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CONTRABAND CELL PHONES IN 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: PUBLIC SAFETY 

IMPACT AND THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS 

OF JAMMING TECHNOLOGIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 15, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Chief of Staff 

JAMES REID, Deputy Chief of Staff 

BRUCE H. ANDREWS, General Counsel 

CHRISTINE D. KURTH, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

BRIAN M. HENDRICKS, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 15, 2009 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Pryor .................................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Hutchison ............................................................................ 2 

Statement of Senator Begich .................................................................................. 26 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 28 

Letter, dated January 26, 2009, from Tim Reisch, Secretary of Corrections—State of South Dakota Department of Corrections to Hon. John 

Thune ............................................................................................................. 28 

WITNESSES

Hon. John Whitmire, Texas State Senator ............................................................ 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Richard A. Mirgon, President-Elect, Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) International .................................................................. 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Gary D. Maynard, Secretary, Maryland Department of Public Safety and 

Correctional Services ........................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Steve Largent, President and CEO, CTIA—The Wireless Association ............ 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

John M. Moriarty, Inspector General, Texas Department of Criminal Justice .. 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

APPENDIX

Hon. Barbara Mikulski, U.S. Senator from Maryland, prepared statement ...... 35 

Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants (CURE), prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 36 

Jay Salkini, President and Chief Executive Officer, Tecore Networks, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 38 

Letter, dated July 13, 2009, to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and Hon. Kay 

Bailey Hutchison from Jim Rubenstein, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Corrections ................................................................................................ 40 

Letter, dated August 4, 2009, to Hon. Jay Rockefeller and Hon. Kay Bailey 

Hutchison from Rep. Jerry Madden, Texas State House of Representatives . 40 

Letter, dated July 13, 2009, to Hon. Jay Rockefeller and Hon. Kay Bailey 

Hutchison, from Jon Ozmint, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections .................................................................................................................. 41 

Letter, dated January 14, 2009, to Hon. Sam Brownback from Roger Werholz, 

Secretary, Kansas Department of Corrections .................................................. 42 

Letter, dated January 21, 2009, to Hon. John F. Kerry from Harold W. 

Clarke, Commissioner, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive 

Office of Public Safety and Security, Department of Correction ...................... 42 

Letter, dated January 21, 2009, to Hon. Edward M. Kennedy from Harold 

W. Clarke, Commissioner,The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive 

Office of Public Safety and Security, Department of Correction ...................... 43 

Letter, dated January 20, 2009, to Hon. Blanche Lincoln from Larry Norris, 

Director, Arkansas Department of Correction ................................................... 43 

Letter, dated January 20, 2009, to Hon. Mark Pryor from Larry Norris, 

Director, Arkansas Department of Correction ................................................... 44 

Letter, dated December 17, 2008 to Hon. Mark Pryor from Larry B. Norris, 

Director, Arkansas Department of Correction ................................................... 44 

Letter, dated December 17, 2008 to Hon. Blanche Lincoln from Larry B. 

Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction ...................................... 45 

Page

IV 

Letter, dated March 3, 2009, to Hon. Bob Corker, from George M. Little, 

Commissioner, State of Tennessee—Department of Correction ....................... 46 

Letter, dated March 3, 2009, to Hon. Lamar Alexander, from George M. 

Little, Commissioner, State of Tennessee—Department of Correction ........... 46 

Letter, dated July 27, 2009, to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and Hon. Kay 

Bailey Hutchison from Anne Milgram, Attorney General and George 

Hayman, Commissioner—Department of Corrections, State of New Jersey, 

Office of the Attorney General, Department of Law and Public Safety .......... 47 

Letter, dated July 14, 2009 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and Hon. Kay 

Bailey Hutchison from Harold Feld, Legal Director—Public Knowledge; Michael Calabrese, Vice President and Director Wireless Futures Program— 

New America Foundation; Sascha Meinrath, Director—Open Technology 

Institute; Jonathan Lawson, Executive Director—Reclaim the Media; Joshua Breitbart, Policy Director—People’s Production House; Stephen 

Renderos, Organizer—Main Street Project; Amanda Deloney, Network Coordinator—Media Action Grassroots Network (MAG–NET); Tracy Rosenberg, Acting Director—Media Alliance; Malkia Cyril, Executive Director— 

Center for Media Justice ..................................................................................... 48 

Letter, dated July 13, 2009, to Julius Knapp, Chief, Office of Engineering 

and Technology, Federal Communications Commission from Christopher 

Guttman-McCabe, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA—The Wireless 

Association ............................................................................................................ 51 

(1) 

CONTRABAND CELL PHONES IN 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: PUBLIC SAFETY 

IMPACT AND THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS 

OF JAMMING TECHNOLOGIES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Pryor, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator PRYOR. We will go ahead and call the hearing to order. 

This hearing is called, ‘‘Contraband Cell Phones Correctional Facilities: Public Safety Impact and the Potential Implications of 

Jamming Technologies.’’ And I want to thank my colleagues for 

being here today. And I know that we have several other committees that are meeting right now, so we may have some Senators 

coming and going. 

So what I’d like to do is just give a brief opening statement, then 

let the Ranking Member, Senator Hutchison, give hers, and then 

maybe dispense with other opening statements, unless Senators 

want to do that, and then hear from the panel, and then we’ll have 

a robust discussion. 

Over the past two decades, the number of wireless subscribers in 

the United States has grown from 3.5 million to about 270 million. 

At the same time, these devices have shrunk from the size of a 

brick to a little bigger than a matchbox. These cell phones can do 

much more than make a call. They can take pictures, they can surf 

the Internet, they can send text and e-mail messages. 

While advances in technologies have benefited consumers, there’s 

also a dark side. More and more, cell phones are being smuggled 

into prisons. Inmates are using them to continue criminal activity 

behind bars. In the worst cases, prisoners are organizing gang activity, intimidating witnesses, and ordering murders from their 

cells. This has to be stopped. 

Correctional officers have stepped up efforts to find such devices 

by using phone-sniffing dogs and searching prisoners, visitors, and 

prison workers. In addition, there is technology being deployed to 

detect and locate and monitor contraband cell phones in prison. 

But the question remains, are these tools enough? 

2 

Some have suggested that wireless jamming technology would be 

effective in stopping the use of contraband cell phones. The FCC, 

however, has prohibited the testing of jammers by states as a violation of the Communications Act. In addition, groups have voiced 

concern that jamming may interfere with public safety and commercial wireless communications. There are also questions about 

how well jammers work and whether other technologies are better 

suited to address the problem. 

We have an esteemed panel of witnesses to provide testimony on 

these issues. I want to thank our panel for being here today and 

making your time and testimony available to us. But before I introduce the panel, I would like to ask the Ranking Member, Senator 

Hutchison, to make her opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very 

pleased to be here, and I so thank you for calling this hearing, because I will discuss the bill that I have introduced that I hope is 

going to give law enforcement and prison officials more capabilities 

to protect the public. And I look forward to talking about that. 

In 2008 alone, corrections systems reported startling numbers of 

confiscated phones. California reported nearly 3,000 phones found 

with inmates. Mississippi had nearly 2,000. The problem is not 

unique to just states. The Federal Bureau of Prisons reports they 

confiscated more than 1,600 phones during 2008. 

Cellular phones inside our Nation’s penal system act as a force 

multiplier for criminals. A single phone can be shared among numerous inmates, and just a few phones inside a prison can lead to 

a coordinated attack on guards and facilitate escape attempts. 

According to the Justice Center at the Council of State Governments, three inmates, including a convicted killer, arranged for 

their escape from a Kansas facility using a contraband cell phone. 

In Tennessee, an inmate used a cell phone to plot an escape that 

resulted in the death of a corrections officer. And in June of last 

year, inmates at three Oklahoma correctional facilities coordinated 

an outbreak of violence across the system, resulting in three deaths 

and many injuries. 

Cell phones have been used to carry out threats and attacks 

against the public. One of our witnesses today, my friend, State 

Senator John Whitmire, was the target of a death row inmate 

using a cell phone. In one heartbreaking case, an inmate on trial 

for murder in Maryland orchestrated the assassination of a witness 

against him using a smuggled cell phone in prison. The witness 

was gunned down outside his home in front of his children. 

Our law enforcement officers and prosecutors have a difficult job 

to do. Can you imagine how much more difficult it is when witnesses might be afraid to testify because an inmate inside a prison 

can threaten them and their family from the comfort of their prison 

cell? We’re seeing a dramatic rise in the number of ongoing criminal enterprises orchestrated from prison cells via cell phone, including drug trafficking. 

So what can be done? This morning, we will hear from a number 

of witnesses on the front lines. The states clearly have an imporVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:08 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\56406.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
3 

tant responsibility. But, Mr. Chairman, we do too. To be successful, 

our corrections officers need as many tools as we can give them to 

prevent the use of phones if they evade detection and discovery. 

When a single call can result in someone’s death, we have an obligation to exhaust every technology at our disposal. 

At the moment, the FCC Act, Federal Communications Act, prohibits the use of jamming devices in all but a few cases. The prohibition against intentional interference serves an important purpose. Unregulated use of jamming technology could pose significant 

risk to commercial wireless operations and also public safety communications. I am mindful of those concerns, and I believe they are 

legitimate. But I’m also concerned that the efforts being made at 

the state level alone are not sufficient to keep pace with the scope 

of this problem. 

In January, I introduced Senate Bill 251, the Safe Prisons Communications Act. I am joined in this bipartisan effort by several 

members of the Committee, and my lead co-sponsor is Senator Barbara Mikulski from Maryland. The bill preserves the general prohibition against intentional interference with wireless communications. However, it creates a process for correctional facilities to seek 

a waiver from the FCC to operate a wireless jamming device. 

The bill does not grant this authority outright. It directs the FCC 

to conduct a robust rulemaking in which it considers whether it is 

in the public interest to allow waivers, and under what circumstances. The Commission will also conduct a device approval 

process that ensures that devices operate with the lowest possible 

power output and include other interference mitigating measures. 

Each correctional facility would have to apply individually for the 

ability to deploy jamming technology. 

So, Mr. Chairman, let me say that AT&T and Verizon, the largest providers at this time, have worked with our staff to try to address the concerns which are legitimate of the wireless companies. 

And I want to work with them and continue to work with them. 

I also look forward to working with the representative of an organization that represents the wireless communications companies, because it’s in everyone’s interest that we not interrupt service to legitimate consumers. 

However, we also need to make sure that when a person is incarcerated in prison, that the public should feel safe from that particular criminal. And that’s the way it used to be before the sophisticated criminal and the sophisticated technology intervened. So 

I’m going to continue to work with everyone in this process, all of 

the public service providers, the prison and corrections facility representatives. 

But, Mr. Chairman, we do have a responsibility here, and I hope 

that after this hearing and in working with all of the people and 

entities involved in this, that we will learn enough that we can 

move my bill and Senator Mikulski’s bill and the bipartisan support that we have in a way that walks the very fine line to assure 

that service is not interrupted for legitimate people, but when 

someone goes to prison, that the public is safe from that person 

truly. And we need to work on it right now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

4 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. You mentioned Senator Mikulski 

from Maryland, and Senator Mikulski wanted to be here this morning, but she’s voting on healthcare reform in the HELP Committee. 

And she and Maryland Governor O’Malley are deeply troubled that 

prisoners have been able to use cell phones to commit crimes from 

prison. It’s a problem in Maryland and nationwide. 

And Senator Mikulski wanted to thank the Commerce Committee for holding the hearing to try to address those troubling 

problems and try to find solutions to stop it. And I know that you 

and Senator Mikulski worked very hard on that. 

What I’d like to do now is turn this over to our panel of witnesses. We’d ask that witnesses keep their opening statements to 

5 minutes. And there’s a light system there with a timer for your 

convenience. And what I’ll do is just briefly introduce each one, and 

then just go down the row and let you make your 5-minute opening 

statement. 

First, we’re going to hear from the Honorable John Whitmire. 

He’s a State Senator from Texas. Second, we’ll hear from Mr. Richard Mirgon. He’s the President-Elect, Association of Public-Safety 

Communications Officials—International. Then it’ll be Mr. Gary 

Maynard, Secretary, Maryland Department of Public Safety and 

Correctional Services. 

Next will be a very familiar face and friend here to this committee, Mr. Steve Largent, President and CEO of CTIA. And next 

we will hear from Mr. John Moriarty, Inspector General, Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Senator Whitmire? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WHITMIRE, 

STATE SENATOR, TEXAS 

Mr. WHITMIRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members. And to 

my Senator Hutchison, thank you for bringing this timely topic to 

our attention. I’ve chaired criminal justice in the State Senate in 

Texas since 1993. And every time I thought I had seen everything, 

Senator, you see something else. And also, I can say is what you 

don’t know is what scares you the most in this business. 

In that context, last October, I received a call at the District office in Houston, returned that phone call, and this individual starts 

describing conditions on death row. Toward the end of the conversation—I assumed I was talking to a guard that was reporting 

circumstances. And I asked him, ‘‘Who are you and where are you?’’ 

He said, ‘‘I’m on death row. I’m an inmate.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, how are 

you talking to me?’’ He said, ‘‘On a cell phone.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, how’d 

you get the cell phone?’’ He said, ‘‘$2,100 to a guard.’’ I said, ‘‘How 

do you keep it charged?’’ ‘‘Oh, I have a charger.’’ 

That began a conversation over a period of about 2 weeks with 

a convicted capital murderer on our death row, working with the 

Inspector General, Mr. Moriarty. Two weeks later, his family was 

arrested because they had purchased the phone, given it to a correction officer, and this began the extreme issue of how to remedy 

cell phones in the State of Texas. We have 158,000 inmates located 

in 112 locations. 

The Governor ordered a lockdown, cell-by-cell search. Hundreds 

of phones were discovered. We actually determined that Mr. 

Tabler, the inmate who had called me, was sharing a death-row 

5 

phone with nine other death-row inmates. The other nine inmates 

were members of very violent gangs still working on the streets of 

the State of Texas: Texas Syndicate, Texas Mafia. They had used 

2,800 minutes on that one phone the month before his placing a 

call to me. 

I can’t stress to you how serious a public safety issue I think this 

is. After the arrest of his mother and grandmother, who had assisted in acquiring and paying the time on his phone, he threatened to have me killed. One of our conversations consisted of his 

talking about my family members. Law enforcement tells me he 

was threatening me, letting me know that he had done searches on 

my addresses and family members. 

So I can’t stress on behalf of the people that I represent, your 

constituents across this Nation, we’ve got to put a stop to it, have 

zero tolerance. I’m told that the jamming is one of the most valuable tools. We have used pat-downs, dogs, and metal detectors. I’ve 

demanded zero tolerance within our prison system. But we need 

this additional tool. And I thank you for allowing us to discuss it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitmire follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WHITMIRE, TEXAS STATE SENATOR

The fastest growing and most alarming development in the introduction of contraband within the Texas prison system is the inmate’s use of cell phones. I am here 

today to support Senator Hutchinson’s Senate Bill 251, which would allow the jamming of contraband cell phones within a prison setting. Based on my personal experiences of having a death row inmate, convicted of two senseless murders, call me 

several times on his cell phone while incarcerated on Texas’ death row. These calls 

were made from the Polunsky Unit’s death row section, which is supposed to be the 

securest part of the Texas prison system. 

On October 7, 2008, my office received a phone message from an individual who 

claimed to be a personal friend of mine. Although I did not recognize the name, I 

returned the call later that evening. During the conversation, the individual admitted he really did not know me but he was contacting me to ask for assistance for 

a death row inmate he knew who had complaints about the conditions of his housing. Later in our conversations he admitted that he was that death row inmate and 

his name was Richard Tabler. Not being convinced or thinking it was even possible 

for him to make such a call, he proved his identity by holding the phone so that 

I could hear the unforgettable sounds of a prison in the background, the clanging 

of steel doors and hollering of voices. 

Now convinced that he was a death row inmate and using a cell phone from prison I contacted John Moriarty, the Inspector General for the Texas Board of Criminal 

Justice, who heads up the agency with police powers to investigate crimes in prison. 

We agreed that I would continue to accept these calls while his office opened an investigation to locate and seize the phone from inmate Tabler. In subsequent cell 

phone conversations inmate Tabler discussed my two daughters, where they lived 

and other details that he wanted me to know he knew. Frankly, that scared the hell 

out of me and convinced me that an inmate having this ability represented a major 

public safety issue. 

While working with John Moriarty, I continued to accept the phone calls to gain 

information to assist the investigation. Soon inmate Tabler began to ask favors, 

such as a special visit from his mother who lived out of state. The issue came to 

a conclusion on October 20, 2008, when a cross state police sting operation took 

place leading to the arrest of Tabler’s mother when she arrived at the Austin— 

Bergstrom International Airport on a flight from her home in Georgia. Prison officials found inmate Tabler in possession of a cell phone on death row. Inmate 

Tabler’s mother and sister were indicted with the Felony criminal offense of assisting an inmate to obtain a contraband cell phone in prison. As the investigation continued, a letter was received by OIG from inmate Tabler threatening retaliation by 

having me murdered. 

I then found out that this was not the first cell phone confiscated from death row, 

and that it was indeed the 19th cell phone that year and that 670 cell phones had 

been found system wide within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) 

6 

in 2008. I became even more concerned when it was revealed that Tabler was not 

the only death row inmates using this cell phone, as many as nine death row inmates had made over 2,800 phone calls from the same cell phone during the past 

month alone. I was also alarmed that some of these inmate where identified as 

members of prison gangs including the Texas Syndicate, Aryan Brotherhood of 

Texas and the Crips. The potential for an inmate to orchestrate an assortment of 

crimes and harass victims is a very real and present danger. 

On October 20, 2008, based on the developing investigation, Governor Rick Perry 

ordered the Texas Board of Criminal Justice to take immediate action to increase 

prison security by locking down the entire system and conducting individual cell 

searches in all 112 prison units and of all the 156,000 inmates. 

Due to these major security breaches within TDCJ and the presence of cell phones 

within the Death Row housing of the Polunsky Unit, I called an emergency meeting 

of the Senate Committee on Criminal Justice on October 21, 2008. Following the 

public hearing I sent a letter to Oliver Bell, Chairman of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, and Brad Livingston, Executive Director of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. It reads: 

After Tuesday’s hearing concerning the overwhelming amount of contraband in 

our prisons, I am convinced that an urgent, sustained response is required to 

implement zero tolerance on contraband. The prevalence of contraband is well 

documented and has been widely publicized including: 

• May 2008 media report alleging that corrupt officers were taking over a prison. 

• May 2008 KPRC news station of charges of prison corruption. 

• May 2008 media reports of prison warden removed for corruption. 

• May 2008 media reports of the Terrell Unit lockdown over contraband issues. 

• May 2008 TDCJ commitment to investigate roadside clash with KPRC news 

crew. 

• May 2008 TDCJ termination of prison captain due to corruption. 

• June 2008 Criminal Justice Legislative Oversight Committee held hearing on 

prison corruption. 

I will not even attempt to list the media coverage prior to or after the hearing 

held October 21, 2008, along with the Governor’s order for a statewide lockdown 

of the entire prison system to search for contraband. I am totally convinced that 

unless the following improvements are immediately implemented, significant 

safeguards will not be in place: 

• A complete search of all individuals entering a prison to include the use of 

electronic metal detectors (only 22 units out of 112 have these machines), 

searching of property and pat down searches, monitored by law enforcement 

and ranking prison officials. 

• Cell phone jamming blockers and monitoring systems. 

• Increased and constant use of drug detection dogs or systems. 

• Rewards for inmates and correctional officers reporting contraband violations. 

• Vigorous prosecution of alleged violators and strong punishment. 

• Maximized use of surveillance cameras with the capability to digital record 

the video and audio. Equipment must be in all areas of each unit (TDCJ has 

5000 old cameras among 112 unit, many not operative, while Texas Youth 

Commission with 14 units has 8,000 new digital cameras with recording capability). 

• Long term movements to professionalize the correctional officer positions and 

their supervisors, with increased compensation and higher entry standards. 

It is imperative that Mr. Livingston advise Mr. Bell, the Legislature and the 

State leadership in a very detailed, accurate, and urgent manor of the resources 

required to correct the observed and documented dysfunctions within TDCJ operations. 

I understand the challenges of operating the second largest prison system in our 

nation, but we must respond to these challenges with a sense of urgency and 

have the will to conquer and overcome the barriers in front of us. The citizens 

of Texas deserve no less than our maximum efforts and will not settle for less 

than significant, sustained, and successful actions. 

I would love to report to this committee that the intensive actions taken so far 

have resolved the problems of cell phones in prison; however, that is not the case: 

7 

• the additional money appropriated to TDCJ during our last legislative session 

will not be enough to fix this matter in the long term, 

• and the enhancements to our criminal laws to aid prosecution of these matters 

and increased penalties will not in itself solve these problems. 

Our problems and those of other states in combating contraband cell phones in 

our prison system continues and requires additional tools to correct this issue. Since 

the system wide lockdown and searches were completed, an additional 946 cells 

phones have been confiscated in the Texas prison system this year. 

The authority to jam cell phones in specified prison property, will help render 

these contraband items useless. Cell phone jamming is a required element that is 

needed to resolve this problem. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. MIRGON, PRESIDENT-ELECT, 

ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC-SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS 

OFFICIALS (APCO) INTERNATIONAL 

Mr. MIRGON. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, 

and other members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to be here today. I am Richard Mirgon and I currently serve 

as the President-Elect of the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials. We’re widely referred to as APCO International. 

APCO International was established in 1935 and is the largest 

public safety communications organization in North America, representing nearly 16,000 members worldwide. 

I come here with some unique experiences. During my career, 

I’ve spent 14 years as a Deputy Sheriff in Jefferson County, Colorado, where I spent my first year working at a large correctional 

facility. I then spent the last 18 years as a Director of Technology 

Services for Douglas County, Nevada, until my recent retirement 

in 2008. 

As a member—as Director of Technology Services, I managed all 

public safety communications, information technology, emergency 

management for the county and first-responder agencies. Prior to 

that, I spent 4 years in the United States Air Force, where I had 

some experience dealing with radio frequency jamming. 

All this shows that I have a full understanding of all these issues 

being discussed today. As a former Deputy Sheriff, I personally appreciate you scheduling this hearing to address an important, yet 

complicated, issue. This issue is very important to not only myself 

personally, but APCO International. And we do fully believe that 

something needs to be done to deal with these issues occurring in 

today’s prisons. 

However, APCO’s position, as we stand today, we are in opposition to RF jamming for a number of reasons. And I would like to 

discuss five of those reasons. First, we believe it puts our public 

safety radio systems at significant risk for interference, and that 

puts the lives of first responders at risk. 

A petition just recently filed with the FCC incorrectly asserts 

that these bands don’t have interference today because the spectrum is properly regulated and managed. Yet, as many of you may 

recall, public safety is still working through rebanding issues 

brought about by unintended and unforeseen consequences from a 

major wireless carrier that has cost public safety hundreds of millions of dollars to correct and could, in the end, cost over $2 billion. 

Second, we do not believe it is effective. Since the early days of 

incarceration in jail, inmates have found ways to communicate with 

8 

the outside, everything from coded letters and messages to defeating high technology inmate phone systems. This technology will not 

be any different. Some very smart inmate in a prison who has a 

degree in engineering or just plain creative will devise some way, 

such as extending the antenna on the cell phone, to bypass the 

jamming. They potentially could take an amplifier out of another 

phone and use it to amplify their signal to bypass any jamming in 

that type of technology. 

Third, this has been compared to how technology is used in other 

countries and how well it works. The problem is, our spectrum is 

not lined up as it is in other countries. In many European countries, that spectrum for public safety is entirely different from spectrum used for cell phones. Our spectrum is interleaved with the 

commercial wireless spectrum at this time. 

Fourth, as I’ve referred to earlier in a petition that has been filed 

yesterday with the FCC, cell phones, it states, can have multiple 

unintended consequences if it is not done with adequate planning. 

Will every system have adequate planning? Assuming it does, will 

it stay that way? Anyone who’s managed a radio system has stories 

about someone without proper knowledge or experience moving an 

antenna, modifying an antenna, making a change to a system, and 

causing unintended interference that has shut down systems. 

Finally, we believe that there are more effective methods in dealing with cell phone use in institutions, such as here in D.C., where 

they use cell phone detectors, been working effectively. And for 

many years, cell phone interception was used in Nevada in casinos 

for casinos to derive additional revenue where they intercepted the 

signal and rerouted it. And, from an experienced public safety person, you couldn’t make a cell phone call from inside a casino without that casino intercepting it. So we believe that there is proven, 

effective technology that would be less intrusive on public safety. 

APCO fully appreciates that the sponsor and supporters are 

merely attempting to find solutions to a growing problem. If Congress should choose to move forward, we would like to make the 

following regulations: ensure that there is no possibility of interference with public safety communications; ensure that there is no 

possibility of interference with cellular 911 calls; eliminate the risk 

of diversion of cell phone jamming technology to illegal markets; 

continue to recognize the primary of public safety communications; 

require priority consideration of alternative methods in addressing 

this problem; provide an acceptable level of product quality; and 

potentially offer assurance bonds by the manufacturer of the equipment to allow for funding that could be used to correct any interference problems that may occur. 

In closing, once again, APCO does not support jamming as it’s 

designed today and believes other methods should be used to resolve this issue. However, we do look forward to working with the 

prisons and other folks to help solve this problem and get them a 

solution that is workable for everyone. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mirgon follows:] 

9 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. MIRGON, PRESIDENT-ELECT, ASSOCIATION OF

PUBLIC-SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS OFFICIALS (APCO) INTERNATIONAL

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and other members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. As a former Deputy 

Sheriff, I personally appreciate you scheduling this hearing to address an important, 

yet highly complicated issue. I understand first hand the importance of combating 

organized criminal and gang-related networks inside and outside of our Nation’s correctional facilities, as well as inside and outside of our national borders. Because 

of the established nexus between criminal enterprises and the funding of terrorism, 

I also understand that this is not just a matter of public safety or criminal justice, 

but of national and homeland security. 

I am Richard Mirgon, and I currently serve as the President-Elect of the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International, more widely referred 

to as APCO International. I come here with some unique experiences. During my 

carrier, I spent 14 years as a Deputy Sheriff in Jefferson County, Colorado where 

for my first year I worked in a large correctional facility. I then spent the last 18 

years as the Director of Technology Services/911 for Douglas County, Nevada, until 

my recent retirement in late 2008. As Director of Technology Services/911 for Douglas County, I managed all public safety communications, information technology and 

emergency management for the county and its first responder agencies. Prior to all 

this, I spent 4 years in the Air Force where I had some experience with Radio Frequency Jamming. All this allows me to have a full understanding if the issue that 

is being debated today. 

For the benefit of those of you that do not know, APCO International was established in 1935 and is the largest public safety communications organization in North 

America, representing nearly 16,000 members worldwide, most of whom are state 

or local government employees, who build, supply, manage and operate communications systems and facilities for police, fire, emergency medical services and other 

state and local government public safety agencies. APCO serves the needs of more 

than 100,000 professionals in the public safety communications industry with training, frequency coordination, engineering, licensing, advocacy, and networking services and opportunities. APCO International is the largest FCC-certified frequency 

coordinator for Part 90, Public Safety Pool channels, and appears regularly before 

the FCC on a wide variety of public safety communications issues. APCO includes 

law enforcement, fire, EMS and other public safety professionals, that is composed 

of experienced, front line technical experts implementing and overseeing current 

systems in the field, and is solely focused on public safety communications (including voice, data and video, or radio and information technologies). Thus, we have long 

provided an informed safe haven for public safety to research, discuss, debate and 

come to consensus on issues of significance to our profession. As part of the Nation’s 

criminal justice system, our members also interact on a daily basis with our correctional institutions and professionals. 

When a death row inmate can illegally access a cell phone to call and threaten 

a state legislator and his family, something needs to be done. When criminals in 

lock up awaiting trial can access cell phones to get others to intimate or kill witnesses, something needs to be done. When drug trafficking leaders in prison can direct international drug smuggling operations from inside our correctional facilities, 

something needs to be done. Clearly, there is a need to confront this problem of illegal communications deriving from, among and into our correctional facilities. The 

question is, what is the best, most efficient and effective solution to realize the results we intend; and how do we do so without unintentionally creating other, possibly more severe problems? We look forward to working with you to help to come 

closer to these answers. 

As long ago as the mid-1990s, the Southern Poverty Law Center provided extensive evidence and training to our law enforcement community on the emerging cooperation of domestic and international terrorists, organized crime, gangs, international criminal enterprises, drug cartels and others, including prison-based recruitment of extremists and ongoing criminal networks. Recent intelligence and 

criminal investigations, including the emerging problems in the U.S. Southwest Border, provide further evidence of this ongoing threat. Still, I strongly urge Congress 

and this committee to move carefully, thoroughly and comprehensively in addressing illegal communications of prisoners with others within and beyond our correctional institutions. 

APCO’s position is that we do not support cell jamming until such time that the 

vendors and user of this technology can prove that there will be NO negative impact 

on public safety networks and access to 9–1–1 by legitimate users and that all other 

viable alternative have failed. 

10 

APCO fully appreciates that the sponsor and supporters are merely attempting 

to develop a process to allow for the FCC to consider use of cell jamming technology 

in the correctional setting, and that the legislation does not intend to simply allow 

for acquisition and use of such technologies without a more comprehensive rulemaking process by the FCC. Following is a breakdown of the eight categories that 

APCO suggest as the primary goals and objectives for Congress to incorporate if it 

should choose to move forward with this policy area: 

• Ensure that there is no possibility of interference with Public Safety Communications in or around correctional facilities, especially during an emergency. 

• Ensure that there is no possibility of interference to cellular calls to 9–1–1 outside the prison. 

• Eliminate the risk of diversion of cell jamming technology to illegal markets as 

contraband for terrorists and other criminals. 

• Continue to recognize the primacy of public safety communications separate and 

apart from, as well as ahead of, other non-emergency, commercial interests. 

• Require priority consideration of alternative means of addressing illegal cell 

phone use in correctional facilities. 

• Provide for Acceptable Level of Product Quality. 

• Require Users to post an assurance bond for each system deployed to insure 

funds are available to correct any interference problems created. 

• Actively reach out, include and incorporate the experience, knowledge and perspectives of those in the military, public safety and national security communities (to include FBI, NTIA, NIST, NIJ, TSWG, SPAWAR and others) that are 

testing, researching and using cell jamming technology both here and abroad to 

gain their cooperation, experience and insights on this most important matter. 

Interference with Public Safety Communications 

The public safety community is still dealing with the interference issues that developed with NEXTEL and the 800 MHz public safety systems, which led to a massive, multi-billion dollar project to relocate public safety radio systems. Thus, we 

must take every possible effort to avoid similar problems from cell-jamming equipment in prisons or elsewhere. Cellular jamming will likely not discriminate between 

voice and data traffic. Many public safety agencies rely heavily on wireless providers 

for their mobile computing backhaul needs. Access to data (tactical plans, records, 

GIS, documents, pictures) in the field can greatly affect the speed and efficacy responders have in dealing with a situation. The potential of jamming outside of the 

environment of a prison, even if the devices are carefully tailored to avoid public 

safety frequencies, may not just disrupt 9–1–1 calls, they may also disrupt responders who may need to use these cellular data services in response to an issue within 

or around the prison campus. 

Interference with 9–1–1 Calls 

APCO is concerned that the use of jamming devices could block 9–1–1 calls from 

wireless telephones outside the correctional facility, creating a serious threat to the 

safety of life and property. In many communities, the majority of 9–1–1 calls are 

from wireless telephones. We must ensure that these devices will not interfere with 

a cellular 9–1–1 call to a public safety answering point. 

Diversion of Cell Jamming Technology 

The current legislation establishes provisions for destruction of cell-jamming devices when no longer in use within prisons, thus addressing the problem of cell-jamming devices falling into the wrong hands. However, APCO encourages the committee and Congress to look at more accountable and that a registry is kept by a 

third-party entity, and that any device in use must be registered. 

Primacy of Public Safety Communications 

The most recent draft of the legislation continues to commingle and equate commercial and public safety interests. APCO strongly believes that public safety and 

emergency communications are a higher level priority concern, and must be dealt 

with separate and apart from non-emergency commercial communications issues. 

Consider Alternative Means of Preventing Illegal Cell Phone Use in Prisons 

Correctional facilities, wireless carriers and others should be required to explore 

other means of addressing this problem. For example, could prison security be enhanced to stem the flow of contraband into prisons? Are ‘‘cell sniffing’’ devices an 

option for finding cell phones behind prison walls? Could wireless carriers install 

11 

‘‘microcells’’ to capture calls from within prisons and nearby areas, so legitimate 

calls can be separated from illicit calls? 

Quality of Cell Jamming Technology 

There seems to be a broad variety of equipment available to perform jamming. 

Some have military precision and that are developed by the defense industry, however others are relatively inexpensive devices which have little control aside from 

an on/off switch. Careful consideration must be given to exactly which form of device 

may be approved for these environments, as allowing a ‘‘jammer’’ may be allowing 

a device costing hundreds dollars to cripple a public safety system costing millions 

of dollars. 

Incorporate Military, Public Safety & National Security Communities 

APCO understands that the same technology that is proposed for providing cell 

jamming capabilities for purposes of illegal prison communications is currently utilized by our military and law enforcement agencies for protecting against radio controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs). As well, APCO understands that 

NTIA has already approved FBI’s use of cell jamming technology for domestic capabilities against any potential RCIEDs, which often will be incorporated into Vehicle 

Borne IEDs that are commonly used against our troops and others by terrorists and 

insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Indeed, DHS is currently funding 

the expansion of our domestic capabilities in this area. 

APCO was recently informed that NIJ and SPAWAR have also tested cell jamming technology for purposes of domestic use, and possibly specifically as it pertains 

to correctional settings. The most recent draft of the legislation only requires FCC 

to include ‘‘at least one outside body’’ in its development of pilots and testing of such 

technologies. We would encourage Congress to provide more formal direction and assist to FCC by specifically including those entities and associations with experience 

in researching, testing, implementing and overseeing cell jamming capabilities, particularly as it relates to potential interference with priority and emergency communications. 

We at APCO look forward to continuing to work with Congress, the FCC, and our 

criminal justice and industry partners to effectively and efficiently deal with the illegal smuggling and unauthorized use of cell phones and other means of communication into, within or deriving from our Nation’s correctional facilities. Again, I 

thank you for your time, consideration and shared concern for our Nation’s safety 

and security from crime and terrorism, including that stemming from our correctional facilities and occupants. As the leading association for public safety technology professionals, we at APCO share your unwavering belief that technology, 

when correctly governed, tested and applied, and when implemented and managed 

in an cost effective manner, helps us to realize significant progress in our Nation’s 

economic development, public safety, and national security. I am happy to answer 

any questions that you may have at this time. 

Senator PRYOR. Our next witness, Mr. Maynard. 

STATEMENT OF GARY D. MAYNARD, SECRETARY, 

MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND 

CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 

Mr. MAYNARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I’m Gary Maynard, Secretary of the Department of Public 

Safety and Correctional Services in the State of Maryland. I’ve provided my testimony. I’ll try to make my remarks briefer today to 

allow more time for questions. 

As a member of the Association of State Correctional Administrators representing the 50 state corrections directors around the 

country, and as past President of the American Correctional Association, I am here today to support Senate Bill 251, Safe Prisons 

Communications Act of 2009. 

I’ve been involved in corrections for 39 years, working in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and in five states, serving in four of those 

as head of the state corrections agency. For those of us in this field, 

one of the most important functions is the security of our prisons 

12 

and the overall safety, not only of the institution and the people 

inside, but the community at large. 

One of the leading contributors to criminal behavior has been the 

increase in gang activity and the violence associated with it. Many 

gangs are using the prisons as a recruiting ground, building their 

numbers and jeopardizing the safety of our institutions and the 

communities to which they were returned. These groups seek out 

ways to continue their criminal activity from prison to the community, and most of those, through their use of cell phones. And the 

introduction of cell phones within our prisons are growing at an 

alarming rate. 

Senator Hutchison had mentioned that in California, over 3,000 

cell phones were found. That was twice as many as they found the 

previous year. Victims, witnesses, and public officials are being 

threatened, harassed, and even killed by prisoners with access to 

cell phones. And as was mentioned, even in our own state, a detainee, a witness who was housed in our pre-trial detention division, was convicted of ordering the death of a young man in Baltimore, a witness. He made the call from a cell phone within our facility. 

We’re not the only state, Maryland, that has these problems. 

Senator Whitmire mentioned the threats made from death row. 

Last year in Massachusetts, a maximum security inmate threatened a medical staff person to bring in a cell phone—bring in a gun 

into the prison. 

In the—it was mentioned, the escape in Kansas. Even in the 

State of Arkansas this past couple of months ago, an escape of two 

dangerous inmates was facilitated with the use of a cell phone. 

In response to this growing problem, many states, including Florida, New Jersey, and others, have made possession of a cell phone 

in prison a felony, and we intend to do that in the State of Maryland this next year, as it’s currently a misdemeanor. 

Corrections officials across the country are making every effort to 

prevent phones from entering the institutions through enhanced 

technology searches and other unconventional methods. The use of 

canines has been mentioned. We got the idea from Virginia and 

Maryland. We trained and raised our own dogs, trained them. Several states, West Virginia, South Dakota, Florida, and Arizona, are 

also following that example. 

In addition, many other states like us have invested in technology and policies to enhance our ability to control the introduction of cell phones. Phones are smuggled into our prison a variety 

of ways: on or within an inmate’s body, by visitors, by staff, tossed 

over fences or walls, concealed within deliveries or shipments of 

food, or through contractors. 

While we’re able to address each of these areas, inmates have a 

lot of time to think, and they are very innovative. We need to rely 

on all the technology we can get. We need to fight technology with 

technology. This bill would provide correctional administrators with 

the opportunity to petition the Federal Communications Commission and request the operation of a wireless jamming device. This 

would allow us to evaluate the technology and substantially improve our ability to control criminal behavior. 

13 

We don’t think that signal jamming is a total solution, but it 

would just provide another option to correctional administrators to 

deal with this issue. The states and the Federal Government have 

an equal interest in prison security. We think state correctional administrators should not be denied the opportunity to use a tool already available to the Federal Government to further secure prisons. 

In order to provide safer prisons and safer communities, we respectfully ask that you give favorable consideration to the Safe 

Prisons Act of 2009. In our view, illegal cell phone use by inmates 

in our Nation’s prisons is an issue that directly impacts our country’s public safety. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maynard follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY D. MAYNARD, SECRETARY, 

MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is Gary 

Maynard, and I serve as Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety 

and Correctional Services. 

As a member of the Association of State Correctional Administrators, I am here 

today to support S. 251, the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009. 

I have been involved in corrections for 39 years, working at the Federal Bureau 

of Prisons and in five states, serving in four of those as head of the corrections system. 

I have also served as President of the American Correctional Association. 

Throughout my career I have had an opportunity to develop successful prison 

management practices. For those of us in this field, one of the most important functions is the security of our prisons and the overall safety, not only of the institution 

and the people inside, but of the community-at-large. 

One of the leading contributors to criminal behavior has been the recent spike in 

gang activity and the violence associated with it. 

Many gangs are using the prison system as a recruiting ground, building their 

numbers and jeopardizing the safety of our institutions and the communities to 

which they will return. 

These groups seek out ways to continue to operate their criminal activity from 

prison—most often through the use of cell phones. The introduction of cell phones 

within our prisons is growing at an alarming rate. 

For example, in California, prison officials reported that they collected over 2,800 

cell phones last year, two times the amount found the previous year. 

Victims and public officials are being threatened, harassed, and even killed by 

prisoners with access to cell phones. 

Phones can be brought into prisons in a variety of ways. They are smuggled on 

or within an inmate’s body, by staff, by visitors, tossed over the fences or walls, concealed within deliveries or shipments of food and supplies, or through contractors. 

Recently, a detainee who was housed within our Division of Pretrial Detention 

and Services was convicted of ordering the death of a young man in Baltimore. He 

made the call from a smuggled cell phone within our facility. 

Maryland is not the only state facing these types of problems. In Texas recently, 

a death row inmate used an illegal cell phone to call and threaten a State Senator. 

In West Virginia, a correctional officer at the Federal Prison in Hazelton was indicted for smuggling a phone into the facility for an inmate. 

This past year in Massachusetts, a maximum security inmate threatened a medical staff member with a cell phone in an attempt to coerce her into bringing a gun 

or other weapon into the prison—a plan that was prevented by quick action on the 

part of the Massachusetts Department of Correction. 

In Nevada, an inmate escaped through the use of a cell phone which was introduced to the facility through a compromised staff member. During his escape he 

committed three armed home robberies, a kidnapping, and auto theft. 

In Washington State, correctional officers have been terminated and are facing 

criminal prosecution for their role in introducing into the facilities cell phones that 

were used to support drug activity. 

Cell phones were used to plan two escapes from prisons in Kansas. In one of the 

cases, a cell phone was used to deliver instructions to an accomplice outside of the 

14 

perimeter of the facility in order to avoid perimeter patrols—allowing the accomplice 

time to cut the fence and deliver weapons. One escape ended in a high speed chase 

and the second in a shoot out with local law enforcement. Although no one was 

killed, the presence of cell phones in the prison system allowed the threat and possibility to exist. 

In South Carolina, inmates have used cell phones to coordinate escapes, smuggle 

contraband, and commit credit card fraud for thousands of dollars. 

The Solutions 

In response to this growing problem, many States, including Florida and New Jersey, have passed legislation making the possession of a cell phone within prison a 

felony—something we hope to do in Maryland this year, where it is currently a misdemeanor offense. 

Moreover, the corrections community has continued to expand efforts to prevent 

the flow and use of cell phones within our institutions. Increased efforts have been 

made in cell phone interdiction. 

Corrections officials across the country are making every effort to prevent phones 

from entering the institutions through enhanced technology, searches, and other unconventional methods. 

For example, in Maryland, we have established a Corrections K–9 Unit—dogs 

trained to sniff out cell phones. Since June 2008 our K–9 unit has detected 85 

phones across the system. 

This strategy has been replicated in other states, including West Virginia, South 

Dakota, Florida, and Arizona. 

In addition, like many other states, we have invested in technology and policies 

to enhance our ability to control the introduction of cell phones. All of these efforts 

will lead to increased confiscation of cell phones and other contraband, but no matter what security measures are put in place, we can not possibly eliminate this 

threat altogether. 

As I mentioned earlier, phones are smuggled into our prisons in a variety of 

ways—on or within an inmate’s body, by visitors, by staff, tossed over the fences 

or walls, concealed within deliveries or shipments of food or supplies, or through 

contractors. 

While we are able to implement security measures to address each of these areas, 

our inmate population has time to think of ways to beat the system, and they are 

innovative and imaginative. 

The continued use of cell phones by incarcerated individuals to continue their 

criminal behavior puts the public’s safety in jeopardy. 

We need to be able to rely on a better method to prevent the use of cell phones. 

We need to fight technology with technology. 

This bill would provide correctional administrators with the opportunity to petition the Federal Communications Commission and request the operation of a wireless jamming device within a prison, penitentiary, or correctional facility. 

This would allow us to evaluate the technology and substantially improve our 

ability to control criminal behavior in our prisons. 

We do not believe that signal jamming will be the total solution, but it will put 

another option at the disposal of State correctional administrators. 

The states and the Federal Government have an equal interest in prison security. 

There is no legitimate reason why State correctional administrators should be denied the opportunity to seek a tool, already available to the Federal Government, 

to further secure prisons. 

Last year, the South Carolina Department of Corrections successfully demonstrated cell phone jamming within a prison without blocking cell phone service 

for people outside. 

Texas, Washington, D.C., and Maryland have all asked for the ability to pilot the 

same type of system. We feel certain the technology works. 

In order to provide safer prisons and safer communities, we respectfully ask that 

you give favorable consideration to the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009. 

In our view, illegal cell phone use by inmates in our Nation’s prisons is an issue 

that goes to the heart of our country’s public safety. 

Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Largent? 

15 

STATEMENT OF STEVE LARGENT, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. LARGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Hutchison, and Members of the Committee. Thanks for inviting me 

to address this issue. It’s an issue that CTIA and this Committee 

can fight together, the problem of contraband cell phones in prisons. We fully support your concern with this important safety 

issue. As we approach this problem together, my plea is that we 

find both the right policy solution and a technological solution that 

won’t harm the public’s legitimate cell phone use outside correctional facilities. 

Our members are committed to ensuring that only those who are 

legally entitled to possess and receive wireless service do so. This 

means increased cooperation among Federal and state law enforcement, corrections officials, and the industry, and we’re committed 

to this effort. 

That’s the right policy solution. What’s the right technological solution? Put simply, the right solution is one that effectively prohibits access by those who should not have it while ensuring that 

law-abiding citizens and public safety users enjoy the most reliable 

service possible. 

Both from a policy perspective and from a technical standpoint, 

jamming is not the best option. For more than 80 years, the policy 

of the Federal Government and this committee has been clear: the 

prevention of willful interference with radio signals. Yet, that is 

what jamming would entail. Jamming not only deprives the public 

of legitimate service, even more important, it can interfere with the 

ability of public safety officers, including first responders, to access 

their wireless service in an emergency. 

Instead, we ask you to consider other reasonable, effective, and 

affordable ideas that would better solve this problem. The first is 

cell detection. It identifies wireless devices in a given geographic 

area, like a prison, without causing problems for other wireless 

users operating in commercial or public safety bands. Cell detection 

will assist corrections officials with detection, location, and confiscation of unauthorized devices. In turn, this can provide law enforcement with call records and other types of information that can 

assist in disciplinary actions and criminal prosecutions. 

Cell detection also is compatible with wire-tapping. A recent 

high-profile case in Baltimore that was mentioned earlier, which 

led to the indictments of both inmates and correction officers, 

shows the results this type of intelligence can bring. Managed access offers a second alternative to jamming. Managed access solutions allow commercial wireless network access only to specifically 

authorized users, while blocking others. 

This solution also ensures that controls apply only within a prison and not outside of it. And because no jamming occurs, there is 

no interference to other users. So, from the industry’s perspective, 

there are less intrusive, yet effective, options to consider other than 

jamming. And these superior technologies exist today and can be 

deployed quickly. 

And to be clear, jamming is not a panacea. Even with over-jamming a facility, there’s no promise of complete success inside the 

16 

facility, though harmful interference with legitimate users outside 

the facility is all but guaranteed, especially in urban areas. 

The Congress should therefore take great care to consider the impact that any jamming proposal would have on both public and 

public safety users. Given this wide array of technical solutions, we 

believe states and industries should partner to conduct trials of 

these alternatives. And we’re discussing this approach with the 

State of Maryland today. 

CTIA strongly supports the underlying goal of S. 251. We are, 

however, concerned by procedural rules it would impose on the 

FCC. If Congress opts to allow the use of jammers, we believe the 

proper approach would be to test first, then write rules, and only 

then allow applications to jam to be considered. 

We also believe the bill should favor alternative non-interfering 

technologies, such as those I discussed here earlier, alternatives 

that would avoid altogether the problems associated with jamming 

and preserve law enforcement’s ability to gather intelligence by 

way of wire taps. 

Finally, we suggest the policymakers should also address the 

supply and demand problem at the heart of the issue. Congress in 

many states should update their contraband statutes to impose 

tougher penalties for possession, provision, or support of handsets 

inside correctional facilities. We commend states such as West Virginia and Texas that have modernized their contraband statutes 

and encourage others to follow. 

Increased airport-style security checks of all parties entering a 

correctional facility will also help this problem. Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear here today. We look forward to working with 

you to address this important safety and law enforcement issue in 

a way that ends the use of contraband phones in prisons while preserving reliable wireless service for the public and public safety. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Largent follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVE LARGENT, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of CTIA— 

The Wireless Association. 

On behalf of CTIA and its members, let me be absolutely clear from the outset 

on two points: First, we understand the reason for today’s hearing and fully support 

policymakers’ efforts to keep contraband wireless phones out of correctional institutions. Second, our carriers have no legitimate subscribers residing in these institutions and no interest in seeing inmates use wireless services to conduct unlawful 

activities or harass or intimidate the public. We want to work with the Congress 

to develop and implement measures that will solve this problem and preserve the 

ability for law-abiding members of the public to continue to reliably access the wireless services provided by CTIA’s member companies. 

Resolving this issue in a way that both protects and serves the public will require 

cooperation among Federal and state policymakers and administrators and industry, 

and I’m here to pledge the wireless industry’s assistance in this effort. That said, 

it is the wireless industry’s view that the jamming of wireless signals is not a panacea and raises potentially serious concerns that must be taken into account as Congress contemplates how to address this issue. While some parties have attempted 

to position jamming as ‘‘the solution’’ to controlling contraband phones in correctional institutions, we do not believe it should be a preferred solution given the 

availability of superior technological alternatives. 

Foremost among the concerns we have with any jamming proposal is the impact 

it could have on the ability of wireless service providers to reliably and effectively 

17 

1 U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, ‘‘High-Priority Criminal Justice 

Technology Needs,’’ March 2009, at 16. Document available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 

nij/225375.pdf. 2 Vendors in attendance at the meeting included Airpatrol of Columbia, MD, BINJ Laboratories of Quincy, MA, Electronic Entities Group or Torrance, CA, ITT of Columbia, MD, Tecore 

Networks of Columbia, MD, CellAntenna of Coral Springs, FL, and Triple Dragon Communications of Vancouver, BC. 

provide critical connectivity to public safety officers, including first responders who 

may have to enter a prison to fight a fire or deal with another emergency, and other 

legitimate customers. The public safety role of commercial wireless services is well 

known to the American public and members of this Committee. The industry provides access to 911 and E911 services, offers priority access service to government 

officials in times of natural or man-made emergencies, and is working to bring 

emergency alert services to market as soon as the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) releases the standards under which the EAS process will be implemented. Wireless consumers rely on their ability to use their wireless phones as lifelines in time of need and for their daily business and personal needs, and thus the 

possible authorization of jamming without due regard for the consequences of such 

a decision and the interference it may cause is of serious concern to CTIA’s membership. 

Since enactment of the Radio Act, this Committee has played a vital role in shaping wireless policy, and one of the long-standing cornerstones of that policy has been 

the prevention of willful interference with radio signals. This was reflected in the 

Communications Act of 1934, and reiterated in the 1990 amendments that added 

Section 333 to the Act. We believe these sound policies have worked well, and before 

departing from them we urge policymakers to consider whether there are reasonable, effective, and affordable technological solutions that would better solve the 

problem. We believe there are and want to highlight several alternative solutions 

that policymakers should consider. 

The first of these alternative solutions is cell detection, a monitoring and tracking 

approach that allows for the identification of individual wireless devices within a 

correctional environment. Cell detection does not create interference and thus these 

systems can operate without causing problems for legitimate wireless users operating in commercial or public safety bands. 

With cell detection systems, prison administrators and correctional officers can detect, locate, and confiscate unauthorized wireless devices found in a correctional environment. Confiscated wireless devices can provider correctional authorities and 

law enforcement with call records, address information, and even photographs that 

can assist in disciplinary actions and criminal prosecutions. Alternatively, once illicit devices have been detected, prison officials and law enforcement may decide to 

leave them in place and arrange to monitor them in accordance with the wiretap 

statutes. As demonstrated in the recent high-profile case in Baltimore in which a 

number of inmates and correctional officers were indicted on the basis of information gathered by wiretaps, intelligence gathered in this way can be a critical tool 

that assists law enforcement in investigations and the prevention of criminal activity. 

Cell detection technology is available today, and the United States Department 

of Justice recently acknowledged the need to improve its ability ‘‘to detect, locate, 

and defeat the use of unauthorized wireless communications devices in all operating 

environments, including in, but not limited to, correctional environments,’’ adding 

that it also requires ‘‘improved, unobtrusive means to accurately detect a broad 

spectrum of contraband to preclude its introduction into correctional . . . environments.’’ 1 These functionalities are not possible with jamming, which may thwart the 

use of contraband phones in some cases but will not prevent smuggling, identify the 

location of unauthorized devices, or assist in their confiscation. 

In addition to cell detection, another promising technological solution to this problem involves the use of managed access. This approach enables a corrections facility 

to manage wireless access in controlled area, such as a prison. Managed access 

would restrict communications on the commercial wireless networks to only a subset 

of allowed users (also known as a ‘‘white-list’’). Other users are blocked from the 

commercial system access in the area. Managed access solutions also utilize location 

determination technologies to ensure that the controls apply only in the geographic 

area of the prison. And the best part is, because no jamming transmission occurs, 

there is no interference to other users. 

Just last week, CTIA convened a day-long meeting involving North American vendors of cell detection and managed access solutions 2 and engineers from a number 

18 

of CTIA’s carrier members to discuss potential solutions to this issue. We hope our 

efforts will put the industry in a position to trial alternative solutions in partnership 

with various states, including the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Corrections, with which we have had an on-going dialogue about ways in which we can 

collaborate to resolve these issues in a way that meets the needs of the Department 

of Public Safety and Corrections and our customers. We believe these efforts will 

be successful and serve as a model that can be used in locations around the country. 

Cell detection and managed-access technologies should be considered as superior 

and preferred alternatives to jamming for two critical reasons: because jamming will 

not guarantee that contraband wireless devices will be rendered inoperable or that 

convicts won’t be able to communicate with the outside world and because jamming 

can cause harmful interference to legitimate users. Regarding the first of these 

points, jamming is not foolproof and, with either a direct line of sight to a cell tower 

or shielding from the jammer’s signal, an inmate in possession of a phone may still 

be able to complete a call or send a text message. 

Regarding the second, and more serious of our concerns, for jamming to be effective, correctional administrators will have to jam their entire facilities, fence to 

fence and everything in between. Absent a commitment to jam the entire facility, 

the same corrupt individuals who smuggle contraband phones to inmates simply can 

point out where they can be used outside the range of a jammer. To jam an entire 

facility and deal with the constantly changing radio-frequency environment, which 

is impacted by changes in network load, cell tower locations, weather, and even the 

time of year, and the helical way in which radio waves propagate (which contrasts 

with the linear nature of prison boundaries), will require ‘‘over-jamming’’ in which 

the harmful signal extends beyond the facility and into areas where legitimate users 

may be impacted. We know this because the problem of illicit wireless usage in prisons is not unique to the United States, and in other countries where jammers have 

been employed to thwart this problem, they have caused significant interference beyond their intended range. The laws of physics are universal, and these same problems will occur here if we proceed with the deployment of jamming equipment, especially in areas where correctional facilities are located in urban and suburban environments or adjacent to transportation corridors. This is often the case, as shown 

in the screen-shots accompanying testimony. 

In addition to disrupting commercial wireless service used by persons outside a 

correctional facility, a system designed to jam wireless calls emanating from within 

a correctional facility could also jam important public safety communications. The 

800 MHz public safety band is adjacent to the cellular band and the 700 MHz spectrum bands that will soon be brought into use by both commercial and public safety 

entities are interleaved with one another, thus making it quite conceivable that a 

system designed to jam commercial service might also jam communications used by 

fire departments or other public safety agencies that might be called upon to operate near or even at a prison. In contemplating the authorization of jammers, the 

Congress should consider these possibilities and exercise substantial care to protect 

both the public and public safety users. 

In our view, that care should start with a bias in favor of non-interfering technologies. However, if jamming is to be considered, the proper approach would be to 

start with rigorous FCC lab and field testing, involving industry engineers, followed 

by the establishment of rules that would govern the use of certified, tested equipment. Once FCC rules are in place, the Commission could consider case-by-case requests for the use of jammers. In evaluating such requests, the Commission should 

consider what technical alternatives are available, what actions have been taken to 

prevent the smuggling of wireless devices into the applicant’s facility or facilities, 

what procedures have been employed to locate and confiscate unauthorized devices, 

and why those procedures have proven inadequate, as well as the location of the 

facility for which authorization to jam is being sought. In areas where a facility is 

in close proximity to commercial or residential properties, or to major transportation 

corridors, jamming may not be appropriate even under tightly controlled circumstances and the Commission must weigh the public interest in evaluating requests for authorization to jam. 

Strong post-deployment safeguards also would be necessary in the event that jamming is authorized. Devices must be subject to strict chain-of-custody requirements 

and include remote shut-down capabilities to prevent them from falling into the 

wrong hands and being used inappropriately. Additionally, aggressive post-deployment monitoring should be employed to identify interference. 

Even with these safeguards in place, interference is likely, and public safety and 

wireless carriers will not know about instances of interference until after they occur. 

This forces the industry and public safety to react, and in an instance where a citiVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:08 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\56406.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
19 

3 Affidavit of John R. Campbell, Warden, Val Verde Correctional Facility, Del Rio, Texas, filed 

August 1, 2007 in Petition of the GEO Group, Inc. for Forbearance from Application of Sections 

302, 303 and 333 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and Sections 2.803 and 2.807 

of the Commission’s Rules to Allow State and Local Correctional Authorities to Prevent Use of 

Commercial Mobile Radio Services at Correctional Facilities. 4 Vince Beiser, ‘‘Prisoners Run Gangs, Plan Escapes and Even Order Hits With Smuggled 

Cellphones,’’ Wired, May 22, 2009, available at http://www.wired.com/politics/law/magazine/ 

17–06/fflprisonphones?currentPage=all. 5Mike Hellgren, ‘‘Calling the Shots: Cell Phones & Crime Behind Bars,’’ available at http:// 

wjz.com/local/cell.phone.contraband.2.999932.html. 6Special Report: Inmate Cell Phone Use Endangers Prison Security and Public Safety, Office 

of the Inspector General, State of California, May 2009, at 6. 

zen’s or public safety official’s safety or well-being is at stake, reacting after the fact 

may be too late. 

While CTIA strongly supports the underlying goal of S. 251, and although the new 

draft of the legislation does contain several improvements over the introduced 

version of the bill, we remain troubled that the bill turns the process of testing, setting rules, and considering applications for authorization on its head. The bill would 

permit applications for authorization to deploy jammers upon enactment and require the FCC to act on any such application within 60 days, yet it does not require 

testing and the establishment of rules to be completed for 1 year. This process must 

be reversed. 

Additionally, the bill lacks any reference to alternative, non-interfering technologies. The deployment of technology that includes the possibility, in fact likelihood, of interference will impose on the industry the burden and cost associated 

with regular field-testing and monitoring near thousands of correctional facilities; 

a better, less burdensome approach would be to require periodic, but unannounced 

testing by the FCC. The best approach, however, would be to give preference to noninterfering alternatives so that the problems associated with jamming are avoided 

altogether and law enforcement’s ability to gather intelligence by way of wiretaps 

is preserved. 

Finally, the bill is incomplete because it fails to address the supply and demand 

problem at the heart of this issue. We urge Congress not to lose sight of why we 

have this problem or, put differently, how wireless handsets are getting in to correctional facilities. 

Fundamentally, as the title of the hearing suggests, this is a contraband issue and 

the Congress and many states need to update and enforce their contraband statutes 

to impose tougher penalties for the possession, provision, or support of contraband 

handsets. Unfortunately, even prison officials acknowledge that ‘‘the most common 

method used by the inmate population for obtaining cell phones is through the use 

of corrupted staff’’ at correctional institutions.3 This conclusion has been repeated 

by others, including the Texas inspector general, who recently told Wired magazine 

that ‘‘there is no question that corrupt officers are involved’’ in the smuggling of contraband wireless devices,4 and Antonio Gioia, a drug prosecutor with the Maryland 

State Attorney’s Office in Baltimore, who told WJZ–TV that ‘‘It’s not a big secret. 

They [phones] are chiefly smuggled in by correctional officers.’’ 5 The motive for this 

activity is financial, as a recent report of the California Office of the Inspector General found that over 1 year, one ‘‘correctional officer received approximately 

$150,000 for smuggling approximately 150 phones to inmates.’’ 6 Remarkably, while 

the officer in question was terminated, he faced no legal repercussions for his actions. 

This kind of corruption and other efforts to smuggle contraband to prisoners must 

be stopped by significantly enhancing the penalties associated with this behavior. 

These efforts also must extend to those who facilitate the use of contraband 

handsets by paying for service. While the threat of incarceration may not deter 

those who already are imprisoned, it may cause those who provide illicit wireless 

devices or enable their use by inmates to stop for fear of facing meaningful time 

behind bars. 

We have seen the imposition of enhanced penalties work in other areas. Three 

years ago, this Committee was concerned—as we were—with the problem of 

pretexting. With our full support, congressional action imposing stiffer penalties, including criminal sanctions, helped to quickly and effectively dry up the market for 

pretexting. That approach should be tried here too, and while several states, including West Virginia, North Dakota, Arkansas, Texas, Florida, Nevada, and Indiana, 

have recently updated their contraband statutes to include specific penalties for the 

possession or provision of unauthorized handsets, many states have yet to do so. 

CTIA encourages other states and the Federal Government to enact legislation to 

make the possession, provision, or support of a contraband wireless device a felony. 

20 

7 Ibid. 

Many states also need to implement ‘‘airport style’’ security measures for staff and 

visitors who enter prison grounds. Remarkably, not all states require even the same 

level of security checks to enter a prison facility that citizens and staff routinely encounter when entering a congressional office building. In states that do require ‘‘airport style’’ security measures as a prerequisite to entry, officials ‘‘consider this interdiction method effective at curbing cell phone smuggling at the point of entry’’ and 

the Federal Bureau of Prisons believes the screening process ‘‘has been a good deterrent.’’ 7

Finally, in considering whether action is necessary to allow some limited use of 

jamming technology, CTIA also urges the Committee to ensure that the FCC actively and aggressively enforces the existing prohibition on the unauthorized use of 

jammers. Carriers and others who depend on the ability to use spectrum on an interference-free basis are encountering too many cases where individuals have engaged in unlawful ‘‘self-help’’ to jam wireless signals, often with an impact that 

reaches far beyond their intended target. 

Just this spring, CTIA identified the use of a jammer at Mt. Spokane High School 

in Mead, Washington, where school administrators had installed an illegal jammer 

to prevent students from using their phones during school hours. As it happened, 

the jammer also interfered not only with communications between commercial mobile radio service customers, but also with the county sheriff’s cross-band repeater, 

the key to enabling communications between the county’s sheriff, local police, and 

the local SWAT team. One of our carriers that serves western Kansas and eastern 

Colorado experienced a similar problem when illegal jamming equipment was deployed by the Agate School District in Colorado. We recognize that the FCC’s enforcement team is spread thin, but increased attention to, and action against, those 

who market or deploy unauthorized jammers and other devices that cause interference is both appropriate and necessary. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear on today’s panel. I appreciate the opportunity to share the wireless industry’s views on this matter and look forward to 

working with you to achieve a solution to this matter that works to put an end to 

the use of contraband phones in prisons and preserves reliable wireless service for 

law-abiding citizens. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Moriarty? 

STATEMENT OF JOHN M. MORIARTY, INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

Mr. MORIARTY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hutchison, and 

Members of the Committee, thank you for allowing me to be testify 

here today in support of Senator Hutchison’s S. 251 on the jamming of illegal wireless communications. 

My office initially became aware of the severity of the problem 

in 2004, and has been conducting criminal investigations inside the 

Texas prison system since that time. In March of 2004, investigators from my office were working an organized crime case involving 

a violent prison gang. In the course of the investigation, information was developed that a Ranking Member of the gang had ordered a murder of another member from inside one of Texas’s maximum security prisons by using an illegal cell phone. 

We intervened before the murder could take place. This case resulted in the arrest and conviction of a corrections officer for bribery and the termination of two others. 

Texas was the first in the Nation to enact legislation to make it 

a felony crime to provide a cell phone to an inmate. Despite these 

and many more aggressive steps, the problem has continued to 

grow. Texas has 158,000 inmates incarcerated in 112 secure facilities. The larger the number of inmates incarcerated, the larger the 

illegal wireless commercial device problem. 

21 

There’s a false belief that when a person is incarcerated, they 

probably when a person is incarcerated, they stop committing 

crime. Many state prison systems do not have state police criminal 

investigators embedded within the system as Texas does, and face 

an even bigger challenge to investigate the origins of these phones. 

We have identified three primary sources of these devices: carried on the person of corrupt employees or contractors, dropped in 

a specific location and smuggled into the facility by inmates, or 

concealed in packages shipped in to the prison facilities. 

On October 20, 2008, a systemwide lockdown was ordered in 

Texas and extensive search procedures were enacted, as mentioned 

earlier by Senator Whitmire. All persons entering the facilities, all 

items, were subject to searches by use of metal detectors, x-rays. 

As the search procedures became more comprehensive, the smuggling methods also changed. The inmates—and corrupt employees, 

in some cases—have changed their operational techniques by resorting to secreting devices in their body cavities in order to defeat 

the search procedures. Conducting body cavity searches is permitted only under extreme circumstances due to the intrusiveness 

of the search. This search technique is not taken lightly, and persons involved in smuggling also know this. 

Devices have been recovered in shipments of goods delivered to 

the prisons. In one case, an air compressor was intercepted and 75 

devices recovered from the tank. This is an ongoing battle for corrections departments all across the country. Investigations have 

shown that quite often, one phone may be used by numerous inmates, as Senator Whitmire mentioned earlier, using different SIM 

cards. As most of us know, a SIM card is about the size of a postage stamp. Due to the small size, they are very difficult to detect. 

Quite often, we’ll find that there’s one phone, but nine SIM cards 

or eight SIM cards being used by that one device. 

We have tried the use of some very sophisticated countermeasures, and it has not been successful in the prison environment. In Texas, investigations have revealed that the cost to have 

a cell phone smuggled inside of a prison ranged between $400 and 

$2,000 on death row. 

Since 2004, my office has aggressively investigated 2,098 illegal 

wireless commercial device cases and obtained over 2,000 subpoenas for wireless records. These investigations have shown that 

these illegal devices have been used in organized criminal activity 

involving prison gangs, drug trafficking, homicide, and solicitation 

of capital murder. 

As you can imagine, this is a massive drain on our investigative 

resources. The drug cartels operating across the border from Texas 

have a lot of assets to attempt to corrupt correctional staff. Investigations have revealed that inmates with Mexican drug cartel ties 

have been communicating through these illegal phones. The termination of the usefulness of these devices by permitting jamming 

within the confines of the prison is the most logical solution to ensure public safety. 

As the oversight authority for the system, it is my opinion that 

the State of Texas has utilized all available resources to interdict 

cell phones from entering and operating within the prisons. Signaljamming is a key component that is missing. The current situation 

22 

is a serious national threat to public safety and can only be properly rectified by passage of this legislation. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for this opportunity and would 

be happy to take any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moriarty follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN M. MORIARTY, INSPECTOR GENERAL, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for allowing me to testify here today in support of Senator Hutchinson’s Senate Bill 251 on the jamming 

of illegal wireless communication devices in prison facilities. My office initially became aware of the severity of the problem in 2004 and has been conducting criminal 

investigations on cell phones inside the Texas prison system since that time. 

In March 2004, investigators from my office were working an organized crime case 

involving a violent prison gang. In the course of the investigation, information was 

developed that a ranking member of the gang ordered the murder of another member from inside of a maximum security prison by using an illegal cell phone. We 

intervened before the murder could take place. This case resulted in the arrest and 

conviction of a corrections officer for Bribery and the termination of two others. 

Texas was the first in the Nation to enact legislation to make it a felony crime 

to provide a cell phone to an inmate. Despite these and many more aggressive steps, 

the problem has continued to grow. I believe that in order to fully appreciate the 

challenge that state systems face, you must understand how large several of the 

state penal systems are. Texas has 156,000 inmates incarcerated in 112 secure facilities. California, New York and Florida also have large numbers of inmates. The 

larger the number of inmates incarcerated the larger the illegal wireless communication device problem. 

There is a false belief that when a person is incarcerated they stop committing 

crime. Criminal law enforcement investigators who operate inside of the state prisons have a very difficult job. Unlike free world criminal investigators, the prison 

criminal investigator is dealing daily with hard-core, street-smart convicted felons, 

in most of their investigations. Many state prison systems do not have state police 

criminal investigators embedded within the system as Texas does, and face an even 

bigger challenge to investigate the origins of these phones. 

We have identified three primary sources of these devices: 

1. Carried on the person of corrupt employees or contractors. 

2. ‘‘Dropped’’ in a specific location then smuggled into the facility by inmates. 

3. Concealed in packages shipped into the prison facilities. 

In one undercover investigation, an investigator from my office posed as a member of the Texas Syndicate prison gang. He arranged a meeting with a corrupt corrections officer in a parking lot in Houston and provided her with a cell phone, $400 

and a small quantity of Heroin. During the meeting the officer detailed that she was 

working for all of the gangs smuggling cell phones. It is all about the money. 

In the case involving an offender from death row contacting Senator John 

Whitmire, the investigation revealed that the cell phone had passed through a dozen 

inmates or their family members before it reached its destination on death row. 

The extensive search procedures enacted on October 20, 2008, for all persons and 

items that enter their facilities included pat searches, metal detectors and x-rays. 

As the search procedures became more comprehensive the smuggling methods also 

changed. The inmates and corrupt employees in some cases have changed their 

operational techniques by resorting to secreting the devices in their body cavities 

in order to get past the search procedures. Conducting body cavity searches is permitted only under extreme circumstances due to the intrusiveness of the search. 

This search technique is not taken lightly and persons involved in smuggling also 

know this. 

Devices have been recovered in shipments of goods delivered to the prisons. In one 

case an air compressor was intercepted and 75 devices recovered from the tank. 

This is an ongoing battle for all the corrections departments in the country. Investigations have shown that quite often one phone may be used by numerous inmates 

using several different SIM cards. A SIM card is about the size of a postage stamp. 

In a search of one inmate, he had 4 SIM cards placed vertically into the heel of his 

shoe. Due to their small size they are very difficult to detect. The use of some very 

sophisticated counter-measure devices has been attempted and has not been very 

successful in the prison environment. 

23 

The smuggling of cell phones has become a national issue in the corrections’ public corruption arena. In Texas, investigations have revealed that the cost to have 

a cell phone smuggled inside a prison range between $400 to as high as $2,000 on 

Death Row. We have also developed evidence that money from foreign nationals involved in the anti-death penalty movement was utilized to facilitate some of these 

organized smuggling operations. Since 2004, my office has aggressively investigated 

2,098 illegal wireless communication device cases and obtained 2,035 subpoenas for 

wireless records. On October 20, 2008, Governor Perry ordered a system wide 

lockdown. 949 cell phone investigations have been opened by my office since that 

time. 

These investigations have shown that these illegal devices have been used in organized criminal activity involving, prison gangs, drug trafficking, homicide and solicitation of capital murder to name a few of the offenses. As you can imagine this 

is a massive drain on our investigative resources. 

I have been dealing with this problem on a daily basis since 2004 and have conducted extensive research into the issue, and in my opinion the solution is the targeted jamming of correctional facilities. The drug cartels operating across the border 

from Texas have a lot of assets to attempt to corrupt correctional staff to violate 

the law. Texas is very aggressive in the protection of its border, and hence the prison system ends up with cartel and gang members in custody. Investigations have 

revealed that inmates with Mexican drug cartel ties have been communicating 

through these illegal phones. The termination of the usefulness of the device by permitting jamming within the confines of the prison is the most logical solution to ensure public safety. 

As the oversight authority for the system, it is my opinion that the state of Texas 

has utilized all available resources to interdict cell phones from entering and operating within the prisons. Signal jamming is the key component missing. The current 

situation is a serious national threat to public safety that can only be properly rectified by passage of this legislation. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for this opportunity. I would be happy to take 

any questions you might have. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. I do have a couple of questions, and 

then I’d like to turn it over to my colleagues. 

First, for Mr. Largent, several states, including Arkansas, recently filed a petition for rulemaking at the FCC to permit wireless 

jamming in corrections facilities. I was wondering if CTIA is planning on taking a position on that? Have you all made a decision 

on whether to support or oppose that? 

Mr. LARGENT. Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that I’m not 

aware of that particular petition to the FCC. But I would tell you 

that what CTIA supports is—you know, we’re not here to defend 

the actions of prisoners or having cell phones in prisons. What we 

want to see is a way to stop the use of prisoners using cell phones, 

and at the same time, protect the ability of public safety and the 

public of being able to use their cell phones outside those prison 

walls. 

And the problem with jamming as a technique, in my opinion, 

it’s crude, it’s unreliable, and there are better ways to do it so that 

it doesn’t interfere with public safety’s communications, doesn’t 

interfere with the public’s communication ability, and yet, it stops 

the ability of prisoners from using cell phones. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator Whitmore, let me ask you a follow-up to 

your statement, and that is, you know, you support wireless jamming. Do you think there might be other, more effective, ways to 

do this and not use jamming? Do you feel like that’s the most efficient, effective way to stop this? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. It would certainly appear—we have certainly 

used every traditional, innovative measure in the State of Texas. 

After the incident involving my phone call, we went to a lockdown, 

24 

systemwide. It took about 2 weeks to do a cell-by-cell search. All 

employees were patted down, metal detectors, dogs. 

It’s not for lack of effort by the correction officers and their employees of trying to have zero tolerance. I can only tell you, if you 

can imagine, by meeting with correction officials and other state officials, I demanded action immediately. They told me they did the 

best they could, but we’re still experiencing phones being intercepted and used in our prisons. 

What you have to realize, and I’m sure you do, is the desire of 

these inmates and their parties to have these phones. The benefits 

are so great. Can you imagine going to death row, but still able to 

harass law enforcement, judges, prosecutors, victims, carry out a 

very profitable criminal enterprise? 

I think we’re all in agreement, it’s irrefutable that the problem 

exists, it’s what do you do about it? I’m going to tell you the State 

of Texas has 112 mostly remote, rural locations. Short of jamming 

and a complete shutting down of those phone signals, I don’t think 

we can remedy the problem. It is a public safety problem. I wish 

I—if we had the time, but probably not necessary, to put a name 

and face with these people using the phones. It’s the worst of the 

worst. 

And if they can have cell phones on death row, which should be 

the most secure area of our prison system, it just shows the extent 

of the problem. And I’m just really appealing for a common-sense 

approach. Untie the hands of prison officials and let them use all 

available tools, and address the concerns of the industry. But I 

think they can be accommodated. 

And I work close with the industry, and I’m sensitive that we not 

interfere with law-abiding citizens’ use of these phones. But really, 

public safety, as we all know, is our first priority and our responsibility as public officials. I feel we have to have this tool. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Senator Hutchison? 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just 

ask both Senator Whitmire and Mr. Moriarty, you’ve heard the 

concerns raised by Mr. Largent and Mr. Mirgon, and also, I’d like 

to ask Mr. Maynard to respond here. Why aren’t the tools that we 

have now—dogs, the ability to try to listen has been mentioned. 

Why aren’t those tools effective enough? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. I would say, Senator, the size of the problem. We 

have 158,000 inmates. Waco, Texas, we’re familiar with, is 100,000 

people. We’re literally locking up—unfortunately, but necessary— 

one and a half Waco, Texas and 112 locations. We have 40,000 of 

these TDCJ employees, 26,000 guards. 

When humans are involved, unfortunately, and there’s a profit 

motive, you’re going to have corruption and the need to apprehend 

these phones. And so I don’t think we quit using our available 

tools, but we’ve also—— 

Senator HUTCHISON. Tell me about the guard—— 

Mr. WHITMIRE.—got to use the next one. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Tell me about the guard problem. I mean, 

how—— 

Mr. WHITMIRE. Well, Mr. Tabler, the inmate on death row, when 

I asked him how he got his phone, he said, ‘‘$2,100 paid to a 

guard.’’ Most of our guards, as you know, are law-abiding, hardVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:08 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\56406.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
25 

working civil servants who put their lives on the line each and 

every day. They take home $1,900, a starting correction officer. 

Just the sheer money alone is the unfortunate incentive. 

Then they get compromised, and the whole facility is in danger, 

the community where it resides. And I’m sitting in Houston, Texas. 

My family was in danger, and all citizens of the State of Texas. 

So it’s just the size of the problem, and, like I said, it’s common 

sense. You use—it’s a war, is the way I would draw an analogy to 

it. You do not use available weapons if they’re going to be useful 

in this battle of crime. 

Senator HUTCHISON. OK. Mr. Maynard, what do you think about 

what you have available now, and why is it not enough? 

Mr. MAYNARD. Senator, as you know, the State of Maryland is 

going to host a demonstration of all the technology that might be 

used in addition to jamming. And Governor O’Malley and Senator 

Mikulski’s also petitioned the NTIA to conduct a 30-minute demonstration of jamming, just so we could see what effect it has. 

I think none of the things that we do—the dogs, the—we use in 

Maryland x-ray machines for packages coming in. We use secureview scanners for inmates to pass through like metal detectors at 

airports. We just—we have four of the BOSS chairs, the body orifice scanning system, that can detect cell phones within an inmate’s body. We’re getting 20 more of those, so we’ll have one for 

every prison. 

We are using all the technology, we think. We would like to be 

able to petition the FCC to try the jamming. It would still be reviewed. We would have to ensure that it applied only to one institution. But so far, I’ve never seen jamming, because it’s not legal 

to observe jamming unless we get permission to do that. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Moriarty, what about the expense of 

this? Is it realistic to use the technology that we have now for 

every prison throughout the United States? 

Mr. MORIARTY. The Texas legislature this past session authorized me to use and possess detection equipment. Our plans on the 

table right now are to—we’ve got budgeted over a half a million 

dollars just for that one mobile set and four full-time employees to 

go around the 112 prisons. I mean, it’s just—it’s very difficult to 

utilize that detection equipment. 

You know, there is no expectation of privacy in the penitentiaries, and the State of Texas recognized that and authorized 

those tracking of those cell phones without court order. But it is 

very cost prohibitive. We’ve looked at a lot of the methods that 

have been mentioned here today, and found that with as many facilities as we have, it’s not a wise use of taxpayer dollars. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. My time is up, and I’m going to 

let others—but I would like to have a second round. And, Mr. 

Chairman, I do have letters that I’d like to be submitted for the 

record from the state departments of correction, from South Carolina, Kansas, Massachusetts, Arkansas, and Tennessee. And Senator Thune has asked also to submit a letter from South Dakota 

in support of Senate Bill 251. 

Senator PRYOR. Without objection. Senator Begich? 

[The information referred to is contained in the Appendix.] 

26 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have to say 

in all the issues we deal with in Commerce, I never anticipated 

we’d be talking about this issue, to be very frank with you. But it 

does drive some questions for me. And I appreciate the Ranking 

Member’s effort in this area, and I actually support this idea. 

It seems like—and I’ll just make a comment, and that is for the 

technology we have today and the advancements we have with 

wireless and many other types of technology, it seems the concerns 

that I’ve heard from Congressman Largent, Mr. Largent, and others that we can accomplish this. 

Because I have sat in this same hearing having telecom people 

here, telling me how advanced and the great telecommunications 

we have and the power of technology and the advancement in 

R&D, so I believe them. So I think solving the problems that you 

have are not going to be a problem, in my view. 

But I want to go to the basic issue, and maybe—I’m not sure, Mr. 

Moriarty, if you could answer this question. But—and I’m also 

looking to Senator Whitmire. There’s 20—I’m going to use Texas— 

26,000 correctional officers, if I heard that number correctly. 

Mr. MORIARTY. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. We are solving a problem which is a symptom 

of another problem, which is we have correctional officers—and I 

agree with you, Senator Whitmire. We have an incredible—all 

across this country, correctional officers are doing fantastic work. 

They’re usually paid less than police officers, which is a problem, 

I think. That’s just my own personal belief as a former mayor. I 

think they should be equal for the work they do. 

But putting that all in perspective, it seems like we’re treating 

the symptom of a bigger problem, and that is we have a certain 

amount of officers that are taking monetary or other gain in order 

to supplement their own lifestyle and whatever. How many of the 

26,000 officers, or the folks that have been dealt with with dealing 

with this contraband, have been prosecuted and are serving jail 

time? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. Out of—my office conducts more bribery investigations than any law enforcement office in the State of Texas. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. Give me a number. 

Mr. WHITMIRE. We aggressively—we’re in the ballpark of 100 

maybe a year that we lock up. And we have our own special prison 

prosecution unit. We are very aggressive on dealing with the public 

corruption issues, whether it be drugs, cell phones, unlawful contact with an inmate, whatever it may be. But just because they resign or they walk out the door doesn’t mean we’re not coming after 

them with a warrant. We have a very aggressive program in Texas. 

Senator BEGICH. Let me, if I can, ask another question. I’m not 

sure I totally heard what you said. In regards to this type of investment, was it 500,000 per one prison that this is being sampled on? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. This is—the system that we’re looking at is a mobile system that we can go from prison to prison on, looking, 

searching at different hours of the day and night for active cell 

phones. 

27 

Senator BEGICH. And the four employees that would be part of 

that? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. They’re investigators from my office that’ll be 

specially trained on the operation of the equipment. 

Senator BEGICH. And reasonable pay? Good pay? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. Well, they’re state police officer’s pay. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. That’s one point. I was trying to do a little 

contrast there. So they’re paid more than a correctional officer? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. That’s correct. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. That just makes my point from what I said 

earlier, that we need to move those pay levels up, to be very frank 

with you. And then in regards to—if you wanted to implement this 

throughout the whole system—again, I’m using Texas as an example. You had 112—if I heard that right, 112 correctional institutions? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH. You’re talking at a minimum—if they were mobile, but stationary, 50 million or more for equipment purposes and 

then operational? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. If you were to install—there are hard-wire detection systems also. 

Senator BEGICH. Sure. 

Mr. WHITMIRE. But it would be quite a bit more than what we’re 

talking about for that one mobile system. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. Do you think—and, again, honestly, I support this legislation, because I do believe that the wireless technology of today has advanced in the last 2 years even better than 

it was 4 years ago, 6 years ago, and it will advance even more in 

the future. And I think when challenged, the wireless industry, situations like this, they will overcome the obstacles that may or may 

not be in the way, or perceived obstacles. So I think there’s great 

opportunity here. So I support the idea. I support the concept. 

But I am concerned because of the other issue, and that’s that 

this is a symptom of the core issue. You know, I have a hard 

enough time bringing a bottle of water through TSA, and it seems 

that if we focus our energy in that area, figuring out what we can 

do more with our correctional officers to ensure that they have the 

resources they need, that the institutions have the resources they 

need to ensure the highest level—when those doors are opened, 

nothing passes through. 

And I know it’s hard, because we run a prison system also in 

Alaska. But it’s a difficult challenge. And so I would just put that 

as more of a comment without—I’m not sure there is an answer. 

But that’s a great challenge. And I think you made my point, that 

the people you’re hiring, the four, are going to be paid more than 

correctional officers, because that’s part of the equation that you 

get to, and that is fair and good compensation for people who are 

working very hard under very difficult situations now. 

So I’ll just leave it at that. But thank you very much. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator Thune? 

28 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

you for holding today’s hearing and thank Senator Hutchison for 

her leadership on this issue. I’m glad to be a co-sponsor of her bill. 

I do believe that the illicit use of wireless devices by prisoners 

needs to be addressed. And, as we speak, there are countless inmates who are using smuggled cell phones to coordinate illegal activity and plan escapes or intimidate witnesses. 

And I think this legislation allows our correctional facilities in 

this country to operate cell phone jamming technologies upon the 

approval of the FCC and also set some limits on those devices to 

ensure that they don’t interfere with communications outside of the 

prison. So I think the bill is a step in the right direction, and it 

will improve the safety of our prisons by preventing prisoners from 

using wireless devices and communicating with those outside of the 

prison. 

And, as Senator Hutchison said, I do want to submit a letter for 

the record that I received from the South Dakota Department of 

Corrections, which endorses the Safe Prisons Communications Act 

of 2009 and supports its timely enactment. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Pierre, SD, January 26, 2009 

Hon. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Thune: 

I write to urge your support of the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, S. 

251 and H.R. 560. 

The bill would allow the FCC to grant waivers permitting correctional institutions 

to jam or interfere with wireless communications by inmates. Under the legislation, 

the FCC would enact rules and require applications before authorizing the use of 

such a device. The signal employed would be at the lowest, technically feasible 

transmission power to avoid jamming beyond the correctional facility perimeter. 

Jamming cell phones would be a significant aid to correctional officials in supervising inmate communications. As the Secretary of the South Dakota Department 

of Corrections, I fully support this legislation and hope you will support correctional 

institutions in South Dakota and across the Nation with your vote. 

Respectfully submitted, 

TIM REISCH, 

Secretary of Corrections. 

Senator THUNE. And I appreciate the panel this morning and the 

insights that you’re providing with respect to this issue. 

And I guess I would like to maybe just ask a couple of questions, 

if I might. One, to Mr. Moriarty, in your testimony, it’s—you made 

it clear that Texas has made it a felony to provide cell phones to 

inmates. And I guess I’m interested in knowing the results of that 

law. If that question’s already been asked, I apologize for repeating 

it. And then are inmates still obtaining and using some of these devices? And then I guess follow-up would be do you think that jamming is the most effective approach to stop further use of those devices? 

Mr. MORIARTY. The law—we’ve prosecuted numerous inmates for 

possession of the phone inside the facilities, as well as some family 

29 

members that have supplied the phones, as well as some correctional staff that have smuggled the phones in. 

The problem continues to grow. We think it’s a useful tool and 

a deterrent in some circumstances. However, they’re—when you’re 

talking taking—receiving money between $400 to $2,000, you 

know, that’s quite a bit of money to these employees. And, again, 

it’s a small percentage, but just one of those individuals can put 

lot of phones inside one of those facilities. 

Again, there has been a lot of innovation. It has been very—in 

the smuggling methods, both with the inmates—and it’s morphing 

as we get—step up and ramp up the searches, we’re finding that 

they were using false bottoms in containers. Like I said, body cavities, we’re—there’s no end to how important these phones are. We did an undercover deal in Texas where the phone was $400, 

and there was also an introduction to some heroin. And if somebody had told me 5 years ago that a phone would be $400 and heroin $50, I’d told them they were crazy. But that’s exactly what 

transpired on that undercover. 

So, I mean, it’s—I’m not saying this is—jamming is the total, 100 

percent solution to this. Texas, 22 of the 112 facilities account for 

the majority of the phones, and they are in rural, remote areas. 

We’ve also been dealing with Federal law enforcement that jam on 

occasion, and have spoken with them and consulted with them, and 

they said that they could narrow that signal and jam the specified 

area without causing any type of problem. 

I think we need—the testing and moving forward on the testing 

is critical to—I won’t want to interfere with any public safety communications also, but I think it’s a very valuable tool that we need 

to put in our tool kit. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Largent, have any of these—I know that the 

state correction facilities are looking for the opportunities to test 

some of these devices. And I guess I’m curious of knowing what 

your thoughts are about how the wireless carriers—what role they 

ought to play in testing some of these things. And have any of your 

members participated in tests so far, of jamming technologies in 

some of the prisons? 

Mr. LARGENT. No, not in jamming technologies. We are—I think 

we’re scheduled to do something with the State of Maryland to test 

some of the other technologies that are available, and, actually, 

higher-tech. And so we’re in the process right not. 

Senator THUNE. Good. And do your—I assume you believe that 

the—the carriers ought to be involved in testing, as the correctional 

facilities try to determine whether or not this is the most effective 

way? 

Mr. LARGENT. Actually, I appreciate you asking that question, 

because that’s one of our real concerns with S. 251 as it’s currently 

written, and that is that the—it’s structured in such a way that the 

equipment is installed in the prisons, and then you test, as opposed 

to testing before it’s approved. And it’s sort of backward, in our 

opinion. I think you need to test, make sure it works and works 

appropriately, that there’s no spillover effect, which is our fear, 

that the spillover effect affects legitimate cell phone use in the 

areas. And then you can authorize it to be used in a prison setting 

once you’ve tested it and make sure that it works properly. 

30 

That would be one change that I would make to S. 251 that I 

think would alleviate a lot of the fears that our companies have. 

And I’m really here, not to defend our companies, but to defend our 

customers, because they’re the ones that are going to have the disruption of service. 

And there have been cases already where the cell jamming technology is being used in prisons in South America and India and 

other places, and there are stories of up to 200,000 cellular customers, legitimate customers, whose service was disrupted. And 

that’s the kind of thing that we don’t want to see take place in this 

country. And I know nobody on this panel wants to see that happen, or nobody in the Senate wants to see it take place. 

But that’s the fear that we have in just talking about cell jamming. We think there are other technologies that are available 

today—you can buy them today and implement them—that would 

be proven technologies that would be as effective without jamming 

signals. 

Senator THUNE. Let me just ask one final question. If jamming 

devices are deployed in prisons, are there—what are the realistic 

chances that those devices would fall into the wrong hands, either 

inside or outside of the prison, and be used, for example, against 

law enforcement? Is that a concern that any of you might have? 

Mr. LARGENT. Well, I can tell you that—let me just speak for just 

a second. There’s cell jamming equipment that is out there today 

that has been sold illegitimately, and some schools, for example, I 

think in Colorado, were actually deploying them. And they didn’t 

know it was illegal. And then they—you know, it was discovered 

they were using this jamming equipment, and it was disrupting 

public safety’s ability to use this same spectrum. And so they 

quickly took it down. But it’s available illegally now. But, again, 

it’s not a legal piece of equipment in this country. 

Mr. MIRGON. Yes, sir. And what it does is in a couple instances 

where it has occurred, it shuts down what is known as the control 

channel, which makes the radio system fail. So you’re not just impacting the people right in that area, you’re impacting a whole system. 

But I will qualify those were illegally brought in, used for mischievous purposes, and did not have any of the benefits of proper 

engineering. 

Mr. WHITMIRE. I was just going to follow up. If we can’t do it 

now—I mean, I don’t know how you’re giving live examples of how 

it’s creating problems because it’s prohibited, the measures that 

we’re asking for. And we can speculate and certainly work with the 

authorities to safeguard against the instruments in the wrong 

hands, but we know for a fact today that the cell phones are in the 

wrong hands of convicted, violent offenders. And like so many 

things I know, unless they—I try to do what’s for the greater good. 

And while we share the concerns of the industry and need to 

work with them hand-in-hand to make certain that our law-abiding 

citizens’ reception is not interfered with, we certainly need to address the illicit use of it. Because it is growing, as Mr. Moriarty 

pointed out. 

And, you know, talking about additional penalties, we’ve done 

that. But you’re already serving a life sentence or a death sentence. 

31 

It’s not much of a deterrent to go ahead and make that a felony. 

It has hopefully impacted the employees, but then there, the profit 

motive takes over. So we’ve got to address that. 

But I’m just urging for a common-sense approach to untie the 

hands of—you know, it’s amazing. Mr. Largent mentioned that we 

ought to test it before it’s installed. Well, I would suggest to Mr. 

Largent, he ought to talk to the Federal officials that are already 

using it. That would be an appropriate test that I think would be 

used. 

And I would just say, as a state official, it’s nuts for me to hear 

that our Federal prison officers and law enforcement can use an instrument that we’re now requesting permission to use. So it gets 

back to common sense, I guess. 

Mr. LARGENT. I would like to address that. If I were the Senator, 

I would be as motivated and irate as he is about not addressing 

this issue. And I am totally sympathetic with what took place in 

his situation. I would say, first of all, that the jamming equipment 

that I referenced in my statement just a minute ago is in place in 

India and South America and other countries, but not in this country. So I would clarify that. 

Mr. WHITMIRE. Would it be identical? Excuse me, if I could—I 

mean, are you talking about the exact—— 

Mr. LARGENT. You know, jamming is a technology that’s ages old. 

So I don’t know that it would be the same technology or not. But— 

so anyway, I would like to just clarify that point. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. The Chairman will be back in 

just a few minutes. But let me ask—well, let me first state that we 

have another draft. Having worked with all of the interested parties who are willing to come to the table, we do have a new draft 

of the bill that will be coming out next week. And one addresses 

one of your concerns, Mr. Mirgon, that there would be a documented process for shutting down a jamming device completely if 

there is any emergency—a fire or anything where first responders 

would be affected. And we would clearly want to make that for the 

whole area that that particular band would be serving. So that is 

a part of our next draft of the bill. 

And we also have one that addresses your concerns, Mr. Largent, 

and that is that there would be inventory controls—well, first of 

all, there would be tested applications required before FCC approval. You wouldn’t have the rules going forward without the testing of the devices, which I think certainly was a legitimate concern. 

And then we also have required inventory controls for the 

jammers once they’re deployed so that you would know if the 

jammer went into another person’s hands and was then being used 

for illicit purposes. And there would be a requirement that the jamming, which does have the waiver, would be destroyed and certified 

as destroyed to the FCC when the waiver expires. 

So we want to work with all of you to assure that we put every 

safeguard in place in the bill. And I would just ask Mr. Mirgon and 

Mr. Largent if there are other areas that you would like to see addressed, will you work with us to try to do that? Because we don’t 

want to in any way harm our first responders, of course, or our 

public safety capabilities. But also, considering the testimony we’ve 

32 

heard and the experiences that are being generated all over our 

country right now, we do want to address this issue. 

So, Mr. Mirgon, Mr. Largent, what other areas would you like to 

see us sit down and address? 

Mr. MIRGON. One of the things I—and, first off, I appreciate your 

comments, and thank you for your willingness to work with us. 

And clearly, our position is, we do want to work with people to help 

solve this problem. As a public safety professional, I hear these stories. I’ve experienced many of them firsthand. Been there, done 

that. And I feel for these people, as managers, having to try to deal 

with this. 

But one of the things that we might want to consider is that ensuring that these systems can only be worked on by the manufacturer or trained technicians, and they somehow be sealed and documented. 

Because, unfortunately, I have had RF engineers work for me 

who go in and work on a piece of equipment they don’t know about. 

They make modifications to—you know, it’s like the Tim the Tool 

Man type mentality. I can make this better. And they turn up the 

power, and all of the sudden, you’ve shut down somebody else’s system. So I think that would help alleviate a lot of concerns. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Very good point. We’ll do that. We’ll make 

that happen. Mr. Largent? 

Mr. LARGENT. Well, I would just say that RF signals in general— 

and I’m not an electrical engineer—but I’m told they’re erratic and 

they’re subject to change based upon the seasons of a year, whether 

trees have leaves on them or not, and they can be erratic and unpredictable. And, you know, I think as long as the testing could incorporate those different scenarios, that it would probably be OK. 

But our concern is that you could test in the summer when trees 

have leaves and the signals may not be a problem outside the walls 

of the prison. And then in the wintertime, when the trees lose their 

leaves, the signals are a problem. And that’s just the nature of RF 

signals, from my understanding. Again, I’m not a expert in radio 

signals or RF signals. But that would be one concern that I would 

have, just that testing period that you’re referring to would test 

under all scenarios so that we can be confident that, you know, 

public safety’s not going to lose a signal or the public’s not going 

to lose the ability to make calls in and around a prison. 

Mr. MIRGON. And if may tag onto that, I think that’s a great 

idea. I believe there’s a simple solution for that, that the state 

radio shops have the ability to measure signals, and if there was 

a quarterly requirement to do just a drive-by—— 

Senator HUTCHISON. To test. 

Mr. MIRGON.—and test them, you could probably do that testing 

in under an hour to help certify that the signals are maintaining 

within those parameters. 

Senator HUTCHISON. I think these are both very doable and very 

important. And we will work with you to really put the bill in 

shape so that we can pursue both purposes. Let me just ask in the 

last minutes if there’s anything from the three representing the 

criminal justice system, anything that hasn’t been put in the record 

that you would like to see added as we wrap this up? 

Mr. WHITMIRE. No, ma’am. 

33 

Senator HUTCHISON. All right. Let me just say that Senator 

Begich has now joined as a co-sponsor of the bill. And I want to 

read the list of co-sponsors. Senator Mikulski, as we mentioned 

earlier, is the lead Democrat. Also, Senator Cochran, Senator Lieberman, Senator Thune, Senator Wicker, Senator DeMint, and 

Senator Vitter are co-sponsors of the bill. 

So I hope that we can work together. Oh, and, by the way, the 

bill has been introduced in the House, as well, and has upwards 

of 40 bipartisan co-sponsors. So it’s an issue that is very important 

for law enforcement in the states. And if we can work with the 

FCC to give the states another tool, and our Federal prison system, 

as well, I think people ought to have the right to know that when 

someone goes to prison, they are safe from that person, and particularly victims. I cannot imagine a victim who breathes a sigh of 

relief that a rapist or an attempted murderer is in prison, and all 

of the sudden, the person is not safe, even though the person is behind bars. That’s unacceptable in our country, and I want to do everything we can to stop this problem. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearing. And I look 

forward to working with everyone at the table to pursue our legislation this year. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Well, thank you. And thank you for your leadership and your attention on this issue, because you’re making a 

great difference all over the country. 

Let me just say that I appreciate the panel for being here. I appreciate your input, your thoughts, your ideas. As Senator 

Hutchison said, she’s really wanting to work with all sides to try 

to get this bill done as quickly as possible and get it moved to the 

floor whenever it’s appropriate. So I’d just encourage you all to 

reach out to her with your ideas as suggestions, because I know 

her and she’s very focused on this and wants to get this done. The 

last thing I was going to say is that there were a few Senators, because of conflicts in scheduling, that couldn’t be here today. Some 

may want to submit questions in writing. And we’re going to leave 

the record open for 2 weeks, and in the event that they do ask 

questions, we would appreciate the panelists to get those back to 

us as quickly as possible. 

With that, we’re going to adjourn the hearing. And, again, thank 

you very much for being here. 

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(35) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA MIKULSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Good morning. I want to thank Chairman Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison, for 

holding this important hearing today. Thank you for inviting me to testify on the 

Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009 (S. 251). This is a critical piece of legislation of which I am a proud to be a co-sponsor. I want to talk about why we need 

to consider and pass this bill now. 

All Marylanders were shocked and dismayed to hear about this new organized 

crime practice of using cell phones in prisons to conduct criminal activities in communities on the outside while criminals enjoy a lavish lifestyle on the inside. As one 

reporter described it, from their prison cells and with the help of corrections staff, 

members of a violent gangs feast on salmon and shrimp, sip Grey Goose vodka and 

puff on fine cigars, all while directing drug deals, extorting protection money from 

other inmates, and arranging attacks on witnesses and rival gang members. And 

ordering a hit on a Maryland father of two. 

On July 10, 2007, Carl Lackl, a 38-year-old father of two, was executed in front 

of his home in Baltimore County, Maryland. Lackl was an eye-witness to multiple 

murders who was supposed to testify at the murder trial set to begin on July 18, 

2007. The murder hit was ordered on Lackl by Patrick Byers, Jr., who was incarcerated in a Baltimore jail. The ordering of the hit was made via a text message sent 

to the killers from his cell phone, which had been smuggled into prison. 

Maryland’s talented Governor Martin O’Malley wanted to spring into action to 

jam cell phone transmissions from prison. To his dismay, he found he needed a 

waiver from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to protect the people 

of Maryland. He is right to be dismayed. 

In 2008, Maryland correction officers confiscated 847 illegal phones. This is not 

just a Maryland problem. This is a national problem: California correction officers 

confiscated 2,809 phones; Mississippi correction officers confiscated 1,861 phones; 

and Federal prison officials have found 1,623 phones. Not all phones are being found 

and the crime spree continues. 

For these reasons, I have joined this bipartisan effort and am speaking for Maryland’s can-do Governor, for the citizens of Maryland, and for the law enforcement 

officers who work so hard to catch and prosecute criminals to keep communities 

safe. They think they’ve imprisoned the criminals, but the criminals continue to operate out of jail with their smuggled cell phones. 

That’s why I’m a cosponsor of the Hutchinson bill. The Safe Prisons Communications Act allows a state to petition the FCC to block the use of cell phones from 

prison. It protects citizens. Current FCC law leaves citizens unprotected because it 

forbids the use of cell phone jammers in State and Federal prisons. The Hutchinson 

bill simply creates a mechanism to waive this ban when cells phones are being used 

illegally by prisoners. It is not a blanket waiver for all prisons. Each prison must 

individually make its case to the FCC as to why the jammer is necessary. Our bill 

double protects in case of any unintended consequences so neighboring communities 

are not impacted by the cell jammer. A prison can only jam if it does NOT interfere 

with emergency communications or any services outside the prison. 

Prison officials are trying their best to detect and locate all illegal cell phones 

using canines and conducting random top to bottom searches of jails. Their efforts 

have been somewhat successful and many illegal cell phones have been found. However, enterprising criminals have been able disassemble cell phones by hiding the 

parts, thus evading detection. Prisoners are continuing to find ways to use cell 

phones illegally and continuing to commit violent crimes. Prison wardens need more 

options to combat illegal cell phone use. This bill does exactly that. It provides another means to stop use of illegal cell phones by allowing prisons on a case by case 

basis to use cell jammers. I am proud co-sponsor of this legislation because it will 

help make our neighborhoods safer and give prison necessary tools they need. 

Speaking later today is Gary D. Maynard, the Secretary of Corrections for my 

home state of Maryland. He has only been with the State of Maryland for 2 years, 

36 

1 Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the 

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order on Remand and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC 

Red 3248, 3253 (2002). 

but he brings 30 years of experience in state corrections systems. He began his career as a corrections counselor and worked his way up to serve as the warden of 

several prisons. More recently, he served as the Director in the Departments of Correction in Iowa and South Carolina. Secretary Maynard knows the problems facing 

jails and what solutions work. I thank him for being here. 

Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison, for this opportunity to 

share why I think this legislation is necessary in combating use of illegal cells 

phones by prisoners. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and move this 

bill swiftly through Committee and to the floor for a vote by the full Senate. We 

can’t afford another tragedy like that the Lackl family had to endure. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CITIZENS UNITED FOR THE REHABILITATION OF ERRANTS

(CURE) 

Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants (‘‘CURE’’), a nationwide grassroots prison reform organization with chapters in most states, submits this testimony in connection with the July 15, 2009 hearing held by the Senate Committee 

on Commerce, Science and Transportation on S. 251, the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, introduced by Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R. Tex.). CURE recommends that the Commerce Committee incorporate H.R. 1133, the Family Telephone Connection Protection Act of 2009, into its consideration of S. 251. The long 

distance telephone rates charged to prison inmates and their families are exorbitant 

and make it harder for inmates to maintain critical family and community connections that are so crucial to rehabilitation. H.R. 1133 will ensure that the FCC addresses this issue effectively. Lower long distance inmate telephone rates would reduce the incentive for inmates to bring concealed cell phones into prisons and thus 

would help to address the security problem that S. 251 is designed to ameliorate. 

Background: Inmate Telephone Rates Keep Rising While Other 

Telecommunications Rates Have Declined 

Prison inmates generally pay some of the highest long distance rates in the country. These rates result from the exclusive service agreements that prison administrators typically enter into with telecommunications carriers for inmate calling services. As part of the bidding process, competing service providers generally are expected to offer generous commissions to the prison administrator or state correctional agency or treasury for the right to provide exclusive service to the facilities. 

The winning bidder is typically the service provider that offers the highest commission rates, rather than the lowest service rates, and those commission rates often 

exceed 45 percent and sometimes reach as much as 65 percent of gross revenues. 

The winning bidder then charges excessive rates for inmate calls in order to cover 

the huge commissions that it has agreed to pay. 

Thus, as the FCC has recognized, this approach ‘‘perversely’’ has the distorting 

effect of allowing competitive pressures to drive prices up, rather than down, ‘‘because the bidder who charges the highest rates can afford to offer the confinement 

facilities the largest location commissions.’’ 1 This upward trend in commission payments and rates has continued for years. Typical long distance inmate collect calling 

rates now include a per-call charge as high as 53.95 and a per-minute charge of as 

much as $0.89, and CURE has seen inmate collect rates of $4.28 plus $0.98 perminute, when the typical long distance rates available to residential subscribers or 

calling card users are a few pennies per minute. Inmate telephone service now 

stands alone as the last remaining telecommunications monopoly niche. At many 

prison facilities, inmates also are limited to collect calling services and are not offered the cheaper alternative of debit card or debit account calling services, in which 

the prisoner establishes an account with the prison commissary to pay for telephone 

calls. 

The inflated rates resulting from these exclusive service agreements, excessive 

commissions and ‘‘collect call-only’’ requirements make long distance telephone calls 

from prison inmates unaffordable. At current rates, one hour of conversation per 

week can result in a monthly telephone bill of $300, a huge financial burden for the 

innocent low income families and loved ones receiving and paying for inmate collect 

calls. Prisoners are forced to restrict their calling, and their families are forced to 

restrict their acceptance of collect calls, effectively depriving inmates and family 

37 

2 American Bar Association, Recommendation Adopted by the House of Delegates (Aug. 8–9, 

2005). See also Catherine Anderson, Chair, Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association, 

Report (Aug. 2005). 3 American Correctional Ass’n., Public Correctional Policy on Adult/Juvenile Offender Access 

to Telephones (Jan. 24, 2001; Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.aca.org/government/policvresolution/ 

(select ‘‘Policy,’’ type in ‘‘Access to Telephones’’ and click on ‘‘Search’’) (last visited February 14, 

2007). 4 Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, Confronting Confinement, 35–36 

(John J. Gibbons & Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Comm’n Co-Chairs) (June 2006). 5 Id. at 36. 6 Id. at 36–37. 7See Family Telephone Connection Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1133, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. 

§ 2(5), (10) (2009). 

members of their most reasonable means of communication and further straining 

the family and community ties necessary for released inmates’ rehabilitation. 

For years, prison inmate advocates have pressed for regulatory mechanisms that 

would provide relief from the exorbitant rates and limited service options for inmate 

long distance calling services. CURE and The Coalition of Families and Friends of 

Prisoners of the American Friends Service Committee (‘‘AFSC’’) have stressed the 

need to reduce the burden of oppressively high inmate calling rates, which is borne 

largely by economically disadvantaged relatives and friends of inmates, often located 

far from the facilities where the inmates are incarcerated. Not only do these excessive rates directly injure the non-inmates paying them, but, as studies cited by 

CURE and AFSC explain, they also work to the detriment of society by weakening 

rehabilitative ties that reduce recidivism, preserve families, ease prison tensions 

and promote societal efforts to rehabilitate ex-offenders. Moreover, these exorbitant 

rates are imposed on a captive market that is unable to afford them, while all other 

consumers enjoy the benefits of increased competition, reduced rates, and choices in 

telecommunications services. 

In 2000, CURE organized a nationwide campaign, the Equitable Telephone 

Charges (‘‘eTc’’) Campaign, to mobilize prisoners’ family members and other concerned citizens to advocate for more reasonable rates. The eTc Campaign has had 

significant success in persuading state authorities to reduce inmate service rates, 

especially intrastate and local rates, and making debit and prepaid calling options 

more available to prisoners. Excessive interstate long distance inmate rates, however, remain a substantial burden in all but a handful of states. 

The need to act on this issue is now widely recognized. In 2005, the American 

Bar Association adopted a recommendation urging all levels of government to ‘‘afford prison and jail inmates reasonable opportunity to maintain telephonic communication with the free community, and to offer telephone services in the correctional 

setting with an appropriate range of options at the lowest possible rates.’’ 2 The recommendation was accompanied by a report citing studies demonstrating the importance of regular telephone communication between prisoners and family and friends 

for prisoners’ rehabilitation and eventual return to the community as law-abiding 

citizens. 

On February 1, 2006, the American Correctional Association approved an amended formal policy statement recognizing that ‘‘offenders should have access to a range 

of reasonably priced telecommunications services.’’ 3 A report released in June 2006 

by a diverse national prison reform commission, including correctional and other 

public officials, stresses the negative effects that high inmate telephone rates have 

on the family and community ties necessary to prevent violence and the need to 

‘‘smooth the process of reentry and make it more likely that prisoners will succeed 

after release.’’ 4 It urges policymakers to ‘‘support family and community bonds . . . 

by minimizing the cost of prisoners’ telephone calls’’ 5 and to ‘‘end practices such as’’ 

extracting huge commissions from inmate telephone service providers and limiting 

inmate telephone service to collect calling ‘‘that interfere with the maintenance of 

critically important family and community ties.’’ 6

H.R. 1133 Would Further Rehabilitative Goals 

H.R. 1133 contains findings that prisoners’ families and loved ones ultimately pay 

for most calls from prisoners, whether collect calls or otherwise. The bill finds that 

the excessive rates imposed on ‘‘[i]nnocent citizens . . . simply due to having a family member or loved one who is incarcerated’’ are ‘‘a burden on interstate commerce.’’ 7 The bill also finds that the lack of competition and the high commissions 

paid by service providers to administrators are responsible for the high rates. Excessive inmate service rates ‘‘weaken the family and community ties that are necessary 

for successful reentry into society’’ by released prisoners and burden the rehabilitaVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:08 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\56406.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
38 

8 Id. § 2(13), (14). 9Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, Governmental Affairs Office, ABA, to Rep. Bobby 

Rush, at 2 (Jan. 31, 2006) (‘‘ABA Letter’’). 10See, e.g., Editorial, Keeping in Touch With a Parent in Prison, New York Times, Jan. 14, 

2006, at A14. 11 ABA Letter at 2. 12 Id. 

tion that ‘‘reduces crime and the future costs of imprisonment.’’ 8 In effect, excessive 

inmate service rates generate more social and economic costs for all of society, far 

beyond the excessive calling costs. 

H.R. 1133 reaffirms the FCC’s authority to regulate inmate telephone service and 

to implement the types of relief described in the bill. It would require that the FCC 

consider imposing, among other measures: maximum interstate calling rates; a requirement that inmate telephone service providers offer debit calling as well as collect calling services; a prohibition of call blocking by an inmate service provider solely on the ground that the service provider has no contract with the local telephone 

company serving the intended call recipient; and a prohibition of commission payments by inmate calling service providers to prison administrators and state correctional agencies. 

The ABA has endorsed the proposed legislation, pointing out ‘‘the human costs’’ 

of excessive inmate rates,9 as have leading newspapers.10 The ABA pointed out that 

‘‘the family and friends of incarcerated people,’’ rather than the prisoners themselves, ‘‘regularly shoulder the high cost of prison telephone services,’’ which makes 

it more difficult to achieve ‘‘the penological and societal benefits that occur when 

incarcerated people arc able to maintain contact with the outside world.’’ 11 The ABA 

also noted that entering into exclusive service arrangements that provide commission payments of as much as 65 percent of all telephone revenue ‘‘creates an ethical 

quagmire’’ for prison administrators.12

H.R. 1133 Would Help To Achieve The Same Goal As S. 251 

S. 251 would authorize states to petition the FCC to permit the installation of 

jamming equipment to block cell phone use in correctional facilities. The purpose 

of the bill is to eliminate prisoners’ use of cell phones, which has reportedly become 

a problem because of some prisoners’ use of cell phones for illegal purposes. It is 

certainly true that some cell phones apparently have been smuggled into prisons for 

illegal purposes, but CURE is not aware of any studies or investigations demonstrating the typical intended uses of cell phones in prisons overall. 

CURE believes, based on its awareness of prisoners’ and their families’ struggles 

to reduce their telephone bills, that most of the smuggled cell phones are being used 

by incarcerated individuals to stay in touch, at a more reasonable cost, with families 

and friends—the very people they will need in order to make a successful transition 

to the free world. In other words, current prison telephone policies, particularly 

those that support the egregiously high rates charged for long distance calls, may 

be responsible for much of the contraband cell phone usage in prisons. While the 

Nation spends millions of dollars on projects to smooth the transition to the free 

world, we should be fostering the contacts that will help with those transitions. 

More intelligent and humane inmate calling service rates and policies would not 

only reduce recidivism by fostering prisoners’ ties to the community, but would also 

reduce the incentive to smuggle cell phones into prisons. 

Like the Second Chance Act passed last year, H.R. 1133 would enable prisoners 

to maintain the strong family and community ties necessary for rehabilitation. Because more reasonable long distance inmate calling rates would reduce the incentive 

to bring cell phones into prisons, CURE urges the Commerce Committee to incorporate H.R. 1133 into its consideration of S. 251. CURE would be happy to work 

with the Committee to explore any and all possible solutions to making all interstate inmate phone calls affordable for families of prisoners and to reduce illegal cell 

phone use in correctional facilities. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAY SALKINI, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

TECORE NETWORKS

I would like to thank Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison and the 

distinguished members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for giving me the opportunity to submit testimony on the Safe Prisons 

Communications Act pursuant to the Committee hearing on July 15, 2009. I would 

also like to express my appreciation for the work you are doing to address a serious 

public safety issue that is truly national in its scope. 

39 

Tecore Networks is a global supplier of wireless technologies with a proud history 

of doing business in the great states of Maryland, Texas and Florida. We have 

served commercial mobile service providers and government agencies since 1991. 

Cellular technology is proliferating around the globe, and its growth can create unintended consequences. However, solutions should be considered carefully and with 

appropriate technical information in order to maintain the benefits that this technology provides. 

Based on our successful deployment of a proprietary and legal technology to address contraband cell phone use in a correctional system, we have become more 

aware of the scope and size of the problem throughout the United States. In fact, 

our analysis shows that as many as 27,000 cell phones might have been smuggled 

and used behind bars nationwide in 2008, with each phone typically being shared 

among multiple inmates. 

While I am in complete agreement with the intent of S. 251, I am concerned about 

the emphasis on jamming as a solution. Jamming is a specific technology which 

would prevent unwanted cell phone calls by blocking any and all cellular communications in the covered geography. Unfortunately, due to the difficulty in effectively 

modulating jamming devices, such communications would likely include some combination of calls: 

• by legitimate customers of the commercial operators who happen to be in an 

area covered by the jamming signal; 

• to 911; 

• from corrections personnel or other authorized individuals inside the correctional facility; and 

• intended for lawful intercept, a critical tool for public safety. 

In short, jamming poses significant risks to the public which may outweigh potential benefits. By emphasizing jamming in the legislation, it could well become the 

focus of corrections officials seeking a solution despite the availability of more effective, less invasive technologies. I respectfully urge the Committee to expand the 

scope of applicable solutions to include those which control or manage unauthorized 

communications rather than simply jam them. 

At the same time, I fully support the corrections officers of this Nation in their 

quest for effective tools to address this problem. It is clear that these men and 

women have gone to considerable lengths to try alternative solutions, including body 

orifice scanners, cell-phone sniffing dogs and cell-phone detection technologies. Evidence shared during the hearing revealed that simply confiscating a cell phone is 

not enough; the critical component allowing communication on many phones is the 

subscriber identity module (SIM) card, which is the size of a postage stamp, can easily be removed from the phone, and can be used by an inmate on any compatible 

device. 

An effective solution should: 

• prevent unauthorized communications without the need to locate the device; 

• permit legitimate communications including calls from authorized devices, to 

911 or by consumers not subject to the restrictions of the correctional facility; 

and 

• to the extent possible, provide forensic information to assist law enforcement, 

such as device and SIM serial numbers, originating and terminating telephone 

numbers, and—with the appropriate warrants—capture and monitoring of communication traffic including voice, text messaging and data. 

The trials of alternative technologies have also revealed that there are multiple 

stakeholders in an effective solution to the problem of contraband cell phones in 

prisons. The requirements of the correctional institution are central to any remedy. 

However, based on Tecore’s experience in providing communications systems, I also 

recognize and support the needs of the following parties: 

• commercial mobile service providers must be afforded their rights and allowed 

to discharge their responsibilities to serve valid subscribers; this includes avoiding the liability of failing to complete an emergency call for such a subscriber 

• public safety agencies must also be assured that frequency bands assigned to 

them will be unimpeded; and 

• regulators must be provided clear direction and mandates in line with the resources they have to fulfill them. 

In summary, I respectfully request that you strengthen the Safe Prisons Communications Act by broadening the scope of solutions beyond jamming to include those 

40 

which control or manage unauthorized communications, and by addressing the 

needs of all stake holders including commercial mobile service providers, public safety agencies and regulators. 

Thank you. 

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS AND

PUBLIC SAFETY—DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS

Charleston, WV, July 13, 2009 

Hon. JAY ROCKEFELLER, 

Chairman, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

Ranking Member, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison, 

I am writing to express my support for the ‘‘Safe Prisons Communications Act of 

2009’’ that has been introduced in the U.S. Senate. I also want to thank you for 

holding a hearing this week on this important legislation. Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds of cell phones at this time, and this legislation will provide 

correction officials across the country with the best tool to impede the illegal use 

of contraband cellular phones by prison and jail inmates. 

In recent years, the number of contraband cell phones smuggled into correctional 

facilities has skyrocketed. These phones represent a threat to the security of the facility, staff, public officials, and the victims of crime. Once in possession of a cell 

phone, inmates have been able to conduct any number of crimes, ranging from intimidating witnesses, harassing victims, threatening elected victims, and engaging 

in gang activity. 

Since 2006, there have been 13 incidents due to the presence of cell phones in 

West Virginia correctional facilities, although fortunately none of them resulted in 

high profile crimes. However, cell phones are now one of the most sought after items 

of contraband by inmates in custody. To address the serious threat that these devices represent, the West Virginia Canine Unit is in the process of training two dogs 

to detect cell phones. 

Although correctional agencies make every effort to prevent the introduction of 

cell phones into our prison systems, only cell phone jamming technologies stop these 

dangerous phone calls. State correction agencies should be able to go through the 

same process that Federal agencies do and petition for a waiver. For these reasons, 

the West Virginia Department of Correction is requesting your support for passage 

of the ‘‘Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009.’’ I look forward to working with 

you to further the safety of West Virginia correctional officials and the public. 

Sincerely, 

JIM RUBENSTEIN, 

Commissioner. 

JUSTICE CENTER

THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS

August 4, 2009 

Hon. JAY ROCKEFELLER, 

Chairman, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

Ranking Member, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison, 

The Council of State Governments Justice Center is writing to express its support 

for S. 251, the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, which is scheduled for 

mark up by the Committee on Wednesday, August 5, 2009. Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds of cell phones at this time, and this legislation will provide 

correction officials across the country with the best tool to impede the illegal use 

of contraband cellular phones by prison and jail inmates. 

In recent years, the number of contraband cell phones smuggled into correctional 

facilities has skyrocketed. These phones represent a threat to the security of the facility, staff, public officials, and the victims of crime. In Maryland an inmate on trial 

41 

for murder orchestrated the assassination of a witness against him using a smuggled cell phone. The witness was gunned down outside his home, and in front of 

his children. In Tennessee, an inmate used a cell phone to plot an escape that resulted in the death of a corrections officer. And in June of last year, inmates in 

three Oklahoma facilities coordinated an outbreak of violence across the system, resulting in three deaths and multiple injuries. 

It has recently been brought to our attention that many of the cell phones confiscated have been found in the possession of sex offenders. In the past 6 months, 

81 sex offenders in Texas were found with contraband cell phones. And last year, 

111 sex offenders in South Carolina were disciplined for the possession of contraband cell phones. Unrestricted and unmonitored communication and access to the 

Internet by convicted sex offenders is high public safety risk. 

The Justice Center hopes that you will support the Safe Prisons Communications 

Act of 2009 and give our correctional officials the ability to protect the public and 

themselves. 

Sincerely, 

Rep. JERRY MADDEN, 

Texas State House of Representatives. 

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Columbia, SC, July 13, 2009 

Hon. JAY ROCKEFELLER, 

Chairman, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

Ranking Member, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison, 

I am writing to express my support for the ‘‘Safe Prisons Communications Act of 

2009’’ that has been introduced in the U.S. Senate. I also want to thank you for 

holding a hearing this week on this important legislation. Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds of cell phones at this time, and this legislation will provide 

correction officials across the country with the best tool to impede the illegal use 

of contraband cellular phones by prison and jail inmates. 

In recent years, the number of contraband cell phones smuggled into correctional 

facilities has skyrocketed. These phones represent a threat to the security of the facility, staff, public officials, and the victims of crime. Once in possession of a cell 

phone, inmates have been able to conduct any number of crimes, ranging from intimidating witnesses, harassing victims, threatening elected victims, and engaging 

in gang activity. 

The availability and use of cell phones in South Carolina correctional facilities has 

had serious consequences. Inmates in South Carolina have used cell phones to conduct tens of thousands of dollars of credit card fraud, coordinate escapes, and to 

more precisely smuggle contraband like drugs and escape tools into the state’s prisons. We have worked to raise awareness of the problems associated with cell phone 

contraband by installing metal detectors, X-ray machines and mandatory searches 

of all personnel entering South Carolina’s medium- and maximum-security prisons. 

As the techniques for smuggling cell phones into prisons have become more creative, 

so too has the Department. 

Although correctional agencies make every effort to prevent the introduction of 

cell phones into our prison systems, only cell phone jamming technologies stop these 

dangerous phone calls. For these reasons, the South Carolina Department of Correction is requesting your support for passage of the ‘‘Safe Prisons Communications Act 

of 2009.’’ I look forward to working with you to further the safety of South Carolina 

correctional officials and the public. 

Sincerely, 

JON OZMINT, 

Director. 

42 

KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Topeka, KS, January 14, 2009 

SAM BROWNBACK, 

U.S Senator, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Brownback: 

The possession and use of cell phones by inmates is becoming an increasingly serious and significant security risk in Kansas correctional facilities and in correctional 

facilities across the country. An escape from a medium security facility at Lansing 

in February 2006, and an escape from an administrative segregation unit at El Dorado in October 2007, were both facilitated by use of cell phones by inmates. During 

the period from July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008, a total of 86 cell phones were 

found within Kansas correctional facilities, either in the possession of inmates or in 

areas accessible to Inmates. From July 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008, 42 cell 

phones were found. 

In addition to arranging and coordinating escape plans, cell phones can be used 

by inmates to arrange for the introduction of contraband, to harass and intimidate 

crime victims and others in the community, and to carry out criminal activities in 

the community. Possession and use of cell phones by Kansas inmates is prohibited 

and is a violation of department rules and state statute. However, cell phones have 

been introduced into Kansas correctional facilities and are being used by inmates. 

To prevent inmates from being able to successfully communicate with others 

through the use of contraband cell phones, the Kansas Department of Corrections 

is supportive of legislation that will allow cell phones signals in correctional facilities to be jammed. Currently the Communications Act of 1934 and FCC rules ban 

the technology that can jam cell phones signals within a targeted area. We seek 

amendments to the law to allow cell phone jamming of calls made from correctional 

facilities. This capability is necessary for public safety reasons. The technology for 

such jamming is available and has been demonstrated at facilities operated by the 

South Carolina Department of Corrections. 

Your assistance regarding this issue is requested. Please let me know if you have 

any questions. 

Sincerely, 

ROGER WERHOLTZ, 

Secretary. 

Cc: Governor Sebelius 

Association of State Correctional Administrators 

Attorney General Six 

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Milford, MA, January 21, 2009 

Hon. JOHN F. KERRY, 

United States Senator, 

Boston, MA. 

Dear Senator Kerry: 

I am writing to relay to you my support for S. 251 the ‘‘The Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009’’. The passage of this legislation would allow corrections’ facilities to operate a wireless jamming device to jam cell phones being used by individuals incarcerated in a correctional institution and will severely curtail the use of cell 

phones by inmates fox criminal and/or fraudulent reasons. 

I have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of cell phones smuggled into our 

prisons over the past several years. In addition to being used by incarcerated criminal enterprises to conduct criminal and fraudulent activities, these cell phones are 

used by inmates to harass and threaten past victims, past witnesses and public officials. This uncontrolled access to a cell phone by inmates poses a serious threat to 

the safe operation of a correctional facility as well as to the overall public safety 

of our citizens. 

It is my opinion that this legislation, as written, provides correctional agencies 

with a viable mechanism to make cell phones useless on prison grounds and still 

provides safeguards that the integrity of wireless networks outside of a prison’s 

walk will be maintained. 

43 

In closing, I ask your support of the passage of this legislation. If this legislation 

were to become law, it would provide correctional administrators, like me, with a 

valuable tool to be used to combat the current use of contraband cell phones for 

criminal activity. 

I thank you for your consideration in this matter. 

Sincerely, 

HAROLD W. CLARKE, 

Commissioner. 

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Milford, MA, January 21, 2009 

Hon. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, 

United States Senator, 

Boston, MA. 

Dear Senator Kennedy: 

I am writing to relay to you my support for S. 251 the ‘‘The Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009’’. The passage of this legislation would allow correctional facilities to operate a wireless jamming device to jam cell phones being used by individuals incarcerated in a correctional institution and will severely curtail the use of cell 

phones by imitates for criminal and/or fraudulent reasons. 

I have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of cell phones smuggled into our 

prisons over the past several years. In addition to being used by incarcerated criminal enterprises to conduct criminal and fraudulent activities, these cell phones are 

used by inmates to harass and threaten past victims, past witnesses and public officials. This uncontrolled access to a cell phone by inmates poses a serious threat to 

the safe operation of a correctional facility as well as to the overall public safety 

of our citizens. 

It is my opinion that this legislation, as written, provides correctional agencies 

with a viable mechanism to make cell phones useless on prison grounds and still 

provides safeguards that the integrity of wireless networks outside of a prison’s was 

will be maintained. 

In closing, I ask your support of the passage of this legislation. If this legislation 

were to become law, it would provide correctional administrators, like me, with a 

valuable tool to be used to combat the current use of contraband cell phones for 

criminal activity. 

I thank you for your consideration in this matter. 

Sincerely, 

HAROLD W. CLARKE, 

Commissioner. 

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Pine Bluff, AR, January 20, 2009 

Hon. BLANCHE LINCOLN, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Lincoln: 

I recently sent you a letter requesting your assistance in amending a 1934 Federal law that makes it illegal to jam radio signals, including cellular telephone signals. 

Senate Bill #S. 251 and House Bill #H.R. 560 have been entered regarding the 

above matter. We would appreciate very much your support of these bills, as cell 

phones are an ongoing problem and a major security threat to correctional facilities 

in Arkansas. The use of a cell phone aided an Arkansas inmate in his escape in 

October of 2008. Cell phones are confiscated almost every day at our units. 

Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. 

Sincerely, 

LARRY NORRIS, 

Director. 

44 

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Pine Bluff, AR, January 20, 2009 

Hon. MARK PRYOR, U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Pryor: 

I recently sent you a letter requesting your assistance in amending a 1934 Federal law that makes it illegal to jam radio signals, including cellular telephone signals. 

Senate Bill #S. 251 and House Bill #H.R. 560 have been entered regarding the 

above matter. We would appreciate very much your support of these bills, as cell 

phones are an ongoing problem and a major security threat to correctional facilities 

in Arkansas. The use of a cell phone aided an Arkansas inmate in his escape in 

October of 2008. Cell phones are confiscated almost every day at our units. 

Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. 

Sincerely, 

LARRY NORRIS, 

Director. 

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Pine Bluff, AR, December 17, 2008 

Hon. MARK PRYOR, U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Pryor: 

The Arkansas Department of Correction requests your assistance in amending a 

1934 Federal law that makes it illegal to jam radio signals, including cellular telephone signals. As you know, cell phones are a major security threat to correctional 

facilities in Arkansas and across the country. 

Recently, use of cell phone aided the escape of an Arkansas inmate and thwarted 

his capture for 11 days. Cell phones are seized almost every day at our units, and 

their numbers are increasing. The phones not only further escapes, they can also 

lead to violence and other crimes both inside and outside of our facilities. 

At the state level, we are proposing legislation that would make it a crime for 

an inmate to have and use a cell phone. It is already a crime for someone to provide 

a cell phone to an inmate. While this legislation should certainly help deter cell 

phone possession, it is hardly a complete solution to the problem. 

Capabilities do exist that effectively jam cell phone signals, which in turn, renders 

them useless within a prison. These capabilities do not interfere with cell phone use 

outside prisons walls nor do they interfere with 911 emergency calls or law enforcement communications. 

But under the Communications Act of 1934, willfully or maliciously interfering 

with a radio communication is a crime. The law does not carve out exceptions for 

state governments; thus, the state of Arkansas cannot utilize a device that willfully 

interferes with cellular telephone signals, even for security reasons. 

This is consistent with Federal Communications Commission rulings involving the 

operation of cell phone jammers. For example, the FCC ruled in a recent decision 

that the Federal law does indeed prohibit operation of devices that interfere with 

cellular telephone signals. Cf.DPL Surveillance Equip., FCC Citation, No. DA 08– 

21202 (May 27, 2008) concluded that U.S. Code Title 47, sections 302a and 333 bar 

the operation of jammers, except those operated by the Federal Government. 

It is likely the FCC has not authorized licensing procedures because section 333 

criminalizes willful interference with a radio signal and a Federal agency cannot 

issue rules that purport to authorize conduct that Federal law explicitly prohibits. 

(See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (1997), which declares 

that a Federal regulation cannot stand if it is manifestly contrary to a Federal statute.) 

FCC spokesman Robert Kenny was quoted in the October 30, 2008, edition of the 

Austin American Statesman as saying, ‘‘We have no authority to even grant it (a 

license permitting the operation of a cell phone jamming device) if we thought it 

was worthwhile or something that was warranted. It’s likely going to take some 

level of action by Congress.’’ 

Based on the FCC’s own acknowledgement, it will take Congressional action to 

enable Arkansas and other states to render cell phones nothing more than worthless 

45 

contraband in state prisons. Without such action, Arkansas is left with less effective 

options to protect law-abiding citizens from the threatening, harassing or retaliatory 

actions of murderers, rapists, drug dealers, thieves and other felons in its state prisons. 

I look forward to working with you on this matter. If you have any questions 

about steps my office has taken on this issue, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Sincerely, 

LARRY B. NORRIS, 

Director. 

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Pine Bluff, AR, December 17, 2008 

Hon. BLANCHE LINCOLN, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Lincoln: 

The Arkansas Department of Correction requests your assistance in amending a 

1934 Federal law that makes it illegal to jam radio signals, including cellular telephone signals. As you know, cell phones are a major security threat to correctional 

facilities in Arkansas and across the country. 

Recently, use of cell phone aided the escape of an Arkansas inmate and thwarted 

his capture for 11 days. Cell phones are seized almost every day at our units, and 

their numbers are increasing. The phones not only further escapes, they can also 

lead to violence and other crimes both inside and outside of our facilities. 

At the state level, we are proposing legislation that would make it crime for an 

inmate to have and use a cell phone. It is already a crime for someone to provide 

a cell phone to an inmate. While this legislation should certainly help deter cell 

phone possession, it is hardly a complete solution to the problem. 

Capabilities do exist that effectively jam cell phone signals, which in turn, renders 

them useless within a prison. These capabilities do not interfere with cell phone use 

outside prisons walls nor do they interfere with 911 emergency calls or law enforcement communications. 

But under the Communications Act of 1934, willfully or maliciously interfering 

with a radio communication is a crime. The law does not carve out exceptions for 

state governments; thus, the state of Arkansas cannot utilize a device that willfully 

interferes with cellular telephone signals, even for security reasons. 

This is consistent with Federal Communications Commission rulings involving the 

operation of cell phone jammers. For example, the FCC ruled in a recent decision 

that the Federal law does indeed prohibit operation of devices that interfere with 

cellular telephone signals. CfDPL, Surveillance Equip., FCC Citation, No. DA 08– 

21202 (May 27, 2008) concluded that U.S. Code Title 47, sections 302a and 333 bar 

the operation of jammers, except those operated by the Federal Government. 

It is likely the FCC has not authorized licensing procedures because section 333 

criminalizes willful interference with a radio signal and a Federal agency cannot 

issue rules that purport to authorize conduct that Federal law explicitly prohibits. 

(See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (1997), which declares 

that a Federal regulation cannot stand if it is manifestly contrary to a Federal statute.) 

FCC spokesman Robert Kenny was quoted in the October 30, 2008, edition of the 

Austin American Statesman as saying, ‘‘We have no authority to even grant it (a 

license permitting the operation of a cell phone jamming device) if we thought it 

was worthwhile or something that was warranted. it’s likely going to take some 

level of action by Congress.’’ 

Based on the FCC’s own acknowledgement, it will take Congressional action to 

enable Arkansas and other states to render cell phones nothing more than worthless 

contraband in state prisons. Without such action, Arkansas is left with less effective 

options to protect law-abiding citizens from the threatening, harassing or retaliatory 

actions of murderers, rapists, drug dealers, thieves and other felons in its state prisons. 

I look forward to working with you on this matter. If you have any questions 

about steps my office has taken on this issue, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

LARRY B. NORRIS, 

Director. 

46 

STATE OF TENNESSEE—DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Nashville, TN, March 3, 2009 

Hon. BOB CORKER, U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Corker: 

Subject: Cell Phones in Prisons 

I am writing you to request your support for the ‘‘Safe Prisons Communications 

Act of 2009’’ that has been recently filed by Senators Kay Bailey Hutchinson and 

Jim DeMint in the Senate and by Representative Kevin Brady in House of Representatives. The number of cell phones in state and Federal facilities across the 

country is continuing to rise at an alarming rate. These phones represent a threat 

to the security of the facility, staff, and victims of crime. The act will provide wardens and superintendents with the authority to operate wireless jamming devices 

in our correctional facilities that will greatly reduce the criminal activities that are 

currently being conduct inside and outside our facilities. 

During the last year, the Tennessee Department of Correction recovered approximately 650 cellular (prepaid and contract) telephones and that number is increasing. In addition to safety concerns, the presence of cellular telephones generates financial obligation issues with inmates in prison. 

We believe that these phones are routinely and primarily being utilized to engage 

in criminal activity, including but not limited to, drug trafficking, Strategic Threat 

Group (STG) organization violence, and credit card fraud. Inmates are also using 

the camera feature of the cell phone to take pictures of security features such the 

location of security cameras. We do not believe that inmates are using cellular telephones to primarily circumvent the inmate telephone system. 

There have been proven cases of STG affiliated ordered ‘‘hits’’ on the streets from 

the inmates who possessed these phones inside of a prison. There have been two 

(2) correctional staff homicides during which cellular phones were used in the commission of an escape. 

With the increased technology that is being attached to these phones, inmates 

have Internet access capability which permits them unlimited access and contact to 

continue their illegal activities. We have received numerous complaints from crime 

victims that inmates are maintaining websites such as MySpace, Facebook, etc. 

through their Internet capabilities provided by these cellular phones. 

Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds of cell phones at a time, and simply 

locating and removing cell phones one by one is a difficult and constant challenge. 

For these reasons, the Tennessee Department of Correction is requesting your 

support for passage of the ‘‘Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009.’’ 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE M. LITTLE, 

Commissioner. 

pc: George and Camille Camp—ASCA 

John Morgan, Deputy to the Governor 

Pat Miller, Senior Advisor and Director of Legislative Affairs 

Steve Elkins, Legal Counsel to the Governor 

STATE OF TENNESSEE—DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Nashville, TN, March 3, 2009 

Hon. LAMAR ALEXANDER, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Alexander: 

Subject: Cell Phones in Prisons 

I am writing you to request your support for the ‘‘Safe Prisons Communications 

Act of 2009’’ that has been recently filed by Senators Kay Bailey Hutchinson and 

Jim DeMint in the Senate and by Representative Kevin Brady in House of Representatives. The number of cell phones in state and Federal facilities across the 

country is continuing to rise at an alarming rate. These phones represent a threat 

to the security of the facility, staff, and victims of crime. The act will provide wardens and superintendents with the authority to operate wireless jamming devices 

in our correctional facilities that will greatly reduce the criminal activities that are 

currently being conduct inside and outside our facilities. 

47 

During the last year, the Tennessee Department of Correction recovered approximately 650 cellular (prepaid and contract) telephones and that number is increasing. In addition to safety concerns, the presence of cellular telephones generates financial obligation issues with inmates in prison. 

We believe that these phones are routinely and primarily being utilized to engage 

in criminal activity, including but not limited to, drug trafficking, Strategic Threat 

Group (STG) organization violence, and credit card fraud. Inmates are also using 

the camera feature of the cell phone to take pictures of security features such the 

location of security cameras. We do not believe that inmates are using cellular telephones to primarily circumvent the inmate telephone system. 

There have been proven cases of STG affiliated ordered ‘‘hits’’ on the streets from 

the inmates who possessed these phones inside of a prison. There have been two 

(2) correctional staff homicides during which cellular phones were used in the commission of an escape. 

With the increased technology that is being attached to these phones, inmates 

have Internet access capability which permits them unlimited access and contact to 

continue their illegal activities. We have received numerous complaints from crime 

victims that inmates are maintaining websites such as MySpace, Facebook, etc. 

through their Internet capabilities provided by these cellular phones. 

Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds of cell phones at a time, and simply 

locating and removing cell phones one by one is a difficult and constant challenge. 

For these reasons, the Tennessee Department of Correction is requesting your 

support for passage of the ‘‘Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009.’’ 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE M. LITTLE, 

Commissioner. 

pc: George and Camille Camp—ASCA 

John Morgan, Deputy to the Governor 

Pat Miller, Senior Advisor and Director of Legislative Affairs 

Steve Elkins, Legal Counsel to the Governor 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY

Trenton, NJ, July 27, 2009 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

Chairman, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

Ranking Member, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison: 

We are writing in support of S. 251, a bill that would allow States to jam cell 

phones that inmates illegally use within State correctional facilities. Specifically, the 

bill would allow States, with permission from the Federal Communications Commission, to install devices that prevent, jam, or interfere with wireless communications 

within the boundaries of a specific prison, penitentiary, or correctional facility within that State. This is a critical tool that law enforcement currently lacks. We, the 

Attorney General and the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections of the 

State of New Jersey, strongly urge the Senate to approve this bill and provide states 

with the ability to end cell phone transmissions within our prisons. 

In New Jersey, our efforts to remove violent gang offenders from our state’s communities are undermined, as they are in many states, by the ability of those same 

individuals to communicate with fellow gang members and operate their criminal 

enterprises from within the prison walls by using cell phones. Using contraband cell 

phones, incarcerated individuals have the ability to intimidate witnesses through 

threats and violence, to conduct business as usual, and to coordinate escapes with 

persons on the outside. In one instance in our State, law enforcement was able to 

monitor a phone call placed by a gang inmate on a cell phone and subsequently 

joined by an inmate at a different prison and a third inmate at a county jail. This 

conference call is notable not only for the breadth of participation by incarcerated 

gang members at different correctional institutions, but for the topic of conversation, 

namely, to plot retaliation against an attack on a fellow gang member. Although 

this call was monitored, countless other conversations are not. To the contrary, 

48 

1 Vince Beiser, ‘‘Prisoners Run Gangs, Plan Escapes and Even Order Hits With Smuggled 

Cellphones,’’ Wired, May 22, 2009 (‘‘Beiser Wired’’). 

much too often, the fact of the conversation, much less its content, remains unknown and undetected by law enforcement and corrections officials. 

Communication is critical to any criminal organization’s ability to maintain its 

command and control of criminal activity on the streets. Cell phones in prisons, and 

the communications that they facilitate, therefore, are a prime engine of the growth 

and expansion of criminal gangs both in prisons and on the streets, At the same 

time, public safety is compromised because incarceration no longer thwarts the ability of a gang member or violent offender to terrorize a community. 

Given this reality, the authority to block cell phone transmissions from within a 

prison is the most effective manner for law enforcement and corrections officials to 

prevent an unknown quantity of calls. New Jersey law enforcement agencies, including the Department of Corrections, are collaboratively conducting investigations and 

operations inside and outside the prison walls to identify and sever connections between street gangs and prison gangs. Nonetheless, inmates with cell phones are 

able to operate in the gaps between those efforts, to communicate with persons outside the prison. 

While detection and location technologies are legal and available, they arc expensive and often cost-prohibitive to install on a facility-wide basis, much less in numerous facilities across the state. More important, they will never be as effective 

in addressing the problem as the ability to simply prevent the communication from 

taking place. Instead, legislative action is required to enable State law enforcement 

and corrections officials to have the most effective technologies available to tackle 

the problem. 

We urge the Senate to give States the authority to block cell phone transmissions 

from prisons. Absent tools to combat the problem of cell phones in prisons, states 

will be limited in their ability to address this problem and to effectively stop communications between criminal organizations inside and outside of our correctional 

facilities. 

Sincerely yours, 

ANNE MILGRAM, 

Attorney General. 

GEORGE HAYMAN, 

Commissioner, 

Department of Corrections. 

cc: The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg, United States Senator 

The Honorable Robert Menendez, United States Senator 

July 14, 2009 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

Chairman, 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Committee, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

Ranking Member, 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Committee, 

Washington, DC. 

Re: S. 251, The Safe Prisons Communication Act (SPCA) 

Dear Senators Rockefeller and Hutchison: 

The undersigned organizations write to voice our strong opposition to S. 251, The 

Safe Prisons Communication Act (SPCA). The proposal to end the more than 75- 

year ban on deliberately interfering with authorized radio communications in the 

United States would place commercial and public safety communications in this 

country at needless risk. Not only do alternative means exist to address the problem 

of contraband cell phone use in prison, but the proposal to block cell phone use in 

prison by jamming will not achieve its objective of eliminating contraband cell phone 

use. As noted in a recent article in Wired Magazine: ‘‘A few layers of tinfoil can 

shield a phone from the jamming signal.’’ 1

Rather than rely on the self-serving promotions of a single company seeking to 

profit from this unfortunate security issue, prisons should work with cell phone providers to implement proven technological means to block and/or monitor contraband 

cell phone use within prisons. In addition, Congress should use this opportunity to 

address the real problem of overcharges for telephone calls from prisoners to their 

families and loved ones. The vast majority of contraband calls are made by prisoners 

49 

2See Beiser Wired, See also Media Justice Fund and Funding Exchange Report, ‘‘Criminal 

Charges: Excessive Criminal Phone Rates Take A Toll on Innocent Families (2009). 3 47 U.S.C. § 333. 4See Informal Complaint and Petition for Rulemaking of the Public Interest Spectrum Coalition, WT Docket No. 08–167, at vi. 5 Even countries that prohibit civilian use but permit law enforcement and military use domestically have problems with cell phone jammers disrupting cell phone use. See, e.g., http:// 

www.methodshop.com/gadgets/reviews/celljammers/index.shtml. 6See, e.g., Letter of Chris Fisher, President, Association of Public Safety Officials—International, Inc., to Michael Copps, Acting Chairman, Federal Communications Commission 

(March 13, 2009). 7Given that the FCC has unambiguously stated that the manufacture, importation, transportation, marketing and use of cell phone jammers violates Federal law, it would appear that 

CellAntenna’s numerous and highly publicized demonstrations are a felony which should result 

in fines and arrests rather than appearances at a Congressional hearing. See Public Notice, 

‘‘Sale or Use of Transmitters Designed to Prevent, Jam or Interfere With Cell Phone CommuContinued 

to their families because prisoner families—often among society’s poorest—must pay 

outrageous collect call charges.2 An approach that combined existing technology 

used in cooperation with cell phone companies, additional funds for prison security 

to fight the problem of contraband entering prisons in the first place, and reducing 

costs for authorized prisoner phone calls to reduce the need for contraband, will 

prove far more successful in the long run and will avoid putting our public safety 

and commercial wireless networks at risk. 

The Importance of An Absolute Ban On Jammers 

Since its passage, the Communications Act of 1934 absolutely prohibited in no uncertain terms any deliberate interference with a signal ‘‘licensed or authorized . . . 

by the United States.’’ 3 This provision has made it possible for licensees to design 

our current complex system of radio communication, cellular service, and other wireless networks secure in the knowledge that no one will deliberately interfere with 

their signals. Consumers, in exchange, have enjoyed the use of cell phones and other 

wireless devices without fear that anyone will seek to deliberately interfere with the 

transmission. For example, many travelers now chose to use their own cell phones 

or wireless Internet connections, rather than pay traditionally higher rates charged 

by hotels. Public safety users likewise rely on the ability to use lifesaving wireless 

technologies without concern for jamming, a reliance that will continue to grow as 

new spectrum and new technologies become available to public safety and commercial users following the digital television transition and the clearing of the 700 MHz 

band for new public safety and commercial uses. 

The introduction of legal cell phone jamming places this entire system at risk. 

History has shown that permitting the legal manufacture and sale of devices—even 

for limited purposes—will inevitably result in their becoming available on a mass 

consumer basis. For example, the use of wireless microphones in the broadcast 

bands is limited by FCC rule to a small number of licensed users and—in theory— 

strictly controlled to avoid possible interference with television viewing and other 

uses of the band. Despite these limitations, anyone can buy these microphones 

through retail stores and websites, and the number of unauthorized wireless microphones in the broadcast bands may well exceed 1 million.4

Congress should not create the risk of a similar proliferation of unauthorized cell 

phone jammers. Only a complete prohibition on cell phone jammers has successfully 

limited the sale and deployment of them in this country. Despite their availability 

in other countries, use of cell phone jammers in this country is forced underground 

and does little to interfere with commercial or public safety wireless use.5 For this 

reason, both commercial and public safety licensees have consistently opposed the 

efforts of CellAntenna to receive a Special Temporary Authorization (STA) to test 

cell phone jammers in the United States.6 Only a uniform ban with no exceptions 

will prevent the widespread use of jammers over time. 

CellAntenna’s Claims That It Can Safely Block Contraband Calls Are 

Highly Suspect 

CellAntenna, the private company driving the campaign to legalize cell phone 

jamming in the United States, insists that it can block commercial cell phone signals in prisons, without interfering either with lawful cell phone use outside of prison or with public safety use in or outside of prison. CellAntenna has provided no 

proof of its claims. Rather, CellAntenna has sought to leverage a genuine public 

safety concern for its own profit by conducting unscientific and unauthorized demonstrations in various prisons. While these ‘‘demonstrations’’ allow CellAntenna to 

attract a fair amount of publicity,7 they do nothing to demonstrate the validity of 

50 

nications Is Prohibited In The United States,’’ DA–05–1776 (June 27, 2005), available at http:// 

hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocslpublic/attachmatch/DA–05–1776A1.pdf 8See Letter of The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 

(AASHO) to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, filed in WT 

Docket No. 09–30 (March 18, 2009). 9 It is useful to contrast CellAntenna’s behavior with that of advocates of unlicensed use of 

the broadcast white spaces. White spaces advocates scrupulously obeyed all FCC rules and regulations, and applied for (and received) limited experimental licenses to conduct genuine experiments which produced meaningful engineering data. Only after years of building on developed 

technologies, and supported by a broad set of industry stakeholders, did the Commission feel 

confident enough to authorize tests of prototypes in the field. 

CellAntenna’s claims that it can affordably block contraband cell phone transmissions without interfering with public safety or legal wireless use. 

As spectrum experts have explained, jamming contraband cell phone signals without jamming authorized communications presents an extremely difficult engineering 

challenge.8 Cell phone signals use many bands, often proximate to or shared with 

public safety operations. To achieve its claims, CellAntenna’s equipment must isolate the cell phone bands used by contraband phones, operating at sufficient power 

and with sufficient coverage to ensure that no transmissions will escape, while simultaneously avoiding any leakage into neighboring public safety bands, operating 

at sufficient power to ensure total coverage of the prison, but limiting power so that 

no energy escapes to create ‘‘dead zones’’ outside prisons or in areas used by guards. 

Existing cell phone jammers do not engage in such delicate and precise spectrum 

blocking. Cell phone jammers are relatively cheap devices that engage in continuous 

transmission on the selected frequencies, creating ‘‘dead zones’’ by overwhelming a 

cell phone’s receiver. These devices rely on brute force, without regard to operations 

taking place on neighboring bands. CellAntenna’s claims far exceed the capabilities 

of existing cell phone jammers (where legal), raising considerable doubts that they 

can perform under circumstances other then the controlled demonstrations it has 

very publicly conducted. 

CellAntenna will no doubt excuse itself by observing that the FCC has not granted it an authorization to conduct legal experiments—a fact which has not prevented 

CellAntenna from performing its demonstrations. But CellAntenna has neither applied for a genuine experimental license under which it could conduct real experiments, nor has CellAntenna conducted experiments in countries where cell phone 

jamming is legal.9 Rather CellAntenna has preferred to engage in a strategy of holding public demonstrations of questionable legality and no engineering value as a 

means of promoting its legislative aims. 

Congress should not force the FCC to create rules to authorize this jamming technology based on the unsubstantiated claims of a single company. At the least, Congress should not require the FCC to respond to petitions within 60 days, and create 

final rules within one year, as required by S. 251. 

Finally, even if CellAntenna can jam signals with precision, prisoners have too 

many ways to evade jamming. Using commonly available materials such as aluminum foil or a roll of paper towel, a prisoner can block jamming signals and augment a contraband cell phone’s transmission to a nearby cell tower. Furthermore, 

the widespread availability of contraband cell phones indicates the possibility of corrupt prison personnel, who could circumvent jammer technology in the same way 

they have circumvented existing security measures designed to prevent prisoner access to contraband phones. 

Better Means Of Blocking Contraband Cell Phones Exist That Do Not Put 

Public Safety or Commercial Services At Risk 

Given the importance of maintaining security in prisons, it might seem worth the 

risk to public safety and commercial services to authorize cell phone jamming in 

prisons if no other way existed. But existing cell phone technologies offer a better 

and safer alternative to CellAntenna’s unproven precision jamming. In addition, 

Congress should address the underlying issues that make cell phone smuggling both 

possible and lucrative: inadequate funding of prison security, and the high cost to 

the families of prisoners when prisoners make legally authorized collect calls. 

Cell phone providers can already adjust cell phone networks so that only authorized handsets can connect to the network. This practice, known as ‘‘white listing,’’ 

will prevent any contraband phone from functioning without causing any interference to wireless systems. Alternatively, cell phone providers can log phone numbers of calls originating in prisons and submit these lists daily to appropriate prison 

officials to verify that no contraband hand sets are operating in the prison. This 

later approach has the added advantage that prison officials can secure warrants 

to monitor any calls originating from unauthorized handsets, assisting law enforceVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:08 Aug 02, 2010 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\56406.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
51 

ment in any investigation and helping to ferret out the underlying source of the contraband. 

At the same time, Congress should take this opportunity to address the underlying issues that create the problem of contraband handsets in the first place. First, 

Congress should provide adequate funds for prison security, so that contraband does 

not penetrate prisons in the first place. In addition, Congress can also address the 

demand for contraband phones by requiring companies that service prisons to 

charge reasonable long-distance prices to the innocent families of prisoners. As documented in a recent report by the Media Justice Fund and Funding Exchange, it can 

cost the family of a prison inmate $300 a month in collect charges to maintain minimal contact with an imprisoned father, mother, son or daughter. As further documented in Wired Magazine, the high cost of authorized telephone calls makes renting contraband cell phones in prison a lucrative business for prisoners and guards 

alike. While lowering the coast of legal phone calls between prisoners and families 

will not entirely eliminate the incentive to smuggle in contraband cell phones, it will 

help reduce the incentive and make the existing problem far more manageable. 

Conclusion 

For all these reasons, the undersigned wish to make their opposition to 

CellAntenna’s campaign to legalize cell phone jamming in this country a part of the 

public record in this hearing. For more than 75 years, the total ban on deliberate 

interference with authorized wireless transmissions has allowed wireless technology 

to develop in the United States in a robust and economical fashion. Allowing the 

legal manufacture, importation and sale of jamming equipment will create a loophole that history shows the FCC will find impossible to close. Because existing 

means of addressing the problem offer a far greater hope of success without the risk, 

Congress should refrain from amending the ‘‘jammer ban’’ in 47 U.S.C. § 333. 

Sincerely, 

Harold Feld 

Legal Director 

Public Knowledge 

Michael Calabrese 

Vice President and Director Wireless 

Futures Program 

New America Foundation 

Sascha Meinrath 

Director 

Open Technology Institute 

Jonathan Lawson 

Executive Director 

Reclaim the Media 

Joshua Breitbart 

Policy Director 

People’s Production House 

Stephen Renderos 

Organizer 

Main Street Project 

Amanda Deloney 

Network Coordinator 

Media Action Grassroots Network 

(MAG–NET) 

Tracy Rosenberg 

Acting Director 

Media Alliance 

Malkia Cyril 

Executive Director 

Center for Media Justice 

CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION

Washington, DC, July 13, 2009 

JULIUS KNAPP, Chief, Office of Engineering and Technology, 

Federal Communications Commission, 

Washington, DC. 

RE: Experimental License Application of Tecore, Inc. 

FCC File Number 0202–EX–PL–2009 

Dear Mr. Knapp: 

CTIA—The Wireless Association (‘‘CTIA’’) respectfully submits this letter in support of the above-referenced experimental license application of Tecore Networks, 

Inc. (‘‘Tecore’’). CTIA supports the grant of this experimental license—on a fully coordinated basis with CTIA’s affected members—to better develop a record on the capabilities of alternative technological solutions to the unlawful use of mobile devices 

within prisons. The possession and use of wireless devices by inmates in correctional 

facilities is a genuine and important issue, and CTIA supports the development and 

real-world testing of lawful solutions to stop the unauthorized use of these devices 

52 

by inmates. CTIA submits that the testing of Tecore’s proposed solution will enable 

interested stakeholders, including state and Federal corrections agencies, other interested administrative agencies, the Public Safety community, and wireless carriers, to gather important data on the ability of non-jamming technologies to mitigate and resolve the illicit use of wireless phones within prisons. 

CTIA recently hosted a day-long discussion among its members and several companies that have developed potential technologies for lawfully addressing the use of 

mobile devices within correctional facilities. Tecore was one of the presenters and 

indicated that its proposed solution would allow for the denial of access to the wireless network within a prison without the use of any jamming technology. To enable 

this capability, Tecore would deploy base station technology that would transmit a 

‘‘preferred’’ signal covering the grounds of the prison and thereby locking any unauthorized communications traffic to its network’s control. Tecore’s demonstration of 

this capability, however, requires operating authority to transmit in the cellular 

(824–849/869–894 MHz) and Personal Communications Service (‘‘PCS’’) (1850–1910/ 

1930–1990 MHz) bands, which Tecore seeks in its experimental license request. 

CTIA believes there is merit to Tecore’s technological proposal and supports the 

grant of Tecore’s experimental license request. Because Tecore must transmit in the 

cellular and PCS frequency bands, CTIA asks that the Federal Communications 

Commission (‘‘Commission’’) condition the experimental grant with a requirement to 

coordinate all operations with CTIA’s affected members that hold cellular and PCS 

licenses in the market area of the test. CTIA has discussed this effort with its members and there is agreement that such coordination is feasible and that the underlying experimental testing would be desirable. 

CTIA expects that the proposed tests can gather significant data to help determine whether Tecore’s technology could effectively manage cell phone usage in the 

prison environment. This exercise will help the Commission, the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Corrections, and other affected parties gauge the effectiveness of this solution. CTIA believes that these cooperative efforts will assist in 

the development of well-considered solutions and aid in the creation of a full record 

of the capabilities of lawful technologies that can aid corrections officials’ efforts in 

combating cell phone usage within prisons. 

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me or Brian Josef with any questions. 

Sincerely, 

CHRISTOPHER GUTTMAN-MCCABE, 

Vice President, Regulatory Affairs. 

cc: Jim Schlichting 

Ira Keltz 

James Burtle 

David Hu 

Charles Mathias 

Æ