COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Senior Judge Baker 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

ANTOINE LOPEZ LLOYD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2350-97-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 NOVEMBER 24, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Randolph T. West, Judge 

 L. Kim Van Horn (Overman, Cowardin & 

Martin, P.L.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Antoine Lopez Lloyd (defendant) appeals his convictions for 

attempted robbery, maiming, and two counts of the use of a 

firearm in the commission of a felony. On appeal, he contends 

the trial court erroneously admitted the statement of a 

codefendant into evidence. Because we hold this ascription of 

error was not preserved for appeal, we affirm. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedental 

value, we recite only those facts necessary to disposition of the 

appeal. 

 Michael Eugene Williams, an eyewitness to the incident, told 

police that defendant and Julius Debraux assaulted Anthony 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Sterling, robbed him and shot him as he fled from his attackers. 

 The Commonwealth offered Williams's statement into evidence 

under the declaration against penal interest exception to the 

hearsay rule. Defendant's counsel objected on the grounds that 

Randolph v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 345, 355, 482 S.E.2d 101, 

105 (1997), required the Commonwealth to show the declarant, 

Williams, was unavailable.1

 The trial court noted that Williams was in jail awaiting 

trial for offenses arising from the same incident and, therefore, 

he was unavailable. See Raia v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 546, 

550, 478 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1996) (holding that because a 

codefendant cannot be forced to incriminate himself in violation 

of the Fifth Amendment, he was unavailable for purposes of the 

hearsay exception). When Williams's statement was read into 

evidence by Detective Springfield, defendant's counsel made no 

further objection or argument. 

 Defendant's counsel concedes on appeal that Williams was 

unavailable. She now asserts that Williams's statement did not 

qualify under the exception because the statement was not against 

his penal interest. This is not the same argument advanced in 

the trial court. "No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

 

 1The "penal interest" exception to the hearsay rule contains 

four requirements: (1) the declarant must be unavailable to 

testify, (2) the statement must be against the declarant's 

interest at the time it was made, (3) the declarant must be aware 

that it is against his interest and (4) it must be reliable. See

Randolph, 24 Va. App. at 355, 482 S.E.2d at 105-06. 
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considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was 

stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the 

ruling . . . ." Rule 5A:18. See Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 

App. 591, 593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991). Because defendant's 

counsel did not make such objection in the trial court, the issue 

is barred from our consideration on appeal. 

 Because we find that the statement was admissible and, 

combined with the rest of the Commonwealth's evidence, it was 

sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm. See Code 

§ 8.01-680. 

 Affirmed.