UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BRICKLAYERS & TROWEL TRADES INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. JOANN BARRON d/b/a BA RRON TILE COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 1:18-cv-0165-CRC

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiffs in this ERISA action—m ultiemployer employee benefit plans—seek to recover unpaid contributions and associate d damages from an Ohio-based tile company. Despite having been properly served, the compa ny has not responded to the comp laint, the Clerk’s entry of default, or the Court’s order to show cause why judgment should not be entered against it. Plaintiffs now request a default judgment, monetary damages, an d attorneys’ fees, as well as an injunction requiring the company t o submit to a payroll audit a nd make the required plan contributions going forward. Becau se Plaintiffs have adequatel y established that the Defendant is liable and that they are enti tled to all of the requested re lief, the Court will grant their motion and enter judgment against the company.

I. Background Plaintiffs—the Bricklayers & Tro wel Trades International Pensio n Fund (“IPF”) and the International Masonry Institute (“IMI”)—are “employee benefit p lans” and “multiemployer plans” under the Employee Retireme nt Income Security Act of 197 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 et seq. (“ERISA”). The plans are funde d by contributions made by emplo yers who are signatories to collective bargaining agreements . Ohio-based Defendant Joann B arron is an individual doing2 business under the trade name “ Barron Tile Company” (“Barron”) and is one such employer. It is required under its collection b argaining agreements and the plans’ written procedures governing the collecti on of employer contributions (“Collection Procedures”) to submit monthly reports and payments to the plan s based on the number of hours worked by its employees in covered job positions. David F. Stupar Supp. Pls.’ Mot. Defaul t J. (“Stupar Decl.”) ¶ 7. If Barron fails to make the require d contributions, Plaintiffs are entitled to file suit to recover the unpaid contributions; interest on the unpaid contributions; eit her an additional assessment of interest on the unpaid contributi ons or liquidated damages prov ided for under the plan not in excess of 20 percent, whichever i s higher; reasonable attorneys ’ fees and costs; and other legal or equitable relief as the cour t deems appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(g)(2). Plaintiffs allege that Barron f ailed to “report and pay all amo unts owing to [them] as required” by the applicable colle ctive bargaining agreements an d the plans’ Collection Procedures. Compl. ¶ 10. Barr on was properly served on Januar y 31, 2018. Pls.’ Aff. Service. It did not respond to the complai nt, however, and the Clerk of the Court entered default on February 26, 2018. Entry of Defau lt. Plaintiffs now petition the Court to enter a default judgment, seeking monetary judgement against Barron in the amou nt of $8,794.44, which includes delinquent contributions , interest on delinquent payme nts, liquidated damages, process server costs, filing fees, and a ttorneys’ fees. S tupar Decl. ¶ ¶ 9-13, 15-18. Section 502(e)(2) of ERISA provide s for federal jurisdiction “i n the district where the plan is administered.” 29 U.S .C. § 1132(e)(2). According to t he complaint, both the IPF and the IMI are administered in the Dis trict of Columbia. Compl. ¶¶ 1- 2. The Court therefore has jurisdiction over the case. Plaintiffs filed the complaint wit hin ERISA’s three-year statute-oflimitations period. See 29 U.S.C. § 1113.3 II. Standard of Review The standard for default judgment is a two-step procedure. See , e.g., Boland v. Cacper Constr. Corp., 130 F. Supp. 3d 379, 382 (D.D.C. 2015). First, the plaintiff requests that the Clerk of the Court enter default against a party who has “faile d to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, the pl aintiff must move for ent ry of default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Default judgment is available when “the adversa ry process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal citation omitted). “De fault establishes a defaulting party’s liability for the well- pleaded allegations of the compl aint.” Id. After establishing liability, the court must make an independent evaluation of the damages to be awarded and has “considerable latitude in determining the amount of damages.” Id. The court may hold a hearing or rely on “detailed affidavits or documentary evidence” submit ted by plaintiffs in support of their claims. Boland v. Provi dence Constr. Corp., 304 F.R.D. 3 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Fanning v. Permanent Sol. I ndus., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2009)).

III. Analysis The Court must determine whether entry of default judgment is a ppropriate and, if Barron is liable, whether Plaintiffs a re entitled to the manner and am ount of relief they request. The Court concludes that the company breached its duties under ERIS A and the Collection Procedures and that Plaintiffs a re entitled to both the monetar y and injunctive relief requested.
A. Liability Plaintiffs filed suit in Janua ry 2018 to recover the damages pr escribed by ERISA and the Collection Procedures. Compl . ¶ 1. Barron was served with the summons and complaint on4 January 31, 2018. Pls.’ Mot. Defau lt J. 1. The Clerk of the C ourt declared it to be in default on February 26, 2018. Entry of D efault. On June 12, 2018, the Co urt issued an Order to Show Cause why judgment should not be e ntered for Plaintiffs and set June 28, 2018 as the deadline for Barron to respond. Barron has not responded to either the complaint, the Clerk’s entry of default, or the Court’s Order to Show Cause. Because the Clerk of the Court has entered default and Barron h as failed to respond, the Court accepts Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations and holds th at it is liable and that entry of default judgment is appropriate . See Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d at 67. ERISA requires employers to make contributions to multiemployer plans “in accordance with the terms and conditions of” the rele vant collective bargaining agr eements. 29 U.S.C. § 1145. The IPF and IMI’s Collection Procedur es specify that contributions are due “on or before the 15th day of the month” after the mont h in which work was performed. Stupar Decl. ¶ 5. They further provide that Barron will “submit monthly fringe benefit remitta nce reports and pay monthly fringe benefit contributions to the IPF and IMI for each hour o f covered work performed by its employees within the work and geog raphic jurisdictions of the A greement.” Stupar Decl. ¶ 7. By failing to submit required re ports and pay the required cont ributions to IMI and IPF for covered work, Barron is liable for contractual an d statutory da mages. The Court may enter default j udgment when a defendant makes no request “to set aside the default” and gives no indica tion of a “meritorious defense. ” Fanning, 257 F.R.D. at 7. Barron, as noted above, has not res ponded to the complaint sinc e being served in January 2018. The Court thus concludes that ent ry of default judgment against the Defendant is appropriate.5 B. Damages The next issue before the Court is the amount of damages due: “ [P]laintiffs must prove these damages to a reasonable certainty.” Elite Terrazzo Floor ing, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d at 68. Under ERISA, employers are r equired to pay any delinquent contr ibutions, interest on unpaid contributions, liquidated dama ges at a rate of up to 20 percent or an additional interest assessment at the rate provided unde r the plan (whichever is hi gher), and legal fees. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). When a defendant has failed to respond, the Court must make an independent determination—by relying on affidavits, documentation, or an ev identiary hearing—of the sum to be awarded as damages. As support for their requested damages, Plaintiffs have submitt ed declarations from David F. Stupar, the Executive Director of the IPF and an autho rized representative of the IMI, and Richard Hopp, Plaintiffs’ a ttorney of record and counsel at O’Donoghue & O’Donoghue LLP. Both attest to having persona l knowledge of the facts reg arding the assessment of contributions owed by Joann Barron , as well as the costs incurr ed in the current suit. Stupar Decl. ¶ 1; Hopp Decl. ¶ 1. Courts i n this district, including this one, have accepted similar declarations in support of motions for default judgment regardi ng monetary damages owed to IPF and IMI. See Cacper Constr. Corp., 130 F. Supp. 3d at 383; Providence Constr., 304 F.R.D. at 37; Elite Terrazzo Flooring, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 69. Mr. Stu par’s declaration details the amounts owed for delinquent cont ributions, interest on late pai d payments, liquidated damages, court fees, and the process serv er’s fee. Stupar Decl. ¶¶ 9-13 , 15-18.
1. Cover Group 2 First, Mr. Stupar affirms th at Barron reported but failed to pa y all the contributions due to IPF and IMI for covered wor k performed in Local Union No. 8 – O hio, cover group 2, in August,6 October and December 2016, and February, March, April, May, Jun e, and September 2017. Stupar Decl. ¶ 9. Barron owes t he IPF contributions in the amo unt of $1,252.21, and the IMI contributions in the amount of $780.68, interest on the delinqu ent contributions due to the funds in the amount of $284.17, and liquida ted damages in the amount of $406.64. Id. Barron also failed to timely pay contributi on dues to the IPF and IMI for c overed work performed by cover group 2 during the months of May, July, August, November and De cember 2016 and January, April and December 2017 and January 2018. Stupar Decl. ¶ 16. Barron owes liquidated damages in the amount of $933.60 to the IPF and IMI. Id. Second, Barron failed to report and pay all the contributions t o the IPF and IMI for covered work performed in L ocal Union No. 8 – Ohio, cover group 2, in July and August 2017, and February and March 2018. Stupar Decl. ¶ 10. Without the r eports, Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment based on reasonable estimates of hours worked by emplo yees in covered employment. See, e.g., Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund v. Builders Metal Supply Inc., 304 F.R.D. 47, 50 (D.D.C. 2014). Plaintiffs estimate that $245.98 is owed each month to the IPF (for a total of $983.92) and $148.98 is owed each month to t he IMI (for a total of $595. 92) based on the average hours reported by Barron. The interest on these delinquent contributi ons is $44.59 to the IPF and $27.01 to the IMI; liquidated dama ges are $147.60 to the IPF an d $89.40 to the IMI. Stupar Decl. ¶ 11-12.
2. Cover Group 29 First, during March and May 2017, B arron reported but failed to pay to the IMI all contributions owed for covered w ork performed in Local Union No . 8 – Ohio, cover group 29. Stupar Decl. ¶ 13. Barron owes the IMI contributions in the am ount of $7.54, interest on the7 delinquent contributions in t he amount of $1.05, and liquidated damages in the amount of $1.51. Id. Second, Barron failed to report and pay all contributions to th e IPF and IMI for covered work performed in Local U nion No. 8 – Ohio, cover group 29, in December 2016 and June, August, September, October, November and December 2017, and Jan uary, February and March 2018. Stupar Decl. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs estimate that $6.82 is owe d each month for December 2016 and $7.05 per month for June, August, September, October, Novem ber and December 2017, and January, February and March 2018 to the IMI (for a total of $70 .27) based on the average monthly hours reported by Barr on. Stupar Decl. ¶ 15. The inte rest on these delinquent payments is $4.18 to the IMI; liquidated da mages are $12.65 to the IMI. Id.
3. Court Fees Additionally, Plaintiffs are ent itled to recover court fees und er ERISA Section 502(g)(2)(D). Here, Plaintiffs incurred a $400 court filing fe e and a $185 process server fee. Stupar Decl. ¶¶ 17-18. The costs detailed above total $6,227.94.
C. Attorneys’ Fees Aside from contractual damages , ERISA also requires defendants to pay plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees . 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). O’Dono ghue & O’Donoghue charged Plaintiffs $295 an hour for 8.7 hour s of work, totaling $2,566. 50 in attorney’s fees for this case. Hopp Decl. ¶ 2, 4. In support of the requested attorney’s fees , Mr. Hopp’s declaration details the services provided to Plaintiffs . He attests that he has over 2 7 years of exper ience practicing exclusively in the field of labor and employee benefits. Id. ¶ 1. He also notes t hat the firm has8 charged reduced hourly rates in t his case that fall “substantia lly below” the rate in the current Laffey matrix. Id. ¶ 4. Mr. Hopp’s declaration outlines the individual tasks he perform ed, from preparing the complaint to drafting the moti on for default judgment. Hopp De cl. Ex. 1. Because this declaration constitutes the type of “detailed . . . documentary evidence” on which the Court may rely, see Fanning, 257 F.R.D. at 7, t he Court concludes that Pl aintiffs have justified the hours expended in this case. The Court likewise finds the r equested rates to be reasonable. Mr. Hopp states that the negotiated fee of $295 an hour is “bel ow the usual and customar y fee charged for this type of work.” Hopp Decl. ¶ 4. Given that the firm charged below-mark et rates, the Court finds the request to be reasonable. See , e.g., Providence Constr. Corp., 304 F.R.D. at 37 ( holding that “Funds are entitled to an attorney s-fee award calculated at mar ket rates . . .”). The Court therefore determines that Pl aintiffs are entitled to $2,566.50 in attorney’s fees.
D. Equitable Relief The final issue before the Court is whether Plaintiffs are enti tled to their requested equitable relief: an order dire cting Barron to submit an audit of its payroll records and an injunction requiring Barron to 1) s ubmit all remittance reports accurately to Plaintiffs no later than the fifteenth day of the m onth following the month in whic h the Defendant’s employees performed their work, and 2) pay the Plaintiffs all contributio ns owed no later than the fifteenth day of the month following the mont h in which the Defendant’s e mployees performed their work. Pls.’ Mot. Default J. 9–10. ERISA permits courts to grant “oth er legal or equitable relief as [it] deems appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(E). This ma y include “an injunction req uiring a defendant to permit, and9 cooperate with, an audit of its books and records.” Fanning v. AMF Mechanical Corporation, No. CV 17-1514 (TJK), 2018 WL 2389727, at *4 (D.D.C. May 24, 20 18) (quoting Flynn v. Mastro Masonry Contract ors, 237 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D.D.C. 2002 )). In similar si tuations with non-responsive defendants, courts h ave awarded injunctions requ iring an employer to comply with its obligations under ERISA and collective bargaining agre ements. See Boland v. Yoccabel Constr. Co., Inc., 293 F.R.D. 13, 20-21 ( D.D.C. 2013); Int’l Pa inters & Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund v. ZAK Architectural Metal & Glass, LLC, 635 F. Su pp. 2d 21, 26 (D.D.C. 2009); Carpenters Labor-Mgmt. Pension Fund v. Freeman-Carder, LLC, 498 F. Supp. 2d 237, 242 (D.D.C. 2007). Guided by these prior cases, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ peti tion for an injunction “because the defendant has demonstrated no willingness to compl y with either its contractual or statutory obligations or to partic ipate in the judicial process .” ZAK Architectural Metal & Glass, LLC, 635 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (internal citation omitted). The Co urt directs Barron to submit to an audit of its payroll records, f ile the reports required under t he applicable collective bargaining agreement, and pay all contributi ons to IPF and IMI that may be come due after the entry of judgment.
IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ Mot ion for Entry of Default Judgment. The Court will issue an order consistent with this o pinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge Date: June 29, 2018