United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-2774

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Diana Piantanida, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Wyman Center, Inc., also known as *

Kiwanis Camp Wyman, *

*

Appellee. *

__________

Appeals from the United States

No. 96-2987 District Court for the 

__________ Eastern District of Missouri.

Diana Piantanida, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Wyman Center, Inc., also known as *

Kiwanis Camp Wyman, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 18, 1997

 Filed: June 23, 1997

___________
 The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Missouri.

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Before LOKEN, MAGILL, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

The Wyman Center, Inc. (Wyman Center) demoted its

employee Diana Piantanida while she was on maternity

leave, allegedly because she had failed to perform her

professional duties in a timely manner prior to going on

leave. Piantanida brought this employment discrimination

action based on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (PDA), and the

Missouri Human Rights Act, Rev. Mo. Stat. §§. 213.010-

213.137, alleging that she had been demoted, and thereby

constructively discharged, because she was a "new mom."

The district court granted summary judgment against

1

Piantanida, holding that Piantanida's claim for

discrimination based on her status as a new parent fell

outside the parameters of the PDA. We affirm.

I.

On June 15, 1992, Piantanida began working for the

Wyman Center, an organization dependent on charitable

donations, as an executive assistant. One of

Piantanida's key duties was to send form letters to

donors acknowledging their gifts to the Wyman Center. At

the end of an initial probationary period of her

employment, Piantanida's direct supervisor gave

Piantanida a favorable evaluation, but noted concerns
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with Piantanida's ability to meet deadlines and to stay

current with day-to-day projects. See Appellant's App.

at 275 (evaluation dated Sept. 15, 1992). Piantanida

took maternity leave from her position on March 22, 1993.
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During Piantanida's maternity leave, the Wyman Center

allegedly discovered that Piantanida had failed to send

acknowledgment letters to donors for 83 gifts. On April

20, 1993, the Wyman Center notified Piantanida that she

would be given a different position when she returned

from her maternity leave because of her apparent

inability to complete the acknowledgment letters in a

timely manner. The new position had fewer

responsibilities and a salary of about half of the old

position.

Piantanida has agreed that her demotion was not based

on her pregnancy or her maternity leave. See Dep. of

Diana Piantanida at 137-40, reprinted in Appellant's App.
 The following testimony was presented by Piantanida at her deposition: 2

Question (by defense counsel): So it would be fair to say the sole reason

you think that your demotion was caused by--well, you tell me what it is

you think that the change in the job structure with you was related to your

maternity leave?

Answer (by Piantanida): I was told by Dave Hilliard that he told Lorrie

Goecker to create a position for a new mom to handle.

Q. Okay. Was there any--was there anything else?

A. This new position being created is the main reason, because there's

no justification that this position should be made, other than now I have

a new baby and I wouldn't be capable of doing the job.

Q. So this was related not to your pregnancy, not to your maternity,

but being a new mother?

A. Correct.

. . . 

Q. So is it fair to say that the sole comment that you're relying upon is

the comment that you allege Mr. Hilliard said, that this would be a good

job for a new mom?

A. Correct.

Q. Was there anything else at Wyman that you think was responsible

for moving you into this new job?

A. No.

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at 204. Piantanida, however, claims that, when she spoke

2
Dep. of Diana Piantanida at 138-39 (emphasis added), reprinted in Appellant's App.

at 204.

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with the Wyman Center 
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about the new position, the Wyman Center's Executive

Director, David Hilliard, told her that she was being

given a position "for a new mom to handle." Id. at 138,

reprinted in Appellant's App. at 204. Piantanida

declined to accept the new position because of its low

pay. The person who replaced Piantanida received as much

as Piantanida received in her original position; i.e.,

almost twice as much as Piantanida was offered for the

new position.

Piantanida brought this Title VII action against the

Wyman Center, alleging pregnancy discrimination. The

district court granted summary judgment to the Wyman

Center, and ordered Piantanida to pay $1743.46 in costs.

The court held that discrimination based on one's status

as a new parent is not prohibited by the PDA, and that

Piantanida had therefore failed to state a claim. See

Mem. (June 4, 1996) at 21, reprinted in Appellant's Add.

at 22. The court also reached the alternative holding

that summary judgment was proper even if this status is

protected by the PDA. See id. ("Assuming arguendo that

the plaintiff's claim of discrimination as a 'new mother'

comes within the purview of the PDA, . . . plaintiff

fails to produce sufficient evidence showing a material

issue of fact exists on whether the defendant treated the

plaintiff 
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less favorably than others because of her pregnancy,

childbirth, and/or related medical conditions.").

Piantanida now appeals.

II.

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de

novo, taking all of the facts and inferences from the

facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See

Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 1996).

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. 

Title VII was amended to prohibit discrimination

based on pregnancy after the Supreme Court in General

Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976),

held that pregnancy discrimination was not based on

gender. The amended statute provides that:

The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of

sex" include, but are not limited to, because of

or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or

related medical conditions; and women affected

by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical

conditions shall be treated the same for all

employment-related purposes, including receipt

of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as

other persons not so affected but similar in

their ability or inability to work, and nothing

in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be

interpreted to permit otherwise. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added).
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Piantanida has agreed that her dismissal was not

directly related to either her pregnancy itself or her

decision to take maternity leave. We are thus faced with

the narrow question of whether being discriminated

against because of one's status as a 
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new parent is "because of or on the basis of pregnancy,

childbirth, or related medical conditions," id., and

therefore violative of the PDA.

In examining the terms of the PDA, we conclude that

an individual's choice to care for a child is not a

"medical condition" related to childbirth or pregnancy.

Rather, it is a social role chosen by all new parents who

make the decision to raise a child. While the class of

new parents of course includes women who give birth to

children, it also includes women who become mothers

through adoption rather than childbirth and men who

become fathers through either adoption or biology. An

employer's discrimination against an employee who has

accepted this parental role--reprehensible as this

discrimination might be--is therefore not based on the

gender-specific biological functions of pregnancy and

child-bearing, but rather is based on a gender-neutral

status potentially possessible by all employees,

including men and women who will never be pregnant. Cf.

Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80

(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that an employer's denial of

fertility treatments under insurance benefits is not a

violation of PDA, and noting that "[p]otential pregnancy,

unlike infertility, is a medical condition that is sexrelated because only women can become pregnant. In this

case . . . the policy of denying insurance benefits for

treatment of fertility problems applies to both female

and male workers and thus is gender-neutral"); Troupe v.

May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994)

(holding that PDA plaintiff's complaint, that she was

terminated because her employer did not believe that she

would return from her maternity leave, was not a
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violation of Title VII, and noting that a male employee

on medical leave could also be terminated due to

employer's fear that he would not return).

Piantanida's claim of discrimination based on her

status as a new parent is not cognizable under the PDA.

Cf. Piraino v. International Orientation Resources Inc.,

84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a

plaintiff successfully alleged pregnancy discrimination,

and stating that "[t]his is therefore not a case in which

the claim relates only to an employer's refusal to hire

(or reinstate) a mother with a young child, without 
 Because we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that 3

Piantanida has failed to state a cognizable claim under Title VII and the PDA, we do

not consider the district court's alternative grant of summary judgment. 

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a hint of any role that the earlier pregnancy played in

the decision" (emphasis added)). Piantanida has

therefore failed to state a claim for relief under Title

VII. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant

of summary judgment against her. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at

738 (noting that plaintiff "has made no effort to show

that if all the pertinent facts were as they are except

for the fact of her pregnancy, she would not have been

fired. So in the end she has no evidence from which a

rational trier of fact could infer that she was a victim

of pregnancy discrimination").3

III.

Piantanida also appeals the district court's

assessment of costs against her. Piantanida's argument

that the district court erred in its assessment of costs

is premised entirely on her argument that the district

court erred in its grant of summary judgment. See Reply

Br. at 26 ("With respect to the order taxing costs,

plaintiff has no substantive objections to raise.

Plaintiff merely seeks to have the order vacated should

the Court reverse the district court's grant of summary

judgment in this case."). Because we conclude that the

district court did not err in granting summary judgment

against Piantanida, we also affirm its assessment of

costs against her.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.