2 d 5 4 8 (1 9 9 0 ), a n d a b a n d o n e d b y Uni t ed St at es v . D i xon , 509 U

. S. 688, 703–04, 113 S. C t. 2 8 4 9 , 2 8 5 9

– 6 0 , 1 2 5 L . E d . 2 d 5 5 6 (1 9 9 3 ). See St at e v. Wi ll i am s , 97 8 So

. 2d 89 5 , 89 7 (La. 20 0 8 ). 8 prosec ution.). The re sult is t he same under both the Blo c kb urge r analy sis or the ana ly sis for lesser

4 included off

enses be cause eac h offe nse has an element the ot her does not, that is, who it was that was killed by Appellant’s a ctions. See Phill ips , 787 S.W .2d at 394 (“Rathe r, each offense r equire s proof of a f act whic h the other doe s not, i.e ., the identity of eac h victim, thus meetingthe test established in Blockburger , supra.” ). Ap pe lla nt c ite s Sta te

v . P owe ll , 671 So.2d 493 (L a. Ct. App. 1995), for the proposition that only one convic tion is permissible when killing the mother a lso causes the death of an unborn c hild. T h e r e ar e tw o p r o b le ms w it hr e ly in g o n Powe ll

in this case. The first problem is that L ouisiana

rec og nizes broade r doubl e jeopardy protec tions than does Texas. L ouisiana uses the Blockburger test, but also uses the “same evidenc e” te st, which is “somewhat broade r i n conce pt than Blockburger , the ce ntral idea beingthat one should not be punished (or put in jeopardy

) twice for the s ame c ourse of

conduct.” Po we ll , 6 7 1 S o
. 2 d at5 0 1 (c i t i n g Sta te

v . St e e le 387 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (L a . 1 98 0)

. Te xas d oe s n ot tr e a t off e ns e s in the same c ours e of c on du c t or tra ns a c tio n as t

he “ same 5 offe nce” as a matter of course for double jeopar dy purposes, see , e.g. , V

ick v . St ate , 991 S.W .2d 830, 83 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ), and th e Tex as Cons tit uti on of fe rs do ub le je op ard

y pr ote c tio n th a t is coextensive with the federa l constitution. SeeSte phens v . St ate , 80 6 S.W. 2d 81 2, 81 5 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1990). The sec ond problem with rely ing on Po we ll relates to how t he defenda nt was charg ed in that

case . He wa s char g ed with murder for killing a

mother and with feticide for kill ing he r child. See Po we ll , 671 So. 2d at 501. Howeve r, the State char g ed the def endant with fe ticide in such a w ay that the murder

of the mother w as an element of the f eticide of fense

. Id. at 501–02. This was not the only way the fe ticide offe nse could have bee n char g ed, and the way it was charg ed is akin to a fe lonyO ne o f t he reasons t hi s i ss ue i s f o res eeab l e i s b ecause o f t he m any p rob l em s i n ap p l y i ng t he p reced i ng 6

re g im e , w h ic h c rim ina lize d the killing o f ch ild re n o n ly i f t h e y w e re b o rn a live

. See , e
. g. , C u e lla r v . S ta te , 957 S. W

. 2d 134 , 137 –4 0 (T ex. Ap p. –C orpus Chri s t i 199 7, pet

. r ef ’ d) ( appl y i ng “ bo r n a l i ve” r ul e a nd s ur vey i ng ca s es f r om a r ou n d t h e s t at e an d a r ou n d t h e cou n t r y )

. T h e appl i ca t i on of t h e “ bor n a l i v e” r u l e h as be en t r ou bl es ome f or c e n tur ie s. See , e
. g. , 4 W ill ia m B la c k sto n e , Com m ent ar i es on t he Law of Engl and 1 9 8 (T he U ni vers i t y of C hi cago P r es s 197 9) ( 17 69 ) ( di s cus s i ng pre s umpt i ons t hat may be appl i ed an d t he probl ems of proof i n t he i ns t anc e wh er e a 9 murder, where the def

endant is cha

rg ed with the murde r of a n individual t h at occur s during the commission of an other fe lony

. SeeT EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 19.02(b)( 3) (Ve rnon 2003). Te x as law is consistent with Po we ll in that there c annot be a punishment f or both f elony murder and the underlying f

elony if the fe lony

murder of

fense establishes all of the e lements of the unde rlying felony

. See Li

ttre ll , 271 S.W. 3d a t 277. Th e c a se a t ha nd is d if fe re nt b e c a

us e pr oo f o f o ne of

fe ns e does not establish all of the e lements of the other offe nse. The c losest analog y

to Appellant’s argument is found in Pa tte rso n v . St ate , 152 S.W .3d 88, 92 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ). In th a t c a se , th e c ourt fo un d a la c k o f l e g isl a tiv e int e nt t o a llo w mult ipl e punis hme nts fo r o ff

e ns e s invo lvi ngthe se xua l a ssa ult of a c hil d w he re on e of

fe ns e is “ de mon str a

bly pa rt of the c omm iss ion of the g re a te r of fe ns e ,” e ve n thou g h ea c h ha d an e le me nt the oth e r d id n ot. Id. We conclude that the leg islative intent is differe nt with respec t to intox ication manslaug hter a nd unborn children. The c ourt’s dec ision in Rat hmell has established f

or more tha

n twenty y ear s that there may

be a se parate prosec ution or penalty for e ach “ in d i v i dual” killed in a sing le eve nt of involuntary

manslaug hter. T he leg islature wa s char g ed with this knowledg e whe n it chang ed the statute definingan individual to include an unbor n child. SeeT EX
. G OV ’ T
. C ODE ANN
. § 311.023(4) (Ve rnon 2005). F urthermor e, the leg islature def ined an individual in the broa dest manner , rec og nizi ng unborn life f

rom the moment of fe rtiliz ation. See T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1.07(26). And the legislature exempted intox ication manslaug hter fr om the g ener al rule r equiringconcur rent punishment for off

enses trie d in a sing le proc eeding . T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 3.03(b)( 1)(A)

. Th e se statut e s are no t ambi g uo us
. Th e br e a dth of thi s st a tut e , a

nd the pr ote c tio n it

a ff or ds , logic ally anticipates a

nd criminalizes the loss of the life of a n unborn child due to the l o s s o f the mother’s life. This pr ecise fac t pattern might not ha ve bee n anticipated, but the le g islature intended for unbor n children to be treated exactly as any other “ individual.” And it did this in the context of a statutory

scheme that permits multipl e punis hments for every individual kill ed by an intox icated dr ive r. Th e re are no g ro un ds on wh ic h to c on c lud e that the le g isl a tur e int e nd e d f or an unb or n c hil d 6m o t her conc eal s t he d eat h of an i nf ant ).

T he m o st f

o res eeab l e ap p l i cat i o n of t hi s st at ut e i s i n t he co nt ext of an ab o rt i o n of an unb o rn chi l d

. T he 7 l eg i s l at u r e an t i ci pat ed t h e i mpac t t h i s s t at u t e cou l d h av e on a bor t i on , a n d e n ac t ed a l aw h ol di n g t h at t h e h omi ci de s t at u t es di d n ot a ppl y t o u n bor n c h i l dr en i n t h e con t ex t of “ l aw f u l me di ca l pr oce du r e[ s ] , ” ac t s of t h e mot h er , or la w ful d isp e n sa tio n s o f d ru g s. See T EX
. P E N A L C O D E A NN
. § 1 9

. 0 6 (V ernon S up p
. 20 0 8 ).

A p p el l ant ’ s co nst ruct i o n of t he st at ut es would al l o w f o r mul t i p l e p rosecut i o ns o r puni shment when a 8 wreck caused by an i nt o xi cat ed dri ver di rect l y ki l l s an unb o rn chi l d but no t when i t do es s o i nd i rect l y by ki l l i ng t he
m o the r. T h e leg islatu re c o u ld ha v e m a d e this d istinc tio n . H o w e v e r, the re su lt o f suc h a d istinc tio n is sufficie n tly awk war d t hat i t s uppo r t s our hol di ng t hat t he l egi s l at ur e di d not i nt end t o di f f er ent i at e bet ween t he var i ous way s an u n b o rn c h ild c o u ld b e kille d

. 10 to be treated any

differ ently

than any other individual when t h at ch i l d ’s death is ca used by an intox icated dr iver. By

contra st, on another f

orese eable issue, whether a mother c ould be liable for 7 the death or injury

to her own unbor

n child due to a n intox ication assault or ma nslaug hter she commit t ed , t h e l egi s lature de cided that she could not be. See T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 49.12 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). 8 Acc ording ly , we conclude that the i ntox ication m anslaug hter of Amy Ander son and of he r unborn child we re not the same offe nse for double jeopar d y p u rp o s es and that the leg islature int e nd e d to a ll ow mu lti ple pr os e c uti on s o r p un ishme nts in c a se s su c h a s th is. We o ve rr ule Appellant’s third issue.

T E S T I M ONY B Y P OLICE O F F I CE RS In h i s fourth is sue, Appe llant argues that the trial c ourt err ed in allowingOffic er D onny Oliver to g ive nonexpert testimony about the situs of the wre ck. In his fifth issue, Appellant ar g ues that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in a llo wi ngTr oo pe r Ja so n M a tur a to t e sti fy a s a n e xpe rt wi tne ss. Appli cable Law Witn e sse s w ho are no t e xpe rt s may te sti fy a bo ut op ini on s or inf

e re nc e s, but on ly wh e n th os e opinions or infere nces a

re r ationally

based on the perc eption of the wi t n es s an dhelpful to a c lear understandingof the witness’s testimony or the de termination of a f act in issue. T EX
. R. E V ID
. 701. An expert witness may

offe r an opinion if he is qua lified by hi s knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, training , or educ ation to do so and if scientific, te chnica l, or specia liz ed knowledg e will assist the trier of fac t in understandingthe evidenc e or to deter mining a fac t in issue. T EX
. R. E V ID
. 7 0 2

. We11

revie w the trial c ourt’s dec ision to admit or exclude expert testimony under a n abuse of

discretion standard. Ke lly

v . St ate , 824 S.W .2d 568, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). An abuse of discre tion occurs whe n the t rial court acts without ref ere nce to any

g uiding r ules and princ iples or ac ts arbitrar ily or unre asonably

. Mo ntgomer y v . St ate , 8 1 0 S. W. 2 d

3 7 2 , 3 8 0 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). Ho we ve r, if the tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on to a dmi t or e xclu de the e xpe rt te sti mony is “w i thin the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment,” it does not abuse its discre tion. See Ke lly , 824 S.W. 2d a t 57 4; Mo ntgomer

y , 810 S.W .2d at 391 (op. on re h’g ). We also re view a tr ial court’s decision to a dmit or exclude testimony under rule 701 for a buse of discr etion. See Os bo urn v . St ate , 92 S.W .3d 531, 537-38 (Te x . Crim. App. 2002)

. As the court of criminal appe als has re cog nized, there is not a “distinct line . . . betwee n lay opinion and expert testimony .” Seeid. at 537. The Te st im ony Donny Oliver wa s a police of

fice r wit h the W ills Point P olice De partment at the time of the

wre ck. H e w a s n o t t

r a in e d to r e c o n s tr

u c t a c c id e n ts , b u t h a d

r e c e iv e d tr a in in g in

inv e s ti g a ti ng
acc idents. Oliver did not overstate his qualifications. He c andidly stated that he had be en instructed to s e c ur e the sc e ne and

wa it fo r a DP S tr oo pe r i f h e wa s c a lle d to a fata lity a c c ide nt. He a lso testified t h at i n n o nfata lity acc idents, it was his responsibility to attempt to determine who w as at f a u l tb a s e d o n th e p h ys i c a l e v i d e n c e i n c l u d i n g d am a g e t o th e r o a dw ay o r p r o p e rty n e ar

th e r o a dw ay. Oliver ha d not been disclosed a s an expert wit ness, and Appellant objected t o his testimony on the g round that his te stimony was e x pert testimony . The State a rgued that his testimony

would not be expert testimony , but w ould f all under rule 701, that is nonexpert testimony about what he saw a

nd perc eived. The court overruled A ppellant’s objec tion, and Oliver off ere d an opinion that the wre ck

occur red in Ande rson’s lane

. His opinion was based on his observations of t he sce ne of the wre ck including the vehicular

fluid on the roadw ay , g oug es in the roadw ay , and a “debr is f ield” of piec es of the ve hicles, all of whic h appea red to orig inate in Ander son’s lane. J ason Matura

is a trooper

employ ed by the Texas Depa rtment of Public Safety . He testified

as an e x pert witness. He testified t h at h e h ad b ee n employ ed as a trooper sinc e 2000, that he ha d be e n thro ug h b a sic tr a ini ng , a nd that he a tte nd e d a

n 8 0- ho ur “ le ve l I I ” a c c ident cou rs e . H e a lso

c omp le te d le ve l I I I , IV, V, and , VI a c c ide nt i nv e sti g a tio n c ours e s, wa s a me mbe r o f t

he c ra sh

rec onstruction team, and ha d, at the time of the tria l, investigated about 500 ac ci d en t s including12

fourtee n acc idents involving a fata lity

. He testified that he made a scale diag ram of the scene and took photogr aphs. He testified that a more tho rough ana ly sis of the speed of the vehicle s or a mathematica l modeling of the wre ck was unnece ssary beca use the phy sical evidenc e was suff icient for him to deter

mine how the wr eck oc curr ed. Instead, ba sed on his trainingand experienc e, he testified t h at h e was able to make that deter mination based on the g oug e mar ks, skid marks, and other p h y s ic a l e v id e n c e
. Ap p e ll an t o b je c te d to M a tu

r a ’ s te s ti mo n y o n th e b a s is th a t h e w as not qualified to g ive an e x pert opinion on the wre ck. The trial c ourt overr uled that objection, and Matura testified that the wr eck oc curr ed in Ander son’s lane. Ana lys is Appellant ar g ues that Oliver a nd Mat ura w ere not qualified to testify as an a ccide nt

rec onstruction experts. But this misperceive s their testimony

. Fr om the testimony , it is appa rent that there are at lea s t t wo wa y s to evaluate a wr eck a fter the fac t. One is to examine the phy sical evidenc e, including the vehicles and the roadw ay , and attempt to surmise what occur red. The other, which Appe l lant calls “a ccide nt rec onstruction,” is to mathematica lly rec reate the wr eck. A mathematica l rec reation of a wre ck uses the spe eds and w eig hts of the vehicle s and fa ctors in t he coef f ic ie n t o f f

r ic ti o n o f th e r e le v an t s ur f a c e s an d v e h ic le s to c r e a te a mo d e l th a t inte g r ates the phy sical evide nce into a mathematical e quation that explains t he wr eck. Neither Oliver nor Matura c laimed to be quali fied to do an a ccide nt rec onstruction that involved a mathematical re cre ation of the wr eck. N or did either attempt to do such a r econstruc tion. Oliver t es t i fi ed based on his first hand obser vations of the vehic les that came minutes after the

wr e c k

. H e h a d tr a i n i n g i n a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , b u t h e w a s c an d i d a b o u t th e l i m i t a tio ns of

his training . Matura’ s observations we re more prec ise, and he did much more investig ative wor k than Oliver did. As the Texarka

na cour t rec og nized in Pilgrim ’s Pride Corp. v. Sm oak , 134 S.W

. 3 d 8 8 0, 89 3– 94 (T e x. Ap p. –T e xar ka na 20 04 , pe t. d e nie d) , n ot e ve ry wr e c k r e qu ir e s e xpe rt

te sti mony

to explain what occur

red. In that case , an officer testified about his conc lusions based on interviews of witnesses a

nd observations of skid marks on the roadw ay
. Id. at 893. S i m i l arly , Oliver’s testimony in th is c a s e w a s r a ti o n a ll y b a s e d o n h is p e r c e p ti o n o f th e s c e n e o f th e w r e c k an d was helpful t o a cle ar unde rstandingof his limit ed testimony on this iss ue. See T EX
. R. E V ID
. 70 1. Hi s13

o p i n i o nt e s t i m o n y w a s e s s e n t i a l l y b a s e d o n th e p r e m i s e th a tth e s k i d m ar k s , d am a g e t o th e r o a dw ay, and debr is field would all be ar rayed in a c onsistent or predicta ble way around the situs of the wre ck. Since all of those thing s were in Anderson’ s lane—Oliver descr ibed a de bris field of piec es fr om the

au t o m obiles that was spre ad like a shotgun blast from whe re he conclude d the impact

oc c ur re d— Ol ive r’ s c on c lus ion wa s e sse nti a lly the same a s his te sti mony that tho se thi ng s w e re a ll within Anderson’s lane

. Testimony

as to what Oliver observe d is pe rmissible. To the extent his testimony may have

crosse d over into g iving a n opinion ba sed on his spe cialized knowledg e, and there fore was e x pert testimony , we hold that any err or was harmless. See Jo hnso n v . St ate , 9 6 7 S. W. 2 d

4 1 0 , 4 1 7 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ). Ol ive r d id not pr of e ss t o h ave mor e tr a ini ngand e xpe ri e nc e tha

n h e ha d, and

his conclusions wer e re iterate d by Matura a nd Wim berly , both of whom had sig nificant tra ining in and

e xpe ri e nc e wi th i nv e sti g a tin g a uto mob ile wr e c ks

. Acco rd ing ly , a ft e r e xami nin g the re c or d a s a whole, we conclude that any err or did not influence the jury or had but a

slight ef fec t. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 44.2(b). Matura’ s testimony

was more detailed. He rea ched the same essential conc lusion that Oliver did, but he did more bac kchec king in ter ms of compiling mea surements of ma ny of the important fe a tur e s o f t

he ro a dw ay

and the e vid e nc e le ft

be hin d. He a lso dr a ft e d a re po rt , ta lke d to wi tne sse s, and pre pare d a map. He did not do a math em at ical model of the wre ck, but his testimony de mon str a te s th at he wa s q ua lif ie d to do the kin d o f a

na ly sis he did

in t his c a se . So me of

his te sti mony may have be e n ratio na lly ba se d on his ob se rv a tio ns , p ur su ant t o r ule 70 1, and

so me of it require d the kind of spec ialized technical knowle dg e conte mplated by rule 702. Appellant ar g ues, without citation to authority , that “ac cident re construction is the mea ns by which th e c a

u s e o f a c c id e n t i s d e te r

mi n e d , ” an d

th a t s in c e M a tu

r a d id n o t d o ana c c ide nt

rec onstruction, his opinion shoul d not have been admitted. We disag ree . Appellant does not c ite, and we have not f

ound, authority

for the pr oposition t hat a f ormal ac cident re construction, by which Ap pe lla nt m e ans a

mathe matic a l mo de lin g of the a c c ide nt, is the on ly wa y to d e te rm ine the c a

us e of an acc ident. Matura demonstrated that he was qualified to give the kind of opinion he g ave, which

was a n opinion of how the wre ck occ urre d based on his obser vation of the sce ne of the wre ck and

su bs e qu e nt i nv e sti g a tio n. Th e tr ia l c ourt did no t er r by allo wi nghim

to t e sti fy a s an e xpe rt

or to14

of fe r a n o pin ion a s to ho w the wr e c k o c c ur re d. We o ve rr

ule Ap pe lla

nt’ s f ourt h a nd fi ft h is su e s.

J URY I NS T RUCT I ON In his sixth issue, Appellant argues that criminally neg lige nt homicide is a l es s eri ncluded of fe ns e of int oxic a tio n mans la

ug hte r and the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by no t in str uc tin g the jur

y that it c ou ld find him guilty

of the lesser offense. Appellant does not argue that cr iminally neg lige nt homicide is a lesser inc luded offe nse of intoxi cation manslaughter in eve ry case , and indee d it is not

. See Wo oten v . St ate , 267 S.W .3d 289, 304–05 (Tex . App.–Houston [14th Dis t.] 2008, pet. re f’d) (cr iminally

neg lige nt homicide not a lesser included offense of intox ication m anslaug hter). I nstead, Appellant ar g ues that it is a lesser inc luded offe nse under the fa cts of this case beca use of the w ay the indictment alleg es the off ense. We disag ree
. The first step in a ssessing whether one offe nse is inc luded in a nother is t o l o o kt o t he statut or y e le me nts and fa c ts, a s ple a de d in the ind ic tme nt, to se e if the e le me nts of the le sse r o ff

e ns e
are pleade d in the indictment. Hal l , 225 S.W .3d at 536. The indictm ent in this case a lleg es that Appellant oper ated a motor vehicle while intox icated a nd cause d the death of Amy Ander son and he r u nb or n c hil d b y “ a c c ide nt o r m ist ake , to -w it: by c ro ssi ngov e r i nto the lane of tr a ff ic tha t A my Be th Anderson wa s driving in and causing the m otor vehicle he was driving and operatingto collide wi th t he mot or ve hic le Amy

B e th And e rs on

wa s d ri vin g and

op e ratin g
. . . . ” A p e rs on c omm its criminally

neg lige nt homicide if he “cause s the death of an individual by criminal neg lige nce.” T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 19.05 (Ve rnon 2003). Appellant ar g ues that the jury could have conclude d that he was not intox icated but that he acte d with criminal neg lige nce by crossinginto Anderson’s lane of tra ffic. B ut it was not alleg ed in th e indi ctment that he a cted with cr iminal neg lige nce. T he indictment alleg ed that he c aused Ander son’s death and the death of her c hild, but it did not alleg e, either expli citly or implicitly , that he ac ted with criminal neglig ence
. This is appropr iate because intox ication m anslaug hter is a strict l i abil ity offe nse. See Wooten , 2 6 7 S

. W

. 3 d a t3 0 5

. A c c o r d i n g l y , un d e r th e c o g n a t e p l e a d i n g s te st articulated in Hal

l , th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr in r e fu sin g to g ive the re qu e ste d i ns tr uc tio n b e c a us e
c ri min a lly

ne g lig e nt h omi c ide wa s n ot e sta bli sh e d b y

pr oo f o f t he same or

le ss t ha n a ll the e le me nts and fa cts required to prove the commission of the offe nse cha rg ed. See Hal

l , 225 S.W .3d at 536.15

We overrule Appellant’s sixt h issue.

D I S P OS I T I ON Havingoverr

uled Appellant’ s six issues, we af fi rm the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.



### S AM GRI FF I T H J ustice

Opinion delivere d Marc h 31, 2009. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.

(PUBL I SH)