EXHIBIT “B”

2:15-cv-10857-LJM-MKM Doc # 1-2 Filed 03/06/15 Pg 1 of 22 Pg ID 12
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As of: February 16, 2015 8:50 AM EST

Moody v. Home Owners Ins. Co.

Court of Appeals of Michigan

February 25, 2014, Decided

No. 301783, No. 301784, No. 308723

Reporter

304 Mich. App. 415; 849 N.W.2d 31; 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 364; 2014 WL 714879

CHARLES MOODY, Plaintiff, and GET WELL

MEDICAL TRANSPORT, PROGRESSIVE

REHAB CENTER, and CAROL REINTS, INC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, v HOME OWNERS

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.CHARLES MOODY,

Plaintiff-Appellant, and GET WELL MEDICAL

TRANSPORT, PROGRESSIVE REHAB

CENTER, and CAROL REINTS, INC, Plaintiffs,

v HOME OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.LINDA C. HODGE,

Plaintiff-Appellant, v STATE FARM MUTUAL

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Subsequent History: Held in Abeyance at, Sub

nomine at Hodge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 853 N.W.2d 334, 2014 Mich. LEXIS 1701

(Mich., 2014)

Appeal granted by Moody v. Home Owners Ins.

Co., 497 Mich. 866, 853 N.W.2d 331, 2014 Mich.

LEXIS 1703 (2014)

Appeal dismissed by, Motion granted by Moody v.

Home Owners Ins. Co., 2015 Mich. LEXIS 230

(Mich., Feb. 4, 2015)

Appeal granted by Hodge v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 Mich. LEXIS 231 (Mich.,

Feb. 4, 2015)

Appeal dismissed by Moody v. Home Owners Ins.

Co., 2015 Mich. LEXIS 232 (Mich., Feb. 4, 2015)

Prior History: [***1] Wayne Circuit Court. LC

No. 10-006722-AV. Wayne Circuit Court. LC No.

10-006722-AV. Wayne Circuit Court. LC No.

10-012109-AV.

Moody v. Home Owners Ins. Co., 812 N.W.2d 771,

2012 Mich. LEXIS 745 (Mich., 2012)

Hodge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493

Mich. 937, 826 N.W.2d 730, 2013 Mich. LEXIS

221 (2013)

Moody v. Home Owners Ins. Co., 491 Mich. 923,

812 N.W.2d 770, 2012 Mich. LEXIS 744 (2012)

Core Terms

providers’, district court, circuit court,

subject-matter, limited jurisdiction, cases, amount

in controversy, parties, consolidated, damages,

jurisdictional, exceeded, benefits, claim for

damages, no-fault, court rule, subject matter, new

trial, fair trial, pleadings, void, court’s jurisdiction,

district court judge, lack of jurisdiction, presenting

evidence, appellants’, Dictionary, reversal, insurer,

allegations

Case Summary

Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-Subject matter jurisdiction was

lacking under MCL 600.8301(1) in consolidated

motor vehicle accident cases where relief

ostensibly within the district court’s jurisdictional

limits was requested but, at trial, an amount of

damages much greater than the jurisdictional limit

was placed in dispute through evidence and

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argument; [2]-Accordingly, the district court

should have either transferred each case to the

circuit court pursuant to MCR 2.227(A)(1) or

dismissed each case pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4);

[3]-The error was not waivable and, in any event,

the defense preserved it; [4]-Medical providers’

claims and the injured party’s claims for no-fault

benefits based on the same accidental injuries had

to be aggregated in determining compliance with

the jurisdictional limit; [5]-Wrong and irrelevant

comments by counsel independently warranted

reversal and remand for a new trial.

Outcome

Orders affirmed.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

HN1 See MCL 600.8301(1).

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >

De Novo Review

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >

De Novo Review

HN2 Whether a district court has subject-matter

jurisdiction on the facts presented is a question of

law reviewed de novo.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >

De Novo Review

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >

De Novo Review

HN3 The interpretation and application of both

statutes and court rules are questions of law that

are reviewed de novo.

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

HN4 Nothing in MCL 600.8301(1), MCR

2.227(A)(1), or MCR 2.116(C)(4), requires that a

court limit its jurisdictional query to the amount in

controversy alleged in the pleadings.

Governments > Courts > Rule Application &

Interpretation

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

Governments > Courts > Rule Application &

Interpretation

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

HN5 Principles of statutory construction apply to

both statutes and court rules. The primary goal of

statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give

effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed by

the language of the statute. Similarly, the language

used in a court rule and its place within the

organization of the Michigan Court Rules is

important. Thus, when addressing how to construe

a statute or a court rule, one must first look to the

language used and give the words their plain and

ordinary meaning unless defined otherwise. In

this regard, when words are undefined, one may

properly consult a dictionary concerning their

plain and ordinary meaning. When the language

used in a court rule or statute is clear and

unambiguous, no further interpretation is either

necessary or permitted. The overarching rule of

statutory construction is that a court must enforce

clear and unambiguous statutory provisions as

written. Furthermore, when a court interprets a

statute, it may not read anything into an

unambiguous statute that is not within the

Legislature’s manifest intent as derived from the

words used in the statute itself.

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Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

HN6 The circuit court is the primary court in

Michigan having jurisdiction over civil cases.

MCL 600.605 provides: Circuit courts have

original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil

claims and remedies, except where exclusive

jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by

statute to some other court or where the circuit

courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution

or statutes of the state. MCL 600.8301(1) provides

for an exception for bringing civil actions in

district court when the amount in controversy

does not exceed $25,000.00. The phrase ′′amount

in controversy′′ and the word ′′controversy′′ are

not defined by statute or Michigan case law. The

word ′′amount′′ clearly refers to a dollar value

because the district court’s jurisdictional limit is

stated in the dollar value of $25,000. The plain

and ordinary meaning of ′′controversy′′ is

confirmed by consulting a dictionary, which

defines it as a usually prolonged public dispute

concerning a matter of opinion. Amount in

controversy refers to the damages claimed or

relief demanded by the injured party in a lawsuit.

Accordingly, the plain, ordinary, and legal meaning

of ′′amount in controversy′′ under MCL

600.8301(1) is the amount the parties to a lawsuit

dispute, argue about, or debate during the

litigation.

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

HN7 While the amount in controversy in a

lawsuit will most often be determined by reviewing

the amount of damages or injuries a party claims

in his pleadings, MCL 600.8301(1) does not

explicitly state this. Indeed, the statute does not

provide a preferred or any method for determining

the amount in controversy.

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

HN8 A court may read nothing into an

unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest

intent of the Legislature as derived from the

words of the statute itself.

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

HN9 The amount in controversy under MCL

600.8301(1) is the dollar value of the amount that

is disputed in the lawsuit, the amount that the

parties argue about, debate, or, stated otherwise,

the amount that the parties controvert.

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

HN10 What the plaintiff alleges he will be able to

prove at trial, not what the factfinder later

determines (or the amount entered in a judgment),

establishes the amount in controversy for the

purpose of determining the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. The rule requiring the determination

of the jurisdictional amount based on the plaintiff’s

allegations does not support a plaintiff’s artfully

pleading a claim for relief ostensibly within the

limits of the district court’s subject matter

jurisdiction but then placing in dispute through

evidence and argument at trial an amount of

damages much greater than the court’s

jurisdictional limit. Furthermore, a contention that

the subject matter jurisdiction of the court can be

determined by the amount ultimately awarded by

the court, i.e., by limiting judgment to the

jurisdictional amount, is contrary to the

long-standing rule of determining the subject

matter jurisdiction of the court by the amount in

controversy before a trial and the determination of

the facts by a judge or jury. Jurisdiction is

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determined based on the amount claimed before

the facts are determined.

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

HN11 A court is continually obliged to question

sua sponte its own jurisdiction over a person, the

subject matter of an action, or the limits of the

relief it may afford.

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Preliminary Considerations >

Venue > General Overview

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Preliminary Considerations >

Venue > General Overview

HN12 See MCR 2.227(A)(1).

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Preliminary Considerations >

Venue > General Overview

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Preliminary Considerations >

Venue > General Overview

HN13 MCR 2.227(A)(1) provides no particular

manner in which a court determines that it lacks

jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.

Rather, it only provides that if the court acts sua

sponte regarding its determination, the parties

must be given notice and an opportunity to be

heard on the jurisdictional issue. Further, the court

rule plainly requires that the court may consider

matters other than the pleadings when considering

whether it has subject matter jurisdiction and

whether it must either dismiss or transfer a case to

a court having jurisdiction. MCR 2.227(A)(1) does

not restrict a court in its jurisdictional

determination to a review of the pleadings, and

such a requirement may not be read into the rule

when not derived from its manifest intent as

evidenced by the words of the rule itself.

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Summary

Judgment > Partial Summary Judgment

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Summary

Judgment > Partial Summary Judgment

HN14 MCR 2.116(C)(4) provides that summary

disposition may be entered where the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. A motion brought on

the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction

may be brought at any time. MCR 2.116(D)(3).

The determination whether the court has

jurisdiction when a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4)

is brought is explicitly not restricted to the

pleadings alone.

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Summary

Judgment > Partial Summary Judgment

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment >

Supporting Materials > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Summary

Judgment > Partial Summary Judgment

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment >

Supporting Materials > General Overview

HN15 See MCR 2.116(G)(5).

Civil Procedure > ... > Standards of Review >

Harmless & Invited Errors > Invited Errors Doctrine

Civil Procedure > ... > Standards of Review >

Harmless & Invited Errors > Invited Errors Doctrine

HN16 Invited error is typically said to occur when

a party’s own affirmative conduct directly causes

the error. Under the invited error doctrine,

appellate relief is generally not available because

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when a party invites the error, he waives his right

to seek appellate review, and any error is

extinguished. A related rule is that error requiring

reversal may only be predicated on the trial

court’s actions and not upon alleged error to

which the aggrieved party contributed by plan or

negligence.

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Relief From

Judgments > Void Judgments

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability of

Lower Court Decisions > Preservation for Review

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Relief From

Judgments > Void Judgments

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability of

Lower Court Decisions > Preservation for Review

HN17 Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right. Defects in subject

matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be

raised at any time. Because subject matter

jurisdiction concerns the court’s power to hear a

case, it is not subject to waiver. In addition, a

court must at all times be cognizant of its own

jurisdiction and sua sponte question whether it has

jurisdiction over a person or the subject matter of

an action. When a court is without jurisdiction of

the subject matter, any action with respect to such

a cause, other than to dismiss it, is absolutely

void.

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Joinder of

Claims & Remedies > Joinder of Claims

Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter

Jurisdiction > Amount in Controversy

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Joinder of

Claims & Remedies > Joinder of Claims

HN18 Where there is an identity between a

party’s claims and those of other parties and

where the claims were consolidated for trial, a

court considers them merged for purpose of

determining the amount in controversy under

MCL 600.8301(1). Further, where claims are

derivative, aggregating the claims of a single

plaintiff is appropriate for the purpose of

determining whether a court’s subject matter

jurisdiction jurisdictional amount is satisfied or

exceeded. This analysis is consistent with the

general rule that when the claims of multiple

parties are consolidated to facilitate the

presentation of proofs, the cases are not merged

into one cause. They retain their own separate

identities.

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Joinder of

Claims & Remedies > Joinder of Claims

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Joinder of

Claims & Remedies > Joinder of Claims

HN19 When cases are consolidated under MCR

2.505(A) because of a substantial and controlling

common question of law or fact, the court rule is

silent with regard to whether the consolidated

cases are effectively merged into a single case.

The case law has discussed two situations. In one,

the consolidated cases are ordered tried together

but each retains its separate character and requires

the entry of a separate judgment. But in the other

situation, when actions that are normally between

the same parties are consolidated, the actions are

joined together to form a single action in which a

single judgment is entered. This latter situation

exists where several actions are pending between

the same parties stating claims which could have

been brought in separate counts of a single claim.

Insurance Law > ... > No Fault Coverage > Personal

Injury Protection > Medical Benefits

Insurance Law > ... > No Fault Coverage > Personal

Injury Protection > Medical Benefits

HN20 Michigan ’s no-fault act provides that

benefits are payable to or for the benefit of an

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injured person. MCL 500.3112. But the right to

bring an action for personal protection insurance

benefits, including claims for attendant care

services, belongs to the injured party. Thus, the

injured party may waive by agreement his or her

claim against an insurer for no-fault benefits, and

a service provider is bound by the waiver. If an

injured party waives a PIP claim, a service

provider’s remedy is to seek payment from the

injured person.

Civil Procedure > Trials > Closing Arguments >

Objections to Closing Arguments

Civil Procedure > Trials > Closing Arguments >

Objections to Closing Arguments

HN21 Generally, an issue is properly preserved if

it is raised before, addressed by, or decided by the

lower court or administrative tribunal. The

appellate preservation requirement has been

referred to as the ′′no objection—no ruling—no

error presented′′ rule. Nevertheless, the case law

could be read as generally requiring a request for

a curative instruction or a motion for a mistrial to

preserve appellate review of remarks by counsel.

But appellate review without such actions may be

granted where counsel’s remarks deny a party a

fair trial. Thus, incurable errors are not shielded

from appellate review because an attorney fails to

request what in that case would be a futile

instruction. Although a motion for a mistrial is

appropriate, it is not mandatory.

Civil Procedure > Trials > Closing Arguments >

Objections to Closing Arguments

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >

De Novo Review

Civil Procedure > Trials > Closing Arguments >

Objections to Closing Arguments

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >

De Novo Review

HN22 Appellate review of claims of misconduct

by counsel is de novo to determine whether a

party was denied a fair trial. Analysis of such

claims requires two steps: (1) did error occur and

(2) does it require reversal. A lawyer’s comments

will usually not be cause for reversal unless they

indicate a deliberate course of conduct aimed at

preventing a fair and impartial trial or where

counsel’s remarks were such as to deflect the

jury’s attention from the issues involved and had

a controlling influence on the verdict. Stated

otherwise, reversal is required only where the

prejudicial statements of an attorney reflect a

studied purpose to inflame or prejudice a jury or

deflect the jury’s attention from the issues

involved. Proper instructions to the jury will cure

most, but not all, misconduct by counsel.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >

Clearly Erroneous Review

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >

Clearly Erroneous Review

HN23 A lower court’s finding of fact is reviewed

on appeal for clear error. MCR 2.613(C). A

finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court,

on the whole record, is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Civil Procedure > ... > Justiciability > Mootness >

Evading Review Exception

Civil Procedure > ... > Justiciability > Mootness >

Real Controversy Requirement

Civil Procedure > ... > Justiciability > Mootness >

Evading Review Exception

Civil Procedure > ... > Justiciability > Mootness >

Real Controversy Requirement

HN24 An issue is moot when a judicial

determination cannot have any practical legal

effect on the existing controversy. But an appellate

court may review a moot issue if it is publicly

significant and likely to recur, yet may evade

judicial review.

Insurance Law > ... > No Fault Coverage > Personal

Injury Protection > Medical Benefits

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Insurance Law > ... > No Fault Coverage > Personal

Injury Protection > Medical Benefits

HN25 An assigned claims facility is not liable for

no-fault benefits unless no personal protection

insurance is applicable to the injury, no personal

protection insurance applicable to the injury can

be identified, the personal protection insurance

applicable to the injury cannot be ascertained

because of a dispute between 2 or more automobile

insurers concerning their obligation to provide

coverage or the equitable distribution of the loss,

or the only identifiable personal protection

insurance applicable to the injury is, because of

financial inability of 1 or more insurers to fulfill

their obligations, inadequate to provide benefits

up to the maximum prescribed. MCL 500.3172(1).

Furthermore, the assigned claims facility, if it

pays benefits, is entitled to reimbursement from

the defaulting insurers to the extent of their

financial responsibility.

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Relief From

Judgments > Motions for New Trials

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Relief From

Judgments > Motions for New Trials

HN26 MCR 7.112 provides that in its appellate

capacity a circuit court may grant relief as provided

in MCR 7.216, which in turn provides in pertinent

part that the court of appeals may, in its discretion,

and on the terms it deems just, enter any judgment

or order or grant further or different relief as the

case may require. MCR 7.216(A)(7). The

misconduct of a party’s attorney that denies

another party a fair trial is a basis for granting a

new trial. MCR 2.611(A)(1)(a), (b).

Judges: Before: MARKEY, P.J., and

FITZGERALD and OWENS, JJ.

Opinion by: Jane E. Markey

Opinion

[**35] [*419] MARKEY, P.J.

These consolidated appeals are before this Court

for consideration as on leave granted.1 Each case

concerns the jurisdiction of the district court

under MCL 600.8301(1) when a plaintiff presents

evidence and argument of damages far in excess

of the district court’s $25,000

amount-in-controversy jurisdictional limit. In

Docket No. 301783, plaintiffs Get Well Medical

Transport, Progressive Rehab Center and Carol

Reints, Inc., appeal the order of Wayne Circuit

Judge Robert Colombo, Jr., reversing a district

court judgment in their favor following a jury trial

and remanding for a new trial. In Docket No.

301784, plaintiff Charles Moody appeals the same

order of Judge Colombo vacating the judgment in

Moody’s favor because the district court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction and remanding to the

district court to either dismiss the case or transfer

it to the circuit court. Similarly, in Docket No.

308723, plaintiff Linda C. Hodge appeals the

order of [***2] Wayne Circuit [**36] Judge

Brian R. Sullivan vacating a [*420] district court

judgment in her favor in the amount of $25,000

plus interest following a jury verdict of $85,957

against defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Moody filed his complaint for no-fault benefits in

36th District Court on September 15, 2008.

Paragraph 3 of his complaint alleges that he

′′claims damages do not exceed $25,000.00.′′ The

complaint’s prayer for relief sought ′′damages in

whatever amount Plaintiff is found to be entitled

not in excess of [$]25,000.00, plus interest, costs,

and no-fault attorney fees.′′

The providers filed their complaint in 36th District

Court on June 11, 2009, seeking payment for

1

See Hodge v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 493 Mich 937; 826 NW2d 730 (2013); Moody v Getwell Medical Transport,

491 Mich. 923; 812 N.W.2d 770 (2012). This Court entered an order on April 3, 2013, consolidating the appeal in Docket No. 308723

with those in Docket Nos. 301783 and 301784.

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′′reasonably necessary products, services and

accommodations′′ that they provided Moody as a

result of the motor vehicle accident. Get Well

Medical Transport, [***3] Progressive Rehab

Center and Carol Reints, Inc., sought no-fault

benefits in the amounts, respectively, of $5,604;

$14,845; and $2,533.14, for a combined total

claim for damages of $21,982.14.

While still awaiting discovery regarding the extent

of Moody’s claims, Home Owners moved on July

29, 2009, to consolidate Moody’s case with that

of the providers. An order doing so was entered

without objection. Meanwhile, Home Owners filed

several motions to compel discovery. The district

court finally entered an order compelling signed

answers to Homeowners’ interrogatories on

October 6, 2009, to which Moody responded on

October 12, 2009. In his answers to the

interrogatories, Moody indicated that, in addition

to a $32,447.23 bill from Henry Ford Hospital, he

also intended to present to the jury damage claims

for over $110,000 in lost wages and over $262,800

in attendant-care benefits.

[*421] In light of Moody’s answers to the

interrogatories and subsequent depositions taken

just before trial, Home Owners, on the day trial

was scheduled to commence, raised the issue of

the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction because

it appeared certain Moody intended to claim

damages far exceeding the $25,000 jurisdictional

limit of the district [***4] court under MCL

600.8301(1). Home Owners asserted several

arguments, including (1) when Moody’s counsel

presented argument and evidence of damages in

excess of $25,000, the district court would lose

jurisdiction, and defendant would move for

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4)(the

court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter); (2)

Moody’s action could be transferred to circuit

court under MCR 2.227(A)(1); and (3) if Moody’s

counsel were permitted to present argument and

evidence of damages in excess of $25,000, Home

Owners should be allowed to impeach Moody’s

claims through evidence or by judicial notice of

the fact that the district court’s jurisdiction is

limited to claims not exceeding $25,000.

The district court ruled that it would not restrict

Moody’s counsel in the evidence or argument he

could present, and that if the jury returned a

verdict for Moody in excess of $25,000, it would

cure the jurisdictional problem by limiting the

judgment to $25,000, exclusive of attorney fees,

interest, and costs. Furthermore, the district court

ruled that it would not take judicial notice of the

district court’s jurisdictional limit and that defense

counsel could not advise the jury of it.

[***5] Finally, the district court ruled it would not

transfer Moody’s action to the circuit court. The

district court entered a hand written order that

provided: ′′This action will not be transferred to

circuit court. Each plaintiff’s complaint is limited

to the jurisdictional dollar amount of $25,000

exclusive of attorney [**37] fees, [*422] interest

and costs. Defendant will be precluded from

advising [the] jury of [the] court’s jurisdictional

limits.′′

During his opening statement, Moody’s counsel

repeatedly told the jury that if Home Owners were

required to pay no-fault benefits, it could obtain

reimbursement from the assigned claims facility.

After defense counsel’s third objection to the

comments, the district court ruled it would not

preclude the argument but that it would permit

defense counsel to argue in its opening statement

that Home Owners would not be entitled to

reimbursement from the assigned claims facility.

And that is what defense counsel did. The

providers’ counsel supported Moody’s counsel on

this point in his opening statement, indicating that

he understood that an insurance company could

obtain reimbursement from the assigned claims

facility if it were determined within one or two

[***6] years that the company should not have

been paying the claim in the first place.

The main issue at trial was whether at the time of

the accident Moody was ′′domiciled in the same

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household′′ as his father and stepmother, whom

Home Owners insured, or whether Moody lived

with his mother in Detroit. The trial extended over

three weeks, and Moody’s counsel presented

evidence of no-fault claims far in excess of

$25,000. In addition to the proofs of the

$32,447.23 hospital bill from Henry Ford, Moody

presented evidence of lost wages of $28,288 to

$29,298.28, replacement services of $14,600, and

claims of attendant care for $192,720. After

presentation of this evidence, Home Owners twice

renewed its motion for summary disposition under

MCR 2.116(C)(4) because Moody’s claims for

damages far exceeded the district court’s $25,000

jurisdictional limit; the district again denied Home

Owners’ motions.

[*423] The jury found against Home Owners on

its coverage defense, deciding that Moody lived

with his father and stepmother at the time of the

accident; that issue has not been appealed. The

jury awarded Moody $32,447.23 for the hospital

expense. But the jury found that Moody did not

sustain any lost wages [***7] nor did he incur any

attendant-care expenses. The jury further found

that Moody’s allowable expenses were not

overdue. When entering its judgment, the district

court reduced the award to $25,000, the court’s

jurisdictional limit. The jury awarded the providers

the amounts that they sought: $5,604 to Get Well,

$13,845 to Progressive Rehab, and $2,533.14 to

Carol Reints, Inc. Home Owners appealed in the

circuit court.

Judge Colombo heard oral argument on Home

Owners’ appeal on October 19, 2010, and issued

a lengthy opinion from the bench. Judge Colombo

considered that MCL 600.605 provides that circuit

courts have original jurisdiction over ′′all civil

claims and remedies, except where exclusive

jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by

statute to some other court,′′ and that MCL

600.8301(1) provides that the ′′district court has

exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the

amount in controversy does not exceed

$25,000.00.′′ The circuit court concluded that it

was inappropriate for the district court to allow a

plaintiff to present evidence of damages greater

than the district court’s jurisdictional limit, noting

[***8] that although district courts formerly were

permitted to award damages in excess of the limit

when a case was remanded from the circuit court,

the statute authorizing that practice, former MCL

600.641, had been repealed. Judge Colombo also

noted that Moody was bound by his pleadings,

which alleged damages of not more than $25,000.

Accordingly, ′′Moody could not present damage

proofs that exceeded $25,000.′′

[*424] [**38] Judge Colombo also rejected

Moody’s reliance on the principle that a court’s

subjectmatter jurisdiction is determined only by

the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint. Instead,

Judge Colombo reasoned that a court must at all

times question its own jurisdiction over parties,

the subject matter of the action, and the limits of

the relief that it may grant. Further, when a court

determines that it lacks jurisdiction, it should not

pursue the matter further except to dismiss the

action or transfer it to the proper court. The circuit

court opined:

Once [Home Owners] raised the issue of

the district court’s jurisdiction, the district

court was obliged to determine whether it

had subject matter jurisdiction. The district

court concluded that it had jurisdiction

because it could reduce any verdict

[***9] to $25,000. This was clearly error

on the part of the district court. It had no

jurisdiction to try Moody’s case when the

damage proofs exceeded its jurisdiction.

Judge Colombo also stated it believed that

Moody’s counsel engaged in forum shopping as a

matter of strategy in hopes of having a better

opportunity to win on the issue of residence.

Judge Colombo summarized his reasons for

reversing the judgment for Moody:

The facts in this case are too compelling to

do anything but to set aside the jury

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verdict and the judgment in this case.

Counsel for Moody presented damage

proofs of hundreds of thousand dollars

[sic] in excess of the district court’s

jurisdictional amount. His proofs did not

comply with his pleadings. He attempted

to proceed in district court, even though

the district court was without jurisdiction

and [he] improperly engaged in forum

shopping. . . . The only appropriate remedy

is reversal of the jury verdict and the

judgment under all the circumstances in

this case. The case is remanded to the

district court to either dismiss the Moody

case for lack of jurisdiction or transfer it to

[the circuit court] pursuant to MCR 2.227.

[*425] The circuit court also ruled that the

judgment [***10] for the providers must be

reversed and the case remanded for a new trial

because the providers’ claims were so intertwined

with Moody’s case for which the district court

lacked jurisdiction. The circuit court reasoned that

because the providers’ case was consolidated with

Moody’s case, ′′significant evidence was admitted

in the case that normally would not have been

admitted in the medical providers’ case.′′ The

court believed that the presentation of the extra

evidence ′′may have affected the outcome on both

the issues of residence and damages.′′

With respect to Home Owners’ claims regarding

improper comments by Moody’s counsel at trial,

Judge Colombo opined that error warranting

reversal occurred when Moody’s counsel

purposefully interjected the irrelevant issue of the

assigned claims facility. The court concluded that

the cumulative effect of counsel’s comments,

particularly regarding the assigned claims facility

and subrogation, deprived Home Owners of a fair

trial. Accordingly, in addition to finding that the

district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction,

the circuit court ordered a new trial on the basis

that counsel’s improper comments deprived Home

Owners of a fair trial. Also, [***11] for this

additional reason, Judge Colombo reversed as to

all plaintiffs and ordered a new trial.

The appeal in Docket No. 308723 presents the

same central legal issue as in Docket Nos. 301783

and 301784 regarding the district court’s

jurisdiction under MCL 600.8301(1). Plaintiff

Linda C. Hodge brought an action in 36th District

Court asserting a first-party no-fault claim and

[**39] presented proof of damages far in excess

of the district court’s $25,000 jurisdictional limit.

The jury returned a verdict of $85,957 against

defendant State [*426] Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company, and on October 1, 2010, the

district court entered a judgment of $25,000 plus

interest against State Farm. State Farm appealed

in the circuit court, which held a hearing on

December 16, 2011. Judge Brian R. Sullivan

reversed and issued an order on February 1, 2012,

providing in pertinent part that ′′[t]he amount in

controversy in this case was in excess of the

$25,000.00′′ jurisdictional limit of MCL 600.8301.

The circuit court ordered that ′′the jury verdict and

subsequent judgment . . . is reversed and vacated

for the reason that the court lacked jurisdiction

over the subject [***12] matter because the

amount in controversy exceeded the district court’s

jurisdictional limits contained in MCL 600.8301[.]′′

II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S JURISDICTION

The central issue in all three appeals pertains to

the application of MCL 600.8301(1), which

provides: HN1 ′′The district court has exclusive

jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in

controversy does not exceed $25,000.00.′′ HN2

Whether the district court has subject-matter

jurisdiction on the facts presented is a question of

law reviewed de novo. Hillsdale Co Senior Servs,

Inc v Hillsdale Co, 494 Mich 46, 51; 832 NW2d

728 (2013). Likewise, HN3 the interpretation and

application of both statutes and court rules are

questions of law that are reviewed de novo. Id.;

Chen v Wayne State Univ, 284 Mich App 172,

191; 771 NW2d 820 (2009).

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We conclude that HN4 nothing in MCL

600.8301(1), MCR 2.227(A)(1), or MCR

2.116(C)(4) requires that a court limit its

jurisdictional query to the amount in controversy

alleged in the pleadings. Here, plaintiffs Moody

and Hodge patently claimed damages far in excess

of the $25,000 amount-in-controversy limit of the

district court’s jurisdiction throughout litigation.

The district [*427] court judges presiding over

these actions were duty-bound to recognize

[***13] the limits of their subject-matter

jurisdiction, In re Estate of Fraser, 288 Mich 392,

394; 285 NW 1 (1939),

2

and either dismiss the

cases brought by Moody and Hodge or transfer

them to the circuit court, Fox v Univ of Michigan

Bd of Regents, 375 Mich 238, 242; 134 NW2d 146

(1965),

3

and MCR 2.227(A)(1). Because the district

court judges failed to either dismiss these cases

that were patently outside their subject-matter

jurisdiction or transfer them to the circuit court,

the subsequent judgments—and on the facts

presented here, also the judgment on the providers’

claims—are void. In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426,

438; 505 NW2d 834 (1993),

4

Jackson City Bank

& Trust Co. v Fredrick, 271 Mich 538, 544; 260

NW 908 (1935),

5

and Altman v Nelson, [**40]

197 Mich App 467, 472-473; 495 NW2d 826

(1992).

6

These cases are governed by HN5 principles of

statutory construction, which apply to both statutes

and court [*428] rules. Henry v Dow Chem Co,

484 Mich 483, 495; 772 NW2d 301 (2009);

Brausch v Brausch, 283 Mich App 339, 352; 770

NW2d 77 (2009). ′′The primary goal of statutory

interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the

Legislature’s intent as expressed by the language

of the statute.′′ Ferguson v Pioneer State Mut Ins

Co of Mich, 273 Mich App 47, 51; 731 NW2d 94

(2006). [***15] Similarly, the language used in a

court rule and its place within the organization of

the Michigan Court Rules is important. Henry,

484 Mich at 495. Thus, when addressing how to

construe a statute or a court rule, one must first

look to the language used and give the words their

plain and ordinary meaning unless defined

otherwise. Lafarge Midwest, Inc v Detroit, 290

Mich App 240, 246; 801 NW2d 629 (2010);

Ferguson, 273 Mich App at 51-52. In this regard,

when words are undefined, one may properly

consult a dictionary concerning their plain and

ordinary meaning. Cairns v East Lansing, 275

Mich App 102, 107; 738 NW2d 246 (2007). When

the language used in a court rule or statute is clear

and unambiguous, no further interpretation is

either necessary or permitted. People v Lown, 488

Mich 242, 254-255; 794 NW2d 9 (2011);

Ferguson, 273 Mich App at 52. The overarching

rule of statutory construction is that a court must

enforce clear and unambiguous statutory

provisions as written. Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich

169, 175; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). Furthermore,

when a court interprets a statute, it may not read

anything into an unambiguous statute that is not

within the Legislature’s manifest intent as

[***16] derived from the words used in the statute

itself. People v Breidenbach, 489 Mich 1, 10; 798

NW2d 738 (2011); Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of

2

′′Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority, and a court may, and should, on its own motion, though the question

is not raised by the pleadings or by counsel, recognize its lack of jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying proceedings, dismissing the

action, or otherwise disposing thereof, at any stage of the proceeding.′′ Fraser, 288 Mich at 394.

3

′′When a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, any [***14] action with respect to such a cause, other than to dismiss

it, is absolutely void.′′ Fox, 375 Mich at 242.

4

′′[A] proven lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders a judgment void.′′ Hatcher, 443 Mich at 438.

5

′′When there is a want of jurisdiction over the parties, or the subject-matter, no matter what formalities may have been taken by the

trial court, the action thereof is void because of its want of jurisdiction, and consequently its proceedings may be questioned collaterally

as well as directly.′′ Jackson City Bank, 271 Mich at 544.

6

′′When there is a want of jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, no matter what formalities may have been taken by the

trial court, the action is void because of its want of jurisdiction.′′ Altman, 197 Mich App at 472-473.

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State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194, 218; 801

NW2d 35 (2011).

HN6 The circuit court is the primary court in

Michigan having jurisdiction over civil cases.

MCL 600.605 provides, [*429] ′′Circuit courts

have original jurisdiction to hear and determine

all civil claims and remedies, except where

exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution

or by statute to some other court or where the

circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the

constitution or statutes of this state.′′ MCL

600.8301(1) provides for an exception for bringing

civil actions in district court ′′when the amount in

controversy does not exceed $25,000.00.′′ The

critical phrase ′′amount in controversy′′ and the

critical word ′′controversy′′ are not defined by

statute or Michigan caselaw. See Szyszlo v Akowitz,

296 Mich App 40, 51; 818 NW2d 424 (2012). But

this Court has suggested that ′′amount in

controversy′′ is ′′based on the damages claimed.′′

Id. See also Etefia v Credit Technologies, Inc, 245

Mich App 466, 475; 628 NW2d 577 (2001).

The word ′′amount′′ clearly refers to a dollar value

because the district court’s jurisdictional

[***17] limit is stated in the dollar value of

$25,000. The plain and ordinary meaning of

′′controversy′′ is confirmed by consulting a

dictionary which defines it as ′′a [usually]

prolonged public dispute concerning [**41] a

matter of opinion.′′ Random House Webster’s

College Dictionary (1996). Also, ′′controversy′′ is

defined in The American Heritage Dictionary of

the English Language (new college ed., 1981), as

′′[a] dispute, especially a lengthy and public one,

between sides holding opposing views.′′ Both

dictionaries list ′′argument′′ as the synonym of

′′controversy.′′ These dictionaries also define,

respectively, ′′controvert′′—the verb version of

′′controversy′′—as ′′to argue against; dispute; deny;

oppose . . . . ; debate; [and] discuss,′′ and ′′[t]o

raise arguments against; voice opposition to; deny

[and] [t]o argue or dispute about; to debate.′′ Also,

because the phrase ′′amount in controversy′′

concerns a court’s jurisdiction, it may have

acquired a ′′peculiar and appropriate meaning in

the [*430] law,′′ MCL 8.3a, so it is also

appropriate consult a legal dictionary. People v

Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 488 n 2; 769 NW2d

256 (2009). Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed),

defines ′′amount in controversy′′ as ′′[t]he damages

claimed or relief demanded by [***18] the injured

party in a lawsuit.′′ But Black’s also defines the

word ′′controversy′′ to mean ′′[a] disagreement or

a dispute, [especially] in public [or] [a] justiciable

dispute.′′ Id. Likewise, Black’s Law Dictionary

defines ′′controvert′′ as ′′[t]o dispute or contest[.]′′

Id.

On the basis of these definitions, we conclude that

the plain, ordinary, and legal meaning of ′′amount

in controversy′′ under MCL 600.8301(1) is the

amount the parties to a lawsuit dispute, argue

about, or debate during the litigation. HN7 While

the amount in controversy in a lawsuit will most

often be determined by reviewing the amount of

damages or injuries a party claims in his or her

pleadings, the statute does not explicitly state this.

Indeed, the statute does not provide any method

for determining the amount in controversy. HN8

′′[A] court may read nothing into an unambiguous

statute that is not within the manifest intent of the

Legislature as derived from the words of the

statute itself.′′ Breidenbach, 489 Mich at 10

(quotation marks and citation omitted). If the

Legislature had intended to establish that the

limits of the district court’s jurisdiction were to be

determined solely on the basis of the amount

demanded in the complaint, it could easily have

done so, but it did not. [***19] Rather, HN9 the

Legislature used the phrase ′′amount in

controversy,′′ which is the dollar value of the

damages that are disputed in the lawsuit. Stated

otherwise, it is the amount the parties argue about,

debate, or controvert. Here, Moody’s pretrial

discovery answers, the arguments of Moody’s

counsel before trial, and the presentation of

evidence at trial, all showed that the amount in

controversy in that case far exceeded [*431] the

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$25,000 subject-matter jurisdiction of the district

court. MCL 600.8301(1). Hodge similarly

presented evidence of damages far exceeding the

$25,000 subject-matter jurisdiction of the district

court. Without subject-matter jurisdiction over

Moody’s and Hodge’s complaints, the only actions

the district court judges could have properly taken

would have been to dismiss the cases, MCR

2.116(C)(4), or transfer them to the circuit court,

MCR 2.227(A)(1). See Fox, 375 Mich at 242; Yee

v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App

379, 399; 651 NW2d 756 (2002).

We find appellants’ arguments to the contrary

unpersuasive. First, appellants cite several cases

for the proposition that subject-matter jurisdiction

is determined only by the allegations in the

plaintiff’s complaint and prayer for relief. See Fox

v Martin, 287 Mich. 147, 151; 283 N.W. 9 (1938)

(′′Jurisdiction does not depend upon the facts, but

upon the allegations.′′); Zimmerman v Miller, 206

Mich 599, 604-605; 173 NW 364 (1919);

[***20] Trost v Buckstop [**42] Lure Co, 249

Mich App 580, 586; 644 NW2d 54 (2002) (′′’A

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined

only by reference to the allegations listed in the

complaint.’′′), quoting Grubb Creek Action Comm

v Shiawassee Co Drain Comm’r, 218 Mich App

665, 668; 554 NW2d 612 (1996) ); and Altman,

197 Mich App at 472 (′′Jurisdiction always

depends on the allegations and never upon the

facts.′′). None of these cases is factually similar to

the ones at hand—in which a plaintiff has set forth

in the complaint a request for relief up to the

$25,000 jurisdictional limit of the district court,

knowing that the true amount sought exceeded

$25,000, and then presented to the jury evidence

of and argument for damages far exceeding the

jurisdictional limit of the court. Rather, the cited

cases address the point in time when a court’s

jurisdiction is initially determined and also whether

the [*432] subject matter of the suit other than the

amount in controversy is cognizable in the circuit

court. See Fox, 287 Mich at 153 (effort to

foreclose on an expired lien); Trost, 249 Mich App

at 587 (libel action); Grubb Creek Action Comm,

218 Mich App at 666 (review of drain board’s

determination [***21] of necessity); and Altman,

197 Mich App 473-474 (a paternity and custody

action). In Zimmerman, for instance, the issue was

whether the circuit court lost jurisdiction because

the plaintiff alleging breach of contract failed to

establish damages more than the court’s

jurisdictional minimum. The Court held on the

basis of longstanding caselaw that the ′′jurisdiction

of the court is determined by the amount demanded

in the plaintiff’s pleadings, not by the sum actually

recoverable or that found by the judge or jury on

the trial . . . .′′ Zimmerman, 206 Mich at 604-605.

Properly understood, these cases stand for the

proposition that HN10 what the plaintiff alleges

he or she will be able to prove at trial, not what the

fact-finder later determines (or the amount entered

in a judgment), establishes the amount in

controversy for the purpose of determining the

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

This principle has ancient roots in Michigan,

sprouting from Strong v Daniels, 3 Mich 466, 471

(1855), which held ′′upon general principles . . .

that jurisdiction must be determined from the

record, and, where it depends on amount, by the

sum claimed in the declaration or writ.′′ The Court

in a later case stated the rule that [***22] ′′the

damages claimed in the declaration or process,

and not the amount found by the court or jury

upon trial, must be the test of jurisdiction . . . .′′

Inkster v Carver, 16 Mich 484, 487 (1868). So,

according to these early cases, determining a

court’s jurisdiction at the outset on the basis of

what the plaintiff believed he or she could prove

was ′′the only practical rule . . . .′′ Id. at 488.

[*433] The rule requiring the determination of the

jurisdictional amount on the basis of the plaintiff’s

allegations does not support, as here, a plaintiff’s

artfully pleading a claim for relief ostensibly

within the limits of district court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction but then placing in dispute through

evidence and argument at trial an amount of

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damages much greater than the court’s

jurisdictional limit. Furthermore, appellants’

contention that the subject-matter jurisdiction of

the court may be determined by the amount

ultimately awarded by the court, i.e., by limiting

judgment to the jurisdictional amount, is contrary

to the longstanding rule adopted in Strong of

determining the subject-matter jurisdiction of the

court by the amount in controversy before trial

and the determination of the facts by a judge or

jury. We recognize [***23] dicta in Strong about

a jury’s ability to award more than the

jurisdictional [**43] limit of the court,7

but the

Strong Court’s holding was that jurisdiction is

determined using the amount claimed before the

facts are determined. Moreover, the implication of

appellants’ argument—that subject-matter

jurisdiction may be conferred by artful pleading

and by limiting a judgment to the district court’s

jurisdictional limit after the facts are

determined—violates the principle that the parties

to a lawsuit cannot confer jurisdiction on a court

that does not have it. In re Hatcher, 443 Mich at

433. A plaintiff may not merely say some magic

words and confer jurisdiction where it otherwise

would not exist. In fact, a ′′court must make its

own determination regarding the [*434] existence

of a statutory basis for jurisdiction.′′ Id. And the

court must make this jurisdictional determination

before the fact-finding of the trial has concluded.

Fox, 287 Mich at 151-152; Zimmerman, 206 Mich

at 604-605.

Appellants cite other cases regarding federal

district court jurisdictional limits, the removal of

state court actions to the federal district court, and

cases involving entry of default judgments that

are simply not relevant to interpreting MCL

600.8301(1) or the Michigan Court Rules.

Furthermore, the case of Brooks v Mammo,254

Mich App 486, 489-492, 494 n 3; 657 NW2d 793

(2002), had such a unique procedural

history—including the repeal and amendment of

pertinent statutes and a trial court that declined to

exercise jurisdiction that it actually

possessed—that the Court itself referred to Brooks

as presenting a ′′factual oddity.′′ Therefore, Brooks

has virtually no value in deciding the issues

presented in these appeals, which involve a very

different scenario. The case of Krawczyk v Detroit

Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 117 Mich

App 155; 323 NW2d 633 (1982), rev’d in part on

other grounds 418 Mich 231; 341 NW2d 110

(1983), also does not assist appellants’ argument.

The defendant in Krawczyk did not initially

contend that the district court lacked subject-

[***25] matter jurisdiction, only that judgment

could not be entered for more than the district

court’s jurisdictional limits. Krawczyk, 117 Mich

App at 162. The Court held that certain benefits

were not recoverable, thus reducing the judgment

amount, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney

fees, to within the district court’s jurisdictional

limits. Id. at 163. Our Supreme Court affirmed in

part and reversed in part this Court’s decision

regarding recoverable no-fault benefits, but it did

not address the issue of the district court’s

jurisdictional limits. Krawczyk, 418 Mich at 236.

[*435] We also find that Clohset v No Name Corp

(On Remand), 302 Mich App 550; 840 NW2d 375

(2013), does not alter our analysis of the issues

presented in these cases because it is factually

unique and addresses the district court’s ′′more

specific′′ equitable jurisdiction regarding ′′claims

arising under chapter 57 of the Revised Judicature

Act (RJA), MCL 600.5701 et seq., which concerns

proceedings to recover possession of premises.′′

Clohset, 302 Mich. App. at 560. The Court held

that because the district court’s equitable

jurisdiction under MCL 600.8302(1) and (3) was

invoked, that specific jurisdictional grant took

7

The Court opined: ′′It is well settled in actions commenced before a justice of the peace, that the test of jurisdiction is the sum

demanded in the writ or declaration, and the justice will [***24] not be ousted of his jurisdiction by the jury returning a verdict, or by

proof of damages beyond his jurisdiction. In such case the excess may be remitted, and judgment rendered for the balance.′′ Strong, 3

Mich at 473.

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precedence [***26] over the more general

jurisdictional grant [**44] provided in MCL

600.8301(1). Clohset, 302 Mich App at 561-562.

Therefore, the Court held the district court had

jurisdiction to enter the parties’ stipulated consent

judgment even though it would have otherwise

exceeded the jurisdictional limit of MCL

600.8301(1). Id. at 562-563. The court reasoned

that if the district court erred entering the stipulated

judgment, the defendant could not collaterally

attack the error ′′in the ’exercise of jurisdiction.’′′

Clohset, 302 Mich. App. at 564, citing Bowie v

Arder, 441 Mich 23, 49, 490 NW2d 568 (1992),

quoting Jackson City Bank, 271 Mich at 545. The

Clohset court further noted that a consent judgment

is different from a judgment after trial because it

represents the agreement of the parties, and,

absent fraud, mistake, or unconscionable

advantage, it cannot be appealed or set aside

without the consent of the parties. Id. at 565-566,

572-573. Finally, the Court found applicable the

principle that a party may not participate in and

harbor error. Id. at 566-567. In sum, because the

present cases do not involve summary proceedings,

the equitable jurisdiction of the district court

under MCL 600.8302, [***27] or the entry of a

stipulated consent judgment, Clohset has no

application to the circumstances presented in the

instant cases.

[*436] Appellants’ arguments also fail when

considered in light of pertinent court rules. Before

the trial of these cases, it was patent to the parties

and the district court judges that Moody and

Hodge were asserting claims for damages far in

excess of the district court’s jurisdictional limit of

$25,000. Given that HN11 ′′a court is continually

obliged to question sua sponte its own jurisdiction

over a person, the subject matter of an action, or

the limits of the relief it may afford,′′ Yee, 251

Mich App at 399, the district court judges should

have either dismissed these cases or transferred

them to circuit court pursuant to MCR 2.227(A)(1),

which provides:

HN12 When the court in which a civil

action is pending determines that it lacks

jurisdiction of the subject matter of the

action, but that some other Michigan court

would have jurisdiction of the action, the

court may order the action transferred to

the other court in a place where venue

would be proper. If the question of

jurisdiction is raised by the court on its

own initiative, the action may not be

transferred until the [***28] parties are

given notice and an opportunity to be

heard on the jurisdictional issue. [Emphasis

added.]

HN13 The court rule provides no particular

manner in which a court ′′determines that it lacks

jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action . . .

.′′ Rather, it only provides that if the court acts sua

sponte regarding its determination, the parties

must be ′′given notice and an opportunity to be

heard on the jurisdictional issue.′′ MCR

2.227(A)(1). Further, the court rule plainly requires

that the court may consider matters other than the

pleadings when considering whether it has

subjectmatter jurisdiction and whether it must

either dismiss or transfer a case to court having

jurisdiction. MCR 2.227(A)(1) does not restrict a

court in its jurisdictional determination to a review

of the pleadings, and such a requirement may not

be read into the rule when not derived from its

manifest intent as evidenced by the [*437] words

of the rule itself. See Breidenbach, 489 Mich at

10; Mich Ed Ass’n, 489 Mich at 218; Henry, 484

Mich at 495.

Also pertinent is HN14 MCR 2.116(C)(4), which

provides that summary disposition may be entered

when ′′[t]he court lacks jurisdiction of the subject

matter.′′ Home [**45] Owners moved for

summary disposition under this rule in

[***29] Moody’s case after he presented evidence

of damages far in excess of the district court’s

subject-matter jurisdictional limit of $25,000. A

motion brought on the grounds of lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction may be brought at any

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time. MCR 2.116(D)(3); Hillsdale Co Senior Servs,

494 Mich at 51 n 3. The determination whether

the court has jurisdiction when a motion under

MCR 2.116(C)(4) is brought is explicitly not

restricted to the pleadings alone. MCR 2.116(G)(5)

provides (with emphasis added): HN15 ′′The

affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions,

admissions, and documentary evidence then filed

in the action or submitted by the parties, must be

considered by the court when the motion is based

on subrule (C)(1)-(7) or (10).′′ See also Toaz v

Dep’t of Treasury, 280 Mich App 457, 459; 760

NW2d 325 (2008); L & L Wine & Liquor Corp v

Liquor Control Comm, 274 Mich App 354, 356;

733 NW2d 107 (2007). Because Moody and

Hodge claimed and presented evidence of damages

far in excess of $25,000, ′′it was the [district]

court’s duty to take notice of its lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction and dismiss [the cases]

pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4).′′ Yee, 251 Mich App

at 399.

To summarize, there is [***30] nothing in MCL

600.8301(1), MCR 2.227(A)(1), or MCR

2.116(C)(4) that limits the district court’s

duty-bound jurisdictional query to the pleadings.

Plaintiffs Moody and Hodge plainly claimed

damages far in excess of the $25,000 ′′amount in

controversy′′ [*438] limit of the district court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court

judges were required to either dismiss each

plaintiff’s case or transfer it to the circuit court.

See Fox, 375 Mich at 242; MCR 2.227(A)(1);

MCR 2.116(C)(4). Because the district court judges

failed to do either, the subsequent district court

judgments—including that with respect to the

providers’ claims that were consolidated with

those of Moody—are void for want of

subject-matter jurisdiction. Fox, 375 Mich at 242;

Jackson City Bank & Trust Co, 271 Mich at 544.

III. DOCKET NO. 301783

The providers argue that they may bring a direct

claim against Home Owners for no-fault benefits.

See Lakeland Neurocare Ctrs v State Farm Mut

Ins Co, 250 Mich App 35; 645 NW2d 59 (2002).

Furthermore, the providers note that even their

combined claims did not exceed the court’s

$25,000 jurisdictional limit and that it was Home

Owners that moved to consolidate the providers’

claims [***31] with those of Moody. Therefore,

the providers argue, under the ′′invited error′′

doctrine, see People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 352

n 6; 662 NW2d 376 (2003), Home Owners cannot

complain of any taint from consolidation of the

providers’ case with Moody’s case as the circuit

court held.

We find that the providers’ invited-error argument

is without merit. In Jones, 468 Mich at 353 n 6,

the Court noted that HN16 ′′’[i]nvited error’ is

typically said to occur when a party’s own

affirmative conduct directly causes the error.′′

Under the invited-error doctrine, appellate relief

is generally not available because ′′when a party

invites the error, he waives his right to seek

appellate review, and any error is extinguished.′′

Id. A related rule is that ′′error requiring reversal

may only be [*439] predicated on the trial court’s

actions and not upon alleged error to which the

aggrieved party contributed by plan or negligence.′′

Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 210; 670

NW2d 675 (2003) See also Smith v Musgrove, 372

Mich 329, 337; 125 NW2d [**46] 869 (1964)

(′′Error to be reversible must be error of the trial

judge; not error to which the aggrieved appellant

has contributed by planned or neglectful omission

of [***32] action on his part.′′).

HN17 Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right. Quality Products

& Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich

362, 374; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). Here, Home

Owners moved to consolidate the providers’ case

with Moody’s case before discovery disclosed

that Moody’s claims for damages were far in

excess of the district court’s jurisdictional limit.

After discovery disclosed that the amount in

controversy with respect to Moody’s claims

exceeded the district court’s jurisdictional limit,

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Home Owners brought the issue to the attention of

the court and requested that Moody’s claims be

transferred to circuit court. Further, when Moody’s

counsel presented evidence of claims exceeding

the court’s jurisdictional limit, Home Owners

moved for summary disposition under MCR

2.116(C)(4) because Moody claimed damages far

in excess of the district court’s $25,0000

jurisdictional limit. Thus, as a factual matter,

Home Owners did not waive its jurisdictional

arguments and preserved its claim that the district

court erred by denying severance of Moody’s

claims or by not dismissing them.

Moreover, defects in subject-matter jurisdiction

cannot be waived and may be [***33] raised at

any time. Hillsdale Co Senior Servs, 494 Mich at

51 n 3. Because subject-matter jurisdiction

′′concerns the court’s power to hear a case, it is

not subject to waiver.′′ Lown, 488 Mich at [*440]

268. In addition, a court must at all times be

cognizant of its own jurisdiction and sua sponte

question whether it has jurisdiction over a person

or the subject matter of an action. Straus v

Governor, 459 Mich 526, 532; 592 NW2d 53

(1999); Yee, 251 Mich App at 399. ′′When a court

is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, any

action with respect to such a cause, other than to

dismiss it, is absolutely void.′′ Fox, 375 Mich at

242.

In the providers’ case, based on pretrial discovery,

it was patently obvious before the trial began, to

the district court and to the parties, that Moody’s

claims for damages far exceeded the $25,000

amount-in-controversy jurisdictional limit of MCL

600.8301(1). Given the clear evidence supporting

the determination that Moody’s claims for

damages exceeded the district court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court should

have dismissed Moody’s claims. Fox, 375 Mich at

242. Alternatively, under the Michigan Court

Rules, the district court could have transferred

[***34] Moody’s case to the circuit court. MCR

2.227(A)(1). Because the district court failed to

either dismiss Moody’s claims or transfer them to

circuit court, the subsequent proceedings,

including the consolidated providers’ claims, were

void. Fox, 375 Mich at 242.

We also reject the providers’ argument that their

claims may be saved by severing them after the

fact of trial and judgment from the

extra-jurisdictional claims of Moody. While the

providers may bring an independent cause of

action against a no-fault insurer, the providers’

claims against Home Owners are completely

derivative of and dependent on Moody’s having a

valid claim of no-fault benefits against Home

Owners. Specifically, the providers’ claims are

dependent on establishing Moody’s claim that he

suffered ′′accidental bodily injury arising out of

the . . . use of a motor [*441] vehicle,′′ MCL

500.3105(1), that they provided ′′reasonably

necessary products, services and accommodations

for [Moody’s] care, recovery, or rehabilitation,′′

MCL 500.3107(1)(a), [**47] and that at the time

of the accident, Moody was ′′domiciled in the

same household′′ as his father who was insured by

Home Owners, MCL 500.3114(1). The providers’

and Moody’s claims with [***35] respect to the

requisites of Home Owners’ liability are therefore

identical. HN18 Because there is an identity

between Moody’s claims and those of the

providers and because the claims were

consolidated for trial, we consider them merged

for the purpose of determining the amount in

controversy under MCL 600.8301(1). The

providers cite Boyd v Nelson Credit Centers, 132

Mich App 774, 780-781; 348 NW2d 25 (1984), for

the proposition that the claims of individual

plaintiffs may not be aggregated to satisfy the

circuit court’s jurisdictional minimum amount in

controversy. We note that Boyd has precedential

effect under the rule of stare decisis, MCR

7.215(C)(2), but because it was decided before

November 1990, Boyd is not binding precedent,

MCR 7.215(J)(1). Further, because the providers’

claims are derivative of Moody’s claims, we find

applicable the exception noted in Boyd that permits

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aggregating the claims of a single plaintiff for the

purpose of determining whether a court has

subject-matter jurisdiction because the

amount-in-controversy limitation is satisfied or,

as here, exceeded. Boyd, 132 Mich App at 781.

This analysis is also consistent with the general

rule that when the claims of multiple parties are

consolidated [***36] to facilitate the presentation

of proofs, the cases are not merged into one cause.

They retain their own separate identities. See

Armstrong v Commercial Carriers, Inc, 341 Mich

45, 52; 67 NW2d 194 (1954). But this Court has

observed that HN19 when cases are consolidated

[*442] under MCR 2.505(A) because of ′′a

substantial and controlling common question of

law or fact,′′ the ′′court rule is silent with regard to

whether the consolidated cases are effectively

merged into a single case.′′ Chen, 284 Mich App

at 195. The Court in Chen, citing 3 Longhofer,

Michigan Court Rules Practice (5th ed), § 2505.3,

p 79, discussed two situations. In one, the

consolidated cases are ordered tried together ′′’but

each retains its separate character and requires the

entry of a separate judgment.’′′ Chen, 284 Mich

App at 195, quoting Longhofer, § 2505.3, p 79.

But in the other situation, when actions that are

′′’normally between the same parties’′′ are

consolidated, the ′′’actions are joined together to

form a single action in which a single judgment is

entered.’′′ Chen, 284 Mich App at 195, quoting

Longhofer, § 2505.3, p 79 (emphasis added). This

latter situation exists ′′where several actions are

pending between the same parties stating claims

which could have been brought in separate counts

of a single claim.′′ People ex rel Director of

Conservation v Babcock, 38 Mich App 336, 342;

196 NW2d 489 (1972) [***37] .

Here, there is virtual identity between the

providers’ and Moody’s claims, and Moody could

have brought all the claims in a single case in

which a single judgment was entered. Indeed, it is

Moody’s claim against Home Owners that the

providers are allowed to assert because HN20 the

no-fault act states that ′′benefits are payable to or

for the benefit of an injured person,′′ MCL

500.3112. See Lakeland Neurocare Ctrs, 250

Mich App at 38-40. But the providers’ claims

actually belong to Moody because ′′the right to

bring an action for personal protection insurance

[PIP] benefits, including claims for attendant care

services, belongs to the injured party.′′ Hatcher v

State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 269 Mich App 596,

600; 712 NW2d 744 (2006). Thus, the injured

party may waive by agreement his or her claim

against [*443] an insurer for no-fault benefits,

[**48] and a service provider is bound by the

waiver. SeeMichigan Head & Spine Institute, PC

v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 299 Mich App 442,

447-449; 830 NW2d 781 (2013). If an injured

party waives a PIP claim, a service provider’s

remedy is to seek payment from the injured

person. [***38] Id. at 449-450.

We conclude on the basis of the foregoing analysis

that there is such an identity between the providers’

and Moody’s claims that consolidation for trial

resulted in merging the claims for purpose of

determining the amount in controversy under

MCL 600.8301(1). Because the providers’ claims

are derivative of Moody’s claims, the consolidated

claims are the equivalent of a single plaintiff

asserting multiple claims against a single

defendant. See Boyd, 132 Mich App at 781.

In sum, Home Owners did not waive its objection

to the district court’s jurisdiction by initially

moving to consolidate the claims of Moody and

the providers. The fact that the providers’

combined claims were within the district court’s

$25,000 jurisdictional limit does not cure the

jurisdictional defect arising from consolidating

the providers’ claims with those of Moody given

that the amount in controversy with regard to the

consolidated claims clearly exceeded the district

court’s $25,000 subject-matter jurisdiction. MCL

600.8301(1). The entire judgment that included

both the providers’ and Moody’s claims was void.

Fox, 375 Mich at 242; Jackson City Bank & Trust

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Co, 271 Mich at 544. Also, as discussed next, the

circuit court did not err [***39] by finding that

Home Owners was denied a fair trial by counsel’s

improper remarks, which independently warranted

reversal and remand for a new trial concerning the

providers’ claims. Reetz v Kinsman Marine Transit

Co, 416 Mich 97, 100-103; 330 NW2d 638

(1982).

[*444] IV. DOCKET NOS. 301783 AND 301784:

COUNSEL MISCONDUCT

A. PRESERVATION

Moody and the providers argue that Home Owners

failed to preserve this issue for appeal and, in fact,

waived the issue. Appellants contend that while

Home Owners asserted in the trial court and on

appeal in the circuit court that alleged attorney

misconduct entitled it to a directed verdict, Home

Owners did not request a new trial in either court.

We disagree.

Contrary to appellants’ argument, Home Owners

preserved for appeal the issue of Moody’s

counsel’s improper remarks to the jury when

Home Owners objected and obtained a ruling on

the issue from the trial court. HN21 Generally, an

issue is properly preserved [***40] if it is raised

before, addressed by, or decided by the lower

court or administrative tribunal. General Motors

Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 290 Mich App 355,

386; 803 NW2d 698 (2010). And, in Reetz, 416

Mich at 101-102, the Court referred to the

appellate preservation requirement as the ′′no

objection—no ruling—no error presented′′ rule.

Reetz could be read as generally requiring a

request for a curative instruction or a motion for a

mistrial to preserve appellate review of remarks

by counsel. But appellate review without such

actions may be granted when counsel’s remarks

are so improper that they might have denied a

party a fair trial. Id. at 100. Thus, ′′incurable

errors are not shielded from appellate review

because an attorney fails to request what in that

case would be a futile instruction.′′ Id. at 101.

[**49] In these cases, the district court judge

abdicated both her responsibility to control the

trial proceedings, MCR 2.513(B), and to instruct

the jury regarding the law, MCR 2.512(B). See

Reetz, 416 Mich at 103 n 9 (′′[T]he [*445] trial

court has a duty to assure that all parties who

come before it receive a fair trial. Consequently, if

counsel exceeds the proper bounds of argument, a

judge should interrupt to correct counsel

[***41] and take any curative measures which are

necessary.′′); Badalamenti v William Beaumont

Hosp-Troy, 237 Mich App 278, 293; 602 NW2d

854 (1999) (′′The trial court has a duty to assure

that the parties before it receive a fair trial.′′). It is

apparent from the record that the district court

judge presiding over Moody’s case simply allowed

Moody’s counsel to present conflicting views on

an irrelevant issue and that a defense request for a

curative instruction would have been futile.

Although a motion for a mistrial would have been

appropriate, it was not mandatory. Reetz, 416

Mich at 102. As a result, this record demonstrates

that Home Owners’ counsel sufficiently preserved

for appellate review the issue of improper remarks

of counsel.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HN22 Appellate review of claims of misconduct

by counsel is de novo to determine whether a

party was denied a fair trial. SeeReetz, 416 Mich

at 100. Analysis of such claims requires two

steps: (1) did error occur and (2) does it require

reversal. Id. at 102-103; Hunt v Freeman, 217

Mich App 92, 95, 550 NW2d 817 (1996). ′′A

lawyer’s comments will usually not be cause for

reversal unless they indicate a deliberate course of

conduct aimed at preventing a fair and impartial

trial or where counsel’s remarks were [***42] such

as to deflect the jury’s attention from the issues

involved and had a controlling influence on the

verdict.′′ Ellsworth v Hotel Corp, 236 Mich App

185, 191; 600 NW2d 129 (1999). Stated otherwise,

′′[r]eversal is required only where the prejudicial

statements of an attorney reflect a studied [*446]

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purpose to inflame or prejudice a jury or deflect

the jury’s attention from the issues involved.′′

Hunt, 217 Mich App at 95. Proper instructions to

the jury will cure most, but not all, misconduct by

counsel. Reetz, 416 Mich at 105-106.

On this issue, the circuit court sitting in its

appellate capacity also made a pertinent finding of

fact: ′′Counsel for Moody purposely injected an

irrelevant issue to prejudice [Home Owners] and

to erroneously suggest to the jury that [Home

Owners] may not be liable for any of the claims

and can recover from a third-party source.′′ HN23

A lower court’s finding of fact is reviewed on

appeal for clear error. MCR 2.613(C). ′′A finding

is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court, on the

whole record, is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.′′ Hughes

v Almena Twp, 284 Mich App 50, 60; 771 NW2d

453 (2009).

C. DISCUSSION

Based on our determination [***43] that the

judgment entered in these cases is void, this issue

may be moot. HN24 An issue is moot when a

judicial determination cannot have any practical

legal effect on the existing controversy. People v

Richmond, 486 Mich 29, 34-35; 782 NW2d 187

(2010). But this Court ′′may review a moot issue

if it is publicly significant and likely to recur, yet

may evade judicial review.′′ General Motors Corp,

290 Mich App at 386. That is the case here. We

conclude that the circuit court did not clearly err

regarding the facts and did not commit legal error

by concluding that the improper remarks of

Moody’s counsel, in [**50] which the providers’

counsel joined, denied Home Owners a fair trial,

thus warranting reversal and remand for a new

trial.

[*447] Moody’s appellate counsel concedes for

the purposes of this appeal that his trial counsel’s

comments regarding the assigned claims facility

were ′′either wrong or irrelevant.′′ We agree that

counsel’s arguments were both wrong and

irrelevant. Home Owners’ policy insuring

Moody’s father requires it to pay Moody PIP

benefits if Moody were determined to be

′′domiciled in the same household′′ as his father.

MCL 500.3114(1). HN25 The assigned claims

facility is [***44] not liable for no-fault benefits

unless

no personal protection insurance is

applicable to the injury, no personal

protection insurance applicable to the

injury can be identified, the personal

protection insurance applicable to the

injury cannot be ascertained because of a

dispute between 2 or more automobile

insurers concerning their obligation to

provide coverage or the equitable

distribution of the loss, or the only

identifiable personal protection insurance

applicable to the injury is, because of

financial inability of 1 or more insurers to

fulfill their obligations, inadequate to

provide benefits up to the maximum

prescribed. MCL 500.3172(1).]

Furthermore, the insurer to which a claim is

assigned, if it pays benefits, ′′is entitled to

reimbursement from the defaulting insurers to the

extent of their financial responsibility.′′ Id.

This record supports that the circuit court did not

clearly err by holding that Moody’s counsel

′′purposely injected an irrelevant issue to prejudice

[Home Owners] and to erroneously suggest to the

jury that [Home Owners] may not be liable for

any of the claims and can recover from a

third-party source.′′ This finding warrants granting

a new trial. Ellsworth, 236 Mich App at 191;

[***45] Hunt, 217 Mich App at 95. The district

court judge ′′failed to instruct the jury to ignore

these references [*448] and the references were

so numerous that it is doubtful any instruction

would have been effective.′′ Reetz, 416 Mich at

106.

As noted already, appellants’ arguments regarding

preservation fail. Appellants’ arguments regarding

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waiver and due process must also fail. Home

Owners did not and could not waive the circuit

court’s authority to grant appropriate relief on

appeal of improper remarks of counsel that deny a

fair trial. Although Home Owners requested in the

district court and on appeal to the circuit court that

a verdict be directed in its favor, rather than

requesting a new trial, the underlying issue of

counsel misconduct was nonetheless preserved

and presented on appeal. Appellants’ contention

that they were denied due process regarding this

issue is without merit. The essential requisites of

procedural due process are adequate notice, an

opportunity to be heard, and a fair and impartial

tribunal. Hughes, 284 Mich App at 69. Appellants

received ample notice and opportunity to be heard

on this issue, and nothing suggests that the circuit

court was not fair and impartial. Thus, appellants

were not denied due process of law.

Moreover, [***46] the circuit court possessed the

authority to grant a new trial. HN26 MCR 7.112

provides that in its appellate capacity ′′the circuit

court may grant relief as provided in MCR 7.216,′′

which in turn provides in pertinent part that the

Court of Appeals may, ′′in its discretion, and on

the terms it deems just′′ enter ′′any judgment or

order or grant further or different relief as the case

may require[.]′′ MCR 7.216(A)(7). Misconduct by

a party’s attorney that denies another party a fair

[**51] trial is a basis for granting a new trial. See

MCR 2.611(A)(1)(a) and (b); Reetz, 416 Mich at

100; Badalamenti, 237 Mich App at 289-290.

Consequently, we [*449] affirm the circuit

court’s alternative basis for granting Home Owners

relief in these cases.

V. CONCLUSION

In all three cases, we affirm the circuit court’s

ruling that the district court lacked subjectmatter

jurisdiction under MCL 600.8301(1).

Consequently, the district court judgments are

void, and we affirm the circuit court orders

vacating those judgments.

We also hold that all no-fault claims for benefits

due a single injured party based on the same

accidental injuries must be aggregated for the

purpose of determining compliance with the

district [***47] court’s subject-matter jurisdiction

under MCL 600.8301(1). Consequently, we affirm

the circuit court’s order vacating the judgment for

the providers in Docket No. 301783.

Finally, we affirm the circuit court’s determination

in Docket Nos. 301783 and 301784 that counsel

misconduct denied Home Owners a fair trial and

independently warranted reversal and remand for

new trial.

We remand to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. As the

prevailing parties, appellees may tax costs under

MCR 7.219. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald

/s/ Donald S. Owens

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