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i 

57–429 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–79] 

ADDRESSING A NEW GENERATION 

OF THREATS FROM WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION: DEPARTMENT 

OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION 

PROGRAMS AND THE DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE 

THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

FULL COMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 15, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

JULIE UNMACHT, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 15, 2009, Addressing a New Generation of Threats from 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Department of Energy Nonproliferation Programs and the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program ...................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 15, 2009 ....................................................................................... 31 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2009 

ADDRESSING A NEW GENERATION OF THREATS FROM WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 3 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy, and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration ........................................................................................................................ 5 

Nacht, Dr. Michael L., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic 

Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P. ............................................................................ 35 

Nacht, Dr. Michael L. ....................................................................................... 45 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Massa ......................................................................................................... 53 

(1) 

ADDRESSING A NEW GENERATION OF THREATS FROM 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AND THE 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE THREAT 

REDUCTION PROGRAM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 15, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Let me start by officially welcoming our colleague, Representative Buck McKeon, from California for his honest-to-goodness first hearing as a ranking member 

of this committee. He got off to a great start during our markup. 

And here we are at our first hearing, so we would like to officially 

welcome him in the first of many hearings that we will work together. 

We welcome our witnesses, Honorable Thomas D’Agostino, Under 

Secretary for Nuclear Security with the Department of Energy and 

the Department’s Administrator for National Nuclear Security Administration; Dr. Michael Nacht, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Global Strategic Affairs with the Department of Defense. 

And we welcome both of you for being with us. This is a highly 

important hearing, and we look forward to your testimony. 

The risks associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, particularly the risk that such weapons can fall into 

terrorists’ hands, are some of the gravest threats facing our country. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced a 

new era of proliferation. In the last eight years alone, North Korea 

has tested a nuclear weapon, expanded its nuclear arsenal and proliferated weapons of mass destruction, technology, and expertise to 

Iran and to Syria. 

Iran has rapidly developed capabilities that may enable it to 

build nuclear weapons. 

A far-reaching nuclear proliferation network run by Dr. A.Q. 

Khan of Pakistan was uncovered and dismantled. 

Nuclear arms rivalries have intensified in Asia and the Middle 

East. 

Changes in civil nuclear power programs have challenged the 

nonproliferation regime. The spread of biotechnology has increased 
2 

the availability of technologies for sinister purposes. Dangerous 

chemical, nuclear, radiological and biological materials have remained poorly secured. At the same time, terrorist networks 

around the globe have taken a deep interest in obtaining and using 

these materials. 

The Department of Energy nonproliferation programs and the 

Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program undertake critical work to address the serious weapons of mass destruction threats facing our country today and must be a top national security priority. Unfortunately during the past eight years 

these programs have suffered from a lack of effective policy guidance and leadership as well as programmatic and funding constraints. The 9/11 Commission gave the U.S. a grade D on average 

to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism, 

and emphasized that Congress should provide the resources needed 

for these efforts as quickly as possible. 

This committee has taken a number of important steps to address the 9/11 Commission’s concern and move weapons of mass 

destruction nonproliferation and threat programs in the right direction over the last two years. The committee has also urged a strong 

national commitment to reinvigorate these programs and ensure 

that they are a top national security priority going forward. I am 

pleased that the President has now made that commitment and 

has already undertaken an ambitious effort to ensure that the U.S. 

does whatever we can do to reduce the risk that weapons of mass 

destruction and related material could ever fall into terrorist 

hands. This includes an international effort to secure all vulnerable 

nuclear material around the world within four years, and an effort 

to expand U.S. cooperation with Russia and pursue new partnerships to lock down sensitive material. 

When the House passed the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2010 this committee provided the President with 

additional funding, new authorities and other tools to further the 

President’s goals and objectives in this area. This includes a $403 

million funding increase for Department of Energy nonproliferation 

programs and a $30 million funding increase for the Department 

of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. 

Gentlemen, we look forward to hearing about the good work that 

your departments are doing. And under the new administration, we 

hope you will address the new generation of weapons of mass destruction threats facing our country. We are especially eager to 

hear about opportunities that exist to get a jump start on the 

President’s initiatives. 

I would like to remind our members and remind our witnesses 

that, directly following the end of this hearing, we will move to 

Rayburn 2337 for a follow-on classified briefing for members only. 

Before I begin, we turn to my good friend, the ranking member, 

the gentleman from California, Mr. Buck McKeon, for any comments that he may wish to make. 

Mr. McKeon. 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s 

hearing on addressing a new generation of threats from weapons 

of mass destruction, with a particular focus on efforts under way 

in the Department of Energy’s nonproliferation programs and the 

Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. I 

would also like to welcome our witnesses, Thomas D’Agostino, the 

Undersecretary for Nuclear Security at the Department of Energy, 

and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; and Dr. Michael Nacht, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Global Strategic Affairs. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning. We look forward to your testimony. As the Chairman said, since this is my 

first full committee hearing as ranking member, I wanted to take 

a brief moment and express my sincere enthusiasm and commitment to work with Chairman Skelton and our members on both 

sides of the aisle to ensure that America’s men and women in uniform have the direction, tools and resources they need to succeed 

and that our defense policies meet the evolving security demands 

facing our nation. 

Today we are focused on the next generation of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) threats. I think it is fair to say that many 

would agree that we live in a complex security environment that 

includes nuclear-capable states, nations determined to be nuclear 

powers, and terrorists who seek nuclear materials and know-how. 

If we look to the latest headlines in the news, we will find a defiant 

North Korea which ignores the international community with its 

nuclear tests, multiple ballistic missile launches and proliferation 

of WMD technology and expertise; a calculating Iranian regime 

that is determined to develop its capabilities to build nuclear weapons; and Al Qaeda and their affiliates who seek to undermine the 

Pakistani government, a nation with a nuclear weapons program. 

It is how we approach this WMD threat where we may have 

some disagreements. From my perspective, we need a balanced and 

effective toolkit filled with unilateral and multilateral tools of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and military preparedness, including missile defense and emergency response. 

Today we are focused on one set of tools at our disposal—defense 

nonproliferation programs managed by the Department of Energy 

and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program managed by the 

Department of Defense. 

Gentlemen, I look forward to hearing your individual assessments of the major proliferation challenges facing the United 

States and the international community and how your respective 

organizations prioritize to meet these challenges. 

I am also interested in learning your thoughts on U.S.-Russia 

nonproliferation cooperation. As you know, earlier this month 

President Obama met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, 

and in a joint statement, both nations confirmed their commitment 

to strengthen cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons and stop acts of terrorism. Based on this renewed commit-
4 

ment, what will be the impact, if anything, on your existing programs with Russia and in terms of cost-sharing? 

At this time, I would also like to raise two concerns. First, while 

I recognize that addressing the WMD proliferation threat is in U.S. 

national security interests, our success depends on our partnerships with Russia and other nations. I am concerned that the 

United States often gets stuck paying the bills, especially for those 

nations who have the financial means to contribute. Let me emphasize that a partnership is not a one-way street; it is not an assistance program, and it is not effortless. 

Please describe how you are working with other nations to ensure they take the proliferation threat seriously and how they are 

contributing, both in terms of capital and financial—political and 

financial capital, to address our shared proliferation interests. 

Second, in the recently passed National Defense Authorization 

Act, both the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

and the Department of Defense (DOD) received funding above the 

President’s budget request for their nonproliferation programs. 

While I support the bill that we passed, I am concerned that the 

additional $402.6 million provided to the NNSA came without a 

formal request from the Administrator or Secretary of Energy and 

was based on a vague commitment made during President Obama’s 

April 5th speech in Prague where he outlined his vision, ‘‘to secure 

all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within the next 

four years.’’ My concern is that we are funding programs before the 

President’s rhetoric has translated into an integrated interagency 

strategy or plan that has been shared with Congress. 

As further evidence of my concerns, neither our colleagues on the 

Senate Armed Services Committee nor the House appropriators 

provided additional funding for NNSA’s defense nonproliferation 

programs. In addition, both of these committees also reduced funding for an NNSA program to disable and dismantle North Korea’s 

nuclear program next year. North Korea’s rejection of the Six-Party 

talks and recent provocative actions are strong indicators that the 

international community will be in a stalemate with North Korea 

for the foreseeable future. 

Considering these circumstances, Republicans would rather see 

this funding and additional increases designated by the committee 

for these programs be shifted to other priorities, such as missile defense, given the current threat. 

Before closing, I want to reiterate that our nonproliferation programs are essential to U.S. national security interests, especially 

our efforts to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists. 

Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony and a candid discussion that follows and thank you for being here. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Our old friend, the Honorable Tom D’Agostino, we will call on 

you first, sir. 
5 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, UNDER 

SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, members of the 

committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today 

to discuss NNSA’s vital role in supporting the administration’s efforts to address weapons of mass destruction threats. 

Mr. Chairman, under your leadership the committee has been a 

strong supporter of NNSA’s nonproliferation activities. 

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, would you move the microphone just 

a little closer? We are going to have this room renovated, and it 

is going to be a lot easier for witnesses as well as the committee 

to hear witnesses some six months from now. 

But, right now, we will have to do with what we have. So please 

proceed. Thank you. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

The committee’s assistance will become even more critical as the 

NNSA seeks to expand and accelerate efforts, consistent with the 

President’s nuclear security strategy. The nonproliferation activities that I will address today are a subset Department of Energy’s 

overall capabilities to address the weapons of mass destruction 

threat. These activities complement the Department’s other recognized nonproliferation, arms control and counterterrorism capabilities. However, my remarks today focus on our first and second line 

of defense activities to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, of materials and of technology. 

The President made clear in his April speech in Prague in joint 

statements with our Russian partners and elsewhere that nuclear 

weapons remain a fundamental issue facing the international community in the 21st century. He has stated that the most immediate 

and extreme threat to global security is the potential acquisition of 

nuclear weapons by terrorists. To address this threat, the President 

has outlined an ambitious strategy: deal with the nuclear arsenals, 

halt the proliferation of weapons to additional states, and prevent 

terrorists from acquiring weapons or the materials to build them. 

I have had the opportunity to speak to members of this committee on the important work that the NNSA has done and the enterprise carries out to ensure that the United States’ nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable to deter any adversary and to provide the appropriate defensive umbrella to our allies. 

While I am speaking today about a major separate component of 

the NNSA, the nonproliferation component of our national security 

mission relies upon similar scientific and technical expertise. It is 

that scientific and technical nuclear expertise, combined with our 

proven track record on implementing programs both domestically 

and abroad, that makes the NNSA defense nonproliferation program a leader in nonproliferation activities around the world. 

The NNSA nuclear security programs provide an important 

means to achieve a number of President Obama’s objectives. His 

April Prague speech provides a priority list of areas in which 

NNSA will focus future nuclear security activities. Chief among 
6 

those is the President’s call to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years, expand our cooperation with 

Russia, and pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive 

materials. 

This is an urgent and ambitious goal. However, it is one that we 

stand prepared to support. Our work scope includes a prioritybased assessment of activities required to address security concerns 

at specific sites worldwide. NNSA will undertake the following actions to expand nuclear security cooperation with Russia and other 

key partners; secure nuclear material at the most vulnerable sites 

worldwide; remove and eliminate weapons-useable nuclear materials where possible; strengthen international security standards, 

practices and international safeguards; improve international capabilities to detect and intercept smuggling of nuclear materials; and 

to prevent terrorists and proliferators from poaching on the international market in the dual use of nuclear-weapons-related equipment and technologies. 

To start addressing the four-year time line to secure vulnerable 

material, some existing NNSA activities will be accelerated, including our Material Protection Control and Accounting Program, our 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative and our Nonproliferation and 

International Security programs. Other aspects of the present 

agenda will require new or expanded efforts, but in short, we have 

our to-do lists. 

This NNSA plan of work alone will not accomplish all of the 

President’s nuclear security objectives. Under the leadership of the 

White House, we will work closely with the Department of State, 

Department of Defense, Homeland Security and others in achieving 

these goals. The joint statement on nuclear cooperation issued by 

Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Russia just last week, as well 

as the March 2010 Global Nuclear Security Summit, announced at 

the G8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy, likewise will provide a solid foundation for work with our international partners. 

In closing, as the Administrator of the NNSA I am very proud 

of the work and accomplishments of the nonproliferation program 

that we have. For the sake of not taking up too much of the committee’s time today, I have not covered our other numerous activities and accomplishments in my oral statement. However, I have 

included the details of our nonproliferation programs and the 

achievements in the written testimony. You have my assurance 

that, as we continue on our important work to achieve the President’s nonproliferation goals, while closely working with our interagency partners, NNSA will do its best to make the world a safer 

place. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee thank you 

very much, and that concludes my remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary D’Agostino can be found in 

the Appendix on page 35.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the written testimony of the 

witnesses will be included in the record. 

Dr. Nacht, please. We welcome you. 
7 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL L. NACHT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. NACHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, have submitted written testimony for the record. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Armed Services Committee, 

I am very pleased to appear before you today to discuss these terrible threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and explain 

how the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program plays an important role in the overall U.S. strategy to mitigate these threats. 

We all know that weapons of mass destruction pose a tremendous threat to our nation, our interests and even our way of life, 

and the Department of Defense is seized with this challenge, and 

we are determined to ensure that we develop and maintain the 

plans, strategies, capabilities and programs necessary to prevent 

WMD proliferation wherever possible. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has identified four 

strategic priorities that provide our Department with the mechanism for examining WMD challenges. These four priorities are: Increasing barriers to WMD proliferation and use; identifying and 

mitigating emerging WMD threats; developing an integrated, layered WMD defense; and managing WMD threats emanating from 

failing or fragile states or from ungoverned spaces. 

These priorities provide a valuable framework to support the 

President’s ambitious nuclear security agenda from his Prague 

speech. Within DOD, these priorities are shaping our efforts to address WMD related issues in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the 

QDR, which is currently under way. The QDR provides an unparalleled opportunity to communicate the importance of WMD issues to 

the broader defense community. 

Let me briefly offer the committee a report on our current and 

future Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) activities. And before I 

begin, I do want to thank the committee for its continued strong 

support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, and we take 

this as a vote of confidence in the Department’s efforts thus far to 

implement the CTR Program. 

Mr. Chairman I know you and your colleagues are well acquainted with the history and activities of the Program. I just want 

to bring you up to date briefly on the status of some current 

projects, some recent achievements, and then some new initiatives. 

CTR today is in a period of transition from a nuclear-centric effort focused on the former Soviet Union to a more expansive effort 

to respond to WMD threats throughout the world. CTR continues 

to oversee the destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems 

and associated infrastructure in accordance with all relevant stock 

provisions and agreements. Security systems at 24 nuclear weapon 

storage sites in Russia have been upgraded in partnership with the 

Department of Energy, with the final upgrades completed in late 

2008 last year. DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE) are now 

coordinating closely to give the Russian military the means to sustain operational readiness into the future. 
8 

On March 5th of this year, the first chemical munitions were destroyed in the Shchuch’ye chemical weapons destruction facility. By 

2012, the facility will destroy the chemical weapon stockpile at the 

nearby Planovy military base, which contains approximately oneseventh of Russia’s chemical arsenal. In Azerbaijan, CTR is helping 

the Coast Guard interdict WMD smuggling in the Caspian Sea, 

and we are installing a comprehensive surveillance system that 

will cover the major shipping lanes in the Caspian. 

And by the way, Congressman McKeon, I can cite some specific 

cost-sharing examples here perhaps after I finish my testimony. 

The Biological Threat Reduction Program, the BTRP, continues its 

work to consolidate and secure pathogen collections, develop a capability for disease detection, diagnostics and reporting and enhancing strategic research partnerships. 

We have negotiated an implementing agreement with Armenia 

which is pending signature. There is construction of the Central 

Reference Laboratory in Tbilisi, Georgia, which is on track to be 

completed this year. And at the request of the Georgian government, CTR was working to make the lab a joint disease surveillance and research center. These are ongoing activities today. 

What about the future? First, we must continue to have a strong 

CTR presence in Russia, as the President attempts to reset our relationship with Russia, where the CTR Program should be a central part of that resetting process. CTR is working with an interagency forum to meet the President’s goal of nuclear lockdown 

within four years, as Administrator D’Agostino has already discussed. 

This group is currently assessing known locations of nuclear material to determine the best way forward. This initiative is a high 

priority for the President, and CTR looks forward to assisting in 

this effort. In addition, the CTR Program is bracing for a wide 

range of emerging WMD threats beyond the former Soviet Union. 

A recent National Academy of Sciences study recommended that 

CTR expand geographically and evolve in form and function to confront emerging WMD threats. In conjunction with an interagency 

committee on bioengagement, CTR has identified four countries, 

Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya and Uganda, as potential partners in 

future bioengagement efforts. 

A National Research Council report on the Biological Threat Reduction Program noted that countries that lack the infrastructure 

necessary to detect, diagnose, and protect disease outbreaks are at 

a greater risk of succumbing to a bioterror attack. Dual-use technologies, materials and expertise flow freely across international 

borders. Dangerous pathogens exist in nature and can be 

weaponized without special equipment or advanced technical skills. 

So the increasing threat of animal-to-human transfer of pathogens underscores the importance of reporting on animal disease 

outbreaks as well as human. To meet this threat, the Biological 

Threat Reduction Program has built facilities, such as the Joint 

U.S.-Georgia Disease Surveillance and Research Center, that will 

have the unique capability of conducting research in both human 

and animal especially dangerous pathogens. 

BTRP will continue to grow and evolve as CTR shifts from a nuclear focus to a more expansive vision for threat-reduction efforts. 
9 

Let me conclude my remarks by endorsing the new legal authorities this committee has included in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). I wish to emphasize to the committee that 

DOD understands the sensitivities associated with the use of these 

authorities, and we will only utilize them within the guidelines set 

forth in the legislation. 

So, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would say CTR is one piece 

of an overarching national strategy to counter WMD. We have 

made significant progress over the history of the Program, but we 

have more to do across the growing spectrum of WMD threats. The 

Department of Defense looks forward to continued close coordination with Congress and its interagency partners as we seek to address the threats posed by WMD. And I welcome your questions 

and look forward to a productive discussion. Again, thank you for 

giving me this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Nacht can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, thank you very much. 

Let me ask each of you, in your considered opinion, what is the 

greatest existing or emerging threat posed by the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction? 

Go ahead, please. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Why don’t I start, Mr. Chairman? 

In my view, obviously, it is a complicated question. I don’t want 

to point to a particular region in the world, but I would like to answer it in the following way. This is all about the material. Preventing terrorists, nonstate actors, rogue states from having the 

kind of material that can prove to be dangerous; fissile material 

and, in some cases, certain types of radiological material, can cause 

also panic, if you will, but may not have that destructive power 

that fissile material may have. 

Our priorities are to look at both areas, but it is all about the 

material. So we have a program working with the Defense Department that integrates the whole material spectrum problem. Looking to secure material where it exists around the world is a key 

part of it, and reducing the number of locations of the material, 

eliminating material, trying to get rid of that fissile material that 

has no energy value, if you will, and converting material from highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium; detecting material 

as it moves around the world, having a specific program to focus 

on material detection; and then ultimately stop adding to the material problem with programs and ideas, such as the Fissile Material 

Cutoff Treaty and reopening it to discussion internationally to get 

those pieces together. 

So the threats come down to the material. It is kind of like that 

old real estate add, which is location, location, location. I think it 

is material, material, material. Obviously technology and policies 

are a big part of that. But that is how I like to think about this 

problem sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Nacht. 

Dr. NACHT. Of course, President Obama to some degree answered 

that question in Prague when he said the most immediate and extreme threat to global security is a nuclear weapon in the hands 
10 

of terrorists. Within the Department of Defense, we are very much 

emphasizing that it is most expeditious to stop the proliferation of 

WMD at its source, because once it gets out into a transportation 

network, it is much harder to interdict. 

Let me give you several examples of how we are trying to do this. 

In cooperation with the Department of Energy, we, last year, finished physical protection upgrades at every Russian nuclear weapon storage site for which U.S. assistance has been requested to enhance the security of those sites and make it less feasible for material to be stolen. 

Currently, the two departments continue to work closely with the 

Russian ministry of defense to develop a cadre of military personnel capable of operating, maintaining and repairing those security systems far into the future. In an effort to address the insider 

threat, which is really central to stopping the flow of material from 

the source, we work closely with the Russian—the three agencies. 

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) in Russia and DOD and DOE are 

involved in further developing MOD personnel reliability programs 

intended to ensure that personnel with access to nuclear weapons 

are fit for duty. 

The DOD and MOD together have developed and installed an 

automated system to inventory and to track the location and condition of Russia’s nuclear weapons. We also continue to support the 

transport of nuclear warheads from operational locations to dismantlement facilities and to consolidate its secure storage. So we 

remain engaged with the Russian Federation on multiple fronts, including eliminating strategic nuclear arms and their delivery vehicles. 

Of course, nuclear weapons are not the only form of WMD that 

pose such a threat, even in the hands of terrorists. So as I mentioned in the past already, the first processing building at 

Shchuch’ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility began to destroy agents in March of this year. A second processing building 

will be completed by the end of this year. So interdicting and stopping the proliferation of the weapons at its source is our primary 

approach to this problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, in following up on my opening remarks, there has 

been a great deal of attention focused on the President’s goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide in four years. 

Again, it is my understanding that, at this time, neither the Department of Energy nor the Department of Defense nor this Congress has seen a formal strategy, plan or timeline to meet this goal. 

Would you please tell us when should the Congress expect to receive such a formal strategy or plan? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I will start, sir, and then shift over. What 

we have done at the Department of Energy, and we are very familiar with the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and work 

closely with Dr. Nacht and his team, is we looked at our program, 

which is structured as I mentioned earlier around securing material, addressing that and being able to detect movement of items 

across the world, frankly; and looked at accelerating those elements 
11 

of our program, trying to push the end dates, some of which are 

out in the 2016 to 2018 time frame, and moving them closer within 

the next four-year period. 

So the scope of work that we have laid out we don’t have an approved plan. My team, headed by Mr. Baker, has put together a 

draft plan. I have asked him to put together a draft plan, but that 

draft plan is not approved yet by me. It is, frankly, we are negotiating both internally within the Department and in the interagency 

process. 

However, in the meantime, I don’t need to have a final approved 

plan to know what work I have in front of me because I have a 

good sense of it. And so we are looking at recalibrating the 

internals of our program to address what we think are the most 

vulnerable and most important areas to address first. 

And then the interagency process, as you have described in your 

opening remarks, are exactly where ultimately I would like to see 

this go. This is not just about the NNSA or this is not just about 

the Department of Defense and the NNSA solving, addressing this 

problem. This is about the whole federal government and, quite 

frankly, all of our international partners who are part of this solution. It will take a little bit of time to get to the point, and unfortunately, I can’t give you a date, but it will take a bit of time to sort 

out all those pieces. But in the meantime, I think Dr. Nacht and 

I know about our work that we have cut out in front of us, and we 

want to accelerate those pieces that we can, particularly with our 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative in the National Nuclear Security Administration, as well as with our Material Protection and 

Accounting Program that we have. Those two pieces coupled with 

the right policy and safeguards framework will ultimately get us a 

lot closer to where we need to be four years from now. 

Dr. NACHT. Let me follow on with some remarks from the Defense Department’s perspective. As Dr. D’Agostino has said, the 

staffs of several of the agencies involved in this work are collaborating and developing an overall strategy, which is in progress. 

There are several parts to this process that I can cite. First, we are 

defining and scoping the problem in terms of the definitions and 

thresholds for vulnerable materials. What is it we really are looking for? What is included in our effort to lockdown? And what is 

excluded? We are refining and prioritizing the list of key facilities 

and sources of vulnerable materials worldwide. 

We are defining where the problem is best addressed, to expanding and accelerating existing programs, and where new activities 

and programs will be required, to include an evaluation of roles 

and missions of the major departments in the federal government. 

And I believe that we could be able to return to you in September 

and provide a more detailed report on the proposed way forward. 

Mr. MCKEON. So you are expecting by September to give us the 

plan? 

Dr. NACHT. I am optimistic that we will have something to report 

to you in September. The NNSA, of course, is overseeing this. They 

are taking the lead on it in terms of coordination, and we are all 

on the job on this. We know how critically important it is. It is not 

only something that has been restated by President Obama; it was 
12 

now endorsed at the G8 summit in L’Aquila, so it is becoming a 

global initiative. So we know it is a very high priority. 

Mr. MCKEON. Will the four years start when the President gave 

his speech or in September when you give us an update or a draft 

of a plan? 

And Mr. D’Agostino, you said it would take some time. Would 

you be able to report back in September? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I think what we would be able to—we 

have an element of our plan, we have our work scope identified, 

and the key will be making sure that our priorities are not just 

within the Department of Energy, but are consistent with the rest 

of the federal government, quite frankly, and having those things 

line up and mesh up nicely. 

I believe we will have a plan that I am comfortable with. As you 

obviously know, sir, we are in the process of defining our fiscal year 

2011 and outyear program in details. I have a personal desire, and 

I know Dr. Nacht does as well, to make sure that things get settled 

as quickly as possible on this plan because it helps inform the kind 

of program I will ultimately submit to the White House and negotiate to get into the President’s budget next January. 

So I think I will have enough information from a draft standpoint. I don’t know if it will be ready for Congress yet, but quite 

frankly, I am pushing very hard, and I know Dr. Nacht is pushing 

very hard, to get this thing done. We understand that this is a 

focal point, and we understand that this is the thing that is going 

to help us shape the details of our program. And whether more 

money needs to be put in category A versus category B and where 

the priorities are, we are right on top of that because it is important to get this done. 

Mr. MCKEON. Is the President asking both of you to—is this just 

something that sounded like a good thing to do, or is he really serious and he wants this done in four years from the time he gave 

the speech, and you are working on it and you will have the plan 

back September or January? I think the Congress is very interested in seeing that and then monitoring it because I think we all 

agree that that is something that should be done, and four years 

is a good time to have it done. So is this something that he is pushing you on, that he wants this plan and the date started from when 

he gave the speech? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The President is quite serious about this 

plan, sir. I haven’t talked to him personally about it, but I have 

talked—my contacts at the National Security Council are very clear 

that we are going to put together a plan, we are going to work the 

details of it. I don’t know when, quote-unquote, the official start 

date might be. My view is the President said he wants the plan 

done within four years. I know the date he said. I think it is April 

4th. And I am working to that end. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think we are running out of time. We will run 

and vote in just a minute. But I have one request following up on 

Mr. McKeon. You will, the minute the plan is fully ready, communicate it to this committee, am I correct? 
13 

Dr. NACHT. Yes, of course. As soon as the plan is fully ready, we 

will communicate this to the committee. And there may be ways we 

can brief you off line or in closed session on the progress. 

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, the sooner the better. A briefing would 

be excellent. But we would like to have the full plan. I am sure we 

would consider a full hearing on that issue the minute that it is 

given to us. We will return after the vote, and Ms. Sanchez will be 

the lead questioner. We will be adjourned until we come back. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will resume. The gentlelady from 

California, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today. 

I have sat on this subcommittee that deals with these issues now 

for I think 11 of the 13 years that I have been in the Congress. 

And there are really two issues that worry me today, and I continue to try to understand and get my hands around it. So I will 

start with the first. 

The START treaty will expire December 5th of this year. And I 

know that your agency is the one that deals with giving the technical information about numbers and capabilities and delivery systems, et cetera. So my question is—it is my personal opinion that 

it is very difficult to reach a renegotiation and then extension treaty by December 5th. So my question to you would be, what is it 

that we as Congress can do to ensure that we meet this December 

5th, that we get something that we meet this December 5th deadline, because I think it is very, very critical? It exposes us to a new 

arms race, if you will, if we don’t do something about this. 

Dr. NACHT. Well, Congresswoman, obviously, you are aware that 

there have been very intensive negotiations. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I have been to Russia several times. 

Dr. NACHT. Right. And Rose Gottemoeller from the State Department chairs our negotiating team. They are actually leaving again 

next week for the first round of negotiations post-summit. I think 

the calendar is daunting, as you suggest. We are making every effort, and the Russians have been told this, and they are fully aware 

of this, that we don’t want to go through a process of extending the 

treaty. 

We want a new treaty that will be completed by the time the 

START treaty expires. Now, then, we think probably it is unlikely 

that the treaty will be completed and the ratification process will 

be completed by the time the treaty expires, the START treaty. So 

we would seek an extension from the Congress to continue the 

treaty while the ratification process goes forward. But we are hopeful, very hopeful, that a treaty will be reached, an agreement will 

be reached on a new treaty before December 5th. We will submit 

it to the Senate and to relevant House committees as well, but for 

consent for ratification, which will then take place. Senator Lugar 

has stated publicly it might take four months. So sometime before 

the spring of 2010, we would hope to have a new agreement. 

Now, the summit, as you know from the joint understanding, did 

reflect a lot of hard bargaining that has already taken place. We 

have an agreed range of operationally deployed strategic nuclear 

weapons of 1,500 to 1,675. We have an agreed range of strategic 
14 

nuclear delivery vehicles 500 to 1,100. Each side has argued for one 

side or the other. At least we have now bounded the problem, and 

I think we can see our way through to an agreement on both those 

characteristics of the forces which are critically important. 

There are other elements of the treaty as well and definitional 

issues that have to be resolved, so there is a lot of hard negotiating 

ahead. But I think our readout of the summit was that the Russians, although they are challenging to work with, want an agreement. Actually, their nuclear delivery vehicle programs are lagging 

ours by quite a lot numerically. Just the atrophying of their systems; they are putting more weapons on fuel delivery vehicles, 

which actually is quite destabilizing. We would prefer to have single-warhead weapons on delivery vehicles so it is not seen as a 

first-strike weapon. So this suggests to me—I mean, there are 

other issues. There is a missile defense issue in Europe. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, I know about that also. 

Dr. NACHT. So I don’t want to in any way sugarcoat it. It is not 

going to be simple. But I think this is an important next step. 

We had the London meeting between President Medvedev and 

the President in April. We had the Moscow summit last week. I 

think it is promising—I spent a lot of time negotiating it with the 

Russians in the past, in the 1990s—that we will have a treaty before the START treaty expires. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Let me stop you right there because I have a second question. I am very concerned—my number one priority has always been the concern over Iran getting nuclear weapons. What do 

you think the Congress can do? I think it is not just an ability for 

them to get the ability to send missiles off, but their ability to put 

it in the hands of somebody who might walk it into our country or 

into another ally’s country. What should the Congress be doing? 

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, answer the question, please, and then we 

will go to the next witness. 

Dr. NACHT. Well, this is a large subject. Obviously stopping Iran 

from acquiring nuclear weapons or transmitting them to others is 

obviously a top national security priority for the President. We 

have had this recent—now where Iran is going through sort of our 

people domestically. 

One of our issues is, we are seeking to impose an effective sanctions regime on Iran, so that they will find it in their interest to 

come to the table. But it is not easy to do. Germany alone exports 

$6 billion worth of goods and equipment to Iran. A lot of our European allies are deep negotiating commercial partners with Iran. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We have been working with them through the dialogues that we have in the Congress. 

Dr. NACHT. The Chinese buy a lot of oil from Iran. So whether 

you are looking for a U.N. Security Council resolution, if you are 

looking for a multi-party sanctions regime, we are talking to the 

people who are selling the Iranians a lot of high-priced systems. So 

anything the Congress can do, frankly, to shore up our ability to 

enforce a sanctions regime we think would be very valuable. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Bartlett—but before I call Mr. Bartlett, let me again reiterate, gentlemen, we would appreciate continued briefings on the 
15 

progress on the four-year plan. And when it is finalized, at the earliest moment, please, communicate it to this committee because we 

wish to follow through at that time. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Several years ago, I spent three days in North Korea. They may 

be evil; they are not stupid. They know, and I suspect the same is 

true of Iran, they know that if they launched a missile from their 

soil, nuclear tipped, that the consequences of that would be that we 

would vaporize their country. 

Gentlemen, they are just not going to do that. I have no idea why 

we are watching to see when they get a missile which could reach 

us from their soil. They are not going to launch a missile from their 

soil toward us. If they launch a missile toward us, it will be from 

the sea. And if it is nuclear-tipped, the most probable use of that 

weapon is going to be to produce an extra atmospheric electromagnetic pulse (EMP) lay down. Their weapon and their missile is 

unlikely to have much precision. If they miss their target by 100 

miles for extra atmospheric detonation, it really won’t matter, will 

it? The most probable place the weapon is going to be launched 

from is the sea. And the most probable use of the weapon is going 

to be an EMP attack. Why am I not seeing any meaningful preparation to protect us against either one of these? 

Dr. NACHT. Well, let me just take a piece of what you have said. 

When the North Koreans started testing these missiles, most recently after they tested a nuclear device, Secretary Gates ordered 

redeployment of missile defense systems, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and an Aegis system, to protect the Hawaiian islands. We are working on—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, if I might interrupt. That is because we 

thought they were going to launch from their soil, and the current 

missile would only reach Hawaii; it wouldn’t reach our mainland. 

I am saying, sir, that they are not going to launch from their soil. 

They may be evil; they are not stupid. They are not going to launch 

from their soil. They are going to launch from the sea, which 

means that all up and down both of our coasts, we are vulnerable. 

Why am I not seeing any meaningful preparation to protect us 

against that? And if they do launch there, sir, the most probable 

use of that weapon—it is in all of their open literature and all of 

their war games—and if a nonstate actor had it, that it is absolutely what they are going to do, it is going to be an extra atmospheric detonation-producing EMP. I am not seeing any meaningful 

preparation to prepare for that attack either. Why am I not seeing 

any preparation for either of these two, which is the most probable 

way the missile is going to be used and the most probable way the 

nuclear weapon is going to be detonated? 

Dr. NACHT. With respect to possible EMP attacks on the United 

States, there is work being done which we could discuss in another 

venue. With respect to a sea-based system, there are no current 

platforms or delivery vehicles available to the North Koreans to 

launch an attack on the U.S. homeland from sea. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, that just isn’t true because any tramp steam- er and a Scud launcher, which they can buy for $100,000, can 

launch a missile to an apogee of 180 miles. That is perfectly ade-
16 

quate, sir, for an EMP attack which would devastate all of New 

England. They do have platforms. Any tramp steamer and a Scud 

launcher is an adequate platform. 

Dr. NACHT. Congressman, of course, you are aware, take the recent following of the Korean ship from the North Korean port toward Burma that turned around just recently; we have excellent 

surveillance of all North Korean naval vessels. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, there are thousands of commercial ships out 

there. And if a canvas is over it, you cannot tell whether it is a 

stack of bananas or a missile launcher on the deck. We can’t see 

through the thinnest covering on the deck. There is no way, in today’s world, that we could detect whether that cargo on the deck 

is a launcher or Caterpillar tractors. 

Dr. NACHT. I think, Congressman, you raise some good points, 

and I think we can continue this perhaps with members from the 

Defense Intelligence Agency and others in a closed session and I’d 

be happy to go into more detail on exactly your concerns. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Marshall, please. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I second, third and fourth what my colleague Mr. Bartlett had 

to say. This is so obvious. One of the reasons why I agreed to cochair the Missile Defense Caucus; we are not adequately prepared 

to deal with rogue missiles. And a rogue missile launched the way 

Mr. Bartlett described would just be absolutely devastating to the 

United States, would significantly weaken the United States. It 

would, obviously, be in the interest of all of our adversaries to do 

that. And the possible consequences, the human consequences, 

within the United States are just too horrible to even contemplate. 

And so I look forward to closed session discussions of this problem 

and what we are doing about this problem. 

CTR and the evolution of CTR, Mr. Nacht, if you had additional 

funds available to you, what would you be doing with those funds? 

How would you modify the Program, improve the Program, expand 

the Program, those sorts of things? I understand we have moved 

significantly away—well, not away from—but we have broadened 

the scope of our inquiry beyond nuclear to bioterrorism, chemical, 

et cetera. And if you could describe what you would do with additional resources, that would be helpful. 

Dr. NACHT. Well, you raised one point immediately. We are moving substantially into the bioterrorism threat space, and we are 

still at the early stages. It is not easy to collaborate with other 

countries on this, although we have made some progress. A lot of 

the systems we are talking about are dual-use systems. They can 

be used for perfectly legitimate commercial research activities. We 

could really scope out a broader effort to try to develop something 

that might begin to move down the road toward a lockdown of 

pathogens even though it would be even more ambitious than the 

nuclear lockdown. 

Mr. MARSHALL. When you say it is not easy to coordinate with 

other countries on this particular subject, is it because of lack of 

resources or there is just lack of interest on their part to cooperate 

with us? 
17 

Dr. NACHT. I would say it is a mix. You know, if we speak to 

some governments, they find that we are being excessively intrusive on what they are doing in certain areas, or they deny that 

there is any malevolent intent or any military application. Sometimes we can’t prove that. We don’t have the intelligence to know 

definitively. 

So we need collaboration that sometimes comes actually from a 

broader framework. Take for example the case of Georgia. Georgia 

was invaded by Russia last summer. Georgia has all kinds of security concerns. We have signed an agreement that basically pledges 

to maintain their security. They are very keen on collaborating 

with us, even though it is a very sensitive matter dealing with 

their Russian neighbors on all of this. So there we have a substantial new program for a biological laboratory in Georgia. 

But other countries don’t have that sense of security needs or 

concerns. They don’t think they are a transit point for bioterrorism, 

and they are just more reticent. Now, sometimes funds can help. 

If we say, we will put a downpayment down on this activity or we 

will pay the majority share in the first tranche, they might be more 

interested. So I think additional funds could help. But we have 

been very careful not to go to the committee or the Congress for 

request of funds that we know we can’t use effectively. 

And, you know, you have been generous enough to support beyond our request. So, you know, we have not submitted—we don’t 

have a list, really, of unfunded priorities that we have in our pocket that we could go to. It is unusual, unlike a lot of other areas. 

But if you are urging us to do it, we could develop it. 

Mr. MARSHALL. That would be great, if you would develop it. We 

may not fund it, but it would be nice to know what additional 

steps—where would you go from where you are right now. 

Dr. NACHT. Sir, we will follow up on that with NNSA. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thornberry, please. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. D’Agostino, I appreciate what you and your colleagues at 

NNSA have done over the years on nonproliferation. I have 

thought that if the federal government were going to waste money 

in one area that that would probably be the area to waste it in, 

because any chance of reducing slightly the odds of a terrorist getting a weapon of mass destruction would be worth a lot. But, at 

the same time, we want to make sure our money is spent smartly 

and effectively. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Right. Right. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And I have some concerns that a lot of this is 

moving so quickly that we have the risk of throwing money at 

problems and not spending it as smartly and as effectively as we 

might—could. 

For example, it seems to me that the clearest, easiest program 

to defend is Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 

(MPC&A), where we put greater security around nuclear fissile materials. But the question is, how much is enough? How much do we 

keep upgrading, for example, Russian facilities when they are 

spending a tremendous amount of money to upgrade their own 

military and it is becoming much more effective over time? 
18 

And what I really want to get to is, do you have an objective 

standard of metrics that can help evaluate where different facilities 

are, partly as a way to know where to put the money, but partly 

as a way to know whether we are making progress or not? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Thornberry, thanks very much for the 

question. 

The answer to that is, yes, we do have an objective set of metrics. 

The nonproliferation program is driven, in fact, by metrics. 

With respect to MPC&A or even our Global Threat Reduction 

Initiative, we have a very clearly laid out scope of work that goes 

out into the future. Much of this work, as you know, takes some 

time to do. I mean, you have to start with usually country-to-country negotiations, and in each country it is unique and different. 

But in the end, we know how many facilities we have said we 

were going to work on in Russia. We have laid out that scope. We 

know how many buildings we said we want to secure in Russia. We 

know how many ports and land transfer crossings we have in Russia and around the world that we plan on doing. And we are literally working our way through that menu. And so, at any given 

point in time, we know how well we are doing, are we getting a 

B-plus or an A-minus or a C or what have you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And can you say that this facility in Russia 

and this other facility in wherever, Bulgaria, meet category III security standards, for example? I mean, is there a standard set by 

which you can measure across the different countries where security is relative to perfect security, which doesn’t exist? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. We use the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) Circular 225, Rev. 4, which is an international security guidelines that go off and help guide our program. 

We make sure that those facilities meet that bare minimum set of 

security standards. And we work our way through that list. 

So it is very much metric-based. At any given point in time, for 

example, we have 73 out of 123 sites that we said we are going to 

finish off in Russia are actually done; 73 are completed—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And you have walked away from them? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. We have sustainability agreements. This 

is the key point, though, and I think you are absolutely right, is 

making sure we have a transition plan with Rosatom, for example, 

which is one of our major partners in Russia. We have a transition 

plan in place to work that off. Right now they pick up 40 percent 

of the load on maintainability, and the plan is to get them off of 

the U.S. approach out into the next few years. The Ministry of Defense, which we work closely with the Defense Department, has already agreed that they are taking care of 100 percent of the security upgrades that we have jointly worked on. 

So I am very much in the mind of making sure that this is not 

the gift that keeps on giving, if you will. This is something where 

we expect a partnership relationship. And, frankly, I am quite 

pleased with the partnership relationship. 

I will give you one more example, the Federal Customs Service 

in Russia, for example. Right now, with them we are working on 

putting security upgrades at 370 land border crossings, with the 

agreement right off the bat that they do 50 percent of the work, 

we do 50 percent of the work. And on the 50 percent of the work 
19 

that we do, they are picking up the maintenance costs on those facilities bit by bit, so that over the next three years they will have 

100 percent of the maintainability on that covered. 

Now, of course, we are going to watch them to make sure they 

follow through on that—that is my own parochial interest—but I 

think it is happening. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I was late because of the 

Veterans Committee. If Mr. Thornberry would like another five 

minutes, I will yield my time to him. He is one of the experts and 

zealous advocates. If he only has five minutes of information, then 

he is done—I will let you have my time. 

Okay. Well, I am just going to pass. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, all right. 

Dr. SNYDER. There he goes. 

Mack has been a leader in this program. There were political 

threats to this program 10, 12, 13 years ago, and Mack lead action 

both in this committee and on the floor of the House because of the 

importance of these programs. And I want to recognize him. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for another five 

minutes. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I appreciate the gentleman from Arkansas. He 

and I have traveled together with some of your folks and seen some 

of this, particularly in the early days, which, again, seems to me 

to be eminently defensible. I am worried, though, again, that, as 

we move ahead, that it continues to be eminently defensible. 

And let me just pursue a little bit—you were talking about Russia, and you talk about Russia a lot in your statement, and the 

partnership we have with Russia. You talk in your statement that 

Russia is bringing back some civilian fuel that it has produced from 

neighboring countries. Other than that example, is Russia doing 

anything for anybody else other than itself? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Well, we work with Russia on the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which talks about the 

training and export control and making sure—since we obviously 

have the majority of the material and the warheads, we have a certain obligation, we feel a significant obligation in that manner, to 

essentially get the whole world up to a certain level of standards 

with respect to nuclear counterterrorism. 

Essentially, we work obviously very closely with repatriating material, as you have described. Russia is very keen and has been 

very helpful with us, kind of with some other states that I would 

rather talk about in closed session. I would be happy to do that in 

closed session because of the sensitivity of the discussion. 

But also they have—because of our partnership with Russia, 

other nations have watched this, and we have agreement with our 

second line of defense activities where this isn’t just a matter of the 

United States going over to some foreign port and saying, ‘‘We will 

take care of everything; we are going to install this equipment.’’ We 

typically provide the equipment and the know-how on the operations, but those other countries pick up the rest of the work, 

which is significant. It is not only the installation, but the operations and the maintenance of that stuff. 
20 

So we are—I am very confident overall with our partnerships. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I appreciate it. 

And I appreciate, again, Dr. Snyder yielding. 

I would just say, to keep bipartisan support, it will be very important for the administration to make sure we are not just funding Russian military modernization and that they do not only what 

they say they are with their own materials and facilities, but they 

are genuinely helpful, whether it is public or not, are genuinely 

helpful in getting better control of materials in other places. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. So, with that feedback, I appreciate the gentlemen. Yield back to the gentleman from Arkansas. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Heinrich, please. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Gentlemen, what do you see as the role of the Congress in motivating our allies and partners, countries like Germany, to pursue 

a more effective sanctions regime with Iran? 

Dr. NACHT. This is a tough nut. And it has been an issue that 

has been addressed at least going back to the early Clinton years, 

so we are talking about at least a 15-year-old problem here. 

The fact of the matter is that there are many lucrative commercial arrangements between private entities in a number of ally 

countries with Iran whose behavior has not been altered by any 

government persuasion by their host government, by their own government. 

What the U.S. can do in that regard, you know, we have tried 

various forms of consultation and negotiation and dissuasion, but 

so far I would say we have, you know, mixed results, very mixed 

results. 

I don’t know if some more draconian legislation coming out of the 

Congress would actually be helpful, because there are so many dimensions to our relationships with the European partners, with the 

Chinese, that, you know, we can go—it is a very important matter, 

but if we go overboard in this area, we may pay a price in another 

area. 

So I think this is an area under review. We are struggling with 

it, and we are looking for—it is a very tailored approach. You can’t 

have an overall sanctions policy, I think, because the situations are 

so different. I mean, to alter Chinese behavior about acquisition of 

oil resources from Iran is one whole problem. Dealing with heavy 

machinery from Siemens in Germany to Iran is a different problem. Dealing with the Russians on their nuclear technology is still 

a third problem. So we have not derived an umbrella approach to 

this problem, but we are open to ideas. It is critically important. 

Obviously, as long as Iran believes and knows that they are not 

really being hurt very much economically—and their economy is 

not in good shape, as we all know—then it gives them less of an 

incentive to alter their behavior or to sit down and talk with us in 

a meaningful way about their nuclear program. 

Mr. HEINRICH. To shift gears a little bit, we saw with the outbreak of H1N1 in Mexico that we have places right in our own 

backyard where there is no effective surveillance and reporting detection when it comes to both animal and then animal-to-human 

pathogens. 
21 

Where do you see the most acute needs for more effective detection and reporting as sort of a first line to prevent both bioterror 

outbreaks and also to manage natural animal-to-human pathogens 

that can have huge public health ramifications as well? 

Dr. NACHT. That is a very important subject and could be very, 

very important this fall. It is a little outside of my particular lane. 

There is an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, 

Paul Stockton, who works these issues in close consultation with 

the Department of Homeland Security and with Health and 

Human Services (HHS). And that is really—— 

Mr. HEINRICH. I guess, what do you see as the relationship between early detection and reporting and how that can maybe help 

both with natural outbreaks but also having a surveillance system 

in place that potentially can be helpful in bioterror attacks as well? 

Dr. NACHT. I mean, obviously, the earlier we can detect the outbreak and the better surveillance systems we have in place, the 

more likely we will be prepared to deal with these matters. 

I think that we are looking very carefully at division of labor on 

exactly what kind of systems and what should we request from the 

Congress, what should be deployed, who is in the information loop. 

Because, as you know, I mean, take the catastrophe of 9/11, how 

many different governmental and other players are involved? If 

this became a major outbreak in the fall, I mean, it would be a national emergency. 

So it is a large subject. It is a subject that is under interagency 

review currently. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Okay. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Before I call on Mr. Turner, Dr. Nacht, let me follow through on 

the discussion you had with Mr. Thornberry a few moments ago. 

He asked about the Department of Energy cost-saving with Russia on nonproliferation activities, and we received several examples 

of such cost-sharing. But are you able to give us examples of such 

cost-sharing for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction programs? 

Dr. NACHT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I can cite a few examples. 

In Azerbaijan, the government there is paying the cost of the Cooperative Threat Reduction bio facility that has been established 

there. 

Of course, all of our Cooperative Threat Reduction partners provide land for facilities. They provide in-kind services, such as security forces to protect the facilities. Russia is actually paying a portion of the cost for the dismantlement of their ballistic missile submarines, which is a CTR program. 

And our friends in Canada and Britain have contributed financially to the nerve agent elimination plant in Russia. So they are 

helping to pay for the elimination of a plant in Russia that we are 

helping with the Russians to eliminate, but it is British and Canadian funding that is supporting that. 

So there is a mix of different cost-sharing arrangements across 

the many different programs under CTR in the defense area. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Turner. 
22 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate both of you gentlemen being here. I have a 

great deal of respect for Mr. D’Agostino. And, Mr. Nacht, you have 

an incredible record of service to your country and substantively on 

these issues. And I have a topic that perhaps the two of you might 

be able to help me with. 

I am very concerned about North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. I certainly respect Mr. Bartlett’s issue that he had raised 

of alternative ways that they might attack us, but at the same time 

we have the evidence of their full pursuit of a nuclear weapons program and a very aggressive missile program that appears to be, I 

believe and I think others and perhaps you believe, is a direct 

threat to the national security of our country. 

In the budget that was put forth by the President, he requested 

funding for the disablement and dismantlement of North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons program. Now, during our committee’s markup, I 

noted that the request for the disablement and dismantlement of 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program totaled $80 million. That 

was the President’s budget request, $80 million. 

At the same time, the President requested a cut of $120 million 

in missile defense funding that would have completed part of the 

missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. So we are setting aside $80 

million for the disablement and dismantlement of North Korea’s 

nuclear weapon program, and we are eliminating $120 million to 

finish a missile defense field that was two-thirds of the way complete in Fort Greely, Alaska. 

I offered an amendment that was defeated to offset that, to take 

the $80 million for North Korea and offset it on the $120 million 

that we were losing to actually defend ourselves. 

Now, while I support nonproliferation programs and I certainly 

support the dismantlement and the disablement of North Korea’s 

nuclear program, I am highly skeptical that Kim Jong-il will return 

to the negotiation table and allow either the United States or the 

International Atomic Energy Agency to disable and dismantle 

North Korea’s nuclear program. 

It is my understanding that Secretary of State Clinton expressed 

similar pessimism in April, when she told a Senate committee that 

North Korea’s return to the six-party talks was ‘‘implausible, if not 

impossible.’’ 

So I believe that those funds could be better spent. I fear that 

we are going to get to the end of the year and that $80 million is 

still going to be sitting there. 

You only have to look at North Korea’s recent actions. The SixParty talks have come to a complete halt. North Korea conducted 

another nuclear test. North Korea ejected U.S. International inspectors. North Korea reversed most of the initial disablement 

work that was under way. North Korea has repeatedly tested 

cruise and ballistic missiles, to include an intercontinental ballistic 

missile which threatens our homeland. 

It appears that many senior officials within the Obama administration are coming to the realization that the Six-Party and diplomatic engagement with Kim Jong-il are ineffective. According to 

the Los Angeles (LA) Times, they have all but lost hope that North 
23 

Korea will cooperate, and some are arguing that it is time for a 

new approach. Others agree with my assessment. 

And so, gentlemen, you have a great deal of expertise in this, and 

I was wondering what your thoughts were, if you thought that this 

year, that the $80 million designated in NNSA’s budget to verify, 

disable, and dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program, has any 

likelihood of being used. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir, for the question. 

The direct answer to your question, whether it has any likelihood 

of being useful, I think is dealt with—and I will also offer some 

comments on North Korea, if I could. 

And I think, yes, there is an element of the work that we were 

planning on doing—North Korea kind of being the lead horse in the 

race, if you will—for working on equipment, tools, and technologies 

that we think are important for the United States to have at the 

ready to deploy, kind of, anywhere, frankly, to work on disabling 

and dismantling nuclear weapons programs or nuclear material 

programs around the world. 

As Dr. Nacht stated earlier, and I completely agree, that we have 

looked at—the best place to solve security problems is where the 

material is or as close as possible to the source. The further away 

you get from the problem makes it a much harder. The security 

problem becomes much more difficult; it is harder to detect the material. 

And so, we feel—and particularly as the budget was developed 

in February, we were, of course, in the middle of engaging directly. 

But a significant portion of that $80 million was not North Koreaspecific but was nuclear security-specific. It is the equipment, the 

tools, the technology for us to be able to determine how far a nation-state has gone; buying the containers, if you will, some of the 

long-lead material that we would ultimately use to repatriate, 

whether it is North Korean material or whether it is material from 

another country, and bring it back to a secure location. 

So there is a tremendous amount of what I would call dual country capability—in fact, more than dual. These are the things that 

we would have done around the world. But that is my sense of the 

situation. I will defer my thoughts on missile defense. 

Dr. NACHT. Yes. Let me first say a word about the missile defense budget situation. Obviously, it is controversial in some elements of the Congress. 

Secretary Gates went through a very thorough review and analysis of missile defense needs, including detailed studies done by the 

Missile Defense Agency that went right through review with the 

combatant commanders and the joint staff and the chairman and 

the vice chairman. And the leadership agreed unanimously that 30 

ground base interceptors, 26 based in Fort Greely and four in Vandenberg Air Force Base, was sufficient for the next period to deal 

with projected North Korean threats based upon our best intelligence of the evolving North Korean threat. And it is actually not 

just against the North Korean threat, but against some other potential threats too. 

So, at the moment, the Defense Department is not seeking additional funds beyond what we have requested there. 
24 

On the money for the North Koreans, I think Administrator 

D’Agostino has answered fully. I would just say, of course North 

Korea is going through some sort of succession process currently. 

We don’t know if it is going to take three months or three years. 

By all accounts, the leader is very ill. The son who he has anointed 

is of uncertain stature, 26 years old. And it may well be that a 

number of activities of the North in escalating, kind of, aggressive 

behavior in recent months, is as much for domestic consumption as 

it is for international activities. 

They are an opaque society, as you know. The quality of our information about them is not zero, but it is limited. And we are actually developing scenarios—we have developed scenarios for future North Korean situations in which these funds could be used 

more effectively should those scenarios materialize. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony here today 

and for the work that you do to keep our nation safe. 

Particularly, Mr. D’Agostino, I want to thank you for your time 

yesterday. I enjoyed our conversation when we met yesterday. And 

I want to thank you again, of course, for your testimony today. 

Let me begin with the new loose nuke threat, nuke material 

threat. Obviously, the threat of a loose nuke falling into the hands 

of terrorists is a threat not just to the U.S. but, clearly, to every 

nation. 

What I would like to ask is, how much more does the NNSA need 

to secure—and this is from a program perspective—need to secure 

and reduce all known nuclear weapons, as well as unsecured weapons-grade nuclear material, around the world? And what are the 

remaining costs of this effort? And what is also being done to expand cooperation with partner nations to address this shared risk? 

You know, in the context of your answer, if you can talk about 

the successes that we have had, but most especially what is left undone. I am particularly concerned if you can give some insight into 

what you are doing to protect us from the insider threat. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Certainly, sir. The insider threat piece 

may be best dealt with in closed session. And if we don’t have time, 

I could come up to your office, sir, and talk to you about it there, 

as well. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That is fine. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. There is a lot more work to be done, actually, on the materials and weapons side. We have, obviously, this 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative program you have heard about 

and you have analyzed, which is to convert or shut down 200 reactors around the world that use highly enriched uranium, remove 

essentially 4,600 kilograms of material by 2016, and protect close 

to 4,000 buildings. 

We are down the track on each one of those lines of work, but 

we are not completed and we are not finished down the track. We 

are only 32 percent of the way there on our reactor conversion 

work. We are looking at accelerating up as much as possible what 

we think are the most vulnerable ones. We are about 50 percent 

of the way there on removing and getting into secure sites the 
25 

highly enriched uranium and plutonium that exists around the 

world to get to that 4,600 total. And we are only about 15 percent 

of the way down on securing the number of buildings that we have 

around the world. 

Now, let me be fair here and clear. Not all of these sites have 

fissile material, particularly in the buildings area. Most of the 

buildings have radiologic material, sources and things like that 

that could be used for a radioactive dirty device—still not good, but 

not as bad of a problem, obviously, with fissile material. 

In our Material Protection, Control, and Accountability Program, 

we have slightly better numbers with respect to completion of the 

work that we have to do. About 60 percent of our sites that we 

think are in the work scope are done; 87 percent of the buildings. 

And only about 40 percent of the Megaports work that we have to 

detect material is done. 

So it is pretty significant. We think it is going to take a concerted 

effort—we know it will take a concerted effort, obviously, to complete all of the work. But what we are working on right now is the 

costing plan and the program plan, to pull all of this together. 

I think your other question dealt with partner nations, what are 

other nations doing, kind of, with respect to these programs. And 

it really depends on the particular program. We have agreements 

in place, ready to execute, for example, additional work in Mexico, 

in the Ukraine, in Kazakhstan. Many of those states have agreed 

to pay up front for a significant portion of that work. And, obviously, our approach in all of these cases for Megaports, for example, is to have the nation-states operate and maintain those facilities. We check on them, but we have them do that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How many other countries are actually cooperating with us in this effort and actually contributing dollars to the 

effort? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I will have to get you specifics as a—I 

would like to take the specifics as a lookup. 

But if I can offer you some perspective and offer the committee 

some perspective, we operate with over 100 countries around the 

world. In most cases, to do the significant work that we have to do, 

we sign memorandums of agreement with those nations where we 

define the type of a cost-share agreement. 

Overall, we look along the process—the general principle is we 

come up and kick-start, get the work started, and provide the 

equipment and technology and know-how. We have them pick up 

the work from there and carry it forward. And then we check and 

offer assistance. 

So I will get you the details off the record, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I see my time has expired, but I 

would like to talk about the insider threat issue when we get into 

closed session. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Certainly. I would be glad to. 

The CHAIRMAN. Who is next? Mr. Franks, please. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

You know, I guess I first want to commend the points of Dr. 

Bartlett and Mr. Marshall even though they are no longer here. I 
26 

do think that their points are salient. And I am looking forward to 

hearing more of your response in a different venue, as you say. 

Let me just say that I believe EMP potentially to be the most effective asymmetric weapon in the hands of almost anyone that 

could have them. I also agree that the departments that you represent are wise in focusing on the source to try to do those things 

to prevent the material from ever becoming available to anyone. 

And I was especially appreciative of Dr. Nacht’s comments related 

to Iran being such a priority in that regard. 

Let me just say something that is very obvious to both of you. 

I say it primarily for the record, and sometimes restating the obvious is important. I believe missile defense, an effective missile defense, especially in the area related to Iran, even the European 

site, to be something that is capable of devaluing the entire nuclear 

program in Iran’s plan. And I believe that—you know, it is going 

to be hard to deter them in any circumstance, but if we have whatever efforts we are making that are coupled with at least the notion that any leverage they might gain is ameliorated by our missile defense capabilities, I think that is vitally important. And I 

hope it is something that we don’t overlook. It is not just about 

stopping a missile; it is about stopping the proliferation. Missile defense is probably one of our most important components in preventing proliferation. 

With that said, let me shift gears here and ask you, Mr. 

D’Agostino, in your testimony, page 2, you say that North Korea’s 

continued defiance of the international community through its 

WMD-related missile and nuclear activities makes clear the urgency of today’s global nuclear threats. 

So I guess I am hoping you can explain to the committee how 

you surmise that North Korea’s defiance—and, incidentally, I agree 

with you—but explain it to us how North Korea’s defiance drives 

a global nuclear threat. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I look at this as an example, real-time, 

that is dynamic. And I think this is the piece that we just have a 

very clear example of—when the President’s budget for 2010 was 

coming to its final days of closure and we were doing the negotiation in writing and making sure the numbers were right and the 

words were right and, more importantly, the strategy is right, we 

were in a different situation, and it changes quite quickly. 

So my sense is this is a dynamic problem. It is a problem that 

is a lot faster than the budget process that we have on the executive branch. Obviously, it outpaces everything. So, to me, that 

drives a sense of urgency to get on top of the problem as quickly 

as possible, to put the resources on the problems as quickly as possible. It is very significant, but it is something that we can’t shy 

away from. And, obviously, we are not. With the committee’s support, excellent support, we have been in a position to do that. 

The one thing I might add is that, with the committee’s support 

as well, it has made it possible for us to receive resources from 

other countries. Other countries see it the same way as we do. Canada and United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, other nations have 

actually contributed their resources toward our problems in the 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative. I think that is an excellent tes-
27 

timony to the programs that you support, as well as to this urgency 

piece that comes forth. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Given the parameters, the sensitivities that you have to deal 

with here, I do think that, as Mr. Langevin mentioned, again, the 

greatest challenge that we face, at least short term, is some type 

of nuke device in the hands of terrorists. Because it is not so much 

that they are so much better at delivering it, but I am convinced 

that their mindset of actually using it is really unquestionable. And 

I think that is what makes it so dangerous. 

It is likely that if they do gain some type of nuclear yield weapon, it probably won’t be a large weapon. It will probably be a smaller weapon which may not be as effective for EMP, and they may 

just want to try to bring it into the United States. 

So my question to you, Dr. D’Agostino, and certainly, Dr. Nacht, 

if you are inclined to respond as well, is: Help the committee understand, within the parameters that you can in this venue, what 

mechanisms do we have, either at the ports—and you mentioned 

in your Second Line of Defense a lot about the ports—within the 

ports and the border crossings, what do we have here, whose responsibility is it to be making sure that we screen for nuclear devices coming into this country. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Department of Homeland Security has 

primary responsibility. We provide technical support and backup 

with our radiation detectors, as well as we have—we also take 

care, with the Department of Homeland Security, we have our 

Megaports program to make sure that we have detectors up and 

operating in 100 of the largest seaports around the world, which 

send the materials, send goods here in the United States. 

So that is a short answer. I am not sure how much time I can 

keep talking. But from that standpoint, our job is to make sure to 

finish the work on Megaports initiative, which is significant, as 

well as to support the Department of Homeland Security in its Secure Freight Initiative, which has a responsibility for looking at all 

the material that comes in here domestically. 

Dr. NACHT. And the Department of Defense’s role is to work with 

NORTHCOM also in consultation with DHS so that, as horrible as 

it sounds, if a weapon is detonated, that a second weapon is not 

detonated, so that one weapon would be horrific, but more than one 

would be much worse. So not to have some sort of ad hoc approach 

to dealing with the perpetrators but having as comprehensive a 

plan as possible to stop them from doing any more damage than 

they have done. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say that we are supposed to have votes 

shortly which will take about 45 minutes. Let’s get as many questioners as we possibly can and observe the 5-minute rule. After the 

votes on the floor, we will adjourn here to 2327 for the classified 

hearings, and those that have not had the opportunity to ask questions in the order they would have asked here will be recognized 

at that moment in 2337 to continue on the classified basis. With 

that understanding, Mr. Kissell, we will squeeze in as many as we 

can before the votes come. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
28 

A couple of quick questions, thank you, gentlemen, for coming 

today. We had a hearing—I think it might have been January the 

22nd, earlier this year, when former Senator Graham and his Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction testified before us. And 

one of the conclusions they drew and presented to us was that they 

predicted there would be a weapons of mass destruction attack 

upon the United States I think in the next three, four, years. And 

the opportunity to stop it was there, but actually, we were losing 

ground in terms of being able to stop it. In other words, we weren’t 

making up that deficit towards being able to keep this from happening. 

In your opinions, what is that opportunity now, is that a growing 

situation or a lessening situation that we would have that attack? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I will start and turn it over to my colleague. I typically am not a big fan of putting time frames, because 

I don’t want to promote anybody from trying to beat the odds or 

not. What I think my focus frankly is—I think we are getting better, but only because what we are seeing is an increased sense of 

urgency. I think the increased sense of urgency is properly placed 

by the administration. 

I think it is well understood in my organization, which is more 

of a technical organization than necessarily establishing the policy, 

if you will, but the key is that we recognize, we understand the 

devastating impacts of material getting out. I am speaking mostly 

on the nuclear side, which is my expertise, and what we are trying 

to focus on is, do more. And I am looking internally at the program 

to see, am I properly prioritized? 

But I am also communicating externally with my colleagues at 

the National Security Council to make sure they recognize that. I 

think what we have got from the administration which I represent 

is this renewed sense of urgency, this idea of securing material 

within a certain period of time; the idea of working internationally 

and establishing the right type of international frameworks; the 

idea of making sure that the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) is properly supported and we have the next generation of 

scientists and technicians ready to work. Because as energy increases, as the nuclear power becomes more ubiquitous, we want 

to make sure we design in the safeguards into those systems so 

that we don’t cause ourselves problems out in the out years 5 or 

10 years from now. So, from a technology standpoint, I think the 

urgency is there, and the light is on the problem; it is up to us to 

go out and go execute, frankly. 

Dr. NACHT. Congressman, I note that the language of the Commission was that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a 

terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. So that 

is what, three and a half years now. I don’t know, I am a little— 

point predictions are sometimes a little hard to justify. Clearly, we 

have a major problem here. I think the combination of the activities Administrator D’Agostino and myself talk about and the President’s commitment suggests that we are looking at this problem 

globally, nuclear, as well as biological. We have renewed resources 

in the intelligence community to track, as best we can, terrorist activities. And I would say we are trying to get that curve to turn 
29 

around, plateau and then drop off, but we are in a full court press 

now in this administration on this problem. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman, let’s see if we can squeeze two 

questioners in between now and the time we have to go vote. There 

will be five votes, and it will take approximately 45 minutes. We 

will reconvene and the questioners will be in the same order as if 

you were here in 2337. So let’s get there as soon as the five votes 

are over. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It was mentioned, concern about Iran and their development of 

nuclear weapons, and it was also mentioned about sanctions, effectiveness of sanctions against Iran by the United States in the international community. I believe there was legislation in the House 

and Senate that has been introduced that would in fact impose further sanctions on Iran. I wonder if one of you could speak or both 

of you could speak to the effectiveness of that legislation or sanctions that you would envision specifically that would be effective in 

terms of getting Iran to back off of its development of nuclear 

weapons. 

Dr. NACHT. There is little I can say about that at this time. We 

could provide you with more detailed information and perhaps in 

another setting with additional colleagues who work this problem 

more specifically. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, thank you very much. 

I would really appreciate any information you could provide on 

that issue. If, in fact, sanctions would help in deterring Iran from 

attaining nuclear weapons, then we need to do everything we can 

to promote those sanctions at the earliest possible time in order, 

again, to deter them from moving forward. Now, I wonder if you 

at all would speak to—if you were to say what is the number one 

threat facing the United States, is it bioterrorism, is it a dirty 

bomb or is it an ICBM, a nuclear weapon launched from a rogue 

nation? 

Dr. NACHT. Again, the President answered that question by saying it would be a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons. I think the 

core difference between the terrorist or even the suicide bomber, 

obviously, and the nation state is that they are very difficult, if not 

impossible, to deter. You can’t dissuade them. You can try to prevent them, but they don’t have anything to lose because they know 

they are on an exalted mission, and they are going to a better reward after the detonation. So whether it is biological attack or a 

nuclear attack by terrorists, I think it is now an absolutely top priority for us to try to deal with. 

We have varying degrees of judgment about our ability to deter 

other states, but I think many of us believe that even Iran and 

North Korea are deterrable from using these weapons because they 

have a tremendous amount to lose once they use them. In fact, 

their entire societies are at risk, whereas the terrorist does not 

have that incentive. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas, please. 
30 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

I would like to ask a question about Pakistan and reference the 

same report that Congressman Kissell referred to on the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation. That report—their report describes Pakistan as the focus 

point of WMD and terrorism. I just wondered if you could reflect 

on that your own thoughts and how we as a country, particularly 

given the destabilized situation in Pakistan today, how we can exercise influence over Pakistan to secure their weapons and deal 

with the threat among—in their midst. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I would be glad to start off on the answer. 

We absolutely agree; working with Pakistan, probably working 

with Pakistan makes a lot of sense. In fact, Pakistan has—we do 

work with Pakistan, with the Department of Homeland Security on 

Secure Freight Initiative in putting radiation detectors in their 

ports. One port is done, Karachi is the second port. We are negotiating that type of work. We have export controls experts who are 

in the process of working with Pakistan on training them on what 

to look for with respect to what comes into the country and goes 

out of the country. 

Pakistan has legislation in place as a nation to establish this 

type of capability and maintain it. They have developed their own 

list of materials and advanced their list of materials on things that 

they are looking for. We also, from the standpoint of their programs, we know that Pakistan, obviously, some of the details I 

would rather go into in a closed session. But what I can say about 

the military is they are a very highly professional group. They are 

well trained. They understand the problem and the work they have 

cut out before them and in fact the work the rest of the world has 

cut out for them, and they take these issues very seriously. 

We do work closely in many areas, as I said, with their port security, export control work, and we have actually seen things taking 

place in country which signifies they have taken that seriously. 

Other details I will address later in closed session. 

Dr. NACHT. I would just add that collaboration of the Pakistani 

government with the United States is a sensitive matter in Pakistan. So what we do with them is best discussed elsewhere. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I yield back, given the time constraints. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn to 2337. Mr. Spratt will be the 

next questioner. We will see you in half an hour, 45 minutes. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned to reconvene in closed session.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 15, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 15, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 15, 2009 

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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MASSA 

Mr. MASSA. Based on the success of the dismantling of the Libyan nuclear weapons program of the 1990s, are there any lessons learned from that effort that can 

be applied in respect to Iran and North Korea? 

Dr. NACHT. The important lesson learned was that the USG was able to move 

quickly in response to the Libyan decision to dismantle their WMD program. The 

proposed ‘‘not-withstanding authority’’ legislation, Section 1305 of the House 2010 

National Defense Authorization Bill, will permit additional flexibility should Iran or 

North Korea agree to dismantle their WMD programs. 

Æ