UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

MARY JO JASKIEWICZ, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-10265 

v. Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

ST. MARY’S OF MICHIGAN, 

 Defendant. 

_______________________________________/ 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING 

COUNT I OF COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE, AND DISMISSING COUNT II OF 

COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

 Plaintiff Mary Jo Jaskiewicz filed suit against her former employer, Defendant St. Mary’s 

of Michigan, alleging that they terminated her in violation of the federal Family and Medical 

Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601ff, and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, 

Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101ff. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. Jaskiewicz suffered a permanent and 

debilitating back injury that forced her to take FMLA leave and employer-provided leave. 

During that time, because she was unable to return to her former nursing position, she applied for 

other positions within St. Mary’s hospital. According to Jaskiewicz, St. Mary’s failed to hire her 

for two positions she applied for and for which she was qualified. She claims that St. Mary’s 

refusal to hire her constitutes retaliation for taking FMLA leave and discrimination based on the 

fact that she is disabled. 

 St. Mary’s has moved for summary judgment on both of Jaskiewicz’s claims. It argues 

that she is unable to establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation and cannot demonstrate 

that she was discriminated against on the basis of her disability or that St. Mary’s failed to 

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accommodate her disability. Jaskiewicz cannot establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation 

because the adverse employment actions she suffered are too attenuated from her FMLA leave. 

As a result, her FMLA claim must be dismissed. St. Mary’s motion for summary judgment will 

be granted in part. Jaskiewicz’s state law claim of disability discrimination, although more 

facially meritorious than her FMLA claim, will be dismissed without prejudice to it being 

pursued in state court. 

I. 

 Mary Jo Jaskiewicz is a resident of Bay County, Michigan. She worked as a registered 

nurse with Defendant St. Mary’s for more than thirty years. Defendant St. Mary’s is a domestic 

nonprofit corporation that operates a hospital in Saginaw, Michigan. 

A. 

 Jaskiewicz began working for St. Mary’s on June 7, 1982. Shortly before taking leave, 

Jaskiewicz worked on 4 North, the name used to describe a specific ward in the hospital. 

Jaskiewicz initially started on this floor with St. Mary’s. But over the years, as units have moved 

within the hospital she worked temporarily with other units on other floors. She began her most 

recent assignment on 4 North on June 11, 2012. 

 While assigned to 4 North, Jaskiewicz worked primarily with oncology patients. The job 

description for Jaskiewicz position contains three “working conditions/physical requirements.” 

They are: 

 Contact with patients under a wide variety of circumstances including but 

not limited to exposure to the risk of bloodborne diseases and to 

unpleasant elements such as serious accidents, injuries and illnesses; 

subject to unpredictable, emergent, or crises situations; occasionally 

subject to irregular hours; and the pressure associated with answering 

multiple patient/physician calls and inquiries. 

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 Extensive standing and walking; lifts, positions, pushes and/or transfers 

patients; carriers and transports equipment and supplies; and considerable 

reaching, stooping bending, kneeling, and crouching. 

 May require irregular work hours. 

Ex. 3 (sic throughout), Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 14-4. Nurses in Jaskiewicz’s unit worked twelve 

hour shifts for the whole time she was assigned to that unit. Jaskiewicz’s shift lasted from 7 p.m. 

to 7 a.m. There were roughly three to four other registered nurses on the night shifts with 

Jaskiewicz. Each of those nurses was assigned roughly five to six patients each, depending on 

the number of admitted patients. 

B. 

 Jaskiewicz hurt her back while at work in January of 2011. She suffered a disc herniation. 

For two weeks, she worked with restrictions that included a limitation on lifting. During that 

period, Jaskiewicz did not do any patient lifting. At the end of the two week period, she 

continued working without restriction. 

 Jaskiewicz reinjured her back when lifting a box at home on April 10, 2013. She saw a 

doctor the next day. Her doctor provided an off-work note that stated Jaskiewicz was “to be off 

work next week 4-15-13 through 4-19-13.” Ex. 4, Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 14-5. Jaskiewicz’s doctor 

went on to explain that she “may return to work 4-20-13 with 20 lb weight restriction X 2 

weeks.” Id. (sic throughout). Jaskiewicz’s supervisor received the doctor’s note on April 22, 

2013. Jaskiewicz and her supervisor also spoke that day and Jaskiewicz was informed that the 

decision of whether Jaskiewicz’s restrictions could be accommodated would be made at the 

corporate level. 

 On April 24, 2013, Jaskiewicz and her supervisor spoke again. Jaskiewicz’s supervisor 

told her that the hospital could not accommodate Jaskiewicz’s restrictions. Her supervisor 

advised her that because of her restrictions and St. Mary’s inability to accommodate them, 

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Jaskiewicz would need to take a leave of absence. Jaskiewicz’s supervisor put her in touch with 

HR, which provided Jaskiewicz with FMLA documentation. 

C. 

 Jaskiewicz’s physician completed an FMLA Certification of Health Care Provider form 

on April 29, 2013. The form stated that Jaskiewicz was unable to perform the transfer of patients 

and unable to lift more than twenty pounds. Following the filing of the physician’s certification, 

Jaskiewicz went on FMLA leave. Her leave lasted the statutory maximum twelve weeks. Near 

the end of her twelve weeks of FMLA leave her restrictions remained in place and she was 

unable to return to work. Her treating physician advised her that because of her ongoing 

restrictions she may need to explore new job opportunities that do not involve lifting. Her FMLA 

leave ended on July 4, 2013. 

Since Jaskiewicz could not return to work after her FMLA leave, she needed to begin 

taking personal leave. She submitted a leave request on July 11, 2013. St. Mary’s approved her 

request on July 15, 2013. 

Jaskiewicz visited her physician again in October of 2013 and once again her restrictions 

were continued and she was advised to seek alternative employment. Her physician also 

provided medical information on Jaskiewicz’s condition to St. Mary’s long term disability 

insurance provider. That information included a representation that Jaskiewicz was “totally 

disabled” and listed a series of restrictions which included not moving more than twenty pounds 

and only being capable of performing an office job for eight hours per day. 

After her physician imposed these restrictions, Jaskiewicz contacted St. Mary’s and 

informed them of her restrictions. She sought the possibility of returning to work on reduced 

hours to accommodate her restrictions. St. Mary’s human resources representative informed 

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Jaskiewicz that she should look for other open positions at St. Mary’s because her former 

position require twelve hour shifts. The next day, Jaskiewicz applied for a new job. 

D. 

 Jaskiewicz first applied for the position of Performance Improvement Specialist. She 

filed the application on November 14, 2013. The position posting contained the following job 

description and requirements: 

RN/BSN preferred. Reports to the Director of Quality Management and is 

responsible for coordinating the activities of the Performance Improvement 

program at St. Mary’s of Michigan to facilitate achieving the goals and objectives 

of the Hospital-Wide Performance Improvement Committee. Organizes and 

presents summaries of hospital wide Performance Improvement initiatives, 

activities, and results to the Hospital-Wide Performance Improvement Committee. 

This is a non-patient care position, but may have contact with persons of all age 

groups. Current licensure as Registered Nurse in Michigan. CPHQ desirable. 5 

years of progressive clinical experience. 2 or more years in management. 

Ex. L, Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 12-13. Jaskiewicz believed she was qualified for the 

position. She wrote on her application that she has “been off work since April 2013 for medical 

reasons.” Ex. 14, Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 14-15. She noted that she “[n]ow require[s] an 8 hour 

position which does not require direct patient care, as per advise [sic] of physician.” Id. 

Jaskiewicz did not receive an interview. 

 Jaskiewicz visited human resources on December 2, 2013 to provide St. Mary’s with a 

note from her physician that stated Jaskiewicz was able to return to work on December 3, 2013. 

The return-to-work note retained her eight-hour workday restriction and her twenty-pound lifting 

restriction. While at human resources she discussed the Performance Improvement Specialist 

position she had applied for. During that discussion she was advised “to go ahead with other 

applications.” Pl.’s Resp. Br. 9, ECF No. 14. 

 Jaskiewicz reviewed additional online job postings as a result of this advice and noticed 

that the posting for the Performance Improvement Specialist position had been removed. 

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Jaskiewicz called human resources and spoke with a secretary about the removal of the 

Performance Improvement Specialist posting. The secretary informed Jaskiewicz that the posting 

was removed because St. Mary’s decided it would select someone from the position out of those 

who had already applied. Jaskiewicz heard nothing about the position until she again contacted 

human resources and learned that the position had been filled. The position was filled with a 

qualified applicant but Jaskiewicz believes the applicant chosen had less experience than her. St. 

Mary’s hiring manager, who made the hiring decision for the Performance Improvement 

Specialist position, testified that Jaskiewicz was not, despite her belief, actually qualified for the 

position. That is because Jaskiewicz did not have the requisite progressive clinical experience, 

which required having had a permanent assignment to critical care, intensive care, or surgical 

units. Jaskiewicz was only ever assigned to such units as temporary coverage. To the contrary, 

the nurse selected for the position had ten years of experience in such units. 

E. 

 Jaskiewicz’s next application for another position with St. Mary’s came on July 12, 2014, 

over one year after her FMLA leave had ended. She applied for the position of Physician Office 

Nurse in the Medical Oncology Department. On her application Jaskiewicz wrote under “Reason 

for Transfer Request” that she has “been on Medical Leave of Absence/Unable to return to my 

former job position/Seeking alternate employment.” Ex. 18, Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 14-19. The 

posting for the position did not list a schedule of working hours per day required of employees in 

the position. Jaskiewicz did not receive an interview for the position. 

 On August 7, 2014, Jaskiewicz reached out to human resources and again spoke with the 

same secretary she had previously. The secretary told Jaskiewicz that the Physician Office Nurse 

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position had been filled internally.1

 Jaskiewicz called the secretary back on August 11, 2014 and 

asked why she did not receive an interview. The secretary referred Jaskiewicz to Ashlee 

Adelberg, a human resources consultant that screened applicants for the Physician Office Nurse 

position. Ms. Adelberg explained that she did not select Jaskiewicz for an interview because of 

the significant difference in pay between Jaskiewicz last position as an RN on 4 North and the 

Physician Office Nurse position. In her experience, Ms. Adelberg told Jaskiewicz, nurses 

applying for positions with significant reductions in pay, like the reduction Jaskiewicz would 

have experienced, often withdraw from consideration once they are aware of the pay difference. 

 In her deposition, Ms. Adelberg detailed her applicant screening process. She stated that 

her first step is to take a look at the current rate of pay for internal transfers relative to the 

position they have applied for. If the internal transfer “had been at the high level of the R.N. 

[pay] scale” she would not forward his or her application to the hiring manager. Ex. N 12, Def.’s 

Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 12-15. It was her experience that “with these types of positions . . . 

we’ll go through applications, we’ll do interviews, the manager will, and make offers to R.N. 

candidates who are at [the higher end of the pay scale], and they won’t accept based on the pay 

rate difference.” Id. Ms. Adelberg testified that she cannot recall whether she read Jaskiewicz’s 

application or just proceeded to eliminate her based on her prior pay. She did state that it was 

normally not her practice to read through an entire application before screening an internal 

applicant based upon their pay rate. Jaskiewicz’s explanation that she was applying for the 

position because she needed a job since she had been off work was on the first page of her 

application.2

 She would have taken an hourly pay cut of over $10.00 per hour were she to accept 

 1

 Jaskiewicz would also be considered an internal candidate for the position, despite being on leave. 

2

 It continued onto the second page. 

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the Physician Office Nurse position. The nurse hired to fill the position took an hourly pay cut of 

$1.20 per hour. 

F. 

 On August 12, 2014, one day after Jaskiewicz spoke with Ms. Adelberg, St. Mary’s 

issued her a letter stating that her leave had been exhausted and that, as a result, her employment 

was terminated. St. Mary’s provides for leaves of absence up to one year. Jaskiewicz’s one year 

of leave had expired. 

 Jaskiewicz filed her complaint on January 22, 2015. 

II. 

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the “movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The focus must be “whether the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must 

prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). The 

moving party has the initial burden of identifying where to look in the record for evidence 

“which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must set 

out specific facts showing “a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 250 (1986) (citation omitted). 

The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant and determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 

Id. at 251-52, see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 

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(1986). “Entry of summary judgment is appropriate ‘against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d 481, 485 (6th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). 

III. 

The Sixth Circuit has recognized two discrete theories of recovery under the FMLA: (1) 

the “interference” theory arising under § 2615(a)(1), and (2) the “retaliation” theory arising from 

§ 2615(a)(2). Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 282 (6th Cir. 2012). 

Jaskiewicz pleads only a retaliation claim under the FMLA. The central issue raised by the 

retaliation theory is “whether the employer took the adverse action because of a prohibited 

reason or for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. (quoting Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443 

F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2006)). In other words, an employer’s intent is relevant only in 

retaliation claims because those claims “impose liability on employers that act against employees 

specifically because those employees invoked their FMLA rights.” Id. (citing Edgar, 443 F.3d at 

508) (emphasis original). 

To establish a prima facie retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: 

(1) she was engaged in an activity protected by the FMLA; (2) the employer knew 

that she was exercising her rights under the FMLA; (3) after learning of the 

employee’s exercise of FMLA rights, the employer took an employment action 

adverse to her; and (4) there was causal connection between the protected FMLA 

activity and the adverse employment action.”3

 

Killian, 454 F.3d at 556 (citing Arban, 345 F.3d at 404). Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff 

engaged in protected FMLA activity; that it knew of that activity; and that Plaintiff suffered an 

 3

 The Sixth Circuit “applies the familiar burden-shifting test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to retaliation claims under the FMLA.” Edgar v. JAC Products, Inc. 443 F.3d 501, 508 

(6th Cir. 2006) (citing Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 313-16 (6th Cir. 2001) and Rodriguez 

v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d 928, 933 (E.D. Mich. 2005)) (internal citations omitted). 

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adverse employment action. Defendant does contest Jaskiewicz’s ability to prove that there was a 

causal connection between her protected activity and any adverse employment action she claims. 

To satisfy the final prong of her prima facie case, Jaskiewicz must demonstrate a causal 

connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment actions she was subject 

to. Defendant asserts that Jaskiewicz cannot establish the final element of her prima facie case: 

that there was a causal connection between her FMLA leave and the adverse employment actions 

she was subject to. To satisfy this element, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to “raise 

[an] inference that her protected activity was the likely reason” for the adverse action. Sosby v. 

Miller Brewing Co., 211 F. App’x 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Zanders v. Nat’l R.R. 

Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990). However, “[t]he burden of proof at the 

prima facie stage is minimal; all the plaintiff must do is put forth some credible evidence that 

enables the court to deduce that there [was] a causal connection between the retaliatory action 

and the protected activity.” Cutcher v. Kmart Corp., 364 F. App’x 183, 190 (6th Cir. 2010). 

Jaskiewicz concedes that she has no evidence of a connection other than temporal 

proximity. Although temporal proximity alone is generally insufficient to establish 

circumstantial evidence of a causal connection, the Sixth Circuit has clarified that, in some 

circumstances, temporal proximity alone can suffice to show a causal connection in a retaliation 

case: “Where an adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns 

of a protected activity, such temporal proximity between the events is significant enough to 

constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of 

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retaliation.” Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2008) (analyzing temporal 

proximity under the ADEA and Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act).4

With respect to claims for FMLA retaliation, the Sixth Circuit has held that a span of less 

than three months is sufficient to create an inference of a causal connection. See Clark v. 

Walgreen Co., 424 F. App’x 467, 473 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he court correctly credited the 

temporal proximity [two months] of [the plaintiff’s] leave and his firing as sufficient evidence of 

a causal connection between the two.”); Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 

2007) (holding that a three-month time lapse between the plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave and 

her termination on the day she was scheduled to return to work established a causal connection at 

the prima facie stage). Here, Jaskiewicz claims three different adverse employment actions and 

alleges that all three are close enough in time to her FMLA leave to satisfy her prima facie case. 

A. 

 Jaskiewicz claims that St. Mary’s did not hire her for two positions for which she was 

qualified. The timing of these two failures to hire, without more, does not establish a causal 

nexus with Jaskiewicz’s FMLA leave. Both failures to hire were too far removed from 

Jaskiewicz’s FMLA leave to establish, without more, a causal connection between her leave and 

the actions without any evidence of FMLA discrimination on the part of St. Mary’s. Jaskiewicz 

took FMLA leave from April 10, 2013 to July 4, 2013. She applied for the Performance 

Improvement Specialist position on November 14, 2013, four months after her FMLA leave 

ended. She applied for the Physician Office Nurse position on July 12, 2014, more than a year 

after her FMLA leave ended. St. Mary’s failure to hire her for either position came too long after 

 4

 The Sixth Circuit relies on other employment discrimination law to fill the gaps in FMLA case law. See, 

e.g., Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2008) (relying on ADA, ADEA, and Title VII cases); 

Bryson, 498 F.3d at 561 (same). 

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the end of Jaskiewicz’s protected activity to constitute a per se causal connection in support of 

her prima facie case. 

 Jaskiewicz seeks to overcome this lack of a causal connection by invoking 29 C.F.R. § 

825.700. That provision states that an employer must abide by any program or plan it has in 

place “that provides greater family or medical leave rights to employees than the rights 

established by the FMLA.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.700. Jaskiewicz argues that because she continued 

on a medical leave of action after her FMLA leave, the legal protections of her FMLA leave 

somehow extend by the force of 29 C.F.R. § 825.700. But she offers no authority in support of 

that proposition. Indeed, the law is to the contrary. The Sixth Circuit has explicitly stated: 

There is no regulatory or statutory authority to impose upon an employer the 

obligation to provide FML in excess of the 12–week period under these 

circumstances. Once an employee exceeds his twelve work weeks (or sixty 

workdays) of FMLA leave, additional leave in the twelve month period is not 

protected by the FMLA, and termination of the employee will not violate the 

FMLA. 

Coker v. McFaul, 247 F. App’x 609, 620 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Jaskiewicz’s continuation on non-FMLA did not extend her FMLA protections beyond 

the end of her leave on July 4, 2013. As a result, an inquiry into the temporal connection between 

St. Mary’s decisions not to hire Jaskiewicz for two posted positions must be related back to the 

time in which her FMLA leave ended. Jaskiewicz cannot demonstrate the requisite temporal 

proximity between her FMLA leave and the failures to hire to establish a causal connection 

between the two. 

B. 

 Jaskiewicz’s also makes a claim that she was not provided sufficient information about 

the possibility of taking intermittent FMLA leave. She argues that St. Mary’s violated the FMLA 

by telling her that she had to take continuous FMLA leave and not informing her that she could 

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return intermittently. According to Jaskiewicz, she told St. Mary’s that she could perform some 

of the work that her old job demanded as long as she had nursing assistants help her move 

patients. 

 It is not clear how this claim fits into Jaskiewicz’s claim of FMLA retaliation. First, the 

claim that St. Mary’s withheld pertinent information about Jaskiewicz’s FMLA rights is not a 

claim of FMLA retaliation. Rather, it is a claim of FMLA interference. Jaskiewicz did not plead 

an FMLA interference claim. The lack of an interference claim in her pleading is fatal to her 

ability to claim FMLA interference at the summary judgment stage. See Hoff-Pierre v. Univ. 

Hosp., Inc., 523 F. App’x 313, 314 (6th Cir. 2013); Huffman v. Speedway LLC, Case No. 13-CV12453, 2014 WL 5817321, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2014). 

 Furthermore, there is no unilateral right to intermittent leave under the FMLA. The 

FMLA states that leave “shall not be taken by an employee intermittently or on a reduced leave 

schedule unless the employee and the employer of the employee agree otherwise. 29 U.S.C. § 

2612(b)(1). See also Maynard v. Town of Monterey, Tennessee, 75 F. App’x 491, 493 (6th Cir. 

2003) (upholding denial of summary judgment to plaintiff who claimed he was improperly 

denied FMLA leave). Thus, Jaskiewicz’s claim that she would have taken intermittent leave if 

she knew it was available is unpersuasive. She had no right to such leave. 

IV. 

Having concluded that Jaskiewicz’s federal claim is to be dismissed, her claim under 

state law for violation of the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act must now be 

addressed. 

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The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims because they form 

part of the same controversy as Jaskiewicz’s federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, 

this Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if: 

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 

district court has original jurisdiction, 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction, or 

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 

jurisdiction. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). When a plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed on the merits, the 

question of whether to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims rests within the Court’s 

discretion. Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 860 (6th Cir. 2002). However, the dismissal of 

the claim over which the federal court had original jurisdiction creates a presumption in favor of 

dismissing without prejudice any state-law claims that accompanied it to federal court. Id. at 863. 

In addition, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and 

to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of 

applicable law.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The issues 

presented, which may more directly implicate Jaskiewicz’s physical impairments than her 

temporally attenuated FMLA claim, are more appropriate for resolution by a state court. 

Therefore, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. Jaskiewicz’s supplemental 

state law claim will be dismissed without prejudice. 

V. 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant St. Mary’s of Michigan’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED in part.

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It is further ORDERED that Count I of Plaintiff Mary Jo Jaskiewicz’s Complaint, ECF 

No. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 It is further ORDERED that Count II of Plaintiff Mary Jo Jaskiewicz’s Complaint, ECF 

No. 1, is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

 

Dated: February 8, 2016 s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on February 8, 2016. 

 s/Michael A. Sian 

 MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager 

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