UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4724

APRIL D. REYNOLDS, a/k/a Nettie,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins.

Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-00-7)

Submitted: March 21, 2002

Decided: March 29, 2002

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion. 

COUNSEL

Michelle Roman Fox, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas

E. Johnston, United States Attorney, Sherry L. Muncy, Assistant

United States Attorney, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

April D. Reynolds appeals the sentence of forty-one months

imprisonment she received following her guilty plea to one count of

distribution of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a) (West 1999). We

affirm in part and dismiss in part. 

Reynolds first challenges the district court’s decision that she was

not a minor participant in the offense under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2(b) (2000) because she merely acted as a runner.

Although Reynolds may not have been paid by the other conspirators

for her assistance, she obtained crack for an undercover officer and

sold it to him. Because a drug seller in a drug conspiracy does not

have a minor role, see United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1149

(4th Cir. 1992), the district court did not clearly err in denying her the

adjustment. 

Reynolds next argues that the $10 fine she received for a 1995 misdemeanor battery conviction should not have been counted in her

criminal history because she was denied the appointment of counsel.

We find that the fine was properly counted. Reynolds retained an

attorney to represent her with respect to the battery charge. Moreover,

even a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be counted if

it did not result in sentence of imprisonment. See Nichols v. United

States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994); USSG § 4A1.2, backg’d (same).

Reynolds further alleges that the two-year delay between the underlying incident and execution of the warrant for her arrest violated her

due process rights. However, a sentence resulting from a prior conviction that has not been ruled constitutionally invalid must be counted.

USSG § 4A1.2, comment. (n.6). 

Finally, Reynolds contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a downward departure based on

extraordinary post-offense rehabilitation. Because the court recognized its authority to depart on this ground, its determination that

Reynolds’ rehabilitation was commendable but not extraordinary is

not reviewable on appeal. United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338,

352-53 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 (2000). 

2 UNITED STATES v. REYNOLDS
We therefore affirm the sentence. We dismiss that portion of the

appeal which contests the district court’s decision not to depart. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART

UNITED STATES v. REYNOLDS 3