UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MARTA PARDO, 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-10597 

 Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [10, 13] 

Plaintiff Marta Pardo (“Pardo”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), 

challenging the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 

denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act 

(the “Act”). Both parties have filed summary judgment motions [10, 13], which have been 

referred to this Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B). 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the 

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) conclusion that Pardo is not disabled under the Act. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

[13] be GRANTED, Pardo’s Motion for Summary Judgment [10] be DENIED, and that, 

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g), the ALJ’s decision be AFFIRMED. 

 

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II. REPORT 

A. Procedural History 

On April 24, 2012, Pardo filed an application for DIB, alleging a disability onset date of 

June 7, 2011. (Tr. 128-30). This application was denied initially on August 23, 2012. (Tr. 85-

88). Pardo filed a timely request for an administrative hearing, which was held on September 12, 

2013, before ALJ Kim Bright. (Tr. 38-68). Pardo, who was represented by attorney Marianne 

Dergham, testified at the hearing, as did vocational expert Charles McBee. (Id.). On September 

26, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Pardo is not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 

19-33). On December 30, 2014, the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-5). Pardo timely 

filed for judicial review of the final decision on February 17, 2015. (Doc. #1). 

B. Framework for Disability Determinations 

Under the Act, DIB are available only for those who have a “disability.” See Colvin v. 

Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). The Act defines “disability” as the: 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner’s regulations provide that a disability is to be 

determined through the application of a five-step sequential analysis: 

Step One: If the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity, benefits are denied without further analysis. 

Step Two: If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments that “significantly limits . . . physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities,” benefits are denied without 

further analysis. 

Step Three: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, 

has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, 

and the severe impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 

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the regulations, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled 

regardless of age, education, or work experience. 

Step Four: If the claimant is able to perform his or her past relevant work, 

benefits are denied without further analysis. 

Step Five: Even if the claimant is unable to perform his or her past 

relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform, in view of his or her age, education, and work 

experience, benefits are denied. 

Scheuneman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 6937331, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing 

20 C.F.R. §404.1520); see also Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 

2001). “The burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four steps .... If the analysis 

reaches the fifth step without a finding that claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the 

[defendant].” Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). 

C. Background 

1. Pardo’s Reports and Testimony 

At the time of the administrative hearing, Pardo was 42 years old, and at 5’8” tall, 

weighed 200 pounds. (Tr. 43, 184). She lived in a house with her husband and two minor 

children. (Tr. 44, 156). She completed two years of college but had no additional education. 

(Tr. 45-46). Previously, she performed clerical work and then was employed as a district sales 

manager for Avon Corporation. (Tr. 46-47). 

Pardo alleges disability as a result of bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, anxiety, 

rheumatoid arthritis, chronic foot pain, and migraines. (Tr. 184). She testified that she stopped 

working in June 2011, after she broke her foot dismounting a horse. (Tr. 47, 50-51). Since that 

time, she has had two surgeries on her foot, but says “it still hasn’t stopped hurting.” (Tr. 50). 

At the time of the hearing, Pardo was wearing a “bone stimulator.” (Tr. 49). 

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Pardo also testified that, at the time she stopped working, she was overwhelmed and 

“stressed out” at work as a result of her mental impairments. (Tr. 55). She sees both a 

psychiatrist and a therapist for her mental health issues. (Tr. 51). She testified that she had a 

“complete nervous breakdown” in 2000 and was hospitalized for two weeks, but she was able to 

continue working for years after this hospitalization. (Tr. 52-55). According to Pardo, she has 

always struggled with concentration and focus at work, but this problem gradually worsened 

over the years. (Tr. 53). In July 2012, she was hospitalized for three days after she reported 

attempting suicide by taking pills. (Tr. 54). She testified that she is “unmotivated” and 

“overwhelmed” and feels like there is a “great cloud over [her] head all the time.” (Tr. 54). She 

also has difficulty with her memory, saying that she forgets “basically everything.” (Tr. 56). 

Pardo is able to drive and does so regularly. (Tr. 45, 160). She prepares meals, attends to 

her own personal care, cares for her son and horse, performs household chores (such as 

vacuuming, mopping, and sweeping), shops in stores, and is able to pay bills, use a checkbook, 

and handle a savings account. (Tr. 48, 157-60). She enjoys reading, watching television, 

scrapbooking, and spending time with her horse. (Tr. 48, 162). She talks to her mother 

frequently, attends church weekly, and goes out with her husband on occasion. (Tr. 56, 162). 

2. Medical Evidence

 a. Physical Impairments 

On June 30, 2011, Pardo first saw Richard Needleman, M.D., who noted that she had a 

Lisfranc fracture of her right foot and recommended surgery (which was performed the 

following week). (Tr. 221-22). On July 20, 2011, Pardo returned to see Dr. Needleman, who 

noted that she had mild swelling but was progressing well. (Tr. 223). On August 3, 2011, and 

October 5, 2011, Dr. Needleman continued to note that Pardo was progressing well after surgery, 

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with no particular complaints. (Tr. 224-25). Pardo continued to have minimal discomfort, if 

any, over the next couple of months, and Dr. Needleman consistently noted that she was doing 

very well, with full range of motion, and no swelling, tenderness, or pain on provocative testing. 

(Tr. 225-27). 

On January 18, 2012, Pardo underwent a second surgery to have the hardware from the 

first surgery removed. (Tr. 243-44). One week later, Dr. Needleman noted some discomfort on 

provocative testing, but unremarkable foot and ankle motion. (Tr. 228). On February 8, 2012, 

Pardo reported more pain than she had prior to the surgery, and she was directed to wear a 

footplate in her sneaker. (Tr. 229). On March 7, 2012, Pardo reported severe pain in the anterior 

aspect of her foot, saying that she could not tolerate the footplate. (Tr. 230). Dr. Needleman 

documented discomfort over the first tarsometatarsal joint and unremarkable foot and ankle 

motion. (Id.). 

At a follow-up visit to Dr. Needleman on March 14, 2012, Pardo reported that she no 

longer had pain in the medial aspect of her foot, but she did have pain under the ball of her foot. 

(Tr. 231). According to Dr. Needleman, a CT scan showed a possible slight irregularity in the 

third tarsometatarsal joint and some narrowing along the plantar lateral aspect of the first 

tarsometarsal joint. (Tr. 231, 441). He recommended a Spenco insert for her shoe. (Tr. 231). 

On April 4, 2012, Pardo continued to report pain in the medial aspect of her foot and 

occasional lateral discomfort. (Tr. 232). Dr. Needleman suggested that they could take care of 

all present and possible future problems in one surgery by fusing the first tarsometatarsal joint, 

but Pardo was not interested in surgery at that time and wanted to wait until the fall. (Id.). As a 

result, Dr. Needleman stated: “It is important to know that not only may she require surgery in 

the future but she also is under significant limitations in her activity.” (Id.). 

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Pardo returned to see Dr. Needleman on August 1, 2012, reporting less discomfort in the 

ball of her foot. (Tr. 411). She had no pain on examination but some discomfort in the inner 

aspect of her foot with ambulation. (Id.). On September 12, 2012, Pardo reported some 

discomfort when she performed particular maneuvers on her horse that required a lot of pressure 

on her foot. (Tr. 358). She indicated a desire to proceed with the third surgery that had been 

recommended, but Dr. Needleman postponed this surgery until after Pardo quit smoking. (Id.). 

Pardo eventually had a third surgery on October 25, 2012. (Tr. 393-400). One week 

later, she presented to Dr. Needleman with no complaints, saying that her foot felt fine. (Tr. 

359). Dr. Needleman reported moderate swelling but noted that Pardo was progressing very 

well, and he again urged her to quit smoking, noting that it can increase healing time. (Id.). At 

follow-up visits in November and December 2012, Pardo reported that her foot felt fine, and Dr. 

Needleman consistently noted that she was progressing well. (Tr. 360, 417). 

On January 11, 2013, Pardo continued to report that her foot felt fine and that she was up 

to full weight bearing. (Tr. 418). Dr. Needleman again urged Pardo to stop smoking, as he was 

concerned that a nonunion was developing. (Id.). A CT scan performed a few days later showed 

stable postsurgical changes involving the midfoot. (Tr. 444). At a visit on January 25, 2013, Dr. 

Needleman added an arch support to Pardo’s walker boot and recommended a bone stimulator. 

(Tr. 419). He also indicated that he had “been trying to get her back in the cast with the toe 

plate,” but she refused. (Id.). On February 22, 2013, Pardo reported pain in the mid medial 

aspect of her foot. (Tr. 420). On examination, there was no swelling, but she had discomfort in 

the first tarsometatarsal region on provocative testing. (Id.). 

On March 29, 2013, Pardo reported no pain. (Tr. 424). A CT scan performed on April 5, 

2013 was unchanged from the one three months earlier. (Tr. 425, 445). On April 12, 2013, 

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Pardo reported “absolutely no pain,” and a few weeks later, she continued to report no pain. (Tr. 

425-26). On May 24, 2013, Dr. Needleman noted that recent x-rays were unchanged and 

advised her to continue with the bone stimulator and full length graphite foot plate. (Tr. 427). 

He indicated that if she had continued pain, she might need revision surgery after she stopped 

smoking. (Id.). At her next visit, on June 21, 2013, Pardo reported that she had only a little 

discomfort over the medial aspect of her ankle. (Tr. 428). Dr. Needleman continued to have 

concern about whether her first tarsal metatarsal arthrodesis was healed and advised her to 

discontinue walking around the house barefoot. (Id.). On July 19, 2013, Pardo still had some 

discomfort, but a July 24, 2013 CT scan showed a stable right foot. (Tr. 429, 446). 

 b. Mental Impairments 

Pardo treated with Michael Boudrie, a social worker, from 2010 to 2012. (Tr. 300-17, 

320-57). She also received mental health counseling at Apex Behavioral Health from at least 

January 2011 through July 2013. (Tr. 270-91, 361-64, 447-66). Although these handwritten 

notes are difficult to decipher, they make clear that she routinely denied suicidal or homicidal 

ideations. (Id.). On July 5, 2012, however, she was briefly admitted to Oakwood Hospital after 

she claimed that she tried to harm herself by taking pills. (Tr. 389-91). From August 2012 to 

November 2012, Pardo continued to report moderate depression and anxiety, but a good 

response to treatment. (Tr. 322-23, 356-57). Updated progress notes from Apex indicate that 

Pardo’s mental health remained stable or improving throughout 2013, with relatively normal 

exam findings. (Tr. 447-54). 

On August 16, 2012, Pardo attended a psychological consultative examination with 

Gayle Oliver-Brannon, Ph.D. (Tr. 296-99). Pardo reported being able to care for her hygiene, 

perform household chores, prepare meals, and shop. (Tr. 296-97). She demonstrated appropriate 

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judgment and insight, and her speech was clear and logical. (Tr. 297). Pardo was diagnosed 

with bipolar disorder and general anxiety disorder, and her prognosis was characterized as fair to 

guarded. (Tr. 298). Dr. Oliver-Brannon then opined: 

The claimant seems to need ongoing medical and mental health services to 

treat mood and psychiatric issues. Such issues seem to prevent her from 

engaging in successful long term employment. She is able to engage in 

simple to moderate daily living tasks. She seems socially appropriate with 

others. She seems motivated to improve [her] condition and recognizes 

she needs mental health treatment to function as normal as possible. She 

does adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. 

(Tr. 299). 

3. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Charles McBee testified as an independent vocational expert (“VE”) at the administrative 

hearing. (Tr. 59-67). The ALJ asked the VE to imagine a hypothetical individual of Pardo’s 

age, education, and work experience who can perform light work with the following additional 

limitations: occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds; occasional stooping, balancing, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; able to perform 

simple, routine tasks consistent with unskilled work in a static work environment with few 

changes; and only superficial interactions with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. (Tr. 62-

65). The VE testified that the hypothetical individual would not be capable of performing 

Pardo’s past relevant work. (Tr. 64-65). However, the VE further testified that the hypothetical 

individual would be capable of working in the jobs of photocopy machine operator (2,000 jobs in 

the state of Michigan), hand packager (3,000 jobs), and folder (2,000 jobs). (Tr. 64-65). 

D. The ALJ’s Findings 

At Step One of the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Pardo has not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 7, 2011 (the alleged onset date). (Tr. 21). At 

Step Two, the ALJ found that Pardo has the severe impairments of bipolar disorder, major 

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depressive disorder, rheumatoid arthritis, migraines, fractured foot status-post surgery, and 

obesity. (Tr. 22). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Pardo’s impairments, whether considered 

alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. (Tr. 22-24). 

The ALJ then found that Pardo retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform light work with the following limitations: occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; 

occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional stooping, balancing, kneeling, 

crouching, and crawling; able to perform simple, routine tasks consistent with unskilled work in 

a static work environment with few changes; and only superficial interactions with coworkers, 

supervisors, and the public. (Tr. 24). 

At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Pardo is unable to perform her past relevant work 

as a sales manager, claims technician, or clerical worker. (Tr. 31-32). At Step Five, the ALJ 

concluded, based in part on the VE’s testimony, that Pardo is capable of performing a significant 

number of jobs that exist in the national economy. (Tr. 32-33). As a result, the ALJ concluded 

that Pardo is not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 33). 

E. Standard of Review 

The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final administrative 

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Judicial review under this statute is limited in that the 

court “must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the 

Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact 

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 

591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 

647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f an agency has failed to adhere to its own procedures, we will not 

remand for further administrative proceedings unless the claimant has been prejudiced on the 

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merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency’s procedural lapses.”) (internal 

quotations omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

decision, the court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide 

questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility 

of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). 

When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings, the court is limited to an 

examination of the record and must consider the record as a whole. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; 

Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). The court “may 

look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals 

Council,” or in this case, the ALJ. Heston, 245 F.3d at 535; Walker v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ 

or this court discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. See Kornecky v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n ALJ can consider all 

evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by 

a party.”) (internal quotations omitted). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, “it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter 

differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted);

Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (“if substantial evidence 

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supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial 

evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion’”). 

F. Analysis 

In her motion for summary judgment, Pardo argues that the ALJ erred in (1) failing to 

adequately assess the credibility of her subjective complaints; and (2) failing to give adequate 

weight to the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Needleman. (Doc. #10 at 15-21). Each of 

these arguments is addressed below. 

 1. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Credibility Analysis 

As the Sixth Circuit has held, determinations of credibility related to subjective 

complaints of pain rest with the ALJ because “the ALJ’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of 

the claimant ‘is invaluable, and should not be discarded lightly.’” Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Beavers v. Sec’y of Health, Ed. & 

Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978)). Thus, an ALJ’s credibility determination will not 

be disturbed “absent compelling reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001). 

The ALJ is not simply required to accept the testimony of a claimant if it conflicts with medical 

reports and other evidence in the record. See Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 

(6th Cir. 1997). Rather, when a complaint of pain is in issue, after the ALJ finds a medical 

condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms, he 

must consider “the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence, the individual’s 

own statements about symptoms, statements and other information provided by treating or 

examining physicians . . . and any other relevant evidence in the case record” to determine if the 

claimant’s claims regarding the level of his pain are credible. Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7, 1996 WL 

374186, *1 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. §404.1529. 

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In this case, after finding at Step Two that Pardo suffers from severe mental and physical 

impairments (Tr. 22), the ALJ concluded that she nevertheless retains the residual functional 

capacity to perform a reduced range of light work (Tr. 24-31). In reaching this conclusion, the 

ALJ specifically referenced Pardo’s testimony that she cannot work because of her depression 

and inability to focus, as well as ongoing pain from her June 2011 right foot injury and 

subsequent surgeries. (Tr. 25). However, the ALJ found that while Pardo’s conditions could 

reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, her statements about the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible to the extent they 

conflicted with the RFC assessment. (Tr. 25-31). 

Pardo challenges this conclusion, principally arguing that the ALJ “failed to give specific 

reasons for discrediting her testimony” beyond “general statements.” (Doc. #10 at 16). The 

Court disagrees. As explained in greater detail below, in evaluating Pardo’s credibility, the ALJ 

specifically considered her activities of daily living, the objective medical evidence, and Pardo’s 

lack of adherence to prescribed treatment, and she gave good reasons for discrediting Pardo’s 

allegations of work-preclusive limitations. (Id.). 

As an initial matter, with respect to Pardo’s physical impairments, the ALJ properly 

considered the objective medical evidence when evaluating her credibility. Specifically, the ALJ 

noted that this evidence showed that Pardo responded well to treatment for her physical 

impairments. (Tr. 26-27). After Pardo had surgery in June 2011, subsequent progress notes 

reflect that the surgery was successful in relieving her symptoms, and she was progressing well. 

(Tr. 26, 223-27). Moreover, as the ALJ noted, physical examinations showed that Pardo had 

unremarkable foot and ankle motion and minimal discomfort (if any) on provocative testing. 

(Tr. 26, 223-32). In addition, a CT scan performed in March 2012, showed the fixation plate and 

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screws intact with no evidence of bony destruction or lytic changes to suggest osteomyelitis. 

(Tr. 26, 441). 

The ALJ also noted that Pardo eventually reported some discomfort when she performed 

certain maneuvers on her horse1

 and, as a result, underwent fusion surgery of the first 

tarsometatarsal joint with a calcaneal bone graft to her right foot in October 2012. (Tr. 26, 358, 

393-400). By January 2013, however, Pardo reported that she was having very little pain or 

discomfort, and examinations revealed no swelling. (Tr. 26, 418). Since that time, progress 

notes reveal that Pardo has continued to have minimal, if any, pain. (Tr. 26, 424-28). Moreover, 

an April 2013 CT scan showed a stable right foot. (Tr. 446). Such objective evidence is a 

“useful indicator” for an ALJ to use when evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s symptoms. 

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c)(2) (“Objective medical evidence of this type is a useful indicator to 

assist us in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of your symptoms 

and the effect those symptoms, such as pain, may have on your ability to work.”).2

The ALJ also noted that Pardo’s allegations of disabling mental symptoms are 

inconsistent with the treatment notes, which reflect that she has responded well to treatment. (Tr. 

28). Indeed, recent treatment notes reveal that Pardo has routinely had normal speech and 

                                                            

1

 The mere fact that Pardo was able to participate in horseback riding is inconsistent with 

complaints of disabling pain. 

2

 The ALJ also considered the fact that Pardo “has not been entirely compliant in following 

prescribed treatment recommendations” in concluding that her symptoms “may not have been as 

limiting as [she] has alleged in connection with this application.” (Tr. 30). Specifically, the ALJ 

noted that Pardo has continued to smoke cigarettes, despite repeatedly being advised to quit, as it 

places her at a higher risk for developing nonunion and increased incidence of wound problems 

and infection. (Tr. 30-31, 359-60, 417-19, 425). This is a proper consideration. See Sias v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 861 F.2d 475, 480 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the ALJ 

properly discounted the claimant’s credibility where he failed to follow prescribed treatment); 

Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *8 (noting that “the individual’s statements may be 

less credible if ... the medical reports or records show that the individual is not following the 

treatment as prescribed and there are no good reasons for this failure.”). 

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thought process, with her judgment, insight, orientation, memory, and concentration also fair 

and/or improved after her medications were adjusted. (Tr. 28, 447-54). The ALJ also noted that, 

at the August 2012 psychological consultative examination, Pardo presented as cooperative and 

in contact with reality, with appropriate judgment and insight, as well as clear and logical speech. 

(Tr. 28, 297). Again, the inconsistency between Pardo’s allegations of disability and the 

objective medical evidence is a valid consideration in evaluating her credibility.3 See, e.g., Allen 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 574910, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2015) (affirming ALJ’s 

decision to discount claimant’s credibility where the treatment notes were inconsistent with the 

severity of her alleged mental limitations). 

In addition, in assessing the credibility of Pardo’s allegations, the ALJ noted that, despite 

her allegations of disabling symptoms, she engages in extensive daily activities. Specifically, the 

ALJ noted that Pardo is able to care for her hygiene, perform household chores, prepare meals, 

shop, drive, and manage money. (Tr. 30). The ALJ also noted that Pardo routinely talks to her 

mother on the telephone, reads, watches television, and attends church, all of which suggest a 

broad range of ability to focus, concentrate, and interact socially. (Id.). It was entirely 

appropriate for the ALJ to consider the fact that Pardo’s ability to perform daily activities is less 

limited than one would expect, given her allegations of disabling symptoms. See Walters, 127 

F.3d at 532 (an ALJ may consider household and social activities in evaluating the credibility of 

the claimant’s allegations of disabling symptoms). 

In sum, the ALJ recognized the duty imposed upon her by the regulations and, contrary to 

Pardo’s assertions, did far more than make “general statements” that Pardo was not credible. 

                                                            

3

 In evaluating the credibility of Pardo’s claims of disabling mental symptoms, the ALJ also 

appropriately considered the fact that she actually stopped working due to her foot injury, and 

not because of any mental impairment. (Tr. 31). Indeed, as the ALJ noted, Pardo was able to 

work for more than ten years after a 2000 mental health hospitalization. (Tr. 31, 52-53). 

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(Doc. #10 at 16). Indeed, in assessing Pardo’s credibility, the ALJ properly considered her 

activities of daily living, the objective medical evidence, and her lack of adherence to prescribed 

treatment. Thus, the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.4

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s 

Decision to Give Little Weight to Dr. Needleman’s Opinion 

Pardo also argues that the ALJ erred in giving “little weight” to the April 2012 opinion5

of her treating physician, Dr. Needleman. (Doc. #10 at 18-21). Courts have recognized that an 

ALJ “‘must’ give a treating source opinion controlling weight if the treating source opinion is 

‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’ and is 

‘not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Blakley, 581 F.3d at 

406 (internal quotations omitted). While treating source opinions are entitled to controlling 

weight under these circumstances, it is “error to give an opinion controlling weight simply 

                                                            

4

 Towards the end of her argument regarding the ALJ’s credibility assessment, Pardo asserts: 

“here, Plaintiff’s ability to work has been severely over-estimated, resulting in an erroneous 

finding that she retains the ability to perform light work. The ALJ ignored Plaintiff’s numerous 

additional significant symptoms when determining that he could work as a photocopy machine 

operator, hand packager or folder (for example from the VE’s findings). The ALJ seems to have 

ignored even his own hypothetical posed to the VE, which asked if Plaintiff would be able to 

work if it was necessary for him to use the bathroom 8-10 times per shift, for approximately 5 

minutes per bathroom break. (Tr. 73).... Therefore, [sic] is requested that this matter be 

remanded due to the ALJ’s failure to consider the effects claimant’s severe depression and pain 

on her ability to perform sustained work activities.” (Doc. #10 at 17-18). This argument is 

flawed in numerous respects. First, Pardo cannot show error by making a conclusory statement 

that the ALJ purportedly “ignored [her] numerous additional significant symptoms,” without 

specifying what those symptoms are. Second, Pardo’s reference to the need for bathroom breaks 

appears to be related to a different male claimant, not Pardo; Transcript page 73 is not part of the 

hearing testimony in this case, and nowhere during the actual hearing in this case was such an 

issue discussed. Finally, as discussed above, the ALJ did adequately discuss Pardo’s credibility 

in the context of her alleged mental impairments. 

5

 In her motion for summary judgment, the Commissioner argues that, “Dr. Needleman never 

offered any ‘medical opinion’ subject to the Treating Physician’s Rule.” (Doc. #13 at 23). 

Though the Court finds some merit to this argument – as the “opinion” at issue is merely a single 

sentence contained in a treatment note – it is a moot issue, because Pardo’s substantive argument 

lacks merit. 

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because it is the opinion of a treating source” unless it is well-supported and consistent with the 

record as a whole. Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *2 (July 2, 1996); see also Warner 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Treating physicians’ opinions are 

only given such deference when supported by objective medical evidence.”). If the ALJ declines 

to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, she must document how much weight 

she gives it, considering a number of factors, including the “length of the treatment relationship 

and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, 

supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the 

specialization of the treating source.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th 

Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2) (ALJ must “give good reasons” for weight given to 

treating source opinion)). 

In his April 2012 opinion, Dr. Needleman stated that, “It is important to know that not 

only may [Pardo] require surgery in the future but she also is under significant limitations in her 

activity.” (Tr. 232). The ALJ explicitly considered Dr. Needleman’s statement, noting that it 

was “not consistent with the totality of the record.” (Tr. 28). For example, the ALJ noted that 

Dr. Needleman’s own progress notes failed to reveal the significant clinical and laboratory 

abnormalities one would expect if Pardo were indeed so limited, “as examinations by him 

showed sensation without any deficit, unremarkable foot and/or ankle motion and minimal 

discomfort, if any, on provocative testing.” (Tr. 28 (citing Tr. 223-32, 243, 405-09, 411-12, 430-

33, 437-38) (emphasis in original)). And, the ALJ noted that Dr. Needleman’s statement was 

inconsistent with the “relatively benign” CT findings, as well as Pardo’s activities of daily living 

(including the fact that she was able to ride her horse until at least September 2012). (Tr. 28). 

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Pardo makes no effort to address – let alone rebut – the reasons offered by the ALJ for 

discounting Dr. Needleman’s opinion. 

In sum, the Court concludes that the ALJ gave good reasons for giving little weight to Dr. 

Needleman’s opinion, and these reasons are supported by substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1527(c).6

For all of the above reasons, and upon an independent review of the entire record, the 

Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment [13] be GRANTED, Pardo’s Motion for Summary Judgment [10] be 

DENIED, and the ALJ’s decision be AFFIRMED. 

Dated: October 30, 2015 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation and 

Order, any party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and 

recommendations and the order set forth above. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(1). Failure to timely file objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, (1985); United States v. Sullivan, 431 

F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005). Only specific objections to this Report and Recommendation will 

                                                            

6

 In the last paragraph of her motion, Pardo appears to challenge the ALJ’s Step Five 

determination based on the suggestion that a “static work environment” would preclude jobs 

such as a hand packager. (Doc. #10 at 23). Pardo offers no support for this assertion, however, 

and she ignores the fact that the VE provided testimony to the contrary. (Tr. 65). Thus, this 

argument too is without merit. 

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be preserved for the Court’s appellate review; raising some objections but not others will not 

preserve all objections a party may have. See Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 

F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596-97 (6th 

Cir. 2006). Copies of any objections must be served upon the Magistrate Judge. See E.D. Mich. 

LR 72.1(d)(2). 

A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with 

a copy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Any such response should be 

concise, and should address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue presented in the 

objections. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on October 30, 2015. 

 s/Felicia Moses for Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager 

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