A ft erexami ni ng the br i efs and the appe l l at e r ecor d, thi s thr ee- j udge pane l has * det erm i ned unani m ous l ythator al ar gum entw oul d notbe of mat er i al as s i s t ance i n the d e te rm in a tio n o f

th is ap p e a l. See Fed. R . A pp. P. 34( a) ( 2) ; 10th C i r . R . 34. 1( G ) . T he c a se is th e re f

o re o rd e re d su b m itt e d w ith o u t o ra l ar g u m e n t. 

## F I LED Unite d St at e s C ourt o f Appe als Te nt h Ci r c uit 

### A p r i l3, 2007 Elisab eth A. Shumaker C l erk of C ourt PU BL I SH UNI TED S TATES CO URT O F AP PEALS

T E N T H C IR C U IT KI P T ON F L E M I NG,

P e tit io n e r - A p p e llan t, v. ED W A RD L. EV A N S,

R es pondent- A ppel l ee. N o. 06- 6110

AP P EA L F ROM THE UNI TE D S TA TE S DI S TR I CT COURT F O R T H E WE S T E R N D I S T R I C T O F O K L A H O MA ( D. Ct . No . D. Ct . No . CI V– 0 5 - 6 9 0 - C) S ub m i tt ed o n the bri efs: * K i pt on Fl emi ng, pr o s e. W . A . D r ew E dm onds on, A tt orneyG ener al of O kl ahoma, and J aySchni eder j an, A s s i s t ant Att o rn e yGe n e r a l , Of

f i c e o f th e Att o rn e yGe n e r a l f o rth e S t a t e o f

Ok l a h o ma , Ok l a h o ma C i ty , O kl ahoma, forA ppel l ee. B efor e T AC HA , C h ie f C ir c u it J u d g e , HA RTZ , and TY M KOVI CH , C i rcui tJudg es. T AC HA , C hi ef Ci r cui tJ udge.A lth o u g h the s tat e c o u rt ’s sen tenc ing stat em en t do es n o t app ea r i n the re co rd, M r. 1 F lem ing ’s ap p li ca ti o n fo r fe d era l hab ea s reli ef ind icates tha t his sen tenc es f o r C o u n ts I I a n d III w e re to ru n c o n se c u tiv e ly . A c c o rd in g ly , h e w a s “ in c u sto d y ” w ith re sp e c t to C ountI I I w hen he f

i l ed hi s pet i t i on and thus the D i s tr i ctC ourtappr opr i at el yexer ci s ed ju ri s d ic tio n u n d e r § 2 2 5 4 . See G ar lot te v. Fordi ce , 5 1 5 U .S . 3 9 , 4 1 (1 9 9 5 ) (h o ld in g th a t, forpurpos es of fe der al habea s corpus j ur i s di ct i on, a pet i t i onerw ho i s “i n cus t ody ” forone o f a se rie s o f

c o n se c u tiv e se n ten c e s is “ in c u sto d y ” f o r a ll o f th o se se n ten c e s); see al so O ylerv. A l lenbrand , 2 3 F .3 d 2 9 2 , 2 9 3

– 9 4 (1 0 th C ir. 1 9 9 4 ) (n o tin g th e re q u ire m e n t th a t a § 2 2 5 4 p e titio n e r b e “ in c u s to d y ” is ju ri s d ic tio n a l) . -2- P et i t i on er- A pp el l ant K i pton F l em i ng , a st at e pri soner app eari ng pro se, seeks a cert i fi cat e of appeal abi l i ty( “C O A ”) t o appea l the D i s tr i ctC ourt ’ s deni al of hi s pet i t i on fora w r i tof habe as corpus pur s uantt o 28 U . S. C . § 2254. T he D i s tr i ctC ourtdi d not a d d re s s M r. F le m in g ’s s u b s ta n tiv e c la im s b u t in s te a d d is m is s e d th e p e titio n a s u n tim e ly. We t a k e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r2 8 U. S . C. § § 1 2 9 1 a n d 2 2 5 3 , g r a n th i s ap p l i c a t i o n f o ra CO A, vacate the judgm ent of the D i stri ctC ou rt , and rem and for further proceedings. I . BA CKGROUND I n 2001, M r . Fl emi ng w as char ged i n O kl ahoma st at e courtw i th thr ee c r i m i nal co u n ts. C o u n ts I I an d III are relev an t here . C o u n t I I ch arg ed h im w ith assa u ltan d b att ery w i th a dange r ous w eapon, and C ountI I I char ged hi m w i th dom es t i c abus e as s aul tand b att ery . T h e p roc ee d ing s w ith resp ec t t o thes e tw o co u n ts t o o ktw o d ist inct p aths . M r. F lem ing p lead ed g u il tyto C o u n t I II, b u t he w en t t o tr ial o n C o u n t I I, o n w h ich a jury found hi m gui l ty . H e w as s ent ence d t o thi rtyy ear s ’ i m pr i s onm entforC ountI I and one y ea r of ti m e se rve d fo r C o u n t I II. 1 M r . Fl emi ng r ai s es s ever al cons t i tut i onal cl ai m s r el at ed t o eac h countof-3-

convi ct i on. Speci fi cal l y , he cl ai m s thathe r ece i ved i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el on both count s , thathi s convi ct i ons vi ol at e the D oubl e J eopar dyC l aus e, and thathe w as d e n ied d u e p ro c e ss o f

law d u e to th e sta te’ s u se o f p e rju re d tes tim o n ya t trial a n d its conce al m entof a pl ea a gr eements truck w i th one of i t s pr i m aryw i tnes s es . T he ca s e w as r efe rr ed t o a magi s tr at e j udge w ho r ecomm ended thatM r . Fl emi ng’ s cl ai m s w i th r es pect to C o u n t I II be d ism issed as ti m e-b arred an d that h is cl aim s w ith resp ec t t o C o u n t I I p roc ee d . B o th M r. F lem ing an d the s tat e f il ed o b jecti o n s to the m ag istrate jud g e’s f i n d i n g s . M r . F l e mi n g a r g u e d th a tth e ma g i s tr a t e e rr e d i n c o n c l u d i n g th a th i s c l a i ms re g a rd in g C o u n t III a re tim e -b a rre d . F o r its p a rt, th e sta te a rg u e d th a t th e re c o rd c lea rly es t abl i s hes thatcl ai m s r egar di ng C ountI I ar e al s o t i m e- barr ed bec aus e M r . Fl emi ng w as aw ar e atthe t i m e of hi s di r ectappea l of the fa ctual bas i s of the cl ai m — the al l eged p e rju re d tes tim o n ya n d th e sta te’ s c o n c e a lm e n t o f a p lea a g re e m e n t. T he D i s tr i ctC ourtadopt ed the r eas oni ng of the magi s tr at e j udge and gr ant ed the s t at e’ s m ot i on t o di s m i s s M r . Fl emi ng’ s cl ai m s w i th r es pectt o C ountI I I , butdeni ed the stat e’s m o ti o n w ith resp ec t t o C o u n t I I, n o ti n g that itco u ld n o t t ak e into ac co u n t r ec o rd evi dence t o di s m i s s an ac t i on on the pl eadi ngs . T he s t at e then fi l ed a mot i on for s um m aryj udgm ent , ar gui ng thatM r . Fl emi ng’ s cl ai m s w i th r es pectt o C ountI I ar e t i m ebarr ed and a tt ache d M r . Fl emi ng’ s br i ef on di r ectappea l ci t i ng t o the r el evantfac t s of w hi ch M r . Fl emi ng now cl ai m s he w as pr evi ous l yunaw ar e. M r . Fl emi ng had an o p p o rtu n ityto resp o n d . O n rec o m m en d ati o n fro m the m ag istrate jud g e, th e D istri ct C o u rt fo u n d n o g en u ine issu e o f f ac t as t o the tim eli n ess o f th e p eti ti o n an d g ran ted th e state’s-4-

m o tio n . T h e D istric t C o u rt d e n ied M r. F lem in g ’s a p p lica tio n f o r a C O A a n d d e n ied h is m ot i on t o pr ocee d in fo rm a p a u p e ris o n ap p e a l. I I . DI S CU S S I ON A . J ur i s di ct i on T he D i s tr i ctC ourtent er ed i t s or derand j udgm enti n thi s cas e on February27, 2006, i ndi cat i ng thatno partyhad fi l ed obj ect i ons t o the magi s tr at e j udge’ s r eportand r ecomm endat i on. M r . Fl emi ng fi l ed a not i ce of appea l on M ar ch 14, 2006. H e al s o fi l ed a mot i on forr ehear i ng on thatday , not i fy i ng the D i s tr i ctC ourtthathe had t i m el ym ai l ed o b jecti o n s to the m ag istrate jud g e’s rep o rtan d rec o m m en d ati o n . T h e D istri ct C o u rt gr ant ed M r . Fl emi ng’ s m ot i on and vac at ed the February27 or der . T he courtent er ed a new or deradopt i ng the r eportand r ecomm endat i on of the magi s tr at e j udge on M ar ch 24, 2 0 0 6 . T h e state a rgu es th at on ce the D istri ct C o u rtv ac ated it s F eb rua ry2 7 o rde r M r. Fl emi ng’ s not i ce of

appea l of thator derw as r ender ed moot . M r . Fl emi ng di d notfi l e a n e w n o tic e o f

ap p e a l f o llo w in g th e e n tryo f

th e M a rc h 2 4 o rd e r, s ee Fe d. R. A pp . P. 4( a) ( 1) ( A ) ( r equi r i ng a not i ce of appea l t o be fi l ed w i thi n 30 day s aft erthe j udgm entor or derappea l ed fr om i s ent er ed) , and the s t at e ther efor e mai nt ai ns thatthi s C ourtl acks ju ri s d ic tio n o v e r th e in s ta n t m a tte r, s ee F e d . R . A p p . P . 3 (c o n d iti o n in g f e d e ra l ap p e llate ju ri s d ic tio n o n th e f

ilin g o f a tim e ly n o tic e o f

ap p e a l) . W e d is a g re e . R ul e 3 r equi r es a not i ce of appea l t o “des i gnat e the j udgm ent , or der , orpartther eof b eing ap p ea led.” F ed . R . A p p . P . 3 (c)(1)(B ). W e “ li b era ll yco n stru e” the ru le’s req u ir em en ts: “w h en p ap ers a re tech n icall yat va ri an ce w ith the lett er o f R u le 3, a c o u rt-5-

m a yn o n e th e les s f

in d th a t th e lit ig a n t h a s c o m p lied w ith th e ru le if th e lit ig a n t’s a c tio n is the func t i onal equi val entof w hatthe rul e r equi r es . ” Sm i th v. B arry , 502 U . S. 244, 248 ( 1992) ( al t er at i on and i nt ernal quot at i on m arks om i tt ed) . A l though M r . Fl emi ng di d not f ile a f o rm a l n o tic e o f

ap p e a l w ith in th e 3 0 -d a yd e a d lin e , h e d id f ile , o n A p ri l 1 4 , 2 0 0 6 , a combi ned “mot i on forl eave t o pr ocee d on appea l w i thoutpr epaym entof cos t s orfee s and ap p lica tio n f

o r c e rtific a te o f

ap p e a lab ili ty .” H e a lso f iled a p ro se d o c k e tin g sta tem e n t. Furtherm or e, al though M r . Fl emi ng’ s A pr i l 14 m ot i on expr es s l yr efe r ence s the vac at ed February27 or der , thi s di s cr epanc ydoes notr enderM r . Fl emi ng’ s not i ce of appea l in e f f e c tiv e . E v e n if

a n o tice f

a ils to p ro p e rlyd e sig n a te th e o rd e r f ro m w h ich th e ap p e a l is ta k e n , th is C o u rth a s ju ri s d ic tio n if th e ap p e lla n t’ s in te n tio n w a s c le a r. U ni ted States v. Mor ales , 1 0 8 F . 3 d 1 2 1 3 , 1 2 2 2

– 2 3 (10 th C ir . 1 9 9 7 ). T h e c lear inten t of M r. F lem ing ’s A p ri l 1 4 m o tio n w a s to ap p e a l th e D is tr ic t C o u rt ’s M a rc h 2 4 o rd e r d is m is s in g h is c la im . A l though he denomi nat ed the or derbei ng appea l ed as the court ’ s or derof February27, th a to r d e rwa s s u p e r c e d e d b yth e c o u rt ’ s M a r c h 2 4 o r d e r , wh i c h r e a c h e d th e s a me conclus i on as the form er . M r . Fl emi ng’ s fi l i ngs cont ai n al l the i nform at i on r equi r ed by R u le 3 (c ) a n d th u s a re th e “ f u n c tio n a l e q u iv a le n t” o f a f o rm a l n o tic e o f

ap p e a l. See Sm ith , 502 U . S. at248 ( s t at i ng thatthe purpos e of anot i ce of appea l “i s t o ens ur e thatthe f ili n g p ro v id e s s u f

f icie n t n o tice to o th e r p a rties a n d th e c o u rts” ); s ee al s o R odgers v. W

yo. A t torney G en. , 205 F. 3d 1201, 1204 & n. 3 ( 10th C i r . 2000) ( l i s t i ng document s cons trued a s th e e q u iv a le n t o f

a n o tic e o f

ap p e a l) , overr uled on othergr ounds as r ecogni z ed by Moo re v. M

arr , 254 F. 3d 1235, 1239 ( 10th C i r . 2001) . T hi s C ourtther efor e has-6-

j ur i s di ct i on t o r evi ew M r . Fl emi ng’ s pet i t i on. B . A nt i t err or i s m and Effec t i ve D eath Penal tyA ct A C O A m aybe i s s ued “onl yi f the appl i canthas m ade as ubs t ant i al s how i ng of the d e n ial o f a c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t.” 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 3 (c )(2 ). T h is re q u ire s M r. F lem in g to s how “thatr eas onabl e j ur i s t s coul d debat e w hether( or , forthatm att er , agr ee that ) the p eti ti o n sh o u ld h av e b ee n reso lved in a d iffe ren t m an n er o r th at th e issu es p rese n ted w ere adequa t e t o des erve enc our agementt o pr ocee d further . ” Slack v . McD ani el , 52 9 U. S. 473, 484 ( 2000) ( quot at i on om i tt ed) . I n addi t i on, w hen the di s tr i ctcourt ’ s rul i ng i s bas ed on pr ocedur al gr ounds , the pet i t i onerm us tdemonstr at e that“j ur i s t s of r eas on w oul d fi nd i tdebat abl e w hetherthe pet i t i on s t at es a val i d cl ai m of the deni al of a c ons t i tut i onal r i ght a n d th a t ju rists o f

re a so n w o u ldf

in d it d e b a tab le w h e th e r th e d istric t co u rt w a s c o rre c t in i t s pr ocedur al rul i ng. ” I d. T he A nt i t err or i s m and Effec t i ve D eath Penal tyA ct( “A E D PA ”) i m pos es a oney e a r l im ita tio n s p e ri o d o n th e f ilin g o f f e d e ra l h a b e a s a c tio n s . See 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 4 4 (d ). T h e p e ri o d b e g in s to ru n f ro m “ th e la te s t o f

” f o u r d a te s , tw o o f

w h ic h a re re le v a n t h e re . T he fi r s ti s “the dat e on w hi ch the j udgm entbeca m e fi nal bythe conc l us i on of di r ect r evi ew orthe expi r at i on of the t i m e fors eeki ng s uch r evi ew . ” Id . § 2244( d) ( 1) ( A ) . T he s econd i s “the dat e on w hi ch the fa ctual pr edi cat e of the cl ai m . . . coul d have be en di s cover ed thr ough the exe r ci s e of due di l i gence . ” I d. § 2244( d) ( 1) ( D ) . I m port ant l y , the l i m i t at i ons per i od i s s t atut or i l yt ol l ed “[ f] orthe t i m e dur i ng w hi ch a pr oper l yfi l ed appl i cat i on forSt at e pos t - convi ct i on orothercol l at er al r evi ew w i th r es pectt o the-7-

p e rt in e n t ju d g m e n t o r c la im is p e n d in g ” in s ta te c o u rt . I d. § 2244( d) ( 2) . I n addi t i on, the l i mi t a t i o n s p e r i o d ma yb e e q u i t ab l yt o l l e d i f th e p e t i t i o n e r“ d i l i g e n t l yp u r s u e s h i s c l a i ms and demonstr at es thatthe fa i l ur e t o t i m el yfi l e w as caus ed byextr aor di naryci r cumst ance s bey ond hi s contr ol . ” Mars h v. Soar es , 2 2 3 F .3 d 1 2 1 7 , 1 2 2 0 (1 0 th C ir . 2 0 0 0 ). W h e n a d istric t co u rt d e n ies a h a b e a s p e tit io n b a se d o n § 2 2 4 4 (d ), w e g e n e ra lly e x e rc is e d e n o v o re v ie w . Se e B u rg e r v . Sc o tt , 3 1 7 F .3 d 1 1 3 3 , 1 1 3 7 (1 0 th C ir . 2 0 0 3 ). H er e, the D i s tr i ctC ourtal s o found no gr ounds forequi t abl yt ol l i ng the s t atut e- of- l i m i t at i ons per i od. O n appea l , s uch a de ci s i on i s r evi ew ed foran abus e of d is c re tio n . Se e id. at 1 1 3 8 . U lt im ately , there fo re, w e w il l vac ate the D istri ct C o u rt ’s d e ter m in a tio n th a t eq u itab le to lli n g is in ap p lica b le o n lyif re a so n a b le ju rists c o u ldd e b a te w hetherthe court ’ s r efus al t o t ol l the s t atut e of l i m i t at i ons w as an abus e of di s cr et i on. 1. P r ocedural R ul i ng a. T im eli n ess o f C o u n t I II M r . Fl emi ng pl eade d gui l tyt o C ountI I I . T he s t at e tr i al courts ent ence d hi m on D e c e m b e r 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 . B e c a u se M r. F lem in g d idn o t f ile a tim e lym o tio n f

o r le a v e to w ith d raw h is plea o r oth erw ise d ir ec tl yap p ea l his co n v ict ion , h is co n v ict ion o n C o u n t I II b e c a m e f in a l o n D e c e m b e r 3 1 , 2 0 0 1 . See O kl a. St at . t i t . 22, C h. 18, A pp. , R ul e 4. 2. A bs ents t atut oryorequi t abl e t ol l i ng, the A E D PA l i m i t at i ons per i od expi r ed on D ece m ber 3 1 , 2 0 0 2 . M r. F lem in g f iled a n ap p lica tio n f

o r p o st-c o n v ictio n re lief in O k lah o m a sta te courton A ugus t27, 2004. T he s t at e courtdeni ed hi s appl i cat i on and the O C C A aff i rm ed on N ovember30, 2004. M r . Fl emi ng fi l ed thi s § 2254 pet i t i on i n fede r al di s tr i ctcourtonT he p et i t i on w as fi l e-s t am ped on June 1 7, 20 05 , bu tthe d ocu m ent cont ai ns a 2 ver i fi cat i on and a c ert i fi cat e of mai l i ng dat ed June 10, 2005. T he pet i t i on i s deemed “ f ile d ” w h e n th e p e titio n e r g iv e s it to p ri s o n a u th o ri tie s f o r m a ilin g . H

oggr o v. B oone , 150 F. 3d 1223, 1227 n. 3 ( 10th C i r . 1998) ( ci t i ng H ous ton v. Lack , 487 U . S. 266, 270 (19 8 8 )). T h ere is som e su g g esti o n in M r. F lem ing ’s pe ti ti o n that h e k n ew o f h is attorn ey ’s 3 fai l ur e t o per fec tan appe al on J ul y25, 2003, and the D i s tr i ctC ourtas s um ed ar guendo th a t th e lim itatio n s p e rio d b e g a n to ru n o n th is d a te. B e c a u se o f o u r d isp o sitio n o f

th is c a se , w e n e e d n o t re so lv e h e re th e e x a c t d a te o n w h ich M r. F lem in g b e c a m e a w a re o f h is c o u n se l’s f

a ilu re . If th e D istric t C o u rt d e ter m in e s th a t M r. F lem in g is e n tit led to e q u itab le toll ing , then h is pe ti ti o n w o u ld b e ti m elyw h ethe r M r. F lem ing d isco v ere d h is co u n sel’s f a ilu re s o n M a y 1 8 , 2 0 0 3 , o r J u ly 2 5 , 2 0 0 3 .-8- J une 10, 2005. 2 M r . Fl emi ng fi r s tcont ends thatunder28 U . S. C . § 2244( d) ( 1) ( D ) the one- y ear l i m i t at i ons per i od s houl d nothave s t art ed t o run on hi s cl ai m of i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el i n ent er i ng a gui l typl ea unt i l M ay18, 2003, w hen he di s cover ed thathi s tr i al 3 c o u n s e l f a ile d to m o v e to w ith d ra w h is g u ilty p le a a n d to p e rf e c t a n ap p e a l o n th a t is s u e . T o su p p o rt h is p o sitio n , M r. F lem in g c laim s th a t, af terh e sp e c if

ica llyin stru c ted h is att orneyt o m ove t o w i thdr aw hi s gui l typl ea, hi s couns el t ol d hi m he had done s o and the cl ai m w as pendi ng i n s t at e court . I f thatal l egat i on i s true, then “the dat e on w hi ch the fac tual pr edi cat e [of

thi s cl ai m fori neff

ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el ] coul d have be en di s cover ed thr ough the exe r ci s e of due di l i gence , ” 28 U . S. C . § 2244( d) ( 1) ( D ) , w oul d be th e d a yo n w h ich M r. F lem in g c o u ldh a v e re a so n a b lyd isc o v e re d th a t h is c o u n se l f a iled to f o l l o w h i s i n s tru c t i o n s t o s e e kt o wi th d r a w a n d ap p e a l h i s g u i l typ l e a . He n c e , we a s s u me ar guendo thatthe l i m i t at i ons per i od began t o run on thi s dat e, M ay18, 2003, r atherthan o n D e c e m b e r 3 1 , 2 0 0 1 . U sin g th e late r d a te, M r. F lem in g h a d u n til M a y1 8 , 2 0 0 4 , to f ile-9-

h is h ab e a s p e titio n in f

e d e ra l c o u rt . H e d id n o t d o s o . M r . Fl emi ng nextas s ert s thatthe l i m i t at i ons per i od s houl d be equi t abl yt ol l ed fr om Ju ly2 5 , 2 0 0 3 , u n til A u g u st 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 , b e c a u se d u rin g th is tim e h e re a so n a b lyre lied o n h is att orney ’ s m i s r epr es ent at i ons thathe w as i n the mi ds tof pr epar i ng and fi l i ng an app l i cat i on for po st -convict i on rel i ef an d M r. F l em i ng had no cause t o d i scover these m isre p re se n tatio n s. H ab e a s c o u n se l’s n e g lig e n c e is n o t g e n e ra llya b a sis f o r e q u itab le t ol l i ng becaus e “[ t ] her e i s no cons t i tut i onal r i ghtt o an att orneyi n s t at e pos t - convi ct i on pr ocee di ngs . ” C olem an v. Thom ps on , 501 U . S. 722, 752 ( 1991) . “The r at i onal e i s that a tto rn e yn e g lig e n c e is n o t ex tra o rd in a rya n d c lien ts, e v e n if in c a rc e ra ted , m u st ‘v ig ilan tly over s ee, ’ and ul t i m at el ybearr es pons i bi l i tyfor , thei ratt orney s ’ act i ons orfai l ur es . ” Mo dro w sk i v. Mo te , 3 2 2 F .3 d 9 6 5 , 9 6 8 (7 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ); s ee al s o Merr i t tv. B lai ne , 326 F. 3d 157, 169 ( 3d C i r . 2003) ( appl y i ng gener al rul e that“att orneyerr or , m i s cal cul at i on, inad eq u ate rese arc h , o r oth er m ist ak es h av e n o t bee n fo u n d to ri se to the e x tr ao rdin ary c irc u m sta n c e s re q u ire d f o r e q u itab le to lli n g ” (q u o tatio n o m itt e d )); R ous e v. Lee , 339 F. 3d 238, 248 ( 4th C i r . 2003) ( “[A ] m i s t ake bya party ’ s couns el i n i nt erpr et i ng a s t atut e of l i m i t at i ons does notpr es entthe extr aor di naryci r cumst ance bey ond the party ’ s contr ol w h e re e q u ity sh o u ld s te p in to g iv e th e p a rtyth e b e n e f it o f h is e rr o n e o u s u n d e rs ta n d in g .” (q u o tatio n o m itt e d )) ; U n itedS ta tes v . M

a rtin , 408 F. 3d 1089, 1093 ( 8th C i r . 2005) ( “I neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el , w her e i ti s due t o an att orney ’ s negl i gence orm i s t ake, h a s n o t g e n e ra llyb e e n c o n sid e re d a n e x tra o rd in a ryc irc u m sta n c e [ w ith re sp e c t to e q u ita b le to llin g ].” ).T here i s evi den ce i n the r ecord t o sup po rteach o f these al l egati on s. 4 M r . Fl emi ng as s ert s i n hi s aff i davi tthathe s ubm i tt ed hi s pet i t i on forr evi ew on 5 A ugus t8 or9, 2004, t o hi s att orney , bel i evi ng the A E D PA l i m i t at i ons per i od expi r ed on A ugus t16, 2004. H e cl ai m s hi s att orneyonl yhad t o r eform atthe pet i t i on and fi l e i t , but h e d id n o t d o s o u n til A u g u s t 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 . -10- M r . Fl emi ng s eeks t o di s t i ngui s h hi s cas e on the bas i s thathi s att orneydi d notact w ith m e re n e g lig e n c e , b u t ra th e r d e c e iv e d h im in to b e liev in g th a t h e w a s a c tiv e ly p u rsuin g M r. F lem ing ’s l eg al rem ed ies w h en , in f ac t, h e w as n o t. T o this en d , M r. F lem in g c laim s th a t, on Ju ly2 5 , 2 0 0 3 , h is m o th e r re tain e d n e w c o u n se l to re p re se n t h im i n s t at e pos t - convi ct i on pr ocee di ngs . M r . Fl emi ng i nqui r ed of hi s couns el s ever al t i m es dur i ng phone ca l l s and vi s i t s atthe pr i s on as t o the s t atus of hi s pet i t i on. E ach t i m e he 4 i nqui r ed, hi s couns el orhi s couns el ’ s s t aff as s ur ed M r . Fl emi ng thathi s pet i t i on w as bei ng pr epar ed and that , w i thi n a w eek ortw o of thatconver s at i on, the pet i t i on w oul d be fi l ed. In fact , no peti t i on w as fi l ed. A w are that the o ne-y ear l i m i t at i on s peri od w as fast appr oachi ng, M r . Fl emi ng dr aft ed hi s ow n pet i t i on w i th the ai d of a pr i s on i nm at e l aw cl erk. H e then s ubm i tt ed the dr aftt o hi s couns el forr evi ew and fi l i ng i n s t at e court , but hi s couns el fai l ed t o fi l e i tunt i l aft erthe A E D PA l i m i t at i ons per i od expi r ed. 5 O th e r c irc u its h a v e h e ldth a t eg re g io u s a tto rn e ym isc o n d u c t m a yc o n stitu te

“ e x tr a o rd in a ry c ir c u m s ta n c e s ” th a t ju s tif ye q u ita b le to llin g . Se e U n itedS ta tes v . M

a rtin , 408 F. 3d 1089, 1093 ( 8th C i r . 2005) ( concludi ng habea s couns el ’ s aff i rm at i ve m isr ep rese n tat ion s, fa ilu re to c o m m u n icate w ith h ab ea s cli en t, an d fa ilu re to retu rn cli en t’ s p ap ers c o n sti tute eg reg iou s m isco n d u ct th at m ayb e b asis fo r eq u it ab le t o ll ing );-11-

Sp i t syn v. Moo re , 3 4 5 F .3 d 7 9 6 , 8 0 1 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ) (c o n c lu d in g a tto rn e y ’s m isc o n d u c t in fai l i ng t o fi l e habe as pet i t i on and r efus i ng t o r eturn cl i entfi l e cons t i tut es egr egi ous m isc o n d u c t th a t m a yju stif ye q u itab le to lli n g ); B aldayaque v . U ni ted States , 338 F. 3d 1 4 5 , 1 5 2 (2d C ir . 2 0 0 3 ) (co n clud ing eg reg iou s m isco n d u ct on the p art of p eti ti o n er’s couns el , i ncl udi ng fai l ur e t o fi l e § 2255 pet i t i on as r eques t ed bycl i ent , fai l ur e t o conduct re se a rc h o n c lien t’s c a se , an d f a ilu re to c o m m u n ica te w ith c lien t, m a yju stif ye q u itab le to lli n g ); Br o wn v. Shannon , 322 F. 3d 768, 773–74 ( 3d C i r . 2003) ( acknow l edgi ng thatan a tto rn e y ’s a f

f irm a tiv e lies to p e tit io n e r m a yb e g ro u n d s f o r e q u itab le to lli n g ); U

ni ted States v. W

ynn , 2 9 2 F .3 d 2 2 6 , 2 3 0 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 2 ) (s a m e ). W e a g re e w ith th o se c irc u its hol di ng thats uffi ci ent l yegr egi ous m i s conducton the partof a habeas pet i t i oner ’ s couns el m a yju s tif

ye q u ita b le to llin g o f

th e A E D P A lim ita tio n s p e ri o d . W e f u rth e r c o n c lu d e th a t M r. F lem in g h a s a lleg e de n o u g h f a c ts to w a rra n t, at a m in im u m , a n e v id e n tia ry h e a ri n g to d e te rm in e w h e th e r h e is e n title d to e q u ita b le to llin g . C o u n sel w as re tai n ed sh o rt lyaf ter M r. F lem ing all eg es h e d isco v ere d h is tri al co u n sel’s f a i l u r e t o mo v e t o wi th d r a w h i s g u i l typ l e a o n Co u n tI I I ( a n d , a s n o t e d b e l o w, me r e l ytwo w e e k s a f terh is c o n v ictio n o n C o u n t II b e c a m e f in a l). H e w a s th e re f

o re h ire d n e a rlya f

u ll y e a r in a d v a n c e o f

th e e x p ira tio n o f

th e f ili n g d e a d lin e . M r. F lem in g c o n tac ted h im s ever al t i m es overthe cour s e of the y ear , and couns el r epea t edl yas s ur ed M r . Fl emi ng that f ilin g w a s f

o rth c o m in g . See Spi t

s yn , 345 F. 3d at801 ( concludi ng equi t abl e t ol l i ng m ay be j us t i fi ed w hen couns el , w ho w as hi r ed near l ya ful l y eari n advanc e of the fi l i ng deadl i ne, fai l ed t o pr epar e and f i l e a pe t i t i on; he al s o fai l ed t o r eturn pet i t i oner ’ s fi l e upon-12-

re q u e st u n til tw o m o n th s a f terf ili n g d e a d lin e ); B aldayaque , 338 F. 3d at152 ( concludi ng a tto rn e y ’s f

a ilu re to f

ile § 2 2 5 5 p e tit io n , res e a rc h iss u e s, m e e t w ith c lien t, an d k e e p h is cl i entr eas onabl yi nform ed of the s t atus of hi s cas e w as “fa renough out s i de the r ange of behavi orthatr eas onabl ycoul d be expe ct ed bya cl i entthat[the ac t i ons ] m aybe cons i der ed ‘ extr aor di nary ’ ”) . H ence , couns el ’ s m i s r epr es ent at i ons m ayamountt o an “extr aor di naryci r cumst ance , ” and r eas onabl e j ur i s t s coul d debat e w hetherthe D i s tr i ct C o u rtab u s e d its d is c re tio n in re je c tin g e q u ita b le to llin g o n th is b a s is . In a d d it ion to sh o w ing that h is attorn ey ’s m isco n d u ct am o u n ts t o an ex tr ao rdin ary ci r cumst ance , M r . Fl emi ng “mustal s o s how thathe ac t ed w i th r eas onabl e di l i gence , and thatthe extr aor di naryci r cumst ance s caus ed hi s pet i t i on t o be unt i m el y . ” B aldayaque , 3 3 8 F .3 d a t 1 5 3 ; s ee al

s o G i bs on v. Kl i nger , 232 F. 3d 799, 807 ( 10th C i r . 2000) (re q u irin g a s a p re re q u isite to e q u itab le to lli n g th a t a p e tit io n e r “ d ili g e n tlyp u rsu e ” h is fede r al habea s cl ai m s ) . H er e, des pi t e hi s couns el ’ s as s ur ance s , M r . Fl emi ng t ook i tupon h im self to p rep are h is ow n p eti ti o n , w h ich th o u g h fil ed lat e, m ayestab li sh that M r. F le m in g a c te d w ith re a s o n ab le d ilig e n c e in p u rs u in g h is c la im . See Spi t s yn , 345 F. 3d at 801 ( r emandi ng forcons i der at i on as t o w hetherpet i t i onerexer ci s ed r eas onabl e di l i gence in p u rsuin g h ab ea s reli ef w h en h is co u n sel en g ag ed in eg reg iou s m isco n d u ct); B aldayaque , 3 3 8 F .3 d a t 1 5 3 (s a m e ). I f the l i m i t at i ons per i od i s t ol l ed as M r . Fl emi ng m ai nt ai ns i ts houl d be, hi s pet i t i on w oul d be t i m el y . T he l i m i t at i ons per i od ( w e as s um e) s t art ed t o run on M ay18, 2003, and ran u n ti l he re tai n ed h is co u n sel o n Ju ly2 5 , 2 0 0 3 . T h is l ef t 29 7 d ay s d u ri n g w h ich M r.-13-

F lem in g c o u ldf

ile in sta te c o u rt. If M r. F lem in g is e n tit led to e q u itab le to lli n g u n til h is s t at e courtfi l i ng on A ugus t27, 2004, and then s t atut oryt ol l i ng unt i l N ovember30, 2004, w h e n th e O C C A d e n ie d p o s t- c o n v ic tio n re lie f , s ee 2 8 U . S . C . § 2 2 4 4 (d)(2 ), then M r. Fl emi ng’ s fede r al pet i t i on w as t i m el y . H e fi l ed i n fede r al di s tr i ctcourton J une 10, 2005, 19 2 d a y s a ft e rN ov e mber30 . The s t a t e be a r s the bu r de n o f p r ov i ng tha tthe A ED PA lim ita tio n s p e ri o d h a s e x p ir e d , cf . H oo ks v. W

ard , 1 8 4 F . 3 d 1 2 0 6 , 1 2 1 6

– 1 7 (10 th C ir . 1999) ( hol di ng thats t at e bear s the bur den of pr ovi ng the ade quacyof a s t at e pr ocedur al b a r to f e d e ra l h ab e a s re v iew ), an d w e c o n c lu d e re a so n a b le ju rists w o u ldf in d it d e b a tab le w hetherthe di s tr i ctcourtabus ed i t s di s cr et i on w i th r es pectt o i t s pr ocedur al rul i ng.

b . T im eli n ess o f C o u n t I I F o llo w in g a ju rytrial, M r. F lem in g w a s f o u n d g u iltyo n C o u n t II. H e ap p e a led h is convi ct i on t o the O C C A , w hi ch af fi rm ed on A pr i l 9, 2003. B ecaus e M r . Fl emi ng di d not f ile a p e tit io n f

o r c e rtio ra ri, h is c o n v ictio n w ith re sp e c t to C o u n t II b e c a m e f in a l n in e ty d a y s la te r, o n J u ly 8 , 2 0 0 3 . See Rhi ne v. B oone , 182 F. 3d 1153, 1155 ( 10th C i r . 1999) ( expl ai ni ng thati f the def endantfai l s t o fi l e a pe t i t i on forcert i or ar i , the convi ct i on becomes fi nal aft erthe t i m e forfi l i ng the pet i t i on has pas s ed) ; Sup. C t . R . 13. 1 ( pr ovi di ng f o r tim e lyf

ili n g f o r a w rit o f

c e rto ria ri w ith in n in e tyd a y s a f tere n tryo f

th e o rd e r in sta te court ) . A bs ents t atut oryorequi t abl e t ol l i ng, the A E D PA l i m i t at i ons per i od expi r ed on J u l y8 , 2 0 0 4 . M r . F l e mi n g f i l e d a n ap p l i c a t i o n f

o rp o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f i n Ok l a h o ma s t a t e c o u rto n Au g u s t2 7 , 2 0 0 4 . Th e s t a t e c o u rtd e n i e d h i s ap p l i c a t i o n a n d th e OCCA aff i rm ed on N ovember30, 2004. M r . Fl emi ng fi l ed thi s § 2254 pet i t i on i n fede r al di s tr i ct-14-

co u rto n Ju n e 1 0 , 2 0 0 5 . F o r th e re aso n s set fo rth ab o v e w ith resp ec t t o C o u n t I II, M r. F lem in g is e n tit led to a d e ter m in a tio n a s to th e p ro p rie tyo f e q u itab le to lli n g d u e to h is p o s t- c o n v ic tio n c o u n s e l’ s f a ilu re to tim e ly f

ile . In a d d iti o n to th e f

o re g o in g , M r. F lem in g a rg u e s th a t h is c laim s w ith re sp e c t to C ountI I ar e t i m el ybecaus e he di d notl earn of the fa ctual pr edi cat e of one of the i s s ues h e ra is e s in h is p e titio n u n til J u ly 2 0 0 4 . See 28 U . S. C . § 2244( d) ( 1) ( D ) ( s t at i ng thatthe l i m i t at i ons per i od runs fr om the l at es tof fourdat es , i ncl udi ng “the dat e on w hi ch the fac tual pr edi cat e of the cl ai m orcl ai m s pr es ent ed coul d have be en di s cover ed thr ough the exer ci s e of due di l i gence ”) . Speci fi cal l y , M r . Fl emi ng cont ends thatthe s t at e us ed per j ur ed t es t i m onydur i ng tr i al and conc eal ed a pl ea a gr eementw i th one of i t s w i tnes s es despit e his cou nsel ’s request s for di scoveryof suc h inform at i on . H e argues that he fi rs t l e a rn e d o f

th e p e r j u r e d t e s t i mo n ya n d p l e a a g r e e me n twh e n th e c l e rko f th e Ok l a h o ma di s tr i ctcourti nadvert ent l ys enthi m the s eal ed r ecor ds of the s t at e’ s pr i m aryw i tnes s at tr i al , and the r ecor ds r evea l ed the exi s t ence of the pl ea a gr eementas w el l as other favor abl e tr eatm enton the partof the s t at e. M r . Fl emi ng’ s as s ert i ons , how ever , ar e bel i ed byhi s couns el ’ s br i ef on di r ectappea l fi l ed i n Sept ember2002. T he br i ef c ont ai ns the fol l ow i ng al l egat i on: “A ppel l anthad r eques t ed ext ens i ve pr etr i al di s coveryi ncl udi ng any p lea b a rg a in s. T h e S tate w a s a w a re th a t itw o u ldg ra n t len ien c yb u t in ten tio n a llyf a iled to d isc lo se su c h to b o lste r K a th lee n [ ] [ F lem in g ’s] tes tim o n y . A f terA p p e llan t’s tria l, K athl een Fl emi ng r ece i ved extr emel yfavor abl e tr eatm entand di s m i s s al of cha r ges . ” Ba s e d o n th e f

o r e g o i n g , th e Di s tr i c tCo u rtc o n c l u d e d th a tM r . F l e mi n g ’ s c l a i ms-15-

c o n c e rn in g C o u n t II a re tim e -b a rre d b e c a u se h e w a s a w a re o f th e ir f a c tu a l b a sis a s e a rly as Sept ember2002 ( even though he r ai s ed a di ffe r entl egali s s ue r el at ed t o thes e fa ct s on d ir e c t a p p e a l) . W e a g re e . See Spi t z nas v. B oone , 464 F. 3d 1213, 1226 ( 10th C i r . 2006) ( hol di ng pet i t i onerfai l ed t o s how thatfac tual bas i s forcl ai m coul d nothave be en di s cover ed w i th due di l i gence i n partbecaus e pet i t i oner ’ s couns el m ent i oned the fa ct re lie d u p o n d u ri n g s e n te n c in g , p re s u m a b ly in th e p e titio n e r’ s p re s e n c e ). I n s um m ary , w e conc l ude thatj ur i s t s of r eas on w oul d fi nd i tdebat abl e w hetherthe D i stri ctC ou rtabu sed i t s di scr et i on i n d i sm i ssi ng M r. F l em i ng ’s cl ai m on t i m el i ness g ro u n d s w ith re s p e c t to h is h ab e a s c o u n s e l’ s a lle g e d m is c o n d u c t. See Slack , 529 U . S. at 4 8 4 . S h o u ldth e D istric t C o u rt c o n c lu d e th a t M r. F lem in g is n o t en tit led to e q u itab le to lli n g o n th a t b a sis , M r. F lem in g m a yn o t re n d e r h is c laim s c o n c e rn in g C o u n t II tim e ly b yre ly in g o n h is a ss e rtio n th a t h e d idn o t d isc o v e r th e f a c tu a l p re d ica te o f

h is c laim s u n til h e re c e iv e d th e se a led re c o rd s f ro m th e sta te d istric t co u rt. 2. D eni alof

a C ons t i tut i onalR ight E ven i f the D i s tr i ctC ourterr ed i n i t s pr ocedur al rul i ng, how ever , thi s C ourtm ay n o t g ra n t a C O A u n les s M r. F lem in g h a s a lso sh o w n th a t “ju rists o f re a so n w o u ldf

in d it debat abl e w hetherthe pet i t i on s t at es a val i d cl ai m of the deni al of a c ons t i tut i onal r i ght . ” Slack , 5 2 9 U .S . at 4 8 4 . In re a c h in g th is d e ter m in a tio n , w e w ill n o t d e lv e in to th e m e rits of the cl ai m , buti ns t ead w i l l det erm i ne onl yw hetherthe pet i t i onerhas “fa ci al l yal l eged the deni al of a c ons t i tut i onal r i ght . ” G i bs on v. Kl i nger , 2 3 2 F . 3 d 7 9 9 , 8 0 3 (10 th C ir . 2000) ( al t er at i on and quot at i on om i tt ed) . Furtherm or e, i ti s s uffi ci entforpurpos es ofA lth o u g h th e d isc o v e ryo f th e f a c tu a l p re d ica te o f

th is c laim c a n n o t b e th e b a sis 6 f o r e q u itab le to lli n g , if th e D istric t C o u rt d e ter m in e s th a t M r. F lem in g is e n tit led to e q u ita b le to llin g b a s e d o n h is a tto rn e y ’s m is c o n d u c t, th e n th is c la im w o u ld b e tim e ly. -16- g ra n tin g a C O A th a t any one o f th e c la im s in th e h a b e a s p e titio n s ta te s s u c h a c la im . See R ei d v. A ngelone , 3 6 9 F .3 d 3 6 3 , 3 7 2 (4 th C ir. 2 0 0 4 ); s ee al s o G i bs on , 232 F. 3d at803 (co n clud ing that “a t l ea st on e” o f p eti ti o n er’s claim s stated a v ali d co n sti tuti o n al claim ); Jef f erson v. W

elbo rn , 222 F. 3d 286, 289 ( 7th C i r . 2000) ( hol di ng “[a ] tl eas ts om e of [ the p eti ti o n er’s] claim s fa ciall yall eg e the ‘de n ial o f a co n sti tuti o n al ri g h t’ ”). M r. F lem in g a ss e rts s e v e ra l cla im s, a t lea st tw o o f w h ich (o n e o n e a c h c o u n t) sta te a val i d cons t i tut i onal cl ai m . Fi r s t , M r . Fl emi ng cont ends thathe r ece i ved i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el i n vi ol at i on of hi s Si xth A m endmentr i ghtbecaus e hi s tr i al couns el fai l ed t o per fec ta di r ects t at e courtappea l fr om the gui l ty - pl ea c onvi ct i on. M r . Fl emi ng assert s that he asked h i s coun sel t o ap peal hi s guil ty -pl ea con vict i on . In fact , defe nse couns el not i fi ed the s t at e courtof hi s i nt entt o appea l the convi ct i on, butno appea l w as e v e r f iled . T h is C o u rt h a s h e ldth a t “[ w ]h e re . . . ap p e llate c o u n se l n e g lig e n tlyf a ils to per fec tan appe al , couns el ’ s fai l ur e nec es s ar i l ycons t i tut es i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance . ” Johns on v. Cham

pi on , 288 F. 3d 1215, 1229–30 ( 10th C i r . 2002) ( ci t i ng E vi t t s v. Lucey , 4 6 9 U .S . 3 8 7 , 3 9 7 (1 9 8 5 )); s ee al s o B akerv. Kais er , 9 2 9 F . 2 d 1 4 9 5 , 1 4 9 9 n . 3 (10 th C ir . 1 9 9 1 ) ( n o tin g th a t if

it is th e c lie n t’ s w is h to ap p e a l, c o u n s e l m u s t p e rf e c t a n ap p e a l) . S ec o n d , M r. F lem ing all eg es th e state k n o w ing lyu sed p erjured test im o n yo f a p ri m ary w itn e ss a t trial. W e h a v e h e ldth a t th e p ro se c u tio n ’s k n o w in g so licita tio n o f , o r f a ilu re to 6 corr ect , per

j ur ed t es t i m onyvi ol at es a def endant ’ s due pr oces s r i ght s and w i l l be gr ounds-17-

fora new tr i al “‘ i f the fa l s e t es t i m onycoul d i n anyr eas onabl e l i kel i hood have a ffe ct ed the j udgm entof the j ury . ’ ” See U nited S tates v. V

azi ri , 1 6 4 F . 3 d 5 5 6 , 5 6 3 (10 th C ir . 1999) . A l though w e i nt i m at e no vi ew on the mer i t s of thes e cl ai m s , w e conc l ude that r eas onabl e j ur i s t s coul d debat e w hetherthe pet i t i on s t at es a val i d cons t i tut i onal cl ai m of th e d e n ial o f

a c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t. If th e D istric t C o u rt f in d s M r. F lem in g is e n tit led to e q u itab le to lli n g , the c o n stitu tio n a l issu e s h e se e k s to ra ise o n ap p e a l ar e a d e q u a te to deserve further proceedings. I I I . CO NC L US I ON W e G R A N T M r . Fl emi ng’ s appl i cat i on fora C O A on the ques t i on of the t i m el i nes s of hi s § 2254 pet i t i on. W e al s o gr anthi s m ot i on t o pr ocee d in fo rm a p a u p e ris . W e V A C A T E the j udgm entof the D i s tr i ctC ourtdi s m i s s i ng M r . Fl emi ng’ s pet i t i on and R E M A N D f

o r f u rth e r p ro c e e d in g s c o n sis ten t w ith th is o p in io n . A p p e llan t’s m o tio n to s u p p l e me n tth e r e c o r d i s GR ANT E D.