UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHELLE M. POLHEMUS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: 14-14442

 Honorable Arthur J. Tarnow

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security,

 

Defendant. 

__________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [R. 17, 19]

Plaintiff Michelle Polhemus appeals a final decision of Defendant 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her

applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental 

Security Income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Both 

parties have filed summary judgment motions, referred to this Court for a 

Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The 

Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not impermissibly 

play doctor, did not err in finding Polhemus’s claims regarding the severity 

of her impairments not credible, and issued a residual functional capacity 

assessment (“RFC”) that is supported by substantial evidence of record. 

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For these reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that:

• the Commissioner’s motion [R. 19] be GRANTED; 

• Polhemus’s motion [R. 17] be DENIED; and,

• the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED, pursuant to sentence 

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Claimant’s Background and Claimed Disabilities

At the time of the administrative hearing, Polhemus was a 47-year-old 

high school graduate, who had previously worked full-time as a hospital 

cleaner and had continued to perform that work on a part-time basis. [R. 

13-2, Tr. 40-42]. She claimed disability due to diabetes, hypoglycemia, 

thyroid, memory and vision problems, acid reflux, chronic cough, breathing 

problems, heart palpitations and anxiety. [R. 13-6, Tr. 220]. 

B. Procedural History

Polhemus filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging disability as of 

April 23, 2009. [R. 13-5, Tr. 163-77]. The claims were denied initially and 

Polhemus filed a timely request for an administrative hearing, held on

December 17, 2013, at which both she and a vocational expert (“VE”)

testified. [R. 13-2, Tr. 28-57; R. 13-4, Tr. 84-104]. In a December 24, 2013

written decision, the ALJ found Polhemus not disabled. [R. 13-2, Tr. 10-

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27]. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the 

final decision of the Commissioner. [Id., Tr. 3-7]. Polhemus timely filed for 

judicial review. [R. 1]. 

C. The ALJ’s Application of the Disability Framework

DIB and SSI are available for those who have a “disability.” See 

Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). A “disability” is the 

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 

423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).

The Commissioner determines whether an applicant is disabled by 

analyzing five sequential steps. First, if the applicant is “doing substantial 

gainful activity,” he or she will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).

1

 Second, if the claimant has 

not had a severe impairment or a combination of such impairments2 for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months, no disability will be found. Id. 

Third, if the claimant’s severe impairments meet or equal the criteria of an 

 1 Sections 1520(a)(4) and 920(a)(4), which pertain to DIB and SSI 

respectively, list the same five-step analysis.

2 A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§ 1520(c); 920(c).

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impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, the 

claimant will be found disabled. Id. If the fourth step is reached, the 

Commissioner considers its assessment of the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”), and will find the claimant not disabled if he or 

she can still do past relevant work. Id. At the final step, the Commissioner 

reviews the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experiences, and 

determines whether the claimant could adjust to other work. Id. The 

claimant bears the burden of proof throughout the first four steps, but the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner if the fifth step is reached. Preslar v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). 

Applying this framework, the ALJ concluded that Polhemus was not 

disabled. At step one, the ALJ determined that Polhemus had not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date, despite the fact 

that she was continuing to work part time. [R. 13-2, Tr. 15]. At step two, he 

identified severe impairments of gastroesophageal reflux disease/gastritis 

with chronic cough, inflammatory arthropathy/arthritis and lumbar 

degenerative disc disease. [Id.]. At step three, the ALJ concluded that 

none of Polhemus’s severe impairments, either alone or in combination, 

met or medically equaled a listed impairment. [Id., Tr. 16-17]. 

Next, the ALJ assessed Polhemus’s RFC, finding her capable of light 

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work involving no climbing of ropes, ladders or scaffolds. [Id., Tr. 17]. She 

was also to avoid concentrated exposure to odors, dusts, fumes, gasses or 

other irritants, and must be afforded a “‘sit/stand option’ defined as the 

ability to occasionally alternate between sitting and standing positions while 

remaining on-task at least 90 percent of an ordinary workday, with usual 

and customary breaks.” [Id.]. 

At step four, the ALJ determined that Polhemus’s RFC deemed her 

incapable of returning to her past relevant work. [Id., Tr. 21]. However, 

with the assistance of VE testimony, the ALJ concluded at step five that a 

hypothetical claimant matching Polhemus’s profile could still perform a 

substantial number of jobs in the national economy, such that she was not 

disabled, including assembler (10,000 jobs statewide), inspector (3,000 

jobs) and packager (4,000) jobs. [Id., Tr. 22]. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to § 405(g), this Court’s review is limited to determining 

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and was made in conformity with proper legal standards. Gentry v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is 

“more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

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support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 

(6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only the 

evidence in the record below may be considered when determining 

whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bass v. 

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2007). “If the [Commissioner’s]

decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if 

the reviewing court would decide the matter differently, and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal 

citations omitted). 

The Commissioner must also adhere to its own procedures, but 

failure to do so constitutes only harmless error unless the claimant has 

been prejudiced or deprived of substantial rights. Rabbers v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009). An ALJ’s failure to use an

“adjudicatory tool” that does not change the outcome of the decision is 

harmless. Id. at 655-56. 

With these standards in mind, this Court finds that the ALJ’s 

determination that Polhemus is not disabled is supported by substantial 

evidence.

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III. ANALYSIS

Polhemus argues that the ALJ: (1) impermissibly “played doctor” 

when assigning little weight to the opinions of psychological consultants; (2) 

issued an RFC that did not account for all of her medically supportable 

limitations; and (3) made an unsupportable credibility determination. None 

of Polhemus’s arguments has merit. 

A. Alleged Mental Impairment

Polhemus argues that the ALJ “played doctor” by assigning little 

weight to the opinion the April 2012 findings of consultant examiner 

Elizabeth Bishop, Ph.D., that Polhemus suffered from a panic disorder and 

agoraphobia which, in combination with her medical issues, would make it 

difficult for her to maintain consistent employment. [R. 13-2, Tr. 16; R. 13-

7, Tr. 279]. The ALJ also gave little weight to reviewing consultant Ruqiya 

Tareen, M.D.’s July 2012 opinion that Polhemus’s anxiety resulted in 

moderate social functioning and concentration, persistence and pace 

limitations for the same reasons. [R. 13-2, Tr. 16; R. 13-3, Tr. 62]. The 

Court finds that the ALJ did not impermissibly play doctor when assigning 

little weight to these opinions.

An ALJ impermissibly plays doctor by substituting his or her own 

judgment for that of medical experts whose opinions are supported by 

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medical evidence. Simpson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App'x 181, 194 

(6th Cir. 2009). On the other hand, an ALJ is not bound to accept an 

opinion of a medical expert that is not supported by reliable reasoning or 

objectively determinable symptoms. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). An 

ALJ must also consider whether a medical opinion is consistent with the 

record as a whole. § 404.1527(c)(4); Irvin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 573 F. 

App'x 498, 501 (6th Cir. 2014). Furthermore, because they do not provide 

the detailed longitudinal picture provided by treating sources, “opinions 

from nontreating and nonexamining sources are never assessed for 

‘controlling weight.’” Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 

(6th Cir. 2013) (citing § 404.1527(c)).

In the guise of an argument that the ALJ was playing doctor, 

Polhemus appears actually to be asserting that the ALJ was required to 

give controlling weight to nontreating and nonexamining sources – an 

assertion that is plainly without merit given the authority cited above. 

Additionally, contrary to Polhemus’s argument otherwise, the ALJ provided 

good reasons for assigning Dr. Bishop’s and Dr. Tareen’s opinions little 

weight. He reasoned that the opinions lacked medical support, that 

Polhemus had been prescribed psychotropic medication just prior to the 

hearing, that she had not received inpatient or outpatient psychological 

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care, and that there were no longitudinal symptoms of mental impairment in 

the record. [R. 13-2, Tr. 16]. These assessments of the opinions and the 

record are accurate. 

Dr. Tareen’s opinion relied largely on Dr. Bishop’s, and Dr. Bishop’s 

opinion was not supported by medical evidence. [R. 13-3, Tr. 61-67; R. 13-

7, Tr. 277-79]. Further, Polhemus had just been prescribed psychotropic 

medication for anxiety in October 2013, a couple of months prior to the 

hearing. [R. 13-7, Tr. 406]. That anxiety medication was not prescribed by 

a psychologist or psychiatrist; as Polhemus acknowledged to Dr. Bishop, 

she had not had any mental health treatment since 1999. [Id., Tr. 277]. 

Polhemus points out that she was also prescribed an antidepressant after 

her husband left her in March 2011. [Id., Tr. 356-57]. Nonetheless, the 

ALJ’s observation that there is no longitudinal record of symptoms of 

mental impairment holds true. 

Finally, the Court concurs with the Commissioner that Polhemus has 

failed to set forth any evidence that her lack of mental health treatment was 

a symptom of mental illness. Bryce v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. CIV.A. 12-

14618, 2014 WL 1328275, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2014), adopted by

No. 12-CV-14618, 2014 WL 1328277 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2014) (rejecting 

argument that lack of mental health treatment was due to mental disorder 

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where there was no evidence that claimant was unaware of need for 

treatment). The record shows that she reported anxiety and depression to 

medical providers, but that she only conveyed such symptoms 

occasionally. [R. 13-7, Tr. 263-64, 356-57, 406]. The infrequency of 

Polhemus’s complaints of anxiety or depression lends supports to the ALJ’s 

determination that Polhemus suffers no more than minimal limitations with 

respect to her mental capabilities. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ did not impermissibly 

play doctor, and that he provided good reasons for assigning little weight to 

the opinions of Dr. Bishop and Dr. Tareen.

B. Credibility Determination 

Polhemus argues that the ALJ’s credibility analysis is flawed in that

he failed to consider all of the required regulatory factors and misconstrued 

the evidence of record. Credibility determinations of witnesses are within 

the province of the ALJ, and will not be overturned “absent compelling 

reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir.2001). At the same 

time, “such determinations must find support in the record.” Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 241. The Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the ALJ’s 

credibility determination, which is supported by substantial evidence. 

First, although the ALJ is required to consider all of the relevant 

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regulatory factors when assessing a claimant’s credibility, there is no 

requirement that the ALJ “explicitly discuss every factor” so long as his 

decision “contain[s] specific reasons for the finding,” is “supported by the 

evidence” of record and is “sufficiently specific” to make the weight given to 

the claimant’s statements clear to both the claimant and subsequent 

reviewers. Wandrie v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 5770379 at *7 (E.D. 

Mich. Oct. 24, 2013) (quoting S.S.R. 96–7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *2).

Here, there is support in the records for the ALJ’s assessment of

Polhemus’s credibility. The ALJ noted that, although she claims to have 

stopped working in 2009 due to hand pain and unstable sugar levels, she 

had contradictorily told a consulting examiner that she stopped working 

when she got married and moved. [R. 13-2, Tr. 18; R. 13-7, Tr. 277]. The 

ALJ further pointed out that Polhemus’s treatment records showed no 

complaints of hand pain other than general wear and tear until 2013, and 

no significant sugar level problems since the early 2000s. [R. 13-2, Tr. 18; 

R. 13-7, Tr. 265, 271, 398]. In fact, as the ALJ noted, Polhemus’s 

treatment records showed no significant treatment for any of her conditions 

prior to 2011, despite her claim of disability since 2009. [R. 13-7, Tr. 317-

19, 323-24, 353-55, 359-59, 386-87]. 

The ALJ also considered Polhemus’s daily activities, noting that while 

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she testified that she did not drive due to anxiety, she had told providers 

that she had never driven, and neither had her mother or grandmother. [R. 

13-2, Tr. 18; R. 13-7, Tr. 278]. In addition, while Polhemus testified that her 

mother did most of her laundry and cooked for her, she had previously 

reported to providers that she did her own housework and laundry, and was 

even cleaning out her house to move at one point after living there for 

thirteen years. [R. 13-2, Tr. 18; R. 13-7, Tr. 278]. 

Turning to the medical evidence of record, the ALJ discussed the lack 

of objective support for Polhemus’s subjective complaints, including a 

notation that anxiety for which she had been treated in 1999 and 2011 had 

stemmed from situational stressors at work and at home; that a 

consultative examination in 2012 showed no difficulty in grip or dexterity 

and found Polhemus’s “most significant ailment” to be her reflux disease 

with chronic cough; and that her own long-time treating physician opined in 

September 2012 that Polhemus had no particular limitations preventing her 

from working full-time. [R. 13-2, Tr. 19-21; R. 13-7, Tr. 264, 269-75, 331, 

356-57]. 

Although Polhemus argues otherwise, none of the ALJ’s reasons for 

finding her less than fully credible misstates the evidence of record. At 

most, the ALJ may have drawn inferences from this evidence contrary to 

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how Polhemus wishes, such as the basis for her lack of significant 

treatment prior to 2011 or the reasons behind her refusal to drive. 

However, the inferences that the ALJ drew from the record were 

reasonable, and there is no compelling reason to disturb his credibility 

finding. See Wright-Hines v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 597 F.3d 392, 395 (6th 

Cir. 2010) (court “must affirm the ALJ's decision if his findings and 

inferences are reasonably drawn from the record or supported by 

substantial evidence even if that evidence could support a contrary 

decision”). 

C. RFC Assessment

The regulations define the RFC as “the most you can still do despite 

your limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). When crafting an RFC, an 

ALJ is only required to include those limitations he finds credible. See Irvin 

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 573 Fed. Appx. 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Casey 

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993)). 

Polhemus argues that the ALJ erred in crafting an RFC that did not include 

all of her credible limitations, including limitations related to her ankle pain, 

cervical spinal pain and anxiety. To the extent this argument rests on 

Polhemus’s subjective allegations of pain and mental limitations, the Court 

has already concluded that the ALJ properly evaluated her credibility. 

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Furthermore, other than noting a limitation of needing to be off task 

more than ten percent of the workday, Polhemus identifies no specific 

limitation she believes her impairments warrant that was not included in the 

RFC. Instead, she broadly argues that the ALJ’s RFC did not properly 

account for her impairments, and makes general reference to mostly 

unspecified “medical evidence” and “subjective complaints.” [R. 17, PgID 

522-25]. 

Of the few medical records she does cite, none of those records 

demands the imposition of additional limitations beyond those cited by the 

ALJ. For instance, Polhemus points to her initial ankle x-rays noting

“[e]vidence of marked degenerative disease or erosive changes.” [R. 13-7, 

Tr. 421]. However, the diagnosis of a condition alone says nothing about 

its severity. Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir.1988). Indeed,

subsequent treatment records noted improvement in Polhemus’s ankle 

swelling and pain with oral steroid treatment. [R. 13-7, Tr. 405-406, 408, 

427]. 

Similarly, although cervical x-rays showed moderate to severe left 

neural foraminal narrowing at C2-3 and mild narrowing at C3-4, treatment 

notes revealed no loss of range of motion and did not mention any specific 

treatment for cervical spine pain other than a course of oral steroids 

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prescribed for inflammatory arthritis generally, which produced notable 

improvement in overall joint pain and swelling. [Id., Tr. 388-89, 405-406, 

408, 420, 427]. 

With regard to her anxiety, Polhemus argues that the ALJ should 

have imposed a limitation to being off-task more than ten percent of the 

work day, which would have resulted in a disabled finding based on the 

VE’s testimony. However, this limitation is solely based on Polhemus’s 

own subjective allegations that pain and anxiety made it difficult for her to 

concentrate, which the ALJ properly found less than fully credible. Since 

the ALJ’s credibility determination was not rendered in error, Polhemus’s 

argument fails. 

V. CONCLUSION

Because the ALJ’s step two finding consists of, at worst, harmless 

error, and because the remainder of the ALJ’s decision is procedurally 

sound and supported by substantial evidence, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Polhemus’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 17] be DENIED, the 

Commissioner’s Motion [R. 19] be GRANTED and this case be 

AFFIRMED.

s/Elizabeth A. Stafford

ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD

Dated: December 21, 2015 United States Magistrate Judge

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this 

Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service 

of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 

72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but 

fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that party 

might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of 

HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers 

Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection 

must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2).

Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” 

etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than fourteen days after 

service of objections, the non-objecting party must file a response to 

the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in 

the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to 

Objection #2,” etc. The response must be concise and proportionate in 

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length and complexity to the objections, but there is otherwise no page 

limitation. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it 

may rule without awaiting the response.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on December 21, 2015.

s/Marlena Williams

MARLENA WILLIAMS

Case Manager

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