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trial. Fernandez responded that he did not know to notice the witness 

because he just learned about the information. During jury deliberations 

Fernandez obtained a three-page signed statement from the inmate 

describing the eyewitness' confession in detail. After two days of 

deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. 

"This court reviews the district court's decision regarding a 

motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion." Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 

194, 206, 163 P.3d 408, 416 (2007). "Each case turns on its own particular 

facts, and much weight is given to the reasons offered to the trial judge at 

the time the request for a continuance is made." Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. 

222 P.3d 648, 653 (2010). "This court has held denials of motions 

for reasonable continuances to be an abuse of discretion where the purpose 

of the motion is to procure important witnesses and the delay is not the 

particular fault of counsel or the parties." Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 42, 

806 P.2d 548, 557 (1991), limited on other grounds by Summers v. State, 

122 Nev. 1326, 1331, 148 P.3d 778, 782 (2006). "Where . . . the jury's 

determination of guilt or innocence heavily depends upon their assessment 

of the credibility of the defendant and [his accuser], testimony which 

corroborates one party and discredits the other is material and essential." 

Banks v. State, 101 Nev. 771, 774, 710 P.2d 723, 725 (1985). 

The only reasons given by the district court for its denial of 

Fernandez's motion was the timing of the motion and Fernandez's failure 

to notice the witness before trial. Contrary to the district court's 

assertion, Fernandez's failure to notice the inmate as a witness did not 

preclude the court from admitting his testimony. NRS 174.234(3)(a) only 

requires the court to prohibit unnoticed witnesses from testifying where 

the party acted in bad faith. At the time the district court denied the 

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continuance there was no evidence of bad faith. While judicial economy is 

an important concern when considering a motion for a continuance, the 

court should also consider the benefit that the moving party anticipates 

and the likelihood that such a benefit will result. See People v. Barnett, 

954 P.2d 384, 436 (Cal. 1998). Here, a potentially exculpatory witness was 

sitting in a cell less than a block away from the courtroom and the district 

court denied a brief continuance based on its unsupported belief that the 

defendant was misleading the court. Had the inmate testified in the 

manner proffered by Fernandez's attorney, such testimony would have 

supported Fernandez's claim that he did not kill the victim and 

undermined the testimony of the State's key eyewitness who himself had 

been charged with the murder before negotiating a plea agreement with 

the State in exchange for testifying against Fernandez. After considering 

the facts and circumstances of this case and the reasons given by the 

district court in denying the request for a brief continuance, we conclude 

that the district court abused its discretion by denying Fernandez's 

motion. 

Furthermore, we cannot say that this error was harmless. See 

NRS 178.598; Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1189, 196 P.3d 465, 476 

(2008) (explaining that this court will only reverse non-constitutional error 

if the error substantially affects the jury's verdict); see also Banks, 101 

Nev. at 774, 710 P.2d at 725 (considering whether testimony was material 

to defense). While Fernandez admitted that he fought with the victim, he 

claimed that the State's eyewitness was the one who repeatedly stabbed 

the victim and slit his throat in the bathroom. This theory was supported 

by the gash on the eyewitness' hand, testimony that the eyewitness' DNA 

was found in the bathroom, and the eyewitness' attempt to flee the 

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4 

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country shortly after the murder. In light of the importance of the 

eyewitness' testimony and the relative strength of the corroborating 

evidence, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND 

REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 

this order. 1 

cc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge 

Law Offices of C. Conrad Claus 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

1Because we reverse Fernandez's judgment of conviction and 

remand this matter for a new trial we need not address Fernandez's other 

claims of error.