IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Aaron Sukenik, :

Appellant :

: No. 505 C.D. 2015

v. :

: Argued: November 16, 2015

Township of Elizabeth, Gene :

Francesconi, J. Larry Vota, Claire :

Bryce and Chris Evans :

BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge1

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: January 5, 2016

Aaron Sukenik (Sukenik) appeals from the December 15, 2014 order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court), which granted 

summary judgment in favor of the Township of Elizabeth, Gene Francesconi, J. Larry 

Vota, Claire Bryce, and Chris Evans (collectively, Appellees). 

Facts and Procedural History

Sukenik was employed as the Township Manager of the Township of 

Elizabeth (Elizabeth) from July 3, 2012, to February 4, 2013, when he was 

terminated. Sukenik filed a complaint, alleging that he was terminated for reporting 

 

1

This matter was assigned to this panel before January 1, 2016, when President Judge 

Pellegrini assumed the status of senior judge.
2

“wrongdoing” and “waste” in violation of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law 

(Whistleblower Law).2 Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging, 

inter alia, that Sukenik failed to adduce sufficient evidence of a “wrongdoing” or 

“waste” as defined under the Whistleblower Law. The trial court held a hearing and 

granted Appellees’ motion. 

The facts giving rise to this dispute may be summarized as follows. On 

March 19, 2012, Elizabeth’s Board of Commissioners (Board) enacted Township of 

Elizabeth Ordinance No. 891 (Ordinance), which created the Office of Township 

Manager. The Ordinance provides that the Township Manager is the Chief 

Administrative Officer of Elizabeth and serves at the pleasure of the Board. Among 

other things, the Township Manager’s duties consist of supervising the administration 

of all township departments, offices, and agencies; preparing and submitting budgets 

and financial statements to the Board; generating reports on the finances and 

activities of Elizabeth; superintending and managing all day-to-day fiscal affairs of 

Elizabeth; and “attend[ing] all Board of Commissioner’s meetings” and “tak[ing] part 

in discussions.” Sukenik was hired as Elizabeth’s Township Manager on July 3, 

2012. (R.R. at 48a-51a.) 

During his tenure, Sukenik became drawn into a dispute between the 

president of the Board, Gene Francesconi, and the chief of police, Robert McNeilly. 

Sukenik described the relationship between Francesconi and McNeilly as troubled 

because Francesconi served as the interim chief of police before the Board ultimately 

hired McNeilly over Francesconi. After McNeilly’s hiring, Francesconi returned to 

his former position as sergeant for the police department but resigned within one year 

of McNeilly’s hiring. Francesconi was subsequently elected to the Board and took 

 

2 Act of December 12, 1986, P.L. 1559, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1421-1428. 
3

office in January 2012. Francesconi was president of the Board when Sukenik was 

hired as Township Manager. (R.R. at 111a, 210a-13a, 227a-29a.) 

According to Sukenik, Francesconi attempted to micromanage police 

affairs and use Sukenik to disrupt McNeilly’s administration of the police 

department. Sukenik identified three instances where Francesconi unilaterally 

directed him to oppose McNeilly’s decisions: (1) McNeilly’s assignment of specific 

officers to perform follow-up investigations to attempt to resolve open police 

investigations; (2) McNeilly’s proposal to send two officers to Kentucky for internal 

affairs investigations training; and (3) McNeilly’s use of a “take-home car.” Sukenik 

believed that Francesconi’s opposition to McNeilly was improper retaliation and that 

commissioners Bryce, Evans, and Vota were acting in concert with Francesconi to 

sabotage McNeilly’s efforts as chief of police. (R.R. at 100a-07a, 192a.) 

Sukenik complained of Francesconi’s unilateral interference with the 

police department on five occasions. 

First, in October 2012, Sukenik complained to Commissioner Thomas 

that Francesconi was pressuring him to interfere with McNeilly’s operation of the 

police department and that he planned to express his concerns to Elizabeth’s solicitor, 

Patricia McGrail. (R.R. at 296a-99a.) 

Next, after the Board’s public meeting on January 7, 2013, Sukenik, 

McGrail, and Commissioners Francesconi, Bryce, Evans, and Vota remained and 

Francesconi “berat[ed]” Sukenik, demanding that the investigation assignments be 

stopped, that the officers not go to Kentucky for training, and that McNeilly’s “takehome car” be taken from him. (R.R. at 107a.) At that time, Sukenik stated to 

McGrail that “[Francesconi] can’t do this. . . . [T]his is not the right place for this.” 

(R.R. at 107a.) 
4

On January 15, 2013, Sukenik contacted McGrail by telephone and 

advised her that Francesconi did not have the authority to unilaterally interfere with 

the police department’s operations. McGrail confirmed that individual 

commissioners do not have the authority to unilaterally dictate the police 

department’s operations, but advised Sukenik that Francesconi may be acting on 

behalf of the Board. Sukenik informed McGrail that he believed Francesconi’s 

actions against McNeilly could constitute political retaliation because of his history 

with McNeilly. Sukenik suggested that a Police Committee meeting was the 

appropriate forum to consider Francesconi’s objections to McNeilly’s directives. 

After their conversation, McGrail contacted Francesconi and they agreed that 

Francesconi’s concerns regarding McNeilly’s decision-making could be discussed at 

an upcoming Police Committee meeting. (R.R. 108a-11a, 318a-20a.) 

On January 22, 2013, Sukenik and McNeilly attended a Police 

Committee meeting that was held to discuss a pending disciplinary action against a 

township police officer.3 After the disciplinary issue was resolved, Sukenik 

attempted to communicate his concerns that Francesconi’s unilateral interference 

with police department operations was improper and unlawful, and also to inquire 

whether the committee agreed with Francesconi’s assessment that McNeilly’s 

directives should be stopped. However, Commissioner Vola interjected and stated 

that it would be more appropriate for Sukenik’s concerns to be brought before the full 

Board. (R.R. at 108a-114a.) 

 

3

Elizabeth’s Police Committee was comprised of Commissioners Thomas, Evans, and Vota. 

Francesconi did not attend the meeting. 
5

On January 30, 2013, the Board conducted a special meeting to hold a 

public vote on the proposed disciplinary action against the township police officer. 

Before the special meeting, the Board met in executive session and Francesconi 

dismissed Sukenik and McNeilly from attendance. Because he was precluded from 

expressing his concerns regarding Francesconi’s conduct to the Board at the 

executive session, Sukenik drafted a letter to the Board dated February 1, 2013, and 

reiterated his concerns about being asked to interfere with police operations. In the 

letter, Sukenik stated that he believed the interference with the police department 

violated township ordinances and state and federal laws. (R.R. at 52a, 118a-22a.) 

In addition to his complaints regarding Francesconi’s attempts to 

unilaterally interfere with the police department, Sukenik objected to the Board’s 

proposal to conduct a forensic tax audit as a substantial waste of taxpayer funds. 

On December 10, 2012, at the Board’s regularly scheduled meeting, 

Commissioner Bryce made a unilateral request for a forensic audit of Elizabeth’s 

complete financial records for a four-year period and a majority of the Board passed 

Bryce’s motion. Subsequently, Sukenik obtained information regarding a forensic 

audit and determined that it would be extremely costly and time consuming because 

the Board’s directive was vague and did not identify specific areas of concern or 

include any defined parameters. In addition, Sukenik did not believe a four-year 

forensic audit was warranted because an independent certified public accounting firm 

performed annual audit reports for Elizabeth for the years in question and those 

reports indicated that Elizabeth was in sound financial position. Accordingly, 

Sukenik advised the Board that it should reconsider its decision because a four-year 

forensic audit would constitute a significant and unnecessary waste of taxpayer funds. 

The Board ultimately abandoned the four-year forensic audit. (R.R. at 305a-08a.) 
6

On February 4, 2013, a majority of the Board voted to terminate 

Sukenik.

On September 6, 2013, Sukenik filed a complaint against Appellees 

alleging violations of the Whistleblower Law and the Wage Payment Collection Act.4 

On November 12, 2013, Appellees filed preliminary objections to Sukenik’s wage 

payment claim. On December 2, 2013, Sukenik amended his complaint to withdraw 

his wage payment claim and instead asserted a breach of contract claim. On 

December 9, 2013, Appellees filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer 

to the breach of contract claim, arguing that Sukenik could not assert a breach of 

contract claim in this matter. On January 31, 2014, the trial court sustained 

Appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissed Sukenik’s breach of contract claim. 

On October 29, 2014, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 

Sukenik failed to establish a whistleblower claim because he did not make a “good 

faith report” of “wrongdoing” or “waste” under the Whistleblower Law. On 

December 15, 2014, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment 

because it concluded that Sukenik did not report “wrongdoing” or “waste” sufficient 

to establish the essential elements of a whistleblower claim. (R.R. at 70a.) 

On appeal to this Court,5Sukenik alleges that the trial court erred when 

it concluded that he did not report a “wrongdoing” because Francesconi’s unilateral 

 

4 Act of July 14, 1961, P.L. 637, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 260.1-260.45.

5 When reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court’s standard of review 

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Pentlong Corporation v. GLS Capital, Inc., 72 A.3d 

818, 823 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). A motion for summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no 

genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 

1035.2(1). A grant of summary judgment is proper only when, “after examining the record in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolving of all doubts as to the existence of a 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
7

interference with the police department violated section 1405 of Pennsylvania’s First 

Class Township Code (Code).6 Sukenik also alleges that his exclusion from the 

Board’s executive session violated the Ordinance and constituted a “wrongdoing.” 

Finally, Sukenik argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that his opposition 

to the forensic tax audit did not constitute a good faith report of “waste.” 

Discussion

Section 3 of the Whistleblower Law, Act of December 12, 1986, P.L. 

1559, as amended, 43 P.S. §1423(a), protects employees who make a “good faith 

report” of a narrowly-defined “wrongdoing” or “waste.” Section 2 of the 

Whistleblower Law provides that a “good faith report” is “a report of . . . wrongdoing 

or waste which is made without malice or consideration of personal benefit and 

which the person making the report has reasonable cause to believe is true.” 43 P.S. 

§1422. Section 2 defines “wrongdoing” as “[a] violation which is not of a merely 

technical or minimal nature of a Federal or State statute or regulation, of a political 

subdivision ordinance or regulation or of a code of conduct or ethics designed to 

protect the interest of the public or the employer.” Id. “Waste” is “[a]n employer’s 

conduct or omissions which result in substantial abuse, misuse, destruction or loss of 

funds or resources belonging to or derived from Commonwealth or political 

subdivision sources.” Id. To establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblower 

Law, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he made a good 

 

(continued...)

genuine issue of material fact against the moving party, the moving party is clearly entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687, 692 (Pa. 2011). 

6 Act of June 24, 1931, P.L. 1206, as amended, 53 P.S. §56405. 
8

faith report of wrongdoing or waste to the appropriate authorities prior to the alleged 

retaliation. O’Rourke v. Commonwealth, 778 A.2d 1194, 1200 (Pa. 2001). 

To establish a whistleblower claim, a report must specify how an 

employer is guilty of wrongdoing or waste. Gray v. Hafer, 651 A.2d 221, 225 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1994), aff’d, 669 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1995). To constitute a wrongdoing, the 

violation must be one that the employer is charged to enforce for the public good or 

relate to the internal administration of the public employer.7 Id. at 225. The report 

must provide information that is sufficient to identify the law allegedly violated; 

reports of vague or subjectively wrong conduct are not considered wrongdoing under 

the Whistleblower Law. Riggio v. Burns, 711 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. Super. 1998). The 

test is objective; it is irrelevant whether an employee believes the employer’s conduct 

constitutes wrongdoing, an actual violation is required. Kimes v. University of 

Scranton, __ F. Supp. 3d __ (M.D. Pa., Civil No. 3:14-CV-00091, filed Aug. 25, 

2015), slip op. at 20. The law that the employer violated must specifically define 

some prohibited conduct or it cannot be violated in a way that constitutes a 

“wrongdoing.” Evans v. Thomas Jefferson University, 81 A.3d 1062, 1072 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2013); Riggio, 711 A.2d at 501-03. 

 

7

The Whistleblower Law defines an “employer” as “[a] public body or any of the following 

which receives money from a public body to perform work or provide services relative to the 

performance of work for or the provision of services to a public body: (1) [a]n individual; (2) [a]

partnership; (3) [a]n association; (4) [a] corporation for profit; (5) [or a] corporation not for profit.” 

43 P.S. §1422. 
9

Wrongdoing

Sukenik alleges that his complaints regarding Francesconi’s unilateral 

interference with the police department constitute reports of “wrongdoing” because 

Francesconi’s conduct violated the Code,8 which states: 

The chief of police and policemen shall obey the orders of 

the board of township commissioners or such other person 

or committee as may be designated by ordinance or 

resolution of the board for such purposes.

53 P.S. §56405. Sukenik argues that the Code prohibits Francesconi’s unilateral 

interference with the police department because he was not issuing orders on behalf 

of the Board or the Police Committee, nor was he designated by special ordinance or 

resolution to perform such action. 

This Court’s decision in Evans v. Thomas Jefferson University, 81 A.3d 

1062 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) is instructive. In Evans, a dispensing nurse at an addiction 

and rehabilitation clinic refused to administer methadone to a patient because she 

believed that the patient was intoxicated. The patient became angry and complained 

to the program director. The program director directed the clinic director to ask the 

nurse to administer the methadone, but the nurse refused. At the program director’s 

direction, the clinic director administered the methadone and, after she left, the nurse 

reported the program director’s conduct to her supervisor. The nurse was ultimately 

terminated and she filed a whistleblower action, alleging that she was terminated in 

retaliation for reporting the program director’s conduct, which allegedly violated 

federal and state law regulating who may administer controlled substances to patients. 

 

8

The parties stipulate that Elizabeth is a First Class Township bound by the First Class 

Township Code. (Appellant’s brief at 21.) 
10

The trial court granted the employer’s summary judgment motion and the nurse 

appealed. 

On appeal, this Court held that the provisions the nurse cited permitted 

licensed individuals to administer methadone, but they did not prohibit the conduct 

she reported; specifically, the program director’s override of the nurse’s assessment 

that the patient was intoxicated and command to the clinic director to administer the 

methadone. Consequently, because the complained of conduct was not prohibited, 

we affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for the employer 

because the nurse did not report a “wrongdoing” under the Whistleblower Law and, 

thus, could not prove the essential elements of a whistleblower claim. Id. at 1072. 

Similarly, in Riggio v. Burns, 711 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super. 1998), the 

plaintiff was a neurologist employed as an instructor by the Medical College of 

Pennsylvania, where she also served as Associate Director for the college’s epilepsy 

center. Several patients from the epilepsy center were referred to the college’s 

neurology department for surgery where electronic strips were placed on the patients’ 

brains. During these surgeries, the supervising surgeon was not physically present 

and allowed residents to insert the electronic strips. Consequently, one patient died 

and another lapsed into a coma. The plaintiff opposed this procedure and demanded 

that the supervising surgeon perform the procedures himself or be physically present 

to supervise the residents. However, the supervising surgeon did not modify his 

procedure and the plaintiff sent a letter to the college’s Vice President of Clinical 

Affairs objecting to the practice. The plaintiff was subsequently terminated and filed 

a whistleblower action, alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for her report 

objecting to the surgical procedures. 
11

The trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, 

holding that the college was not an “employer” under the Whistleblower Law. The 

Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s order on other grounds; the college was an 

“employer” as contemplated by the Whistleblower Law, but the plaintiff did not 

report a “wrongdoing.” The plaintiff cited licensing statutes for health care providers 

and medical practitioners to support her claim that she reported “wrongdoing.” 

However, the court held that the regulatory statutes provided only general licensing 

requirements and were too general and vague to constitute wrongdoing because they 

were subject to interpretation and did not specifically define what conduct was 

proscribed. Id. at 501. The plaintiff also cited a Medicare regulation stating that the 

attending physician must supervise a resident performing major surgery to be eligible 

for Medicare reimbursement. However, the court rejected her argument, stating that 

“[the regulation] neither created a duty to supervise in person nor prohibited surgery 

in the absence of such personal supervision. Therefore, the regulation simply could 

not be violated as contemplated by the Whistleblower Law.” Id. at 503 (emphasis in 

original). 

Here, Sukenik’s argument that his objections to Francesconi’s unilateral 

interference with the police department constitute a good faith report of 

“wrongdoing” fails for the same reasons articulated in Evans and Riggio. “Under the 

provisions of the Code, (53 P.S. [§]56405), the Board of Township Commissioners 

are given the power of supervision of the police.” Banks v. Board of Commissioners 

of Upper Moreland Township, 298 A.2d 923, 925 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973). Section 1405 

establishes a default chain of command that directs the police department to obey the 

Board’s orders or those of an individual or committee designated by resolution or 

ordinance. It grants the Board authority to give orders to the chief of police and 
12

police officers, or designate that authority to another person or committee. As in 

Evans, section 1405 does not prohibit the conduct Sukenik allegedly reported; 

specifically, an individual commissioner unilaterally interfering with police 

department operations. As in Riggio, section 1405 does not specifically define what 

conduct is proscribed. It imposes no duty on individual commissioners to refrain 

from unilateral interference with the police department, nor does it prohibit such 

activity. Consequently, Francesconi’s unilateral interference with the police 

department does not violate section 1405 as contemplated by the Whistleblower Law. 

Next, Sukenik argues that his February 1, 2013 letter to the Board 

constitutes a report of “wrongdoing” because his exclusion from the Board’s 

executive session violates the Ordinance.9 The relevant section of the Ordinance 

states:

[The Township Manager] shall attend all Board of 

Commissioner’s meetings and shall have the right to take 

part in discussions, but he/she shall not vote. He/she shall 

prepare the agenda of each meeting and shall post same at 

the Township bulletin board at least twenty-four (24) hours 

before the meeting. 

(R.R. at 51a.) 

Sukenik’s February 1, 2013 letter reads as follows:

This letter is to serve as a follow-up to the many 

conversations we have had, and to reiterate my position 

regarding several actions the Board has asked me to take in 

regard to the Police Department. Specifically, I have raised 

– and am now raising again – my belief and concern that 

these actions are in violation of relevant township 

 

9 Notably, Sukenik did not allege violations of the Ordinance in his February 1, 2013 letter. 

(R.R. at 52a.)
13

ordinances and multiple laws regarding local government 

bodies in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, up to and 

including The Sunshine Act10 and The Civil Rights Act.11

(R.R. at 52a.)

In his February 1, 2013 letter, Sukenik makes no mention of his 

exclusion from the Board’s executive session.12 Indeed, he states that the purpose of 

his letter is to “reiterate [his] position regarding several actions the Board has asked 

[him] to take in regard to the Police Department” and his belief that “these actions are 

in violation of relevant township ordinances and multiple laws regarding local 

 

10 65 Pa. C.S. §§ 701-716. 

11 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6.

12 In Johnson v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 595 (E.D. Pa. 

2011), the plaintiff was the director of her employer’s adolescent employment services program. 

The plaintiff learned that a coworker was engaged in a sexual relationship with an underage 

individual who participated in the program and believed the coworker’s conduct was inappropriate 

and was prohibited by the employer’s policy regarding employees’ relationships. She 

communicated her concerns to her supervisor and also stated that the coworker’s behavior was 

inappropriate because she was “[h]aving sex with a consumer that was underage.” Id. at 598. The 

plaintiff was terminated five years later and initiated a whistleblower action, alleging that her 

termination was a retaliatory discharge for reporting her coworker’s wrongdoing. However, in her 

civil complaint, the plaintiff did not address her report of her coworker’s conduct, but instead 

alleged that her employer violated the law by failing to take any action in response to her report 

regarding her coworker’s relationship with a minor. 

The court granted the employer’s summary judgment motion and concluded that “[b]ecause 

Plaintiff never reported Defendants, their actions subsequent to her report are irrelevant in 

identifying the wrongdoing that she reported and for which she now seeks protection.” Id. at 602. 

In other words, although the plaintiff made a report regarding her coworker’s alleged misconduct, 

she made no report regarding her employer’s response to her report, which was the basis for her 

civil complaint. The misconduct she alleged in her civil complaint was not the same misconduct 

she reported. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to report 

the wrongdoing she was alleging and, consequently, could not establish the essential elements of a 

whistleblower claim. Id. at 601-02. Here, although Sukenik reported some conduct in his February 

1, 2013 letter, analogous to the plaintiff in Johnson, Sukenik never reported the conduct that was the 

basis for his complaint; specifically, his exclusion from the Board’s executive session. 
14

government bodies in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, up to and including The 

Sunshine Act and The Civil Rights Act.” (R.R. at 52a.) It is clear that Sukenik’s 

February 1, 2013 letter only considered Francesconi’s unilateral attempts to interfere 

with the police department as misconduct. He stated that the letter was a follow-up to 

previous conversations concerning actions he was asked to take in regards to the 

police department and his belief that “these actions” violated various laws. The only 

actions the letter contemplates are the interference with the police department, not his 

exclusion from the Board’s executive session. Consequently, Sukenik did not report 

a wrongdoing under the Whistleblower Law because he failed to report the 

complained of conduct.

Assuming arguendo that Sukenik’s February 1, 2013 letter constitutes a 

report, Sukenik’s argument still fails because he did not report a “wrongdoing.” The 

Ordinance provides that the Township Manager “shall attend all Board of 

Commissioner’s meetings.” (R.R. at 51a.) However, it is not clear whether the 

Ordinance requires attendance at every variation of a Board meeting, such as special 

meetings and committee meetings, or whether the Ordinance only contemplates 

meetings of the full Board. The Ordinance is subject to interpretation and, as Riggio

advises, it is not clear that such ambiguous standards can be violated in a way that 

constitutes “wrongdoing” under the Whistleblower Law. Riggio, 711 A.2d at 501. 

Moreover, the Ordinance does not specifically define any prohibited 

conduct; it only creates the office of Township Manager and enumerates the powers 

and duties inherent in the position. (R.R. at 48a-51a.) The relevant section of the 

Ordinance grants the Township Manager access to Board meetings and requires him 

to prepare and post the agenda for each meeting. The Ordinance does not prohibit an 
15

individual commissioner from excluding the Township Manager from attendance at 

the Board’s executive sessions. 

Waste

Finally, Sukenik avers that his opposition to the four-year forensic tax 

audit constitutes a report of “waste” under the Whistleblower Law because he 

asserted that the audit would constitute a substantial waste of taxpayer funds. 

However, the Law’s plain language forecloses his argument. The Whistleblower 

Law defines “waste” as “conduct or omissions which result in substantial abuse, 

misuse, destruction or loss of funds . . . .” 43 P.S. §1422 (emphasis added). Thus, 

when alleging that a substantial loss of funds constitutes waste, it is clear that some 

actual loss must occur. 

Here, the Board abandoned the tax audit. Consequently, even if 

Sukenik’s averment is accurate and the audit would have resulted in a substantial 

waste of taxpayer funds, no actual loss occurred because the audit was never 

performed. A report of hypothetical loss is insufficient to trigger the Whistleblower 

Law’s protection. See, e.g., Anderson v. Board of School Directors of Millcreek 

Township School District, 574 Fed. Appx. 169, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that 

the plaintiff’s concerns that the defendant may engage in improper conduct did not 

constitute a report of wrongdoing under the law because the statements were purely 

hypothetical). 

Having reviewed the record in the light most favorable to Sukenik and 

resolving all doubts regarding the existence of a material fact against Appellees, we 

conclude that Sukenik failed to establish the essential elements of a whistleblower 
16

claim because he did not report a “wrongdoing” or “waste” as defined by the 

Whistleblower Law. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary 

judgment in favor of Appellees. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Aaron Sukenik, :

Appellant :

: No. 505 C.D. 2015

v. :

:

Township of Elizabeth, Gene :

Francesconi, J. Larry Vota, Claire :

Bryce and Chris Evans :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 5

th day of January, 2016, the December 15, 2014 

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is affirmed. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge