UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DE’ANDRE A. STURGES,

Plaintiff,

 Civil Case No. 14-CV-14120

v.

 Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

DANIEL H. HEYNS, CINDI CURTIN, 

BONITA HOFFNER, PAUL KLEE, 

VAUGHN STEWART, FNU JACOBSEN, 

RON GRAMBAR1

, and JOHN/JANE DOE(S),

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff De’Andre A. Sturges recently filed a pro se civil rights complaint for

declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a

state prisoner at Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan. The

defendants are: Daniel H. Heyns, director of the Michigan Department of

Corrections; Cindi Curtin, warden at Oaks Correctional Facility in Eastlake,

Michigan; Bonita Hoffner, warden at Lakeland Correctional Facility in Coldwater,

1

 Elsewhere in his complaint, Plaintiff spells this defendant’s surname as

“Grambau,” and an exhibit to the complaint indicates that “Grambau” is the correct

spelling. See Compl., Ex. F. The Court therefore will use the spelling “Grambau”

in the body of this Opinion.

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Michigan; Paul Klee, warden at Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in Adrian; Vaughn

Stewart, the business manager at Gus Harrison Correctional Facility; a female hearing

officer named Jacobsen; Ron Grambau, an assistant resident unit supervisor at Oaks

Correctional Facility; and four business managers employed by the Michigan

Department of Corrections and identified only as John or Jane Doe. 

The complaint and exhibits allege that, on August 26, 2012, Plaintiff and an

inmate named Powell were accused of assaulting a fellow inmate named Peterson at

Lakeland Correctional Facility. Peterson injured his hip during the assault and

required surgery to repair the injury. On August 27, 2012, and on August 28, 2012,

Peterson identified Plaintiff in line-ups as one of his assailants. When a correctional

official questioned Plaintiff about the incident, Plaintiff claimed that he did not know

what happened because he was playing basketball on the other side of the prison

compound when the incident occurred. Prison officials nevertheless charged Plaintiff

with major prison misconduct and placed him in temporary segregation. Following

a hearing on September 12, 2012, defendant Jacobsen found Plaintiff guilty of assault

and battery of an inmate. Jacobsen punished Plaintiff by imposing seven days of top

lock,2

 thirty days without privileges, and $11,766.12 in restitution (one-half of

2

 “‘Toplock’ is a restriction placed on prisoners requiring them to remain in

their cell with limited periods of release.” King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 690 n.5

(6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 985 (2013).

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Petersen’s medical fees). Plaintiff appealed his misconduct ticket, but a hearing

administrator denied the appeal.

On September 19, 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to Oaks Correctional Facility,

and on November 13, 2012, a prison official withdrew some money from Plaintiff’s

prison trust fund account as partial payment for the restitution that defendant Jacobsen

ordered. Plaintiff then pursued prison grievance procedures. He complained that

money was removed from his prison account in violation of state law. Defendant

Grambau denied Plaintiff’s grievance at step I of the grievance procedures, and on

June 21, 2013, defendant Cindi Curtin denied Plaintiff’s grievance at step two of the

grievance procedures. Finally, on July 8, 2013, a grievance specialist in Lansing

denied Plaintiff’s grievance at the third and final step of grievance procedures. 

On October 28, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred from Oaks Correctional Facility

to his present location at Gus Harrison Correctional Facility. He then asked warden

Paul Klee and business manager Vaughn Stewart to stop removing money from his

prison trust fund account. Klee stated that he was authorized to remove the funds, and

Stewart claimed that he was merely following the hearing officer’s order.

Plaintiff now claims that defendant Jacobsen exceeded the scope of her

authority under state law, that the business managers failed to follow proper protocol,

and that the other defendants allowed the misconduct to continue. Plaintiff seeks

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money damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of

his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 requires federal district courts to

dismiss a prisoner’s complaint if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state

a claim for which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Flanory v.

Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 2010); Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th

Cir. 2001). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831-32 (1989). 

“In determining whether a prisoner has failed to state a claim, [courts] construe

his complaint in the light most favorable to him, accept his factual allegations as true,

and determine whether he can prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief.” 

Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005). While a complaint need not

contain “detailed factual allegations,” the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (footnote and

4

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citations omitted). Stated differently, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

Plaintiff brings his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on his claim, he

must prove “(1) that he . . . was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws

of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under

color of law.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants violated proper protocol under

Michigan law fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983 because

Section 1983 authorizes courts to redress violations of rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and federal laws that occur

under color of state law. The statute is thus limited to deprivations of

federal statutory and constitutional rights. It does not cover official

conduct that allegedly violates state law.

Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks,

brackets, and ellipses omitted).

Plaintiff also claims that the defendants violated his rights under the Sixth,

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Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Nevertheless,

a prisoner’s claim for declaratory relief and money damages in a prison misconduct

action generally is not cognizable under § 1983 if a judgment in his favor would

necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed. Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641, 648, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1589 (1997). A judgment in Plaintiff’s favor would

necessarily imply the invalidity of defendant Jacobsen’s restitution order. 

As for Plaintiff’s request that state officials cease removing money from his

prison account, the Court notes that state action taken for a punitive reason does not

necessarily encroach on a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). Liberty interests protected

by the Due Process Clause generally are “limited to freedom from restraint which,

while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to

protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id.

Plaintiff was punished with seven days top lock and thirty days loss of

privileges. Lockdown time and segregation for thirty days does not work a major

disruption in a prisoner’s environment. Id. at 486, 115 S. Ct. at 2301. And while the

amount of restitution in this case may be an atypical punishment and a significant

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hardship on Plaintiff, “[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of

misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court

of law.” Id. at 485, 115 S. Ct. at 2301.

“[D]ebiting of funds from [a prisoner’s] account in satisfaction of a properly

imposed restitution order does not amount to a taking or other wrongful interference

with a property interest.” Barber v. Wall, 66 F. App’x 215, 216 (1st Cir. 2003). 

Furthermore, correctional officials are not required to seek a criminal restitution order

or a civil tort judgment before they withdraw funds from an inmate’s prison account

to pay restitution. “Such a requirement would delay implementation of, and hence,

impair the efficacy of prison disciplinary measures. It would significantly increase

the cost of prison administration and unduly burden courts with litigation which is

essentially administrative in nature.” Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 224 (7th Cir.

1986).

Even if the defendants interfered with a protected liberty or property interest,

Plaintiff’s right to due process was not violated. Due process in prison disciplinary

proceedings includes the rights to: (1) written notice of charges at least twenty-four

hours before the disciplinary hearing; (2) a written statement of the evidence relied on

and the reasons for the disciplinary action; and (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and

present documentary evidence. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66, 94 S. Ct.

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2963, 2978-79 (1974). Additionally, there must be “some evidence” supporting the

hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

455, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 2774 (1985).

Exhibits to the complaint indicate that Plaintiff was given written notice of the

charges more than twenty-four hours before the disciplinary hearing. It appears that

he also was given an opportunity to present documentary evidence and witnesses at

the hearing. Additionally, he was provided with a copy of defendant Jacobsen’s

written statement of the evidence she relied on and the reasons for the sanctions. The

victim’s identification of Plaintiff in two line-ups provided “some evidence” to

support defendant Jacobsen’s decision. Thus, even if Plaintiff had a protected liberty

or property interest in not having money withdrawn from his prison trust fund account

to pay restitution, his due process rights were not violated. 

The Court also notes that, as a professional hearing officer for the Department

of Corrections, defendant Jacobsen enjoys immunity from a suit for money damages. 

Barber v. Overton, 496 F.3d 449, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2007); Shelly v. Johnson, 849 F.2d

228, 229-30 (6th Cir. 1988). And Plaintiff’s complaint regarding the defendants’

denial of his grievances fails to state a claim. Skinner v. Govorchin, 463 F.3d 518,

525 (6th Cir. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

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For all the reasons given above, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a plausible

claim for which relief may be granted and they seek money damages from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is summarily dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this decision would be

frivolous and could not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v.

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445, 82 S. Ct. 917, 921 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated:

Copy to:

De’Andre A. Sturges

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