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[House Report 112-323]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

112th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    112-323

======================================================================

 
  UNITED NATIONS TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REFORM ACT OF 2011

                                _______
                                

December 8, 2011.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 2829]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 2829) to promote transparency, accountability, and 
reform within the United Nations system, and for other 
purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do 
pass.

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     2
Summary..........................................................    40
Background and Purpose...........................................    42
Hearings.........................................................    50
Committee Consideration and Votes................................    51
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    51
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    52
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................    52
General Performance Goals and Objectives.........................    53
New Advisory Committees..........................................    53
Congressional Accountability Act.................................    53
Earmark Identification...........................................    54
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................    54
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    61
Dissenting Views.................................................    65

                             The Amendment

    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United Nations 
Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                 TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a 
voluntary basis.
Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the 
regular budget of the United Nations.
Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform.

      TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES 
                  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Definitions.
Sec. 203. Oversight of United States contributions to the United 
Nations System.
Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions.
Sec. 205. Integrity for United States contributions.
Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the United 
States.
Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States contributions to the United 
Nations.

         TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 301. Annual publication.
Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.
Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the security council.
Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.
Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.
Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.
Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel.
Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies.
Sec. 309. Equality at the United Nations.
Sec. 310. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.
Sec. 311. Regional group inclusion of Israel.
Sec. 312. United States policy on Taiwan's participation in United 
Nations entities.
Sec. 313. United States policy on Tier 3 human rights violators.

     TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Statement of policy.
Sec. 403. Implementation.

              TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Sec. 501. Findings.
Sec. 502. Human rights council membership and funding.

                       TITLE VI--GOLDSTONE REPORT

Sec. 601. Findings.
Sec. 602. Statement of policy.
Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer 
dollars.

                       TITLE VII--DURBAN PROCESS

Sec. 701. Findings.
Sec. 702. Sense of congress; statement of policy.
Sec. 703. Non-participation in the Durban process.
Sec. 704. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer 
dollars.

                           TITLE VIII--UNRWA

Sec. 801. Findings.
Sec. 802. United States contributions to UNRWA.
Sec. 803. Sense of Congress.

              TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Sec. 901. Technical cooperation program.
Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA.
Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the nuclear security action plan 
of the IAEA.

                         TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING

Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations.
Sec. 1003. Certification.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act:
          (1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual who 
        is employed in the general services, professional staff, or 
        senior management of the United Nations, including consultants, 
        contractors, and subcontractors.
          (2) General assembly.--The term ``General Assembly'' means 
        the General Assembly of the United Nations.
          (3) Member state.--The term ``Member State'' means a Member 
        State of the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the 
        term ``country''.
          (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of 
        State.
          (5) Secretary general.--The term ``Secretary General'' means 
        the Secretary General of the United Nations.
          (6) Security council.--The term ``Security Council'' means 
        the Security Council of the United Nations.
          (7) UN.--The term ``UN'' means the United Nations.
          (8) United nations entity.--The term ``United Nations 
        Entity'' means any United Nations agency, commission, 
        conference, council, court, department, forum, fund, institute, 
        office, organization, partnership, program, subsidiary body, 
        tribunal, trust, university or academic body, related 
        organization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies 
        the United Nations flag or is authorized to use the United 
        Nations logo, including those United Nations affiliated 
        agencies and bodies identified as recipients of United States 
        contributions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public 
        Law 109-364), but not including the International Bank for 
        Reconstruction and Development, the International Centre for 
        Settlement of Investment Disputes, the International 
        Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, 
        the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the World 
        Trade Organization.
          (9) United nations system.--The term ``United Nations 
        System'' means the aggregation of all United Nations Entities, 
        as defined in paragraph (8).
          (10) United states contribution.--The term ``United States 
        Contribution'' means an assessed or voluntary contribution, 
        whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United 
        States Federal Government to a United Nations Entity, including 
        contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by 
        a United Nations Entity. United States Contributions include 
        those contributions identified pursuant to section 
        1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
          (11) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 
                Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of 
                the House of Representatives; and
                  (B) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 
                Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental 
                Affairs of the Senate.

                 TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

  Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) The United States pays billions of dollars into the 
        United Nations system every year (almost $7.7 billion in 2010, 
        according to the White House Office of Management and Budget), 
        significantly more than any other nation.
          (2) Under current rules and contribution levels, it is 
        possible to assemble the two-thirds majority needed for 
        important United Nations budget votes with a group of countries 
        that, taken together, pay less than 1 percent of the total 
        United Nations regular budget.
          (3) The disconnect between contribution levels and management 
        control creates significant perverse incentives in terms of 
        United Nations spending, transparency, and accountability.
          (4) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably high 
        levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair its 
        ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of its founding.
          (5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, and sexual 
        abuse scandals of the past several years, American public 
        disapproval of United Nations has reached all-time highs. A 
        2011 Gallup poll revealed that 62 percent of Americans believe 
        that the United Nations is doing a poor job, a negative 
        assessment shared by a majority of respondents from both 
        political parties. Research polling by another firm in late 
        2006 found that 71 percent of Americans think that the United 
        Nations is ``no longer effective'' and needs to be 
        significantly reformed, while 75 percent think that the United 
        Nations ``needs to be held more accountable''.
          (6) Significant improvements in United Nations transparency 
        and accountability are necessary for improving public 
        perceptions of and American support for United Nations 
        operations.
          (7) Because of their need to justify future contributions 
        from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more 
        incentive to be responsive and efficient in their operations 
        than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are 
        not tied to performance.
          (8) Catherine Bertini, the former UN Under-Secretary General 
        for Management and director of the World Food Program (WFP), 
        has stated that ``Voluntary funding creates an entirely 
        different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN. At WFP, every staff 
        member knows that we have to be as efficient, accountable, 
        transparent, and results-oriented as possible. If we are not, 
        donor governments can take their funding elsewhere in a very 
        competitive world among UN agencies, NGOs, and bilateral 
        governments.''.
          (9) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Nations, which 
        states that ``[t]he expenses of the Organization shall be borne 
        by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly'', leaves 
        to the discretion of the General Assembly the basis of 
        apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary 
        pledges by Member States.
          (10) Unlike United States assessed contributions to the 
        United Nations regular budget, which are statutorily capped at 
        22 percent of the total, there is no cap on voluntary 
        contributions.
          (11) The United States, which contributes generously to 
        international organizations whose activities it recognizes as 
        credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22 
        percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded United 
        Nations Specialized Agencies.

SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET ON A 
                    VOLUNTARY BASIS.

  (a) United States Policy.--
          (1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States to 
        seek to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of 
        the United Nations from an assessed to a voluntary basis.
          (2) Action at united nations.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to 
        use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 
        United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for the regular 
        budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis, and to make 
        it a priority to build support for such a transformational 
        change among Member States, particularly key United Nations 
        donors.
  (b) Certification of Predominantly Voluntary UN Regular Budget 
Finding.--A certification described in this section is a certification 
by the Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Committees 
that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget (not including 
extra-budgetary contributions) of the United Nations is apportioned on 
a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall be shall be effective 
for a period of not more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked by 
the Secretary, with notice to the appropriate congressional committees, 
if the underlying circumstances change so as not to warrant such 
certification.
  (c) Withholding of Nonvoluntary Contributions.--
          (1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the effective date 
        of this Act and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
        funds may be obligated or expended for a United States assessed 
        contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations in an 
        amount greater than 50 percent of the United States share of 
        assessed contributions for the regular budget of the United 
        Nations unless there is in effect a certification by the 
        Secretary, as described in subsection (b).
          (2) Allowance.--For a period of 1 year after appropriation, 
        funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution to 
        the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld from 
        obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be 
        obligated and expended for that purpose upon the certification 
        described in subsection (b). After 1 year, in the absence of 
        such certification, those funds shall revert to the United 
        States Treasury.

SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
                    REGULAR BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

  (a) Detailed Itemization.--The annual congressional budget 
justification shall include a detailed itemized request in support of 
the contribution of the United States to the regular budget of the 
United Nations.
  (b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.--The detailed itemization 
required under subsection (a) shall--
          (1) contain information relating to the amounts requested in 
        support of each of the various sections and titles of the 
        regular budget of the United Nations; and
          (2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with 
        the actual or estimated amounts contributed by the United 
        States in previous fiscal years for the same sections and 
        titles.
  (c) Adjustments and Notification.--If the United Nations proposes an 
adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State 
shall, at the time such adjustment is presented to the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and 
consult with the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 104. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

  (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United 
Nations reform.
  (b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
describe--
          (1) progress toward the goal of shifting the funding for the 
        United Nations Regular Budget to a voluntary basis as 
        identified in section 102, and a detailed description of 
        efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials 
        toward that end;
          (2) progress toward each of the policy goals identified in 
        the prior sections of this title, and a detailed, goal-specific 
        description of efforts and activities by United States 
        diplomats and officials toward those ends;
          (3) the status of the implementation of management reforms 
        within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
          (4) the number of outputs, reports, or other mandates 
        generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been 
        eliminated;
          (5) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and 
        streamline the committee structure and its specific 
        recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent 
        with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled 
        ``In larger freedom: towards development, security and human 
        rights for all'';
          (6) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all 
        mandates older than 5 years and how resources have been 
        redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005 
        report of the Secretary General;
          (7) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and 
        Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural 
        Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of those 
        committees and the Economic and Social Council; and
          (8) whether the United Nations or any of its specialized 
        agencies has contracted with any party included on the Lists of 
        Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement 
        Programs.

      TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES 
                  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

  Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) As underscored by continuing revelations of waste, fraud, 
        and abuse, oversight and accountability mechanisms within the 
        United Nations system remain significantly deficient, despite 
        decades of reform attempts, including those initiated by 
        Secretaries General of the United Nations.
          (2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of any Secretary 
        General of the United Nations to promote institutional 
        transparency and accountability within the United Nations 
        System, the Secretary General lacks the power to impose far 
        reaching management reforms without the concurrence of the 
        General Assembly.
          (3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the 
        General Assembly significantly outpaces their proportional 
        contributions to the United Nations system have repeatedly and 
        successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform 
        proposals that would have enabled more detailed oversight and 
        scrutiny of United Nations system operations and expenditures.
          (4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor states, including 
        the United States, lack access to reasonably detailed, reliable 
        information that would allow them to determine how their 
        contributions have been spent by various United Nations system 
        entities, further contributing to the lack of accountability 
        within the United Nations system.

SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

  In this title:
          (1) Transparency certification.--The term ``Transparency 
        Certification'' means an annual, written affirmation by the 
        head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity, 
        provided to the Department of State, that the Entity will 
        cooperate with the Department of State and Congress, including 
        by providing the Department of State and Congress with full, 
        complete, and unfettered access to Oversight Information as 
        defined in this title.
          (2) Oversight information.--The term ``Oversight 
        Information'' includes--
                  (A) internally and externally commissioned audits, 
                investigatory reports, program reviews, performance 
                reports, and evaluations;
                  (B) financial statements, records, and billing 
                systems;
                  (C) program budgets and program budget implications, 
                including revised estimates and reports produced by or 
                provided to the Secretary General and the Secretary 
                General's agents on budget related matters;
                  (D) operational plans, budgets, and budgetary 
                analyses for peacekeeping operations;
                  (E) analyses and reports regarding the scale of 
                assessments;
                  (F) databases and other data systems containing 
                financial or programmatic information;
                  (G) documents or other records alleging or involving 
                improper use of resources, misconduct, mismanagement, 
                or other violations of rules and regulations applicable 
                to the United Nations Entity; and
                  (H) other documentation relevant to the oversight 
                work of Congress with respect to United States 
                contributions to the United Nations system.
          (3) Accountability certification.--The term ``Accountability 
        Certification'' means an annual, written affirmation by the 
        head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity provided 
        to the Secretary of State that the Entity--
                  (A) provides the public with full, complete, and 
                unfettered access to all relevant documentation 
                relating to operations and activities, including budget 
                and procurement activities;
                  (B) implements and upholds policies and procedures to 
                protect whistleblowers;
                  (C) implements and upholds policies and procedures to 
                require the filing of individual annual financial 
                disclosure forms by each of its employees at the P-5 
                level and above and to require that such forms be made 
                available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 
                to Member States, and to the public;
                  (D) has established an effective ethics office;
                  (E) has established a fully independent, autonomous, 
                and effective internal oversight body;
                  (F) has adopted and implemented, and is in full 
                compliance with, International Public Sector Accounting 
                Standards; and
                  (G) has established a cap on its administrative 
                overhead costs.

SEC. 203. OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED 
                    NATIONS SYSTEM.

  (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to enhance oversight of 
United States contributions to the United Nations System and the use of 
those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an effort to 
eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of those 
contributions, and thereby to contribute to the development of greater 
transparency, accountability, and internal controls throughout the 
United Nations System.
  (b) Implementation.--
          (1) In general.--The Department of State shall collect and 
        maintain current records regarding Transparency Certifications 
        and Accountability Certifications by all United Nations 
        Entities that receive United States contributions and submit 
        that information for inclusion in the report required under 
        section 207.
          (2) Notification.--The Department of State shall keep the 
        appropriate congressional committees fully and promptly 
        informed of how United Nations Entities are spending United 
        States contributions.
          (3) Referrals.--
                  (A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall 
                promptly report to the Attorney General and to the 
                appropriate congressional committees when the Secretary 
                of State has reasonable grounds to believe a Federal 
                criminal law has been violated by a United Nations 
                Entity or one of its employees, contractors, or 
                representatives.
                  (B) Notification.--The Secretary of State shall 
                promptly report, when appropriate, to the appropriate 
                congressional committees, and to the Secretary General 
                or to the head of the appropriate United Nations 
                Entity, cases in which the Secretary of State 
                reasonably believes that mismanagement, misfeasance, or 
                malfeasance is likely to have taken place within a 
                United Nations Entity and disciplinary proceedings are 
                likely justified.
          (4) Confirmation of transparency by united nations 
        entities.--
                  (A) Prompt notice by department of state.--Whenever 
                information or assistance requested from a United 
                Nations Entity by the Department of State pursuant to a 
                Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the 
                Secretary of State, unreasonably refused or not 
                provided in a timely manner, the Secretary of State 
                shall notify the appropriate congressional committees, 
                the head of that particular United Nations Entity, and 
                the Secretary General of the circumstances in writing, 
                without delay.
                  (B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the 
                information or assistance being sought by the 
                Department of State in connection with a notification 
                pursuant to subparagraph (A) is provided to the 
                satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
                of State shall so notify in writing to the appropriate 
                congressional committees and the head of that 
                particular United Nations Entity.
                  (C) Noncompliance.--If the information or assistance 
                being sought by the Department of State in connection 
                with a notification pursuant to subparagraph (A) is not 
                provided within 90 days of that notification, then the 
                United Nations Entity that is the subject of the 
                notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its 
                Transparency Certification, and
                  (D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation 
                has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary 
                of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide 
                prompt, written notification of that fact and of the 
                restoration of compliance, along with a description of 
                the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the 
                appropriate congressional committees, the head of that 
                United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any 
                office or agency of the Federal Government that has 
                provided that United Nations Entity with any United 
                States contribution during the prior 2 years.
          (5) Confirmation of accountability by united nations 
        entities.--
                  (A) Prompt notice by secretary of state.--Whenever a 
                United Nations Entity that has provided an 
                Accountability Certification is, in the opinion of the 
                Secretary of State, not in full compliance with any or 
                all of the provisions of that certification, the 
                Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate 
                congressional committees, the head of that particular 
                United Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the 
                circumstances in writing, without delay.
                  (B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the United 
                Nations Entity resumes full compliance with its 
                Accountability Certification following the provision of 
                the notification pursuant to subparagraph (A), the 
                Secretary of State shall so notify in writing the 
                appropriate congressional committees and the head of 
                that United Nations Entity.
                  (C) Noncompliance.--If the United Nations Entity 
                named in the notification in subparagraph (A) does not 
                resume full compliance with its Accountability 
                Certification to the satisfaction of the Secretary of 
                State within 90 days of that notification, then the 
                United Nations Entity that is the subject of the 
                notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its 
                Accountability Certification, and the Secretary of 
                State shall provide prompt, written notification of 
                that fact to the appropriate congressional committees, 
                the head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary 
                General, and any office or agency of the Federal 
                Government that has provided that United Nations Entity 
                with any United States Contribution during the prior 2 
                years.
                  (D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation 
                has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary 
                of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide 
                prompt, written notification of that fact and of the 
                restoration of compliance, along with a description of 
                the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the 
                appropriate congressional committees, the head of that 
                United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any 
                office or agency of the Federal Government that has 
                provided that United Nations Entity with any United 
                States contribution during the prior 2 years.
          (6) Reporting.--
                  (A) Reporting.--In the report submitted by the 
                Director of the Office of Management and Budget to 
                Congress pursuant to section 207, the Secretary of 
                State shall submit for inclusion a section that, among 
                other things, includes a list and detailed description 
                of the circumstances surrounding any notification of 
                compliance issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) or 
                (5)(C) during the covered timeframe, and whether and 
                when the Secretary has reversed such finding of 
                noncompliance.
                  (B) Prohibited disclosures.--Nothing in this 
                subsection shall be construed to authorize the public 
                disclosure of information that is--
                          (i) specifically prohibited from disclosure 
                        by any other provision of law;
                          (ii) specifically required by Executive Order 
                        to be protected from disclosure in the interest 
                        of national defense or national security or in 
                        the conduct of foreign affairs; or
                          (iii) a part of an ongoing criminal 
                        investigation.
                  (C) Privacy protections.--The Secretary of State 
                shall exempt from public disclosure information 
                received from a United Nations Entity that the 
                Secretary of State believes--
                          (i) constitutes a trade secret or privileged 
                        and confidential personal financial 
                        information;
                          (ii) constitutes confidential personal 
                        medical information;
                          (iii) accuses a particular person of a crime;
                          (iv) would, if publicly disclosed, constitute 
                        a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
                        privacy; and
                          (v) would compromise an ongoing law 
                        enforcement investigation or judicial trial in 
                        the United States.

SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.

  (a) Funding Prerequisites.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, no funds made available for use as a United States Contribution to 
any United Nations Entity may be obligated or expended if--
          (1) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not 
        provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year a 
        Transparency Certification as defined in section 202(1);
          (2) the intended United Nations Entity recipient is 
        noncompliant with its Transparency Certification as described 
        in section 203(b)(4)(C);
          (3) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not 
        provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year an 
        Accountability Certification as defined in section 202(3); or
          (4) the intended United Nations Entity is noncompliant with 
        its Accountability Certification as described in section 
        203(b)(5)(C).
  (b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the conclusion 
of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated for use as a 
United States Contribution to a United Nations Entity during that 
fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because of the 
restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United States 
Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other use. Any 
such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to 
be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
  (c) Presidential Waiver.--The President may waive the limitations of 
this subsection with respect to a particular United States Contribution 
to a particular United Nations Entity within a single fiscal year if 
the President determines that failure to do so would pose an 
extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States and 
provides notification and explanation of that determination to the 
appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 205. INTEGRITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.

  (a) Limitation.--(1) No funds made available for use under the 
heading ``Contributions to International Organizations'' may be used 
for any purpose other than an assessed United States contribution to a 
United Nations Entity or other international organization.
  (2) No funds made available for use under the heading ``International 
Organizations and Programs'' may be used for any purpose other than a 
voluntary United States contribution to a United Nations Entity or 
other international organization.
  (3) No funds made available for use under the heading ``Contributions 
to International Peacekeeping Activities'' may be used for any purpose 
other than a United States contribution to United Nations peacekeeping 
activities, to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, or to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
  (b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the conclusion 
of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated for use as a 
United States contribution to a United Nations Entity during that 
fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because of the 
restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United States 
Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other use. Any 
such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to 
be repaid to any United Nations Entity.

SEC. 206. REFUND OF MONIES OWED BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE UNITED 
                    STATES.

  (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) United States taxpayer funds overpaid to United Nations 
        Entities and payable back to the United States sometimes remain 
        in the hands of the United Nations because the United States 
        has not requested the return of those funds.
          (2) Such funds have been paid into, among other United 
        Nations Entities, the United Nations Tax Equalization Fund 
        (TEF), which was established under the provisions of United 
        Nations General Assembly Resolution 973 (1955), and which is 
        used to reimburse United Nations staff members subject to 
        United States income taxes for the cost of those taxes.
          (3) In recent years, the TEF has taken in considerably more 
        money than it has paid out, with the United States apparently 
        overpaying into the TEF by $52.2 million in the 2008-2009 
        timeframe alone.
          (4) According to the United Nations Financial Report and 
        Audited Financial Statements released on July 29, 2010, ``As of 
        31 December 2009, an amount of $179.0 million was payable to 
        the United States of America pending instructions as to its 
        disposition.''.
          (5) That balance was allowed to accrue notwithstanding United 
        Nations Financial Regulation 4.12, which states that any such 
        surpluses ``shall be credited against the assessed 
        contributions due from that Member State the following year.''.
          (6) Allowing the United Nations to regularly overcharge the 
        United States and to retain those overpayments, or to spend 
        them on wholly unrelated activities, is a disservice to 
        American taxpayers and a subversion of the Congressional budget 
        process.
  (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
          (1) to annually instruct the United Nations to return to the 
        United States any surplus assessed contributions or other 
        overpayments by the United States to any United Nations Entity; 
        and
          (2) to use the voice and vote of the United States to press 
        the United Nations to reform its TEF assessment procedures to 
        reduce the repeated discrepancies between TEF income and 
        expenditures.
  (c) Certification and Withholding.--For each and every fiscal year 
subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of 
State submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
certification that the United Nations has returned to the United States 
any surplus assessed contributions or other overpayments by the United 
States to any United Nations Entity, the Secretary of State shall 
withhold from the regular budget of the United Nations an amount equal 
to the amount of the funds that the United Nations has yet to return to 
the United States.

SEC. 207. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED 
                    NATIONS.

  (a) Annual Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually for two years thereafter, the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to 
Congress a report listing all assessed and voluntary contributions of 
the United States Government for the preceding fiscal year to the 
United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related 
bodies.
  (b) Contents.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall set 
forth, for the fiscal year covered by such report, the following:
          (1) The total amount of all assessed and voluntary 
        contributions of the United States Government to the United 
        Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related 
        bodies.
          (2) The approximate percentage of United States Government 
        contributions to each United Nations affiliated agency or body 
        in such fiscal year when compared with all contributions to 
        such agency or body from any source in such fiscal year.
          (3) For each such contribution--
                  (A) the amount of such contribution;
                  (B) a description of such contribution (including 
                whether assessed or voluntary);
                  (C) the department or agency of the United States 
                Government responsible for such contribution;
                  (D) the purpose of such contribution; and
                  (E) the United Nations or United Nations affiliated 
                agency or related body receiving such contribution.

         TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION.

  The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the United Nations to ensure the United Nations 
publishes annually, including on a publicly searchable internet Web 
site, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and their 
functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary and 
assessed, sorted by donor.

SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.

  The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the United Nations to implement a system for the 
required filing of individual annual financial disclosure forms by each 
employee of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, 
and funds at the P-5 level and above, which shall be made available to 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services, to Member States, and to the 
public.

SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

  It is the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any 
proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion 
would--
          (1) diminish the influence of the United States on the 
        Security Council; or
          (2) include veto rights for any new members of the Security 
        Council.

SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS.

  The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the United Nations to ensure that Member States may, 
upon request, have access to all reports and audits completed by the 
Board of External Auditors.

SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.

  The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the United Nations to ensure that the Secretary 
General exercises the right and duty of the Secretary General under 
section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations official in 
any case in which such immunity would impede the course of justice. In 
exercising such waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret the 
interests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation or 
prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly under 
investigation for having committed a serious criminal offense or who is 
credibly charged with a serious criminal offense.

SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

  (a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to work toward 
adoption by the General Assembly of--
          (1) a definition of terrorism that--
                  (A) builds upon the recommendations of the December 
                2004 report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
                Challenges, and Change;
                  (B) includes as an essential component of such 
                definition any action that is intended to cause death 
                or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of 
                intimidating a population or compelling a government or 
                an international organization to do, or abstain from 
                doing, any act; and
                  (C) does not propose a legal or moral equivalence 
                between an action described in subparagraph (B) and 
                measures taken by a government or international 
                organization in self-defense against an action 
                described in such subparagraph; and
          (2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes the 
        definition described in paragraph (1).
  (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) authoritarian regimes often inaccurately label peaceful, 
        pro-freedom, pro-democracy movements as terrorist movements in 
        order to undermine the legitimacy of those movements; and
          (2) any United Nations definition of terrorism should not be 
        used to undermine a peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy 
        movement against authoritarian rule.

SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

  (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report--
          (1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to 
        modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March 
        2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ``In larger 
        freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
        all''; and
          (2) containing the information described in subsection (b).
  (b) Contents.--The report shall include--
          (1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms at 
        the United Nations, including an evaluation of--
                  (A) tenure;
                  (B) performance reviews;
                  (C) the promotion system;
                  (D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced 
                regulations concerning termination of employment of 
                employees; and
                  (E) the implementation of a code of conduct and 
                ethics training;
          (2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing 
        complaints and protective measures for work-place harassment, 
        including sexual harassment;
          (3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a 
        rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions;
          (4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a 
        prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to the 
        mission of a member state to the United Nations from 
        transferring to a position within the United Nations 
        Secretariat that is compensated at the P-5 level and above;
          (5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in travel 
        allowances and attendant oversight with respect to 
        accommodations and airline flights; and
          (6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary 
        General relating to greater flexibility for the Secretary 
        General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing 
        priorities.

SEC. 308. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.

  The United States shall withhold from United States contributions to 
the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period 
amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget that are 
expended with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty 
monitoring body or committee that was established by--
          (1) a convention (without any protocols) or an international 
        covenant (without any protocols) to which the United States is 
        not party; or
          (2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United 
        States is a party to neither.

SEC. 309. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

  (a) Department of State Review and Report.--
          (1) In general.--To avoid duplicative efforts and funding 
        with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in 
        the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the Secretary 
        shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
        of this Act--
                  (A) complete an audit of the functions of the 
                entities listed in paragraph (2); and
                  (B) submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees a report containing audit findings and 
                conclusions, and recommendations for the elimination of 
                such duplicative entities and efforts.
          (2) Entities.--The entities referred to in paragraph (1)(A) 
        are the following:
                  (A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian 
                Rights.
                  (B) The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 
                Rights of the Palestinian People.
                  (C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
                Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative 
                to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the 
                Palestinian Authority.
                  (D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.
                  (E) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
                Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian 
                People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.
                  (F) Any other entity the Secretary determines results 
                in duplicative efforts or funding or fails to ensure 
                balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues.
  (b) Implementation by Permanent Representative.--
          (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United States 
        Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United 
        Nations to seek the implementation of the recommendations 
        contained in the report required under subsection (a)(1)(B).
          (2) Withholding of funds.--Until such recommendations have 
        been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United 
        States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the 
        United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are 
        proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended 
        for such entities.

SEC. 310. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

  The President shall direct the United States permanent representative 
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the United Nations to make every effort to--
          (1) ensure the issuance and implementation of a directive by 
        the Secretary General or the Secretariat, as appropriate, 
        that--
                  (A) requires all employees of the United Nations and 
                its specialized agencies to officially and publicly 
                condemn anti-Semitic statements made at any session of 
                the United Nations or its specialized agencies, or at 
                any other session sponsored by the United Nations;
                  (B) requires employees of the United Nations and its 
                specialized agencies, programs, and funds to be subject 
                to punitive action, including immediate dismissal, for 
                making anti-Semitic statements or references;
                  (C) proposes specific recommendations to the General 
                Assembly for the establishment of mechanisms to hold 
                accountable employees and officials of the United 
                Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and 
                funds, or Member States, that make such anti-Semitic 
                statements or references in any forum of the United 
                Nations or of its specialized agencies;
                  (D) continues to develop and implements education 
                awareness programs about the Holocaust and anti-
                Semitism throughout the world, as part of an effort to 
                combat intolerance and hatred; and
                  (E) requires the Office of the United Nations High 
                Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to develop 
                programming and other measures that address anti-
                Semitism;
          (2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the General 
        Assembly that establishes the mechanisms described in paragraph 
        (1)(C); and
          (3) continue working toward further reduction of anti-Semitic 
        language and anti-Israel resolutions in the United Nations and 
        its specialized agencies, programs, and funds.

SEC. 311. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL.

  The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the United Nations to expand the Western European and 
Others Group (WEOG) in the United Nations in Geneva to include Israel 
as a permanent member with full rights and privileges.

SEC. 312. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN UNITED 
                    NATIONS ENTITIES.

  The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure 
meaningful participation for Taiwan in relevant United Nations Entities 
in which Taiwan has expressed an interest in participating.

SEC. 313. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TIER 3 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS.

  The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that no 
representative of a country designated pursuant to section 110 of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) by the 
Department of State as a Tier 3 country shall preside as Chair or 
President of any United Nations Entity.

     TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

  Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) In 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
        launched an effort to evade direct negotiations for peace with 
        the State of Israel by instead pursuing Palestinian membership 
        in international organizations, which could imply de facto 
        recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Nations.
          (2) The Executive Branch, with significant support from 
        Members of Congress, successfully stopped the PLO's effort by 
        credibly threatening, as noted in a May 1, 1989 statement by 
        then-Secretary of State James A. Baker, ``that the United 
        States [would] make no further contributions, voluntary or 
        assessed, to any international organization which makes any 
        change in the P.L.O.'s present status as an observer 
        organization.''.
          (3) The United States success in this case demonstrates that 
        withholding contributions and placing conditions on their 
        payment can result in real reforms, stop counter-productive 
        developments, and advance United States interests at the United 
        Nations.
          (4) The Palestinian leadership has recently resumed its 
        effort to evade direct negotiations for peace with the State of 
        Israel by seeking recognition of a Palestinian state from 
        foreign governments and in international forums.
          (5) Efforts to bypass negotiations and to unilaterally 
        declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the United Nations 
        or other international forums or to foreign governments for 
        recognition of a Palestinian state or membership or other 
        upgraded status for the Palestinian observer mission at those 
        forums, would violate the underlying principles of the Oslo 
        Accords, the Road Map, and other relevant Middle East peace 
        process efforts.
          (6) On December 15, 2010, the House of Representatives passed 
        House Resolution 1765, in which, inter alia, the House of 
        Representatives:
                  (A) ``reaffirms its strong opposition to any attempt 
                to establish or seek recognition of a Palestinian state 
                outside of an agreement negotiated between Israel and 
                the Palestinians'';
                  (B) ``supports the Administration's opposition to a 
                unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state''; and
                  (C) ``calls upon the Administration to . . . lead a 
                diplomatic effort to persuade other nations to oppose a 
                unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state and to 
                oppose recognition of a Palestinian state by other 
                nations, within the United Nations, and in other 
                international forums prior to achievement of a final 
                agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.''.
          (7) Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, United States Deputy 
        Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated on July 
        26, 2011, ``Let there be no doubt: symbolic actions to isolate 
        Israel at the United Nations in September will not create an 
        independent Palestinian state . . . The United States will not 
        support unilateral campaigns at the United Nations in September 
        or any other time.''.
          (8) On September 16, 2011, the Deputy National Security 
        Advisor for Strategic Communications stated that ``We would 
        veto actions through the Security Council and oppose action 
        through the Security Council associated with a unilateral 
        declaration of [Palestinian] statehood.''.

SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

  It is the policy of the United States to oppose the recognition of a 
Palestinian state by any United Nations Entity, or any upgrade, 
including but not limited to full membership or non-member-state 
observer status, in the status of the Palestinian observer mission at 
the United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the 
Palestinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative 
organization or governing entity, at any United Nations Entity, prior 
to the achievement of a final peace agreement negotiated between and 
agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians.

SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION.

  (a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to advance the 
policy stated in section 402.
  (b) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold 
United States contributions from any United Nations Entity that 
recognizes a Palestinian state or upgrades in any way, including full 
membership or non-member-state observer status, the status of the 
Palestinian observer mission at the United Nations, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Authority, or any other 
Palestinian administrative organization or governing entity, at that 
United Nations Entity, prior to the achievement of complete and final 
peace agreement negotiated between and agreed to by Israel and the 
Palestinians. Funds appropriated for use as a United States 
contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation and 
expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to the 
United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid 
to any United Nations Entity.

              TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

SEC. 501. FINDINGS.

  Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council has failed to meaningfully promote the 
        protection of internationally recognized human rights, and has 
        proven to be even more problematic than the United Nations 
        Human Rights Commission that it was created to replace.
          (2) The United Nations Human Rights Council suffers from 
        fundamental and severe structural flaws present since its 
        establishment by the United Nations General Assembly, such as 
        the fact that it draws its members from the General Assembly 
        without any substantive membership criteria, with the perverse 
        result that a number of the world's worst human rights abusers 
        are members of the council.
          (3) For example, the majority of members of the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council are rated ``Not Free'' or only 
        ``Partly Free'' by Freedom House. Only a minority of members 
        were rated ``Free''.
          (4) The structure and composition of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council have made it subject to gross political 
        manipulation, with the result that, during its almost five 
        years of operation, the Council has passed over 40 resolutions 
        censuring the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared 
        to only a handful censuring the dictatorships in Burma, North 
        Korea, and Syria, just one addressing the severe, ongoing human 
        rights abuses in Libya, Iran, and Belarus, and none addressing 
        the severe, ongoing human rights abuses in China, Cuba, Russia, 
        Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and elsewhere.
          (5) The United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda contains 
        a permanent item for criticism of the democratic, Jewish State 
        of Israel, but no permanent items criticizing any other state.
          (6) The United Nations Human Rights Council has established, 
        or preserved the existence of, a number of ``Special 
        Procedures'' mechanisms to address country-specific situations 
        or thematic issues. These mechanisms include a number of 
        ``special rapporteurs'' whose expenses and staff support are 
        paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
          (7) The United Nations Human Rights Council has also 
        established an ``Advisory Committee'' whose expenses and staff 
        support are paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
          (8) Some of these special rapporteurs and members of the 
        Advisory Committee have displayed consistent bias against the 
        United States, Israel, and the Jewish people, while providing 
        support to human rights abusers.
          (9) Richard Falk, the United Nations ``Special Rapporteur on 
        the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories 
        occupied since 1967'', has compared Israel's treatment of the 
        Palestinians to the Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the 
        events of September 11, 2001, and posted a cartoon on his blog 
        depicting Americans and Jews as bloodthirsty dogs.
          (10) Jean Ziegler, a member of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council Advisory Committee and former United Nations 
        ``Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food'', has accused former 
        President George W. Bush and former Israeli Prime Minister 
        Ariel Sharon of committing ``state terrorism'', has called for 
        an investigation of Israel by the International Criminal Court 
        for ``war crimes'' following Israel's war against Hezbollah in 
        2006, has visited Cuba and praised the Cuban regime's provision 
        of food to the Cuban people, and has stated that Zimbabwean 
        dictator Robert Mugabe ``has history and morality with him''. 
        Ziegler was also involved in the establishment of the ``Al-
        Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights'', a prize 
        established by, funded by, and named after Libyan dictator 
        Muammar al-Gaddafi, and awarded in the past to Fidel Castro, 
        Hugo Chavez, Louis Farrakhan, and Roger Garaudy, who has denied 
        the Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the events of 
        September 11, 2001, and supported Iranian leader Mahmoud 
        Ahmadinejad's call for Israel to be ``wiped off the map''.
          (11) Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, a member of the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee who has 
        previously served as President of the United Nations General 
        Assembly and as foreign minister for the Sandinista regime in 
        Nicaragua, has implicitly accused the United States of 
        ``terrorism'', has called former President Ronald Reagan a 
        ``butcher'', has called for a international boycott of Israel, 
        has stated that the Palestinians were being ``crucified'' by 
        Israel, has called Israel's defensive Operation Cast Lead in 
        the Gaza Strip a ``monstrosity'' and ``genocide'', has urged 
        the United Nations to use the term ``apartheid'' in discussing 
        Israeli treatment of Palestinians, has embraced Iranian leader 
        Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after Ahmadinejad delivered an anti-
        American, anti-Israel address to the United Nations General 
        Assembly, has stated that charges of genocide against Sudanese 
        dictator Omar Hassan al Bashir are ``racist'', and has declared 
        Fidel Castro ``World Hero of Solidarity'', stating that Castro 
        ``embod[ied] virtues and values worth emulation by all of us''.
          (12) Halima Warzazi, a member of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council Advisory Committee, has compared Israel to Nazi 
        Germany, and used her previous membership in a United Nations 
        apparatus to shield Saddam Hussein from censure for gassing 
        Iraqi Kurds in Halabja.
          (13) The ongoing five-year review of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council concluded on June 17, 2011, and failed make any 
        significant reforms to its fundamental and severe structural 
        flaws, including its absence of substantive membership 
        criteria, or to remove the permanent agenda item on Israel.
          (14) On June 17, 2011, John F, Sammis, United States Deputy 
        Representative to the Economic and Social Council, stated that 
        ``The Geneva process [of the five-year review] failed to yield 
        even minimally positive results, forcing us to dissociate from 
        the outcome . . . the final resolution [for the five-year 
        review] also fails to address the core problems that still 
        plague the Human Rights Council . . . The United States has 
        therefore voted `no' on the resolution . . . the Council's 
        effectiveness and legitimacy will always be compromised so long 
        as one country in all the world is unfairly and uniquely 
        singled out while others, including chronic human rights 
        abusers, escape scrutiny . . . The resolution before us today 
        does nothing to address the Council's failures nor move it any 
        closer to the founding values of the UN Charter and the 
        Universal Declaration of Human Rights.''.
          (15) United States membership in the Human Rights Council has 
        not led to reform of its fundamental flaws diminished the 
        Council's virulently anti-Israel behavior. The Council has 
        passed fourteen resolutions criticizing Israel since the United 
        States joined in 2009.

SEC. 502. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND FUNDING.

  (a) In General.--For each and every fiscal year subsequent to the 
effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to 
Congress a certification that the requirements described in subsection 
(b) have been satisfied--
          (1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from a United 
        States contribution each fiscal year to a regular budget of the 
        United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of 
        such contribution that the Secretary determines would be 
        allocated by the United Nations to support the United Nations 
        Human Rights Council;
          (2) the Secretary of State shall not make a voluntary 
        contribution to the United Nations Human Rights Council; and
          (3) the United States shall not run for a seat on the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council.
  (b) Certification.--The annual certification referred to in 
subsection (a) is a certification made by the Secretary to Congress 
that--
          (1) the United Nations Human Rights Council's mandate from 
        the United Nations General Assembly explicitly and effectively 
        prohibits candidacy for Human Rights Council membership of a 
        United Nations Member State--
                  (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; and
                  (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses;
          (2) the United Nations Human Rights Council does not include 
        a United Nations Member State--
                  (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
                  (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses;
                  (C) which the Secretary of State has determined, for 
                purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration 
                Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the 
                International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 
                40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the 
                Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other provision of 
                law, is a government that has repeatedly provided 
                support for acts of international terrorism; or
                  (D) which the President has designated as a country 
                of particular concern for religious freedom under 
                section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom 
                Act of 1998; and
          (3) the United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda or 
        programme of work does not include a permanent item with regard 
        to the State of Israel.
  (c) Special Procedures.--The Secretary of State shall withhold from a 
United States contribution each year to a regular budget of the United 
Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution 
that the Secretary determines would be allocated by the United Nations 
to support the United Nations ``Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in Palestinian territories occupied since 1967'', and any 
other United Nations Human Rights Council ``Special Procedures'' used 
to display bias against the United States or the State of Israel or to 
provide support for the government of any United Nations Member State--
          (1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
          (2) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for human 
        rights abuses;
          (3) which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes 
        of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as 
        continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency 
        Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control 
        Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or 
        other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly 
        provided support for acts of international terrorism; or
          (4) which the President has designated as a country of 
        particular concern for religious freedom under section 402(b) 
        of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.
  (d) Reversion of Funds.--Funds appropriated for use as a United 
States contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation 
and expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to 
the United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be 
repaid to any United Nations Entity.

                       TITLE VI--GOLDSTONE REPORT

SEC. 601. FINDINGS.

  Congress finds the following:
          (1) On January 12, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council passed Resolution A/HRC/S-9/L.1, which authorized a 
        ``fact-finding mission'' regarding Israel's conduct of 
        Operation Cast Lead against violent militants in the Gaza Strip 
        between December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009.
          (2) The resolution pre-judged the outcome of its 
        investigation by one-sidedly mandating the ``fact-finding 
        mission'' to ``investigate all violations of international 
        human rights law and International Humanitarian Law by . . . 
        Israel, against the Palestinian people . . . particularly in 
        the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression''.
          (3) The mandate of the ``fact-finding mission'' makes no 
        mention of the relentless rocket and mortar attacks, which 
        numbered in the thousands and spanned a period of eight years, 
        by Hamas and other violent militant groups in Gaza against 
        civilian targets in Israel, that necessitated Israel's 
        defensive measures.
          (4) The ``fact-finding mission'' included a member who, 
        before joining the mission, had already declared Israel guilty 
        of committing atrocities in Operation Cast Lead by signing a 
        public letter on January 11, 2009, published in the Sunday 
        Times, that called Israel's actions ``war crimes''.
          (5) The mission's flawed and biased mandate gave serious 
        concern to many United Nations Human Rights Council Member 
        States which refused to support it, including Bosnia and 
        Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
        the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
        Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
        and Northern Ireland.
          (6) The mission's flawed and biased mandate was never 
        broadened or revised by any plenary meeting of the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council, and troubled many distinguished 
        individuals who refused invitations to head the mission.
          (7) On September 15, 2009, the ``United Nations Fact Finding 
        Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' released its report, which is 
        commonly referred to as the ``Goldstone Report''.
          (8) The Goldstone Report repeatedly made sweeping and 
        unsubstantiated determinations that the Israeli military had 
        deliberately attacked civilians during Operation Cast Lead.
          (9) The authors of the Goldstone Report admit that we did not 
        deal with the issues . . . ``regarding the problems of 
        conducting military operations in civilian areas and second-
        guessing decisions made by soldiers and their commanding 
        officers in the fog of war''.
          (10) In the October 16, 2009 edition of the Jewish Daily 
        Forward, Richard Goldstone, the head of the ``United Nations 
        Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'', is quoted as 
        saying, with respect to the mission's evidence-collection 
        methods, ``If this was a court of law, there would have been 
        nothing proven''.
          (11) The Goldstone Report, in effect, denied the State of 
        Israel the right to self-defense, and never noted the fact that 
        Israel had the right to defend its citizens from the repeated 
        violent attacks committed against civilian targets in southern 
        Israel by Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
        operating from Gaza.
          (12) The Goldstone Report largely ignored the culpability of 
        the Government of Iran and the Government of Syria, both of 
        whom sponsor Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
          (13) The Goldstone Report usually considered public 
        statements made by Israeli officials not to be credible, while 
        frequently giving uncritical credence to statements taken from 
        what it called the ``Gaza authorities'', i.e., the Gaza 
        leadership of Hamas.
          (14) Notwithstanding a great body of evidence that Hamas and 
        other violent Islamist groups committed war crimes by using 
        civilians and civilian institutions, such as mosques, schools, 
        and hospitals, as shields, the Goldstone Report repeatedly 
        downplayed or cast doubt upon that claim.
          (15) In one notable instance, the Goldstone Report stated 
        that it did not consider the admission of a Hamas official that 
        Hamas often ``created a human shield of women, children, the 
        elderly and the mujahideen, against [the Israeli military]'' 
        specifically to ``constitute evidence that Hamas forced 
        Palestinian civilians to shield military objectives against 
        attack''.
          (16) Hamas was able to significantly shape the findings of 
        the investigation mission's Goldstone Report by selecting and 
        prescreening some of the witnesses and intimidating others, as 
        the Goldstone Report acknowledges when it notes that ``those 
        interviewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about the 
        presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian armed 
        groups . . . from a fear of reprisals''.
          (17) Even though Israel is a vibrant democracy with a 
        vigorous and free press, the Goldstone Report erroneously 
        asserts that ``actions of the Israeli government . . . have 
        contributed significantly to a political climate in which 
        dissent with the government and its actions . . . is not 
        tolerated''.
          (18) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations 
        Human Rights Council endorse its recommendations, implement 
        them, review their implementation, and refer the report to the 
        United Nations Security Council, the Prosecutor of the 
        International Criminal Court, and the United Nations General 
        Assembly for further action.
          (19) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations 
        Security Council--
                  (A) require the Government of Israel to launch 
                further investigations of its conduct during Operation 
                Cast Lead and report back to the Security Council 
                within six months;
                  (B) simultaneously appoint an ``independent committee 
                of experts'' to monitor and report on any domestic 
                legal or other proceedings undertaken by the Government 
                of Israel within that 6-month period; and
                  (C) refer the case to the Prosecutor of the 
                International Criminal Court after that 6-month period.
          (20) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations 
        General Assembly consider further action on the report and 
        establish an escrow fund, to be funded entirely by the State of 
        Israel, to ``pay adequate compensation to Palestinians who have 
        suffered loss and damage'' during Operation Cast Lead.
          (21) The Goldstone Report ignored the issue of compensation 
        to Israelis who have been killed or wounded, or suffered other 
        loss and damage, as a result of years of past and continuing 
        rocket and mortar attacks by Hamas and other violent militant 
        groups in Gaza against civilian targets in southern Israel.
          (22) The Goldstone Report recommended ``that States Parties 
        to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 start criminal investigations 
        [of Operation Cast Lead] in national courts, using universal 
        jurisdiction'' and that ``following investigation, alleged 
        perpetrators should be arrested and prosecuted''.
          (23) The concept of ``universal jurisdiction'' has frequently 
        been used in attempts to detain, charge, and prosecute Israeli 
        and United States officials and former officials in connection 
        with unfounded allegations of war crimes and has often unfairly 
        impeded the travel of those individuals.
          (24) On September 20, 2009, United Nations High Commissioner 
        for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay wrote, ``I lend my full 
        support to Justice Goldstone's report and its 
        recommendations''.
          (25) The State of Israel, like many other free democracies, 
        has an independent judicial system with a robust investigatory 
        capacity and has already launched numerous investigations, many 
        of which remain ongoing, of Operation Cast Lead and individual 
        incidents therein.
          (26) Several nations have indicated that they intend to 
        further pursue consideration of the Goldstone Report and 
        implementation of its recommendations by the United Nations 
        Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the 
        United Nations Human Rights Council, and other multilateral 
        fora.
          (27) On September 30, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary 
        Clinton described the underlying mandate for the Goldstone 
        Report as ``one-sided''.
          (28) On September 17, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, United 
        States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
        expressed the United States' ``very serious concern with the 
        mandate'' underlying the Goldstone Report and noted that the 
        United States views the mandate ``as unbalanced, one-sided and 
        basically unacceptable''.
          (29) Israeli President Shimon Peres has called the Goldstone 
        Report a ``blood libel''.
          (30) The Goldstone Report reflects the longstanding, historic 
        bias at the United Nations against the democratic, Jewish State 
        of Israel.
          (31) The Goldstone Report is being exploited by Israel's 
        enemies to excuse the actions of violent militant groups and 
        their state sponsors, and to justify isolation of and punitive 
        measures against the democratic, Jewish State of Israel.
          (32) On November 3, 2009, the House of Representatives 
        overwhelmingly adopted House Resolution 867, which stated that 
        the House of Representatives:
                  (A) ``considers the [Goldstone Report] to be 
                irredeemably biased and unworthy of further 
                consideration or legitimacy'';
                  (B) ``supports the Administration's efforts to combat 
                anti-Israel bias at the United Nations, its 
                characterization of the [Goldstone Report] as 
                `unbalanced, one-sided and basically unacceptable', and 
                its opposition to the resolution on the report'';
                  (C) ``calls on the President and the Secretary of 
                State to continue to strongly and unequivocally oppose 
                any endorsement of the [Goldstone Report] in 
                multilateral fora, including through leading opposition 
                to any United Nations General Assembly resolution and 
                through vetoing, if necessary, any United Nations 
                Security Council resolution that endorses the contents 
                of this report, seeks to act upon the recommendations 
                contained in this report, or calls on any other 
                international body to take further action regarding 
                this report'';
                  (D) ``calls on the President and the Secretary of 
                State to strongly and unequivocally oppose any further 
                consideration of the `Report of the United Nations Fact 
                Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict' and any other 
                measures stemming from this report in multilateral 
                fora''; and
                  (E) ``reaffirms its support for the democratic, 
                Jewish State of Israel, for Israel's security and right 
                to self-defense, and, specifically, for Israel's right 
                to defend its citizens from violent militant groups and 
                their state sponsors''.
          (33) On October 16, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council voted 25-6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and 5 not 
        voting, and with the United States voting against) to adopt 
        resolution A-HRC-S-12-1, which endorsed the Goldstone Report 
        and condemned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, other such 
        violent militant groups, or their state sponsors. The United 
        States voted against the resolution.
          (34) On November 5, 2009, the United Nations General Assembly 
        voted 114-18 (with 44 Member States abstaining, and with the 
        United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/10, 
        which, among other things:
                  (A) endorsed the United Nations Human Rights 
                Council's resolution A-HRC-S-12-1, which endorsed the 
                Goldstone Report and condemned Israel, without 
                mentioning Hamas, other such violent militant groups, 
                or their state sponsors;
                  (B) requested that the Secretary General of the 
                United Nations transmit the Goldstone Report to the 
                United Nations Security Council;
                  (C) expressed its ``appreciation'' to the ``United 
                Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' for 
                its ``comprehensive report'';
                  (D) expressed grave concern regarding ``reports 
                regarding serious human rights violations'' during 
                Operation Cast Lead, including the findings in the 
                Goldstone Report; and
                  (E) recommended ``that the Government of Switzerland, 
                in its capacity as depositary of the Geneva Convention 
                relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
                of War, undertake as soon as possible the steps 
                necessary to reconvene a Conference of High Contracting 
                Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention on measures to 
                enforce the Convention'' in the West Bank, the Gaza 
                Strip, and ``East Jerusalem''.
          (35) On February 26, 2010, the United Nations General 
        Assembly voted 98-7 (with 31 Member States abstaining, and with 
        the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/
        254, which built on the determinations of A/RES/64/10.
          (36) On March 24, 2010, the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council voted 29-6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and one 
        not voting, and with the United States voting against) to adopt 
        resolution A/HRC/13/L.30, which, among other things--
                  (A) called upon ``all concerned parties, including 
                United Nations bodies, to ensure their implementation 
                of the recommendations contained in the [Goldstone 
                Report]'';
                  (B) requested that the United Nations High 
                Commissioner for Human Rights submit a ``progress 
                report on the implementation of the present resolution 
                to the [Human Rights] Council at its fourteenth 
                session'' in May and June 2010; and
                  (C) decided to ``follow up on the implementation of 
                the present resolution at [the] fifteenth session'' of 
                the Human Rights Council in September 2010.
          (37) On March 25, 2011, the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council voted 27-3 (with 16 Member States abstaining, and with 
        the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/HRC/16/
        L.31, which, among other things--
                  (A) called upon ``all concerned parties, including 
                United Nations bodies, to ensure the full and immediate 
                implementation of the recommendations contained in the 
                [Goldstone Report]'';
                  (B) recommended that the United Nations General 
                Assembly again consider the Goldstone Report at its 
                sixty-sixth session, and urged the General Assembly to 
                submit the report to the United Nations Security 
                Council ``for its consideration and appropriate 
                action,'' including referral to the prosecutor of the 
                International Criminal Court;
                  (C) requested that the United Nations High 
                Commissioner for Human Rights submit a ``progress 
                report on the implementation of the present resolution 
                to the Human Rights Council at its eighteenth session 
                of September 2011''; and
                  (D) decided to ``follow up on the implementation of 
                the present resolution at [the] nineteenth session [of 
                the Human Rights Council] of March 2012''.
          (38) On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone, the head of the 
        ``United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' 
        that authored the Goldstone Report, wrote an op-ed in the 
        Washington Post that renounced the Goldstone Report's claim 
        that the Israeli military deliberately attacked civilians 
        during Operation Cast Lead. Goldstone wrote that the Israeli 
        military's investigations with respect to incidents in 
        Operation Cast Lead ``indicate that civilians were not 
        intentionally targeted as a matter of policy''.
          (39) Efforts to delegitimize the democratic State of Israel 
        and deny it the right to defend its citizens and its existence 
        can be used to delegitimize other democracies and deny them the 
        same right.

SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

  It is the policy of the United States to--
          (1) consider the Goldstone Report irredeemably biased and 
        unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy;
          (2) strongly and unequivocally oppose any consideration, 
        legitimization, or endorsement of the Goldstone Report, or any 
        other measures stemming from this report, in multilateral fora;
          (3) lead a high-level diplomatic campaign in support of the 
        revocation and repudiation, by the United Nations General 
        Assembly, of the Goldstone Report and any United Nations 
        resolutions stemming from the report, including:
                  (A) United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/
                RES/64/10 and A/RES/64/254; and
                  (B) United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions 
                A-HRC-S-12-1, A/HRC/13/L.30, and A/HRC/16/L.31; and
          (4) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other 
        responsible countries not to endorse, support, or legitimize 
        the Goldstone Report or any other measures stemming from the 
        report.

SEC. 603. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER 
                    DOLLARS.

  (a) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold from 
the United States contribution to the regular budget of the United 
Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution 
that the Secretary determines would be or has been expended by the 
United Nations for any part of the Goldstone Report or its preparatory 
or follow-on activities.
  (b) Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars.--Funds appropriated for 
use as a United States contribution to the regular budget of the United 
Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 
subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury 
and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations 
Entity.

                       TITLE VII--DURBAN PROCESS

SEC. 701. FINDINGS.

  Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) The United States is opposed to racism, racial 
        discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, and has 
        long been a party to the Convention on the Elimination of 
        Racial Discrimination.
          (2) Expensive and politically skewed international 
        conferences can disserve and undermine the worthy goals that 
        they are ostensibly convened to support.
          (3) The goals of the 2001 United Nations World Conference 
        Against Racism--held in Durban, South Africa, and commonly 
        referred to as ``Durban I''--were undermined by hateful, anti-
        Jewish rhetoric, and anti-Israel political agendas, prompting 
        both Israel and the United States to withdraw their delegations 
        from the Conference.
          (4) The official government declaration adopted by Durban I, 
        the ``Durban Declaration and Program of Action'', focused on 
        the ``plight of the Palestinian people under foreign 
        occupation'', and thereby singled out one regional conflict for 
        discussion and implicitly launched a false accusation against 
        Israel of intolerance towards the Palestinians.
          (5) On September 3, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
        explained the withdrawal of the United States delegation from 
        Durban I by stating that ``you do not combat racism by 
        conferences that produce declarations containing hateful 
        language, some of which is a throwback to the `days of Zionism' 
        equals racism; or supports the idea that we have made too much 
        of the Holocaust; or suggests that apartheid exists in Israel; 
        or that singles out only one country in the world--Israel--for 
        censure and abuse''.
          (6) The late United States Representative Tom Lantos, who 
        participated as a member of the United States delegation to the 
        Durban Conference, supported that delegation's withdrawal and 
        wrote in 2002 that the conference ``provided the world with a 
        glimpse into the abyss of international hate, discrimination 
        and, indeed, racism''.
          (7) On December 19, 2006, the United Nations General Assembly 
        approved a resolution initiating preparations for a Durban 
        Review Conference (commonly referred to as ``Durban II''), 
        which was held between April 20 and 24, 2009, in Geneva, 
        Switzerland.
          (8) The chair of the preparatory committee for Durban II was 
        Libya, and the co-chairs included Iran and Cuba.
          (9) Throughout the preparatory process for Durban II, member 
        states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference urged that 
        the conference again focus criticism on Israel and single out 
        the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for discussion, and also urged 
        that the conference advocate global speech codes that would 
        impose restrictions contrary to fundamental freedoms recognized 
        in the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
          (10) In testimony before the House of Representatives on 
        April 2, 2008, then-Assistant Secretary of State for 
        International Organizations Kristen Silverberg stated that the 
        United States had decided against participating in preparatory 
        activities for Durban II because ``[there is] absolutely no 
        case to be made for participating in something that is going to 
        be a repeat of Durban I. We don't have any confidence that this 
        will be any better than Durban I''.
          (11) On September 23, 2008, the House of Representatives 
        passed House Resolution 1361, which, among other things, called 
        on the President to ``urge other heads of state to condition 
        participation in the 2009 [Durban II] Conference on concrete 
        action by the United Nations and United Nations Member States 
        to ensure that it is not a forum to demonize any group, or 
        incite anti-Semitism, hatred, or violence against members of 
        any group or to call into question the existence of any state'' 
        and urged all United Nations Member States ``not to support a 
        2009 Durban Review Conference process that fails to adhere to 
        established human rights standards and to reject an agenda that 
        incites hatred against any group in the guise of criticism of a 
        particular government or that seeks to forge a global blasphemy 
        code''.
          (12) The present United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
        Rights, Dr. Navanethem Pillay, who served as Secretary General 
        of Durban II, has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of 
        hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas 
        present at Durban I, describing it as merely ``the virulent 
        anti-Semitic behavior of a few non-governmental organizations 
        on the sidelines'' and praising the biased 2001 Durban 
        Declaration and Programme of Action as ``[t]he legacy of this 
        Conference'', has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of 
        hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas 
        present at Durban II and its preparatory activities, and has 
        repeatedly praised and urged the full implementation of the 
        Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.
          (13) High Commissioner Pillay has repeatedly and publicly 
        criticized nations, including the United States, which 
        announced that they would not participate in Durban II, but has 
        almost never publicly criticized governments who succeeded in 
        using the conference and its preparatory activities to single 
        out Israel for criticism and to attempt to restrict fundamental 
        freedoms.
          (14) A United Nations press release on September 8, 2008, 
        regarding an address by High Commissioner Pillay, disturbingly 
        dismissed objections raised by non-governmental organizations 
        to Durban II as ``ferocious, and often distorted, criticism by 
        certain lobby groups focused on single issues''.
          (15) During February of 2009, the United States actively 
        participated in intergovernmental consultations on Durban II's 
        ``draft outcome document'' and engaged in high-level diplomatic 
        efforts to dramatically reverse the path of Durban II by 
        directing it towards meaningful efforts to combat intolerance 
        and bigotry and directing it away from efforts to undermine the 
        cause of fighting discrimination through singling out Israel 
        for implicit criticism and calling for restrictions on 
        fundamental freedoms.
          (16) On February 27, 2009, a State Department spokesman 
        stated that, despite United States efforts to redirect the path 
        of Durban II, ``the document being negotiated has gone from bad 
        to worse, and the current text of the draft outcome document is 
        not salvageable . . . A conference based on this text would be 
        a missed opportunity to speak clearly about the persistent 
        problem of racism'' and therefore, the United States would not 
        participate in further consultations and negotiations regarding 
        the ``draft outcome document,'' and would not participate in 
        Durban II itself unless the ``draft outcome document'' was 
        radically shortened and revised to eliminate objectionable 
        material.
          (17) On April 17, 2009, the third and final session of the 
        preparatory committee for Durban II proposed a final ``draft 
        outcome document'' that contained a number of provisions 
        advocating restrictions on freedom of expression, and that also 
        implicitly singled out and criticized Israel for racism by 
        reaffirming, in its very first paragraph, the 2001 Durban 
        Declaration and Programme of Action.
          (18) On April 18, 2009, a State Department spokesman 
        announced that ``the United States will not join the [Durban 
        II] conference'', noting that ``The current document . . . 
        still contains language that reaffirms in toto the Durban 
        Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA) from 2001, which the 
        United States has long said it is unable to support . . . The 
        United States also has serious concerns with relatively new 
        additions to the text regarding `incitement', that run counter 
        to the U.S. commitment to unfettered free speech.''.
          (19) On April 19, 2009, the President stated at a press 
        conference that ``I would love to be involved in a useful 
        conference that addressed continuing issues of racism and 
        discrimination around the globe . . . we expressed in the run-
        up to this conference our concerns that if you incorporated--if 
        you adopted all the language from 2001, that's just not 
        something we could sign up for . . . our participation would 
        have involved putting our imprimatur on something that we just 
        don't believe . . . Hopefully . . . we can partner with other 
        countries on to actually reduce discrimination around the 
        globe. But this wasn't an opportunity to do it.''.
          (20) Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, 
        Australia, and New Zealand also did not participate in Durban 
        II, and the Czech Republic walked out of the Conference during 
        its proceedings, never to return.
          (21) Libya was the chair of the Main Committee of Durban II, 
        and vice presidents of Durban II included Libya, Iran, and 
        Cuba.
          (22) Speaking at Durban II on April 20, 2009, Iranian leader 
        Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the democratic State of Israel 
        ``totally racist'' and ``the most cruel and repressive racist 
        regime'', and called for Israel's destruction, stating that 
        ``Efforts must be made to put an end to the abuse by Zionists . 
        . . Governments must be encouraged and supported in their 
        fights aimed at eradicating this barbaric racism''.
          (23) In his speech at Durban II, Ahmadinejad also propagated 
        anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, saying that ``Those who 
        control huge economic resources and interests in the world . . 
        . mobilize all the resources, including their economic and 
        political influence and world media, to render support in vain 
        to the Zionist regime''.
          (24) Disgusted by Ahmadinejad's biased and incendiary 
        statements, delegates from about two dozen nations walked out 
        of the assembly hall in protest, but most delegations remained, 
        and a large number of delegations and observers repeatedly 
        applauded Ahmadinejad's remarks.
          (25) On April 21, 2009, governments participating in Durban 
        II adopted by consensus an ``outcome document'' that contained 
        a number of provisions advocating restrictions on freedom of 
        expression, and that also implicitly singled out and criticized 
        Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its very first paragraph, 
        the 2001 Durban Declaration and Program of Action.
          (26) Throughout Durban II, many speakers singled out Israel 
        for criticism or called for restrictions on fundamental 
        freedoms, including representatives of Iran, Libya, Cuba, 
        Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
        Indonesia, Qatar, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
        Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Bangladesh, 
        Switzerland, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the 
        Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and a 
        number of other organizations and countries.
          (27) During Durban II, several speakers who sought to draw 
        attention to genuine instances of racism, racial 
        discrimination, xenophobia, related intolerance, and human 
        rights violations by the governments of Iran, Libya, and China 
        were repeatedly interrupted by the delegations from those 
        governments and instructed by the conference's chair to not 
        refer specifically to those governments.
          (28) On December 18, 2009, the United Nations General 
        Assembly approved Resolution A/RES/64/148, which urged the 
        ``full and effective implementation of the Durban Declaration 
        and Programme of Action'' and called for a ``one-day plenary 
        event to commemorate the ten-year anniversary [of Durban I] 
        during the high-level segment of the General Assembly to be 
        devoted to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and 
        related intolerance during its sixty-fifth session, in 2011''. 
        The United States, joined by 12 other nations, voted against 
        this resolution.
          (29) On December 24, 2010, the United Nations General 
        Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/65/240, authorizing the 
        holding of a ``one-day high-level meeting of the General 
        Assembly to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption 
        of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, at the level 
        of Heads of State and Government, on the second day of the 
        general debate of the sixty-sixth session'' in September of 
        2011. The resolution also states that the meeting (commonly 
        referred to as ``Durban III'') will adopt a ``political 
        declaration aimed at mobilizing political will at the national, 
        regional, and international levels for the full and effective 
        implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
        Action and its follow-up processes.''. The resolution also 
        requests that the United Nations Secretary General ``establish 
        a programme of outreach, with the involvement of Member States 
        and United Nations funds and programmes as well as civil 
        society, including non-governmental organizations, to 
        appropriately commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption 
        of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.'' The 
        resolution also requests that ``the Office of the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Department 
        of Public Information of the Secretariat . . . launch a public 
        information campaign for the commemoration of the tenth 
        anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and 
        Programme of Action''. The United States, joined by 21 other 
        nations, voted against this resolution.
          (30) The Government of Canada announced that it would not 
        participate in the Durban III meeting. Canadian Minister of 
        Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney 
        stated that ``Our government has lost faith in the entire 
        tainted Durban process. Canada will not participate in this 
        charade any longer. We will not lend our country's good name to 
        a commemoration of what has widely been characterized as a 
        hatefest . . . Canada is clearly committed to the fight against 
        racism, but the Durban process commemorates an agenda that 
        actually promotes racism rather than combats it.''.
          (31) The Government of Israel announced that it would not 
        participate in the Durban III meeting, stating that ``Israel is 
        part of the international struggle against racism. The Jewish 
        people was itself a victim of racism throughout history. Israel 
        regrets that a resolution on an important subject--elimination 
        of racism--has been diverted and politicized by the automatic 
        majority at the UN, by linking it to the Durban Declaration and 
        Programme of Action (2001) that many states would prefer to 
        forget. The Durban Conference of 2001, with its antisemitic 
        undertones and displays of hatred for Israel and the Jewish 
        World, left us with scars that will not heal quickly . . . 
        Under the present circumstances, as long as the [Durban III] 
        meeting is defined as part of the infamous `Durban process', 
        Israel will not participate . . .''.
          (32) On June 2, 2011, the United States publicly announced 
        that it would not participate in the Durban III meeting. The 
        Department of State's deputy spokesman stated that the ``Durban 
        process includes displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism, and 
        we don't want to see that commemorated. In our conversations 
        about this commemoration, we've not seen the kind of progress 
        that we think is indicative. We remain unconvinced that the 
        conference is moving in a new direction.''.
          (33) The Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, the 
        Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the 
        Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom also 
        did not participate in the Durban III meeting.
          (34) On September 22, 2011, at the Durban III meeting, the 
        United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/66/3, 
        a ``political declaration'' which ``[r]eaffirm[ed] that the 
        Durban Declaration and Programme of Action... and the outcome 
        document of [Durban II]. . . are a comprehensive United Nations 
        framework and solid foundation for combating racism, racial 
        discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance'', 
        ``[r]ecall[ed] that the aim of [Durban III] is to mobilize 
        political will at the national, regional and international 
        levels and reaffirm our political commitment to the full and 
        effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and 
        Programme of Action and the outcome document of [Durban II], 
        and their follow-up processes, at all these levels'', and 
        ``welcome[d] the continued engagement of the United Nations 
        High Commissioner for Human Rights to incorporate the 
        implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
        Action into the United Nations system''.
          (35) On September 22, 2011, the White House Press Secretary 
        stated that ``Since its inception. . . the Durban process has 
        included ugly displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism. . . 
        Last December, the United States voted against the resolution 
        establishing [Durban III] because we did not want to see the 
        hateful and anti-Semitic displays of the 2001 Durban Conference 
        commemorated. Over the last few months, we did not participate 
        in negotiations on [Durban III's] Political Declaration 
        document and, like many other countries, we were not present 
        when the Declaration was adopted. We are also deeply 
        disappointed that the rules established for credentialing non-
        governmental organizations to participate were used by some 
        delegations to silence voices critical of the Durban 
        process.''.
          (36) Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their preparatory 
        and follow-on activities, have made little or no demonstrable 
        contribution to combating racism, racial discrimination, 
        xenophobia, and related intolerance.
          (37) To date, several million dollars from the United Nations 
        regular budget has been expended on Durban I, Durban II, Durban 
        III, and their preparatory and follow-on activities.
          (38) The United States is the largest contributor to the 
        United Nations system, and is assessed for a full 22 percent of 
        the United Nations regular budget, which is funded by assessed 
        contributions from Member States.
          (39) Funding for Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their 
        preparatory and follow-on activities through the United Nations 
        regular budget has resulted in United States taxpayer dollars 
        being used for those purposes.
          (40) Congress, through its adoption of the Consolidated 
        Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161) withheld from the 
        United States assessed contribution for fiscal year 2008 to the 
        United Nations regular budget an amount equivalent to the 
        United States share of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
        budget, including its share of the Council-administered 
        preparatory process for Durban II.

SEC. 702. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) the Durban I, Durban II, and Durban III conferences, and 
        their preparatory and follow-on activities, were subverted by 
        members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and 
        irredeemably distorted into a forum for anti-Israel, anti-
        Semitic, and anti-freedom activity;
          (2) by walking out of the Durban I conference, and by not 
        participating in the Durban II conference, and announcing that 
        it would not participate in the Durban III meeting, the United 
        States Government upheld and reaffirmed the fundamental 
        commitment of the United States to combating racism, racial 
        discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance;
          (3) the Governments of Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the 
        Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New Zealand, and the Czech 
        Republic should be commended for their decision to not 
        participate or cease participation in the Durban II conference;
          (4) the Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, 
        the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Latvia, the 
        Netherlands, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom 
        should be commended for their decision to not participate in 
        Durban III; and
          (5) the Administration should expeditiously and unequivocally 
        announce that it will not participate in, support, or 
        legitimize any part of the Durban process.
  (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States 
to--
          (1) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other 
        responsible countries--
                  (A) not to participate in, support, legitimize, or 
                fund any part of the Durban process, and
                  (B) to withhold from their respective contributions 
                to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the United 
                Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of 
                such respective contributions that they determine would 
                be or has been allocated by the United Nations for any 
                part of the Durban III meeting or its preparatory or 
                follow-on activities, or for any other part of the 
                Durban process; and
          (2) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to explore credible, 
        alternative forums for combating racism, racial discrimination, 
        xenophobia, and related intolerance.

SEC. 703. NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE DURBAN PROCESS.

  None of the funds made available in any provision of law may be used 
for United States participation in any part of the Durban process.

SEC. 704. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER 
                    DOLLARS.

  (a) Withholding of Funds for the Durban Process.--The Secretary of 
State shall withhold from the United States contribution to the regular 
budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage 
of such contribution that the Secretary determines would be or has been 
expended by the United Nations for any part of the Durban I or Durban 
II conferences, the Durban III meeting, their preparatory or follow-on 
activities, or any other part of the Durban process, including--
          (1) the ``public information campaign for the commemoration 
        of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban 
        Declaration and Programme of Action'' requested by United 
        Nations General Assembly Resolution A.RES/65/240;
          (2) the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective 
        Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
        Action;
          (3) the ``group of independent eminent experts on the 
        implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
        Action''; and
          (4) the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary 
        Standards.
  (b) Withholding of Funds for Other Biased and Compromised 
Activities.--Until the Secretary of State submits to the appropriate 
congressional committees a certification, on a case-by-case basis, that 
the requirements described in subsection (d) have been satisfied, the 
United States shall withhold from the United States contribution to the 
regular budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the 
percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines has been 
allocated by the United Nations for any conference, meeting, or other 
multilateral forum, or the preparatory or follow-on activities of any 
conference, meeting, or other multilateral forum, that is organized 
under the aegis or jurisdiction of the United Nations or of any United 
Nations Entity.
  (c) Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars.--
          (1) In general.--Funds appropriated for use as a United 
        States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations 
        but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 
        subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States 
        Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to 
        any United Nations Entity.
          (2) Allowance.--Funds appropriated for use as a United States 
        contribution to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the 
        United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure 
        pursuant to subsection (b) may be obligated and expended for 
        that purpose upon the certification described in subsection 
        (d). Such funds shall revert to the United States Treasury if 
        no such certification is made by the date that is one year 
        after such appropriation, and shall not be considered arrears 
        to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
  (d) Certification.--The certification referred to in subsection (b) 
is a certification made by the Secretary of State to the appropriate 
congressional committees concerning the following:
          (1) The specified conference, meeting, or other multilateral 
        forum did not reaffirm, call for the implementation of, or 
        otherwise support the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
        Action (2001) or the outcome document of the Durban II 
        conference (2009) or the Durban III meeting (2011).
          (2) The specified conference or forum was not used to single 
        out the United States or the State of Israel for unfair or 
        unbalanced criticism.
          (3) The specified conference or forum was not used to 
        propagate racism, racial discrimination, anti-Semitism, denial 
        of the Holocaust, incitement to violence or genocide, 
        xenophobia, or related intolerance.
          (4) The specified conference or forum was not used to 
        advocate for restrictions on the freedoms of speech, 
        expression, religion, the press, assembly, or petition, or for 
        restrictions on other fundamental human rights and freedoms.
          (5) The leadership of the specified conference or forum does 
        not include a Member State, or a representative from a Member 
        State--
                  (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
                  (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses; or
                  (C) the government of which the Secretary of State 
                has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the 
                Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in 
                effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
                Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, 
                section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or 
                other provision of law, is a government that has 
                repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
                terrorism.

                           TITLE VIII--UNRWA

SEC. 801. FINDINGS.

  Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (1949) 
        created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
        Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with the temporary, 
        strictly humanitarian mandate to ``carry out . . . direct 
        relief and works programmes'' for Palestinian refugees.
          (2) UNRWA has acknowledged that it is the ``only UN agency 
        that reports directly to the UN General Assembly, and whose 
        beneficiary population stems from one nation-group'', and is 
        responsible solely for Palestinian refugees, while the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible 
        for other refugees across the world.
          (3) UNHCR's definition of a refugee is, in accordance with 
        the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, any 
        person who ``owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
        for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
        particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the 
        country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such 
        fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
        country . . .''.
          (4) UNRWA's much broader definition of a ``Palestine 
        refugee'' is any person, and his descendants, whose ``normal 
        place of residence was [the former British Mandate of] 
        Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who 
        lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 
        conflict.''.
          (5) UNRWA's overly inclusive definition of a ``Palestine 
        refugee'' has resulted in an increase in UNRWA's reported 
        number of ``Palestine refugees'' from under one million in 1950 
        to over 4.5 million today, encompassing multiple generations of 
        descendants of the original Palestinian refugees.
          (6) Hundreds of thousands of ``Palestine refugees'' are 
        citizens of recognized states, including Jordan.
          (7) UNRWA, unlike UNHCR, does not offer refugees the option 
        of resettlement and reintegration into their country of refuge 
        or a third country. Efforts by UN officials in the 1950s to 
        offer resettlement and reintegration as an option for 
        Palestinian refugees were dropped under fierce opposition from 
        Arab governments, and have not been taken up since.
          (8) Through its overly inclusive definition of a ``Palestine 
        refugee'' and its refusal to offer refugees the option of 
        resettlement and reintegration, UNRWA contributes to the 
        perpetuation of the suffering of Palestinian refugees, who have 
        been exploited by Arab governments and Palestinian militant 
        groups for over six decades as a political tool with which to 
        assail Israel.
          (9) Almost all of UNRWA's almost 30,000 staff are Palestinian 
        refugees themselves, presenting a clear conflict of interest.
          (10) UNRWA's total annual budget, including its core 
        programs, emergency activities and special projects, exceeds $1 
        billion.
          (11) The United States has long been the largest single 
        contributing country to UNRWA.
          (12) From 1950 to 2010, the United States has contributed 
        almost $3.9 billion to UNRWA, including an average of over $210 
        million per year between fiscal years 2007 and 2010.
          (13) Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
        U.S.C. 2221(c)) states that ``No contributions by the United 
        States shall be made to the United Nations Relief and Works 
        Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East except on the 
        condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency take 
        all possible measures to assure that no part of the United 
        States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any 
        refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the 
        so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type 
        organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.''.
          (14) Then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. Lew testified 
        before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 13, 2009, 
        that ``We have the highest level of scrutiny in terms of 
        UNRWA''.
          (15) However, in contravention of United States law, UNRWA 
        does not ask its personnel or aid recipients if they are 
        members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
          (16) Even though the United States remains the largest single 
        contributing country to UNRWA, until 2010, UNRWA did not make 
        available its list of staff for screening through United States 
        watch lists, including that of the Department of the Treasury's 
        Office of Foreign Assets Control, refused a United States 
        request to do so in 2005, and still does not do so for its list 
        of aid recipients.
          (17) UNRWA claims that it has fulfilled its obligations under 
        section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by 
        screening personnel through the United Nations Consolidated 
        List pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
        1267, but the names on that list are largely members of Al-
        Qaeda and the Taliban, not of Palestinian Foreign Terrorist 
        Organizations such as Hamas, Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, 
        or Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
          (18) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Peter Hansen, stated 
        in 2004 that ``I am sure that there are Hamas members on the 
        UNRWA payroll and I don't see that as a crime.''.
          (19) A number of UNRWA personnel have been discovered to be 
        affiliated with Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including, 
        inter alia:
                  (A) Issa Batran (now deceased), a commander of 
                Hamas's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and senior rocket-
                maker who taught at an UNRWA school in Gaza;
                  (B) Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi (now deceased), 
                who reportedly carried out a homicide bombing that 
                killed seven Americans and one Jordanian at Forward 
                Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan on December 30, 
                2009, reportedly worked as a physician at an UNRWA 
                clinic in Amman, Jordan, and had longstanding ties to 
                violent Islamist extremism;
                  (C) Said Siam (now deceased), a longtime Hamas 
                official who eventually served as Hamas's Interior 
                Minister in Gaza, and who taught at an UNRWA school in 
                Gaza;
                  (D) Awad al-Qiq (now deceased), a rocket-builder for 
                Palestinian Islamic Jihad who served as headmaster of 
                an UNRWA school in Gaza;
                  (E) Nahd Atallah, an UNRWA staff member in Gaza, who 
                was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 15 years' 
                imprisonment by an Israeli military court of using his 
                UN travel document to bypass Israeli checkpoints in 
                Gaza in order to transport armed Palestinian militants; 
                and
                  (F) an UNRWA teacher who reportedly praised homicide 
                bombers and permitted Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin (now 
                deceased) to speak to an assembly of students at an 
                UNRWA school. UNRWA did not terminate the teacher's 
                employment, instead only giving him a letter of 
                censure.
          (20) UNRWA staff unions, including the teachers' union, are 
        frequently controlled by members affiliated with Hamas.
          (21) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 
        2009 report that--
                  (A) ``UNRWA . . . obviously does not take `all 
                possible measures' in practice'' to assure that United 
                States contributions do not provide assistance to any 
                refugee with ties to Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 
                in accordance with section 301(c) of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961;
                  (B) ``UNRWA makes no attempt to weed out individuals 
                who support extremist positions . . . UNRWA has taken 
                very few steps to detect and eliminate terrorists from 
                the ranks of its staff or its beneficiaries, and no 
                steps at all to prevent members of terrorist 
                organizations, such as Hamas, from joining its 
                staff.'';
                  (C) ``[I]t is rare for an area staff member . . . to 
                report or confirm that another staff member has 
                violated rules against political speech, let alone 
                exhibited ties to terrorism. Not surprisingly, external 
                allegations of improper speech or improper use of UNRWA 
                facilities are difficult to prove, as virtually no one 
                is willing to be a witness against gang members.''; and
                  (D) ``[T]here are no formal procedures for 
                deregistering or denying services to a properly 
                registered refugee, no matter what he or she does.''.
          (22) The late Representative Tom Lantos, in a May 13, 2002 
        letter, expressed his concern that--
                  (A) ``UNRWA is perpetuating, rather than 
                ameliorating, the situation of Palestinian refugees'';
                  (B) ``UNRWA officials have . . . failed to prevent 
                their camps from becoming centers of terrorist 
                activity''; and
                  (C) ``for too long, UNRWA has been part of the 
                problem, rather than the solution, in the Middle East . 
                . . UNRWA camps have fostered a culture of anger and 
                dependency that undermines both regional peace and the 
                well-being of the camps' inhabitants.''.
          (23) UNRWA has long held accounts at the Arab Bank and the 
        Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS), financial institutions that the 
        United States deems or believes to be complicit in money 
        laundering and terror financing.
          (24) The Arab Bank is reportedly at the center of United 
        States investigations into how tens of millions of dollars have 
        flowed to Palestinian groups that allegedly used some of those 
        funds to pay off suicide bombers and their relatives, and is 
        also reportedly being sued in Federal court by American victims 
        of attacks in Israel, with attorneys for the victims accusing 
        the bank of facilitating Acts of International Terrorism.
          (25) On May 11, 2004, the Department of the Treasury 
        designated CBS as a financial institution of ``primary money 
        laundering concern'' pursuant to section 311 of the USA Patriot 
        Act, stating that ``CBS had been used by terrorists and their 
        sympathizers and acted as a conduit for the laundering of 
        proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil'' and 
        that ``numerous transactions that may be indicative of 
        terrorist financing and money laundering have been transferred 
        through CBS, including two accounts at CBS that reference a 
        reputed financier for Usama bin Laden.''.
          (26) On August 10, 2011, the Department of the Treasury 
        designated CBS, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, for serving 
        as an ``agent for designated Syrian and North Korean 
        proliferators''.
          (27) CBS is controlled by the Government of Syria, a State 
        Sponsor of Terrorism.
          (28) The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which use the textbooks 
        of their respective host governments or authorities, has long 
        contained materials that are anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and 
        supportive of violent extremism.
          (29) As far back as over forty years ago, former UNRWA 
        commissioner-general Laurence Michelmore admitted that UNRWA 
        schools were supporting a ``bitterly hostile attitude to 
        Israel.''.
          (30) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 
        January 2009 report that ``[T]eachers in UNRWA schools were 
        often afraid to remove posters glorifying `martyrs' (including 
        suicide bombers) for fear of retribution from armed supporters 
        of the `martyrs.'''.
          (31) UNRWA officials have compromised UNRWA's strictly 
        humanitarian mandate by engaging in political agitation, 
        propaganda, and advocacy agitation against Israel and in favor 
        of Hamas, as reflected by the following, inter alia:
                  (A) UNRWA officials have repeatedly called for the 
                United States and other nations to deal directly with 
                Hamas and have repeatedly called for political 
                ``reconciliation'' between Hamas and Fatah.
                  (B) UNRWA officials have repeatedly castigated Israel 
                for her actions to defend innocent civilians from 
                rocket and mortar attacks from violent extremist groups 
                in Gaza and from other Acts of International Terrorism, 
                and has repeatedly blamed Israel, not Hamas and other 
                violent extremist groups, for present restrictions on 
                access to Gaza.
                  (C) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted 
                in a 2009 report that: ``Although it occasionally 
                issued mild, pro forma criticisms of Palestinian 
                attacks (most of which were clearly war crimes), 
                [UNRWA] put more effort into criticizing Israeli 
                counterterrorism efforts (which were condemned using 
                language associated with war crimes, though any such 
                crimes were far from proved) . . . UNRWA never seems to 
                acknowledge that Israel, since its 2005 withdrawal from 
                Gaza, has launched strikes on the territory largely in 
                order to halt rocket attacks and other assaults.''.
                  (D) Lindsay also noted that ``UNRWA--through its 
                leaders and press spokespersons--is constantly involved 
                in political speech . . . These one-sided speeches on 
                political matters do not further the goals of a 
                humanitarian and supposedly nonpolitical agency.''.
                  (E) UNRWA Commissioner-General Filippo Grandi 
                described as a ``massacre'' Israel's May 31, 2010 naval 
                operation, and use of self-defense measures, to seize 
                the Mavi Marmara ship in order to enforce its naval 
                blockade of the Gaza Strip.
                  (F) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd 
                stated in a 2009 meeting with Congressional staff that 
                ``We [UNRWA] are not just humanitarian.''.
                  (G) In January of 2009, UNRWA spokesman Christopher 
                Gunness called for an investigation as to whether 
                Israel had committed ``a war crime.''.
                  (H) On December 30, 2008, former UNRWA commissioner-
                general Karen AbuZayd stated that only Israel was 
                responsible for the start of the most recent conflict 
                in Gaza.
                  (I) On May 25, 2008, in an interview with Press TV, 
                which is controlled by the Government of Iran, former 
                UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd reportedly 
                claimed that Hamas was free from corruption and ``more 
                popular than ever''.
                  (J) On October 5, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-
                general Karen AbuZayd blamed Israel for violent 
                extremist groups in Gaza launching rockets and mortars 
                against Israeli civilian targets, stating that 
                residents of Gaza ``have absorbed--and continue to 
                experience--military incursions in which civilian 
                lives, livelihoods, and property have been destroyed, 
                and to which they have responded with the continuous 
                firing of Qassam rockets into Israel.''.
                  (K) On March 8, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-
                general Karen AbuZayd, comparing the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
                War with more recent conflicts between Israel and 
                Palestinian militant groups, stated that ``[T]here is a 
                striking historical continuity in the systematic 
                approach to use overwhelming and disproportionate force 
                in the name of security; to separate and exclude 
                Palestinians from the mainstream; to eject them from 
                their land; and to occupy Palestinian land.''.
                  (L) On January 19, 2005, former UNRWA commissioner-
                general Peter Hansen stated that ``My job [is] to 
                represent the refugees.''.
                  (M) In 2002, former UNRWA commissioner-general Peter 
                Hansen falsely accused Israel of carrying out a 
                ``massacre'' in UNRWA's Jenin refugee camp after 
                Israeli forces entered the camp, a base of operations 
                for Palestinian militant groups, to carry out defensive 
                operations to halt repeated homicide bombings in 
                Israel.
                  (N) In 1964, UNRWA allowed its staff to attend the 
                conference in Jerusalem where the Palestine Liberation 
                Organization (PLO) was established.
          (32) Despite UNRWA's contravention of U.S. law and activities 
        that compromise its strictly humanitarian mandate, UNRWA 
        continues to receive United States contributions, including 
        $237.8 million in fiscal year 2010.
          (33) The bilateral ``Framework for Cooperation'' that the 
        United States concluded with UNRWA for 2010 actually 
        ``commends'' UNRWA and does not commit UNRWA to vetting its aid 
        recipients through United States watch lists.
          (34) Assistance from the United States and other responsible 
        nations allows UNRWA to claim that criticisms of the agency's 
        behavior are unfounded. UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness has 
        dismissed concerns by stating that ``If these baseless 
        allegations were even halfway true, do you really think the 
        U.S. and [European Commission] would give us hundreds of 
        millions of dollars per year?''.
          (35) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 
        2009 report that:
                  (A) ``The United States, despite funding nearly 75 
                percent of UNRWA's national budget and remaining its 
                largest single country donor, has mostly failed to make 
                UNRWA reflect U.S. foreign policy objectives . . . 
                Recent U.S. efforts to shape UNRWA appear to have been 
                ineffective . . .'';
                  (B) ``[T]he United States is not obligated to fund 
                agencies that refuse to check its rolls for individuals 
                their donors do not wish to support.'';
                  (C) ``A number of changes in UNRWA could benefit the 
                refugees, the Middle East, and the United States, but 
                those changes will not occur unless the United States, 
                ideally with support from UNRWA's other main financial 
                supporter, the European Union, compels the agency to 
                enact reforms.''; and
                  (D) ``If the [UNRWA commissioner-general's] power is 
                used in ways that are conflict with the donors' 
                political objectives, it is up to the donors to take 
                the necessary actions to ensure that their interests 
                are respected. When they have done so, UNRWA--given the 
                tight financial leash it has been on for most of its 
                existence--has tended to follow their dictates, even if 
                sometimes slowly.''.
          (36) The Government of Canada has recently placed 
        restrictions on its contributions to UNRWA, demonstrating 
        consequences for UNRWA's malfeasance and setting an example for 
        the United States and other donor governments.

SEC. 802. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA.

  Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by 
striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection:
  ``(c)(1) Withholding.--Contributions by the United States to the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to the 
regular budget of the United Nations for the support of UNRWA or a 
successor entity (through staff positions provided by the United 
Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only during a 
period for which a certification described in paragraph (2) is in 
effect.
  ``(2) Certification.--A certification described in this paragraph is 
a written determination by the Secretary of State, based on all 
information available after diligent inquiry, and transmitted to the 
appropriate congressional committees along with a detailed description 
of the factual basis therefor, that--
          ``(A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor, 
        subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA--
                  ``(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist 
                Organization;
                  ``(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or incited anti-
                American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or 
                propaganda; or
                  ``(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, including 
                publications or Web sites, to propagate or disseminate 
                political materials, including political rhetoric 
                regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
          ``(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other facility, or 
        other infrastructure or resource is being used by a Foreign 
        Terrorist Organization for operations, planning, training, 
        recruitment, fundraising, indoctrination, communications, 
        sanctuary, storage of weapons or other materials, or any other 
        purposes;
          ``(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial audits by 
        an internationally recognized third party independent auditing 
        firm and has implemented an effective system of vetting and 
        oversight to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any 
        UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organization or 
        members thereof;
          ``(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational institution uses 
        textbooks or other educational materials that propagate or 
        disseminate anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic 
        rhetoric, propaganda or incitement;
          ``(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a member of a 
        Foreign Terrorist Organization; and
          ``(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations with 
        financial institutions that the United States deems or believes 
        to be complicit in money laundering and terror financing.
  ``(3) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(A) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term `Foreign 
        Terrorist Organization' means an organization designated as a 
        Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Secretary of State in 
        accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
          ``(B) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        `appropriate congressional committees' means--
                  ``(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 
                Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of 
                the House of Representatives; and
                  ``(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 
                Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental 
                Affairs of the Senate.
  ``(4) Effective Duration of Certification.--The certification 
described in paragraph (2) shall be effective for a period of 180 days 
from the date of transmission to the appropriate congressional 
committees, or until the Secretary receives information rendering that 
certification factually inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event 
that a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly 
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a description of 
any information that precludes the renewal or continuation of the 
certification.
  ``(5) Limitation.--During a period for which a certification 
described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the United States may not 
contribute to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual 
amount--
          ``(A) greater than the highest annual contribution to UNRWA 
        made by a member country of the League of Arab States;
          ``(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA budget, 
        exceeds the proportion of the total budget for the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) paid by the 
        United States; or
          ``(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget of 
        UNRWA.''.

SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

  It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) the President and the Secretary of State should lead a 
        high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible 
        nations to withhold contributions to UNRWA, to any successor or 
        related entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations 
        for the support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff 
        positions provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or 
        otherwise) until UNRWA has met the conditions listed in 
        subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 301(c)(2) of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 802 of this 
        Act);
          (2) citizens of recognized states should be removed from 
        UNRWA's jurisdiction;
          (3) UNRWA's definition of a ``Palestine refugee'' should be 
        changed to that used for a refugee by the Office of the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and
          (4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Palestinian 
        refugees, responsibility for those refugees should be fully 
        transferred to the Office of the United Nations High 
        Commissioner for Refugees.

              TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM.

  (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was 
        established in 1957 with the objectives of seeking to 
        ``accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to 
        peace, health and prosperity throughout the world'' and to 
        ``ensure . . . that assistance provided by it or at its request 
        or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way 
        as to further any military purpose.''.
          (2) The United States, via assessed contributions, is the 
        largest financial contributor to the regular budget of the 
        IAEA.
          (3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now called the 
        Technical Cooperation Program, financed primarily through 
        voluntary contributions by member states to the Technical 
        Cooperation Fund, to provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) 
        for peaceful purposes to countries worldwide.
          (4) The United States is the largest financial contributor to 
        the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund.
          (5) A March 2009 report by the Government Accountability 
        Office (GAO) found that ``neither [the Department of State] nor 
        IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries 
        the United States has designated as state sponsors of 
        terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria--even though under U.S. 
        law these countries are subject to sanctions.''.
          (6) The GAO report also found that ``Together, [Cuba, Iran, 
        Sudan, and Syria] received more than $55 million in TC 
        assistance from 1997 through 2007.''. These four countries have 
        received continued assistance since 2007.
          (7) The GAO report also found that ``proliferation concerns 
        about the [Technical Cooperation Program] have persisted 
        because of the assistance it has provided to certain countries 
        and because nuclear equipment, technology, and expertise can be 
        dual-use--capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but also 
        useful in contributing to nuclear weapons development.''.
          (8) The GAO report also found that ``[The State Department] 
        reported in 2007 that three TC projects in [Iran] were directly 
        related to the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr.''.
          (9) The GAO report also found that ``The proliferation 
        concerns associated with the [Technical Cooperation Program] 
        are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess, 
        and resolve . . . [because] there is no formal mechanism for 
        obtaining TC project information during the proposal 
        development phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State 
        documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC proposals 
        were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. policies and 
        IAEA procedures [including monitoring proliferation risks] 
        related to TC program fellowships.''.
          (10) The GAO report noted that ``IAEA officials told us that 
        the [Technical Cooperation Program] does not attempt to exclude 
        countries on the basis of their status as U.S.-designated state 
        sponsors of terrorism or other political considerations'' and 
        that, according to the Deputy Director General for the 
        Technical Cooperation Program, ``there are no good countries 
        and there are no bad countries'' with respect to provision of 
        technical cooperation by the IAEA.
          (11) The GAO report also found that ``given the limited 
        information available on TC projects and the dual-use nature of 
        some nuclear technologies and expertise, we do not believe [the 
        State Department] can assert with complete confidence that TC 
        assistance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction] 
        programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism''.
          (12) The GAO report also found that ``we do not share [the 
        State Department's confidence in IAEA's internal safeguards to 
        prevent TC projects from contributing to weapons development . 
        . .]''.
          (13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
        seq.) prohibited any of the funds authorized to be appropriated 
        for ``International Organizations and Programs'' from being 
        made available for the United States proportionate share for 
        programs for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Liberation 
        Organization, inter alia.
          (14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
        Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105-118) 
        prohibited any of the funds made available by such Act for the 
        IAEA from being made available for programs and projects of the 
        IAEA in Cuba.
          (15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 
        (Public Law 105-277) required the United States to withhold a 
        proportionate share of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba 
        regarding the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro Pi 
        Nuclear Research Center.
          (16) The GAO report asked Congress ``to consider directing 
        [the State Department] to withhold a share of future annual 
        contributions to the [Technical Cooperation Fund] that is 
        proportionate to the amount of funding provided from the fund 
        for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and other 
        countries of concern, noting that such a withholding is a 
        matter of fundamental principle and intended to foster a more 
        consistent U.S. policy toward such nations''.
          (17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that the Government of 
        Iran continues its work on heavy water-related projects and its 
        enrichment of uranium, in violation of United Nations Security 
        Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 
        (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010).
          (18) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) 
        decided ``that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the 
        IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, 
        agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes 
        [inter alia] . . . but that no such technical cooperation shall 
        be provided that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive 
        nuclear activities . . .''.
          (19) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of 
        Governors on February 25, 2011 that the Government of Iran now 
        has approximately 7,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium, is 
        running almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its stockpile 
        of low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilograms, considered 
        sufficient for further enrichment into enough high-enriched 
        uranium for more than one atomic bomb. The Government of Iran 
        has also reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40 kilograms 
        of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U-235.
          (20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the 
        IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February 
        25, 2011, about the ``outstanding issues related to possible 
        military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme''.
          (21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the 
        IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February 
        25, 2011, that ``the [IAEA] remains concerned about the 
        possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed 
        nuclear related activities involving military-related 
        organizations, including activities related to the development 
        of a nuclear payload for a missile.''.
          (22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the 
        IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February 
        19, 2009, that ``Iran has not implemented the Additional 
        Protocol, which is a prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide 
        credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear 
        material and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the IAEA's] 
        request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure, access to 
        additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing 
        of centrifuges, research and development on uranium enrichment, 
        and uranium mining and milling, as also required by the 
        Security Council.''.
          (23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the 
        IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February 
        19, 2009, that ``as a result of the continued lack of 
        cooperation by Iran in connection with . . . issues which give 
        rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran's 
        nuclear programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive progress 
        on these issues.''.
          (24) Iran has refused to comply with resolutions adopted by 
        the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, November 26, 
        2003, March 15, 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 
        11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, and July 31, 
        2006, regarding ``Iran's many failures and breaches of its 
        obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement'' and 
        continues to block IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, 
        in violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
          (25) According to multiple news reports, Iran recently denied 
        access to its enrichment site at Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and 
        has also denied a request by the IAEA to place one or more 
        additional surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at 
        Natanz.
          (26) In April of 2008, United States Government officials 
        publicly revealed that Syria was building at the Dair Alzour 
        site, with North Korea's assistance, a secret nuclear reactor 
        that was based on a North Korean model capable of producing 
        plutonium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away from 
        becoming operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly 
        destroyed the reactor in September 2007.
          (27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hayden, the former 
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that the 
        Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour could have produced enough 
        plutonium for 1 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming 
        operational.
          (28) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of 
        Governors on November 19, 2008 that the Syrian facility at Dair 
        Alzour bore features that resembled those of an undeclared 
        nuclear reactor, adding that ``Syria has not yet provided the 
        requested documentation in support of its declarations 
        concerning the nature or function of the destroyed building, 
        nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations which the 
        IAEA has requested to visit.''.
          (29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated to the IAEA 
        Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, that ``the limited 
        information and access provided by Syria to date have not 
        enabled the Agency to determine the nature of the destroyed 
        facility'' at Dair Alzour site, that uranium particles have 
        been found in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 
        Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and that the 
        particles found at both sites ``are of a type not included in 
        Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material.''.
          (30) Commercial satellite photos published on February 23, 
        2011, indicate efforts by the Government of Syria to conceal 
        its activities at an additional site, Marj as Sultan, which may 
        be connected to the Dair Alzour facility.
          (31) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of 
        Governors on February 25, 2011 that ``Syria has not cooperated 
        with the [IAEA] since June 2008 in connection with the 
        unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the other 
        three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As a 
        consequences, the [IAEA] has not been able to make progress 
        towards resolving the outstanding issues related to those 
        sites.''.
  (b) Prohibition.--No funds from any United States assessed or 
voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be used to support any 
assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation 
program to any country, including North Korea that--
          (1) is a country the government of which has been determined 
        by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control 
        Act, or other provision of law, is a government that has 
        repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
        terrorism;
          (2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its obligations 
        regarding--
                  (A) its safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
                  (B) the Additional Protocol;
                  (C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
                  (D) any relevant United Nations Security Council 
                Resolution; or
                  (E) the Charter of the United Nations; or
          (3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance 
        with the obligations specified in paragraph (2).
  (c) Withholding of Voluntary Contributions.--Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall withhold from the United States voluntary contribution to the 
IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA in the period 
from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through its Technical Cooperation 
Program to countries described in subsection (b).
  (d) Withholding of Assessed Contributions.--If, not later than 30 
days of the date of the enactment of this Act, the amount specified in 
subsection (c) has not been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all 
assistance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to the 
countries described in subsection (b), an amount equal to that 
specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld from the United States 
assessed contribution to the IAEA.
  (e) Waiver.--The provisions in subsections (c) and (d) may be waived 
if--
          (1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance provided through 
        its Technical Cooperation Program to the countries described in 
        subsection (b); or
          (2) the President certifies that the countries described in 
        subsection (b) no longer pose a threat to the national 
        security, interests, and allies of the United States.
  (f) United States Actions at IAEA.--The President shall direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the 
allocation of funds for any assistance provided by the IAEA through its 
Technical Cooperation Program to any country described in subsection 
(b).
  (g) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the implementation of this 
section.

SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA.

  (a) Enforcement and Compliance.--
          (1) Office of compliance.--
                  (A) Establishment.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to International 
                Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and 
                influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish 
                an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA.
                  (B) Operation.--The Office of Compliance shall--
                          (i) function as an independent body composed 
                        of technical experts who shall work in 
                        consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess 
                        compliance by IAEA Member States and provide 
                        recommendations to the IAEA Board of Governors 
                        concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA 
                        Member States that fail to fulfill their 
                        obligations under IAEA Board resolutions;
                          (ii) base its assessments and recommendations 
                        on IAEA inspection reports; and
                          (iii) take into consideration information 
                        provided by IAEA Board Members that are 1 of 
                        the 5 nuclear weapons states as recognized by 
                        the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
                        Weapons (21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as 
                        the ``Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty'' or the 
                        ``NPT'').
                  (C) Staffing.--The Office of Compliance shall be 
                staffed from existing personnel in the Department of 
                Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department of Nuclear 
                Safety and Security of the IAEA.
          (2) Committee on safeguards and verification.--The President 
        shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the 
        IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
        at the IAEA to ensure that the Committee on Safeguards and 
        Verification established in 2005 shall develop and seek to put 
        into force a workplan of concrete measures that will--
                  (A) improve the ability of the IAEA to monitor and 
                enforce compliance by Member States of the IAEA with 
                the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Statute of 
                the International Atomic Energy Agency; and
                  (B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond the 
                verification mechanisms and authorities contained in 
                the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements 
                between the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to 
                detect with a high degree of confidence undeclared 
                nuclear activities by a Member State.
          (3) Penalties with respect to the iaea.--
                  (A) In general.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to 
                use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
                at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA 
                that is under investigation for a breach of or 
                noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
                and principles of the Charter of the United Nations has 
                its privileges suspended, including--
                          (i) limiting its ability to vote on its case;
                          (ii) being prevented from receiving any 
                        technical assistance; and
                          (iii) being prevented from hosting meetings.
                  (B) Termination of penalties.--The penalties 
                specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated 
                when such investigation is concluded and such Member 
                State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance.
          (4) Penalties with respect to the nuclear nonproliferation 
        treaty.--The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 
        influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that a 
        Member State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, in 
        noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to the IAEA all nuclear 
        materials and technology received from the IAEA, any Member 
        State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty.
  (b) United States Contributions.--
          (1) Voluntary contributions.--Voluntary contributions of the 
        United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund 
        activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or 
        activities relating to Nuclear Verification.
          (2) Limitation on use of funds.--The President shall direct 
        the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA 
        to--
                  (A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are 
                prioritized for countries that have newly established 
                nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear programs; 
                and
                  (B) block the allocation of funds for any other IAEA 
                development, environmental, or nuclear science 
                assistance or activity to a country--
                          (i) the government of which the Secretary of 
                        State has determined, for purposes of section 
                        6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 
                        section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
                        1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control 
                        Act, or other provision of law, is a government 
                        that has repeatedly provided support for acts 
                        of international terrorism and the government 
                        of which the Secretary has determined has not 
                        dismantled and surrendered its weapons of mass 
                        destruction programs under international 
                        verification;
                          (ii) that is under investigation for a breach 
                        of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations 
                        or the purposes and principles of the Charter 
                        of the United Nations; or
                          (iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 
                        obligations or the purposes and principles of 
                        the Charter of the United Nations.
          (3) Detail of expenditures.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
        secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA 
        to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country 
        of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and 
        nuclear security activities.
  (c) Membership.--
          (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United States 
        Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, 
        and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the 
        membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Member 
        State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the 
        Additional Protocol and--
                  (A) is under investigation for a breach of or 
                noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
                and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or
                  (B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or 
                the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
                United Nations.
          (2) Criteria.--The United States Permanent Representative to 
        the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for 
        Board membership to reflect the principles described in 
        paragraph (1).
  (d) Small Quantities Protocol.--The President shall direct the United 
States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the IAEA to make every effort to 
ensure that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small Quantities 
Protocol in order to--
          (1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol;
          (2) require that any IAEA Member State that has previously 
        signed a Small Quantities Protocol to sign, ratify, and 
        implement the Additional Protocol, provide immediate access for 
        IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities, and agree to 
        the strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and
          (3) require that any IAEA Member State that does not comply 
        with paragraph (2) to be ineligible to receive nuclear 
        material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA 
        Member State and subject to the penalties described in 
        subsection (a)(3).
  (e) Nuclear Program of Iran and Syria.--
          (1) United states action.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
        make every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the 
        IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions 
        already imposed, makes Iran and Syria ineligible to receive any 
        nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any 
        IAEA Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not 
        related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until the 
        IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran or Syria, as the 
        case may be--
                  (A) is providing full access to IAEA inspectors to 
                its nuclear-related facilities;
                  (B) has fully implemented and is in compliance with 
                the Additional Protocol; and
                  (C) has permanently ceased and dismantled all 
                activities and programs related to nuclear-enrichment 
                and reprocessing.
          (2) Penalties.--If an IAEA Member State is determined to have 
        violated the prohibition on assistance to Iran or Syria 
        described in paragraph (1) before the IAEA Board of Governors 
        determines that Iran or Syria, as the case may be, has 
        satisfied the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through 
        (C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be subject to 
        the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), shall be 
        ineligible to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, 
        or assistance from any IAEA Member State, and shall be 
        ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance not related to 
        safeguards inspections or nuclear security until such time as 
        the IAEA Board of Governors makes such determination with 
        respect to Iran or Syria, as the case may be.
  (f) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment 
of this Act and annually for 2 years thereafter, the President shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
implementation of this section.

SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN 
                    OF THE IAEA.

  It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of 
the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of 
the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend, and the General 
Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear 
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.

                         TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING

SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

  It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have 
        contributed greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability 
        for over 6 decades and the majority of peacekeeping personnel 
        who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with 
        honor and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping 
        has been severely tarnished by operational failures and 
        unconscionable acts of misconduct;
          (2) in response to such failures, successive Secretaries 
        General of the United Nations have launched numerous reform 
        efforts, including the high-level Panel on United Nations Peace 
        Operations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar 
        Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special Advisor on the 
        Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal Highness 
        Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, and the 2009 New 
        Partnership Agenda, known as the ``New Horizon'' reports;
          (3) despite the fact that the United Nations has had over a 
        decade to implement many of these reforms, nearly four years to 
        implement the reforms in the Zeid Report, and the fact that 
        Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and 
        the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly 
        have expressed their commitment ``to implementing fundamental, 
        systematic changes as a matter of urgency,'' a number of 
        critical reforms continue to be blocked or delayed by Members 
        States who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status quo;
          (4) further, audits of procurement practices in the 
        Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conducted by the Office 
        of Internal Oversight Services, and the now-defunct United 
        Nations Procurement Task Force have uncovered ``significant'' 
        corruption schemes and criminal acts by United Nations 
        peacekeeping personnel; and
          (5) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations 
        peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
        reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning, 
        management, procurement, training, conduct, and discipline, 
        must be implemented without further delay.

SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
                    OPERATIONS.

  It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:
          (1) Planning and management.--
                  (A) Global audit.--As the size, cost, and number of 
                United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased 
                substantially over the past decade, independent audits 
                of each such operation should be conducted annually, 
                with a view toward ``right-sizing'' operations and 
                ensuring that all operations are efficient and cost 
                effective.
                  (B) Procurement and transparency.--The logistics 
                established within the United Nations Department of 
                Field Support should be streamlined and strengthened to 
                ensure that all peacekeeping missions are resourced 
                appropriately, transparently, and in a timely fashion 
                while individual accountability for waste, fraud and 
                abuse within United Nations peacekeeping missions is 
                uniformly enforced.
                  (C) Review of mandates and closing operations.--In 
                conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph 
                (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all 
                United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a 
                view toward identifying objectives that are practical 
                and achievable, and report its findings to the Security 
                Council. In particular, the review should consider the 
                following:
                          (i) Except in extraordinary cases, including 
                        genocide, the United Nations Department of 
                        Peacekeeping Operations should not be tasked 
                        with activities that are impractical or 
                        unachievable without the cooperation of the 
                        Member State(s) hosting a United Nations 
                        peacekeeping operation, or which amount to de-
                        facto Trusteeship outside of the procedures 
                        established for such under Chapter XII of the 
                        United Nations Charter, thereby creating 
                        unrealistic expectations and obfuscating the 
                        primary responsibility of the Member States 
                        themselves in creating and maintaining 
                        conditions for peace.
                          (ii) Long-standing operations that are static 
                        and cannot fulfill their mandate should be 
                        downsized or closed.
                          (iii) Where there is legitimate concern that 
                        the withdrawal from a country of an otherwise 
                        static United Nations peacekeeping operation 
                        would result in the resumption of major 
                        conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement that 
                        reduces the level of assessed contributions, 
                        similar to that currently supporting the United 
                        Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be 
                        explored and instituted.
                  (D) Leadership.--As peacekeeping operations become 
                larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should 
                adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior 
                leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on 
                specific skills and experience, and current senior 
                leaders and managers who do not meet those standards 
                should be removed.
                  (E) Pre-deployment training.--Pre-deployment training 
                on interpretation of the mandate of the operation, 
                specifically in the areas of use of force, civilian 
                protection and field conditions, the Code of Conduct, 
                HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be mandatory, and all 
                personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be 
                required to sign an oath that each has received and 
                understands such training as a condition of 
                participation in the operation.
                  (F) Gratis military personnel.--The General Assembly 
                should seek to strengthen the capacity the United 
                Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and ease 
                the extraordinary burden currently placed upon the 
                limited number of headquarters staff by lifting 
                restrictions on the utilization of gratis military 
                personnel by the Department so that the Department may 
                accept secondments from Member States of military 
                personnel with expertise in mission planning, 
                logistics, and other operational specialties.
          (2) Conduct and discipline.--
                  (A) Adoption of a uniform code of conduct.--A single, 
                uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a 
                binding rule and applies equally to all personnel 
                serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
                regardless of category or rank, including military 
                personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into 
                legal documents governing participation in such an 
                operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of 
                Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.
                  (B) Understanding the code of conduct.--All 
                personnel, regardless of category or rank, should 
                receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to 
                deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition 
                to periodic follow-on training. In particular--
                          (i) all personnel, regardless of category or 
                        rank, should be provided with a personal copy 
                        of the Code of Conduct that has been translated 
                        into the national language of such personnel, 
                        regardless of whether such language is an 
                        official language of the United Nations;
                          (ii) all personnel, regardless of category or 
                        rank, should sign an oath that each has 
                        received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 
                        each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, 
                        and that each understands the consequences of 
                        violating the Code of Conduct, including 
                        immediate termination of participation in and 
                        permanent exclusion from all current and future 
                        peacekeeping operations, as well as the 
                        assumption of personal liability and victims 
                        compensation, where appropriate, as a condition 
                        of appointment to any such operation; and
                          (iii) peacekeeping operations should continue 
                        and enhance educational outreach programs to 
                        reach local communities where peacekeeping 
                        personnel of such operations are based, 
                        including explaining prohibited acts on the 
                        part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel 
                        and identifying the individual to whom the 
                        local population may direct complaints or file 
                        allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other 
                        acts of misconduct.
                  (C) Monitoring mechanisms.--Dedicated monitoring 
                mechanisms, such as the Conduct and Discipline Teams 
                already deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon, 
                Timor Leste, Cote d'Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the 
                Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present in each 
                operation to monitor compliance with the Code of 
                Conduct, and should report simultaneously to the Head 
                of Mission, the United Nations Department of Field 
                Support, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations, and the Associate Director of the Office of 
                Internal Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Operations 
                (established under section 1114(b)(9)).
                  (D) Investigations.--A permanent, professional, and 
                independent investigative body should be established 
                and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations. In particular--
                          (i) the investigative body should include 
                        professionals with experience in investigating 
                        sex crimes and the illegal exploitation of 
                        resources, as appropriate, as well as experts 
                        who can provide guidance on standards of proof 
                        and evidentiary requirements necessary for any 
                        subsequent legal action;
                          (ii) provisions should be included in all 
                        Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model 
                        Memorandum of Understanding, that obligate 
                        Member States that contribute troops to a 
                        peacekeeping operation to designate a military 
                        prosecutor who will participate in any 
                        investigation into credible allegations of 
                        misconduct brought against an individual of 
                        such Member State, so that evidence is 
                        collected and preserved in a manner consistent 
                        with the military law of such Member State;
                          (iii) the investigative body should be 
                        regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and 
                        should be equipped with modern forensics 
                        equipment for the purpose of positively 
                        identifying perpetrators and, where necessary, 
                        for determining paternity; and
                          (iv) the investigative body should report 
                        directly to the Associate Director of the 
                        Office of Internal Oversight Services for 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies 
                        of any reports to the Department of Field 
                        Support, the Department of Peacekeeping 
                        Operations, the Head of Mission, and the Member 
                        State concerned.
                  (E) Follow-up.--The Conduct and Discipline Unit in 
                the headquarters of the United Nations Department of 
                Field Support should be appropriately staffed, 
                resourced, and tasked with--
                          (i) promulgating measures to prevent 
                        misconduct;
                          (ii) receiving reports by field personnel and 
                        coordinating the Department's response to 
                        allegations of misconduct;
                          (iii) gathering follow-up information on 
                        completed investigations, particularly by 
                        focusing on disciplinary actions against the 
                        individual concerned taken by the United 
                        Nations or by the Member State that is 
                        contributing troops to which such individual 
                        belongs, and sharing such information with the 
                        Security Council, the Department of 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, 
                        and the community hosting the peacekeeping 
                        operation; and
                          (iv) contributing pertinent data on conduct 
                        and discipline to the database required 
                        pursuant to subparagraph (H).
                  (F) Financial liability and victims assistance.--
                Although peacekeeping operations should provide 
                immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse 
                or exploitation, the responsibility for providing 
                longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely 
                with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In 
                particular:
                          (i) The United Nations should not assume 
                        responsibility for providing long-term 
                        treatment or compensation under the Sexual 
                        Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assistance 
                        Mechanism by utilizing assessed contributions 
                        to United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
                        thereby shielding individuals from personal 
                        liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of 
                        impunity.
                          (ii) If an individual responsible for 
                        misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, 
                        redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide 
                        assistance, responsibility for providing 
                        assistance to a victim should be assigned to 
                        the Member State that contributed the 
                        contingent to which such individual belonged or 
                        to the manager concerned.
                          (iii) In the case of misconduct by a member 
                        of a military contingent, appropriate funds 
                        shall be withheld from the troop contributing 
                        country concerned.
                          (iv) In the case of misconduct by a civilian 
                        employee or contractor of the United Nations, 
                        appropriate wages shall be garnished from such 
                        individual or fines shall be imposed against 
                        such individual, consistent with existing 
                        United Nations Staff Rules, and retirement 
                        funds shall not be shielded from liability.
                  (G) Managers and commanders.--The manner in which 
                managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by 
                those serving under them should be included in their 
                individual performance evaluations, so that managers 
                and commanders who take decisive action to deter and 
                address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create 
                a permissive environment or impede investigations are 
                penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
                  (H) Database.--A centralized database, including 
                personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data, 
                should be created and maintained within the United 
                Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the 
                Department of Field Support, and other relevant United 
                Nations bodies without further delay to track cases of 
                misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and 
                subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who 
                have engaged in misconduct or other criminal 
                activities, regardless of category or rank, are 
                permanently barred from participation in future 
                peacekeeping operations.
                  (I) Cooperation of member states.--If a Member State 
                routinely refuses to cooperate with the directives 
                contained herein or acts to shield its nationals from 
                personal liability, that Member State should be barred 
                from contributing troops or personnel to future 
                peacekeeping operations.
                  (J) Welfare.--Peacekeeping operations should continue 
                to seek to maintain a minimum standard of welfare for 
                mission personnel to ameliorate conditions of service, 
                while adjustments are made to the discretionary welfare 
                payments currently provided to Member States that 
                contribute troops to offset the cost of operation-
                provided recreational facilities, as necessary and 
                appropriate.

SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION.

  (a) New or Expanded Peacekeeping Operations Contingent Upon 
Presidential Certification of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.--
          (1) No new or expanded peacekeeping operations.--
                  (A) Certification.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State 
                certifies that the requirements described in paragraph 
                (2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the United 
                Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
                United States at the United Nations to oppose the 
                creation of new, or expansion of existing, United 
                Nations peacekeeping operations.
                  (B) Exception and notification.--The requirements 
                described under paragraph (2) may be waived with 
                respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the 
                President determines that failure to deploy new or 
                additional peacekeepers in such situation will 
                significantly contribute to the widespread loss of 
                human life, genocide, or the endangerment of a vital 
                national security interest of the United States. If the 
                President makes such a determination, the President 
                shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of 
                such waiver, notify the appropriate congressional 
                committees of such determination and resulting waiver.
          (2) Certification of peacekeeping operations reforms.--The 
        certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification 
        made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of 
        reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted 
        by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or 
        the General Assembly, as appropriate:
                  (A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the 
                status of a binding rule and applies equally to all 
                personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations, regardless of category or rank, has been 
                adopted by the General Assembly and duly incorporated 
                into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of 
                Understanding, and mechanisms have been established for 
                training such personnel concerning the requirements of 
                the Code and enforcement of the Code.
                  (B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, 
                serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained 
                concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and 
                each has been given a personal copy of the Code, 
                translated into the national language of such 
                personnel.
                  (C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, 
                are required to sign an oath that each has received a 
                copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide 
                by the Code, and that each understands the consequences 
                of violating the Code, including immediate termination 
                of participation in and permanent exclusion from all 
                current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as 
                the assumption of personal liability for victims 
                compensation as a condition of the appointment to such 
                operation.
                  (D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and 
                implemented educational outreach programs to reach 
                local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such 
                operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the 
                part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to 
                identify the individual to whom the local population 
                may direct complaints or file allegations of 
                exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
                  (E) The creation of a centralized database, including 
                personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data, has 
                been completed and is being maintained in the United 
                Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that 
                tracks cases of misconduct, including the outcomes of 
                investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure 
                that personnel, regardless of category or rank, who 
                have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities 
                are permanently barred from participation in future 
                peacekeeping operations.
                  (F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the 
                United Nations and each Member State that contributes 
                troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by 
                the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations that specifically obligates each such Member 
                State to--
                          (i) uphold the uniform Code of Conduct which 
                        shall apply equally to all personnel serving in 
                        United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
                        regardless of category or rank;
                          (ii) designate a competent legal authority, 
                        preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the 
                        area of sexual exploitation and abuse where 
                        appropriate, to participate in any 
                        investigation into an allegation of misconduct 
                        brought against an individual of such Member 
                        State;
                          (iii) refer to its competent national or 
                        military authority for possible prosecution, if 
                        warranted, any investigation of a violation of 
                        the Code of Conduct or other criminal activity 
                        by an individual of such Member State;
                          (iv) report to the Department of Field 
                        Support and the Department of Peacekeeping 
                        Operations on the outcome of any such 
                        investigation;
                          (v) undertake to conduct on-site court 
                        martial proceedings, where practical and 
                        appropriate, relating to allegations of 
                        misconduct alleged against an individual of 
                        such Member State; and
                          (vi) assume responsibility for the provision 
                        of appropriate assistance to a victim of 
                        misconduct committed by an individual of such 
                        Member State.
                  (G) A professional and independent investigative and 
                audit function has been established within the United 
                Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the 
                Office of Internal Oversight Services to monitor United 
                Nations peacekeeping operations.

                                Summary

Title I--Funding of the United Nations:
    States the policy of the U.S. to pursue shifting the UN 
regular budget to a voluntary basis (rather than the current 
assessed basis). This will allow the U.S. to fund only UN 
agencies and programs that advance U.S. interests and values, 
and the resulting competition among UN entities for funding 
will likely make those entities more transparent, accountable, 
and effective. This title gives the UN two years after this 
bill's enactment date to phase in this reform before the U.S. 
is required to withhold funds. However, after two years, should 
less than 80% of the UN regular budget be funded on a voluntary 
basis, then the U.S. shall, until the 80% threshold is met, 
withhold 50% of its non-voluntary regular budget contributions 
assessed by the UN. Note that this creates a sliding incentive 
scale, not an ``all-or-nothing'' sanction: The more the UN 
makes its regular budget voluntary, the less we withhold, up 
until the UN hits 80% voluntary funding, at which point there 
would be no withholdings.
Title II--Transparency and Accountability for U.S. Contributions to the 
        United Nations:
    Authorizes the Secretary of State to investigate and audit 
the use of U.S. contributions to the UN, and makes funding of 
UN entities contingent upon their providing the Secretary with 
written pledges to cooperate in sharing basic oversight 
information with the Secretary and Congress and to operate in a 
fully accountable manner (including by taking a number of 
specific measures to ensure accountability), and complying with 
those pledges. Also protects Congress's role in determining 
funding levels to UN entities, by prohibiting U.S. 
contributions to the UN from being used for any purpose other 
than the specific purposes for which it was made available by 
Congress (for example, funds made available for assessed 
contributions could not be used for voluntary contributions and 
vice versa). Also makes it U.S. policy to seek repayment to the 
U.S. Treasury of any overpayments made to any UN entity, and to 
seek reform of the UN Tax Equalization Fund.
Title III--U.S. Policy at the United Nations:
    States U.S. policy on various issues relating to the UN 
(e.g., transparency, reform, Security Council expansion, 
terrorism, anti-Semitism, treatment of Israel, Taiwan, 
positions of human rights violators at the UN) and requires 
reports from the State Department on UN reform and personnel 
practices.
Title IV--Status of Palestinian Entities at the United Nations:
    Opposes efforts by the Palestinian leadership to evade a 
negotiated settlement with Israel and undermine opportunities 
for peace by seeking de facto recognition of a Palestinian 
state by the UN (through gaining membership for ``Palestine'' 
in UN agencies or programs). Withholds U.S. contributions from 
any UN agency or program that upgrades the status of the PLO/
Palestinian observer mission.
Title V--United Nations Human Rights Council:
    States that the U.S. may not run for a seat on the Council, 
and must withhold a proportionate share of our UN regular 
budget contribution equal to our proportion of Council funding, 
until State can certify that the Council does not include 
Members: subject to Security Council sanctions; under Security 
Council-mandated human rights investigation; that are state 
sponsors of terrorism; or that are ``countries of particular 
concern'' for religious freedom violations.
Title VI--Goldstone Report:
    Declares it is U.S. policy to lead a high-level diplomatic 
campaign calling for the UN to revoke and repudiate the 
Goldstone Report, which falsely accused Israel of deliberately 
attacking Palestinian civilians during Operation Cast Lead. 
Would also withhold U.S. funding from the Goldstone Report and 
its preparatory and follow-on measures. Also declares it is 
U.S. policy to strongly and unequivocally oppose any 
consideration, legitimization, or support of the Goldstone 
Report, or measures stemming from the report, in international 
organizations, and to encourage other nations to repudiate the 
report.
Title VII--Durban Process:
    Withholds U.S. funding from any part of the UN's 
irreparably flawed Durban process, which was supposed to fight 
racism and bigotry, but which has been hijacked by rogue 
regimes and used to advance an anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, anti-
Western, anti-freedom agenda. Supports the decision of the U.S. 
and other countries to not participate in the Durban 2 and 3 
conferences. States that it is U.S. policy to lead a high-level 
diplomatic campaign to encourage other countries not to 
participate in, fund, or legitimize any part of the Durban 
process, and to develop credible alternative forums to fight 
racism and bigotry. Prohibits funding for U.S. participation in 
any part of the Durban process.
Title VIII--UNRWA:
    Prohibits U.S. funding to the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency, which aids Palestinian refugees. Despite failing 
to meet the requirements under U.S. law to obtain assistance, 
UNRWA has received about $500 million in FY 2009 and 2010 
alone, with over $230 million in further funding included in 
the Administration's FY 2012 budget request. The prohibition on 
funding would remain until UNRWA: vets its staff and aid 
recipients via U.S. watch lists for ties to Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations; stops engaging in anti-Israel propaganda and 
politicized activities; improves its accountability and 
transparency; and stops banking with financial institutions 
under U.S. designation for terror financing or money 
laundering.
Title IX--International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
    Directs the U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA to 
advance a number of reforms at the organization, including 
measures to strengthen the IAEA's ability to monitor member 
states' compliance with their obligations and ensure that 
states not in compliance do not receive nuclear-related 
assistance from the IAEA or other countries. Withholds U.S. 
funding from the IAEA in proportion to the amount the IAEA 
spends on technical assistance to state sponsors of terrorism, 
like Iran and Syria.
Title X--Peacekeeping:
    Calls for far-reaching reforms in the areas of planning, 
management, conduct and accountability in UN peacekeeping, and 
mandates U.S. opposition to new or expanded peacekeeping 
missions until the most critical, but immediately achievable, 
reforms are instituted (subject to a Presidential waiver based 
on vital U.S. national security interests or to prevent 
genocide or other widespread loss of human life). States it is 
U.S. policy to promote the conduct of independent, annual 
audits of each peacekeeping operation to guarantee that all 
missions are efficient and cost effective. Promotes the review 
of all peacekeeping operation mandates with a view toward 
identifying objectives that are practical and achievable. 
Addresses misconduct and sexual exploitation by personnel 
associated with peacekeeping missions by supporting the 
introduction of pre-deployment training, the adoption of a code 
of conduct, and the establishment of an investigative body to 
probe allegations of wrongdoing.

                         Background and Purpose

    Since the United States took a leading role in the founding 
of the United Nations in 1945, the U.S. has strongly engaged in 
the UN to advance U.S. interests and values, and to hold the UN 
accountable to its founding mission. Unfortunately, the UN 
continues to fall far short of the noble goals for which it was 
founded, and the UN's failures continue to have real and 
adverse consequences for American citizens, interests, and 
allies. It is precisely because of the significance of the UN 
that reforming it is such an urgent priority. Accordingly, the 
United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 
2011 seeks to implement lessons learned from past UN reform 
efforts by the U.S. in order to pave the way for new action to 
make the UN more transparent, accountable, objective, and 
effective.
    The fundamental problem with the UN is that it consumes 
more and more U.S. taxpayer dollars each year, and then uses 
American contributions to fund activities that undermine U.S. 
interests and values. According to the Office of Management and 
Budget, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the U.S. contributed a record 
$7.692 billion to the UN system--over 21 percent more than the 
previous year's total, which had also been a record. U.S. 
annual contributions to the UN system have more than doubled in 
the past decade. These dramatic funding increases--even at a 
time of skyrocketing deficits and debt for the U.S. 
Government--reflect similar dramatic increases in the UN's 
budget. The UN's ``regular budget'' (its biennial operating 
budget) has more than doubled in the past decade, from $2.49 
billion in 2000-2001 to $5.16 billion in 2010-2011. As 
Ambassador Joseph Torsella, the U.S. Representative to the UN 
for Management and Reform, has stated, ``For a decade now, the 
United Nations regular budget has grown dramatically, 
relentlessly, and exponentially.'' Likewise, the UN's biennial 
peacekeeping budget has more than quadrupled in the past 
decade, from $1.7 billion in 2000-2001 to $7.2 billion in 2010-
2011.
    In return for their tax dollars, the American people 
received a UN that continues to be pervaded by non-
transparency, malfeasance, mismanagement, corruption, waste, 
fraud, abuse, and bias. For example, the UN's ``Oil-for-Food'' 
program, intended to address the humanitarian needs of ordinary 
Iraqis, was exploited by Saddam Hussein's regime, which used it 
to evade economic sanctions and, according to the Government 
Accountability Office, ``obtain[ed] illicit revenues ranging 
from $7.4 billion to $12.8 billion.'' A UN-appointed 
``Independent Inquiry Committee'' headed by former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker (the ``Volcker Committee'') 
accused the former director of the ``Oil-for-Food'' program of 
taking bribes in exchange for steering program contracts to an 
Egyptian businessman. That official was later indicted in the 
Southern District of New York for bribery, wire fraud, and 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud and theft or bribery. In 2005, 
the Volcker Committee found that ``the cumulative management 
performance of the [UN] Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-
General fell short of the standards that the [UN] should strive 
to maintain.'' Consequently, the Volcker Committee made six 
major recommendations for UN reform, noting: ``The inescapable 
conclusion from the Committee's work is that the [UN] needs 
thoroughgoing reform--and it needs it urgently . . . real 
change must take place, and change over a wide area . . . To 
settle for less, to permit delay and dilution, would be to 
invite failure. It would, in reality, further erode public 
support, undercut effectiveness, and dishonor the ideals upon 
which the United Nations is built.''
    This Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations also investigated the ``Oil-for-Food'' program, 
releasing on December 7, 2005 a report entitled: ``The Oil-for-
Food Program: The Systemic Failure of the United Nations.'' The 
report stated: ``Problems associated with the [``Oil-for-Food'' 
program] are not isolated or unique to that particular UN-
administered program. The [program], and the myriad of problems 
associated with it, are symptomatic of a pervasive 
mismanagement and failure of leadership at the UN . . . Without 
a successful effort by the UN to create a culture of 
accountability and transparency, the ability of the 
organization to perform its core functions will be 
undermined.''
    Another example of the need for UN reform was the ``Cash-
for-Kim'' scandal at the UN Development Program (UNDP) office 
in North Korea. In 2008, a Senate subcommittee found that: (1) 
UNDP's local staff was selected by the North Korean regime, and 
UNDP paid staff salaries directly to the regime--in foreign 
currency--with no way to know that the funds were not being 
diverted to enrich the regime; (2) UNDP prevented proper 
oversight and undermined whistleblower protections by limiting 
access to its audits and refusing to submit them to the UN 
Ethics Office's jurisdiction; (3) the regime used its 
relationship with UNDP to move money outside North Korea; and 
(4) UNDP transferred funds to a company tied to an entity 
designated by the U.S. as North Korea's financial agent for 
weapons sales.
    In March of 2011, Ambassador Mark Wallace, former U.S. 
Representative to the UN for Management and Reform, testified 
before this Committee that ``UNDP . . . was acting in violation 
of its own rules and regulations and had served as a large and 
steady source of hard currency to [North Korea] and Kim Jong 
Il's regime. In addition to hard currency, we discovered that 
dual-use equipment on the U.S. Commerce Control List were sent 
to North Korea without UNDP obtaining proper licenses for re-
export in contravention of U.S. export control laws. We 
discovered that a number of other fiduciary controls related to 
the hiring and management of local personnel and project 
oversight had been grossly neglected. Most troubling, in the 
course of our investigation, a whistleblower that had 
cooperated with both the U.S. Mission as well as the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, was mistreated by 
UNDP management in retaliation for raising legitimate concerns 
about UNDP's operations in North Korea.''
    In the wake of this scandal, UNDP briefly pulled out of 
North Korea, but it later returned and continues to select 
staff from a list of candidates hand-picked by the North Korean 
regime.
    In another example illustrative of the need for immediate 
action to address the UN's failures, an independent Procurement 
Task Force (PTF) uncovered cases of corruption tainting 
hundreds of millions of dollars in UN contracts. In response, 
the UN shut down the PTF, transferring its functions and open 
cases to the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), 
which has largely failed to continue the PTF's work. When the 
former head of OIOS, Under-Secretary-General Inga-Britt 
Ahlenius, attempted to hire the chairman of the PTF, former 
U.S. prosecutor Robert Appleton (who later appeared before this 
Committee in a briefing on UN reform in January of 2011), as 
OIOS's lead investigator, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
blocked the appointment. As Ahlenius's term in office neared 
its conclusion, she stated in an internal report (later leaked) 
to Secretary-General Ban that, with respect to the UN, ``There 
is no transparency, there is lack of accountability. Rather 
than supporting the internal oversight which is the sign of 
strong leadership and good governance, you have strived to 
control it which is to undermine its position. I do not see any 
signs of reform in the [UN].''
    Unsurprisingly, Secretary-General Ban has not released 
Ahlenius's report to the public, despite direct Congressional 
requests to do so. Former UN Deputy-Secretary-General Mark 
Malloch Brown has also stated that ``There's a huge redundancy 
and lack of efficiency'' in the UN system and that the UN's 
budget is ``utterly opaque, un-transparent, and completely in 
shadow.''
    The UN has also continued to single out one country--the 
democratic, Jewish State of Israel--for condemnation. The UN 
Human Rights Council--the majority of whose members are not 
free democracies, and include many repressive regimes--has 
devoted the plurality of its country-specific resolutions and 
special sessions to attacking Israel, and the Council's sole 
country-specific agenda item focuses on condemnation of Israel.
    The UN's Durban process, including the ``Durban III'' 
meeting held at the UN General Assembly in September of 2011, 
continues to single out Israel and implicitly accuse it of 
racism against the Palestinians. The UN General Assembly also 
continues to pass multiple resolutions each year condemning 
Israel, and multiple UN bodies function for the sole purpose of 
propagandizing against Israel for purported human rights abuses 
against the Palestinians.
    Finally, many UN bodies continue to be tarnished by the 
presence of authoritarian regimes in positions of leadership. 
The Cuban dictatorship is the vice chair of the Human Rights 
Council, Iran is a vice president of the General Assembly and a 
member of the Commission on the Status of Women, and North 
Korea and Cuba recently chaired the Conference on Disarmament, 
to cite but a few examples.
    This UN bias against democracies has real-world 
consequences. For example, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), in contravention of its obligations under 
the Oslo Accords, has chosen to bypass direct negotiations with 
Israel and instead seek de facto recognition of a ``Palestinian 
state'' by the UN via the granting of membership in UN bodies 
to ``Palestine.'' While the PLO's application for UN membership 
remains pending before the UN Security Council, the General 
Conference of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) recently voted to grant full membership 
in UNESCO to ``Palestine.'' In addition to discrediting the UN 
itself, this step has further undermined chances for peace and 
security in the Middle East, has rewarded Palestinian rejection 
of direct negotiations and recognition of Israel as a Jewish 
state, and has set a dangerous precedent by granting to a non-
state actor privileges previously reserved for sovereign 
states.
    That the UN is in dire need of reform is not in dispute. 
The question is how to achieve such reform. According to 
Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, 
the Obama Administration has embarked on a ``new era of 
engagement'' regarding the UN, marked by unconditional and full 
payment of U.S. assessed contributions to the UN in the hope 
that such payments will increase U.S. influence. As Ambassador 
Rice said, ``We pay our bills. We push for real reform.''
    This ``money now, reform later'' strategy has failed. For 
example, the Administration has rightfully urged the UN to cut 
its budget and cancel a planned pay raise for UN personnel. 
Instead, the UN is poised to go through with the pay raise and 
increase the UN regular budget for the next biennium. As 
Ambassador Torsella said, this budget increase ``does not 
represent a break from `business as usual,' but rather a 
continuation of it.''
    Likewise, in the six years since the Volcker Committee 
released its recommendations for sweeping reforms, such reforms 
have not been forthcoming. The Congressional Research Service, 
in a communication to the Committee earlier this year, stated 
that ``Based on the information we have to date, it appears 
that many of the Volcker recommendations have not been 
implemented . . . there are many recommendations in the report 
that have not been implemented (creating a COO position, 
distinguishing Secretariat/Security Council roles, and 
overhauling management and hiring practices, to name a few) . . 
. [and] of those recommendations that appear to have been 
implemented, it's difficult to determine whether they came 
about because of the Volcker report. Moreover, there is some 
disagreement as to whether these newly implemented management 
reforms are actually effective.''
    The Obama Administration also decided to seek to reform the 
Human Rights Council from within by joining it. However, the 
Council's ``five-year review,'' which concluded earlier this 
year, failed to enact any of the structural reforms, such as 
meaningful membership standards, that are needed to turn the 
Council from a rogues' gallery to a useful entity for advancing 
human rights. The Council's abominable permanent agenda item 
regarding Israel also remained in place. The Administration 
itself called the review process a ``race to the bottom.'' The 
Council has continued to adopt one anti-Israel resolution after 
another. And the Council generally continues to fail to address 
longstanding human rights violations until and unless the 
perpetrating regimes are already extraordinarily isolated and 
the violations have become so blatant and public that inaction 
becomes impossible to justify politically. For example, the 
Council included Qaddafi's Libyan regime as a member until that 
regime began murdering Libyans in the streets in the spring of 
2011; the Syrian regime was also poised to become a member of 
the Council until it likewise ramped up its public brutality 
earlier this year. The longstanding human rights violations 
perpetrated by the Qaddafi and Assad regimes for decades prior 
to this year did not lead to any action by the Council, and the 
Council still has failed to act to condemn abuses by China, 
Cuba, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, etc. U.S. membership has not 
reformed the Council in any lasting, strategic way, but it has 
legitimized a fundamentally illegitimate body that the New York 
Times once called ``an ugly sham, offering cover to an 
unacceptable status quo.''
    Likewise, the Obama Administration's ``new era of 
engagement'' failed to prevent UNESCO from voting to grant 
membership to ``Palestine.''
    A fundamental lesson has not been learned: The reason the 
U.S. pays so much to the UN and gets such backwards results in 
return is that at the UN, the member countries that call the 
shots do not have to pay the bills. The UN's main source of 
budgetary funding is assessed (mandatory) contributions. The 
U.S. is assessed 22 percent of the cost of the UN's regular 
budget. In contrast, two-thirds of the member countries 
together pay a total of less than one percent of the regular 
budget. But they can and do vote together to adopt bloated and 
skyrocketing budgets and deplorable programming decisions, and 
then pass the costs on the principal donor countries, such as 
the U.S. Because the Administration pays U.S. assessed 
contributions in full, with no strings attached, the U.S. has 
surrendered its strongest leverage to actually advance our 
interests, support our allies, and achieve reforms at the UN.
    As long as other countries and UN bureaucrats know that the 
U.S. will pay every cent of its dues, no matter what, there is 
no incentive for real, sweeping, and lasting reforms. At the 
UN, the deck is stacked against the U.S. A game-changer is 
needed, and that game-changer is H.R. 2829, the United Nations 
Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act.
    This legislation builds on lessons learned by conditioning 
U.S. funding to the UN on a number of vital reforms and other 
actions needed to advance U.S. interests. The most important 
reform is to shift the funding basis for the UN regular budget 
from assessed to voluntary contributions, so that U.S. 
taxpayers, through their elected representatives in Congress, 
can choose how much of their tax dollars go to the UN and what 
those dollars are spent on. A shift to voluntary funding will 
help end the UN's entitlement culture and thereby force UN 
bodies to perform better and cut costs in order to justify 
their budgets in a competitive funding environment--basic free 
market principles.
    This voluntary funding model works for the UN Children's 
Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, and other UN agencies, and it can 
work for the UN as a whole. As Catherine Bertini, the former 
head of the World Food Program, has said, ``Voluntary funding 
creates an entirely different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN. 
At WFP, every staff member knows that we have to be as 
efficient, accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as is 
possible. If we are not, donor governments can take their 
funding elsewhere in a very competitive world among UN 
agencies, NGOs, and bilateral governments.''
    Shifting more of the UN's funding to a voluntary basis has 
been advocated by many other advocates for UN reform. 
Ambassador John Bolton, former U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the UN, stated that ``[O]nly one UN reform is worth the effort, 
and without it nothing else will succeed: Voluntary 
contributions must replace assessed contributions. If America 
insisted it would pay only for what works, and that we get what 
we pay for, we would revolutionize life throughout the UN 
system. There is simply no doubt that eliminating the 
`entitlement' mentality caused by relying on assessed 
contributions would profoundly affect UN officials around the 
world.'' He has also stated that ``Contrary to the claims of 
those who oppose moving toward voluntary funding, such a system 
would not necessarily threaten UN activities. Many independent 
UN-affiliated funds, programs, and specialized agencies 
currently work well relying on voluntary funding. Such funding 
has remained fairly stable from year to year, with donor 
nations consistently and reliably providing money for 
activities that they support. Indeed, in many cases, voluntary 
funding has increased sharply. Almost without exception, only 
voluntarily funded activities that fail to meet donor 
expectations of performance experience reductions in funding 
levels. This type of financial accountability is precisely what 
is needed at the UN.''
    Similarly, Ambassador Wallace testified before the 
Committee that ``[M]any of the UN's best performing agencies do 
so because they have to actually compete with their 
counterparts in the world of nongovernmental organizations . . 
. The United States should strongly consider promoting the 
application of this [voluntary] funding model to other UN 
agencies. Contrary to what some critics have suggested, this 
will not necessarily result in the United States abandoning the 
United Nations . . . Given the inability of the UN to reduce 
superfluous mandates and implement the most basic performance 
requirements for many agencies, it is time for Member States, 
and by extension the taxpayers, to begin imposing those 
standards ourselves. It is time for agencies within the UN 
community to know that, in many cases, there is competition. 
The net winners will be not only Member States, but the people 
many of these agencies are designed to help in the first 
place.''
    Brett Schaefer, an expert on the United Nations at the 
Heritage Foundation, testified before the Committee that 
``Shifting activities funded currently through assessed budgets 
to voluntary funding would make it easier for Congress to 
support the programs that it wishes and withhold funding for 
those it does not. Having U.N. organizations compete for 
funding would also contribute to efficiency and effectiveness 
and improve responsiveness to member state requests. With this 
in mind, Congress should: Seek to shift funding for U.N. 
activities and organizations from assessed budgets to voluntary 
contributions.''
    And in 2005, the bipartisan Gingrich-Mitchell Task Force on 
the United Nations concluded that ``The United States should 
work with other member-states to identify which of the 
operational programs now receiving funds from the assessed 
budget should be funded entirely by voluntary contributions . . 
. Many UN programs . . . might function better if funded 
entirely by voluntary contributions . . . having them rely 
entirely on voluntary contributions imposes a kind of market 
discipline, forcing them to produce results in order to receive 
continued funding.''
    To achieve this reform of shifting to a voluntary funding 
basis, as well as several other vital reforms throughout the UN 
system, this legislation ties U.S. contributions for the UN to 
the implementation of these reforms. This is a common-sense 
approach: If person A contracts with person B for the provision 
of a service to person A, but person B does not meet basic, 
minimum standards in providing that service, then person A 
could withhold payment until he gets what he contracted for. 
If, instead, person A pays his bills to person B on time and in 
full, as the Executive Branch does to the UN, then he will 
never get what he actually paid for. For years--for decades--
the UN has defaulted on its founding purposes and obligations, 
and thus has been in breach of contract with the United States.
    Some have claimed that that withholding assessed 
contributions to the UN would violate U.S. treaty obligations, 
or that this method simply does not work and would lead to 
diminished U.S. leadership in the world. However, past 
experience proves otherwise.
    Withholding of assessed contributions to the UN does not 
constitute a violation of treaty obligations. Article 17(2) of 
the UN Charter states that ``The expenses of the [UN] shall be 
borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.'' 
However, in the 1957 case of Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court 
ruled that ``[A]n Act of Congress, which must comply with the 
Constitution, is in full parity with a treaty, and that when a 
statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a 
treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the 
treaty null.'' Therefore, whenever Congress has enacted 
legislation requiring withholding of U.S. assessed 
contributions to the UN, those statutory requirements have 
superseded U.S. treaty obligations.
    Further, as Thomas E.L. Dewey of the Heritage Foundation 
wrote in 1986, ``[I]t has not been established convincingly 
that any nation has an absolute obligation . . . to pay an 
assessed contribution to the United Nations... The reality is 
that withholding assessed contributions is a longstanding and 
near universal practice since the founding of the U.N.''
    The United States cannot be expected to bind itself, 
against its interests, to treaty provisions that have been 
nullified by international practice (not to mention U.S. law). 
The Executive Branch has previously recognized this point. In 
1965, during the Johnson Administration, Ambassador Arthur 
Goldberg, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN and a former 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, announced, with the 
acquiescence of Congress, what is commonly referred to as the 
``Goldberg Reservation.'' Ambassador Goldberg stated that ``. . 
. if any member can insist on making an exception to the 
principle of collective financial responsibility with respect 
to certain activities of the organization, the United States 
reserves the same option to make exceptions to the principles 
of collective financial responsibility if, in our view, strong 
and compelling reasons exist for doing so. There can be no 
double standard among the members of the [UN].'' As Ambassador 
Goldberg later wrote in the late 1980s to one of his successors 
as Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, ``. . . there can be no question that under the 
`Goldberg Reservation' the United States reserves the right to 
withhold assessments for UN activities which, in our opinion, 
do not serve our national purpose.''
    Having determined that withholding assessed contributions 
does not violate treaty obligations, the remaining question is 
whether this method works. The answer is yes.
    In the 1980s, a Democratic House of Representatives and a 
Republican Senate enacted the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment, 
which conditioned payment of 20 percent of U.S. assessed 
contributions to the UN regular budget and specialized agencies 
on the implementation of reforms in voting on budgets. Key 
reforms in this regard were achieved and, for over a decade, 
helped to restrain the growth of UN budgets. When the U.S. 
later acquiesced in the abandonment of these budgetary reforms, 
UN budgets predictably skyrocketed.
    In 1993, Congress conditioned funding for the UN on the UN 
General Assembly's creation of an inspector general for 
oversight. The next year, the General Assembly created OIOS, an 
imperfect body that has, nonetheless, aided somewhat in 
addressing the UN's pervasive problems.
    In the late 1990s, Senators Jesse Helms and Joe Biden 
worked together to draft legislation, adopted by Congress, that 
conditioned payment of U.S. arrears to the UN on the 
implementation of real, meaningful reforms that saved U.S. 
taxpayers money.
    Another prominent example of successful ``smart 
withholding'' spans over two decades. In 1989, Yasser Arafat's 
PLO sought de facto recognition of a ``Palestinian state'' from 
the UN via the granting of membership in UN agencies, including 
UNESCO and the World Health Organization (WHO), to 
``Palestine.'' This campaign looked unstoppable until the 
George H.W. Bush Administration threatened, in the words of 
Secretary of State James A. Baker, ``that the United States 
[would] make no further contributions, voluntary or assessed, 
to any international organization which makes any change in the 
P.L.O.'s present status as an observer organization.'' UN 
agencies recognized that their funding was in danger and 
quickly deferred indefinitely action on the PLO's membership 
application. Instead of weakening U.S. leadership abroad, the 
George H.W. Bush Administration's readiness to set meaningful 
and real standards for the payment of U.S. contributions to the 
UN strengthened America's hand in advancing U.S. interests and 
protecting U.S. allies at the UN. That Administration went on 
to achieve many other successes at the UN, including multiple 
key UN Security Council resolutions against Saddam Hussein's 
regime in Iraq, as well as the UN General Assembly's repeal in 
1991 of its infamous ``Zionism is racism'' resolution.
    Two separate Democratic Congresses adopted legislation to 
support the George H.W. Bush Administration's position with 
respect to the status of the PLO at the UN. In 1990, Congress 
adopted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 1990 and 
1991, which included a provision stating that ``No funds 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act 
shall be available for the United Nations or any specialized 
agency thereof which accords the Palestine Liberation 
Organization the same standing as member states.'' Likewise, in 
1994, Congress adopted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
for 1994 and 1995, which included a provision stating that 
``The United States shall not make any voluntary or assessed 
contribution--(1) to any affiliated organization of the United 
Nations which grants full membership as a state to any 
organization or group that does not have the internationally 
recognized attributes of statehood, or (2) to the United 
Nations, if the United Nations grants full membership as a 
state in the United Nations to any organization or group that 
does not have the internationally recognized attributes of 
statehood, during any period in which such membership is 
effective.'' Each of the two bills originated in the Committee 
and were both authored by the Committee's chairman.
    Fast-forwarding to this year, the Obama Administration's 
rhetoric did not stop UNESCO from granting membership to 
``Palestine.'' Indeed, it appeared likely that other UN bodies 
would soon follow suit, despite extensive U.S. diplomacy in 
opposition. Then, on October 31, 2011, after the General 
Conference of UNESCO cast its fateful vote in this regard, the 
Obama Administration announced that it would implement the 
aforementioned U.S. laws and stop contributions to UNESCO. This 
use of ``smart withholding'' provoked exactly the kind of 
reaction that U.S. law intended. UN Secretary-General Ban, who 
had previously posed with PLO leader Abu Mazen when the latter 
presented his application for UN membership, sharply changed 
course and stated that Palestinian efforts to join other UN 
agencies are ``not beneficial for Palestine and not beneficial 
for anybody.'' At the time of this report, it is unclear if the 
PLO will continue to pursue membership in other UN agencies in 
the face of strong opposition from forces which would normally 
not stand in the way of anti-Israel measures but are afraid of 
the repercussions for U.S. funding of the UN.
    In short, at the UN, money talks, and smart withholding 
works. It is time to apply this principle across the UN system 
in order to achieve reforms in the interest of the American 
people, American allies, and all responsible nations. The 
United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act 
does just that.

                                Hearings

    During the present Congress, the full Committee has held 
numerous sessions on United Nations reform, including the 
following:

January 25, 2011, ``The United Nations: Urgent Problems that 
        Need Congressional Action.'' (Brett Schaefer, Jay 
        Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs, the 
        Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, the Heritage 
        Foundation; Robert Appleton, former chairman of the 
        United Nations Procurement Task Force; Claudia Rosett, 
        Journalist-in-Residence, the Foundation for Defense of 
        Democracies; Hillel C. Neuer, Executive Director, UN 
        Watch; Peter Yeo, Vice President for Public Policy and 
        Public Affairs, the United Nations Foundation and 
        Executive Director, the Better World Campaign; and Mark 
        Quarterman, Senior Adviser and Director, Program on 
        Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation, the Center for 
        Strategic and International Studies)
March 3, 2011, ``Reforming the United Nations: Lessons 
        Learned.'' (Hon. Mark D. Wallace, President and Chief 
        Executive Officer, United Against Nuclear Iran, and 
        former United States Representative to the United 
        Nations for Management and Reform; Hon. Terry Miller, 
        Director of the Center for International Trade and 
        Economics, the Heritage Foundation, and former United 
        States Representative to the United Nations Economic 
        and Social Council, United States Observer at the 
        United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
        Organization, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
        for Economic and Global Issues; and Ted Piccone, Senior 
        Fellow and Deputy Director for Foreign Policy, the 
        Brookings Institution)
April 7, 2011, ``Reforming the United Nations: The Future of 
        U.S. Policy.'' (Hon. Susan Rice, U.S. Permanent 
        Representative to the United Nations)

                   Committee Consideration and Votes

    On October 13, 2011, the Foreign Affairs Committee marked 
up the bill, H.R. 2829, pursuant to notice, in open session.

        1) LThe Committee considered en bloc and adopted by 
        unanimous consent five amendments: An amendment in the 
        nature of a substitute offered by the Chairman, three 
        amendments offered by Mr. Connolly, and one amendment 
        offered by Mr. Fortenberry.
        2) LAn amendment in the nature of a substitute offered 
        by the Ranking Member, Mr. Berman, was not agreed to, 
        by voice vote.

    H.R. 2829, as amended, was agreed to by Roll Call vote of 
23 ayes--15 noes.
    Voting YES: Ros-Lehtinen, Smith (NJ), Burton, Gallegly, 
Rohrabacher, Manzullo, Royce, Chabot, Wilson (SC), Mack, 
McCaul, Poe, Bilirakis, Schmidt, Johnson (OH), Rivera, Kelly, 
Griffin, Marino, Duncan (SC), Buerkle, Ellmers, and Turner.
    Voting NO: Berman, Ackerman, Payne, Sherman, Engel, Meeks, 
Carnahan, Connolly, Deutch, Cardoza, Higgins, Schwartz, Bass 
(FL), Keating, and Cicilline.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House Rule XIII, the 
Committee reports that the findings and recommendations of the 
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) 
of House Rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions 
of this report, particularly the ``Background and Purpose,'' 
``Summary,'' and ``Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion'' 
sections.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII, the 
Committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget 
authority, entitlement authority, and tax expenditures or 
revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                 Washington, DC, November 18, 2011.

Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Madam Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2829, the United 
Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sunita 
D'Monte, who can be reached at 226-2840.
            Sincerely,
                                      Douglas W. Elmendorf.

cc:
        Honorable Howard L. Berman
        Ranking Member
H.R. 2829--United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act 
        of 2011
    As ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on October 13, 2011

    H.R. 2829 would require the Department of State to increase 
its oversight of the United Nations (U.N.) and would withhold 
assessed and voluntary contributions to the U.N. and its 
entities if certain conditions are not met.
    The department conducts oversight of the U.N. and most of 
its entities through the U.N. Transparency and Accountability 
Initiative. H.R. 2829 would impose new oversight requirements 
on the department. Under the bill, the department would be 
required to obtain and maintain certain annual certifications 
from each U.N. entity that receives U.S. funding. In addition, 
the department would be required to report to the Congress in 
several instances, including:

         LIf an entity refuses or delays an inquiry by 
        the department related to a certification or does not 
        comply with its certification;

         LIf an entity or one of its employees, 
        contractors, or representatives violates federal 
        criminal law;

         LIf there is mismanagement, misfeasance, or 
        malfeasance within an entity justifying disciplinary 
        action;

         LRegarding how entities spend U.S. 
        contributions; and

         LDetailing an itemized budget request for U.S. 
        contributions to the U.N. regular budget.

    Based on information from the department, CBO estimates 
that to implement the bill the State Department would hire two 
additional people at an annual cost of less than $500,000, 
which would increase discretionary costs by $2 million over the 
2012-2016 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary 
amounts.
    The bill would withhold contributions to the U.N. and its 
entities if certain conditions--such as funding the U.N.'s 
regular budget through voluntary contributions instead of 
assessments--are not met. Under current law, there are no 
existing appropriations or specified authorizations of 
appropriations provided for 2012 or future years for 
contributions to the U.N. or its entities. Therefore, CBO would 
not attribute any savings to the bill's provision that might 
result in withholding future contributions.
    Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending or 
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
    H.R. 2829 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Sunita D'Monte. 
The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                General Performance Goals and Objectives

    As explained more specifically in the narrative portions of 
this report (Background and Purpose, Summary, and Section-by-
Section Analysis and Discussion), the principal goal of H.R. 
2829 is to obtain greater transparency and accountability in 
the funding and management of the United Nations, to ensure 
that the U.S. taxpayer dollars provided to UN system entities 
are in fact serving the values and interests of the United 
States. To that end, among other things, the bill: Seeks to 
shift the funding for the UN regular budget from an assessed to 
a voluntary basis; requires basic oversight cooperation from UN 
system entities as a condition of U.S. funding; withholds U.S. 
contributions from any UN agency or program that grants de 
facto recognition of a Palestinian state outside of a 
negotiated settlement with Israel; precludes U.S. funding to 
and participation in the UN Human Rights Council until certain 
basic reforms are certified; withholds U.S. funding from any 
part of the UN's flawed Durban conference process; precludes 
U.S. funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency until certain 
basic reforms are certified; and seeks basic reforms of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and UN Peacekeeping.

                        New Advisory Committees

    H.R. 2829 does not establish or authorize any new advisory 
committees.

                    Congressional Accountability Act

    H.R. 2829 does not apply to the Legislative Branch.

                         Earmark Identification

    H.R. 2829 does not contain any congressional earmarks, 
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in 
clauses 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of House Rule XXI.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

      (AS AMENDED BY CHAIRMAN ROS-LEHTINEN'S MANAGER'S AMENDMENT)

Section 1--Short title; table of contents.
Section 2--Definitions.

                 TITLE I: FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 101--Findings.
    Contains findings regarding the limited control the U.S. 
has over the amount and use of its financial contributions to 
the UN, the presence of the rampant corruption at the UN, and 
the need for reform of the UN's funding structure.
Section 102--Apportionment of the United Nations Regular Budget on a 
        Voluntary Basis.
    States that it is U.S. policy to pursue shifting the UN 
regular budget to a voluntary basis (rather than continue the 
assessed/mandatory structure). This title gives the UN two 
years after this bill's enactment date to phase in this reform. 
After two years, should less than 80% of the UN regular budget 
be funded on a voluntary basis, then the U.S. shall, until the 
Secretary of State certifies that the 80% threshold is met, 
withhold 50% of its assessed (non-voluntary, regular budget 
contributions) assessed by the UN.
    This is not an ``all-or-nothing'' sanction: The more the UN 
makes its regular budget voluntary, the less we withhold, until 
the UN budgeting is at least 80% voluntary, at which point 
there would be no further U.S. withholdings.
    If and when the Secretary makes the above certification 
that the 80% threshold has been met, withheld funds could be 
expended for a period of one year after their appropriation. 
After that one-year period concludes, any unspent funds must be 
returned to the U.S. Treasury, unless the Secretary certifies 
that the 80% threshold continues to be met.
Section 103--Budget Justifications for United States Contributions to 
        the Regular Budget of the United Nations.
    Requires that the annual congressional budget justification 
include an itemized request for contributions to the UN, 
including comparisons with previous years' contributions. Also 
requires the Secretary of State to notify and consult with 
Congress if the UN proposes an adjustment to its regular 
budget.
Section 104--Report on United Nations Reform.
    Requires that the Secretary of State submit a report to 
Congress describing progress towards the goals described in 
this section, and the progress of the UN General Assembly to 
modernize and streamline its activities and review its 
mandates.

      TITLE II: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES 
                  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 201--Findings.
    Contains findings related to the need for management 
reforms at the UN to increase transparency and accountability.
Section 202--Definitions.
Section 203--Oversight of U.S. Contributions to the United Nations 
        System.
    Requires the Department of State to collect and maintain 
records of Transparency and Accountability Certifications 
(written pledges to cooperate in sharing basic oversight 
information with the Department of State and Congress and to 
operate in a fully accountable manner, including by taking a 
number of specific measures to ensure accountability) by all UN 
entities.
    Requires the Department of State to keep Congress informed 
of how UN entities are spending U.S. contributions.
    Requires the Secretary of State to:

     Lnotify Congress and the Attorney General when she 
has reasonable grounds to believe a federal criminal law has 
been violated by a UN entity or one of its employees, 
contractors, or representatives;
     Lnotify Congress, and the UN, of cases where she 
believes mismanagement or wrongdoing has likely taken place 
within a UN entity and disciplinary proceedings are likely 
justified;
     Lnotify Congress and the UN whenever a UN entity 
unreasonably refuses to provide, or delays in providing, 
information or assistance pursuant to a Transparency 
Certification; notify Congress and the UN when a UN entity has 
not provided such requested information within 90 days of the 
above notification (if that occurs, then that UN entity is 
deemed to be noncompliant with its Transparency 
Certification(s));
     Lnotify Congress and the UN when that entity has 
resumed full compliance with its Transparency Certification;
     Lnotify Congress and the UN whenever a UN entity 
is no longer in compliance with its Accountability 
Certification. [If a UN entity has not resumed compliance 
within 90 days of the above notification, then that UN entity 
is deemed to be noncompliant with its Accountability 
Certification.] Requires the Secretary of State to notify 
Congress and the UN when that entity has resumed full 
compliance with its Accountability Certification.

    Also requires the Secretary of State to submit for 
inclusion in the report authorized by section 207 of this Act a 
list and detailed description of the circumstances surrounding 
notifications of compliance and noncompliance. Clarifies that 
this reporting requirement does not authorize the public 
disclosure of sensitive information. Requires privacy 
protections with respect to such reporting.
Section 204--Transparency for United States Contributions.
    Mandates that U.S. funding may be provided to a UN entity 
only if that entity has provided a Transparency Certification 
and Accountability Certification to the Department of State and 
is in compliance with those certifications. The President may 
waive this requirement on a case-by-case basis if he determines 
and certifies to Congress that failure to waive would pose an 
extraordinary threat to U.S. national security interests.
Section 205--Integrity for United States Contributions.
    Requires funds made available under the Contributions to 
International Organizations (CIO) account to be used solely for 
assessed contributions to a UN entity or international 
organization. Requires funds made available under the 
International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) account to be 
used solely for voluntary contributions to a UN entity or 
international organization. Requires funds made available under 
the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities 
(CIPA) account to be used solely for United Nations 
peacekeeping activities, for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Requires that funds appropriated 
for use as a U.S. Contribution to a UN Entity but not obligated 
or expended because of restrictions in this section be returned 
to the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year, and not be 
considered arrears to be repaid to any UN entity.
Section 206--Refund of Monies Owed by the United Nations to the United 
        States.
    Finds that U.S. taxpayer funds overpaid to the UN, 
particularly to the UN Tax Equalization Fund, often remain in 
the hands of the UN. States that it is U.S. policy to instruct 
the UN to return these funds to the U.S. Treasury.
Section 207--Annual Reports on United States Contributions to the 
        United Nations.
    Continues the authorization for an annual report (presently 
authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act) by the 
Office of Management and Budget of all United States assessed 
and voluntary contributions to the United Nations.

         TITLE III: UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 301--Annual Publication.
    States that the United States shall use its influence at 
the UN to ensure the annual publication of all UN subsidiary 
bodies, their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, 
sorted by donor.
Section 302--Annual Financial Disclosure.
    States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to 
implement a system for filing individual financial disclosure 
forms by employees at the UN and its specialized agencies, 
which will be available to the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services, to Member States, and to the public.
Section 303--Policy with Respect to Expansion of the Security Council.
    States that it is U.S. policy to oppose expansion of the UN 
Security Council that would diminish the influence of the U.S. 
at the Security Council or include veto rights for new members.
Section 304--Access to Reports and Audits.
    States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to 
ensure that member states have access to reports and audits 
completed by the Board of External Auditors.
Section 305--Waiver of Immunity.
    States that the U.S. shall use its influence to ensure that 
the UN Secretary-General waives the immunity of UN officials in 
cases in which immunity would impede the course of justice.
Section 306--Terrorism and the United Nations.
    States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to 
work towards the adoption of a definition of terrorism that 
builds upon recommendations of the December 2004 report of the 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, includes 
actions intended to do harm to civilians for purposes of 
intimidation of a government, and does not propose legal or 
moral equivalency between these actions and actions by a 
government in self-defense. States that any UN definition of 
terrorism should not be used to undermine peaceful, pro-
freedom, pro-democracy movements against authoritarian regimes.
Section 307--Report on United Nations Personnel.
    Requires that the Secretary of State submit to Congress a 
report on human resources practices and reforms at the UN.
Section 308--United Nations Treaty Bodies.
    Withholds U.S. contributions from the UN regular budget 
proportionate to the percentage of the regular budget expended 
for a UN human rights treaty monitoring body or committee 
established by conventions to which the U.S. is not a party.
Section 309--Equality at the United Nations.
    Requires completion of an audit regarding duplicative 
efforts at the UN with regard to the Palestinians and making 
recommendations for the elimination of duplicative entities. 
Withholds U.S. contributions from the UN budget proportionate 
to the percentage of our contributions that would be expended 
for those entities, until U.S. recommendations for elimination 
of duplicative entities have been implemented.
Section 310--Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.
    States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to 
ensure that anti-Semitic behavior at the UN is condemned by the 
UN and that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights develop programming to address anti-Semitism.
Section 311--Regional Group Inclusion of Israel.
    States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to 
expand the UN's Western European and Others Group (WEOG) to 
include Israel as a permanent member.
Section 312--United States Policy on Taiwan Participation in United 
        Nations.
    States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to 
ensure meaningful participation for Taiwan in relevant UN 
entities in which Taiwan has expressed an interest in 
participating.
Section 313--United States Policy on Tier 3 Human Rights Violators.
    States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to 
the ensure that no representative of a country designated 
pursuant to section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000 by the Department of State as a Tier 3 country 
shall preside as chair or president of any UN entity.

     TITLE IV: STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 401--Findings.
    Describes the PLO's previous efforts to obtain de facto 
recognition by the UN of a unilaterally-declared Palestinian 
state, as well as how the U.S. successfully derailed those 
efforts by threatening to cut off U.S. contributions to any UN 
entity that upgraded the status of the PLO.
Section 402--Statement of Policy.
    States that it is the policy of the U.S. to oppose 
recognition of a Palestinian state by any UN entity prior to 
the achievement of a final peace agreement negotiated between 
and agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians.
Section 403--Implementation.
    Instructs the Secretary of State to withhold funds to any 
UN entity that upgrades the status of the Palestinian observer 
mission in any way.

              TITLE V: UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Section 501--Findings.
    Describes the flawed structure of the UN Human Rights 
Council and the Council's failure to address numerous egregious 
human rights violations, while spending a disproportionate 
amount of time and resources to condemn the democratic, Jewish 
state of Israel.
Section 502--Human Rights Council Membership and Funding.
    Instructs the Secretary of State to withhold assessed 
contributions to the UN regular budget proportionate to the 
percentage of that budget allocated for the Human Rights 
Council, prohibits voluntary contributions to the Council, and 
prohibits the U.S. from running for a seat on the Council, 
until the Secretary of State can certify that the Council does 
not include Members: subject to Security Council sanctions; 
under Security Council-mandated human rights investigation; 
that are state sponsors of terrorism; or that are ``countries 
of particular concern'' for religious freedom violations. Also 
withholds funds equal to the percentage spent on Council 
apporteurs with mandates used to display bias against the U.S. 
or Israel or to support foreign governments that are: subject 
to Security Council sanctions; under Security Council-mandated 
human rights investigation; state sponsors of terrorism; or 
``countries of particular concern'' for religious freedom 
violations

                       TITLE VI: GOLDSTONE REPORT

Section 601--Findings.
    Describes the anti-Israel bias that pervaded the 
commissioning and drafting of the Goldstone Report. Notes 
longstanding Congressional and Executive Branch opposition to 
the Report.
Section 602--Statement of Policy.
    States that it is U.S. policy to reject the Goldstone 
report, oppose its legitimacy, and lead a multilateral campaign 
to revoke and repudiate the report and UN resolutions stemming 
from the report.
Section 603--Withholding of Funds; Refund of United States Taxpayer 
        Dollars.
    Instructs the Secretary of State to withhold from the U.S. 
contribution to the UN regular budget an amount proportionate 
to the percentage of our contributions determined to have been 
expended on the Goldstone Report and related activities.

                       TITLE VII: DURBAN PROCESS

Section 701--Findings.
    Describes the anti-Semitic, anti-Israel, anti-Western bias 
that has pervaded the Durban process.
Sec 702--Sense of Congress; Statement of Policy.
    States that the Durban conferences were distorted into 
forums for anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, anti-freedom activities 
and commends those countries that did not participate in 
various parts of the Durban Process. States that it is U.S. 
policy to create a credible alternative to the Durban process 
and to encourage other countries to withhold participation and 
funding from the Durban process.
Section 703--Non-Participation in the Durban Process.
    Prohibits U.S. funds from being used for U.S. participation 
in any part of the Durban process.
Section 704--Withholding of Funds; Refund of United States Taxpayer 
        Dollars.
    Instructs the Secretary of States to withhold from the 
United States contribution to the UN regular budget an amount 
equal to the percentage of that contribution that would be or 
has been spent on the Durban process.

                           TITLE VIII: UNRWA

Section 801--Findings.
    Describes UNRWA's strictly humanitarian mandate and 
longstanding problematic behavior, including its refusal to vet 
its staff and aid recipients through U.S. terrorist watch 
lists, its employment of multiple violent extremists, its anti-
Israel and pro-Hamas propaganda, and its connections with 
financial institutions sanctioned by the U.S. Government for 
money laundering, terror financing, and support for arms 
proliferators.
Section 802--United States Contributions to UNRWA.
    Prohibits funding to UNRWA until the Secretary of State 
certifies that: none of UNRWA's officials, employees, or 
affiliates are members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, or 
have disseminated anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic 
rhetoric or propaganda; no UNRWA infrastructure is being 
exploited by Foreign Terrorist Organizations; UNRWA is subject 
to comprehensive and independent financial audits and has 
implemented an effective vetting and oversight system, UNRWA-
funded schools do not use biased educational materials, no 
recipient of UNRWA funds is a member of a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization, and UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations 
with financial institutions that the U.S. believes to be 
complicit in money laundering or terror financing. If the 
Secretary of State makes such a certification, U.S. annual 
funding to UNRWA may exceed neither 22 percent of UNRWA's 
budget, nor the highest annual contribution made by an Arab 
League member state, nor the proportion of the total budget of 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees paid by the U.S.
Section 803--Sense of Congress.
    Expresses the sense of Congress that the President and the 
Secretary of State should lead a diplomatic effort to encourage 
other nations to withhold contributions to UNRWA until UNRWA 
implements key reforms.

              TITLE IX: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Section 901--Technical Cooperation Program.
    Describes how rogue regimes, several of whom are known to 
violate UN nonproliferation sanctions, have received assistance 
from the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program (TCP). States 
that no U.S. contributions to the IAEA may be used to provide 
assistance through the TCP to countries that have been 
designated by the U.S. as supporting international terrorism or 
that are in breach of various non-proliferation treaties and 
resolutions. If the IAEA does not suspend assistance to the 
aforementioned countries, the U.S. must withhold from 
contributions to the IAEA an amount proportionate to the 
percentage of such contributions that would be used for 
technical assistance to these terrorist regimes and countries 
of proliferation concern.
Section 902--United States Policy at the IAEA.
    States that the U.S. shall use its influence to establish 
an Office of Compliance to ensure that all member states 
fulfill their obligations under IAEA Board resolutions. States 
that U.S. contributions to the IAEA should be used primarily 
support nuclear safety and security or activities relating to 
nuclear verification. States that the U.S. will use its 
influence to ensure the adoption of resolutions making Iran and 
Syria ineligible to receive IAEA assistance.
Section 903--Sense of Congress Regarding the Nuclear Security Action 
        Plan of the IAEA.
    Expresses the sense of Congress that the IAEA General 
Conference should adopt a resolution incorporating the Nuclear 
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.

                         TITLE X: PEACEKEEPING

Section 1001--Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
    Notes that while UN peacekeeping operations have 
contributed greatly to the promotion of peace and security, the 
record of UN peacekeeping is tarnished by operational failures 
and misconduct.
Section 1002--Policy Relating to Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping 
        Operations.
    Calls for far-reaching reforms in the areas of planning, 
management, conduct and accountability in UN peacekeeping 
States it is U.S. policy to promote the conduct of independent, 
annual audits of each peacekeeping operation to guarantee that 
all missions are efficient and cost effective. Promotes the 
review of all peacekeeping operation mandates with a view 
toward identifying objectives that are practical and 
achievable. Addresses misconduct and sexual exploitation by 
personnel associated with peacekeeping missions by supporting 
the introduction of pre-deployment training, the adoption of a 
code of conduct, and the establishment of an investigative body 
to probe allegations of wrongdoing.
Section 1003--Certification.
    Mandates U.S. opposition to new or expanded peacekeeping 
missions until the Secretary of State certifies that the most 
critical, but immediately achievable, reforms are instituted 
(subject to a Presidential waiver based on vital U.S. national 
security interests or to prevent genocide or other widespread 
loss of human life).

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

                     FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE XII--FAMINE PREVENTION AND FREEDOM FROM HUNGER

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          Chapter 3--International Organizations and Programs

    Sec. 301. General Authority.--(a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [(c) No contributions by the United States shall be made to 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East except on the condition that the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency take all possible 
measures to assure that no part of the United States 
contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee 
who is receiving military training as a member of the so-called 
Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type 
organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.]
    (c)(1) Withholding.--Contributions by the United States to 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related 
entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations for the 
support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff positions 
provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may 
be provided only during a period for which a certification 
described in paragraph (2) is in effect.
    (2) Certification.--A certification described in this 
paragraph is a written determination by the Secretary of State, 
based on all information available after diligent inquiry, and 
transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees along 
with a detailed description of the factual basis therefor, 
that--
            (A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor, 
        subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA--
                    (i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist 
                Organization;
                    (ii) has propagated, disseminated, or 
                incited anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-
                Semitic rhetoric or propaganda; or
                    (iii) has used any UNRWA resources, 
                including publications or Web sites, to 
                propagate or disseminate political materials, 
                including political rhetoric regarding the 
                Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
            (B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other 
        facility, or other infrastructure or resource is being 
        used by a Foreign Terrorist Organization for 
        operations, planning, training, recruitment, 
        fundraising, indoctrination, communications, sanctuary, 
        storage of weapons or other materials, or any other 
        purposes;
            (C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial 
        audits by an internationally recognized third party 
        independent auditing firm and has implemented an 
        effective system of vetting and oversight to prevent 
        the use, receipt, or diversion of any UNRWA resources 
        by any foreign terrorist organization or members 
        thereof;
            (D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational 
        institution uses textbooks or other educational 
        materials that propagate or disseminate anti-American, 
        anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, propaganda or 
        incitement;
            (E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a 
        member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization; and
            (F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations 
        with financial institutions that the United States 
        deems or believes to be complicit in money laundering 
        and terror financing.
    (3) Definitions.--In this section:
            (A) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term 
        ``Foreign Terrorist Organization'' means an 
        organization designated as a Foreign Terrorist 
        Organization by the Secretary of State in accordance 
        with section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 
        Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
            (B) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 
                Appropriations, and Oversight and Government 
                Reform of the House of Representatives; and
                    (ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 
                Appropriations, and Homeland Security and 
                Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
    (4) Effective Duration of Certification.--The certification 
described in paragraph (2) shall be effective for a period of 
180 days from the date of transmission to the appropriate 
congressional committees, or until the Secretary receives 
information rendering that certification factually inaccurate, 
whichever is earliest. In the event that a certification 
becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly transmit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a description of any 
information that precludes the renewal or continuation of the 
certification.
    (5) Limitation.--During a period for which a certification 
described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the United States may 
not contribute to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor 
entity an annual amount--
            (A) greater than the highest annual contribution to 
        UNRWA made by a member country of the League of Arab 
        States;
            (B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA 
        budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget for 
        the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
        (UNHCR) paid by the United States; or
            (C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget of 
        UNRWA.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                            Dissenting Views

Introduction
    We are all familiar with the flaws, shortcomings, and 
outrages of the United Nations, both past and present, and 
believe that UN reform is and must remain an important priority 
for the United States. However, we strongly oppose this 
misguided and irresponsible legislation, which--in the guise of 
``reform''--would result in an unprecedented diminution of 
American diplomatic influence and likely lead to the U.S. 
withdrawing from the organization.
    The United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform 
Act of 2011 is premised on the notion that withholding our dues 
is the only way to leverage meaningful change at the UN. But 
there's simply no evidence to support that argument. Previous 
attempts at withholding did not lead to any significant and 
lasting reforms--they succeeded only in weakening our 
diplomatic standing and influence, and undermining efforts to 
promote transparency, fiscal responsibility and good management 
practices in the UN system. For those reasons, the George W. 
Bush Administration opposed the late Chairman Henry Hyde's UN 
bill, which was not nearly as draconian as this legislation.
    We also note the Department of State's strong objections to 
this legislation, which the Secretary expressed in her October 
12, 2011 letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member. The 
Secretary warned ``If implemented, the bill's requirement to 
withhold 50 percent of U.S. assessed contributions to the 
United Nations absent a shift to voluntary-only funding would 
undercut international collaboration in advancing core U.S. 
national security interest such as stauncher nuclear 
proliferation, combating terrorism, fully implementing 
sanctions on countries such as Iran and North Korea, preventing 
conflict around the globe, supporting elections in countries 
just undergoing transition to democracy, fighting pandemic 
disease, providing life-saving humanitarian relief to countries 
such as Haiti, and supporting peaceful transitions in placed 
such as the new nation of South Sudan.''
Unilateral Shift to Voluntary Contributions Simply a Backdoor Mechanism 
        for Pulling U.S. out of UN
    Title I of H.R. 2829 states that the U.S. must withhold 50 
percent of our assessed contributions unless the President 
certifies that at least 80 percent of the entire UN regular 
budget is funded by voluntary contributions within two years. 
Republicans argue that by funding the UN regular budget on a 
voluntary basis, the U.S. will be able to pick and choose what 
it pays for--a multilateral a la carte funding scheme. The 
unrealistic and reckless certification requirement is premised 
on the preposterous assumption that the U.S. would succeed in 
amending the United Nations Charter, which requires a two-
thirds vote of all UN member states and unanimous approval by 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The UN 
Charter has been amended only four times in its 66-year 
history, most recently in 1973 when the body approved an 
enlargement of the Economic and Social Council to better 
reflect the growth in UN member states. The notion that in two 
years time the US could force through an amendment to unravel 
the financial stability of the organization over what would 
likely be near unanimous opposition strains credulity.
    Given the near certitude that the President would be unable 
to make such a certification, the withholdings in Title I would 
almost inevitably come into force two years after this 
legislation was signed into law. Ironically, even if the UN 
Human Rights Council was truly reformed, the Goldstone Report 
was completely repudiated, and the UN instituted more 
meaningful audit and oversight disclosure requirements, this 
bill would still defund the UN if it didn't adopt an 80% 
voluntarily funded regular budget. As such, it is clear to us 
that the withholdings language contained in Title I is not 
meant to promote effective management reforms or tackle the 
political biases exhibited at the UN and its funds, programs, 
and specialized agencies. Rather, Title I can only be viewed as 
a thinly veiled attempt to defund the United Nations and 
ultimately reduce U.S. influence and relevance at the 
organization.
Empty rhetoric on voluntarily funded UN agencies
    Republicans argue that UN agencies and programs which are 
funded on a voluntary basis are inherently more accountable to 
U.S. interests. This view is expressed in the findings 
contained in Title I, which state: ``Because of their need to 
justify future contributions from donors, voluntarily funded 
organizations have more incentive to be responsive and 
efficient in their operations than organizations funded by 
compulsory contributions that are not tied to performance.'' 
The Republicans claim this funding arrangement would give the 
U.S. greater flexibility to choose among various UN entities 
and initiatives, supporting those it prefers and un-funding 
those it considers problematic, irresponsible, or beyond 
salvage. The logical conclusion would be that the United 
Nations would be more sensitive to U.S. preferences, introduce 
healthy competition among UN agencies seeking U.S. dollars, and 
provide an incentive for greater UN transparency and 
accountability.
    We agree that voluntary funding is appropriate for certain 
UN entities--particularly those focused on short- or medium-
term humanitarian or disaster relief situations. In fact much 
of the UN's development and humanitarian assistance efforts are 
funded on a voluntary basis. But by seeking to force a shift to 
all voluntary contributions, this legislation would unravel the 
financial underpinnings of the entire UN regular budget, which 
would lead other nations to respond in kind by adopting their 
own, selective approach to financing the organization. It is 
not unreasonable to expect that UN programs vital to U.S. 
foreign policy and national security interests would face 
funding reductions as a result. For example, the UN special 
political missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are funded 
through the UN regular budget--largely out of the insistence of 
the U.S.--would almost certainly see severely diminished 
financial support from other UN member states, and thus reduced 
legitimacy. Other U.S. priorities at the UN, such as the 
advancement of women, the protection of human rights, and 
counterterrorism cooperation could likely faced reduced funding 
under a voluntary funding scheme. These costs of a la carte 
funding may not be readily apparent on the surface, but they 
are very real.
Limiting the UN's Ability to Protect Woman and Children
    While much of the attention on H.R. 2829 has centered on 
the bill's impact on UN funding, a little-noticed provision, 
Section 308, would have grave consequences for the UN's ability 
to protect and promote the rights of women and children. This 
section would withhold all U.S. contributions to the UN's 
regular budget proportionate to the percentage of the regular 
budget expended for a UN human rights treaty monitoring body or 
committee established by conventions to which the U.S. is not a 
party.
    Though no explanation of this provision was presented in 
the Chairman's opening remarks or given more than a cursory 
explanation in the Majority's section by section analysis, its 
impact would be gravely detrimental to the UN's ability 
implement the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women. If the purpose of this provision was to prevent 
the implementation of these two key human rights conventions, 
we are puzzled why the Majority made no mention of their 
opposition to either convention in the text of H.R. 2829, 
especially given the voluminous findings contained in other 
parts of the legislation.
Using Middle East Issues as Subterfuge
    Republicans have attempted to paint this legislation as a 
direct response to the Palestinians' various UN membership 
gambits, the Goldstone Report, the Durban Process, and 
innumerable examples of bias exhibited at the UN against 
Israel. While we share the Majority's deep frustration and 
anger over the many continued instances of such bias, the 
Republicans have used the issue of Israel's treatment at the UN 
as a smokescreen to obscure their true agenda. Indeed, nowhere 
in Title I--the section of the legislation containing the most 
draconian withholding proposals--are Middle East issued 
referenced. Even if the various anti-Israel entities at the UN 
were reformed or abolished, the withholdings provisions 
contained in Title I would still be triggered.
    We also note that the provisions concerning full 
Palestinian membership in the UN are duplicative of current 
law. Public Law 103-236, Title IV, Sec. 410 and Public Law 101-
246, Title IV already requires withholding of US funds from any 
UN entity that grants full membership to the Palestinian 
Authority. These provisions of law automatically went into 
effect after the UNESCO General Conference voted to grant full 
membership to the Palestinians earlier this year. However, we 
note that the Palestinian Authority publicly stated that it was 
not swayed by U.S. threats to defund the organization if they 
were successful in their attempts to gain full membership in 
UNESCO. Nor were the member states of UNESCO, who voted 
overwhelmingly in support of the Palestinians' membership 
gambit.
Undermines Iran sanctions attempts
    The top foreign policy priority of this Congress has been 
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. 
Yet if this bill were enacted into law, attempts to slow 
Tehran's nuclear program would undoubtedly be weakened. 
Ambassador Susan Rice, the United States Permanent 
Representative to the UN, has stated explicitly that the 
previous round of multilateral sanctions passed by the United 
Nations Security Council would not have possible without the 
direct and sustained engagement of the U.S. at the UN. In her 
letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member, Secretary Clinton 
expressed her concerns that: ``If we diminish our global 
stature, the United States would surrender a key platform which 
to shape international priorities, such as obtaining tough 
sanctions on Iran. The restrictions regarding U.S. 
contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for 
example, are counterproductive to our non-proliferation efforts 
to secure nuclear material worldwide, and would undercut our 
successes in isolating countries such as Iran.''
    Were this legislation to pass, not only would we defund the 
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1737, otherwise known as the Iran Sanctions Committee, which is 
funded out of the UN's regular budget, but we would hamstring 
our ability to push through future rounds of sanctions at the 
UN. During the last period of sustained U.S. arrearages accrued 
at the UN, we lost our seat on the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which was a severe blow 
to U.S. prestige and limited our ability to influence the UN 
budget. The consequences of once again falling into arrears 
could be much worse.
Sensible Democratic Alternative Rejected
    Committee Democrats offered a sensible alternative that 
acknowledged the reality that Congress cannot legislate change 
at the UN like we can in the Executive Branch. Instead, the 
Democratic substitute sought to provide direction to and 
strengthen the Administration's efforts to push for greater 
transparency, accountability, and ethical standards at the UN. 
It would do this by enshrining in law the State Department's UN 
Transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI)--originally 
conceived by former U.S. Ambassador for UN Management Reform, 
Mark Wallace, a George W. Bush Administration appointee--which 
would strengthen the U.S. government's ability to monitor the 
UN's progress on management reform. By enshrining UNTAI into 
law, we would ensure that the initiative will endure into the 
future and that Congress can play a more effective oversight 
role.
    While Republicans claim they want to improve transparency 
and accountability at the UN, they have paid woefully little 
attention to enhancing the U.S. capacity to systematically and 
quantifiably monitor the UN's progress on key management 
criteria. Rather than building upon the successful monitoring 
efforts of Ambassador Wallace, the Republicans initially 
attempted to task the Government Accountability Office with 
responsibilities the GAO determined ``would be duplicative of 
other accountability mechanisms in place, would require 
extensive GAO resources, and would not be cost-beneficial.'' 
While the Majority amended H.R. 2829 to reflect many of the 
concerns raised by the GAO, it does little to build upon the 
Department's existing UN reform monitoring and evaluation 
capacities. By contrast, the Democratic substitute would 
mandate rigorous reviews and monitoring programs for various 
peacekeeping efforts, and make it the policy of the United 
States to work with the UN to institute a number of needed 
management reforms.
    By ensuring that the US retains its full voice and vote at 
the UN, the Democratic substitute would be a far more effective 
tool for promoting real reform and countering anti-Israel bias 
in the UN.
Overall Package Harms America's Standing and Ability to Lead the 
        International Community
    As described above, this bill includes a number of 
provisions that would harm America's foreign policy and 
national security interests and undermine our diplomatic 
influence and standing in the international community. It is 
clear that proponents of the legislation have little interest 
in promoting responsible reforms at the United Nations, but 
rather seek to disengage the U.S. from multilateral 
institutions. Given the untold damage this bill would do to US 
interests around the globe, we have absolutely no hesitation in 
urging our colleagues to reject this misguided and damaging 
legislation.

                                   Howard L. Berman.
                                   Gary L. Ackerman.
                                   Eni F.H. Faleomavaega.
                                   Donald M. Payne.
                                   Brad Sherman.
                                   Gregory W. Meeks.
                                   Russ Carnahan.
                                   Albio Sires.
                                   Gerald E. Connolly.
                                   Theodore E. Deutch.
                                   Brian Higgins.
                                   Allyson Schwartz.
                                   Christopher S. Murphy.
                                   Frederica Wilson.
                                   Karen Bass.
                                   William Keating.
                                   David Cicilline.

                                  
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