[Cite as State v. Mitro, 2022-Ohio-3265.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-21-080

Appellee Trial Court No. 2020-CR-0507

 

v.

Megan Elizabeth Mitro DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: September 16, 2022

* * * * *

Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and

David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant.

* * * * *

DUHART, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Megan Elizabeth Mitro, appeals from a judgment of conviction 

and sentence entered by the Wood County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but we remand the matter for a nunc pro 

tunc entry that conforms with the sentence imposed during the sentencing hearing.
2.

Statement of the Case

{¶ 2} On November 19, 2020, appellant was originally indicted in a three-count 

indictment. Count 1 charged her with felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(1) and (D)(1)(b), a felony of the first degree, as the victim was a peace 

officer who was said to have suffered serious physical harm. Count 2 charged her with 

failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, in violation of R.C. 

2921.221(B) and (C)(5)(a)(1), a felony of the third degree. Count 3 charged her with 

operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of 

them, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and (G)(1)(b), a misdemeanor of the first 

degree. Appellant was arraigned on those charges shortly thereafter. 

{¶ 3} On April 22, 2021, appellant was indicted, under a second case number, on a 

single count of aggravated vehicular assault, which was a felony of the third degree based 

upon the fact that the offense was committed during the commission of a violation of 

R.C. 4511.19(A). Appellant was arraigned on that charge, and her cases were joined for 

trial. The charge for aggravated vehicular assault subsequently identified as Count 4.

{¶ 4} After plea negotiations failed, appellant waived her right to a trial by jury. 

The matter proceeded to a bench trial, which resulted in guilty verdicts on all four counts. 

The court sentenced appellant to serve terms of imprisonment on each count, as follows: 

For Count 1, felonious assault, three years; for Count 2, failure to comply with an order 

or signal of a police officer, 36 months; for Count 3, operating a vehicle under the 
3.

influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them, 180 days; and for Count 

4, aggravated assault, 36 months. The sentences for Counts 1 and 2 were ordered to be 

sentenced consecutively to one another, and the sentences for Counts 3 and 4 were 

ordered to be served concurrently with one another and concurrently with the sentences 

imposed in Counts 1 and 2. At sentencing, the court made clear that appellant was 

sentenced to serve a total of six years in prison and that the sentence could be extended to 

seven and a half years pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act. Appellant timely filed the 

current appeal.

Statement of the Facts

{¶ 5} The evidence adduced at trial established the following. On October 26, 

2020, appellant got into her car and left her home to go to the Rite-Aid, where she 

intended to purchase alcohol. While backing out of her driveway, appellant struck and 

damaged two mailboxes that were on the side of the road, across from her home. She

succeeded in getting to the Rite-Aid, but while attempting to park there, she struck B.G.’s 

vehicle, which was located in the parking space across from hers. 

{¶ 6} B.G., upon exiting the store, observed that appellant’s car was touching his 

car. He contacted the Perrysburg Police Department’s non-emergency line to make a 

report of the situation. 

{¶ 7} Appellant, in the meantime, had gone into the store and selected two bottles 

of alcohol from the shelves, but the clerk refused to allow the purchase. When appellant
4.

came out of the store, B.G. told her that he had contacted the police and he suggested to 

her that they exchange insurance information. Appellant refused to exchange insurance 

information with B.G. and, instead, just sat inside her vehicle. She subsequently

attempted to leave the scene and, in so doing, struck B.G.’s vehicle twice more. Before 

police arrived, appellant exited her vehicle, with the engine still running, and began 

walking, with her dog, out of the parking lot and down Louisiana Avenue, towards the 

post office. 

{¶ 8} Officer D.C. of the Perrysburg Police Department arrived at the Rite-Aid, 

and B.G. told him that appellant had left the scene on foot. Officer D.C. drove down 

Louisiana Avenue to the post office parking lot, where appellant was standing. Officer 

D.C. advised appellant that she needed to return to the Rite-Aid so he could complete his 

crash investigation. Appellant complained that it was a long walk, so Officer D.C. agreed 

to drive her back to the scene. 

{¶ 9} Upon arriving back at the Rite-Aid, officer D.C. advised appellant to sit in 

her vehicle and “turn it off,” because he needed to complete his crash investigation and 

report. Officer D.C. testified that he detected that something was “off” about appellant. 

He stated that he did not detect the odor of alcohol, but, also, had recently had a cold that 

may have impacted his sense of smell. Officer D.C. asked appellant if she had consumed 

anything that would impair her ability to drive, and she stated that she was “on a lot of 

medications.” Officer D.C. then asked appellant if that was “the issue today,” and 
5.

appellant responded, “Yes.” Officer D.C. advised appellant that he planned to do a field 

sobriety test. He then told her, “Hang tight for me, okay,” and walked over to speak with 

B.G. and another witness. 

{¶ 10} While Officer D.C. was speaking with the other witness, appellant 

suddenly began backing out of her parking space, with her driver-side window down. 

This maneuver was captured on Officer D.C.’s cruiser camera, which was played for the 

court during the bench trial. As shown in the camera footage, the following dialogue 

occurred between Officer D.C. and appellant as the maneuver was taking place:

OFFICER D.C.: Megan! Hey! You’re not done yet. Pull back up 

here.

APPELLANT: I thought we were done.

OFFICER D.C.: No, we’re not done. Park the car and turn it off 

please.

APPELLANT: Okay.

But instead of parking the car and turning it off, appellant made a U-turn and began 

driving toward the area where the parking lot exited onto Louisiana Avenue. Officer 

D.C. ran after her, shouting, “Megan!”

{¶ 11} Officer D.C. chased appellant on foot in hopes that she would stop her 

vehicle, because he feared that she would injure someone if she entered the roadway. 

While she was making her exit, but before pulling away from the Rite-Aid parking lot, 
6.

appellant momentarily stopped her car at a stop sign located near the exit, at which point 

Officer S.C. was able to catch up to appellant’s driver-side window. The window was 

still down. As Officer D.C. reached the driver-side door, appellant turned her car to the 

left, in the direction of Officer D.C., and accelerated rapidly onto Louisiana Avenue, 

nearly causing a collision with oncoming traffic. When appellant turned her car toward 

Officer D.C., he feared that he would be run over by appellant’s left rear tire. Officer 

D.C. responded by placing his arm on the door jam, in an attempt to push himself away 

from appellant’s car. As appellant quickly accelerated, revving her car, Officer D.C.’s 

arm slipped into appellant’s car and became stuck behind what he believed was the 

headrest. Officer D.C. continued yelling at appellant to stop, but she persisted in 

accelerating onto the roadway. Initially, Officer D.C. tried to keep his feet moving 

alongside the car, in order to avoid being run over by the rear tire. As appellant 

accelerated down the roadway, Officer D.C. did not believe that he would be able to free 

his arm from her vehicle. A voice in his head told him that he was going to die, but that 

it was okay. Within a few seconds, Officer D.C. became detached from the vehicle and 

was slammed onto the roadway, rolling into oncoming traffic. 

{¶ 12} Officer Kimberly Katafias of the Perrysburg Township Police Department 

responded to appellant’s residence at 1909 Hamilton Drive, after being alerted to the 

events that occurred at the Rite-Aid. The call reporting the crash and injury to Officer 

D.C. was made at 4:11 p.m., and Officer Katafias arrived at appellant’s residence at 4:14 
7.

p.m. At 4:15 p.m., appellant’s father arrived and opened the garage door, so he could 

pull his vehicle into the garage. Officer Katafias, who was monitoring the home, looked 

into the garage and saw the vehicle that appellant drove while she was fleeing the RiteAid. Officer Katafias also saw appellant inside the garage attempting to open the door to 

enter her home. Appellant was swaying, stumbling, and generally having great difficulty 

opening the door. Officer Katafias and another officer placed appellant into handcuffs. 

Appellant repeatedly stated, “I just want to go home, just let me go home.” Officer 

Katafias smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from appellant. Based on her twenty 

years of experience in interacting with impaired individuals, as well as on her specialized 

training regarding detecting alcohol impairment, Officer Katafias concluded that 

appellant was highly intoxicated.

{¶ 13} Detective Jesse Gomez of the Perrysburg Police Department was another 

officer who responded to the situation involving Officer D.C. He went initially to the 

scene at the Rite-Aid and later to appellant’s residence, where appellant had been 

apprehended. Detective Gomez spoke with appellant while she was seated in the back 

seat of a police cruiser. Upon opening the door, Detective Gomez immediately detected 

the odor of alcohol and observed appellant’s slurred speech, as well as her bloodshot 

eyes. As a result, Detective Gomez obtained a search warrant to obtain a blood sample

from appellant. The sample yielded an ethanol result of 0.34 %.
8.

{¶ 14} As a consequence of the appellant’s actions, Officer D.C. suffered a

fractured right humerus, whose immediate repair required a nine-hour surgery during 

which three metal plates and 22 screws were installed. A few months later, Officer D.C. 

had a second surgery, to repair damage to his ulnar nerve. Officer D.C. explained that he 

has limited strength and mobility in his right arm, and that he still requires physical 

therapy. In addition, he has been diagnosed with severe post-traumatic stress disorder, 

anxiety, and depression. Because of his injuries, Officer D.C. can no longer perform his 

job as a police officer. 

Assignments of Error

{¶ 15} Appellant asserts the following assignments of error on appeal:

I. Indefinite sentencing under the Reagan Tokes Act is 

unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution and the applicable sections of the Ohio Constitution.

II. The Trial Court’s judgment entry does not comport with the 

requirements of R.C. 2929.144(A)(B)(2) under the Reagan Tokes Act.

III. The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant in denying her 

Rule 29 motion.

Analysis

{¶ 16} Appellant, in her first assignment of error, challenges as unconstitutional 

the indefinite sentencing aspect of the Reagan Tokes Law (“the Law”). She argues that 
9.

the Law violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, because the determination as to 

whether she will serve the minimum or an indefinite maximum term is to be made by the 

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”), which is an executive, 

rather than a judicial, authority. She further asserts that her due process rights are 

violated, because she is not guaranteed a right to legal representation at the ODRC 

hearing.

{¶ 17} Regarding the Reagan Tokes Law, this court, in State v. Stenson, 6th Dist. 

Lucas No. L-20-1074, 2022-Ohio-2072, has recently explained:

Senate Bill 201 – The Reagan Tokes Law – became effective on March 22, 

2019. The Law ‘significantly altered the sentencing structure for many of 

Ohio’s most serious felonies’ by implementing an indefinite sentencing 

system for non-life, first and second-degree felonies committed on or after 

its effective date. State v. Polley, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-19-039, 2020-

Ohio-3213, 2020 WL 3032862, ¶ 5, fn. 1. The Law specifies that the 

indefinite prison terms will consist of a minimum term, selected by the 

sentencing judge from a range of terms set forth in R.C. 2929.14(A), and a 

maximum term determined by formulas set forth in R.C. 2929.144. The 

Law establishes a presumptive release date from prison at the end of the 

minimum term, but the [ODRC] may rebut the presumption if it 

determines, after a hearing, that one or more factors apply, including that 
10.

the offender’s conduct while incarcerated demonstrates that he continues to 

pose a threat to society. R.C. 2967.271(B),(C)(1), (2) and (3). If OCRC 

rebuts the presumption, it may maintain the offender’s incarceration for a 

reasonable, additional period of time, determined by ODRC, but not to 

exceed the offender’s maximum prison term. R.C. 2967.271(D). 

Id. at ¶ 5.

{¶ 18} In response to Stenson’s challenge to the constitutionality of the Law, we

found that the Law does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine and does not, on its 

face, deprive offenders of their right to due process. Id. at ¶ 5. See also State v. Maddox, 

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1253, 2022-Ohio-1350, ¶ 7, 11, and State v. Alexander, 6th 

Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1129, 2022-Ohio-2430, ¶ 60-79.

{¶ 19} In State v. Eaton, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1121, 2022-2432, ¶ 143, we 

again found that the Law, on its face, does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine 

or infringe upon an offender’s due process rights. Regarding the specific process that is 

due to an offender who faces an additional period of incarceration under the Law, we 

agree with the analysis articulated in the concurring opinion in Eaton, which begins with, 

and subsequently builds upon, the premise that the presumptive-release provisions of the 

Law create a liberty interest that is more analogous to probation or parole revocation than 

to probation or parole eligibility. Id. at 146-147. We agree with this underlying premise 

for the simple reason that “the review hearing under [the Law] is not focused on whether 
11.

the defendant’s conduct ‘justifies his release from confinement’ -- it is focused on 

whether the defendant’s conduct justifies not releasing him from confinement.” Id. at ¶ 

147 (Mayle, J., concurring) (distinguishing the lead opinion, wherein it is concluded that 

the Law creates a liberty interest that is more analogous to probation or parole eligibility

than to probation or parole revocation). Inasmuch as we concur with the due process 

analysis set forth in the concurring opinion of Eaton, we hereby adopt paragraphs 145 

through 169 of Eaton as our own. 

{¶ 20} Based on our reasoning and conclusions in the foregoing cases, we find that 

the application of the Law to appellant’s felony sentence was not unconstitutional, as it 

was not in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine and did not violate appellant’s 

due process rights. Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.

{¶ 21} Appellant argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court’s 

October 12, 2021 judgment entry that sentenced her to prison did not appropriately 

specify the indefinite aspect of her sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.144(A) and (B)(2). 

R.C. 2929.144(A) and (B)(2) state in applicable part:

(A) As used in this section, “qualifying felony of the first or second 

degree” means a felony of the first or second degree committed on or after 

the effective date of this section.

(B) The court imposing a prison term on an offender under division 

(A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a qualifying 
12.

felony of the first or second degree shall determine the maximum prison 

term that is part of the sentence in accordance with the following:

(2) If the offender is being sentenced for more than one felony, if one 

or more of the felonies is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, 

and if the court orders that some or all of the prison terms imposed are to be 

served consecutively, the court shall add all of the minimum terms imposed 

on the offender under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the 

Revised Code for a qualifying felony of the first or second degree that are 

to be served consecutively and all of the definite terms of the felonies that 

are not qualifying felonies of the first or second degree that are to be served 

consecutively, and the maximum term shall be equal to the total of those 

terms so added by the court plus fifty per cent of the longest minimum term 

or definite term for the most serious felony being sentenced.

In this case, the court ordered appellant to serve a definite minimum term of three years 

in prison and an indefinite maximum term of four and a half years on Count 1, and a 

prison sentence of 36 months for Count 2. The court then ordered that Count 1 and 

Count 2 be served consecutive to one another, but concurrent to the sentences imposed in 

Counts 3 and 4. 

{¶ 22} As appellant acknowledges, the trial court correctly advised appellant at her 

sentencing that “[t]he [aggregate] minimum term imposed by the Court is six years [and] 
13.

[t]he [aggregate] maximum term is seven and a half years.” As acknowledged by the 

state, however, the trial court’s October 12, 2021 judgment entry of sentence did not 

reflect the addition of the minimum definite three-year sentence and the maximum 

indefinite four-and-a-half year sentence imposed in Count 1 with the terms imposed in 

Counts 2, 3, and 4, in accordance with the requirements of R.C. 2929.144(A) and (B)(2). 

The state agrees with appellant that the judgment entry was deficient and should be 

corrected. We agree.

{¶ 23} This court has held that when a trial court makes an error pursuant to R.C. 

2929.144(A) and (B) that the case is to be remanded to the trial court for a resentencing 

hearing for R.C. 2929.144 compliance purposes. See State v. Martinez, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-21-1020, 2021-Ohio-3994, ¶ 50. Citing State v. Searls, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

28995, 2022-Ohio-858, the state argues that because the error in this case occurred solely 

in the judgment entry, and not at sentencing, the matter could instead be remanded to the 

trial court for modification of that entry, rather than for a new sentencing hearing. See Id.

at ¶ 34, 41 (matter remanded for modification of sentence, rather than a resentencing 

hearing, in order to achieve compliance with sentencing law where defendant was 

properly advised at in-person sentencing proceeding). We agree that under the 

circumstances of this case a resentencing hearing is unnecessary. Instead, the matter will 

be remanded to the trial court to modify its October 12, 2021 judgment entry so that it 

complies with the requirements set forth at R.C. 2929.144(A) and (B)(2).
14.

{¶ 24} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is found well taken.

{¶ 25} Appellant argues in her third assignment of error that the trial court erred to 

her prejudice in denying her Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, which challenged the 

sufficiency of the evidence introduced by the state on the essential elements of Count 1, 

felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D)(1)(b), a felony of the first 

degree, and Count 4, aggravated vehicular assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) 

and (B)(1), a felony of the third degree.

{¶ 26} Crim.R. 29 provides in relevant part:

(A) Motion for judgment of acquittal. The court on motion of a 

defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, 

shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses 

charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court 

may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the 

close of the state’s case. 

{¶ 27} In State v. Bates, 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-12-002, 2013-Ohio-1270, 

this court set forth the standard to be used in reviewing a Crim.R. 29(A) motion, as 

follows:

We review a ruling on a Crim.R. 29(A) motion under the same 

standard used to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a 
15.

conviction. State v. Brinkley, 105 Ohio St.3d 231, 2005-Ohio-1507, 824 

N.E.2d 959, ¶ 40. Under the sufficiency standard, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial, ‘if believed, would convince the 

average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ State v. 

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the 

syllabus, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 

L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-

Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Therefore, ‘[t]he verdict will not be 

disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable minds could not 

reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’ State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio 

St.3d 421, 430, 1997-Ohio-372, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing Jenks, at 

paragraph two of the syllabus.

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the 

conviction, the appellate court does not weigh the evidence nor assess the 

credibility of the witnesses. State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 212, 378 

N.E.2d 1049 (1978). See also State v. Willard, 144 Ohio App.3d 767, 777-

778, 761 N.E.2d 688 (10th Dist.2001). If the state ‘relies on circumstantial 
16.

evidence to prove an element of the offense charged, there is no 

requirement that the evidence must be irreconcilable with any reasonable 

theory of innocence in order to support a conviction[,]’ so long as the jury 

is properly instructed as to the burden of proof, i.e., beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Jenks at paragraph one of the syllabus.

Id. at ¶ 49-50.

{¶ 28} R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D)(1)(b), which codifies the offense of felonious 

assault, states in applicable part:

(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:

(1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another’s unborn;

(D)(1)(b) * * * If the victim of the offense is a peace officer * * * 

and if the victim suffered serious physical harm as a result of the 

commission of the offense, felonious assault is a felony of the first degree * 

* *.

{¶ 29} The mental state of “knowingly” is defined under R.C. 2901.22(B), which 

provides:

A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is 

aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will 

probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances 

when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When 
17.

knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, 

such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is 

a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a 

conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.

{¶ 30} Appellant argues that because she did not intend to injure Officer D.C., her 

crime was not committed knowingly. 

{¶ 31} The court in State v. Magee, 2020-Ohio-4351, 158 N.E.3d 630 (12th Dist.), 

expounded on the level of awareness that is required to establish the element of 

“knowingly,” stating as follows:

‘“It is a fundamental principle that a person is presumed to intend 

the natural, reasonable and probable consequences of his voluntary acts.”’ 

State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, ¶ 

143, quoting State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 39, 381 N.E.2d 637 

(1978). An accused need not foresee the precise consequences of his 

conduct. State v. Taylor, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2018-11-021, 2019-

Ohio-3437, ¶ 46. ‘To be actionable it is only necessary that the result is 

within the natural and logical scope of risk created by the conduct.’ Id., 

citing State v. Spates, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100933, 2015-Ohio-1014, ¶ 

54.

Magee at ¶ 46.
18.

{¶ 32} In the instant case, it is undisputed that appellant set into motion the 

sequence of events by speeding away from a crime scene, while drunk, with Officer D.C.

clinging to her car, mere inches away from her open driver-side window, and yelling at 

her to stop. Serious injury to Officer D.C. was certainly within the natural and logical 

scope of risk created by appellant’s conduct. 

{¶ 33} Whether appellant specifically intended to cause Officer D.C. any serious 

harm, or whether she knew that her actions would cause the precise injury suffered by 

Officer D.C. are not relevant inquiries when examining the evidence required to establish 

the element of “knowingly.” See State v. Jacinto, 2020-Ohio-3722, 155 N.E.3d 1056, ¶ 

99 (8th Dist.) (“[N]either [Jacinto’s] purpose nor his lack of knowledge that his act would 

cause the precise injury [Lee] suffered are the relevant inquiries when examining the 

evidence required to establish the knowingly element.”).

{¶ 34} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of felonious assault, 

including the element of “knowingly,” proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bates, 6th 

Dist. Williams No. WM-12-002, 2013-Ohio-1270, 611, ¶ 49. 

{¶ 35} R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a), which codifies the offense of aggravated vehicular 

assault, pertinently provides:
19.

(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of a 

motor vehicle * * * shall cause serious physical harm to another person * * 

* in any of the following ways:

(1)(a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division 

(A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent 

municipal ordinance;

{¶ 36} Appellant was convicted of violating R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(f), which

provides:

(A)(1) No person shall operate any vehicle * * * within this state, if, 

at the time of the operation, any of the following apply:

(f) The person has a concentration of seventeen-hundredths of one 

per cent or more by weight per unit volume of alcohol in the person’s 

whole blood.

{¶ 37} In the instant case, appellant does not challenge the evidence showing that 

she operated her vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Instead, she argues that 

her operation of the vehicle did not proximately cause the serious physical harm that was 

suffered by Officer D.C. In fact, she suggests that it was “[Officer D.C.’s] actions, not 

Appellant’s, which included chasing after her vehicle on foot and reaching into the 

moving vehicle, which led to the proximate result of [Officer D.C.] sustaining serious 

physical harm.”
20.

{¶ 38} Both in general terms, and specifically as applied to aggravated vehicular 

assault, the actions of a victim play no role in negating the culpability of the defendant.

Generally in Ohio, another’s potential contribution to the death or injury of 

a victim is not a valid defense to criminal conduct unless that contribution 

was the sole proximate cause of injury or death. State v. Galvin, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 103266, 2016-Ohio-5404, ¶ 20. If the defendant’s criminal 

action contributes to, in other words, is the proximate cause of, the death or 

injury, another’s conduct is irrelevant. Id. There is no contributory 

negligence analog in criminal law.

State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-537, 85 N.E.3d 304, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). Thus, Officer D.C. is in 

no way blameworthy for the injuries he suffered during the incident in question.

{¶ 39} With respect to the question of appellant’s culpability, we look to State v. 

Purdy, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-L-054, 2016-Ohio-1302, ¶20, which states:

‘“The general rule is that a defendant’s conduct is the proximate cause of 

injury or death to another if the defendant’s conduct (1) is a “substantial 

factor” in bringing about the harm and (2) there is no other rule of law 

relieving the defendant of liability.”’ State v. Filchock. 166 Ohio App.3d 

611, 2006-Ohio-2242, 852 N.E.2d 759, ¶ 77 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. 

Flanek, 8th Dist. Cuyhahoga No. 63308, 1993 WL 335601 (Sept. 2, 1993). 

‘A defendant cannot escape criminal liability merely because factors other 
21.

than his actions contributed to the death or injury to the victims, unless the 

other factors were the sole proximate cause.’ State v. Ward, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 18211, 2001 WL 220244 (Mar. 2, 2001), citing Flanek at 

*19 (emphasis in original).

{¶ 40} In the instant case, the evidence established that appellant’s driving while 

under the influence of alcohol caused her to flee the scene and that, in fleeing the scene, 

she caused serious physical harm to Officer D.C. Viewing the evidence most strongly in 

favor of the prosecution, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence that appellant’s 

conduct in violating R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(f), i.e., operating her vehicle under the influence 

of alcohol, was the proximate cause of Officer D.C.’s injuries. See Bates, 6th Dist. 

Williams No. WM-12-002, 2013-Ohio-1270, 611, at ¶ 49. 

{¶ 41} For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant’s third assignment of error is 

found not well-taken.

{¶ 42} The judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed; 

however, the matter will be remanded to the trial court for a nunc pro tunc entry that 

conforms with the sentence imposed during the sentencing hearing. Appellant is ordered 

to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed

and remanded.
22.

State of Ohio

v. Megan Elizabeth Mitro

WD-21-080

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ____________________________

JUDGE

Christine E. Mayle, J. 

____________________________

Myron C. Duhart, P.J. JUDGE

CONCUR. 

____________________________

JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.