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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

GREGORY LAMAR CALHOUN, 

 Petitioner, 

 Criminal Case No. 15-cr-20024 

v. Honorable Linda V. Parker 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent.

________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL [ECF NO. 37]

 

Petitioner Gregory Lamar Calhoun (“Petitioner” or “Defendant”), confined 

at Central Michigan Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan, filed a pro se

motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 37.) In particular, 

Petitioner contends that his defense attorney failed to request that his federal 

sentence run concurrent to his undischarged state sentence. (ECF No. 37 at Pg ID 

145.) Because of this alleged failure, Petitioner requests that this Court order that 

his federal sentence run concurrent with his state sentence. (Id.) 

On October 14, 2016, the Government filed a brief in opposition to 

Petitioner’s motion. (ECF No. 45.) In their opposition brief, the Government 

construes Petitioner’s motion as a motion to vacate his sentence, because “the 

government is not aware of any other provision or rule which would allow the 
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Court to change its sentence under these circumstances, and [Petitioner] has not 

cited such a provision.” (Id. at Pg ID 193.) Further, the Government argues that 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel or that he is 

entitled to a different sentence. (Id. at Pg ID 196.) Petitioner filed a reply brief on 

October 31, 2016, reiterating that his attorney “didn’t have [Petitioner’s] best 

interest” by “not receiving certainty” that his federal and state sentences would run 

concurrently. (ECF No. 46 at Pg ID 198.) For the reasons that follow, the Court is 

denying Petitioner’s motion for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner is currently serving a sentence after pleading guilty to one count 

of felon in possession of a firearm. (ECF No. 30 at Pg ID 89.) In the Rule 11 Plea 

Agreement, entered on August 26, 2015, the parties agreed that Petitioner’s 

guideline range was 37 months to 46 months. (Id. at Pg ID 91.) 

 On November 23, 2015, defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum on 

behalf of Petitioner. (ECF No. 34.) The sentencing memorandum includes a 

request “that any sentence [Petitioner is] given in this court run concurrent to any 

sentence imposed by Michigan for a parole violation.” (Id. at Pg ID 120.) Defense 

counsel reiterated this request at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, defense 

counsel stated: 

We would also ask the Court just for, I guess, house cleaning 

purposes, when – whatever sentence you do decide to give him, just 
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articulate that it would be concurrent with whatever the state sentence 

may be in the future. I know the state – the parole officer has 

expressed that if he’s incarcerated by this Court, they probably would 

drop it. But just in the event they were to proceed while he’s 

incarcerated and with a – with a parole violation and give him more 

time, I would just ask the Court to exercise its discretion and make 

this sentence concurrent with whatever the state may do. 

(ECF No. 44 at Pg ID 177.) In response, this Court deferred to the state to make a 

decision on whether Petitioner would receive a concurrent sentence. (Id. at Pg ID 

191.) 

 On January 11, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion for ineffective assistance 

counsel where he contends that his defense attorney failed to request that his 

federal sentence run concurrent to his undischarged state sentence. (ECF No. 37 at 

Pg ID 145.) Petitioner requests that this Court order that his federal sentence run 

concurrent with his state sentence. (Id.) 

II. Legal Standard

In order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a party must 

satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). Under Strickland, Petitioner must demonstrate “that counsel’s 

performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” Id. at 687. The “deficient performance” prong of this test “requires 

showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. 
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 The “prejudice” prong “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Id. There must be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

at 694. “This does not require a showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than 

not altered the outcome,’ ” but “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be 

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 111-12 (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 693). 

III. Analysis

 As the Government notes, a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel 

is not the proper vehicle for amending or vacating a sentence. (ECF No. 45 at Pg 

ID 193.) A prisoner in custody may petition the Court to vacate, set aside, or 

correct a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Here, Petitioner makes no reference to 

§ 2255 or the language in the statute. 

Assuming arguendo that a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

could vacate, set aside, or correct Petitioner’s sentence, his argument would fail. 

Petitioner alleges that his counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to 

request that Petitioner’s sentence run consecutively to the undischarged state 

sentence. However, as noted earlier, defense counsel made that request in the 
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sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing. (See ECF Nos. 34 at Pg 

ID 120; 44 at Pg ID 177.) Further, Petitioner does not cite any case law to 

demonstrate that the alleged failure of counsel to request concurrent sentences 

shows “errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687. 

IV. Conclusion

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for ineffective assistance of 

counsel (ECF No. 37) is DENIED. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: July 12, 2017 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, July 12, 2017, by electronic and/or U.S. 

First Class mail. 

 s/ R. Loury 

 Case Manager