FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL SNITKO; JENNIFER 

SNITKO; JOSEPH RUIZ; TYLER 

GOTHIER; JENI VERDONPEARSONS; MICHAEL STORC; 

TRAVIS MAY, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; E.

MARTIN ESTRADA, in his official 

capacity as Acting United States 

Attorney for the Central District of 

California; DONALD ALWAY, in his 

official capacity as an Assistant 

Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-56050 

D.C. No. 

2:21-cv-04405-

RGK-MAR 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 7, 2023

Pasadena, California
2 SNITKO V. USA

Filed January 23, 2024

Before: CARLOS T. BEA, MILAN D. SMITH, JR., and 

LAWRENCE VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;

Concurrence by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;

Partial Concurrence by Judge VanDyke

SUMMARY*

Fourth Amendment/Inventory Searches

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment holding 

that plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated 

when the FBI “inventoried” 700 safe deposit boxes at US 

Private Vaults (USPV), and remanded for the FBI to 

sequester or destroy the records of its inventory search

pertaining to the class members.

USPV operated a business which rented safe deposit 

boxes to customers. The government obtained a warrant to 

search and seize USPV’s facilities, including its safe deposit 

boxes, as part of its investigation of USPV for various 

criminal activities. The warrant explicitly did not authorize 

a criminal search or seizure of box contents, and required 

agents to follow their written policies to inventory items and 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
SNITKO V. USA 3

contact box owners so that they could claim their property 

after the search.

Following the seizure of their property, plaintiffs filed 

suit alleging claims for return of property pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) and violations of their 

Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Although plaintiffs’ 

property was returned, they continued to seek equitable 

relief requiring the government to return or destroy records 

of the inventory search. The district court denied plaintiffs’ 

requested relief, finding that the government’s “inventory” 

of the safe deposit contents was a constitutionally proper 

inventory search.

In Part I of its analysis, the panel held that the inventory 

search doctrine, an exception to the warrant requirement that 

allows authorities to search items within their lawful 

custody, did not apply. One of the most important features 

of the doctrine is the existence of standardized instructions, 

which limit the discretion of officers and apply consistently 

across cases. Here, in support of its warrant application, the 

government, in addition to submitting standardized 

instructions, also submitted Supplemental Instructions that 

were designed specifically for the USPV raid. The panel 

held that the Supplemental Instructions took this case out of 

the realm of a standardized “inventory” procedure.

In Part II of its analysis, the panel held that the 

government exceeded the scope of the warrant, which did 

not authorize a criminal search or seizure of the contents of 

the safe deposit boxes. 

Concurring, Judge M. Smith wrote separately to address 

plaintiffs’ additional argument that the origins and rationale 

of the inventory search doctrine makes it inapplicable to safe 

deposit boxes in a locked vault. Judge M. Smith would hold 
4 SNITKO V. USA

that given the greater privacy interests and the implications 

of the rights of third parties, the inventory search doctrine 

does not extend to searches of the box contents in a locked 

vault. 

Concurring in part, Judge VanDyke joined the majority’s 

opinion except as to Part II of its analysis, which he viewed 

as unnecessary given the panel’s resolution of Part I.

COUNSEL

Robert E. Johnson (argued), Institute for Justice, Shaker 

Heights, Ohio; Robert P. Frommer, Joseph Gay, and Michael 

Greenberg, Institute for Justice, Arlington, Virginia; Nilay 

U. Vora and Jeffrey A. Atteberry, The Vora Law Firm PC, 

Santa Monica, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Victor A. Rodgers (argued), Assistant United States 

Attorney, Asset Forfeiture and Recovery Section; Maxwell 

K. Coll and Bram M. Alden, Assistant United States 

Attorneys; Mack E. Jenkins, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Criminal Division Chief; Martin E. Estrada, 

United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney, 

Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees. 

Mark A. Perry, Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, Washington, 

D.C., for Amicus Curiae Cato Institute. 
SNITKO V. USA 5

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, with whom BEA and 

VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, join as to Part I of the Analysis 

and with whom BEA, Circuit Judge, joins as to Part II of the 

Analysis:

This case arises out of the government’s “inventory” of 

700 safe deposit boxes at US Private Vaults (USPV), a 

company the government was investigating for various 

criminal activities, including money laundering. The 

government obtained a warrant to search and seize USPV’s 

facilities and instrumentalities of its crime, including its 

“nests” of safe deposit boxes. The warrant issued by the 

magistrate judge explicitly “d[id] not authorize a criminal 

search or seizure of box contents,” and required agents to 

follow their “written policies” to inventory items and contact 

box owners so that they could claim their property after the 

search.

After the search at USPV, non-criminal Plaintiffs Paul 

and Jennifer Snitko, Joseph Ruiz, Tyler Gothier, JeniVerdon Pearsons, Michael Storc, and Travis May 

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) made claims to the FBI seeking 

return of their property. The government refused to return 

their property, informing Plaintiffs that it sought to civilly 

forfeit their property instead. Plaintiffs filed suit, and, during 

the course of litigation, the government eventually returned

all of Plaintiffs’ property. However, Plaintiffs continued to 

press for equitable relief in the form of destruction of 

records, a remedy we approved in United States v. 

Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (CDT), overruled in part on other grounds as 
6 SNITKO V. USA

recognized by Demaree v. Pederson, 887 F.3d 870, 876 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (per curiam). 

After a trial on the briefs, the district court granted 

judgment in favor of the government, holding that Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the 

government’s “inventory” was not pretextual pursuant to our 

case law regarding the inventory search exception to the 

warrant requirement. Plaintiffs timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. USPV

USPV operated a business in Beverly Hills, California, 

which rented safe deposit boxes to customers. See Snitko v. 

United States, 2022 WL 20016427, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 

2022). Unlike banks, which also rent safe deposit boxes, 

USPV did not require customers to provide personal 

information, social security numbers, driver’s licenses, or 

any other form of identification in order to rent a box. Id. 

Customers kept all keys to the boxes. Id. USPV’s facility 

featured significant security measures, including iris-scan 

vault access, 24/7 electronic monitoring, 24/7 armed 

response, and a time lock on the vault itself. Id.

Protection of customers’ anonymity was USPV’s main 

selling point. On its website, the company explained: “Our 

business is one of very few where we don’t even want to 

know your name. For your privacy and the security of your 

assets in our vault, the less we know the better.” Id. The 

website even went so far as to say that it “would only 

cooperate with the government under court order.” 

Perhaps unsurprisingly, investigations by various 

government agencies of individual criminals resulted in the 
SNITKO V. USA 7

execution of search warrants at USPV. Id. For example, 

past searches pursuant to a warrant of individual safe deposit 

boxes at USPV have uncovered proceeds of crimes such as 

drug trafficking, illegal gambling, and prostitution rings. Id.

II. The Government Investigation into USPV

After years of investigating individual USPV 

boxholders, agencies like the FBI, DEA, and USPIS 

concluded that the individual investigations “weren’t doing 

anything effective” because the “real problem” was USPV, 

which they believed served as a “money laundering 

facilitator.” Id. at *2. Accordingly, the agencies opened an 

investigation into USPV’s business and its principals in 

April 2019. Id. at *2. 

The investigation confirmed that the owners of USPV 

knew of its use by criminals to launder money, solicited 

illicit business, and committed several crimes themselves, 

not limited to money laundering. Id. at *2. The agencies 

thus began discussions about obtaining indictments and 

warrants against the company. Internally, the agencies 

discussed taking “[USPV’s] business out,” which they 

believed involved seizing “eye scanners, the money 

counter,” and “the nest[s] of safe deposit boxes.” Id. at *2.

In the summer of 2020, discussions among and within 

the agencies began regarding the civil forfeiture1 of assets 

1 “Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding” against the object the 

government seeks to forfeit. United States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed. 

Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011). “Criminal forfeiture 

is an in personam proceeding against the defendant personally and is part 

of the defendant’s punishment.” Id. “To achieve criminal forfeiture, the 

government first must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 

defendant is guilty of the crime. The government then must prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, a nexus between the property and the 
8 SNITKO V. USA

they expected to find within the safe deposit boxes. Id. at 

*3. Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Matt Moon contacted 

Agent Jessie Murray about the USPV investigation and 

“asked whether the FBI LA field office had the capacity to 

handle civil forfeiture regarding [USPV].” Id. at *3. Murray 

responded that the office could handle a large-scale seizure, 

but she could not offer an opinion on whether there was 

probable cause to forfeit the assets until she reviewed the 

finalized warrant affidavit. Id. at *3. Upon reviewing the 

affidavit in February 2021 (prior to its submission to the 

magistrate judge), Murray determined that there was 

probable cause to seize the contents of the safe deposit 

boxes. Id. at *3. 

III. Indictment and Warrant Application 

On March 9, 2021, a grand jury returned an indictment 

against USPV. Id. at *3. The indictment charged USPV 

with conspiracy to money launder, distribute controlled 

substances, and structure financial transactions. Id. at *3.

The indictment also included forfeiture allegations, which 

reflected a finding of “probable cause to believe” that certain 

items to be seized were “subject to forfeiture” such as “[t]he 

nests of safety [sic] deposit boxes and keys.” The two 

forfeiture counts stated that “the United States will seek 

forfeiture” of USPV’s property “in the event of defendant 

USPV’s conviction under [the counts] of th[e] Indictment.” 

About a week and a half later, on March 17, 2021, the 

Government submitted applications to Magistrate Judge 

Steve Kim for search and seizure warrants, both of which 

crime.” Id. To achieve civil forfeiture, however, the government must 

only “prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the culpability of the 

owner and a nexus between the property and the illegal activity.” Id. 
SNITKO V. USA 9

included a common affidavit by Special Agent Lynne 

Zellhart, the agent in charge of the FBI’s investigation. Id. 

at *3. The affidavit largely discussed how USPV’s business 

operated, including how its owners knew its boxes were 

rented to facilitate money laundering. Id. at *3. According 

to an exchange between a confidential informant and an 

owner of USPV, the owner stated, “Listen, you don’t want 

every drug dealer in your place either. You need normal 

people too.” The affidavit explained that this statement 

“suggests that drug dealers comprise the majority of USPV 

customers, and the business has to make an effort to attract 

a non-criminal clientele as well, so as not to be too obvious 

a haven for criminals.”

The affidavit also noted that the Government sought to 

seize the box nests as “evidence and instrumentalities of 

USPV’s criminality.” Id. at *3. It explained that “[t]he 

search and seizure warrants the government seeks . . . 

authorize the seizure of the nests of the [safe deposit] boxes 

themselves, not their contents.” Id. at *3. But immediately 

after that sentence, the affidavit read, “[b]y seizing the nests 

of safety [sic] deposit boxes, the government will necessarily 

end up with custody of what is inside those boxes initially.”

Id. at *3. “[T]o protect their agencies from claims of theft or 

damage to the contents of the boxes,” the affidavit stated that 

“[a]gents will follow their written inventory policies.” Id. at 

*3. The affidavit also stated that:

Agents will attempt to notify the lawful 

owners of the property stored in the boxes 

how to claim their property, such as by 

posting that information on the internet or at 

USPV itself, or by contacting the owners 

directly. In order to notify the owners 
10 SNITKO V. USA

directly, agents will, in accordance with their 

policies regarding an unknown person’s 

property, look for contact information or 

something which identifies the owner. 

(USPV recommends that box renters include 

their or their designees’ telephone numbers 

on a note in the box in the event that USPV 

removes the contents for nonpayment of 

rental fees.) 

A footnote in the affidavit explained that “[t]he FBI 

policy regarding taking custody of an unknown person’s 

property provides, in part, that agents “inspect the property 

as necessary to identify the owner and preserve the property 

for safekeeping,” and that the “inspection should extend no 

further than necessary to determine ownership.”

Ultimately, the warrant issued by Judge Kim approved 

the following “items to seized,” at USPV: “the business 

computers; [t]he money counters; . . . [t]he digital and video 

surveillance and security equipment; and [t]he biometric 

scanners,” and the “nests of safety [sic] deposit boxes and 

keys.” Id. at *3. With respect to this last item, the warrant 

stated: 

This warrant does not authorize a criminal 

search or seizure of the contents of the safety

[sic] deposit boxes. In seizing the nests of 

safety [sic] deposit boxes, agents shall follow 

their written inventory policies to protect 

their agencies and the contents of the boxes. 

Also in accordance with their written 

policies, agents shall inspect the contents of 

the boxes in an effort to identify their owners 
SNITKO V. USA 11

in order to notify them so that they can claim 

their property[.] 

Although the warrant provided that agents must “follow their 

written inventory policies,” the details of those written 

policies were not included in the government’s application 

for a warrant, except for the one sentence above regarding 

the “unknown persons policy.” Id. at *3. 

i. Written Inventory Policy 

The FBI’s inventory policy is contained in its Domestic 

Investigations and Operations Guide (“DIOG”), which 

Zellhart described as a “dictionary or a thesaurus” for FBI 

agents. The DIOG instructs the agents that, “after lawfully 

taking custody of property,” they must “conduct a prompt 

and thorough search of the contents of the property, 

including searching any locked or unlocked containers and 

inventorying their contents.” Id. at *4. Agents must then 

record the results of the inventory on certain specified forms, 

and the summary “must include, but is not limited to, a 

description of the property and the items secured for 

safekeeping.” Id. at *4.

2

The DIOG provision further instructs that agents may not 

conduct inventories “solely for investigative purposes,” and 

that “[w]henever there is probable cause to believe an 

inventory search would also yield items of evidence or 

2 Under “Inventory Searches Generally,” the DIOG provides: “The 

purpose of an inventory search is to 1) protect the owner’s property while 

it is in FBI custody; 2) protect the FBI against claims of lost or stolen 

property; or 3) protect FBI personnel from potential danger. As a 

threshold matter, in order for an inventory search to be valid, agents must 

first have lawful custody of the property. The justification for an 

inventory search is the production of an inventory of the property.” 
12 SNITKO V. USA

contraband, agents must obtain a search warrant when 

feasible.” 

ii. Policy Regarding Custody of an Unknown 

Person’s Property 

The warrant also referred to an FBI policy on the 

procedure to follow should agents come into possession of 

an “unknown person’s” property. Id. at *4. That policy 

states that agents should “inspect the property as necessary 

to identify the owner and preserve the property for 

safekeeping,” and that such an inspection should “extend no 

further than necessary to determine ownership.” Id. at *4. 

The district court below found that [t]he “unknown 

persons” policy is “separate from the FBI’s inventory 

policy.” Id. at *4. However, the only written reference to 

language matching this “unknown persons” policy in the 

record is on the same page of the DIOG above, which 

discusses inventory searches. The language is contained in 

a provision titled “Administrative Inventory Searches of 

Lost or Misplaced Items.” As with the inventory policy, 

these instructions state that “if, within the scope of the 

examination necessary to determine ownership, agents 

discover incriminating evidence or contraband, agents 

should seek a warrant to continue the search, absent 

emergency circumstances.” 

IV. Preparation and Execution of the Warrant

i. Preparation 

The agencies prepared two relevant documents prior to 

applying for the warrant in preparation for the search at 

USPV. One is the “Operation Order Search Plan” document. 

That document states that “agents will seize and inventory 

the facilities of the business, including the nest of safe 
SNITKO V. USA 13

deposit boxes, according to the federal seizure warrant” 

(which had not yet issued). The portion of the plan titled 

“Execution” explains that “Teams 1-4” would search the 

residences of the owners of USPV; “Team 5 will execute a 

search warrant at USPV” and “will seize evidence itemized 

in the warrant regarding underlying crimes (money 

laundering, fraud, drug trafficking, etc.)” Team 6 will 

“process and inventory the facilities of USPV, including the 

nest of boxes.” The document then refers the reader to the 

second relevant document, “Supplemental Instructions on 

Box Inventory.”3

The Supplemental Instructions begin by explaining that 

pursuant to the warrant (not yet) issued by Magistrate Judge 

Kim, “agents are authorized to seize the facilities of [USPV] 

and conduct an inventory of the contents therein.” Agents 

were to “search and inventory all boxes according to FBI 

policies and procedures.” All “inventoried contents [are to] 

be processed as described in [the] memo.” 

The first part of the memo, titled “General Procedure,” 

provides instructions on how agents should conduct their 

inventory and log the contents of boxes. According to the 

memo, two teams of three agents were to “methodically open 

and inventory each box.” This involved removing the box, 

labeling it, and “taking care to preserve possible fingerprint 

evidence.” Teams would then “identify the contents of each 

3 In drafting the Supplemental Instructions, Zellhart, as the government’s 

30(b)(6) witness, testified that she did not “have the DIOG in [her] hand” 

but “understood the policy and [] wrote the supplemental instructions for 

the team to follow based on” it. In other words, while the DIOG was a 

sort of “general policy,” Zellhart confirmed that the Supplemental 

Instructions were “sort of the operative policy, the policy that was in 

place on the ground.” 
14 SNITKO V. USA

box, creating an inventory list,” and filling out various 

forms. 

The memo states that “[e]ach inventory [would] likely 

include the following”: the USPV box door with its lock, a 

form with emergency contact information, the physical 

deposit box, and the box’s contents. Although the memo 

instructs agents to “identify” the box’s contents, it does not 

provide further instructions on how to do so.

Separately, teams were to “note if the box includes a 

USPV notification form identifying a contact person for the 

box.” The memo provides that agents “[could not] search 

the content of boxes for evidence, but [could] examine the 

contents to identify the box owner.” Inventories of each box 

would be video recorded, and a copy of any paperwork 

would go to the Asset Forfeiture team. 

The next part of the memo provides more specific 

instructions on how to secure and handle “evidence.” For 

example, any amount of cash over $5,000 was to be placed 

in an “evidence bag” and given a “forfeiture identification 

number.” Any cash would then be taken to a canine unit 

which was on the scene. Agents were to take notes on the 

“condition of cash,” including how “the cash is bundled 

(rubber bands, bank bands); if it has a strong odor 

(marijuana, soil, gasoline, coffee, chemical, etc.); if there 

appears to be a drug residue present; if a gun is also present; 

or anything else of note.” 

To facilitate the inventory, the FBI also created a form 

specifically for use at USPV. The form includes a space for 

“Cash Observations” and, like the Supplemental 

Instructions, tells agents to record “how the cash is bundled,” 

“if it has a strong odor,” and if “drug residue” or “a gun” is 

found with cash. It also includes space to record the results 
SNITKO V. USA 15

of a drug dog sniff. And it prompts agents to record, as part 

of the inventory, “serial numbers on firearms or watches.”

ii. Execution

The Government executed the search and seizure 

warrants on-site at USPV from March 22 to March 26, 2021. 

During that time, the FBI inventoried the contents of over 

700 safe deposit boxes. In performing the “inventory,” 

agents found letters taped to the inside sleeve of the deposit 

box, identifying the owner of the box and providing the 

owner’s contact information. The district court found, 

however, that “occasionally” “[e]ven after finding these 

letters, agents would break open the interior of the box and 

inventory the box’s contents.”

Per the Supplemental Instructions, agents used the 

inventory form to document the condition of cash; ran all 

cash over $5,000 by drug-sniffing dogs; tagged items with 

forfeiture numbers; and photographed objects found in the 

boxes. All cash was “taken to Loomis,” which generated 

receipts, and the money was “wired to the US Marshals 

Service.” All non-cash valuables were “transported to 

Evidence Control” for storage. All “general evidence [was] 

inventoried, processed, labeled and taken to FBI ECC 

[redacted] for storage. . . .” 

V. Results of the Search

Despite the affidavit’s assertion that “it would be 

irrational for non-criminal customers to choose USPV,” it 

turned out that a number of non-criminals were customers at 

the facility. These include the following Plaintiffs: 

• Paul and Jennifer Snitko, who used their USPV 

box to store legal documents, watches with 
16 SNITKO V. USA

sentimental value, hard-drive backups, coins, and 

gold jewelry. They used USPV “because [their] 

bank had a waiting list for a safe deposit box, 

[they] live in a wildfire prone area . . . and [they] 

require a place to store [their] wedding bands 

when engaging in sports activities . . . .” 

• Tyler Gothier, who stored “silver and other 

personal property” in his box and used USPV due 

to its convenient location. 

• Joseph Ruiz, who stored $57,000 in cash in his 

box and used USPV because he was concerned 

that “the COVID pandemic would make it 

impossible for [him] to withdraw [his] funds 

from a bank account.” 

• Michael Storc and Jeni-Verdon Pearsons, who 

stored “approximately $2,000 in cash, as well as 

approximately $20,000 worth of silver,” along 

with “personal documents” in their box. They 

used USPV because they needed a safe place to 

keep the silver. 

• Travis May, who stored $63,000 in cash, 

$100,000 in gold, and various documents in 

sealed envelopes in his box, and used USPV as 

an “alternative location to access valuables in 

case of emergencies.” 

Snitko, 2022 WL 20016427, at *2. After the raid on USPV, 

Plaintiffs filed claims with the FBI seeking return of their 

seized property.4 The government did not return the 

4 See Order re: Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for a TRO at 2, Paul 

Snitko v. United States of America et. al., 2:21-cv-4405, Dkt. No. 52 
SNITKO V. USA 17

property in response to these claims; instead, it indicated that 

it was seeking to forfeit the property. Order re: Request for 

Preliminary Injunction at 2, Paul Snitko v. United States of 

America et. al., 2:21-cv-4405, Dkt. No. 58 (Jul. 16, 2021) 

(Dist. Dkt. No. 58). On May 20, 2021, the Government 

initiated administrative forfeiture5 proceedings against any 

box contents that met a minimum monetary threshold of 

$5,000, by issuing a “Notice of Seizure of Property and 

(Jun. 22, 2021) (Dist. Dkt. No. 52); Order re: Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction at 2, Paul Snitko v. United States of America et. 

al., 2:21-cv-4405, Dkt. No. 60 (Jul. 23, 2021) (Dist. Dkt. No. 60) 

(explaining that Ruiz had filed a claim with the FBI on April 8, 2021).

5 “As the term implies, in nonjudicial (administrative) forfeiture 

proceedings, the government may obtain title to forfeited property 

without any involvement by the courts.” Omidi v. United States, 851 

F.3d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 2017). The process works as follows:

To start the administrative forfeiture process, the 

government must provide notice to interested parties 

after seizing the targeted property. 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1607(a). If no one comes forward to claim an 

interest in the property within the deadline specified in 

the notice, the government may declare the property 

forfeited, at which point title passes to the United 

States. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(B); 19 U.S.C. § 1609. 

If a claimant does come forward to claim an interest in 

the property, the administrative forfeiture process 

ceases and within 90 days the government must 

initiate a judicial forfeiture proceeding—a formal 

court action which, if successful, results in a court 

order declaring the property forfeited. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 983(a)(3). The government may initiate judicial 

forfeiture proceedings in one of two ways: by filing a 

civil forfeiture complaint in the district court, or by 

obtaining a criminal indictment alleging that the 

property is subject to forfeiture. 

Id. at 861–62.
18 SNITKO V. USA

Initiation of Admin. Forfeiture Proceedings” to USPV.6 The 

Notice attached an “Asset List” of items seized from the 

USPV safe deposit boxes, and listed the deadline to contest 

forfeiture slightly over a month from the date the notice was 

issued, on June 24, 2021. 

VI. Litigation 

On June 9, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended 

Complaint against the government, alleging, inter alia, 

claims for return of property pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 41(g) and “violations of Plaintiffs’

rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.” 

A few plaintiffs also filed an Application for a 

Temporary Restraining Order asking the district court to 

enjoin the government from continuing with the forfeiture 

proceedings. The district court granted the application 

because the forfeiture notice “put bluntly, provide[d] no 

factual basis for the seizure of Plaintiffs’ property” as needed 

to comply with due process requirements under Gete v. 

I.N.S., 121 F.3d 1285, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997).

During the litigation, nearly all Plaintiffs and class 

members ultimately had their physical property returned.

The Government then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’

complaint, arguing that their action had become moot.

Plaintiffs argued that their action was not moot because the 

government still retained records of its search, including the 

agents’ notes and photos of box contents, and they sought an 

injunction ordering the government to “sequester and return” 

“or otherwise destroy” the records generated during the 

inventory of the USPV deposit boxes. 

6 The government sent notices to some, but not all, Plaintiffs. 
SNITKO V. USA 19

The district court dismissed most of Plaintiffs’ counts 

involving physical return of seized property as moot.

However, the district court held that Plaintiffs’ claim for 

“Return of Property Pursuant to [Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure] 41(g)” (Count VII) was not moot, citing our case 

law interpreting that rule, which allows, under certain 

circumstances, “an order requiring the government to return 

or destroy all copies of records that it has seized.”7 To 

understand this remedy, we must briefly discuss Rule 41(g) 

and our primary case interpreting it, CDT, 621 F.3d at 1172. 

VII. Rule 41(g) and CDT

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) provides: “[a] 

person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of 

property or by the deprivation of property may move for the 

property’s return.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). In CDT, we 

explained that, “[t]hough styled as a motion under a Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure, when [a Rule 41(g)] motion is 

made by a party against whom no criminal charges have 

been brought, such a motion is in fact a petition that the 

district court invoke its civil equitable jurisdiction.” 621 

F.3d at 1172. 

Citing the advisory notes to the rule, the CDT panel 

explained that “[i]n some circumstances, [] equitable 

considerations might justify an order requiring the 

government to return or destroy all copies of records that it 

has seized.” Id. at 1174 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 

advisory committee notes (1989 amendments)). The CDT

court did not list the “circumstances” in which such an order 

7 The district court also held that Plaintiffs’ Count I, “violation of Fourth 

Amendment rights,” was not moot, but construed that claim as part and 

parcel of their 41(g) claim. 
20 SNITKO V. USA

is warranted, but instead provided that “[w]hat 

circumstances merit this remedy is left to the discretion of 

the district court in the first instance.” Id. It went on to 

affirm the district court on two bases: (1) “equitable 

considerations” required sequestration and the return of 

copies of evidence because the risk of harm to the plaintiffs 

associated with disclosure of the evidence was great, and (2) 

when “the government comes into possession of evidence by 

circumventing or willfully disregarding limitations in a 

search warrant, it must not be allowed to benefit from its own 

wrongdoing by retaining the wrongfully obtained evidence 

or any fruits thereof.” Id. 

In reaching its conclusion, the CDT panel referenced the 

fourth factor of the Ramsden balancing test8 typically 

applied to Rule 41(g) motions in criminal proceedings—

whether “the government showed a callous disregard for the 

[Fourth Amendment] rights of third parties”—and explained 

that “[w]hen the district court determines that the 

government has obtained the evidence through intentional 

wrongdoing—rather than through a technical or good faith 

mistake—it should order return of the property without the 

need for balancing that is applicable in the more ordinary 

case.” Id.

In a separate concurrence, five judges explained that the 

government had also violated its “duty of candor in 

presenting a warrant application,” because it had created a 

“false impression” that if the magistrate judge did not issue 

the warrant soon, the evidence would be destroyed. Id. at 

8 The other three factors of the Ramsden test require the district court to 

consider whether the claimant is (1) plainly aggrieved by the deprivation, 

(2) is likely to suffer irreparable injury if the property is not returned, and 

(3) there is no adequate remedy at law. CDT, 621 F.3d at 1173. 
SNITKO V. USA 21

1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). The concurrence stated 

that “[a] lack of candor in this or any other aspect of the 

warrant application must bear heavily against the 

government in the calculus of any subsequent motion to 

return or suppress the seized data.” Id.

VIII. The District Court’s Order

Having resolved the motion to dismiss, the district court 

certified a class of plaintiffs, defined as “[a]ll renters of U.S. 

Private Vaults safe deposit boxes who (a) had property 

within their safe-deposit box seized by the federal 

government on or around March 22, 2021; (b) have 

identified themselves to the FBI since the seizure; and (3) 

have had their property returned to them.” After all briefing 

was filed, the district court notified the parties that the matter 

was submitted on the papers for a “trial on the briefs.” 

On September 29, 2022, the district court issued its order 

granting judgment in favor of the government. Plaintiffs had 

argued, among other things, that the Government “callously 

disregarded” their Fourth Amendment rights because “(1) 

the Government’s search and seizure exceeded the 

limitations set out in the USPV warrant; and (2) that the 

Government breached its duty of candor by misleading 

Judge Kim in its warrant application.”

The district court rejected both arguments. First, it 

reasoned that “Plaintiffs’ claim that the Government 

exceeded the bounds of the warrant hinges on whether the 

Government’s actions were a valid inventory” pursuant to 

the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement. 

Because Plaintiffs failed to show under the rules governing 

that exception that the government’s “improper 

investigatory motive was the only reason that the 

Government opened the safety [sic] deposit boxes,” the 
22 SNITKO V. USA

district court concluded that the Government’s “inventory” 

was not pretextual. Thus, “[h]aving found a valid 

inventory,” the district court “necessarily f[ound] that the 

Government did not exceed the bounds of the warrant.”

Second, the district court held that the government did 

not breach its duty of candor by misleading the magistrate 

judge in its application for a warrant. Plaintiffs argued that 

the government omitted from the supporting affidavit that it 

intended not only to inventory the box contents at USPV, but 

to civilly forfeit them as well. The district court held that 

this kind of omission was immaterial, however, and that 

“[a]ny reasonable magistrate judge would have inferred that 

the inventory could lead to the potential discovery of 

criminal proceeds in certain boxes, which would then lead to 

forfeiture.” The district court therefore denied Plaintiffs’

requested relief. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review an order denying a motion made pursuant to 

Rule 41(g) by “part[ies] against whom no criminal charges 

have been brought,” for an abuse of discretion. See CDT, 

621 F.3d at 1172. A district court abuses its discretion when 

it makes “an error of law,” Strauss v. Comm’r of the Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011), or its 

decision rests on an unreasonable finding of a material fact. 

See Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 

2021). We review pure questions of law de novo. See, e.g., 

United States v. Depew, 210 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000). 
SNITKO V. USA 23

ANALYSIS

I. The Supplemental Instructions take this case out 

of the inventory search context. 

As discussed above, the district court reasoned that “to 

determine whether the Government’s search exceeded the 

bounds of the warrant, [it] must ascertain whether the 

Government conducted a constitutionally proper inventory 

search.” And, to “ascertain whether the Government 

conducted a constitutionally proper inventory search,” the 

district court applied our court’s precedents governing the 

inventory search exception to the warrant requirement, 

which includes the test for assessing when an inventory is 

“pretextual,” and therefore invalid. 

As a threshold matter, however, Plaintiffs argue that the 

district court should not have assumed that the inventory 

search doctrine extends to the context of this case.

Specifically, they argue that the Supplemental 

Instructions—which were the “operative instructions”9 on 

the ground—were not the kind of “standardized policy” the 

inventory search doctrine contemplates. 

The inventory search doctrine is an exception to the 

warrant requirement that allows authorities to search items 

within their lawful custody. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 

9 The district court stated in a footnote that it was “not convinced” that 

the Supplemental Instructions were the “operative policy,” insofar as 

“the agents were not actually following their standardized inventory 

policies” because “the Supplemental Instructions . . . superseded the 

DIOG.” It proceeded to explain why it believed that the Supplemental 

Instructions were consistent with the DIOG. But it did not dispute that, 

insofar as agents were following any directions on the ground, they were 

following the Supplemental Instructions (if not also the standardized 

instructions). 
24 SNITKO V. USA

U.S. 364, 369 (1976); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 

(1983); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990). One of the 

most important features of the doctrine is the existence of 

standardized instructions. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 

367, 375–76 (1987). “Standardized” need not mean 

“written.” Rather, our case law indicates that “standardized” 

instructions limit the discretion of officers and apply

consistently across cases. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (referring 

to “standardized criteria” or “established routine”); see also 

Standardized, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/standardized

(“brought into conformity with a standard: done or produced 

in a standard, consistent way”). 

For example, in United States v. Mancera-Londono, 912 

F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1990), defendants sought to suppress 

the fruits of an inventory search they asserted followed 

policies which were “not sufficiently standardized,” because 

they were unwritten. Id. The panel rejected that argument, 

noting that regardless of the policy’s form, the oral policy 

was identical to those found in the DEA’s manual for 

forfeiture, which required return of all rental cars to the 

rental agency and an inventory of the same prior to the 

return. Id. at 375-76. 

The need for a “standardized” policy is necessarily a 

feature of the inventory search doctrine because, if an 

inventory is conducted pursuant to a standardized policy, a 

court knows that such a search would have been conducted 

regardless of the degree of suspicion an officer has of a 

person’s (or an automobile’s) criminality. See United States 

v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining 

that a “department’s policies do not define constitutional 

rights,” but instead “assist courts to determine whether an 

inventory search is legitimate, as opposed to pretextual”). In 
SNITKO V. USA 25

other words, a court can be reassured that regardless of 

motive, an inventory will reveal what it will reveal, as it 

requires an officer to do the same thing every time. See 

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367 (“In the present case, as in 

Opperman and Lafayette, there was no showing that the 

police, who were following standardized procedures, acted 

in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.”) 

(emphasis added); see, e.g., Wells, 495 U.S. at 5 (“Our cases 

have required that inventory searches be ‘sufficiently 

regulated,’ so as to avoid the possibility that police will 

abuse their power to conduct such a search.”) (Brennan, J., 

concurring) (internal citation omitted).

That presumably is a reason why, at least in this circuit, 

“dual motives” are permissible in the inventory search 

context. That is, in the case of inventory searches, “the mere 

presence of a criminal investigatory motive or a dual 

motive—one valid, and one impermissible—does not render 

an [inventory] search invalid.” United States v. Johnson, 

889 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). If an officer follows a truly “standardized” 

policy, it is inevitable that he or she would find evidence of 

a crime, regardless of whether he or she intends it. See, e.g., 

Mancera-Londono, 912 F.2d at 375 (holding that inevitable 

discovery doctrine permitted officers to seize items, because 

they followed a sufficiently “standardized” inventory and 

would have found the items pursuant to that inventory). 

However, if an agency is given the discretion to create 

customized10 inventory policies, based on the features of 

10 The antonyms of the word “standardized” are “tailored,” 

“individualized.” and “customized.” See Standardized, MerriamWebster Thesaurus, available at https://www.merriamwebster.com/thesaurus/standardized. Plaintiffs use the word “bespoke.” 
26 SNITKO V. USA

each car it impounds and each person detained, the ensuing 

search stops looking like an “inventory” meant to simply 

protect property, and looks more like a criminal 

investigation of that particular car or person, i.e., more like 

a “ruse.” See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (“[A]n inventory search 

must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to 

discover incriminating evidence.”) Unlike the inventory 

policies followed in the leading inventory search cases,

which were all “standardized” to the extent they pre-existed 

the search of the car or arrestee, and applied consistently 

across subjects of “inventories,”11 the Supplemental 

Instructions in this case were designed specifically for the 

USPV raid. That is apparent from the title of the 

instructions, the testimony of their author, and the 

introduction which prefaces the instructions by explaining 

that agents were (to be) authorized to “seize the facilities of 

the target business (USPV) and conduct an inventory of the 

contents therein.”

The district court, which recognized a difference 

between the Supplemental Instructions and the FBI’s 

“standardized” ones, seemed to believe that the inventory 

search doctrine was nonetheless applicable because the 

agents merely followed the Supplemental Instructions “in 

addition” to the FBI’s standardized ones. But once the 

government begins adding a set of “customized” instructions 

to a “standardized” inventory policy—particularly the type 

of custom instructions presented by this case—the entire 

search stops being conducted pursuant to a “standardized” 

policy, regardless of whether the customized instructions 

11 See e.g., Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369 (“The backup officer inventoried the 

van in accordance with local police procedures, which require a detailed 

inspection and inventory of impounded vehicles.”)
SNITKO V. USA 27

conflict with the standardized ones. Here, the fact that the 

Supplemental Instructions were created specifically for the 

USPV search takes this case out of the realm of a

standardized “inventory” procedure.

We note that it is particularly troubling that the 

government has failed to provide a limiting principle to how 

far a hypothetical “inventory search” conducted pursuant to 

customized instructions can go. At oral argument, for 

example, the government failed to explain why applying the 

inventory exception to this case would not open the door to 

the kinds of “writs of assistance” the British authorities used 

prior to the Founding to conduct limitless searches of an 

individual’s personal belongings. It was those very abuses 

of power, after all, that led to adoption of the Fourth 

Amendment in the first place.

II. The district court abused its discretion in holding 

that the government did not exceed the scope of 

the warrant. 

The district court’s incorrect assumption that the 

ordinary rules of the inventory search doctrine applied to this 

case also infected its analysis of other Fourth Amendment 

issues, such as Plaintiffs’ claim that the government 

exceeded the scope of the warrant. Specifically, the district 

court concluded that whether the government exceeded the 

warrant’s scope “hing[ed]” on whether the search it 

conducted fit within the inventory search exception, without 

considering how those two inquiries might not be one and 

the same.

They are not the same. Compare Perez Cruz v. Barr, 926 

F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2019) (assessing whether search 

complied with administrative search exception to the 

warrant requirement) with id. at 1145 n.9 (“Even if some 
28 SNITKO V. USA

initial detention during a search for documents could have 

been justified under Summers, Perez Cruz’s detention likely 

exceeded anything that could be considered proper in scope, 

because the ICE agents appear to have departed even from 

the warrant itself.”).

12

As the district court recognized, the inventory search 

doctrine as developed in our circuit tolerates “the [] presence 

of a criminal investigatory motive” when conducting an 

inventory, “or a dual-motive—one valid and one 

impermissible.” The standard for determining the 

permissibility of an inventory search is whether the search 

would have occurred “but for” the Government’s allegedly 

improper investigatory purpose. United States v. Orozco, 

858 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2017). By contrast, to 

determine whether the government exceeded the scope of a 

warrant, we compare the terms of the warrant to the search 

actually conducted. See, e.g., United States v. Payton, 573 

F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that search of 

defendant’s computer “exceeded the scope of that warrant” 

because it was done “without explicit authorization in the 

warrant”); CDT, 621 F.3d at 1166 (holding that government 

12 In a footnote, the district court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that “the 

[inventory doctrine’s] ‘dual motive’ analysis is only applicable to 

warrantless searches,” stating “the Ninth Circuit has recently applied the 

dual-motive framework to searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.” 

See Perez Cruz, 926 F.3d at 1143. But as shown above, the court in 

Perez-Cruz drew a distinction between whether the government 

exceeded the scope of the warrant in that case and whether its search was 

justified under the general principles of the administrative search 

doctrine. Moreover, the warrant in Perez-Cruz, unlike the one here, 

actually did authorize a criminal search, so the precise question discussed 

above—whether the government exceeds the scope of a warrant when 

the warrant prohibits a “criminal search or seizure”—was inapplicable 

there.
SNITKO V. USA 29

disregarded terms of warrant where it “failed to comply with 

the procedures specified in the warrant”); United States v. 

Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Where evidence 

is uncovered during a search pursuant to a warrant, the 

threshold question must be whether the search was confined 

to the warrant’s terms.”).

The warrant in this case “d[id] not authorize a criminal 

search or seizure of the contents of the safety [sic] deposit 

boxes.” The district court never analyzed what this 

prohibition in the warrant meant. But it did, by all accounts, 

find that the search at USPV constituted a “criminal search 

or seizure” of box contents, i.e., “[a]n examination of a 

person’s [] property, . . . for the purpose of finding evidence 

of a crime.” Search, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 

2019).

For example, the district court noted that “[g]iven th[e] 

[record] evidence, there can be no question that the 

Government expected, or even hoped, to find criminal 

evidence during its inventory.” The district court cited 

testimony by investigating agents who “candidly admitted” 

that they “fully expected there to be criminal customers at 

this business,” and they anticipated “that there would be 

criminal proceeds in the safe deposit boxes.” It also found 

that the Supplemental Instructions drafted by Agent Zellhart 

“gave guidance on how to handle items with indicia of 

criminality, along with instructing agents on how to properly 

inventory the seized property.” And it noted that “[t]he 

agents executing the warrant also arranged for drug-sniffing 

dogs to be present at USPV, a tactic that would be 

unnecessary unless agents expected to discover drugs or 

drug-adjacent cash.” 
30 SNITKO V. USA

A look at the record, and the Supplemental Instructions 

in particular, confirms that the search was criminal in nature. 

The instructions required agents to not only write a summary 

of the items found in the safe deposit boxes, but in a section 

discussing preservation of “evidence,” told them to tag items 

with forfeiture numbers; send them to “evidence control”; 

and take care to preserve “drug evidence” for fingerprints. 

Cf. Johnson, 889 F.3d at 1127 (invalidating purported 

“inventory search” where arrest report made references to 

“seiz[ing] . . . evidence” of a crime and “plac[ing] [items] 

into evidence.”); United States v. Grey, 959 F.3d 1166, 1184 

(9th Cir. 2020) (noting that the “conduct at issue” in the case 

“more closely resembled a criminal raid than an 

administrative inspection,” given the “[defendant’s] arrest, 

the number of deputies involved and the length of the 

‘protective sweep,’” which resulted in “a greater intrusion 

on [defendant’s] privacy interests”).

Moreover, the government has confirmed that the 

records of box contents can be used to investigate crimes, 

and that they have been stored on a criminal database called 

Sentinel and are to be kept there indefinitely. If there 

remained any doubt regarding whether the government 

conducted a “criminal search or seizure,” that doubt is put to 

rest by the fact the government has already used some of the 

information from inside the boxes to obtain additional 

warrants to further its investigation and begin new ones.

CDT at 621 F.3d at 1169 (noting that, contrary to 

government’s representation in affidavit that it would 

segregate data, the case agent “himself reviewed the seized 

computer data and used what he learned to obtain the 

subsequent search warrants” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Because the district court’s own findings show 

that the FBI conducted a “criminal search and seizure of box 
SNITKO V. USA 31

contents,” it abused its discretion in holding that the 

government did not exceed the scope of the warrant’s terms. 

See Saucillo v. Peck, 25 F.4th 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2022). 

In addition, the district court abused its discretion in 

holding that the government did not exceed the bounds of 

the warrant in this case because it clearly erred in finding 

that the government was incapable of following its own 

standardized instructions. Recall that the warrant in this case 

required agents to follow their “written policies.” 

Incidentally, the FBI’s written policies did indicate what an 

agent should do in the event he or she (1) comes across 

evidence of criminality during an inventory search or (2) 

expects an inventory search to yield contraband. 

Specifically, the inventory policy in the DIOG states: 

“[w]henever there is probable cause to believe an inventory 

search would also yield items of evidence or contraband, 

agents must obtain a search warrant when feasible.” 

As discussed above, the district court found that the 

government “fully expected there to be evidence of criminal 

proceedings” and that, during the course of the search, 

agents did find contraband, which they seized, tagged, 

inspected and secured, without obtaining a warrant. That 

shows that the FBI exceeded the scope of the warrant—by 

failing to “follow their written policies,” above. See, e.g.,

United States v. Ladson, 774 F.2d 436, 438 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(“We hold only that absent exigent circumstances, the 

government must follow the advice in [its] own Guide to 

Forfeiture of Assets: if probable cause exists to enter the 
32 SNITKO V. USA

premises, obtain a warrant.”). The district court 

acknowledged this fact. In a footnote, it stated:

The FBI’s standardized policy tells agents 

that, “where feasible,” they should obtain a 

warrant for property that may be subject to an 

inventory search. Here, the anonymous 

nature of the boxes prevented the 

Government from determining who owned a 

specific box or what was inside, and thus 

prevented them from describing with 

particularity “both the place to be searched 

and the . . . things to be seized.” United States 

v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986).

The district court’s finding that “the anonymous nature of 

the boxes prevented the government from determining who 

owned a specific box or what was inside” was clearly 

erroneous. 

First, unlike all other portions of the order which involve 

factual findings, this statement lacks any citation to the 

record. See Oregon Nat. Res. Council v. Marsh, 52 F.3d 

1485, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial of reh’g

(June 29, 1995) (district court abuses its discretion when 

“record contains no evidence on which [it] rationally could 

have based that decision”). Its conclusory nature is 

concerning, especially in light of the fact that “the 

anonymous nature of the boxes” apparently did not prevent 

the government from (1) obtaining and executing search and 

seizure warrants of safe deposit boxes in the past, (2) 

contacting owners of boxes when it issued its administrative 

forfeiture notices, and (3) applying for, and receiving, 

additional search and seizure warrants based off of the 
SNITKO V. USA 33

contents of the items found in the safe deposit boxes after the 

entire USPV raid was complete. 

Moreover, the statement is inconsistent with the 

government’s representation in its affidavit that it would 

“notify [box] owners directly [by] look[ing] for contact 

information or something which identifies the owner.

(USPV recommends that box renters include their or their 

designees’ telephone numbers on a note in the box in the 

event that USPV removes the contents for nonpayment of 

rental fees.)” The conclusion that the government would not 

be able to obtain warrants for individual boxes appears to 

merely be an adoption of a representation made by the 

government in its response brief below, which itself did not 

cite to anything in the record. 

Because the district court’s conclusion that the 

government was excused from following its standardized 

policy rested on its clearly erroneous finding that the 

government simply could not apply for warrants as to 

individual box holders, it abused its discretion in concluding 

that the government did not exceed the scope of the warrant 

for this reason as well. See Briseño, 998 F.3d at 1022 (“A 

district court abuses its discretion when it . . . bases its 

decision on unreasonable findings of fact.” (cleaned up)). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district 

court’s order which held that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment 

rights were not violated. In light of the government’s 

expressed willingness in its “Motion to Vacate and Remand 

with Instructions to Grant Plaintiffs’ Requested Relief,” to 

have the district court order the “FBI to sequester or destroy 

the records of its inventory search pertaining to class 

members” (ECF No. 48), we REMAND for the district court 
34 SNITKO V. USA

to order the FBI to so dispose of the records, including copies 

of the records kept on the Sentinel database. See CDT, 621 

F.3d at 1162. As such, the government’s motion is DENIED 

AS MOOT.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I write separately to address Plaintiff’s additional 

argument that the origins and rationale of the inventory 

search doctrine makes it inapplicable to this context, i.e., 

safe deposit boxes in a locked vault.1 

The inventory search doctrine is an exception to the 

warrant requirement. The Supreme Court first established 

the doctrine in Opperman, after the criminal defendant’s car 

was impounded for multiple parking violations. 428 U.S. at 

365–66. The police, without a warrant, inventoried the car’s 

contents pursuant to a department policy. Id. at 366. Inside 

1 The government argues that Plaintiffs waived their argument that the 

inventory search doctrine is inapplicable to safe deposit boxes because 

“plaintiffs failed to advance it below.” Although there is “no bright line 

rule . . . to determine whether a matter has been properly raised below,” 

Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG, 825 F.3d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(internal quotation omitted), I conclude that Plaintiffs preserved their 

argument here. Plaintiffs contended below that the government violated 

their Fourth Amendment rights, and in doing so, argued that the 

government proceeded in a manner that contravened “the purposes 

traditionally associated with an inventory,” citing the leading case on the 

inventory search doctrine, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 

(1976). “[H]aving advanced its [impermissible search] theory before the 

district court,” Plaintiffs are “able to make a more precise argument on 

appeal as to why” the inventory search doctrine should not be extended 

here. United States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 312 (9th Cir. 2016).
SNITKO V. USA 35

the car, the police discovered marijuana, for which the 

defendant was charged with possession and convicted. Id. 

The Court in Opperman upheld the search, concluding 

that the exception to the warrant requirement was justified 

when balancing the privacy interests of the individual 

against the government interest in protecting itself. Id. at 

367, 369. It noted that individuals have a lesser expectation 

of privacy in their automobiles than in “one’s home or 

office,” given “the obviously public nature of automobile 

travel,” and the fact that “automobiles, unlike homes, are 

subjected to pervasive and continuing government

regulations and controls, including periodic inspections and 

licensing requirements.” Id. at 367-68. 

Furthermore, the Opperman court noted that the 

“inherent mobility” of an automobile makes enforcing the 

warrant requirement challenging. Id. at 367. And it 

identified three governmental interests that the doctrine 

served: (1) to protect an owner’s property while it is in the 

custody of the police, (2) to insure against claims of lost, 

stolen, or vandalized property, and (3) to guard the police

from danger. Id. at 369. Justice Powell, in a concurrence 

that provided the deciding vote in the case, emphasized: 

Inventory searches, however, are not 

conducted in order to discover evidence of 

crime. The officer does not make a 

discretionary determination to search based 

on a judgment that certain conditions are 

present. Inventory searches are conducted in 

accordance with established police 
36 SNITKO V. USA

department rules or policy and occur 

whenever an automobile is seized.

Id. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring). In other words, 

“[u]pholding searches of this type provides no general 

license for the police to examine all the contents of such 

automobiles.” Id. at 380.

Seven years later, the Court extended the inventory 

search doctrine to routine administrative procedures incident 

to incarcerating an arrested person. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 

462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (discussing an inventory search of 

the arrestee’s shoulder bag revealing amphetamine pills). As 

in Opperman, the Court explained that the search served 

legitimate government interests and emphasized that the 

inventory of containers must be done “in accordance with 

established inventory procedures.” Id.

Similarly, in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 368–69 

(1987), the Court upheld a warrantless search of the contents 

of petitioner’s vehicle inventoried after he was arrested for 

driving under the influence, and his car was impounded. Id.

The Court noted that, “as in Opperman and Lafayette, there 

was no showing that the police, who were following 

standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole 

purpose of investigation.” Id. at 372. By contrast, in Florida 

v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990), the Court invalidated an 

“inventory search” of a suitcase in a car because the Florida 

Highway Patrol had “no policy what[so]ever with respect to 

the opening of closed containers encountered during an 

inventory search,” and so was not permitted to search and 

seize the items without a warrant under that doctrine. Id.
SNITKO V. USA 37

Unlike the administrative search exception,2 which has 

been extended to sites like the border, traffic checkpoints, 

and certain highly regulated businesses, the inventory search 

exception has largely (if not exclusively) been confined to 

the context of searches of (1) individuals booked into jail, 

and (2) impounded vehicles. Cf. United States v. Showalter, 

858 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that the court did 

not “know of [any] authority which creates an inventory 

exception to the warrant requirement which pertains to one’s 

home, rather than an automobile.”) Plaintiffs insist that 

extending the inventory doctrine to allow a search of 

hundreds of safe deposit boxes would take it too far afield 

from the “rationale [for the doctrine] espoused in 

Opperman.” 

I agree and would so hold. As discussed above, a key 

rationale in Opperman was the lesser expectation of privacy 

in and the challenges posed by the “inherent mobility” of 

automobiles. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367–68. Neither of 

those considerations is present here. The government does 

not dispute that one has an expectation of privacy in the 

contents of his or her locked safe deposit box. Nor is there 

anything “inherently mobile” about the boxes, located at a 

2 Although our court has sometimes used the phrases “inventory search” 

and “administrative search” interchangeably, see, e.g., United States v. 

Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017), we recognized a difference 

between these two types of searches in United States v. Grey, 959 F.3d 

1166, 1180 (9th Cir. 2020). See id. (“[W]e would hesitate to extend the 

Orozco test – applicable to border searches, inventory searches, and 

commercial inspections of vehicles and businesses – to an administrative 

search or seizure involving a private residence.”) The government does 

not assert that its search of USPV fits into the administrative search 

exception. 
38 SNITKO V. USA

facility where the government successfully executed search 

warrants in the past. 

It is true that Opperman and its progeny involved certain 

governmental interests which, at first blush, also appear 

present here. While the “inventory” approved did not “guard 

the police from [any] danger,” it did purport to “protect . . . 

the contents of the boxes,” “preserve the property for 

safekeeping,” and “protect [] agencies from claims of theft 

or damage to the contents of the boxes.” See Opperman, 428 

U.S. at 369. 

But that those governmental interests are served in the 

context of inventorying an impounded automobile or an 

arrested person makes much more sense than in the context 

of an “inventory” of a locked vault. Unlike the execution of 

search warrants at a stationary location, vehicles are 

typically impounded on an unplanned basis—explaining 

why we have justified impoundment by the community 

caretaking function. See Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 

F.3d 858, 865–86 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that impoundment 

is only appropriate where a car is “creating an[] impediment 

to traffic or threatening public safety,” or where “the driver’s 

violation of a vehicle regulation prevents the driver from 

lawfully operating the vehicle”); United States v. Garay, 938 

F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that defendant did 

not dispute that the decision to tow the car was a reasonable 

and good-faith exercise of the officers’ care-taking function 

where he had just been arrested and the car was totaled and 

lying in a ditch). And because the police must often seize 

the car without the owner’s permission to take care of the 

community, it makes sense that performing an inventory in 

such an instance would protect against claims of theft or loss 

or protect property found in the car. Cf. Miranda, 429 F.3d 

at 865 (explaining that impounding a car “without regard to 
SNITKO V. USA 39

whether the defendant can provide for its removal” may in 

fact be “patently unreasonable”) (quoting United States v. 

Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 1996)). 

But in the context of stationary locations like the safe 

deposit boxes here—where authorities can generally plan 

searches ahead of time—it is less clear how the benefits of 

an “inventory” could outweigh the higher privacy interests 

at stake. Cf. Miranda, 429 F.3d at 864 (invalidating 

impoundment where car was “parked in the driveway of an 

owner who ha[d] a valid license”). To further illustrate this 

point, Plaintiffs analogize their situation to one in which the 

government seizes an apartment building based on 

allegations against the landlord, and, having seized the 

building, the government then searches the contents of every 

tenant’s apartment—on the basis that it needed to 

“inventory” the items it found there to “protect” the items 

and protect itself “from claims of theft or loss.” Without 

question, we would find such reasoning unconvincing, given 

that the apartment tenants were completely unrelated to the 

investigation, and their items were already “protected” 

against any harm, in their own homes.

In support of their argument, Plaintiffs note that some 

courts of appeals have already declined, or expressed a 

reluctance, to extend the inventory search doctrine outside 

of the context of cars and arrestees: the Eleventh Circuit in 

United States v. Ladson, 774 F.2d 436 (11th Cir. 1985), and 

the Third Circuit in United States v. Showalter, 858 F.2d 149 

(3d Cir. 1988). 

In Ladson, authorities obtained a warrant which ordered 

seizure of defendant’s real property and directed the 

executing federal agent to “prepare a written inventory of the 

real estate and property thereon seized.” 774 F.2d at 438. 
40 SNITKO V. USA

The government went inside the home and proceeded to 

search its contents. Id. Because “[n]othing in the seizure 

warrant . . . expressly authorized the government to enter the 

house without permission,” the government argued that it 

had to conduct a “walk-through” of the house to conduct the 

inventory. Id. at 439. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that 

reading of the warrant, and under its prior precedent, refused 

to use the inventory search exception “as a bootstrap to 

undermine the Fourth Amendment protections afforded the 

sanctity of the home.” Id. at 440 (quoting United States v. 

Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 814 (11th Cir. 1983). It also noted that 

“[s]uch a result is particularly unappealing where, as here, it 

would sanction warrantless governmental intrusions into the 

homes of third parties unrelated to the original seizure.” Id.

Similarly, in Showalter, the authorities had an order to 

go to a property “for the purposes of conducting an 

inspection of the property in order to note any hazardous 

conditions and to inventory any items which are affixed to 

the realty and are thereby subject to the forfeiture.” 858 F.2d 

at 151. Looking to Opperman, the Third Circuit held that 

the search did not “satisfy the requirements that courts have 

established in applying the inventory exception.” Id. at 152–

53. It noted that the defendant had a greater expectation of 

privacy in his home than the defendants in automobile cases, 

and that the authorities did not conduct the search in a 

manner “pursuant to a uniform or standard procedure.” Id. 

at 153. In particular, the panel found problematic the 

presence of federal troopers and DEA agents when they were 

“not necessary for either the taking of the inventory or the 

maintenance of security.” Id. at 154. 

The government’s main response to these cases is that 

they involve searches of a private residence, where “privacy 

rights are at their zenith.” But that does not mean that the 
SNITKO V. USA 41

privacy rights Plaintiffs have in their safe deposit boxes are 

akin to those that individuals have in cars or on their persons 

when booked after arrest. To the contrary, Plaintiffs do have 

a significant privacy interest in their safe deposit boxes, 

given that their conduct indicates they intended their items 

to be “preserved . . . as private,” and society generally views 

the privacy expectations of items in safe deposit boxes as 

reasonable. United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851, 858 (9th 

Cir. 2020) (articulating test to determine privacy interest); 

see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 878 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 

1989) (unpublished) (“We recognize that Thomas is correct 

in claiming that citizens have legitimate expectations of 

privacy in the contents of their safe deposit boxes.”)

I find the reasoning in Ladson and Showalter helpful in 

deciding whether to apply the inventory search doctrine to 

this context. See, e.g., Showalter, 858 F.2d at 153 (looking 

to “the factors which have been used to justify the 

warrantless inventory search of an automobile” in deciding 

whether to extend the doctrine). In particular, I find 

compelling the point made in Ladson that extension of the 

inventory search doctrine here invades the rights of “third 

parties unrelated” to the target of the search, such as 

Plaintiffs. Ladson, 774 F.2d at 440; cf. United States v. 

Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing 

between the case before it and CDT because CDT

“involve[d] an over-seizure of data that could expose 

sensitive information about other individuals not implicated 

in any criminal activity”). 

Finally, I note that the district court’s application of the 

inventory search principles to this case demonstrates why the 

doctrine should not extend to this context. As the district 

court explained, “[w]hether an inventory was impermissibly 

pretextual hinges [on] one question: would the challenged 
42 SNITKO V. USA

search have occurred but for the Government’s allegedly 

improper investigatory purpose?” The district court 

concluded that the government’s search would have 

occurred “but for” any improper investigatory purpose, 

reasoning:

The warrant authorized the Government to 

seize the nests of deposit boxes and inventory 

the contents of those boxes in accordance 

with standardized policy. The FBI’s 

inventory policy requires that when an agent 

“lawfully take[s] custody of property,” he or 

she must “conduct a prompt and thorough 

search of the contents of the property, 

including searching any locked or unlocked 

containers.” Thus, because the Government 

had lawfully taken custody of the box nests 

(due to the warrant’s authorization to seize

them), the inventory policy mandated that 

agents examine the locked containers within. 

Agents had no discretion to determine which 

boxes should be inventoried and which 

should not—indeed, a policy granting such 

discretionary authority would run afoul of the 

Supreme Court’s inventory search 

jurisprudence. It therefore seems clear that 

the agents would have cracked the deposit 

boxes and searched their contents whether or 
SNITKO V. USA 43

not they had an impermissible investigatory 

motive.3 

This passage illustrates the problem with applying the 

inventory search doctrine to this case. The district court’s 

reasoning is illogical: The agents would have searched the 

contents of the boxes regardless of whether they had a 

criminal investigatory motive, because they had to inventory 

the boxes pursuant to policy, as they had “lawful[] custody” 

of them—pursuant to a warrant which it obtained because 

of its criminal investigatory motive. That is the challenge of 

comparing this case to an “inventory” conducted of an 

impounded vehicle: the reason the government has “lawful 

custody” of a car in those cases is because it does not have 

an improper investigatory motive in obtaining custody of the 

car in the first place, but rather takes custody of the car 

because the car was blocking traffic, posed a danger,4 or 

otherwise required removal. See United States v. Cervantes, 

3 The district court also concluded: “That the Government had a 

legitimate inventory motive is evidenced by the fact that the [search was 

a] 4-day process, wherein agents recorded the contents of 700 boxes . . . 

It beggars belief that agents would have worked in this manner solely to 

invent a pretext for a criminal search of the box contents.” The length 

of time it takes to conduct an inventory is not legally relevant to whether 

it was pretextual. Moreover, to the extent the inventory did take so long, 

the point could easily cut the other way—it could have taken so long 

because the government did not merely log the contents of the boxes, but 

thoroughly inspected them using procedures such as dog sniffs. Cf.

Grey, 959 F.3d at 1184 (noting that the “conduct at issue” in the case 

“more closely resembled a criminal raid than an administrative 

inspection,” given, in part, the “the [longer] length of the ‘protective 

sweep.’”)

4 See, e.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 374 (explaining that, in another case, 

“the police had reasonable grounds to believe a weapon might be in the 

car, and thus available to vandals.”)
44 SNITKO V. USA

703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that if “the 

government fail[s] to establish a community caretaking 

function for the impoundment” of a vehicle, it “fail[s] to 

establish the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure and 

subsequent inventory search.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Here, the only reason the government had 

“custody” of USPV and the safe deposit boxes therein was 

because of its investigatory motive. Ultimately, given the 

greater privacy interests at stake and the implication of the 

rights of third parties, I would hold that the inventory search 

doctrine does not extend to searches of box contents in a 

locked vault. 

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part:

I join the majority’s opinion except as to Part II, which I 

view as unnecessary given the panel’s resolution of Part I.