No. 04-800 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2006 MT 210 

_______________________________________ 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

ROBERT LOUIS MEZA, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

______________________________________ 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

 In and for the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 01-681 

 The Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

 For Appellant: 

Jeffrey G. Michael, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana 

 For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Joslyn Hunt, Assistant Attorney 

General, Helena, Montana 

Dennis Paxinos, County Attorney; Sheila Kolar, Deputy County Attorney, 

Billings, Montana 

____________________________________ 

Submitted on Briefs: June 28, 2006 

 Decided: August 29, 2006 

Filed: 

______________________________________ 

Clerk 
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Robert Louis Meza (Meza) appeals from his conviction in the Thirteenth Judicial 

District, Yellowstone County, for criminal possession of dangerous drugs. We affirm. 

¶2 We review the following issues on appeal: 

¶3 Whether the District Court properly determined that a particularized suspicion 

supported the stop of Meza’s vehicle. 

¶4 Whether the District Court properly determined that a particularized suspicion of 

narcotics activity existed to extend the scope of the stop to allow a drug-detecting canine 

to sniff for drugs in Meza’s vehicle. 

¶5 Whether Meza received the effective assistance of counsel. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶6 Billings police officer and canine handler Steve Feuerstein (Officer Feuerstein) 

noticed a pickup truck illegally parked in the middle of a side street as he drove past 

during routine patrol on August 19, 2001. Officer Feuerstein circled around the block 

and came up behind the vehicle. He observed Meza in the driver’s seat of the truck, 

speaking with a man leaning through the passenger window. Officer Feuerstein noted 

that the truck was parked in front of a residence known for its involvement with narcotics 

and obtained the license plate number. Officer Feuerstein continued past the truck, 

driving into the oncoming traffic lane to avoid Meza’s illegally parked vehicle. 

¶7 Officer Feuerstein suspected narcotics activity. He circled the block a second time 

and noticed that the truck had just left the house. Officer Feuerstein accelerated to catch 

the vehicle and as he approached, the truck turned at an intersection without signaling. 

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The truck then pulled over to the side of the road. Meza immediately stepped out of the 

vehicle after stopping. 

¶8 Officer Feuerstein approached and requested Meza’s driver’s license and 

registration. He observed that Meza acted “very nervous.” Officer Feuerstein walked 

back to his patrol car to process Meza’s driving information. At that time, dispatch 

advised Officer Feuerstein that Meza had a history of using narcotics. Officer Feuerstein 

issued Meza two traffic citations, one for impeding traffic under § 61-8-311, MCA, and 

one failing to use a turn signal under § 61-8-336, MCA. 

¶9 Officer Feuerstein advised Meza that he suspected Meza of involvement with 

narcotics and asked for consent to search the truck. Meza declined and Officer 

Feuerstein told Meza that he would have his canine check Meza’s vehicle for odors. 

Officer Feuerstein removed his canine from the patrol car and walked the dog around 

Meza’s truck. The canine signaled the presence of drugs in Meza’s vehicle by scratching 

the driver’s side door and barking. Officer Feuerstein advised Meza that he would seek a 

warrant to search the truck, but that Meza was free to leave without his vehicle. 

¶10 Meza left without his truck and Officer Feuerstein began to file for a telephonic 

search warrant to search the vehicle. Dispatch then advised Officer Feuerstein that Meza 

was on parole. Officer Feuerstein contacted Meza’s parole officer, Officer Steven Hurd 

(Officer Hurd), and explained the situation. Officer Hurd gave Officer Feuerstein 

consent to conduct a parole search of Meza’s truck. Officer Feuerstein searched Meza’s 

truck and discovered methamphetamines. 

¶11 The State charged Meza with criminal possession of dangerous drugs pursuant to § 

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45-9-102, MCA, on September 5, 2001. The State gave notice that it intended to pursue 

Meza as a persistent felony offender under § 46-18-501, MCA. 

¶12 Meza filed a motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his truck. 

Meza contended that Officer Feuerstein lacked the particularized suspicion to stop Meza. 

Meza asserted that he did not commit any traffic violations because no traffic was 

affected by his failure to use a turn signal or parking in the middle of the road. The State 

responded that traffic need not be impeded to cause a violation by parking in the street 

and that Meza’s failure to signal did impede traffic. The District Court denied Meza’s 

motion to suppress on January 24, 2002. 

¶13 The District Court appointed new counsel for Meza. Meza filed a second motion 

to suppress evidence on May 14, 2002. Meza’s counsel chose not to challenge the 

validity of the parole search, stating that parole searches are “basically always allowed.” 

Meza’s counsel argued instead that Officer Feuerstein’s use of a canine to sniff his truck 

represented an improper search. The State responded that according to State v. Scheetz, 

286 Mont. 41, 950 P.2d 722 (1997), a canine sniff did not constitute a search. The 

District Court denied Meza’s motion on September 9, 2002. 

¶14 The court again appointed Meza new counsel and Meza filed a motion to 

reconsider the denial of his second motion to suppress on August 18, 2003, following this 

Court’s decision in State v. Tackitt, 2003 MT 81, 315 Mont. 59, 67 P.3d 295. Meza 

contended that no particularized suspicion supported the canine sniff of his vehicle. The 

State asserted that Meza’s illegal parking in front of a known narcotics house, his 

interaction with a person in front of the house, Meza’s history of drug use, Meza’s failure 

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to signal, nervous behavior after being stopped, and the fact that Meza did not want to 

remain in his truck, created a particularized suspicion to conduct a canine sniff of his 

vehicle. The District Court denied Meza’s motion to reconsider on October 23, 2003. 

¶15 Meza entered a plea of guilty on June 29, 2004, but reserved the right to appeal the 

denial of his motion to suppress. The District Court sentenced Meza as a persistent 

felony offender to a term of ten years at the Montana State Prison with five suspended, to 

run consecutively with a sentence imposed for a separate crime. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶16 This Court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress to 

determine whether the court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous and whether its 

conclusions of law were correct. State v. Carlson, 2000 MT 320, ¶ 14, 302 Mont. 508, ¶ 

14, 15 P.3d 893, ¶ 14. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel present mixed 

questions of law and fact that we review de novo. State v. Novak, 2005 MT 294, ¶ 15, 

329 Mont. 309, ¶ 15, 124 P.3d 182, ¶ 15.

DISCUSSION 

¶17 Whether the District Court properly determined that a particularized 

suspicion supported the stop of Meza’s vehicle. 

¶18 A police officer may stop any vehicle that he or she observes in circumstances that 

create a particularized suspicion that the “occupant of the vehicle has committed, is 

committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Section 46-5-401, MCA. We apply a 

two-part test to determine whether a law enforcement officer had sufficient particularized 

suspicion to justify an investigative stop. State v. Britt, 2005 MT 101, ¶ 8, 327 Mont. 1, ¶ 

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8, 111 P.3d 217, ¶ 8. First, the State must demonstrate objective data from which an 

experienced officer could make certain inferences. Britt, ¶ 8. Second, the State must 

show a resulting suspicion by the officer that the occupant of the vehicle is or has been 

engaged in some wrongdoing. Britt, ¶ 8. 

¶19 Meza contends that pursuant to this Court’s decision in Grindeland v. State, 2001 

MT 196, 306 Mont. 262, 32 P.3d 767, the State must demonstrate that Meza’s failure to 

use a turn signal affected traffic in order to constitute a violation. In Grindeland, we 

addressed the language of § 61-8-336, MCA (2001), which stated that no person may turn 

a vehicle without a signal, “in the event any other traffic may be affected by such 

movement.” We determined that § 61-8-336, MCA, required that traffic be affected by a 

driver’s failure to use a turn signal in order for particularized suspicion to exist to stop a 

vehicle. Grindeland, ¶ 11. 

¶20 Meza fails to recognize that the Legislature amended § 61-8-336, MCA, in 2003 

and removed the language relied upon in Grindeland. 2003 Mont. Laws Ch. 352. The 

statute now reads that “[a] person may not turn a vehicle without giving an appropriate 

signal in the manner provided in this section.” Section 61-8-336(1), MCA. Section 61-8-

336, MCA, no longer requires that traffic be affected in order for a violation to occur for 

failure to use a signal. See § 61-8-336, MCA. As a consequence, Meza violated § 61-8-

336(2), MCA, by not signaling for at least 100 feet before turning in a residential district. 

¶21 Furthermore, Meza committed a separate traffic violation by parking in the middle 

of the street. We need not address the question of whether traffic actually must be 

impeded to constitute a violation, however, because Meza violated § 61-8-311, MCA, in 

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either case by actually impeding traffic by causing Officer Feuerstein to drive around his 

vehicle. The District Court properly determined that particularized suspicion existed to 

stop Meza’s vehicle when he committed two traffic violations. 

¶22 Whether the District Court properly determined that a particularized 

suspicion of narcotics activity existed to extend the scope of the stop to allow a drugdetecting canine to sniff for drugs in Meza’s vehicle. 

¶23 We have held that a canine sniff of a vehicle constitutes a search under Article II, 

Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution. Tackitt, ¶ 22. Due to the limited nature 

of the intrusion of a dog sniff, however, we do not require police officers to obtain a 

warrant. A police officer must only demonstrate a particularized suspicion for the use of 

a drug-detecting canine. Tackitt, ¶ 31. 

¶24 Meza contends that Officer Feuerstein improperly extended the initial traffic stop 

to conduct a canine sniff of his vehicle. A traffic stop may be prolonged and the scope of 

the investigation enlarged as the circumstances require, as long as the scope of the 

investigation remains within the limits created by the facts and the suspicions which they 

arouse. Hulse v. State Dept. of Justice, 1998 MT 108, ¶ 40, 289 Mont. 1, ¶ 40, 961 P.2d 

75, ¶ 40. Meza asserts that the circumstances did not justify a canine sniff of his truck 

because there was no particularized suspicion of narcotics activity. 

¶25 Meza ignores the probative value of his conduct after the stop and the information 

provided by dispatch regarding Meza’s narcotics history. Meza jumped out of his truck 

after being pulled over. Officer Feuerstein testified that Meza acted nervously during the 

initial interaction and that Meza did not want to get back in the truck. Officer Feuerstein 

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also encountered Meza illegally parked outside a house that Officer Feuerstein knew had 

past narcotics operations. Dispatch also had advised Officer Feuerstein that Meza had a 

history of narcotics use. 

¶26 Whether a particularized suspicion exists represents a question of fact determined 

by examining the totality of circumstances surrounding the investigation stop. Britt, ¶ 8. 

Meza’s behavior after being stopped and his narcotics history support a finding of a 

particularized suspicion when considered in conjunction with the information that he 

stopped in the street to have a brief meeting with a person in front of a known narcotics 

house. See Hulse, ¶ 40. The District Court properly determined that particularized 

suspicion existed to conduct a canine sniff of Meza’s truck. 

¶27 Whether Meza received the effective assistance of counsel. 

¶28 Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment 

guarantee a person the right to the effective assistance of counsel. This Court has 

adopted the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 

(1984), to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant must 

demonstrate that his counsel’s performance (1) fell below the range of competence 

required of attorneys in criminal cases and (2) that his counsel’s deficient performance 

prejudiced his case. State v. Hendricks, 2003 MT 223, ¶ 6, 317 Mont. 177, ¶ 6, 75 P.3d 

1268, ¶ 6. The first prong carries a strong presumption in favor of the State, as counsel 

possesses wide latitude in determining what tactics to employ when defending a client. 

State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 11, 323 Mont. 6, ¶ 11, 97 P.3d 1095, ¶ 11. The defendant 

bears the burden to show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard 

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of reasonableness. State v. Grixti, 2005 MT 296, ¶ 25, 329 Mont. 330, ¶ 25, 124 P.3d 

177, ¶ 25. 

¶29 Meza asserts that his counsel’s failure to challenge the validity of the parole search 

of his truck represented ineffective assistance of counsel. Meza’s counsel at the time of 

the second suppression hearing opted not to challenge the validity of the parole search of 

his truck because parole and probationary searches are “basically always allowed.” Meza 

contends that the failure of his counsel to challenge the validity of the parole search fell 

below the range of competence required by attorneys in criminal cases. We disagree. 

¶30 As a general matter, searches of parolees conducted by police officers are 

permissible with the consent of the parole officer. See State v. Boston, 269 Mont. 300, 

305, 889 P.2d 814, 817 (1994); See also State v. Burke, 235 Mont. 165, 766 P.2d 254 

(1988); State v. Burchett, 277 Mont. 192, 921 P.2d 854 (1996). The record reveals that 

Meza’s counsel considered that a challenge to the validity of the parole search would be 

unlikely to succeed. Meza’s counsel opted instead to challenge the validity of this 

particular parole search on the grounds that Officer Feuerstein lacked the particularized 

suspicion of narcotics activity to extend the scope of the stop. Given the strong 

precedents supporting the validity of parole and probationary searches, Meza fails to 

demonstrate that his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. See Grixti, ¶ 25. 

¶31 Affirmed. 

 /S/ BRIAN MORRIS 

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We Concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ JIM RICE 

/S/ JOHN WARNER 

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