UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

LAMONT ALPHONSO JONES, 

 Petitioner, Civil Action No. 14-CV-14849 

v. HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN 

CATHERINE S. BAUMAN, 

 Respondent. 

 ______________ / 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

[docket entry 1]. Petitioner challenges his convictions for five counts of first-degree criminal 

sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(1)(a), and one count of second-degree criminal 

sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(a). He seeks habeas corpus relief on the 

ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent has filed an answer 

arguing that petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is meritless. The Court denies 

the petition and declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner’s convictions arise from the sexual assaults of J.R., who was only nineyears old when petitioner began abusing her. The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the 

circumstances leading to petitioner’s convictions as follows: 

The victim, 12 years old at the time of trial, lived with her mother. 

Defendant, a friend of the victim’s older brother, began caring for 

the victim when her mother was away and practically lived in the 

home. When the victim was nine years old, she became involved 

in a sexual relationship with defendant. Their first sexual 

encounter occurred when they went upstairs to a bedroom and 
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defendant rubbed his penis against her vagina. After this initial 

encounter, the victim and defendant would have sex almost every 

other day, including oral and anal sex. 

One particular occasion occurred in September 2010, when the 

victim and defendant were engaged in vaginal intercourse in the 

living room. One of the victim’s brothers and his friend looked 

through the window and saw defendant and the victim. Defendant 

told the victim to leave the house and that he would tell her brother 

it was a different girl. However, the victim’s brother testified that 

he saw the victim and defendant having sex. The friend also 

testified that he saw defendant having sex with a girl, but he could 

not see the girl’s face. Both the brother and his friend testified that 

defendant told them not to tell anyone and that he was with a 

different girl. 

The victim admitted that she had been suspended from school on 

numerous occasions and that she had been placed on a tether. She 

also indicated that she had been sent to a mental hospital. The 

victim’s mother testified that the victim had some truancy 

problems that worsened over time, and that the victim was 

admitted to Hawthorne, a psychiatric hospital, after refusing to go 

to school. 

According to the victim, her mother paid for two cellular phones 

with which the victim and defendant would exchange text 

messages. Defendant referred to the victim as “baby babe” or 

“wifey” in some of the text messages. The victim also claimed 

that she told a school counselor that she was having sex with 

defendant. The counselor, however, testified that the victim said 

she was having sex with a male classmate, although the counselor 

did not believe her. The counselor contacted child protective 

services and the victim’s mother, communicating suspicions that 

the victim might be pregnant. 

The victim also recalled one time when she was 11 years old and 

her friend was spending the night. While the victim and defendant 

were having sex, the friend walked into the bedroom. The friend 

testified to seeing the victim’s vagina in defendant’s mouth, and 

that defendant said he would kill himself if they told anyone about 

the relationship. The victim then sent a message to her friend’s 

mother, confessing that she was having sex with defendant. The 

victim’s parents were notified, and they took the victim to the 

hospital for a physical examination. 
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Because the victim recently had sex with defendant, nurses took a 

number of samples including a swab of the victim’s neck because 

defendant would suck on and kiss her neck. A certified sexual 

assault nurse examiner testified that the victim stated that she had 

sex with defendant and he threatened to kill himself if she refused. 

The nurse testified that the vaginal examination was consistent 

with the victim’s reported history.1 

An expert in forensic biology and DNA analysis testified that DNA 

from the victim’s neck was consistent with defendant’s DNA. The 

expert explained that the sample was more consistent with direct 

contact, not a secondary transfer that would occur if the victim 

touched a surface with defendant’s body fluid and then touched her 

neck. Another person’s DNA, not belonging to the victim or 

defendant, was detected but the sample was too small to be used as 

a match. 

After reporting the sexual relationship, the victim participated in 

two Kids Talk interviews.2

 Before the first Kids Talk interview, 

defendant told the victim that they could get out of the situation 

and be together if she denied that they had sex. Accordingly, the 

victim denied having sex with defendant and reported that she had 

sex with two boys at school. Before her second interview with 

Kids Talk, the victim smoked marijuana and had sex with 

defendant. She claimed that during this second interview, she told 

the truth about having sex with defendant. 

The victim and defendant continued their sexual relationship even 

after the second Kids Talk interview. The victim testified that she 

last had sex with defendant in a car parked at the West Chester 

Towers, he lost his cellular phone, and he was arrested when they 

returned home. Defendant, however, testified that he was looking 

for his cellular phone in the car and the victim came out to 

apologize to him and tell him that she would fix the situation. The 

arresting police officer testified that he saw defendant leaning 

outside of a parked car and saw a female exit the car and go into a 

nearby house. 

At trial, defendant testified to a much different version of events. 

He claimed that he considered the victim to be like a sibling and 

that he did not look at her in a sexual way. He denied using her 

mother’s cellular phone for text messages. He claimed that he had 

sex in the house with girlfriends, and that when the victim’s 

brother and friend saw him in living room, he was having sex with 

one of his girlfriends. Defendant also testified that the victim was 
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out of control and that she hung out with boyfriends all the time. 

According to defendant, the victim was involved in a sexual 

relationship with her friend’s brother, defendant threatened to tell 

the victim’s mother about the relationship, and in retaliation the 

victim reported that she was having sex with defendant. 

1 While at the hospital, the victim sent a message to [a] male friend 

with whom she had a relationship. 

2 Kids Talk is an independent group that specializes in forensic 

interviews with children. 

People v. Jones, No. 305586, 2013 WL 4746730, *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2013). 

Following a jury trial in Wayne County Circuit Court, petitioner was convicted of 

five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of second-degree criminal 

sexual conduct. On June 13, 2011, he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty-five to 

fifty years for each first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction and five to fifteen years for 

the second-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. 

Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising these 

claims: (i) inadmissible hearsay; (ii) cruel and unusual punishment; (iii) the prosecution failed to 

correct false testimony; (iv) confrontation clause; (v) ineffective assistance of counsel; (vi) 

denied right to present an alibi witness; (vii) denied right to a plea agreement; (viii) ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel; and (ix) cumulative effect of errors denied defendant his right to 

fair trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. 

Jones, 2013 WL 4746730, at *10. 

Petitioner sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court raising two 

claims for relief: ineffective assistance of trial counsel and improperly allowed prejudicial 

hearsay testimony. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Jones, 840 

N.W.2d 314 (Mich. 2013). 
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Petitioner then filed the pending habeas petition through counsel. He argues that 

his defense counsel was ineffective in failing to call three witnesses: two of J.R.’s classmates 

with whom she had sexual relations, and Hailey Wilcox, one of Petitioner’s girlfriends. 

II. STANDARD 

Petitioner’s claims are reviewed using the standards established by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). AEDPA provides: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim— 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court 

proceedings. 

 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” . . . clearly established law 

if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in 

[United States Supreme Court cases]” or if it “confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from 

[Supreme Court] precedent.” 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15–16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). 

“[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas 

court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the 
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Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s 

case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). 

However, “[i]n order for a federal court find a state court’s application of [Supreme Court] 

precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more than incorrect or 

erroneous. . . . The state court’s application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 

520–21 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). “A state court’s determination 

that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 

101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

“[W]hile the principles of ‘clearly established law’ are to be determined solely by 

resort to Supreme Court rulings, the decisions of lower federal courts may be instructive in 

assessing the reasonableness of a state court’s resolution of an issue.” Stewart v. Erwin, 503 

F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007). Finally, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of 

state court factual determinations, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and a petitioner may rebut this 

presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360–61 

(6th Cir. 1998). Put differently, only factual determinations that are “objectively unreasonable in 

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding” will be overturned. McKinney v. 

Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 

(2003). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner argues that habeas relief is warranted because his defense attorney was 

ineffective in failing to call two of the victim’s classmates to testify that they had sexual 
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intercourse with her and in failing to call Hailey Wilcox to show that it was she, not the victim, 

who was seen by the victim’s brother having sex with Petitioner. 

AEDPA “erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose 

claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). The 

standard for obtaining relief is “difficult to meet.” Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1786 

(2013). In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the standard is “all the more difficult” because “[t]he 

standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential and when the two 

apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). “[T]he question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable,” 

but whether “there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 

standard.” Id.

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components: First, petitioner 

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that the deficiency prejudiced 

his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish deficient representation, petitioner must 

demonstrate that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

Id. at 688. To establish prejudice, petitioner must show that, but for the constitutionally deficient 

representation, there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the proceeding would have 

been different. Id. at 694. 

Petitioner’s claim that defense counsel should have called as witnesses two of the 

victim’s male classmates with whom she had been sexually active was denied by the Michigan 

Court of Appeals because the state court found the evidence was inadmissible under Michigan’s 

rape shield statute. Jones, 2013 WL 4746730 at *8. State-law evidentiary claims are not 
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cognizable on habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Given the Michigan 

Court of Appeals’ decision that this evidence was inadmissible, petitioner cannot show how he 

was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to attempt to call these witnesses when their testimony would 

have been excluded. Moreover, petitioner fails to submit an affidavit from either of these 

potential witnesses indicating what their testimony would have been. Conclusory allegations of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, without any evidentiary support, do not provide a basis for 

habeas relief. See Workman v. Bell, 178 F.3d 759, 771 (6th Cir. 1998). Petitioner offers no 

evidence to support his claim. Absent such proof, he is unable to establish that he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call these witnesses. 

Petitioner also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call as a witness 

Hailey Wilcox. He argues that Wilcox would have testified that she was the person the victim’s 

brother saw having sex with petitioner on the living room couch. Other than his own arguments, 

petitioner fails to make an offer of proof in his habeas petition showing that Wilcox was willing 

to testify and would have testified in accordance with petitioner’s version of events. In his direct 

appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, petitioner submitted an unsworn “affidavit of truth” 

from Wilcox along with his motion for an evidentiary hearing. The Michigan Court of Appeals 

held that the statement, which was not notarized, was not an affidavit under state court rules. 

Jones, 2013 WL 4746730, at *8, n.8. The state court also held that petitioner’s testimony about 

Wilcox at trial indicated that he saw no reason to bring Wilcox to testify at trial. Id. at *8. The 

Michigan Court of Appeals held that, in light of this record, petitioner failed to overcome the 

presumption that counsel’s decision not to call Wilcox was sound trial strategy. Id. 

Petitioner provides no argument or evidence to show that the state court’s 

decision was an unreasonable application of Strickland. The evidence against petitioner was 
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strong and included DNA evidence, the victim’s statements to several individuals that she was 

engaging in intercourse with petitioner, explicit text messages between petitioner and the victim, 

and the victim’s friend’s testimony that she witnessed the victim and petitioner engaging in oral 

sex. Counsel reasonably could have concluded that, in light of the strength of this evidence, 

Wilcox’s testimony would not have assisted petitioner’s defense. Other than the “affidavit of 

proof” disregarded by the Michigan Court of Appeals, petitioner offers no evidentiary support 

which would overcome the AEDPA’s doubly deferential standard. Habeas relief is denied on 

this claim. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied and 

dismissed. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is denied because 

petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right, 

and leave to appeal in forma pauperis is denied because the appeal would be frivolous. See Dell 

v. Straub, 194 F. Supp. 2d 629, 659 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 

s/Bernard A. Friedman 

 BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN 

 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: April 28, 2017 

 Detroit, Michigan 

 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and 

any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on April 28, 2017. 

 s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams 

 Acting in the Absence of Carol Mullins 

 Case Manager