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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT P. THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Case No. 15-10210

Honorable Linda V. Parker

LORI A. BRIGGS, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 12(c) MOTION 

FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [ECF NO. 35]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Robert P. Thomas (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against Defendants 

Lori A. Briggs (“Defendant Briggs”) and Melissa Borden (“Defendant Borden”)

(collectively “Defendants”) stemming from the alleged unlawful seizure and 

possession of Plaintiff’s two dogs. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3,4.) Plaintiff filed his 

complaint on January 20, 2015, alleging Defendants violated his civil rights under 

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law 

claims for conversion and replevin. (Id.) 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (ECF No. 35.) 

For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings.
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II. BACKGROUND

This dispute surrounds the ownership of two dogs. Plaintiff alleges that he 

is the owner of Swimmer and her offspring, Katrina. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.) On 

October 8, 2014, Defendant Briggs, a Detroit police officer employed by the 

Evidence Technician Unit, captured Swimmer and Katrina by “luring them from 

[the] property where they had a right to be.” (Id. ¶¶ 11, 16.) Defendant Briggs 

then transported the dogs to Defendant Borden, the owner of an animal rescue, 

rehabilitation, and adoption facility located in Newport, Michigan. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 28.) 

Defendant Borden brought the dogs to her facility, the Devoted Barn, a nonprofit 

shelter located in Monroe County, Michigan. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Briggs had no authority to seize his dogs from 

his property. Plaintiff’s complaint states Defendant Briggs is not affiliated with the 

Detroit Animal Control Center and did not seize the dogs in connection with any 

case in her capacity as a police officer. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Borden has conspired with Defendant 

Briggs over the seizure of his dogs. (Id. ¶ 72.) As of the filing of the complaint, 

Defendant Borden has continued to exercise dominion over Plaintiff’s dogs. (Id. ¶

36.) On September 6, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and in the alternative, a 
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motion for a protective order and/or security for costs and fees. (ECF No. 17.) 

This Court denied Defendants’ motion on September 28, 2016. (ECF No. 24.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(c) is subject to the same standards of review as a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998). A motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading. RMI Titanium 

Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a pleading need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it 

must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007). A pleading does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of 

‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

As the Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and Twombly, “[t]o survive a 

motion to dismiss, a [pleading] must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to ‘state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 
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550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when [it contains] factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that [a party] is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility 

standard “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it 

simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 

reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

When assessing a “plausible” claim, the district court must accept all of the 

factual allegations as true. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th 

Cir. 2001). Even so, “the pleading must contain more . . . than . . . a statement of 

facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. Therefore, “[t]hreadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965).

IV. APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that Defendants were acting under color of state law when 

they seized Plaintiff’s two dogs in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment. (ECF No. 35 at Pg ID 458.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Briggs was 

acting under the color of state law pursuant to her authority as a Detroit police 

officer. (Id. at Pg ID 460.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Defendant 
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Borden, although a private actor, was acting under the color of state law when she 

“willfully participate[d] in joint action with” Defendant Briggs and took unlawful 

possession of Plaintiff’s dogs. (Id. at Pg ID 458-59.) Plaintiff argues he is entitled 

to judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c) because Defendants failed to “plead any factual 

matter in their Answer that would, taken as true for the purposes of Rule 12(c), 

give them any property rights in the two dogs . . . .” (Id. at Pg ID 475.)

In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request should be denied 

because “Plaintiff confuses this Court’s earlier ruling denying Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss with establishing, as fact, that he has the ownership interest he claims.” 

(ECF No. 37 at Pg ID 526.) Defendants argue that their responsive pleading 

“contains numerous statements denying the elements necessary to prove Plaintiff’s 

claims, all of which must be accepted as true for the purposes of this Motion.” 

(Id.)

Defendants are correct that Plaintiff misconstrued the Court’s September 28, 

2016 Order and Opinion to suggest that Plaintiff has proven he is the lawful owner 

of the two dogs. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court found that Plaintiff had 

pleaded “sufficient factual allegations in the complaint establishing ownership” to 

survive a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 24.) Nothing in the Court’s September 28, 

2016 Order and Opinion suggest that Plaintiff has met its burden and proven that 

he is, in fact, the actual owner of the two dogs.
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Applying the same standard for the instant motion, the Court finds that 

Defendants have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to establish they were not 

acting under the color of state law when they allegedly seized Plaintiff’s two dogs 

and, therefore, did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 4 at 

Pg ID 38.) In their Answer, Defendants state “Defendant Briggs admits that she is 

employed by the City of Detroit Police Department . . . [and] she engages in efforts 

to rescue stray dogs and cats.” (Id. at Pg ID 39.) However, although Defendant 

Briggs admits she rescues stray dogs and cats, she denies that such rescue efforts 

are done in connection with her job as a Detroit police officer. (Id. at Pg ID 41.)

“For purposes of a Rule 12(c) motion, all well-pleaded material allegations 

must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is 

nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” Stafford v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 554 

F. App’x 360, 370 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 

Moreover, “[a] Rule 12(c) motion is appropriately granted when no material issue 

of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Id. There is a factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff is the actual owner of 

the two dogs. Plaintiff has not presented the Court with any unrebutted evidence 

that he is the lawful owner of the dog. Furthermore, there is a factual dispute as to 

whether Defendant Briggs was acting under her authority as a Detroit Police 

officer when she seized the two dogs and transferred possession to Defendant 
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Borden. Again, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Defendant Briggs was 

acting under the color of state law in her capacity as a Detroit Police officer when 

she allegedly seized Plaintiff’s two dogs. Nothing in the pleadings permits the 

Court to find, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on his § 1983 

claim.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion under Rule 12(c) for Judgment on 

the Pleadings (ECF No. 35) is DENIED; 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2018 s/Linda V. Parker

U.S. District Court Judge

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of 

record on January 19, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Julie Owens acting in the Absence of Richard Loury

Case Manager