Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

International Finance Discussion Papers

Number 692

December 2000

CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

Caroline L. Freund

NOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate

discussion and critical comment. References in publications to International Finance Discussion

Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material)

should be cleared with the author or authors. Recent IFDPs are available on the Web at

www.bog.frb.fed.us.
CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

Caroline L. Freund*

Abstract: This paper examines the dynamics of current account adjustment among industrialized

countries. We identify twenty-five episodes in which a large sustained improvement in the current

account occurred between 1980 and 1997. We find that a typical current account reversal begins

when the current account deficit is about 5 percent of GDP, and that it is associated with slowing

income growth and a 10-20 percent real depreciation. Real export growth, declining investment, and

an eventual leveling off in both the net international investment position and the budget deficit-GDP

ratio are also likely to be part of the adjustment. These results suggest that current account reversals

in industrialized countries are largely a function of the business cycle.

Keywords: current account deficit, trade deficit, exchange rate adjustment, currency crises

* Economist in the International Finance Division of the Federal Reserve Board. I would like to

thank David Bowman, Hali Edison, Joseph Gagnon, William Helkie, David Howard, Steven Kamin,

Karen Johnson, Vince Reinhart, Charles Thomas, and Kei-Mu Yi for helpful comments and Helen

Oliver for research assistance. Correspondence: Caroline Freund, International Finance Division,

Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C. 20551, e-mail: caroline.l.freund@frb.gov. The views

presented here are solely the responsibility of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting

the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or any other person associated

with the Federal Reserve System.
1

 The twenty-five episodes examined are: Australia 1989, Austria 1980, Belgium 1981, Canada

1981 and 1993, Denmark 1986, Finland 1991, France1982, Greece 1985, Hong Kong 1980, Ireland 1981,

Israel 1982, Italy 1981 and 1992, Korea 1980, Norway 1986, New Zealand 1984, Portugal 1981,

Singapore 1980, Spain 1981 and 1991, Sweden 1982 and 1992, United Kingdom 1989, and United States

1987. We restrict ourselves to episodes in the 1980s and 1990s because only this period involved

extensive capital mobility and flexible exchange rates.

2

1. Introduction

How have large and growing current account deficits among industrialized countries been

reversed in the recent past? To answer this question, we characterize how macro-variables adjust

in conjunction with the current account, using data from twenty-five episodes in which a large

current account adjustment occurred.1

 In brief, we find that a typical current account reversal

begins when the current account deficit is about 5 percent of GDP, that it is associated with

slowing income growth and a significant real depreciation over a period of about three years. 

The short-term interest rate displays a hump-shaped pattern, it is elevated by about 2 percent in

the year the current account bottomed out. There is some evidence that a large government

budget deficit contributes to the current account deficit, but the recovery is not typically

associated with a fiscal consolidation. In general, these episodes involve a declining net

international investment position that levels off, but does not reverse, a few years after the

current account begins its recovery. On the financial side, the recovery is assisted by a sizeable

decline in the investment-GDP ratio with little change in the saving-GDP ratio. While declining

real import growth aids the initial recovery; a sustained surge in real export growth is the more

important force in the continued improvement of the current account over several years. 

This exercise has three main motivations. The first is simply to describe the current

account adjustment process among industrialized countries. In light of the re-emergence of the
3

large current account deficit in the United States, it is useful to be able to answer the question of

when a typical adjustment begins and what it entails. As noted above, the adjustment process

typically begins when the current account deficit is about 5 percent of GDP, it takes 3 to 4 years

and involves slowing income growth and a significant real exchange rate depreciation.

The second is to investigate what factors trigger a current account reversal. We find that

among industrialized countries, current account reversals are largely a function of the business

cycle. The current account worsens when growth is above trend and improves as a recession

sets in. Monetary policy plays an important role in smoothing the adjustment. Surprisingly,

fiscal policy is roughly orthogonal to the adjustment process.

Third, the results provide empirical evidence that generally favors the conventional

wisdom on how the current account adjusts. The standard view maintains that output is demand

determined and that a real exchange rate adjustment is necessary to reduce an external deficit. In

contrast, others have argued that exchange rate depreciation is not a necessary feature of

adjustment. One possibility is that a decline in capital inflows could reduce demand sufficiently

so that the exchange rate remains unchanged. This would be true if the foreign and the domestic

share of spending on domestic goods was the same at the margin. In such well-integrated

economies, only a small relative price adjustment will be needed to accommodate a large shift in

capital flows. The most basic version of the intertemporal approach to current account

determination also gives no role to the exchange rate. According to this view, the current

account is used to smooth consumption, implying that a deficit represents expectations about

high future growth relative to other countries. Assuming these expectations are correct, the debt

will be repaid when domestic income is relatively high.
4

 This paper is divided into 6 sections. The next section discusses related empirical

literature on current account adjustment. Section 3 examines current account adjustment in the

sample countries. Section 4 tests whether exchange rate and real income adjustment during the

reversal were different from their period averages. Section 5 discusses alternative theories of

adjustment. Section 6 concludes. 

2. Related Literature

There is a growing empirical literature which focuses on current account determinants

and how the current account adjusts. Sachs (1981) evaluates whether oil prices or investment

demand was the main determinant of the variation in current account balances across countries in

the 1970s. His findings suggest that investment had a greater relative influence on the current

account than oil prices. Cashin and McDermott (1998) evaluate the sustainability of Australia’s

current account deficit and find that it was not used to smooth consumption optimally. Debelle

and Faruqee (1996) and Chinn and Prasad (2000) examine the determinants of the current

account balance in a cross-section of countries and find some support for stage-of-development

theories of current account determination for developing countries. 

The paper most closely related to this study is Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998), which

examines empirical regularities during current account reversals and currency crises using data

from 105 low and middle income countries. Their findings on current account reversals are

summarized in the following three points:

i. Reversals in current account imbalances are more likely to occur in countries that have run

persistent deficits, that have low reserves and unfavorable terms of trade and less likely to occur

in countries that receive high official transfers and whose debt is largely on concessional terms.
5

ii. Reversals are not systematically associated with a decline in growth%median growth after a

reversal is the same as before the reversal. Growth performance after reversals tends to be better

in more open economies and in countries whose real exchange rate was less appreciated prior to

the reversal.

iii. Currency crises and current account reversals are, in general, distinct events. Less than a

third of all current account reversals in their sample were preceded by a currency crisis. 

While these stylized facts provide a useful guide to current account adjustment in nonindustrialized countries, they offer little insight into current account reversals in large economies. 

Indeed, results from Chinn and Prasad (2000) suggest that the determinants of the current

account-GDP (CA-GDP) ratio in high-income countries are quite different from those in middleand low-income countries. Among industrialized countries, they find that GDP growth, the net

foreign asset-GDP ratio, and the government budget balance all have significant power in

explaining the CA-GDP ratio. Among developing countries, they find that while the latter two

are also significant determinants of the current account, the magnitude of their impact is much

smaller than it was for the industrialized countries. In addition, they find that relative income,

financial deepening, and terms-of-trade effects are important determinants of the CA-GDP ratio

only in developing countries.

The results from this paper also suggest that there are some similarities and some

differences between adjustment processes among industrialized economies and nonindustrialized economies. In particular, one similarity is that adjustments in all economies are

associated with a significant real depreciation. However, one important difference is in the

relationship between real income growth and current account adjustment. Milesi-Ferretti and

Razin do not find a strong relationship between income growth and the current account
2

 They examine real growth in the three years following the reversal, which might partially

explain this finding because adjustment often occurs very rapidly in developing countries. In addition,

they note that growth performance is very heterogeneous and that several countries did experience a

sharp drop in growth following the reversal.

6

adjustment in non-industrialized countries.2 In contrast, we find that declining real income

growth is a significant part of the adjustment process among industrialized countries. One

possible explanation for this difference is that current account imbalances in developing

countries may be driven largely by foreigners willingness to invest and other external factors,

while current account imbalances in large economies are more likely to be driven by domestic

growth. Another possible explanation is that current account imbalances in many developing

nations may be induced by movements in specific commodity prices, which would allow the

current account to move independently of real growth. Finally, in industrialized countries,

pressure groups may work to limit exchange rate adjustments, forcing real income to do much of

the work of external adjustment. 

3. The Dynamics of Current Account Adjustment

To study the adjustment process we examine twenty-five episodes of current account

reversals among industrialized countries. Each episode is identified by the year before the CAGDP began its recovery, i.e. the year the CA-GDP ratio widened to its furthest point in recent

years. For example, income in Finland in year 2 refers to income in Finland two years after the

CA-GDP ratio reached a local minimum. We examine adjustment in the current account, the

exchange rate, real income, the trade balance, savings and investment, the short-term interest

rate, the budget balance, and the net international investment position in the ten year period
3

 The per-capita income level was chosen because there is a natural break in the data around

$10,000. In addition, the World Bank defines high-income in 1997 to be countries with per-capita GNP

above $9,656. This definition leads to the addition of one more country in the high-income category,

Slovenia, which does not have an episode of current account adjustment. Korea and Portugal are the

only countries included in both this study and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998).

4

 Data on per capita GNP was available for 163 countries from the WDI for 1997.

7

surrounding the trough date. The data are mainly from the World Bank World Development

Indicators (WDI) and the IMF International Financial Statistics. A more detailed description of

the data is available in the appendix.

Industrialized countries are defined as those with 1997 per-capita income above

$10,000.3 Twenty-five countries fall into this category.4 These countries accounted for nearly

80 percent of world trade in the 1990s. We then examine the CA-GDP ratio for each country

from 1980 to 1997. In order for a country to have an episode that qualifies as a reversal, four

criteria (similar to those in Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 1998) must be met. They are:

i. The current account deficit exceeded two percent of GDP before the reversal.

ii. The average deficit was reduced by at least two percent of GDP over three years (from the

minimum to the three year average). 

iii. The maximum deficit in the five years after the reversal was not larger than the minimum

deficit in the three years before the reversal. 

iv. The current account was reduced by at least one third.

The first restriction ensures that we examine only episodes of adjustment from a current account

deficit. The second and third ensure that there was a sustained improvement in the current

account. And the final ensures that a small improvement in a very large deficit will not count as

an adjustment. 
8

 Among these twenty-five countries we identify twenty-five episodes of current account

reversal. Table 1 lists the episodes, it reports the year that the CA-GDP ratio was minimized, its

value that year, and its value three years later. The magnitude of the deficit-GDP ratio that the

country had before adjusting varies from -2.2 percent in France to -16.8 percent in Portugal. 

After three years, most of the countries show a nearly complete reversal.

Figure 1 plots the median and average CA-GDP ratio for all of the countries. The typical

CA-GDP pattern shows a current account that continued to worsen for 4 to 5 years before it hit

its minimum and then began adjusting, taking another 3 to 4 years to return to near zero.

The exchange rate

Figure 2 shows the median and average annual percentage change in the real effective

exchange rate index, and Table 2 reports summary statistics on exchange rate depreciation. Both

the figure and the summary statistics suggest that the average real depreciation associated with

current account adjustment might be small, of about 1 or 2 percent annually. However, these

statistics conceal many sharp depreciations that occurred at different times in different countries. 

The extent of depreciation varies significantly across countries, and in many cases exceeds 10

percent in one year of their adjustment.

Table 3 reports the timing and the extent of depreciation that each country experienced in

conjunction with the current account adjustment. In the typical case, the real depreciation began

one year before the current account hit its trough and continued depreciating for three years, with

an overall real depreciation of about 20 percent. This implies that there was a significant J-curve

effect of the depreciation on the trade deficit; the initial depreciation had little impact on real
5 See Edison (2000) for a detailed discussion of various indicators of currency crises, and the

advantages and disadvantages of each one. 

9

trade and therefore the nominal trade balance worsened. This effect is particularly pronounced in

the United States, where the real exchange rate depreciated by 27 percent as the current account

continued to worsen (from 1985-1987). 

Not surprisingly, the nominal depreciation was in general substantially greater than the

real depreciation (Table 3). This suggests that in most countries the adjustment process involved

relatively high inflation.

One question this raises is whether currency crisis are more likely to occur around current

account reversals or whether they might help to predict current account reversals? To answer

this question, we calculate the Frankel and Rose (1996) indicator of currency crises for each

country, using monthly data on the local currency -SDR exchange rate from the IMF IFS. Their

definition is that a crisis has taken place if the nominal exchange rate depreciated by at least 25

percent over the last year, and by at least 10 percent more than in the previous year.5 We further

assume that if a country has a crisis in one month it cannot have another crisis over the next six

months. This ensures that consecutive months will not be identified as new crises. 

Exchange rate regimes and the Frankel and Rose crisis dates are reported in Table 4. 

From 1980 to 1995, we identify 21 currency crises, which occurred in 10 of the 25 industrialized

countries. All four of the industrialized countries that did not have a current account deficit

episode, also did not have currency crises. Of these 21 crises, 17 occurred within two years of a

current account episode. However, only 4 crises took place before the current account reversed.
10

This suggests that crises are more likely to occur in countries recovering from large current

account deficits, but that they do not help predict current account reversals. 

Domestic income growth

Figure 3 shows the average and median real income growth for the twenty-five episodes,

centered around the time the deficit bottomed out. Income growth peaks about two years before

the deficit reaches its trough, and is lowest in the first year of recovery. About four-to-five years

after the deficit is minimized, income growth returns to its pre-deficit level. This provides

evidence that the behavior of the current account is largely cyclical in industrialized countries. 

Strong income growth leads to a declining current account, and as demand slows the current

improves.

In the typical case, annual real income growth was over 3 percent in the years before the

current account hit its trough, and then slowed to about 1 percent in the first year that the current

account improved (Table 2 and Figure 3). In most countries, income growth was slower in the

year after the deficit bottomed out than it had been four years earlier. 

In Section 4, we examine whether income growth and exchange rate depreciation are

significantly different from their long-run averages during adjustment. 

Interest Rates

Figure 4 shows median and average short-term interest rates, defined as the overnight

interbank rate, over the reversal period, and Table 2 reports summary statistics. In most of the

countries, short term interest rates were elevated as the current account bottomed out. In the
11

typical case, interest rates increased by about 2 percentage points in the final three years the

current account deteriorated, and then came down by about 3 percentage points in the first three

years the current account reversed. 

This hump-shaped short-rate path suggests that interest rates were largely driven by real

growth and provides further evidence that much of the behavior of the current account is cyclical. 

The path is also consistent with monetary authorities attempting to support the exchange rate

during its initial decline%before the recovery in the current account began. Recall, that in most

episodes the exchange rate depreciation began before the current account bottomed out.

Table 2 also shows the summary statistics for real interest rates (the deposit rate less the

rate of inflation). Real interest rates lagged short rates and in the typical case did not come down

until the third year into recovery. 

Twin Deficits?

Many of the countries had a general government budget deficit in the year the current

account deficit bottomed out. A budget deficit could worsen the international balance because

of the impact of higher government spending on aggregate demand. As shown in Figure 5, the

deterioration in the current account, however, was not in general associated with an expansion in

the budget deficit. This suggests that while the budget deficit in many of these countries may

have contributed to the current account deficit, it was not responsible for the deterioration in the

current account. There is some evidence that a few years into recovery some fiscal consolidation

took place. 
12

The bottom of Table 2 provides summary statistics on the budget deficit. In the typical

case, there was little change in the budget deficit in the three years leading up to the recovery. 

However, as growth slowed during the recovery of the current account, most countries

experienced growth in the budget deficit-GDP ratio. 

The Trade Balance 

For nearly all countries the trade balance was a large contributor to the current account

deficit, and with the exception of Canada’s 1993 episode, the current account recovery was

assisted by a trade balance improvement. 

As shown in Figure 6, in the typical case, the trade balance was -2 percent of GDP, when

the current account bottomed out. In the previous three years, the trade balance worsened by

about 1 to 2 percent of GDP; and in the following three years, the trade balanced improved by

about 4 percent of GDP. In the first two years, the recovery was assisted by a decline in the

import-GDP ratio as real import growth slowed sharply (see the summary statistics of trade in

Table 5). But, the surge in real export growth in the second and third year of recovery was

responsible for most of the improvement in the trade balance over the adjustment period (Table 5

and Figures 6-8). Nearly all of the episodes involve an increase in the export-GDP ratio over the

first three years of their recovery, while only about half of the countries have a declining importGDP ratio.
6

 Data on the NIIP was not available for the following episodes: Denmark, France, Greece, Hong

Kong, Ireland, Israel, Korea, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, and Sweden.

13

Savings and Investment

In most countries, the current account decline seems to be associated more with a decline

in national savings than with an increase in investment. This supports the view that in most

countries the current account deficit was largely demand driven. In contrast, the improvement in

the current account comes primarily through reduced investment. 

Figures 9 and 10 show the savings-GDP ratio and the investment-GDP ratio and Table 6

shows summary statistics on the change in the saving rate and the investment rate in the three

years before and after the current account bottomed out. In the typical case, the saving-GDP

ratio fell by about 2 percentage points in the three years preceding the deficit minimum and there

was little change in investment. In the next three years of adjustment, the investment-GDP ratio

fell by about 4 percent of GDP and there was little change in savings. Nearly all of the countries

in the sample had reduced investment in the first two years that the current account improved;

only about half of the countries had increased savings.

The Net International Investment Position

In most of these countries, the net international investment position (NIIP) was declining

as the current account worsened. Figure 11 shows the median and average of the NIIP.6

 Table 6

shows the change in the NIIP in the previous three years and in the following three years. Of

fourteen countries for which data is available, ten had a negative NIIP-GDP ratio when the

current account deficit hit its trough. In only two of the episodes (Canada 1981 and Italy 1992),
7 Mann (1999) examines the financing of large current account deficits in a handful of industrial

countries and concludes that there does appear to be a critical value of the NIIP-GDP ratio that triggers a

current account reversal (p. 157).

8

 These are Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, and Switzerland.

14

was the reversal of the current account associated with a reversal in the NIIP, so that is not a

necessary condition for adjustment.7 Still, in most of the episodes the reversal was associated

with some leveling off of the NIIP a couple of years after the current account bottomed out

(Figure 11). 

4. Some Quantifications on Income Growth and the Exchange Rate

In this section, we examine whether income growth and exchange rate movements are

significantly different from their long-run averages. We use data on all industrialized countries,

including four that did not experience current account reversals from 1970-1997 in order to more

accurately estimate overall macro trends.8

 We estimate the following simple regression equation: 

(1) , vit i t s it =+++ αγ βε

where vit is income growth (exchange rate depreciation) in country i at time t, "i is a countryspecific fixed effect, (t

 is a fixed affect for the calendar year, and $s is a fixed effect for the year

calibrated relative to the current account trough, and ,it is an error term which is assumed to be

iid. Thus, $0 is the partial correlation between income growth (exchange rate depreciation) and

the year that the current account bottomed out. The (s are partial correlations between income

growth and the calendar years. For example, (1980 is the effect of the year 1980 on income

growth. The (s will control for worldwide macro variables that might affect income growth (the
9

 We also include a lag dependent variable to control for possible autocorrelation, and the results

were qualitatively unchanged (not reported). 

10 In this specification, we exclude the four countries that did not have current account reversals.

15

exchange rate) among industrialized countries in a particular year, such as oil prices or other

global shocks. 

The regressions were estimated using OLS, with a correction for heteroskedasticity.9

 For

income growth, we test whether each $s

, from $-3 through $3, is significantly different from the

average of the time effects ($s) over the period. The results are reported in the first column of

Table 7. The results show that income growth is below average for four years and is

significantly lower than average for two years, by about 1 to 2 percent, during the recovery.

Next, the regression was run with the change in the real exchange rate as the dependant

variable.10 The results are reported in the second column of Table 7. These results should be

interpreted with caution because of the poor fit of this specification. Still, the results suggest that

significant depreciation occurs in the first year of recovery and that all of the $s are below

average around the current account recovery. We also test whether the sum of the $s, from three

years before the current account bottomed out to the third year of recovery, is significantly

different from the seven-year average (column 2). The results are reported in the bottom row of

Table 7. They suggest that the current account recovery is associated with a significant real

depreciation of about 10 percent over this period. This confirms our earlier results that slowing

income growth and a real depreciation are a significant part of the current account reversal. 
16

6. Alternative Theories of Adjustment

While current account adjustment typically involves a real depreciation and a slowdown

in GDP growth, there is some idiosyncratic noise that sometimes exaggerates and sometimes

mutes the typical story. In particular, a few exceptions to the typical case exist, proving that in

some cases adjustment can occur without an exchange rate depreciation and/or a slowdown in

GDP growth. Specifically, the current account reversals in Canada, Denmark, and Norway were

accomplished without a real or a nominal depreciation, and in Singapore the reversal took place

with neither a depreciation nor a slowdown in GDP growth. Each of these is to some extent a

special case, but it is still interesting to examine how adjustment occurred.

In Canada, the effective exchange rate indices are somewhat misleading because they

conceal a large depreciation of the Canadian dollar with respect to the U.S. dollar. From 1976 to

1986 the Canadian dollar depreciated by 34 percent against the U.S. dollar, about half of which

took place as the current account improved. Since the Canadian adjustment took place primarily

vis-a-vis the United States, Canada’s episode remains broadly consistent with traditional theory.

In Norway, the current account deficit was the result of an oil price shock. The price of

oil fell by nearly 50 percent in 1986 from its level in the previous year. The sharp decline in the

oil price reduced the value of Norwegian exports and the current account moved from a surplus

of about 5 percent to a deficit of 5 percent in one year. As oil prices rebounded over the next few

years, the current account recovered.

The Danish and Singaporean experiences are more interesting. As a member of the

European Monetary System, Denmark was required to keep the spot exchange rates between the

Krone and the currencies of the other participants within margins of 2.25 percent. The Krone
17

was under pressure to fall below its exchange band in 1987, but the central bank used the

overnight interest rate to defend the currency. The Danish Central Bank reports that "when the

foreign exchange crisis peaked in January 1987 the short-term interest rate was raised from 9.25

percent to 14 percent per annum" (Jespersen 1987). The decline in capital inflows in conjunction

with the monetary tightening reduced domestic demand sufficiently that the current account

improved while the exchange rate remained unchanged. Walter (1991) notes a similar pattern of

current account adjustment in Germany (Denmark’s largest trade partner). Germany’s current

account has fluctuated widely with respect to its western European neighbors, while Germany

maintained a fixed exchange rate. This suggests that some European countries may be

sufficiently well-integrated that they can adjust with only small changes in short rates, while

exchange rates remain fixed. 

Singapore is perhaps the most interesting exception, experiencing neither an exchange

rate depreciation nor a slowdown in GDP growth as the current account improved. Adjustment

in Singapore is qualitatively consistent with the intertemporal story; the current account was in

deficit because Singapore’s net income was expected to grow relative to other countries, which is

in fact what happened. Singapore was an international borrower in the late 1970's and imported

primarily capital goods, the investment paid off, and in the period following the reversal

Singapore experienced the strongest growth of all the countries in the sample. 

5. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to provide a brief characterization of the process of current

account adjustment in industrialized countries. A typical adjustment occurs after the current
18

account deficit has grown for about four years and reaches about 5 percent of GDP. The results

from previous episodes suggest that reversals involve a real depreciation of 10 to 20 percent and

slow real income growth for a period of about three years. Real export growth, declining

investment, and an eventual leveling off in the net international investment position and in the

budget deficit-GDP ratio are also likely to be part of the adjustment. 
19

References

Cashin P. and C.J. McDermott (1998), "Are Australia’s Current Account Deficits Excessive?"

Economic Record, December 1, 1998, v. 74, iss. 227, pp. 346-61

Chinn, M and E. Prasad (2000), "Medium-Term Determinants of Current Accounts in Industrial

and Developing Countries: An Empirical Exploration." NBER Working Paper #7581.

Debelle, G. and H. Faruqee (1996), "What Determines the Current Account? A Cross-Sectional

and Panel Approach" International Monetary Fund Working Paper: WP/96/58.

Edison, H. (2000), "Do Indicators of Financial Crises Really Work: An Evaluation of an Early

Warning System" International Finance Discussion Paper #675, Federal Reserve Board,

Washington D.C.

Frankel, J. and A. Rose (1996), "Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An Empirical

Treatment" Journal of International Economics 41, November, 351-66. 

International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange

Restrictions, Various issues 1980-1997.

Jespersen, J. (1988), "Monetary Policy in 1987" in Danmarks Nationalbank Monetary Review

May, p. 6-9.

Mann, C. (1999), Is the U.S. Trade Deficit Sustainable? Institute for International Economics:

Washington D.C. 

Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. and A. Razin (1998), "Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises:

Empirical Regularities" NBER working paper #6620.

Sachs, J. (1981), "The Current Account and Macroeconomic Adjustment in the 1970s"

Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.

Walter, N. (1991), "German External Adjustment Since 1985" In Fred Bergsten Ed.,

International Adjustment and Financing: the Lessons of 1985-1991, Institute for International

Economics: Washington D.C., pp. 155-177.

 

 
20

Data Appendix

The current account balance relative to GDP, real GDP in local currency units, the government

budget balance as a share of GDP, gross domestic savings and gross domestic investment as a

share of GDP, exports and imports as a share of GDP, real exports, real imports, and the real

interest rate are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. 

The real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange rate adjusted for changes in

consumer prices and is from the IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS). The money market

rate and the nominal market SDR exchange rate are also from the IMF, IFS. 

The net international investment position and the capital flow data are from the IMF, Balance of

Payments Statistics.
21

Table 1: 25 Episodes of Current Account Adjustment

Country (year) CA-GDP Ratio Percent change over

three years Year = 0 Year=3

Australia (1989) -6.20 -3.74 40

Austria (1980) -4.92 0.40 108

Belgium (1981) -4.23 -0.07 98

Canada (1981) -4.21 -0.40 91

Canada (1993) -3.94 0.56 114

Denmark (1986) -5.33 -1.04 81

Finland (1991) -5.52 1.30 124

France (1982) -2.18 -0.01 100

Greece (1985) -8.09 -1.48 82

Hong Kong (1980) -5.03 0.57 111

Ireland (1981) -13.63 -5.59 59

Israel (1982) -8.66 4.79 155

Italy (1981) -2.58 -0.78 70

Italy (1992) -2.47 2.31 194

Korea (1980) -8.46 -1.84 78

New Zealand (1984) -13.59 -8.00 41

Norway (1986) -6.02 0.21 104

Portugal (1981) -16.78 -2.83 83

Singapore (1980) -13.34 -3.51 74

Spain (1981) -2.88 1.11 139

Spain (1981) -3.75 -1.43 62

Sweden (1980) -3.45 -0.78 77

Sweden (1992) -3.56 2.14 160

United Kingdom (1989) -4.36 -1.75 60

United States (1987) -3.72 -1.65 56

Median -4.92 -0.78 83

Mean -6.28 -0.86 94
22

Table 2: Summary Statistics, Macro Fundamentals

Year Relative to Deficit Minimum

Real Exchange Rate

Ap(+)/Depreciation(-)

-2 -1 0 1 2 3

Median (percent) 2.07 -1.45 -0.97 -0.41 -1.15 -0.42

Mean (percent) -1.37 -2.48 -1.08 -2.33 -2.15 -0.74

No. appreciatinga 13 10 10 9 10 9

No. depreciatinga 8 12 13 14 13 13

Real GDP Growth

Median (percent) 4.00 3.92 2.29 0.78 1.16 2.54

Mean (percent) 3.84 4.00 2.13 1.62 1.37 2.90

No. increasing 24 24 20 19 17 23

No. decreasing 1 1 5 6 8 2

Change in Short Rates from previous year

Median (percentage points) 0.37 0.25 1.12 0.53 -1.68 -1.66

Mean (percentage points) -0.01 0.59 1.18 -0.21 -1.27 -1.58

No. increasinga 12 11 13 14 5 6

No. decreasinga 9 10 9 8 17 16

Change in Real Interest Rates from previous year

Median (percentage points) 0.48 -0.07 -0.70 0.57 0.84 -0.63

Mean (percentage points) 0.92 0.52 0.80 0.59 3.96 -1.15

No. increasinga 11 10 10 15 14 7

No. decreasinga 9 11 11 7 8 15

Change in Budget Balance from previous year

Median (percentage points) -0.12 -0.57 -0.37 -0.30 0.10 -0.59

Mean (percentage points) 0.53 -0.86 -0.40 -1.22 0.41 0.57

No. increasinga 11 10 7 10 12 7

No. decreasinga 13 14 17 14 12 16

a. The total number of observations varies by year because of missing data.
23

Table 3: The Exchange Rate

Real Nominal

Depreciation Begana Endedb Duration Depreciation Begana Endedb Duration

Australia89 21 1 5 4 25 0 5 5

Austria80 19 -1 2 3 28 0 5 5

Belgium81 51 -3 4 7 51 -1 4 5

Canada81 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Canada93 19 -1 3 4 30 -3 2 5

Denmark86 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --

Finland91 30 -1 2 3 43 0 3 3

France82 15 -1 3 4 57 -2 3 5

Greece85 21 -2 2 4 94c -2 4 6

Hong Kong80 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 41 -3 4 7

Ireland81 41 -2 1 3 48 -3 4 7

Israel82 14 2 6 4 700c -3 6 9

Italy81 12 -1 1 2 58 -1 4 5

Italy92 28 0 4 4 39 -1 3 4

Korea80 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 40 -3 1 4

New Zealand84 11 -1 1 2 57 -3 3 6

Norway86 5 -3 1 4 8 0 1 1

Portugal81 8 1 3 2 90c 044

Singapore80 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -- -- -- --

Spain81 36 -1 3 4 67 -1 4 5

Spain91 17 1 4 3 35 0 3 3

Sweden80 20 1 4 3 48 0 5 5

Sweden92 21 1 4 3 37 0 2 2

United

Kingdom89

15 3 5 2 10 0 1 1

United States87 34 -1 2 3 37 -2 1 3

Median 19 -1 3 3 42 -1 3.5 5

Notes: n.a. not available. -- no exchange rate depreciation around the time of the deficit. a. The first year that the exchange rate

depreciated relative to the previous year. b. The first year the exchange appreciated relative to the previous year, following the

period of depreciation. c. The currency was depreciating throughout the period, but by relatively more in these years.
24

Table 4: Currency Crises

CA/GDP (year) Exchange Regimea Currency Crises Dates

Australia -6.20 (1989) Independent floating April 1985

November 1985

July 1986

Austria -4.92 (1980) Cooperative arrangement No

Belgium -4.23 (1981) Cooperative arrangement No

Canada -4.21 (1981)

-3.94 (1993)

Independent floating No

Denmark -5.33 (1986) Cooperative arrangement No

Finland -5.52 (1991) Cooperative arrangement February 1993

France -2.18 (1982) Cooperative arrangement No

Greece -8.09 (1985) Managed floating January 1983

November 1983

Hong Kong -5.03 (1980) Pegged No

Ireland -13.63 (1981) Cooperative arrangement No

Israel -8.66 (1982) Managed floating June 1980

March 1981

October 1983

May 1984

December 1984

Italy -2.58 (1981)

-2.47 (1992)

Cooperative arrangement February 1993

Korea -8.46 (1980) Managed floating August 1980

New Zealand -13.59 (1984) Independent floating (as of 12/84)

Managed floating

January 1985

Norway -6.02 (1986) Managed floating None

Portugal -16.78 (1981) Cooperative arrangement October 1982

May 1983

July 1993

Singapore -13.34 (1980) Managed floating None

Spain -2.88 (1981)

-3.75 (1991)

Cooperative arrangement July 1983

May 1993

Sweden -3.45 (1980)

-3.56 (1992)

Independent floating (as of 11/92)

Managed floating

February 1993

September 1993

United Kingdom -4.36 (1989) Independent floating (as of 9/92)

Cooperative agreement 

None

United States -3.72 (1987) Independent floating None

Germany None Cooperative arrangement None

Japan None Independent floating None

Netherlands None Cooperative arrangement None

Switzerland None Independent floating None

a. IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, various issues. Currency crises are defined using a modified Frankel and Rose

(1996) index. 
25

Table 5: Summary Statistics, Trade

Year Relative to Deficit Minimum

Change in Trade BalanceGDP from previous year-2 -1 0 1 2 3

Median (percentage points) -0.46 -0.45 -0.74 1.51 1.67 0.89

Mean (percentage points) -0.40 -0.70 -1.17 1.66 1.82 1.21

No. increasing 8 10 7 24 23 21

No. decreasing 19 15 18 1 2 4

Change Import-GDP ratio from previous year

Median (percentage points) 0.57 0.79 0.72 -0.79 -0.13 0.99

Mean (percentage points) 0.98 1.63 1.91 -0.88 -1.08 0.51

No. increasing 17 17 19 10 12 18

No. decreasing 8 8 6 15 13 7

Change Export-GDP ratio from previous year 

Median (percentage points) 0.28 -0.03 0.07 0.61 1.47 2.24

Mean (percentage points) 0.58 0.93 0.74 0.77 0.74 1.71

No. increasing 14 12 13 17 17 20

No. decreasing 11 13 12 8 8 5

Real Import growth

Median (percent) 7.85 6.43 5.15 1.09 2.01 6.38

Mean (percent) 7.61 6.36 4.78 0.49 2.08 6.64

No. increasing 23 20 20 15 16 22

No. decreasing 2 5 5 10 9 3

Real Export growth

Median (percent) 6.27 3.61 4.58 4.95 7.49 8.58

Mean (percent) 6.74 4.89 4.42 6.44 7.44 9.32

No. increasing 25 23 20 23 23 25

No. decreasing 0 2 5 2 2 0
26

Table 6: Summary Statistics, Financial Flows

Change from previous

year in

Year Relative to Deficit Minimum

Savings/GDP -2 -1 0 1 2 3

Median (percentage points) 0.47 -0.46 -0.61 -0.30 0.34 0.91

Mean (percentage points) 0.13 -0.43 -1.01 -0.04 0.15 0.61

No. increasing 13 8 9 11 15 16

No. decreasing 12 17 16 14 10 9

Investment /GDP

Median (percentage points) 0.61 0.26 0.53 -1.77 -1.56 -0.10

Mean (percentage points) 0.53 0.27 0.16 -1.70 -1.66 -0.59

No. increasing 15 14 14 3 5 11

No. decreasing 10 11 11 22 20 14

NIIP/GDP

Median (percentage points) -2.07 -0.42 -2.49 -3.19 -0.24 1.54

Mean (percentage points) -3.89 -1.10 -1.05 -3.80 -0.27 1.16

No. increasinga 2 3 2 4 79

No. decreasinga 10 9 10 10 8 6

a. The total number of observations varies by year because of missing data. 
27

Table 7: Panel Estimation for Income Growth and Exchange Rate Depreciation

Test of the hypothesis that $s

=Mean($s)

Income Growth

(1)

Exchange Rate Depreciation 

(2)

s = -3 0.71 

(1.70)

-0.78 

(-0.57)

s = -2 0.32 

(0.81)

-0.56 

(-0.25)

s = -1 0.69* 

(2.02)

-1.49 

(-0.86)

s = 0 -0.54 

(-0.94)

-0.95 

(-0.75)

s = 1 -1.15*

(-2.95)

-3.28* 

(-2.29)

s = 2 -1.58*

(-4.04)

-1.93 

(-1.50)

s = 3 -0.56 

(-1.38)

-0.68 

(-0.55)

Test of hypothesis that the sum of $-3

through $3 is equal to the sum of means.

-9.67* 

(-2.81)

No. of Observations 575 425

R-Squared 0.59 0.13

Note: All regressions include country fixed effects, calendar-year fixed effects, and year-relative-to-currentaccount-trough fixed effects. The regressions were run with a correction for heteroskedasticity (White 1980). Tstatistics in parentheses. * Significant at the five percent level.
-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 1: Current Account/GDP

Percent 

-4

-2

0

2

4

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 2: Real Depreciation 

Percent 

0

1

2

3

4

5

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 3: Real GDP Growth

Percent 
6

8

10

12

14

16

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 4: Money Market Rates

Percent 

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 5: Budget Balance / GDP

Percent 
-6

-4

-2

0

2

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 6: Net Exports / GDP

Percent 

25

30

35

40

45

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 7: Imports / GDP 

Percent 

25

30

35

40

45

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 8: Exports / GDP

Percent 
18

20

22

24

26

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 9: Saving / GDP

Percent 

18

20

22

24

26

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median

Average

 Figure 10: Investment / GDP 

Percent 

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

Year relative to current account trough

Median (full sample)

Median (balanced sample)

Average

 Figure 11: Net International Investment Position

Percent