UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

KIMBERLY J. GUEST-MARCOTTE, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-10738 

v Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, 

METALDYNE SALARY CONTINUATION PLAN, and 

METALDYNE POWERTRAIN COMPONENTS, INC., 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________________/ 

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTION, ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

 Plaintiff Kimberly Guest-Marcotte was employed with Metaldyne Powertrain 

Components for about eight years. After she was diagnosed with Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, 

Guest-Marcotte applied for short-term disability benefits with her employer’s ERISA Plan 

administrator, Defendant Life Insurance Company of North America. Despite providing 

documentation from physicians that she “could not perform the material duties of her regular 

occupation,” the Plan administrator denied her request for short-term disability benefits because 

Guest-Marcotte had not shown that “she is unable to perform all the substantial and material 

duties of his or her regular occupation . . . .” The day after the Plan administrator denied her 

appeal for short-term benefits, Metaldyne terminated her employment due to the “unknown 

nature of your ability to perform your job functions in the future,” as evidenced by the 

documentation from physicians. In other words, the physician documents were not sufficient to 

show that Guest-Marcotte was disabled for purposes of short-term disability benefits, but were 

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sufficient for Metaldyne to terminate her employment because she was not capable of 

performing her job functions. 

 On February 27, 2015, Plaintiff Kimberly Guest-Marcotte filed suit against her former 

employer, Metaldyne Powertrain Co., and her former employer’s ERISA Plan administrator, Life 

Insurance Co. of North America (“LICNA/CIGNA”). Guest-Marcotte claims that Defendant 

Metaldyne discriminated against her because she had a disability, even though she was able to 

perform her job duties. Guest-Marcotte also claims that Defendant LICNA/CIGNA improperly 

denied her request for long-term disability benefits because she was disabled from working. 

 On April 24, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Guest-Marcotte’s Persons with 

Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”) claim, asserting that, given her repeated and 

unequivocal statements that she was completely disabled for the purpose of receiving long-term 

benefits, she is estopped from now claiming that she could perform the duties of her job. 

Because Guest-Marcotte has provided no explanation for the apparent inconsistency between her 

PWDCRA and ERISA claims, her PWDCRA claim will be dismissed. 

I.

 Guest-Marcotte worked as a Senior Risk Analyst for Metaldyne from July 2005 until 

November 22, 2013. She alleges that she became unable to continue her normal workload in 

June 2013 due to her Ehlers-Danlos syndrome.1

 Guest-Marcotte applied for short-term benefits 

under Metaldyne’s Salary Continuation Plan, which provides short-term benefits to an employee 

who: 

because of Injury or Sickness . . . is unable to perform all the substantial and 

material duties of his or her regular occupation, or solely due to Injury or 

 

1

 According to the Ehlers-Danlos National Foundation website, “[i]ndividuals with Ehlers-Danlos syndromes (EDS) 

have a genetic defect in their connective tissue, the tissue that provides support to many body parts such as the skin, 

muscles and ligaments. The fragile skin and unstable joints found in patients with EDS are the result of faulty or 

reduced amounts of collagen.” www.ednf.org/what-eds. 

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Sickness, is unable to earn more than 80% of his or her Indexed Covered 

Earnings. 

Compl. Ex. 3. 

 In support of her application for short-term benefits, Guest-Marcotte relied on the 

testimony Doctors Kadaj and Tinkle. In a Healthcare Provider Questionnaire, Dr. Kadaj wrote 

that Guest-Marcotte’s condition was expected to last a “lifetime,” Ex. 2 at 1, that she was not 

able to perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable 

accommodations, that there were no accommodations that would enable her to perform her job 

duties, and that “[i]t is unlikely she will recover fully/sufficiently.” Id. at 2-3. 

 LICNA/CIGNA denied her short-term benefits claim in August 2013, apparently because 

she had not met the definition of “disabled”.2

 In her appeal, Guest-Marcotte’s attorney described 

the impairments: “[s]he could not sit, stand, or drive for any length of time. Her cognitive 

abilities were impaired, and she was in significant pain. She was constantly fatigued, and could 

not perform repetitive tasks such as typing or using a computer mouse,” and that she “could not 

perform the material duties of her regular occupation . . . .” Ex. 2 at 9. Guest-Marcotte’s appeal 

was denied in November 2013. 

 On November 22, 2013, Metaldyne terminated Guest-Marcotte’s employment based on 

Dr. Kadaj’s letter “which indicated that you remained unable to perform the essential function of 

your position with or without a reasonable accommodation,” and that she was “unlikely to 

recover fully/sufficiently to perform the functions of your position”. Doc. 1, Ex. 8. Thus, as 

Guest-Marcotte accurately notes, her request for short-term benefits was denied because she was 

not disabled, yet Metaldyne terminated her employment because she was disabled. 

 

2

 The denial letter did not explain why Guest-Marcotte’s application was denied, but instead simply recited the 

Disability Policy. 

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 On February 27, 2015, Guest-Marcotte filed suit against Defendants. Guest-Marcotte 

attached affidavits from both Dr. Kadaj and Dr. Tinkle, each of whom testified that he believed 

that Guest-Marcotte was disabled. See Tinkle Affidavit at ¶ 15 (“It was my professional opinion 

that Ms. Guest-Marcotte was disabled indefinitely from employment . . . .”); Kadaj Affidavit at ¶ 

11 (“At the time Ms. Guest-Marcotte applied for Short Term Disability, it was my professional 

opinion that Ms. Guest-Marcotte was disabled from employment . . . .”). 

 On April 24, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Guest-Marcotte’s PWDCRA 

claim, asserting that she was estopped from claiming that she could perform her job duties (as 

required to state a PWDCRA claim) because she had repeatedly alleged that she was disabled 

from performing her job duties when she applied for short-term benefits. On June 22, 2015, 

United States Magistrate Judge Patricia Morris issued a report recommending that Defendants’ 

motion be granted: “I suggest that Defendants have pointed to sufficiently undermining 

statements and admissions by Plaintiff to preclude Plaintiff from proving her prima facie case 

under the PWDCRA.” Rep. & Rec. 8. Guest-Marcotte filed a timely objection to the report on 

July 2, 2015. 

II. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party may object to and seek review of 

a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If objections are 

made, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition 

that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Objections must be stated with 

specificity. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985) (citation omitted). “Only those specific 

objections to the magistrate’s report made to the district court will be preserved for appellate 

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review.” Carson v. Hudson, 421 F. App’x 560, 563 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Souter v. Jones, 395 

F.3d 577, 585-86 (6th Cir. 2005)). 

III. 

 Guest-Marcotte filed one objection to the Magistrate’s report: she claims that she has 

adequately pleaded a PWDCRA claim. She contends that it is Defendants who should be 

estopped from asserting inconsistent defenses (i.e., that Guest-Marcotte was not disabled for the 

purpose of short-term benefits, but was so disabled that her employment had to be terminated). 

 To prevail on an employment discrimination claim under the PWDCRA, a “plaintiff must 

show (1) that he is [disabled] as defined in the act, (2) that the [disability] is unrelated to his 

ability to perform his job duties, and (3) that he has been discriminated against in one of the 

ways delineated in the statute.” Chmielewski v. Xermac, Inc., 580 N.W.2d 817, 821 (1998). In 

other words, Guest-Marcotte cannot prevail on her PWDCRA claim if her Ehlers-Danlos 

syndrome rendered her unable to perform the duties of Senior Risk Analyst. 

 Defendants claim that Guest-Marcotte is essentially estopped from claiming that her 

disability is unrelated to her ability to perform her job duties. They explain that Guest-Marcotte 

repeatedly applied for short-term disability benefits, claiming that that she was unable to perform 

the essential function of her job, Ex. 2 at 2, that there were no accommodations that would 

enable her to perform her job responsibilities, id., and that “it is unlikely she will recover 

fully/sufficiently,” id. at 3. Therefore, according to Defendants, Guest-Marcotte cannot now 

claim that she is completely disabled in order to obtain short-term disability benefits while 

simultaneously claiming that she is disabled but able to perform her job duties for purposes of 

her PWDCRA claim. 

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 Generally, the Michigan courts have concluded that the pursuit and receipt of disability 

benefits does not automatically preclude or estop the recipient from pursuing a PWDCA claim. 

Carpenter v. Snacktime Services, Inc., 2005 WL 763308, at *7-8 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 5. 2005) 

(plaintiff not estopped from pursuing PWDCA merely because a worker’s compensation 

magistrate judge had determined that he was disabled). This is because claims for Social 

Security benefits and PWDCA claims have different definitions for the word “disabled”. See

Tranker v. Figgie International, Inc., 585 N.W.2d 337, 339-40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) 

(declarations of disability in an SSDI do not necessarily bar a plaintiff from proving a claim of 

disability discrimination because in the social security definition of “disabled” does not take into 

account the possibility of accommodation); Kiely v. Hearland Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 359 

F.3d 386, 389-90 (6th Cir. 2004) (same). 

 However, when a plaintiff has represented that she was totally incapable of working at 

the time of the adverse employment decisions but does not explain how she could have been 

otherwise “qualified” for the position in question, courts have generally held that she cannot 

satisfy the elements of her PWDCA claim as a matter of law. Cleveland v. Policy Management 

Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 804 (1999) (a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination “cannot 

simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of” an earlier claim that he is disabled);

Neview v. D.O.C. Optics Corp., 382 F. App’x 451, 459 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that plaintiff 

had failed to meet burden under ADA where “[i]n both her deposition and at her workers’ 

compensation hearing, Neview testified that at the time of her termination she was totally 

incapable of working as a DOC store manager, or in any job whatsoever.”); Carpenter v. 

Snacktime Services, Inc., 2005 WL 763308, at *7-8 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 5. 2005) (“plaintiff is 

judicially estopped from pursuing her PWDCRA claim because of assertions she made during 

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her worker’s compensation hearing. Specifically, plaintiff admitted that there was no 

accommodation that defendant could provide to allow her to perform her job.”). 

 Here, Guest-Marcotte has made no attempt to reconcile or explain her inconsistent 

positions regarding her ability (or a lack of) to perform her job duties. Instead, Guest-Marcotte 

focuses on Defendants’ inconsistent reactions to her claims: “Defendants have repeatedly found 

that [Guest-Marcotte’s] condition does not preclude Plaintiff from performing her job, thus not 

believing Plaintiff’s disability claims. Nonetheless, despite repeated statements in the denial of 

benefit claim letters from LICNA/CIGNA that Plaintiff could perform her job, her employer 

fired her in violation of the statute because she could no longer perform her job.” Objs. 8. But, 

as Magistrate Judge Morris correctly concluded, “[i]t is Plaintiff’s admissions that matter when 

considering whether Plaintiff’s claim is legally sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, not 

Defendants’ potentially inconsistent defenses.” Rep. & Rec. 9 (citing Malibu Media, LLC v. 

Sanchez, 2014 WL172301, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2014)). 

 Guest-Marcotte filed suit alleging two claims that are—at least facially—inconsistent: 

she claims that she was completely disabled for the purpose of obtaining short-term disability 

benefits, but that her disability did not affect her ability to perform her job duties for the purpose 

of her PWDCA claim. Although a plaintiff may allege these two claims, the plaintiff must

provide some explanation—any explanation—that would reconcile the incongruity. GuestMarcotte has not done so here, and therefore she has not sufficiently pleaded a claim for 

violation of the PWDCRA. 

IV.

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Guest-Marcotte’s Objection (ECF No. 22) is 

OVERRULED. 

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 It is further ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF 

No. 20) is ADOPTED. 

 It is further ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is 

GRANTED. 

 It is further ORDERED that Guest-Marcotte’s PWDCRA claim is DISMISSED. 

s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: August 5, 2015 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on August 5, 2015. 

 s/Karri Sandusky 

 Karri Sandusky, Acting Case Manager 

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