J-A08037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ARTHUR ANDRE ANDERSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 375 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 24, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0001785-2021

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: MAY 2, 2023

Arthur Andre Anderson (Anderson) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his bench conviction in the Court of Common Pleas 

of Allegheny County (trial court) of several counts of Driving Under the 

Influence (DUI) of Alcohol or a Controlled Substance and the summary offense 

of failure to yield.

1

 Anderson challenges the trial court’s partial denial of his 

motion to suppress that challenged the search of Anderson’s person and car 

because it violated both the Fourth Amendment to the United States

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (a)(2), (a)(1) and § 3323(c). The 

trial court found Anderson not guilty of three drug-related charges: person 

not to possess a controlled substance, possession of marijuana and possession 

of drug paraphernalia, 35 §§ 780-113(a)(16), (31) and (32).
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Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 We 

affirm.

I.

This case arises from an August 24, 2020 incident where Police Officer 

Jayme Spealman of the North Braddock Borough Police Department and her 

partner, Officer Smerkar,

3 observed Anderson’s vehicle fail to stop at a stop 

sign at about 9:00 p.m. At the suppression hearing, Officer Spealman was 

the only witness. She testified that while on patrol, she observed Anderson’s 

car “blow through” a stop sign without yielding. (N.T. Suppression, 1/27/22, 

at 6). The officers initiated a traffic stop and Officer Spealman observed 

Anderson “making movements as if he was leaning over the seat trying to 

conceal something.” (Id. at 7). Anderson then completely rolled through a 

second stop sign before coming to a stop.

As Officer Spealman approached Anderson’s vehicle, he “was still 

leaning over like he was either reaching for something, either trying to push

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2 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee “the right of the people 

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Luczki, supra at 542. “To secure the 

right of citizens to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, courts in 

Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending 

levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens to the extent those 

interactions compromise individual liberty.” Id. (citation omitted).

3 Officer Smerkar’s first name is not apparent from the record.
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something or grab something . . . completely leaning over the seat.” (Id. at 

8). She described Anderson’s movements as furtive and Officer Smerkar 

withdrew his gun from his holster as he approached the passenger side of the 

vehicle and issued commands. Because Anderson continued to move after 

Officer Spealman directed him not to, she opened the car door and “asked him 

to step out of the car, but there was also a weapon. I saw a knife in the 

console . . . pocket of the door.” (Id. at 9). Officer Spealman testified that 

she could smell alcohol emanating from Anderson’s person or from the vehicle

and she described his demeanor as “very agitated . . . [he] couldn’t stand still

. . . He kept moving away from the vehicle. He was very, very nervous as if

he was trying to divert our attention away from him. He was acting real, real 

excited.” (Id. at 11). Because his window was closed and he could not hear 

Officer Spealman’s request, Officer Spealman then opened the door to get Mr. 

Anderson's attention, observing an “orange carpenter knife” in the door 

pocket. (Id. at 15). Officer Spealman ordered him out of the car and he was 

placed in the back of their police vehicle. As they were taking Anderson to 

their vehicle, Officer Spealman smelled alcohol coming from his breath or from 

inside his vehicle. The officers took his driver’s license, checked his 

information and called for backup.

Back-up officers responded to the scene and Sergeant Larry Butler 

conducted a pat-down of Anderson’s person, finding a small bag of marijuana 

and two small baggies of suspected crack cocaine. During a search of 
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Anderson’s vehicle, police recovered an orange carpenter knife from the 

driver’s side console and a glassine pipe from the passenger side console. 

Officer Spealman observed as another officer conducted a horizontal gaze 

nystagmus (HGN) test, the field sobriety test, which Anderson failed. Officer 

Spealman then arrested Anderson on suspicion of DUI and transported him to 

a hospital for a blood draw. (Id. at 14). At the suppression hearing, Officer 

Spealman opined that based on her interaction with and observation of 

Anderson, coupled with her training and experience, he was impaired to an 

extent that rendered him unable to safely operate a vehicle.

The trial court granted the suppression motion in part and denied it in 

part. It denied the portion of the suppression motion related to the DUI 

charges but suppressed evidence of the glass smoking device, the marijuana 

and the cocaine. After Anderson waived his right to a jury trial, he

immediately proceeded to a bench trial and the parties’ stipulated to 

incorporating the testimony from the suppression hearing, the affidavit of 

probable cause, the police report and the results of Anderson’s blood test, 

which showed a positive result for alcohol and cannabinoids with a blood 

alcohol content of .092%. The trial court found Anderson guilty of the DUI 

offenses and failure to yield at a stop sign and found him not guilty of the 

drug-related offenses. It sentenced Anderson to attend a four-day DUI 

alternative to jail program, followed by six months of probation. This timely 
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appeal followed. Anderson and the trial court complied with Rule 1925. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).4

II.

While acknowledging that the initial traffic stop was legal, relying on 

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), 

Anderson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

the field sobriety test and blood draw underlying the DUI charges because of 

the prolonged unlawful stop to investigate without the requisite reasonable 

suspicion for possible drug charges, resulting in an unlawful seizure and 

violating his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution.

5 What Anderson appears to be arguing is that 

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4 When reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence,

[w]e may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so 

much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the 

record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions 

drawn therefrom are in error. An appellate court, of course, is not 

bound by the suppression court’s conclusions of law. It is within 

the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations 

omitted).

5 The Fourth Amendment of the United States establishes the “right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . ” Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “The people shall be secure in their 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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even if the police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a field sobriety 

test and a blood test to determine if he was driving under the influence, 

because that determination was “delayed” by the drug investigation, he is 

then entitled to have the results of the field sobriety test suppressed. 

Rodriquez, however, offers no support for that proposition.

In Rodriguez, a K-9 police officer stopped a vehicle because the vehicle 

slowly moved onto the shoulder for one or two seconds and then jerked back 

onto the road. The K-9 officer approached the two men in the vehicle, asked 

for pertinent information and issued a warning to the driver. Even though he 

acknowledged the traffic stop was over, the K–9 officer instructed the driver 

not to move while he walked his dog around the vehicle, and the dog alerted 

the officer of the presence of drugs. Seven or eight minutes had elapsed from 

the time the written warning was issued until the dog indicated the presence 

of drugs. A search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of methamphetamine. 

A motion to suppress was brought because the traffic stop had ended and the 

police officer had unconstitutionally extended that stop to conduct another 

investigation to walk the dog around the vehicle.

In suppressing the search that resulted in the drug charges, the United 

States Supreme Court held that “while an officer may conduct certain 

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persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and 

seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things 

shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable 

cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.”
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unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop . . . he may not do so 

in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily 

demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S. 

Ct. at 1615. It then held that “A seizure justified only by a police-observed 

traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the 

time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the 

violation.” Id. at 575 U.S. at 350–51, 135 S.Ct. at 1612 (alterations in 

original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 

(2005)).

Rodriguez does not apply to this case for several reasons. First, the 

charges that were at issue in Rodriquez – the drug charges - flowed from an 

unreasonably prolonged stop after the traffic violation had been resolved by 

the issuance of a warning citation, while in this case the evidence at issue

directly flowed from a legal traffic stop. Second, Rodriquez involved a search 

after the reason for the lawful search had ended and the drug charges were 

the result of a prolonged stop, while in this case, the investigation as to 

whether to arrest Anderson for DUI was ongoing because of the failed field 

sobriety test. Third, even if Rodriquez somehow applied, there was no delay 

because Officer Spealman, who had already observed that Anderson was 

impaired when he exited his vehicle, testified that the failed field sobriety 

occurred contemporaneously with the drug investigation so that there was no 

unreasonable delay. Finally, Anderson has not shown how he was impacted 
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in any way by the drug investigation even if there had been a delay because 

he would have still failed the field sobriety test and blood draw, just sooner.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, because we affirm the trial 

court’s denial of the motion to suppress the results of the field sobriety test 

and the blood test, we affirm Anderson’s conviction of DUI.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/2/2023