UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

LAVERE BRYANT and 

ASTRIN CHANDLER, 

 

 Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 14-14181 

 Honorable Denise Page Hood 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

 

SALLY JENKINS, 

DANIELLE HAGAMAN-CLARK, 

LEAH BRONSON and, 

FLAG STAR BANK, 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF CHANDLER’S COMPLAINT 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

 This case has been referred to the undersigned for management, hearing and 

determination of all pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A), and for any reports and 

recommendations on dispositive matters that may be necessary pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§636(b)(1)(B). 

 Plaintiff Astrin Chandler (“Chandler”) has been granted leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis in this matter. (Doc. #5). The Court now having assessed the sufficiency of the 

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), IT IS RECOMMENDED that Chandler’s complaint 

be dismissed sua sponte. 

II. REPORT 

A. Background 

On April 3, 2015, Lavere Bryant (“Bryant”), who is currently incarcerated at the Bellamy 

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Creek Correctional Facility, purported to file a complaint “in behalf of [co-plaintiff] Astrin 

Chandler [] and himself.” (Doc. #15 at 5).1

 The bulk of the complaint centers on Bryant’s 

allegations that defendants Flag Star Bank and one of its employees, Sally Jenkins, unlawfully 

seized Bryant’s financial records and disclosed them to the Dearborn Police Department after 

Jenkins observed a news broadcast of a robbery-homicide incident and identified Bryant as the 

unknown suspect. Bryant brings his claims pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3401, which prohibits a 

financial institution or its employees from disclosing a customer’s financial records to the 

Government unless authorized by law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bryant also purports to bring a 

state law claim for breach of contract resulting from the disclosure of his confidential financial 

records. Additionally, Bryant alleges that the disclosure of his financial records, which showed 

payments to Public Storage, resulted in the unlawful search and seizure of Chandler’s storage 

unit by Assistant Prosecuting Attorney (“APA”) Hagaman-Clark and Dearborn Police Officer 

Leah Bronson.2 

Chandler alleges that APA Hagaman-Clark and Officer Bronson authorized and executed 

an unconstitutional search and seizure of property from her storage unit, resulting from the 

unlawful disclosure of Bryant’s financial records. (Doc. #15 at 7, 10). She complains that the 

property has not been returned and seeks compensatory and punitive damages against APA 

Hagaman-Clark and Officer Bronson. Chandler brings these claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§1983. Additionally, Chandler alleges that Officer Bronson committed perjury by claiming to 

have knowledge that Bryant had access to her storage unit. (Doc. #15 at 7). The Court now 

 

1

 The complaint’s signature block lists both plaintiffs’ names, and states, “By Lavere Bryant.” 

(Doc. #1 at 14). The complaint bears only Bryant’s signature. (Id.). 

2

 In a separate Report and Recommendation issued on today’s date, the Court recommends 

dismissal of Bryant’s complaint in its entirety. (Doc. #18). 

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considers the sufficiency of Chandler’s claims for relief. 

B. Analysis 

Once a complaint is filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a), the court must test 

its sufficiency under §1915(e). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), a court “shall dismiss” a 

case at any time if it: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” 

The court must construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally and hold her complaint to 

a less stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney. See Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 

248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005). However, §1915(e)(2)(B) directs that a complaint must be dismissed if 

it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “A complaint should not be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 

facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” Scott v. Brennan, 2010 WL 

4624022, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2010) (quoting Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 

1993)). 

1. Bryant Cannot Pursue Chandler’s Claims on Her Behalf 

As an initial matter, a procedural defect with Chandler’s complaint compels its dismissal 

without prejudice. Bryant purports to file the instant complaint “in behalf of [co-Plaintiff] Astrin 

Chandler [] and himself.” (Doc. # 15 at 5). As noted above, supra fn. 1, Bryant clearly purports 

to be representing and acting on Chandler’s behalf. Indeed, the complaint bears only his 

signature. (Doc. #1 at 14). However, federal law prohibits pro se individuals like Bryant from 

representing other litigants. 28 U.S.C. §1654 (emphasis added) states: 

In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their 

own cases personally or by counsel as, the rules of such courts, 

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respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct cases therein. 

Thus, like any litigant, while Bryant may prosecute his own claims pro se, he is limited to 

representing himself and may not act in a representative capacity for any other person. See 

Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007). Put simply, “[t]he statute does not 

permit ‘unlicensed laymen to represent anyone else other than themselves.’” Id. (quoting Eagle 

Assoc. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991)). 

 The Sixth Circuit has specifically held that pro se prisoners like Bryant may not represent 

others in federal court litigation. For instance, in Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th 

Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs may not appear pro se “where interests other than 

their own are at stake.” See also Garrison v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 333 F. App’x 914, 

919 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that pro se litigant may represent himself on his own claims but may 

not act in representative capacity on behalf of others). Numerous other courts have similarly 

held that pro se inmates do not have the capability to adequately litigate suits on behalf of others. 

See, e.g., Moore v. Warren, 2014 WL 1464404, at *3 (E.D. Mich. April 15, 2014) (“[The] case 

law and plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1654 preclude [Plaintiff] from representing anyone other 

than herself.”); Bey v. Youngblood, 2014 WL 4965956, at *2 (E.D. Mich. October 3, 2014) (“The 

right to litigate for oneself ... does not create a coordinate right to litigate for others) (quoting 

Myers v. Loudon Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005)); Proctor v. Applegate, 2008 

WL 2478331, at *1, n. 3 (E.D. Mich. June 16, 2008) (“It is well established that plaintiff Proctor 

may only represent himself with respect to his individual claims and many not act on behalf of 

other[s].”). 

 Thus, to the extent Bryant purports to have filed the complaint “in behalf of [co-Plaintiff] 

Astrin Chandler [] and himself,” (Doc. #15 at 5), this should not be permitted, and the complaint 

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should be dismissed without prejudice as to Chandler. 

2. Chandler’s Claim against APA Hagaman-Clark is Barred by Prosecutorial 

Immunity 

 Even assuming that Chandler is representing herself in this action, her claim against APA 

Hagaman-Clark fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed. In the complaint, Chandler 

alleges that APA Hagaman-Clark counseled Officer Bronson, unlawfully and without probable 

cause, to procure a warrant to search Chandler’s storage unit. (Doc. #15 at 7). Like judges, 

prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages under § 1983 for actions 

performed within the scope of their prosecutorial duties. Johnson v. Wayne County, 2006 WL 

3086938 at *3 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)). Here, where APA 

Hagaman-Clark was seeking information related to a criminal investigation, she was acting 

within the scope of her prosecutorial duties when she allegedly advised Officer Bronson to 

procure a warrant to search Chandler’s storage unit. Thus, the doctrine of absolute immunity 

applies because APA Hagaman-Clark’s challenged conduct was “intimately associated with the 

judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. As such, Chandler’s claim 

against APA Hagaman-Clark is barred by prosecutorial immunity and should be dismissed. 

3. Chandler Also Fails to State a Claim against Officer Bronson

 Even construing the complaint liberally, Chandler has failed to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted against Officer Bronson. In the complaint, Chandler concedes that 

Defendant Jenkins identified Bryant as the suspect in a robbery-double homicide investigation, 

and implicated Chandler’s storage unit in this crime when she disclosed Bryant’s financial 

records—which showed payments to Public Storage—to the Dearborn Police Department. (Doc. 

#15 at 6-7). Despite these admissions, Chandler makes the conclusory allegation that Officer 

Bronson committed perjury when she claimed to know that Bryant had access to the storage unit 

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in question. (Doc. #15 at 7). She also alleges, without further factual basis, that Officer Bronson 

procured a warrant to search her storage unit “maliciously and without probable cause,” and 

executed a search of the unit “wholly without a substantial basis for inferring a fair probability 

that evidence of the robbery-homicide exists in the unit.” (Doc. #15 at 7-9). 

 Chandler’s unsupported and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading 

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), the Supreme Court held 

that Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but a pleading must provide “more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). In short, a plaintiff must allege 

enough facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” and 

dismissal is only appropriate if the plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient factual allegations to 

make a claim plausible. Id. at 570. The Supreme Court clarified the “plausibility” standard in 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): 

To survive [dismissal], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. 

Id. at 678 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is axiomatic that purely legal 

conclusions unsupported by any factual allegations do not satisfy the plausibility standard set 

forth in Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., 16630 Southfield Ltd. Partnership v. Flagstar Bank, 727 

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F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that a plaintiff may not overcome dismissal simply by 

referring to conclusory allegations in the complaint that defendant violated the law); West v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 3213269 *at 4 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2013) (holding fraud 

claim lacking specificity and detail insufficient to satisfy plausibility standard); EEOC v. WW 

Group, Inc., 2012 WL 580471 (E.D. Mich. February 22, 2012) (holding complaint alleging 

discriminatory “employment practices” but providing no further factual detail regarding those 

practices deficient under Twombly and Iqbal). 

 Applying this standard to Chandler’s complaint, she fails to set forth sufficient factual 

detail to state plausible claims against Officer Bronson. Chandler concedes that Defendant 

Jenkins identified Bryant as the suspect of a robbery-double homicide, and that his financial 

records linked him to her storage unit, but offers no factual basis to support her conclusions that 

Officer Bronson procured a search warrant without probable cause, executed an unlawful search 

of her storage unit, or committed perjury. Her allegations amount to mere recitations of legal 

conclusions, and thus her complaint is insufficient because it offers nothing more than “naked 

assertion[s]” lacking “further factual enhancement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). 

Because Chandler has failed to state a claim with sufficient plausibility under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), her claims against Officer Bronson should be dismissed without 

prejudice. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Chandler’s complaint be 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as it was improperly filed on her behalf by another pro 

se litigant. If the Court reaches the merits of Chandler’s complaint, IT IS RECOMMENDED

that her claims against APA Hagaman-Clark be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and that 

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her claims against Officer Bronson be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

Dated: June 22, 2015 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, any 

party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and 

recommendations set forth above. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. 

Mich. LR 72.1(d)(1). Failure to timely file objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of 

appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, (1985); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th 

Cir. 2005). Only specific objections to this Report and Recommendation will be preserved for 

the Court’s appellate review; raising some objections but not others will not preserve all 

objections a party may have. See Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 

1373 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2006). 

Copies of any objections must be served upon the Magistrate Judge. See E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d)(2). 

A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with 

a copy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Any such response should be 

concise, and should address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue presented in the 

objections. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 22, 2015. 

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 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager 

 

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