IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50754

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JAMES LUTHER GODFREY, III,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:18-CR-302-1

Before BARKSDALE, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

James Luther Godfrey, III, entered a conditional-guilty plea to being a 

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), reserving 

his right to challenge the denial, after a hearing, of his motion to suppress 

evidence. Godfrey was sentenced below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines 

sentencing range to, inter alia, 50-months’ imprisonment. He contends the 

district court committed reversible error by denying his suppression motion

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 18, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

because the evidence against him was gathered pursuant to a warrant 

grounded in a bare-bones affidavit. 

When considering the denial of a suppression motion, “we review the 

district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo”. 

United States v. Bruno, 487 F.3d 304, 305 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Officers executing a search warrant may rely in good faith on a warrant, even 

if it is subsequently invalidated. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–24

(1984).

This good-faith exception does not apply, however, if, inter alia, the 

affidavit supporting the warrant so lacks indicia of probable cause that it is a 

bare-bones affidavit. See id. at 923 (citation omitted); United States v. Mays, 

466 F.3d 335, 343 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). A bare-bones affidavit is 

one that “contain[s] wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and 

circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine probable 

cause”. United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation 

omitted). Whether an affidavit is bare bones is determined under the totality 

of the circumstances, see United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 

1994) (citation omitted), and using common sense, see United States v. Jackson, 

818 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

The affidavit at issue is not made up of “wholly conclusory statements”, 

lacking “facts and circumstances from which [the] magistrate [could] 

independently determine probable cause”. See Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 321 

(citation omitted). Examples of such conclusory statements include: “the 

affiant ‘has cause to suspect and does believe’ that liquor illegally imported is 

located on certain premises”; and “the affiants ‘have received reliable 

information from a credible person and do believe’ that heroin is stored in a 

home”. United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300, 1303 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991) 

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(citations omitted). In contrast, the officer’s affidavit at issue specified that Ed

Tally (a citizen-informant property inspector) saw contraband in a certain 

apartment when he entered it as part of his job.

Further, Godfrey’s contention the affidavit at issue was bare bones 

because it made no assertions regarding Tally’s credibility fails under United 

States v. Blount, which provides that “absent specific reasons for police to doubt 

his or her truthfulness, an ordinary citizen, who provides information to police 

at a crime scene or during an ongoing investigation, may be presumed credible 

without subsequent corroboration”. 123 F.3d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1997) (en 

banc); see also United States v. Fooladi, 703 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1983) 

(“When an average citizen tenders information to the police, the police should 

be permitted to assume that they are dealing with a credible person in the 

absence of special circumstances suggesting that such might not be the case.”

(alteration and citation omitted)). 

Although Godfrey attempts to distinguish Blount on the basis that the 

informant in that case gave information in an ongoing investigation, there is 

no indication this distinction is material. Instead, Blount held the pertinent 

inquiry is whether officials are aware of certain facts undermining the citizeninformant’s credibility. See Blount, 123 F.3d at 835. Godfrey casts no specific 

doubts on Tally’s credibility and, therefore, has not shown it should not be 

presumed credible. 

AFFIRMED. 

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