United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC., 

DBA SCAG POWER EQUIPMENT,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

THE TORO COMPANY, 

EXMARK MANUFACTURING CO., INC.,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2016-2433, 2016-2514

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin in No. 2:16-cv-00544-WED, 

Chief Judge Rudolph T. Randa, Judge Lynn Adelman. 

______________________ 

Decided: February 16, 2017

______________________ 

MICHAEL T. GRIGGS, Boyle Fredrickson, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by 

ADAM BROOKMAN, SARAH M. WONG. 

RACHEL C. HUGHEY, Merchant & Gould P.C., Minneapolis, MN, argued for defendants-appellants. Also represented by ANTHONY RICHARD ZEULI. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
2 METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

The United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Wisconsin granted Metalcraft of Mayville, 

Inc.’s motion for a preliminary injunction precluding The 

Toro Company and Exmark Manufacturing Co., Inc. from 

making, using, selling, and offering to sell lawnmowers 

equipped with platform suspension systems that infringe

U.S. Patent No. 8,186,475 (“the ’475 patent”). We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc., d/b/a Scag Power Equipment (“Scag”), manufactures commercial riding 

lawnmowers. To improve its mowers, Scag developed a 

suspended operator platform, which is disclosed and 

claimed in the ’475 patent. The ’475 patent discloses a 

suspended operator platform for a ride-on lawnmower or 

other riding light utility vehicle connected to a rigid 

chassis by a suspension system. ’475 patent at Abstract, 

2:33–34. The operator platform supports the entire body 

of the operator. Id. at 2:51–52. The suspension system 

suspends the operator platform from the chassis in a 

manner that isolates an operator from vibrations, or 

shock loads, generated by the mower during use or when 

driven over uneven terrain. Id. at 4:1–6. The operator 

platform can suspend or isolate some controls from the 

rigid chassis. Id. at 2:37–39. For example, the patent 

teaches that the steering controls may be mounted on the 

suspended platform. Id. at 2:39–41. 

Scag commercialized the system disclosed in the ’475 

patent in its Cheetah line of lawnmowers. In 2015, both 

The Toro Company and its wholly owned subsidiary, 

Exmark Manufacturing Co., Inc., (collectively “Toro”), 

introduced riding lawnmowers with suspended operator 

platforms to compete with Scag’s Cheetah line. Toro 

introduced the platform as part of its new MyRIDETM 

suspension system, and Exmark introduced the platform 

as an upgrade to its Lazer Z Series lawnmowers. It is 
METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY 3

undisputed that the steering controls in Toro and 

Exmark’s riding lawnmowers are connected to the chassis, not the operator platform. Appellants’ Br. 24, Appellee’s Br. 13.

On May 5, 2016, Scag filed an infringement action

against Toro in the Eastern District of Wisconsin and

simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction 

to enjoin Toro from making, using, selling, and offering to 

sell lawnmowers with platform suspension systems that 

infringe its ’475 patent. On August 1, the district court 

granted Scag’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On 

August 4, Toro filed a notice of appeal and a motion to 

stay entry of the preliminary injunction. The district 

court denied Toro’s motion to stay entry of the injunction 

and granted Scag’s motion to set bond and enter the 

injunction order. 

Toro appeals the district court’s grant of a preliminary 

injunction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and (c)(1).

DISCUSSION

In general, we review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction using the law of the regional circuit, here 

the Seventh Circuit. Murata Mach. USA v. Daifuku Co., 

830 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Trebro Mfg., 

Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 

2014)). “However, the Federal Circuit has itself built a 

body of precedent applying the general preliminary injunction considerations to a large number of factually 

variant patent cases, and gives dominant effect to Federal 

Circuit precedent insofar as it reflects considerations 

specific to patent issues.” Id. (quoting Trebro, 748 F.3d 

at 1165). Both the Seventh Circuit and the Federal 

Circuit review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. See Lawson Prods., Inc. v. 

Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1437 (7th Cir. 1986); Abbott 

Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
4 METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY

2008). “An abuse of discretion may be established by 

showing that the court made a clear error of judgment in 

weighing relevant factors or exercised its discretion based 

upon an error of law or clearly erroneous factual findings.” Novo Nordisk of North Am., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 

77 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is 

within the sound discretion of the district court. Id. To 

obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must establish 

“that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, 

and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 

1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, a patentee must show that

it will likely prove infringement of the asserted claims

and that its infringement claim will likely withstand the 

alleged infringer’s challenges to patent validity and 

enforceability. Sciele Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 

F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Amazon.com, Inc. 

v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001)). A preliminary injunction should not issue if 

the accused infringer “raises a substantial question 

concerning either infringement or validity.” Amazon.com, 

239 F.3d at 1350. 

A. Likelihood of Success 

1. Likelihood of Infringement

Infringement is a question of fact we review for clear 

error. AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 

1056 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We review claim construction de 

novo except for subsidiary fact findings, which we review 

for clear error. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 

135 S. Ct. 831, 841–42 (2015). The factual components of 

claim construction include the background science or the 
METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY 5

meaning of a term to a skilled artisan during the relevant 

time period. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 

1034, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Teva, 135 

S. Ct. at 841).

Asserted independent claims 11, 14, and 21 all claim 

“an operator platform that supports the seat and an 

entire body of an operator during use of the utility vehicle.” ’475 patent at 12:4–5, 12:27–28, 13:10–11. In opposing Scag’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Toro did

not dispute that its accused mowers meet the asserted 

patent claims, except with respect to one limitation. 

J.A. 374. Toro argued its accused mowers do not infringe 

because the accused devices do not meet the limitation 

“an entire body of an operator.” Id. It argued its mowers 

lack this limitation because the steering controls of the

accused mowers are mounted to the chassis, not the 

operator platform, and therefore the operator’s hands and 

arms are not supported by the platform. J.A. 375–77. 

The district court concluded that Metalcraft was likely to succeed on the infringement issue. J.A. 14. It 

acknowledged Toro’s argument but concluded that “the 

fact that the defendants’ lawnmowers have steering 

controls attached to the chassis, as opposed to the operator platform, is not a defense to infringement.” J.A. 12. It 

construed “an operator platform that supports . . . an 

entire body of an operator” “in reference to how a person 

sits in an ordinary chair.” Id. 

On appeal, Toro argues the district court erroneously 

rejected Toro’s noninfringement defense because the 

court’s construction of “an entire body of an operator” 

excludes the operator’s hands and arms. We disagree. 

Nowhere did the district court conclude that “an entire 
6 METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY

body of an operator” excluded the operator’s arms and 

hands.1 

The district court correctly determined that the claims 

at issue do not require that the steering controls be 

mounted on the suspended operator platform. A review of 

the claims at issue demonstrates that none of them contain such a limitation. Unasserted dependent claims, in 

contrast, contain limitations that require the steering 

controls be connected to the operator platform. See, e.g.,

dependent claim 12. The claims also delineate between 

two structurally separate elements: the operator platform 

that supports the seat and the entire body of the operator 

and the steering controls. See id. (requiring that the 

steering controls be connected to and move in unison with 

the operator platform). The steering controls are not 

claimed as a component of the operator platform. Moreover, the specification makes clear that the operator platform supports the entire body and that steering controls 

are connected to, but not part of, the operator platform. 

The specification consistently distinguishes the operator 

platform from components that may be attached to it, 

 

1 Toro relies for its claim that the district court held 

that an operator’s entire body does not include an operator’s arms or hands on one sentence in the district court’s 

opinion that states “[a]ll of the accused mowers have 

steering controls connected to the chassis, not the suspended operator platform, which means that the platform 

does not support the rider’s arms and hands,” to understand that the district court made such a finding. We 

decline to interpret this single sentence, located in the 

middle of the court’s discussion of the parties’ arguments, 

as a fact-finding. J.A. 10. We agree with Scag that this 

sentence is merely part of the court’s summary of the 

positions taken by each party and refers to Toro’s position.
METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY 7

such as the steering controls. ’475 patent at 2:39–40 

(“steering controls may be mounted on the suspended 

platform”); Id. at 2:51-55; id. at 5:3–5 (“[s]teering controls 55 include a pair of levers 58A, 58B that are pivotally attached to the operator platform 70”); id. at 6:9–10 

(“the components attached to the operator platform 70

such as steering controls 55”). The ’475 patent makes 

clear that it is the suspended operator platform that 

supports “an entire body of an operator” and that the 

operator platform is a separate and distinct element from 

the steering controls. In light of the claims and the specification, we reject Toro’s claim construction argument. 

Toro also argues that the “entire body of an operator” 

limitation requires the steering controls be mounted on 

the operator platform or else the operator’s hands will not 

be isolated from shock loads. It argues that since its 

accused mowers have steering controls connected to the 

chassis, its mowers do not isolate the operator’s entire 

body from shock loads and therefore do not meet the 

“entire body of an operator” limitation. Toro improperly

equates supporting the entire body of an operator with 

isolating every aspect of an operator’s body from shock 

loads. 

No doubt, the ’475 patent discusses the advantages of 

isolating an operator’s body from shock loads. However, 

the ’475 patent treats supporting the entire body of an 

operator and isolating the operator from shock loads as 

two distinct aspects of the claimed invention. Referring to 

Figures 1 and 2, the specification states that the mower 

includes a suspension system that “suspends the operator 

platform 70 from the chassis in a manner that isolates an 

operator from vibrations, or shock-type or other loads.” 

’475 patent at 4:1–4 (emphasis added). This is different 

from when it refers again to Figures 1 and 2 and states, 

“suspension system 100 is configured to support an entire 

body of the operator, the operator platform 70, and the 

components attached to the operator platform 70 such as 
8 METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY

steering controls 55.” Id. at 6:7–10 (emphasis added). 

The ’475 patent uses precise language to differentiate 

between the distinct concepts of supporting and isolating 

with respect to other elements as well. The specification 

states, “with yet another aspect of the invention, an 

operator’s seat is vibrationally isolated from a suspended 

operator platform,” and “[i]solating the mower deck 20

from the suspension system 100 prevents scalping.” Id.

at 3:1–3, 6:22–23 (emphases added). In contrast, the 

specification states, “[a] drive train is supported in a 

generally rigid manner in chassis 10” and “[m]ower 

deck 20 is supported by frame 12.” Id. at 4:9–10, 4:14–15

(emphases added). 

Finally, the claim language itself keeps these concepts 

separate. In contrast to asserted claims 11, 14, and 21, 

which claim “an operator platform that supports the seat 

and an entire body of an operator,” claim 5 requires “a 

seat and at least one elastomeric isolation mount connecting the seat to the operator platform to reduce transmission of vibrations therebetween.” Since the ’475 patent 

discerns between the invention’s functionality of supporting versus isolating from vibrations, we may not import 

into the entire body of an operator limitation a functional 

requirement that every part of the body be isolated from 

shock loads. It would be improper to import the isolation 

feature into the separate entire body limitation as Toro 

asks us to do. As a result, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Toro’s noninfringement defense and determining that Metalcraft had 

established a likelihood of success on infringement.

2. Substantial Question of Validity

Obviousness is a question of law based upon underlying factual determinations, which we review for clear 

error. Senju Pharm. Co. v. Lupin Ltd., 780 F.3d 1337, 

1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A claim is invalid for obviousness 

“if the differences between the claimed invention and the 
METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY 9

prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole 

would have been obvious before the effective filing date of 

the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in 

the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 

35 U.S.C. § 103. In determining whether there would 

have been a motivation to combine prior art references to 

arrive at the claimed invention, it is insufficient to simply 

conclude the combination would have been obvious without identifying any reason why a person of skill in the art 

would have made the combination. See In re Van Os, 844 

F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Whether a skilled 

artisan would have been motivated to combine the references is a question of fact. Apple Inc., 839 F.3d at 1051. 

Toro argued that claim 21 would have been obvious in 

light of U.S. Patent No. 3,420,568 (“Henriksson”) and 

Japanese Patent Application No. JP55-69340 (“Sasaki”). 

Henriksson discloses a device for resilient support of a 

driver’s compartment mounted on a vehicle frame to 

provide vertical movement to cushion the driver from 

shocks absorbed by the vehicle from the earth or road. 

Henriksson at 1:15–25. Sasaki discloses a device for 

adjusting an initial load of a spring in a damper used in a 

rear-wheel suspension system of a motorcycle or the like. 

Sasaki at 2.

Toro argued that a person of ordinary skill in the art 

would have been motivated to combine Henriksson and 

Sasaki. It argued that while Henriksson does not disclose 

dual (fine and course) adjusters, as claimed by claim 21,2

dual shock adjusters were well-known in the prior art. 

J.A. 379. It presented Sasaki as prior art that discloses 

 

2 Claim 21 claims “a suspension system connecting 

the operator platform to the chassis and including (i) a 

course-stiffness adjuster . . . and (ii) a fine-stiffness adjuster.” ’475 patent at 13:12–17. 
10 METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY

shock absorbers with both fine and course adjustment. 

Id. 

The district court rejected Toro’s motivation to combine argument. It recognized that “a patent ‘composed of 

several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, 

known in the prior art’” and that “it can be important to 

identify a reason that would have prompted a person of 

ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” 

J.A. 13–14 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 

U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007)). It concluded that Toro failed to 

raise a substantial question of validity, stating Toro 

offered “no reason, and the Court cannot imagine one, 

that a person of ordinary skill in this field would combine 

a motorcycle shock with a suspended truck cab and come 

up with a suspended operator platform.” J.A. 13–14. 

On appeal, Toro argues the district court’s analysis is 

inconsistent with KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21, which stated: 

‘The idea that a designer hoping to make an adjustable 

electronic pedal would ignore Asano because Asano was 

designed to solve the constant ratio problem makes little 

sense. A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” Toro argues it would 

have been obvious to a person of skill in the art to combine Henriksson and Sasaki because Henriksson sought 

to solve the problem of transmission of shock loads to the 

operator and specified conventional and telescope-type 

shock absorbers as methods of reducing shock loads. 

We hold that the district court’s finding that there 

would not have been a motivation to combine is not clearly erroneous. The district court correctly acknowledged 

that it is not enough for Toro to merely demonstrate that 

elements of the claimed invention were independently 

known in the prior art. Often, every element of a claimed 

invention can be found in the prior art. In re Kotzab, 217 
METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY 11

F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Moreover, Toro merely 

identifies a problem that Henriksson sought to solve. 

However, “knowledge of a problem and motivation to 

solve it are entirely different from motivation to combine 

particular references.” Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 

512 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

We agree with the district court that Toro provides no 

explanation or reasoning for concluding that one of skill in 

the art would have combined these particular references 

to produce the claimed invention. Without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to 

arrive at the claimed invention, we are left with only

hindsight bias that KSR warns against. See KSR, 550 

U.S. at 421. And while we understand that “[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic 

conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation,” we also recognize that we cannot allow hindsight 

bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art 

patches into something that is the claimed invention. See 

KSR, 550 U.S. at 419, 421. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

rejecting Toro’s obviousness defense and determining that 

Toro did not raise a substantial question of validity.

Toro also argued below that Henriksson anticipates 

claims 11 and 14. The district court found that Henriksson “discloses a heavy-duty truck with a driver’s compartment, not an operator platform as described by claims 

11 and 14” and therefore is not an anticipatory reference. 

J.A. 13. Toro challenges the district court’s finding. 

We decline to address the anticipation issue. A party 

may establish a likelihood of success by showing that at 

least one valid and enforceable patent claim is likely to be 

infringed. Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 473 F.3d 

1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Because asserted claim 21 

covers the accused products and because we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in determin-
12 METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY

ing that Metalcraft established a likelihood of success as 

to infringement and validity with respect to claim 21, we 

need not reach the anticipation arguments regarding 

claims 11 and 14 to sustain the injunction as to claim 21 

which reaches all of the accused products. 

B. Irreparable Harm

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the 

preliminary injunction is not granted and there is a 

causal nexus between the alleged infringement and the 

alleged harm. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 

F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Evidence of potential 

lost sales alone does not demonstrate irreparable harm. 

See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 

1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Evidence showing that no amount 

of monetary damages, however great, could address the 

harm tends to show it is an irreparable harm. See Celsis 

in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012). Where the injury cannot be quantified, no 

amount of money damages is calculable, and therefore the 

harm cannot be adequately compensated and is irreparable. 

The district court determined that Scag is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary 

injunction because “it is impossible to quantify the damages caused by the loss of a potentially lifelong customer.” 

J.A. 15. Toro argues the district court abused its discretion by ignoring evidence it presented of at least twelve 

other companies that sell mowers designed to decrease 

shock loads to the operator. It also argues the court erred 

in accepting Scag’s argument that brand loyalty resulted 

in the loss of “a potentially lifelong customer,” and there 

are no facts to support this finding. We do not find Toro’s 

arguments persuasive. 

There is no requirement that the district court discuss 

every fact alleged by Toro. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. 
METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY 13

Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

Even if Toro means to allege that these twelve other 

companies have infringing lawnmowers that compete 

with Scag’s, “[t]he fact that other infringers may be in the 

marketplace does not negate irreparable harm.” Pfizer, 

Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005). Furthermore, the district court determined 

“the damage to Scag is irreparable because it is impossible to quantify the damages caused by the loss of a potentially lifelong customer.” J.A. 15. The fact that Toro’s 

own Senior Marketing Manager declared that some 

customers “prefer to purchase an entire line of products 

from the same manufacturer for consistency” supports the 

court’s determination. J.A. 15 (citing J.A. 432, ¶ 7). The 

district court did not clearly err on this record; the loss by 

Scag of customers may have far-reaching, long-term 

impact on its future revenues, and the sales lost by Scag 

are difficult to quantify due to “‘ecosystem’ effects, where 

one company’s customers will continue to buy that company’s products and recommend them to others.” Apple 

Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 641, 645 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015). “Because of its variable and uncertain nature, 

this loss is very difficult to calculate.” Id. Therefore, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that 

Scag is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

an injunction.

C. Balance of Equities and the Public Interest

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that “the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and 

that an injunction is in the public interest.” Luminara, 

814 F.3d at 1352. The district court must weigh the harm 

to the moving party if the injunction is not granted 

against the harm to the non-moving party if the injunction is granted. Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 

F.2d 1446, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1988). It is within the court’s 

discretion to balance the equities. Atlas Power Co. v. Ireco 

Chems., 773 F.2d 1230, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In consid-
14 METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY

ering whether the public interest favors the grant of an 

injunction, the district court should focus on whether a 

critical public interest would be injured by the grant of 

injunctive relief. Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1458. 

The district court identified the harms that Toro asserted it would suffer if enjoined as those associated with 

losing a patent infringement lawsuit. J.A. 17. It recognized that in the absence of an injunction, Scag would 

face substantial hardship in being forced “to compete 

against its own patented invention.” J.A. 16–17. It 

concluded that Scag’s harm in the absence of an injunction outweighs Toro’s harm if enjoined. J.A. 17. It also 

concluded that in light of the importance of encouraging 

innovation and in light of the fact that the public can 

continue to obtain the patented suspension system from 

Scag or other non-infringing mowers from Toro, the public 

interest favors the issuance of an injunction. Id.

Toro argues that its harm outweighs Scag’s and the 

injunction harms the public because it disrupts the status 

quo by removing from the public lawnmowers that had 

been available for over a year. 

We are not persuaded that the district court’s contrary determination was an abuse of discretion and decline 

to disturb the grant of the preliminary injunction on these 

bases.

D. Content and Scope of the Injunction

Pursuant to Rule 65(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, every order granting an injunction must “state 

the reasons why it issued; state its terms specifically; and 

describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the 

complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained 

or required.” “[W]hether the terms of an injunction fulfill 

the mandates of Rule 65(d) is a question of law that we 

review without deference.” Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS 

Corp., 383 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We do not 
METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY 15

uphold vague or overly broad injunctions because “those 

against whom an injunction is issued should receive fair 

and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction actually 

prohibits.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters 

& Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974). In the 

patent infringement context, we have found as overly 

broad an injunction that “simply prohibits future infringement of a patent.” Int’l Rectifier Corp., 383 F.3d 

at 1316. 

The district court’s order enjoins Toro from “making, 

using, selling, and offering to sell lawnmowers equipped 

with platform suspension systems that infringe Scag’s 

patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,186,457.” J.A. 6. Toro argues 

the district court’s preliminary injunction is overly broad. 

We do not agree. The Decision and Order in which the 

district court grants the motion for the preliminary injunction discusses both the claims at issue as well as the 

defendants’ accused products which it enjoins. J.A. 6–18.

Claim 21 was argued to cover all the accused products, and Toro has made no meaningful arguments which 

delineated among the accused products. We have affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the patentee 

has established a likelihood of success that the accused 

products infringe claim 21 and that there is not a substantial question of validity as to claim 21. In such a 

case, we affirm the preliminary injunction as to the accused products.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in granting Scag’s 

motion for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s grant of injunctive relief on 

claim 21 as to the accused products. 

AFFIRMED
16 METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC. v. THE TORO COMPANY

COSTS

Costs to Appellee.