alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Following trial, a jury convicted Defendant Bijan Woodley of carjacking in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2119 and of use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (ECF No. 197.) The Court imposed consecutive prison sentences of 24 months 

and 84 months. (ECF No. 238.) Woodley’s conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (ECF No. 272) and his petition for certiorari was denied (ECF No. 

279). 

This Court subsequently denied Woodley’s request for resentencing (which was treated as 

a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. 

Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). In Sessions, the Court applied the reasoning of Johnson v. United 

States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), to determine that the definition of “crime of violence” contained in 

18 U.S.C. § 16(b) was also unconstitutionally vague. 138 S. Ct. at 1216. So the Court interpreted 

Woodley to be arguing that his conviction under § 924(c), which contains a residual clause 

identical to that in § 16(b), was unconstitutional. (ECF No. 296, PageID.4337.) The Court 

disagreed because the Sixth Circuit had suggested that, apart from the residual clause, federal 

carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause in § 924(c)(3)(A). (ECF No. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

 

D-1 BIJAN WOODLEY 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 15-cr-20007 

Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR COUNSEL [303] 
2 

297, PageID.4341 (citing case law).) The Sixth Circuit has since ruled that carjacking “necessarily 

involves the threatened use of violent physical force and, therefore, . . . constitutes a crime of 

violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause”—not the residual clause. United States v. Jackson, 918 

F.3d 467, 486 (6th Cir. 2019). 

 Woodley again seeks the appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 303.) This time to evaluate 

whether he is entitled to relief under United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), in which the 

Supreme Court held that the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. Id. But 

again, Woodley’s conviction for carjacking still qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements 

clause, § 924(c)(3)(A), which has not been invalidated. 

Thus, as Woodley would be unable to show that his § 924(c) conviction is affected by 

Davis, and no motions are currently pending, the Court denies his request for counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 19, 2019 

s/Laurie J. Michelson 

LAURIE J. MICHELSON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on the 

attorneys and/or parties of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on November 19, 2019. 

 s/Erica Karhoff 

Case Manager to 

 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
#### § 167.05-20 Marine inspector or inspector.

These terms mean any person from the civilian or military branch of the Coast Guard assigned under the superintendence and direction of an Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, or any other person as may be designated for the performance of duties with respect to the inspections, enforcement, and administration of Subtitle II of Title 46, U.S. Code, Title 46 and Title 33 U.S. Code, and regulations issued under these statutes.

[CGD 95-028, 62 FR 51217, Sept. 30, 1997]
**EXHIBIT 31**Rule 13a-14(a)/15(d)-14(a) CertificationI, Michael P. Muldowney, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Nextera Enterprises, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosures controls andprocedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presentedin this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, asof the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablelikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date:November 3, 2005     By: /s/ Michael P. Muldowney     President and Chief Financial Officer  (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer)
§ 196.25-1 Improper use prohibited. ( a ) No person shall flash or cause to be flashed the rays of a searchlight or other blinding light onto the bridge or into the pilothouse of any vessel underway.
**EXHIBIT**

**ITEM 11**

 

StatementReference Computation of Per Share Earnings

 

Primary earnings per share amounts were computed on the basis of theweighted average number of shares of common stock during the year.  The weighted average number of shares usedfor this computation was 1,785,812, 1,658,675, 1,614,196, 1,576,589 and1,528,268, in 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, and 2003, respectively.

 

Fully diluted earnings per share amounts were computed on the basis ofthe weighted average number of shares of common stock and common stockequivalents outstanding during the year. Common stock equivalents include employee stock options.  The weighted average number of shares usedfor this computation was 1,881,004, 1,831,892, 1,923,532, 1,919,512 and1,796,859, in 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, and 2003, respectively.

 

----
#### Martha M. Hall *v.*Augusta Lawton et al.

January Term, 1908.

Present: Rowell, C. J., Tylek, Munson, and Watson, JJ.

Opinion filed February 3, 1908.

*Wills*— Construction—Jurisdiction *of Chancery*— No. *40, Acts 1896.*

Tfie court of chancery will not take jurisdiction, under No. 40, Acts 1896, of a bill for the construction of a will, brought by a devisee pending her appeal from the probate court’s final decree of distribution involving that question.

Appeal in Chancery, Windsor County. Heard at Chambers, September 3, 1906, on the pleadings and master’s report, *Miles,*Chancellor. Decree dismissing the bill with costs to the defendants. The oratrix appealed. The opinion states the case.

*Davis & Davis,*and *George L. Fletcher*for the oratrix.

*Stickney, Sargent*& *Sheets,*for the defendants.

Rowell, C. J.

This is a bill in chancery for a construction of the will of the oratrix’s husband, by which certain real estate is devised to her, “her heirs, viz., her children and grandchildren and assigns.’’ ■ The will was duly proved, and the oratrix and another appointed executors. They accepted the trust, settled the estate, rendered their account, and a final decree of distribution was made, whereby the real estate devised to the oratrix was given to her “during her natural life, and at her decease,” to the defendants “and their heirs and assigns forever. ’ ’ Two of the defendants are the only children the testator left; and the other, the only grandchild. The decree was made as the parties hereto agreed it should be, and no question concerning it was submitted to the probate court for its decision as a controverted matter. But the oratrix did not fully understand and comprehend the language of the decree, nor its legal *536force and effect, nor the precise title and estate that it gave her. Having taken counsel after the decree was made, she came to think that the fee ought to have been given to her, and so she appealed to the county court, where the case is still pending, its further prosecution having been enjoined in this suit.

The oratrix claims that under No. 40, Acts of 1896, it was the duty of the court of chancery, and is the duty of this Court, to construe the will. But as that statute was construed and applied in *Harris*v. *Harris,*79 Vt. 22, 64 Atl. 75, this claim cannot be sustained, in the circumstances. There, at the time the bill was brought, the estate was nearing final settlement and distribution in the probate court; and because any one interested in the decree of distribution could appeal therefrom to the county court, from which the case could be brought to this Court on exceptions, it was held that there was no occasion for the intervention of chancery, and the bill was dismissed. See, also, *Clark*v. *Peck’s Executors,*79 Vt. 275, 65 Atl. 14.

On the authority of these eases, and especially of *Harris*v. *Harris,*

*The decree dismissing the bill with costs 4s affirmed, and cause remanded.*
THEA~ORNEY GENERAL 

OFTEXAS 

Honorable Jesse James 

Treasurer, State of Texas 

Capitol Station 

Austin, Texas Opinion ~~-464-~ 

Re: Authority of the State 

Treasurer to clear certain funds held by the 

Treasury Department by 

depositing the funds 

to the General Revenue 

Dear Mr. James: Fund. 

Please be advised that Opinion w-464, dated 

June 20, 1958, Is amended on page three (3) thereof so 

that the sum to the right of the fourth paragraph from 

the top of the page shall be Eight Hundred Thirty-six 

and 36/100 Dollars ($836.36), instead of Seven Hundred 

Six and 36,400 Dollars ($706.36). 

Yours very truly, 

WILL WILSON 

Attorney General of Texas 

HGB:zt 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Geo. P. Blackburn, Chairman 

Riley Eugene Fletcher 

Richard B. Stone 

BY 

Assistant " 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENEXAL 

BY W. V. Geppert
§ 178.510 Ballast. ( a ) Any solid fixed ballast used to comply with the requirements of parts 170, 171, 178, and 179 of this chapter must be: ( 1 ) Stowed in a manner that prevents shifting of the ballast; and
( 2 ) Installed to the satisfaction of the cognizant OCMI.
( b ) Solid fixed ballast may not be located forward of the collision bulkhead unless the installation and arrangement of the ballast and the collision bulkhead minimizes the risk of the ballast penetrating the bulkhead in a collision.
( c ) Solid fixed ballast may not be removed from a vessel or relocated unless approved by the cognizant OCMI except that ballast may be temporarily moved for a vessel examination or repair if it is replaced to the satisfaction of the OCMI.
( d ) Water ballast, either as an active system or permanent, must be approved by the Commanding Officer, Marine Safety Center.
Argued and submitted September 20,

affirmed December 13, 1995,

petition for review denied March 6,1996 (322 Or 645)

#### Janice THIBERT, *Appellant, v.*Robert PATTERSON, *Respondent.*

(94-3174; CA A86860)

907 P2d 1139

Robert A. Lucas argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Lucas and Associates.

No appearance for respondent.

Before Warren, Presiding Judge, and Edmonds and Armstrong, Judges.

PER CURIAM

*295PER CURIAM

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting her a postponement of a show cause hearing and requiring her to proceed with the hearing without an attorney. Appellant also asserts that the show cause orders were improperly presented *ex parte*to the trial judge. Appellant’s designation of the record includes the trial court file and a one-page excerpt of the transcript from the show cause hearing. Based on the record before us, we are unable to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Affirmed. Costs to respondent, not including attorney fees.
#### § 169.569 Fire axes.

(a) Each vessel must carry at least the number of fire axes set forth in Table [169.569(a)](/on/2024-09-23/title-46/section-169.569#p-169.569(a)). The Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection may require additional fire axes necessary for the proper protection of the vessel.

Table [169.569](/on/2024-09-23/title-46/section-169.569)(a)

| Length | | Number of axes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Over | Not over |
| | 65 | 0 |
| 65 | 90 | 1 |
| 90 | 120 | 2 |
| 120 | 150 | 3 |
| 150 | | 4 |

(b) Fire axes must be stowed so as to be readily available in the event of emergency.

(c) If fire axes are not located in the open or behind glass, they must be placed in marked enclosures containing the fire hose.
# C_2012058EN.01001301.xml

| 25.2.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 58/13 |
| --------- | -- | -------------------------------------- | ------- |

---

Action brought on 26 December 2011 — Kaddour v Council

(Case T-654/11)

2012/C 58/24

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Khaled Kaddour (Damas, Syria) (represented by: M. Ponsard, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

| — | Admit this action to be examined under the accelerated procedure; |
| - | ----------------------------------------------------------------- |

| — | Annul, in so far as those acts refer to the applicant:
—
Decision 2011/273/CFSP as completed and amended to date, including all decisions cited in Chapter 13 of the application; —
Regulation No 442/2011 as completed and amended to date, including all regulations cited in Chapter 14 of the application; —
Decision 2011/782/CFSP as completed and amended to date; | — | Decision 2011/273/CFSP as completed and amended to date, including all decisions cited in Chapter 13 of the application; | — | Regulation No 442/2011 as completed and amended to date, including all regulations cited in Chapter 14 of the application; | — | Decision 2011/782/CFSP as completed and amended to date; |
| - | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | - | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | - | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | - | -------------------------------------------------------- |
| — | Decision 2011/273/CFSP as completed and amended to date, including all decisions cited in Chapter 13 of the application; | | | | | | |
| — | Regulation No 442/2011 as completed and amended to date, including all regulations cited in Chapter 14 of the application; | | | | | | |
| — | Decision 2011/782/CFSP as completed and amended to date; | | | | | | |

| — | Order the Council to pay the costs. |
| - | ----------------------------------- |

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law which are essentially identical or similar to those raised in Case T-653/11 Jaber v Council.

---
G-18(D) Periodic Statement New Balance, Due Date, Late Payment and
 

Minimum Payment Sample (Credit Cards) 

Payment Information 

New Balance $1,784.53 

Minimum Payment Due $48.00 

Payment Due Date 4/20/12 

Late Payment Warning: If we do not receive your 

minimum payment by the date listed above, you may have 

to pay a $35 late fee and your APRs may be increased up 

to the Penalty APR of 28.99%. 

Minimum Payment Warning: If you make only the minimum 

payment each period, you will pay more in interest and it will 

take you longer to pay off your balance. For example, if you 

had a balance of $1,000 at an interest rate of 17% and 

always paid only the minimum required, it would take over 7 

years to repay this balance. For an estimate of the time it 

would take to repay your actual balance making only 

minimum payments, call 1-800-XXX-XXXX. 

G-18(E) Periodic Statement New Balance, Due Date and 

Late Payment Sample (Open-End Plans (Non-credit-card Accounts)) 

Payment Information 

New Balance $1,784.53 

Minimum Payment Due $48.00 

Payment Due Date 4/20/12 

Late Payment Warning: If we do not receive your 

minimum payment by the date listed above, you may have 

to pay a $35 late fee and your APRs may be increased up 

to the Penalty APR of 28.99%.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Grand Central Financial Corp.
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, John A. Rife, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.





                                            /s/ John A. Rife
                                            -------------------------
                                            John A. Rife
                                            Chief Financial Officer
                                            August 14, 2002
# C_2012138EN.01003104.xml

| 12.5.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 138/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.5.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/31

---

Order of the Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 7 July 2011 — Pirri v Commission

(Case F-21/11)

(Civil Service - Person claiming the status of official or other servant of the European Union - Action - Manifest inadmissibility - failure to observe the pre-contentious procedure)

(2012/C 138/71)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Antonio Gerado Pirri (Travedona Monate, Italy) (represented by: S. Costantino, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Re:

The applicant’s claim for status of official or other servant of the European Union

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

| 2. | Mr Pirri is ordered to bear his own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mr Pirri is ordered to bear his own costs.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2032 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2032

 To amend title 11 of the United States Code to make nondischargeable 
    debts for personal injuries that result in permanent disability.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 22, 2009

Mr. Burton of Indiana introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                   to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 11 of the United States Code to make nondischargeable 
    debts for personal injuries that result in permanent disability.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as ``Savannah's Law''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENT.

    Section 523(a) of title 11, the United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (18) by striking ``or'' at the end,
            (2) in paragraph (19) by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; or'', and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (19) the following:
            ``(20) for a personal injury that results in a permanent 
        disability.''.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.

    (a) Effective Date.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act 
and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of 
the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Application of Amendments.--The amendments made by this Act 
shall apply only with respect to cases commenced under title 11 of the 
United States Code on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Myron Cole,

Plaintiff,

v.

Delbert Services Corporation; and DOES 1-10,

inclusive,

Defendant.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Civil Action No.: 2:14-cv-13603-LJM-MJH

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL WITH

PREJUDICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, by the undersigned, that the above entitled action

is voluntary dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), without costs to

any party as against the other under the terms of a settlement agreement and general release.

Dated: November 5, 2014

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Sergei Lemberg, Esq.

Sergei Lemberg, Esq

Attorney for Plaintiff Myron Cole

LEMBERG LAW, L.L.C.

1100 Summer Street

Stamford, CT 06905

Telephone: (203) 653-2250

Facsimile: (888) 953-6237

Email: slemberg@lemberglaw.com

Case 2:14-cv-13603-LJM-MJH ECF No. 6 filed 11/05/14 PageID.15 Page 1 of 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that on November 5, 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Notice of Withdrawal with Prejudice was served electronically by the U.S. District Court Eastern

District of Michigan Electronic Document Filing System (ECF) and that the document is

available on the ECF system.

/s/ Sergei Lemberg______

Sergei Lemberg

Case 2:14-cv-13603-LJM-MJH ECF No. 6 filed 11/05/14 PageID.16 Page 2 of 2
#### § 177.970 Protection against hot piping.

Piping, including valves, pipe fittings and flanges, conveying vapor, gas, or liquid, the temperature of which exceeds 65.5 °C (150 °F), must be suitably insulated where necessary to prevent injuries.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20

- 0608 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. KAYLA DAWN PENNINGTON ,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**G RANT** 
Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the Appellant is given an extension of time until June 20 , 2022 , to prepare, file, and serve the Appellant’s reply brief. No further extensions will be granted.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 17 2022

05/17/2022

Case Number: DA 20-0608