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******************************************************PAUL IPPOLITO ET AL. v. OLYMPIC

CONSTRUCTION, LLC (AC 37437)
Alvord, Sheldon and Mullins, Js. Argued December 9, 2015—officially released March 1, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Hon. David R. Tobin, judge trialreferee.) Joseph DaSilva, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Marc J. Grenier, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Thomas M. Cassone, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion SHELDON, J. The plaintiff homeowners, Paul Ippolito and Lisa Ippolito, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, Hon. David R. Tobin, judge trial referee, denying their motion to vacate an arbitration award in favoroftheirhome improvement contractor, defendant Olympic Construction, LLC, and granting the defendant’s motion to confirm that award. The arbitration involved a claim by the defendant for lost profits for work repairing water damage to the plaintiffs’ home, whichitwas notpermittedto complete underthe terms of their home improvement contract due to the plaintiffs’ alleged termination of that contract without just
cause. The plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in confirmingthe arbitrator’s award oflostprofit damages to the defendant because the contract did not comply with certain provisions of the Home Improvement Act (HIA), General Statutes § 20-418 et seq. In particular, the plaintiffs argue that the contract did not comply with General Statutes § 20-429 (a) (6), which requires that everyhome improvement contract containanotice of the homeowner’s right to cancel the contract in accordancewiththeprovisionsoftheHome Solicitation Sales Act (HSSA), General Statutes §§ 42-134 through 42-143, orwith § 20-429 (a) (7), whichrequiresthateach such contract contain a starting date and completion date.1 The plaintiffs claim that the arbitrator’s award of damages to a contractor forwork he agreed to perform under ahome improvement contractthat is noncompliant with the HIAviolated the clear public policy ofthis state and demonstrated amanifest disregard ofthe law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court confirming the arbitration award.
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiffs, owners of a residential property located at 131 PequotLaneinNewCanaan, sufferedwaterdamage at their home following a storm. As a result, the plaintiffs enteredinto acontractwiththe defendantto repair the damage. That contract, dated May 26, 2011, consistedofanAmericanInstitute ofArchitects (AIA) Standard Form A133–2009 and several other documents, which were incorporated therein by reference, including AIA Document A201–2007, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction. The contract provides that all disputes between them arising out ofor related to the contract will be subject to arbitration before an arbitrator from the American Arbitration Association in accordance with the association’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. During the course of repairs, another storm caused
more water damage to the plaintiffs’ home, prompting Paul Ippolito to terminate the parties’ contract before the defendant could complete the agreed upon work. The defendantthenfiledaclaimforarbitration, seeking to recoverlostprofits forworkithad agreedtoperformunder the contract but had not been allowed to complete.
The plaintiffs defended themselves in the arbitration by arguing that the contract was void for noncompliance with the HIA, and thus that it was unenforceable against them by the defendant, because it failed to give themproperstatutorynotice oftheircancellationrights underthe contract, and failed to include a starting date andcompletiondatefortheworktobeperformedthereunder. The arbitrator rejected the plaintiffs’ defense, found that Paul Ippolito’s termination of the contract hadnotbeenforcause, andthus awardedthe defendant $46,448.19 in lost profits for the plaintiffs’ breach of contract. After the arbitration, the plaintiffs moved to vacate the arbitration award in the Stamford Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418 (a),2 and the defendant moved to confirm the award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417.3 The plaintiffs claimed that the award violated the clear public policy of this state because it contravened the previously described provisions ofthe HIA, and that the arbitrator, by not strictly enforcing those statutory provisions, had manifestly disregarded the law. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, andthus deniedtheirmotiontovacate and granted the defendant’s motion to confirm the arbitrator’s award. This appeal followed. ‘‘Judicialreview ofarbitral decisions isnarrowly confined.

. . . When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties’ agreement.

. . . When the scope ofthe submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors oflaw so long as the award conforms to the submission.

. . . Because we favorarbitration as ameans ofsettlingprivate disputes,
we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in
a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution.

. . . ‘‘Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that

. . . the interpretation of the agreement bythe arbitratorswas erroneous. Courtswillnotreview the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators’ decision of the legal questions involved.

. . . In other words, [u]nder an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators’ decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors oflaw or fact.

. . . ‘‘Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, wehave

. . . recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of
a statute

. . . (2) the award violates clear public policy

. . . [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of [General Statutes] § 52- 418.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Economos v. Liljedahl Bros., Inc., 279 Conn. 300, 305–306, 901 A.2d 1198 (2006). Theplaintiffs challengethe awardforviolation of public policy and for contravention of § 52-418
on the ground that, in issuing the award, the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.
I
We first address the plaintiffs’ claim that the arbitrator’s award violates the clear public policy ofthis state becauseitenforces againstahomeowner, onaclaimfor damagesbyacontractor, ahomeimprovementcontract that does not complywiththe HIA. The plaintiffs argue,
more particularly, that the location of the cancellation notice within the contract does not comply with § 20- 429 (a) (6), and that the contract does not contain a starting date and completion date, as required by § 20- 429 (a) (7).
We begin by setting forth our standard of review. ‘‘[W]e favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, [thus] we undertakejudicial review ofarbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution.

. . . We will, however, submit to higher scrutiny an arbitration award that is claimed to be in contravention of public policy.

. . . [P]arties cannot expect an arbitration award approving conduct which is

. . . contrary to public policy to receivejudicial endorsement anymore thanparties can expectacourttoenforcesuchacontractbetweenthem.

. . . When a challenge to the arbitrator’s authority is made on public policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator’s decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award

. . . . ‘‘Thus, when aparty challenges a consensual arbitral award on the ground that it violates public policy, and where that challenge has a legitimate, colorable basis, de novo review ofthe award is appropriate in order to determinewhetherthe award does infactviolatepublic policy.

. . . As this court maintained in [State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, 309 Conn. 519, 528, 69 A.3d 927 (2013)], we deferto the arbitrator’s interpretation ofthe agreements regarding the scope ofthe [contract] provision

. . . . We conclude only that as a reviewing court, we must determine, pursuant to our plenary authority and giving appropriate deference to the arbitrator’s factual conclusions, whether the contract provision in question violates those policies.

. . . ‘‘To determine whether an arbitration award must bevacated for violating public policy, we employ a twopronged analysis.

. . . First, we must determine whethertheawardimplicatesanyexplicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy.

. . . To identify the existence ofapublicpolicy, welookto statutes, regulations, administrative decisions, and case law.

. . . Second, if the decision of the arbitrator does implicate a clearly defined public policy, we then determine whether the contract, as construedbythe arbitrationaward,violates that policy.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, 316 Conn. 618, 629– 31, 114 A.3d 144 (2015) ( Burr Road). ‘‘Our case law

. . . has emphasized, however, that a reviewing court still is bound bythe arbitrator’s factual findings in making such a determination.’’ AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. ofCorrection, 298 Conn. 824, 837, 6 A.3d 1142 (2010).
The plaintiffs claim that the arbitrator’s award violatespublicpolicybecausethecontractisnoncompliant withtwo sections ofthe HIA: (1) § 20-429 (a) (6), which requires that home improvement contracts include a notice ofthe homeowner’s cancellation rights in accordance with the provisions of the HSSA; and (2) § 20- 429 (a) (7), which requires that a home improvement contract contain a starting date and completion date. The plaintiffs argue that, ‘‘[t]o enforce a noncompliant home improvement contract is contrary to the public policy of the state of Connecticut, and thus, said noncompliance compels the concomitant conclusion that the award itself violates the public policy of the state of Connecticut and it must therefore be vacated.’’ The defendant responds that strict enforcement ofthe HIA is not a well-defined, explicit, and dominant public policy of this state. A
We first turn to the plaintiffs’ claim that the contract violates public policy because it does not comply with thenoticeofcancellationrequirementsoftheHIAunder § 20-429 (a) (6), which requires that a home improvement contract include notice of the homeowner’s cancellation rights in accordance with the provisions of the HSSA. The plaintiffs do not dispute that the parties’ contract contains a notice of their cancellation rights,
nor do they argue that the language or typeface ofthat cancellationnotice is inanywaydeficient. Instead, they argue thatthe location ofthe notice withinthe contract documents does not complywith General Statutes § 42- 135a (1) and (2) of the HSSA.
Section 42-135a (1) of the HSSA requires, inter alia, that the sellerinclude a cancellation notice ‘‘in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract for the signature of the buyer

. . . .’’4 Section 42-135a (2) ofthe HSSA, inturn, requires thatthe sellerprovide thebuyer with ‘‘a completed form in duplicate, captioned ‘NOTICE OFCANCELLATION’, whichshallbe attached to the contract

. . . and easily detachable

. . . .’’5 The plaintiffs argue that the cancellation notice in the contract here at issue does not comply with the foregoing requirements because it is ‘‘buried’’ on pages thirtyeight and thirty-nine of a thirty-nine page document separate from the contract, entitled AIA Document A201–2007, General Conditions ofthe ContractforConstruction.
The plaintiffs initially argued before the arbitrator thatthe contract did not contain anynotice ofcancellation rights, but the arbitrator disagreed, finding as follows: ‘‘The [plaintiffs] claim

. . . that the contract failed to contain a notice of cancellation rights. This claim does not hold up. The contract, in section 12.2, directly above Mr. Ippolito’s signature, states that the contract includes AIA document A201–2007, General Conditions ofthe Contract for Construction. On pages 38–39 of that document is the notice of cancellation, which states explicitly that the Owner may cancel the contract ‘without any penalty or obligation’. The effectiveness ofthis inclusion is not affected bythe fact that the date ofthe notice was changed from June 6 to June 10 and the date of the notice limit was changed from June 9 to June 13. The contract clearly does contain the notice ofcancellation rights required by the [HIA].’’
The plaintiffs argued in the trial court, however, as they do before this court, that even if the contract did containacancellationnotice, itslocationinthecontract
was improper. The trial court concludedthatthe award did not violate a clear public policy because the plaintiffs were unable to produce any case law holding that
a defect in the location of the notice of cancellation, absent any other defect, was fatal. Although the plaintiffs argued in the trial court that the contractviolated § 42-135a(2), thetrial court’s decision did not reference that claim and was based solely
on the portion of § 42-135a (1) that requires a seller to include a cancellation notice ‘‘in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract for the signature of the buyer.’’ The plaintiffs never filed a request for articulation to receive a ruling on their claim under § 42-135a (2). Moreover, the plaintiffs have failed to adequatelybrieftheirclaim asto § 42-135a (2) byfailing to set forth how the contract here at issue violates that subdivision. Thus, we decline to review the plaintiffs’ claimto the extentthat it asserts aviolation ofthat subdivision.6
Our first step is to ‘‘determine whether the award implicatesanyexplicit, well-defined, anddominantpublic policy.’’ Burr Road, supra, 316 Conn. 630. We conclude that the arbitration award, insofar as it rejects the plaintiffs’ challenge to the contract’s notice of cancellation, does not ‘‘[implicate] any explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy.’’ Id. Although our Supreme Court has recognized that compliance with § 20-429 (a) is mandatory, it has not required perfect compliance. Wright Bros. Builders, Inc

. v. Dowling, 247 Conn. 218, 230–31, 720 A.2d 235 (1998). ‘‘The HIA is aremedialstatutethatwas enactedforthepurpose of providingthepublicwithaformofconsumerprotection against unscrupulous home improvement contractors.

. . . The aim ofthe statute is to promote understanding
on the part of consumers with respect to the terms of home improvement contracts and their right to cancel such contracts so as to allow them to make informed decisions when purchasing home improvement services.

. . . While the purposes of the statute are advanced by an interpretation that makes compliance withthe requirements of§ 20-429 (a) mandatory, itdoes not necessarily follow that advancement of the purposes alsorequiresthatthemandatorycompliancewith each subsection be technically perfect.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 231.
In Dowling, our Supreme Court concluded that it would be inappropriate to require ‘‘technically perfect compliance’’ with § 20-429 (a), and instead required ‘‘an interpretation of that section that acknowledges and furthers the remedial purposes of the statute

. . . .’’ Id. The plaintiff contractor in that case sought to forecloseamechanic’slienafterthedefendanthomeowners had failed to submit complete payment for renovations that the plaintiff had completed on their home. Id., 223–24. The defendants claimed that their contract did not comply with the HIA because the plaintiff: (1) had not attached two copies of the notice of cancellation to it, in violation of § 42-135a (2); see footnote 5 of this opinion; and (2) had not entered the date of the transaction or the date by which the transaction could be cancelledonthenoticeofcancellation, inviolationof § 42-135a (3).7 Id., 226. The court inDowling disagreed, notingfirstthat, althoughtheplaintiffhadsupplied only
one copy ofthe cancellation notice to the homeowner, it had supplied another copy to the homeowner’s husband, whowasthenactingasheragent. Id., 232. Second, it noted that, even though there were no dates on the cancellation notice, ‘‘[t]he missing information

. . . easily could have been gleaned from even the most cursory review ofthe contract.’’ Id., 233. Therefore, the court concluded that ‘‘the alleged deviations

. . . were of a minor and highly technical nature, and did not result in a lack of notice to the defendants that they had a right to cancel the contract within three days of the contract’s signing.’’ Id., 232. Accordingly, when a minor or technical defect in the cancellation notice of
a home improvement contract does not result in a lack of notice to the homeowners of their right to cancel the contract within three days ofthe contract’s signing,
an arbitrator’s award enforcing the contract againstthe homeowners cannot be found to violate an ‘‘explicit,well-defined, and dominant public policy’’; BurrRoad, supra, 316 Conn. 630; of this state. The arbitratorinthis case foundthatthe cancellation notice complied in substance with the requirements of the HIA, because, eventhough it was set forth on pages thirty-eight and thirty-nine ofa separate document that had been incorporated into the contract by reference, the incorporated document itself was referenced in close proximity to the signature line on the contract. Here, then, because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the cancellation notice was missing from the contract, or that the language or typeface or any other aspect of the cancellation notice was deficient in such a way as to deprive them of notice of their cancellation rights under the HIA, we cannot conclude that enforcement ofthe contract against the homeownersviolated an explicit, well-defined and dominantpublic policy of this state.
B
Weturnnexttotheplaintiffs’ claimregarding § 20-429 (a) (7), which provides that: ‘‘No home improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against an owner unless it

. . . (7) contains a starting date and completion date

. . . .’’ The plaintiffs claim that the contract does not comply with that provision because it does notcontainspecificcalendardatesforstartingandcompleting work under the contract. The arbitrator made the following findings as to the starting date and completion date of work to be performed under the parties’ contract: ‘‘The

. . . claim

. . . that the contract does not include a start date and
a completion date

. . . fails. The General Conditions state in section 8.1.2: ‘[t]he date of commencement of the Work is the date established in the agreement.’ Section 2.3.1.1 of the agreement states: ‘For purposes of Section 8.1.2 of A201–2007, the date of commencementoftheWorkshallmeanthedateofcommencement of the Construction Phase.’ In the following section 2.3.1.2, it states, ‘The Construction Phase shall commence upon the Owner’s acceptance of the ConstructionManager’s GuaranteedMaximum Price proposal or the Owner’s issuance ofaNoticeto Proceed, whichever
occurs earlier.’ The completion date for the contract is defined in Section 9.8 of the General Conditions.8 In this matter, the start dates and the completion date can be readily adduced by looking at the entire contract

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; footnote added.)
The trial court thus rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the contract violated the starting date and completion date requirement ofthe HIA, and with it the claim that enforcement of that contract against them violated an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy of this state. On that score, the court expressly noted that the plaintiffs could not provide any case law that heldthat‘‘thestartingdateand/orcompletiondateneedtobe fixed calendar dates ratherthan dates to be determined upon the occurrence of certain events. (E.g., the completion ofplans; issuance ofabuilding permit; notification of closing on construction financing.)’’
Theplaintiffs again claim on appealthat enforcement against them of a home improvement contract that is noncompliant with the starting date and completion date requirement ofthe HIA violates public policy. We
are boundbythe arbitrator’s factualfindings;AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 298 Conn. 837; including the finding that ‘‘the start date and the completion date can be readily adduced by looking at the entire contract.’’ On the basis of those findings, the arbitrator concluded that the parties’ contract was compliant with the HIA requirement that it contain a starting date and completion date. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim on appeal fails, for even if strict enforcement of the starting date and completion date requirement of the statute were an explicit, welldefined, and dominant public policy of this state, the contract here at issue does notviolate that requirement
or the public policy it is designed to promote.
II
Theplaintiffs next claimthatthe arbitrator’s enforcement of a contract that is noncompliant with § 20-429 (a) (6) and (7) of the HIA demonstrates a manifest disregard of the law, and thus that the award should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4). ‘‘[Section] 52-418 (a) (4) provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated ifthe arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, finalanddefiniteawarduponthe subjectmatter submitted was not made.

. . . [A]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4) because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, finalanddefiniteawarduponthe subjectmatter submitted was not made. We emphasize, however, that the manifest disregard of the law ground for vacating
an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator’s extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles. ‘‘So delimited, the principle of vacating an award because of a manifest disregard of the law is an important safeguard ofthe integrity ofalternate dispute resolution mechanisms. Judicial approval ofarbitration decisions that so egregiously depart from established law that theyborder on the irrational would undermine society’s confidence in the legitimacy ofthe arbitration process.

. . . Furthermore, although the discretion conferred on the arbitrator by the contracting parties is exceedingly broad, modern contract principles ofgood faith and fair dealing recognize that even contractual discretion must be exercised for purposes reasonably within the contemplation of the contracting parties.

. . . ‘‘In Garrity [v.McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 9, 612A.2d 742 (1992)], we adopted the test enunciated by the United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit in interpreting the federal equivalent of § 52-418 (a) (4).

. . . The test consists of the following three elements, all ofwhich mustbe satisfied in orderfor a courtto vacate
an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable ofbeing readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2)thearbitrationpanelappreciatedtheexistence ofa clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Economos v. Liljedahl Bros., Inc., supra, 279 Conn. 306–307.
Theplaintiffs arguethatthe contractdoesnotcomply strictlywith the HIA andthe HSSA, andthat mandatory strict compliance with the HIA and the HSSA is a welldefined, explicit, and clearly applicable law. Moreover, the plaintiffs argue that the arbitrator recognized the existence of the requirements of § 20-429 (a) (6) and (7), but ignored those provisions.
The arbitrator found that the notice of cancellation in the contract here at issue deviated from the strict requirements of the HIA in only a minor and technical manner, and concludedthatthe contract compliedfully with the HIA’s requirement that the contract contain a starting date and completion date. As for the latter determination, it completely undermines the plaintiffs’ claim that by enforcing a contract that failed to contain
a starting and completion date, the arbitrator issued his award in manifest disregard ofthe law. The relevant provisions of the HIA simply were not violated at all. As for the former determination, although the court determined that the location ofthe cancellation notice in the parties’ contract constituted a minor and technical deviation from the requirements of the HIA, we already have determined that no such deviation required the nonenforcement of the contract unless it
was shown to have deprived the plaintiffs of notice of their statutory cancellation rights under the contract. By failing to plead and prove such a deprivation of notice of their statutory cancellation rights as a result of the minor and technical deviation here at issue, the plaintiffshavefailedtoprovethatthe arbitratorignored the requirements ofawell-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable law, or that he thereby demonstrated an ‘‘extraordinary lack offidelity to established legal prin-ciples’’; (internal quotation marks omitted.) id., 306; as required to establish a manifest disregard of the law within the meaning of § 52-418 (a) (4).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 20-429 (a) provides: ‘‘No home improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against an owner unless it: (1) Is in writing, (2) is signedbythe owner and the contractor, (3) contains the entire agreement between the owner and the contractor, (4) contains the date ofthe transaction, (5) containsthenameandaddressofthe contractorandthe contractor’s registration number, (6) contains a notice ofthe owner’s cancellation rights in accordance with the provisions of chapter 740, (7) contains a starting date and completion date, (8) is entered into by a registered salesman or registered contractor, and (9) includes a provision disclosing each corporation, limited liability company, partnership, sole proprietorship or other legal entity, which is or has been a home improvement contractor pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or a new home construction contractor pursuant to the provisions ofchapter 399a, in which the owner or owners of the home improvement contractor are or have been a shareholder, member, partner, or owner during the previous five years. Each change in the terms and conditions of a contract shall be in writing and shall be signed by the

owner and contractor, except that the commissioner may, by regulation, dispense with the necessity for complying with the requirement that each change in a home improvement contract shall be in writing and signed by the owner and contractor.’’

2 General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides: ‘‘Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which

one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality

or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient

cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.’’

3 General Statutes § 52-417 provides: ‘‘At any time within one year after

an award has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration notified thereof, any party to the arbitration may make application to the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, to any judge thereof, for an order confirming the award. The court or judge shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected

as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419.’’

4 General Statutes § 42-135a provides: ‘‘No agreement in a home solicitation sale shall be effective against the buyer if it is not signed and dated by the buyer or if the seller shall: (1) Fail to furnish the buyer with a fully completed receipt or copy of all contracts and documents pertaining to such sale at the time of its execution, which contract shall be in the same language as that principally used in the oral sales presentation and which shallshowthe date ofthetransactionandshallcontainthenameandaddress oftheseller, andinimmediateproximitytothespacereservedinthe contract forthe signature ofthe buyer, oronthe frontpage ofthe receipt ifacontract is notused, andinboldface type ofaminimumsize oftenpoints, astatement in substantially the following form: ‘YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFTER THE DATE OF THIS TRANSACTION. SEE THE ATTACHED NOTICE OF CANCELLATION FORM FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THIS RIGHT.’ ’’

5 General Statutes § 42-135a provides: ‘‘No agreement in a home solicitation sale shall be effective against the buyer if it is not signed and dated by the buyer or if the seller shall (2) Fail to furnish each buyer, at the time such buyer signs the home solicitation sales contract or otherwise agrees to buy consumer goods or services from the seller, a completed form induplicate, captioned ‘NOTICE OFCANCELLATION’, whichshallbe attached to the contract or receipt and easily detachable, and which shall contain in ten-point boldface type the following information and statements in the

same language as that used in the contract:

‘NOTICE OF CANCELLATION

. . . . (Date of Transaction) YOU MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION, WITHOUT ANY PENALTY OR OBLIGATION, WITHINTHREEBUSINESSDAYSFROMTHEABOVEDATE. IF YOU CANCEL, ANY PROPERTY TRADED IN, ANY PAYMENTS MADE BY YOU UNDER THE CONTRACT OR SALE, AND ANY NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT EXECUTED BY YOU WILL BE RETURNED WITHIN TEN BUSINESS DAYS FOLLOWING RECEIPT BY THE SELLER OF YOUR CANCELLATION NOTICE, AND ANY SECURITY INTEREST ARISING OUT OF THE TRANSACTION WILL BE CANCELLED. IF YOU CANCEL, YOU MUST MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER AT YOUR RESIDENCE, IN SUBSTANTIALLYAS GOOD CONDITIONAS WHEN RECEIVED, ANY GOODS DELIVERED TO YOU UNDER THIS CONTRACT OR SALE; OR YOU MAY, IF YOU WISH, COMPLY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SELLER REGARDING THE RETURN SHIPMENT OF THE GOODS AT THE SELLER’S EXPENSE AND RISK. IF YOU DO MAKE THE GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER AND THE SELLER DOES NOT PICK THEM UP WITHIN TWENTY DAYS OF THE DATE OF CANCELLATION, YOU MAY RETAIN OR DISPOSE OF THE GOODS WITHOUT ANY FURTHER OBLIGATION. IF YOU FAIL TO MAKE THE GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER, OR IF YOU AGREE TO RETURN THE GOODS TO THE SELLER AND FAIL TO DO SO, THEN YOU REMAIN LIABLE FOR PERFORMANCE OF ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT. TO CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION, MAIL OR DELIVER A SIGNED AND DATED COPY OF THIS CANCELLATION NOTICE OR ANY OTHER WRITTEN NOTICE, OR SEND A TELEGRAM TO

. . . . (Name of Seller) AT

. . . . (Address ofSeller’s Place ofBusiness) NOT LATER THAN MIDNIGHT OF

. . . . (Date) I HEREBY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION

. . . . (Date)

. . . . (Buyer’s Signature)’ ’’

6 WeareawarethatPracticeBook § 61-10wasrecentlyamendedtoinclude subsection (b), which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he failure of any party on appeal to seek articulation pursuant to Section 66-5 shall not be the sole ground upon which the court declines to review any issue or claim

on appeal.

. . .’’ The commentary for § 61-10 provides, however, that ‘‘[t]he adoption ofsubsection (b) is notintendedto preclude the court from declining to review an issue where the record is inadequate for reasons other than solely the failure to seek an articulation

. . . .’’

7 General Statutes § 42-135a provides in relevant part: ‘‘No agreement in

ahome solicitation sale shall be effective against the buyer ifit is not signed and dated by the buyer or if the seller shall

. . . (3) Fail, before furnishing copies ofthe ‘Notice of Cancellation’ to the buyer, to complete both copies by entering the name of the seller, the address of the seller’s place of business, the date ofthe transaction, and the date, not earlier than the third business day following the date ofthe transaction, by which the buyer may give notice of cancellation.’’

8 Section 9.8.1 ofthe General Conditions ofthe contract states: ‘‘Substantial Completion is the stage in the process of the Work when the Work or designated portion thereof is sufficiently complete in accordance with the Contract Documents so that the Owner can occupy or utilize the Work for its intended use.’’