1

Filed 3/24/21 In re A.M. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Glenn)

----

In re A.M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

C090711

GLENN COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.R. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

(Super. Ct. Nos. 

17JP00860, 17JP00861, 

17JP00862)

Appellants H.R. (mother) and Mi.M. (father) appeal from orders of the juvenile 

court terminating their parental rights and freeing minors A.M., M.M., and A.R. for 

adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)1 They contend there was insufficient 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that the minors are adoptable and the 

juvenile court erred in failing to find the beneficial parental relationship exception to 

adoption applies. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We limit our recitation of the facts to those necessary for resolution of the issues

on appeal.

On December 21, 2017, the Glenn County Health and Human Services Agency 

(Agency) filed section 300 petitions on behalf of minors A.M. (age four), M.M. (age 

five), and A.R. (age eight), alleging the minors fell within the provisions of subdivisions 

(b)(1) and (g), after mother was arrested for being in possession of methamphetamine (for 

sale), marijuana, concentrated cannabis, hash oil, clonazepam pills, digital scales, 

methamphetamine smoking pipes, tasers, ammunition, and tear gas, all within reach of 

the minors. The minors were taken into protective custody and hair follicle tested for 

controlled substances. Their tests indicated high levels of methamphetamine. Mother 

has a lengthy criminal and child welfare history. Father2 also has a lengthy criminal 

history and had been incarcerated in state prison since approximately June 2016. He was 

maintaining written communication with the minors during his incarceration. 

At the dispositional hearing in March 2018, the juvenile court adjudged the minors 

dependent children and ordered them removed from parental custody. The minors were 

placed in foster care, with A.M. and M.M. in one foster home and A.R. in another foster 

home. Reunification services were ordered for both parents. Mother and father’s case 

plans each included a mental health assessment, an outpatient drug and alcohol treatment 

program, substance abuse testing, parenting education, and individual counseling. 

2 The whereabouts of A.R.’s biological father were unknown but the juvenile court 

subsequently found Mi.M. to be the presumed father of all three minors. 
3

Mother was released from incarceration on or about April 4, 2018, and father was 

released from incarceration in or about June 2018. They were provided supervised 

weekly visits with the minors upon their release. Both parents resumed regular use of 

methamphetamine upon their release from incarceration. 

Mother’s reunification services were terminated in October 2018. She had been 

reincarcerated on or about August 31, 2018, after being sentenced to four years for 

welfare fraud and making criminal threats, had made only minimal progress in her 

services and had continued to use methamphetamine. The juvenile court continued 

reunification services for father, although he was only minimally complying with the 

terms of his parole, had also made minimal progress in his services, and was still using 

methamphetamine. Although all three minors had reported that they would like to be 

returned to parental care, mother remained incarcerated and father continued to use 

methamphetamine and make only minimal progress in his services. The juvenile court 

terminated father’s reunification services in January 2019 and set a selection and 

implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26. 

Before the section 366.26 hearing, in anticipation of the minors being placed 

together in a permanent home, A.M. and M.M. were moved into the home of A.R.’s 

foster mother. A.R.’s foster mother, however, was not able to provide permanency for 

the minors. It was a difficult move for A.M. and M.M. because they had bonded with 

their prior foster parents and had hoped to grow up there. A.R. also was struggling with

the knowledge that she would have to move from the home of her foster mother, whom

she loved. The Agency located a very desirable proposed adoptive family that was

committed to adopting all three minors. The minors had been visiting the proposed

adoptive parents, including overnight visits, since April 2019, and had formed positive 

bonds with them. The proposed adoptive parents had experience adopting sibling groups, 

as they had previously adopted another sibling set. 
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All three minors stated that if they are unable to return to parental care, they would 

be happy in the proposed adoptive home. The minors said they love their birth parents 

and were sad that their parents had been unable to reunify with them, but that they 

understood. A.R. shared her sadness about not reunifying with them with the proposed 

adoptive parents, who were very supportive and able to help her work through her 

feelings. A.R. was anxious and excited about moving to the identified proposed adoptive 

home and wanted to move, but expressed that she would also miss her foster mother. 

A.R. also expressed several times that her biggest concerns were having a family that 

would always be there for her and not hit her. By May 1, 2019, the minors had 

repeatedly expressed their excitement about moving to the home of the proposed adoptive 

parents and were “actively requesting to move to their adoptive home.” 

Although the minors were ready to be moved to the proposed adoptive home, and 

had spent a large portion of their summer driving back and forth while essentially living 

between the two homes, the move had been delayed because father had filed an objection 

to the minors being moved out of the county. All three minors were reported to be 

suffering emotional damage from the delay in moving, with A.R. the most negatively 

affected, due to her age, level of awareness, and emotional attachment to her current 

foster mother. A.R. said she is sad to leave the proposed adoptive home to go back to the 

foster home and is sad to say goodbye to the foster mother. She described it as having 

“to say goodbye over and over again.” The emotional toll on A.R. of the delay and 

constant transitioning had resulted in many breakdowns that involved crying, screaming, 

and needing to be rocked to sleep. 

A.R. testified out of parents’ presence at the section 366.26 hearing. She wanted 

the court to know that she loves her foster mother and her foster mother’s daughters, her 

birth parents, the proposed adoptive parents and their daughter, her grandmother, and her 

siblings, A.M. and M.M. She explained that she is close with her foster mother and 

foster mother’s daughters and will miss them when she moves, but she felt good about 
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living with the proposed adoptive parents. She also agreed that she would miss her 

parents and friends when she moved away to live in the proposed adoptive home, but she 

likes being there with her proposed adoptive parents. 

The state adoptions specialist also testified, reiterating much of what had been 

previously reported. She described the minors as “wonderful,” and stated she believes 

they are adoptable. It had not been difficult to find possible adoptive parents for them 

and she had many families from which to choose. She had selected a family who was 

open to postadoption contact, particularly because the minors had a strong relationship 

with their paternal grandmother, but there would be no guarantee of future contact, 

especially with the birth parents, and the proposed adoptive family had declined to enter 

into a postadoption contact agreement. She did not think the minors’ bond with parents

was so significant or strong that the need to maintain it outweighed the benefits of 

adoption. 

Mother testified she visited as regularly as she was permitted, believed her visits 

with the minors went well and that they were sad at the end of visits. She said the minors 

tell her they love her and want to come home with her. Father testified he had a very 

close bond with the minors, he visited them regularly when not incarcerated, and he 

believed the minors’ bond with him was more important than their need to be adopted. 

The parents argued the minors were not likely to be adopted and that the beneficial 

parental relationship exception to adoption should apply, based on their visitation and

bond with the minors. The juvenile court found the minors adoptable, that no exceptions 

to adoption apply, and terminated parental rights. 

Additional facts are included in our discussion of the issues.
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DISCUSSION

I

Adoptability

The parents contend the orders terminating their parental rights must be reversed 

because there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that the 

minors are adoptable. There was, however, ample evidence supporting the juvenile 

court’s finding that the minors are adoptable.

“If the court determines, based on the assessment . . . and any other relevant 

evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, 

the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.” 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) “Although a finding of adoptability must be supported by clear 

and convincing evidence, it [i.e., the determination that it is likely the child will be 

adopted within a reasonable time] is nevertheless a low threshold . . . .” (In re K.B.

(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1292.)

Determination of whether a child is likely to be adopted focuses first upon the 

characteristics of the child; therefore, a finding of adoptability does not require that the 

child already be in a prospective adoptive home or that there is a “proposed adoptive 

parent ‘waiting in the wings.’ ” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649

(Sarah M.).) On the other hand, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has shown 

interest in adopting a minor is substantial evidence the minor is likely to be adopted 

within a reasonable time, either by that person or some other. (In re J.I. (2003) 108

Cal.App.4th 903, 911, disapproved on another matter in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 

9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7; In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154 (Lukas B.); 

Sarah M., supra, at p. 1651.)

The Agency has the burden to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 

minors are likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13

Cal.4th 196, 210.) On appeal, we “must account for the clear and convincing standard of 
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proof when addressing a claim that the evidence does not support a finding made under 

this standard. When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and 

convincing evidence, the question before [us] is whether the record as a whole contains 

substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly 

probable that the fact was true. In conducting [our] review, [we] must view the record in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to 

how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in 

the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of 

O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011-1012.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the 

evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)

Applying this standard, we find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that all three minors are likely to be adopted.

With the exception of A.R. being reportedly underweight, neither of the other two 

minors in this case have any medical or developmental issues. All three minors had 

adjusted well to placement out of parental custody, had demonstrated the ability to love 

and form strong attachments to their caregivers, and are teeming with positive attributes. 

A.M. is described as a sweet, energetic, spunky, affectionate girl who is very 

social. She likes and does well in school and loves to play board games. She initially 

participated in individual therapy to address her anxiety and any issues regarding 

attachment but, by September 2018 was assessed as no longer in need of mental health 

services, was reported not to be having any significant behavior concerns, and her mental 

health and emotional status appeared stable. 

M.M. is described as a very energetic young man who loves outdoor activities. 

M.M. also likes school and performs “outstanding” in certain subject areas, and has a 

great overall attitude and work ethic. His teacher described him as a “wonderful young 

man.” He, like A.M., initially participated in individual therapy to address his anxiety 
8

and any issues regarding attachment but, by September 2018 was assessed as no longer in 

need of mental health services, was reported not to be having any significant behavior 

concerns, and his mental health and emotional status appeared stable. He had also had 

appropriate grief reactions to the change of placement from his initial foster family but 

had adjusted well to the change. He is able to express his thoughts and emotions to those 

he trusts. 

A.R. is described as shy, thoughtful, caring, and kind-hearted. She enjoys and 

excels in school, is liked by her teacher, and participates in community sports. Her 

teacher described her as a “hard worker” and “wonderful student” who is doing “an 

amazing job in all areas.” She had participated in weekly mental health services in 2018 

to process her “feelings of abuse and neglect” and to address anger arising as a result of 

the separation of her family and issues regarding attachment, and had progressed in her 

treatment plan. In 2018, after hearing about mother’s reincarceration, A.R. suffered a 

setback but she had continued to work with her clinician and, by the time of the selection 

and implementation hearing, her mental health and emotional status appeared stable. She 

still struggled, however, with trusting that she will not be harmed by an adult. She was 

continuing to receive weekly therapy, as it was determined she would benefit from 

ongoing therapy to process the trauma and loss she had suffered. She was “anxious and 

excited about moving to an adoptive home.” She was sad, however, to be leaving her 

current foster mother, who she had grown to love. She is very articulate about her 

feelings when she has established a trusting relationship. 

We disagree with the parents’ arguments that these minors, with their plethora of 

positive attributes, cannot be found adoptable due to their “emotional issues, advanced 

age and membership in a sibling set.” While the parents intimate that the minors have 

special needs, the evidence does not support this assertion. Both M.M. and A.M. initially 

had been identified as having anxiety and possible attachment issues, but both had made 

progress in their services and had appropriately bonded with their caregivers, and neither 
9

required further mental health therapeutic services. The fact that A.R. was continuing in 

her counseling services does not suggest that she has special needs or is not likely to be 

adopted. Instead, the fact that A.R. was shown to progress in her ability to process her 

feelings with therapy can be viewed as a positive factor. And, in any event, her mental 

health and emotional status was stable. Moreover, even the prospect that a minor may 

have some continuing behavioral or emotional problems does not foreclose a finding of 

adoptability. (See In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 224-225.) Prospective 

adoptive parents in general can be expected to realize that children in the dependency 

system are likely to suffer from emotional problems and may need continuing counseling 

and strong parenting. As the juvenile court impliedly found, the minors’ needs were not 

out of the ordinary in this light.

With respect to the parents’ emphasis on the minors’ age, age alone cannot show 

that any particular minor is unadoptable, since adoptability focuses on the minor’s 

individual characteristics. (Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1649; In re Elise K.

(1982) 33 Cal.3d. 138, 144-145.) Indeed, the Agency was able to locate the proposed

adoptive family despite the minors’ alleged “advanced age.” It also located the proposed

adoptive family despite the minors’ “membership in a sibling set,” which the parents also 

contend render the minors unadoptable. But, even if the Agency could not find a single 

placement for the three minors as it admittedly preferred, the Agency could also place the 

minors individually, as no finding that individual placement of the minors would be 

detrimental to their well-being was made. 

Finally, the parents complain that the minors had not yet been placed in the 

proposed adoptive home, but had been only visiting, and argue that it had not yet been 

shown that this particular home would meet all of the minors’ needs. A finding of 

adoptability does not, however, require that the child already be in a preadoptive home. 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Nor does it even require a proposed adoptive home or parent 

“ ‘ “waiting in the wings.” ’ ” (Lukas B., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154.) What is 
10

required is the likelihood of adoption within a reasonable time. (In re Jennilee T., supra, 

3 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.) But here, there are such interested proposed adoptive parents, 

who had already formed a positive bond and relationship with the minors. Moreover, the 

adoptions specialist testified that it had not been difficult to find an adoptive family for 

the minors in this case and she had many families from which to choose. As we have 

said, the fact that prospective or proposed adoptive parents are interested in adopting the 

minors is substantial evidence the minors are likely to be adopted within a reasonable 

time, either by those parents or some other. (In re J.I., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 911, 

disapproved on another matter in Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1010, fn. 

7; Lukas B., at p. 1154; Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1651.) The evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s finding that it is highly probably the minors would be 

adopted within a reasonable time.

Having found substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the 

minors are generally adoptable, we need not address the parents’ arguments regarding 

whether the minors also could be found specifically adoptable by their currently 

identified prospective adoption parents. For this reason, we also do not further address 

the parents’ arguments questioning the evidence supporting the suitability of the 

proposed adoptive parents as caregivers or their home, or the parents’ emphasis on the 

lack of time the minors have spent in the proposed adoptive home. The suitability of the 

proposed adoptive parent is not an issue when minors, such as these, are generally 

adoptable. 

II

Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception

The parents also argue that the juvenile court erred by failing to find the beneficial 

parental relationship exception to adoption applied. We find no error.

At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a 

juvenile court must choose one of the several “ ‘possible alternative permanent plans for 
11

a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental 

rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re 

Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)

There are only limited circumstances which permit the court to find a “compelling 

reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the 

child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) Such circumstances include when “[t]he parents have 

maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) [beneficial parental 

relationship exception].)

To prove that the beneficial parental relationship exception applies, the parent 

must show there is a substantial, positive emotional attachment between the parent and 

child. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.) And even if there is 

such a bond, the parent must prove that the parental relationship “ ‘promotes the wellbeing of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a 

permanent home with new, adoptive parents.’ ” (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 

297, quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.); accord, In re 

Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1345 (Jasmine D.).) “In other words, the court 

balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous 

placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If 

severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, 

positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the 

preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” 

(Autumn H., supra, at p. 575.) On the other hand, “ ‘[w]hen the benefits from a stable 

and permanent home provided by adoption outweigh the benefits from a continued 

parent/child relationship, the court should order adoption.’ ” (Jasmine D., supra, at p.

1350; Autumn H., at p. 575.)
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“Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found 

the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that 

preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for 

adoptive placement.” (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) The beneficial 

parental relationship exception to adoption is an exception to the general rule that the 

court must choose adoption where possible, and it “ ‘must be considered in view of the 

legislative preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed.’ ” (In re 

Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)

“The exception must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the 

many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the 

child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction 

between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which 

logically affect a parent/child bond.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576.) 

The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of any 

circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re C.F.

(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 553.) The factual predicate of the exception must be 

supported by substantial evidence, but the juvenile court exercises its discretion in 

weighing that evidence and determining detriment. (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 

614, 622; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315.)

Here, the parents generally visited regularly during those periods when they were 

not incarcerated, but the visits were not always positive. The parents’ visits were 

reported to have gone “predominantly well” during the early phase of the case. Father’s 

visits went predominately well after his release from incarceration in or about June 2018
13

until he was reincarcerated for an unspecified period of time in or about April 2019.3 On 

one occasion, however, law enforcement had to be called to one of his visits after an 

incident with father, which resulted in an emotional and behavioral setback for A.R. 

Father also missed one or more visits in November 2018 due to incarceration and failed 

to show for another visit for unknown reasons. During father’s period of reincarceration, 

he had only some telephone visitation and written communication with the minors. 

Mother had authorized weekly visits with the minors for approximately five

months in 2018 between her incarcerations, which also were reported to have gone 

predominately well. The parents’ last few visits with A.M. and M.M. before mother’s 

reincarceration in August 2018 “went primarily well,” although mother did spend a 

portion of one visit on her phone and the caretaker reported the minors were emotional 

and having a hard time with visits. The parents would also become upset with each other 

during the visits, which confused the minors and made them uncomfortable. 

After mother’s reincarceration in August 2018, she was offered telephone 

visitation. Significantly, however, mother utilized that opportunity on only two 

occasions. Additionally, her telephone visits with A.M. and M.M. had been found 

“emotionally damaging” to the minors. During one telephone call mother made while the 

minors were visiting their maternal grandmother, mother falsely told M.M she would be 

“getting out in two days” and they would be reunified with her in the following days. 

The parents’ visits with A.R. in August 2018 before mother’s reincarceration did 

not go well. During a late August 2018 visit with A.R., the minor acted uncomfortably, 

cried, and avoided interaction with her parents. The minor was crying so hard during the 

visit, the visit had to be terminated early and it took the social worker considerable time 

3 The record does not contain all the dates during which each parent was 

incarcerated throughout this case. In addition to the periods noted herein, mother was in 

custody at the time of the section 366.26 hearing for a flash incarceration. 
14

to console the minor. During the visit with all three minors the following day, the parents 

bickered, and mother appeared anxious and agitated throughout the visit. Mother was 

reincarcerated approximately a day or two later.

Heavily supervised, in-person visitation resumed upon mother’s release on or 

about March 28, 2019, and those visits did not go well either. At one visit, mother told 

the minors they would be returning to mother’s care and were not going to be adopted, 

which was very confusing to the minors. In May 2019, it was noted that the minors were 

not distressed by the end of the visit with their parents nor did they demonstrate any 

distress when saying goodbye and leaving the visit. 

At a Child and Family Team Meeting attended by the parents on or about June 14, 

2019, the paternal grandmother, and the minors, the minors ran to their grandmother first. 

A.M. and M.M. eventually went to greet their parents but A.R. remained with her 

grandmother. At the end of the meeting, mother told A.R., “I love you,” to which A.R. 

responded, “[U]h huh.” 

At the July 25, 2019 visit approximately one month before the section 366.26 

hearing, the parents were very upset that the visitation structure had been changed to 

visiting one minor at a time for 30 minutes each, in conjunction with the maternal 

grandmother’s visit—a structure that had been designed to protect the minors after the 

parents’ behavior suggested a possible flight risk. Parents arrived 10 minutes late to the 

visit and were angry with each other. They then became volatile as the structure of the 

visit was explained and were still being verbally aggressive toward the adoptions 

specialist when A.R. arrived at the visit. A.R. appeared nervous and greeted her 

grandmother first. Mother commenced the visit by demanding A.R. take off her 

sweatshirt and, when the minor refused, tried to remove the sweatshirt herself, insisting,

“Take it off! What are you trying to hide?” The adoptions specialist and social worker 

told mother to discontinue her behavior, as she was scaring the minor. Instead, mother’s

behavior continued to escalate, and she said, “They are not going back to Sacramento and 
15

calling someone else Mom! I’m out of here!” A.R. then responded, “I didn’t even want 

to come here today!” Mother had to be escorted by a Special Investigations Unit officer 

from the visitation. The encounter visibly shook A.R., and the adoptions specialist had to 

cover the minor’s ears, as mother was screaming obscenities as she walked out of the 

room. The adoptions specialist reported she could feel A.R.’s heart beating hard and fast, 

as she clung to the adoptions specialist. 

As can be seen, even if we assume that the parents met their burden that their 

visitation and contact was regular, despite mother’s failure to participate significantly in 

telephone visits during her reincarceration and father’s missed visit, their contact with the 

minors did not demonstrate the type of substantial, positive emotional attachment, 

contemplated to support an exception to the preference for adoption. The parents’ 

unpredictable presence in and out of the minors’ lives was confusing and upsetting to the 

minors. Mother’s false promises further confused them and threatened their sense of 

stability. While the minors had spent the majority of the lives in parental custody, the 

quality and effects of the parents’ interactions with the minors became progressively 

negative through the life of the case, with mother demonstrating that she continued to put 

her needs and wants ahead of those of the minors.

Additionally, all three minors were suffering the consequences of having less than 

permanent placements. A.M. and M.M. were said to be “brokenhearted” to have to leave 

their first placement. A.R. was having emotional breakdowns from what she described as 

having to say goodbye to her foster parent over and over again. Indeed, the minors’

biggest emotional or therapeutic issue was noted to be, not the minors’ separation from 

their parents, but the prolonged delay to permanency. While the minors love mother and 

father, they also love their caregivers and desperately needed, and in the case of A.R., 

actually expressed the need for, stability. The minors had expressed some sadness about 

not being able to reunify with their birth parents but they had actively and repeatedly 

expressed their excitement and desire to move to their adoptive home. A.R. has already 
16

grown to love the proposed adoptive parents. The juvenile court reasonably found that 

leaving the minors in a tenuous placement in order to maintain the turbulence and 

uncertainty of the parents’ contact and behavior did not outweigh the stability and other 

benefits they would obtain through adoption.

Finally, we reject father’s contention that “a permanent plan of legal guardianship 

would have provided all of the necessary and desired stability and permanence the minor 

[sic] required.” “The Legislature has . . . determined that, where possible, adoption is the 

first choice. ‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best 

chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’ [Citation.] 

‘Guardianship, while a more stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus 

falls short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the 

dependent child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) Given this 

preference, there must be a compelling reason to choose a permanent plan other than 

adoption. One was not present here.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court (terminating parental rights) are affirmed.

 KRAUSE , J.

We concur:

 ROBIE , Acting P. J.

 HOCH , J.