UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MONROE WRIGHT EL TRIBE,

Case No. 15-10715

Plaintiff,

v. Paul D. Borman

United States District Judge

MICHIGAN RECON, INC.

Defendant.

______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT

WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF FEES OR COSTS (ECF NO. 2); 

(2) DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ECF NO.

1); AND (3) DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR 

SERVICE BY U.S. MARSHAL (ECF NO. 3)

The matter now before the Court is Plaintiff Monroe Wright El Tribe’s “Application to

proceed in District Court without Prepayment of Fees or Costs” and Request for Service by U.S.

Marshal. (ECF Nos. 2, 3). This latest complaint is the third in a series that Plaintiff has filed in

this district against the identical Defendant, Michigan Recon, Inc., all alleging the same or

related facts, namely that Plaintiff was wrongfully evicted from 9446 Outer Drive, a property in

Detroit Michigan. The first action, case number 14-13673, was filed on September 23, 2014 and

dismissed by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to allege a cause of action

upon which relief could be granted. (See Monroe Wright El Tribe v. Michigan Recon, Inc., Case

No. 14-13673, ECF No. 4). Plaintiff then filed case number 14-13754 on September 29, 2014,

and this Court dismissed that complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) as frivolous and

noted that the Court also lacked jurisdiction over the matter. (See Monroe Wright El Tribe v.

2:15-cv-10715-PDB-MJH Doc # 4 Filed 03/31/15 Pg 1 of 7 Pg ID 11
Michigan Recon, Inc., Case No. 14-13754, ECF No. 7).

I. Proceeding without Prepayment of Fees 

As an initial matter, the Court must first address Plaintiff’s request to proceed without

payment of fees. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), a court may allow commencement of a

civil action without the prepayment of fees or costs if the applicant submits an affidavit

demonstrating that he or she is “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” Here,

Plaintiff has supplied an affidavit which provides that he is unemployed, has no savings or

current income, but does indicate that Plaintiff holds the property at issue in trust and it is valued

at approximately $20,000.00. (ECF No. 2). Based on this information the Court will grant

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed without Prepayment of Fees or Costs. 

However, the Court is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to dismiss a complaint filed

without prepayment of fees that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained: 

Unlike prisoner cases, complaints by non-prisoners are not subject to the

screening process required by § 1915A. However, the district court must still

screen the complaint under § 1915(e)(2). ... Section 1915(e)(2) provides us with

the ability to screen these, as well as prisoner cases that satisfy the requirements

of the section. The screening must occur even before process is served or the

individual has had an opportunity to amend the complaint. The complaint must

be dismissed if it falls within the requirements of § 1915(e)(2) when filed. 

McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)). 

Accordingly, a Court must dismiss an action when it “fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). To determine whether an action states a

2

2:15-cv-10715-PDB-MJH Doc # 4 Filed 03/31/15 Pg 2 of 7 Pg ID 12
claim on which relief may be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), this Court must apply the

dismissal standard as set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic

Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th

Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). To

this end “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). 

Further, a court must dismiss an action as frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact.” See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Whether a

complaint is factually frivolous ... is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for

relief.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 471. “Under § 1915(e), courts may dismiss a complaint not only when

it is ‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory’ but also when the ‘factual contentions [on

which it relies] are clearly baseless.’” Anson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 529 F. App’x 558, 559 (6th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). A complaint that is legally frivolous “ipso facto”

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 328-29). Accordingly, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A

complaint is factually frivolous when the claims are “indisputably meritless” and “a judge does

3

2:15-cv-10715-PDB-MJH Doc # 4 Filed 03/31/15 Pg 3 of 7 Pg ID 13
not have to accept ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual allegations as true”. Id. (citations omitted). 

When applying these standards, the Court liberally construes the pro se litigant’s

complaint and holds it to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991)

(“[T]he allegations of a complaint drafted by a pro se litigant are held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers in the sense that a pro se complaint will be liberally

construed in determining whether it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”). 

II. Plaintiff Fails to Set Forth a Claim

Plaintiff has returned to this Court for a third time apparently arguing that he was

wrongfully evicted by Defendant Michigan Recon Inc. and relying summarily upon the “Vienna

Convention Diplomatic Relations Art. 22(I), 28 U.S.C. § 1609”. Plaintiff makes no substantive

arguments but rather just states that “Monroe Wright El Tribe is living ‘couch to couch’” since

the “unlawful eviction” and refers the Court to his previous complaint, in Monroe Wright El

Tribe v. Michigan Recon, Inc., case number 14-13754. (Compl. at 2). Plaintiff then states that

he has been injured by the “unlawful eviction performed 10/21/14” that occurred “before a

decision was made by the Federal District Court” in the earlier filed case number 14-13754 and

refers the Court to international treaties and the Vienna Convention. (Compl. at 1-2). Plaintiff

states an “order of possession to 9446 Outer Drive is in proper application” and “[t]he damages

sought are Punitive, Compensatory Damages and damages for pain and suffering.” (Compl. at

2). 

First, the Court notes that Plaintiff appears to be arguing that the alleged wrongful

eviction occurred prior to this Court’s dismissal of the earlier filed complaint and infers that such

4

2:15-cv-10715-PDB-MJH Doc # 4 Filed 03/31/15 Pg 4 of 7 Pg ID 14
an eviction would not have occurred but for the timing of this Court’s order. This is not so. The

Court dismissed Plaintiff’s previous complaint as lacking jurisdiction and also as frivolous

pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). (See Case no. 14-13754, ECF No. 7). Therefore, to the extent

Plaintiff’s claim is based the argument that an earlier decision in case number 14-13745 would

have prevented an eviction such an assertion is without merit. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has failed to set forth a claim based on those allegations.

Next, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to argue that the eviction was wrongful based

on the Vienna Convention, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any facts upon which to base this

argument. While the pleading standard provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 does not require “detailed

factual allegations”, Plaintiff must set forth “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me-accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Here,

Plaintiff merely asserts that the eviction was unlawful and refers the Court to the Vienna

Convention and a related and previously dismissed frivolous action. Even construing the present

allegations in the most liberal manner, Plaintiff has failed to plead enough factual content for the

Court to draw a reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for an “unlawful eviction”. 

III. Plaintiff’s Claim is Frivolous

Additionally, to the extent one could find that Plaintiff has asserted a claim in the current

Complaint, the Court finds again that Plaintiff’s claims are factually and legally frivolous. This

Court previously noted in the earlier filed action, case number 14-13754, that Plaintiff claims

that he holds the Property at issue for a fictional foreign state known as “Monroe Wright El

Tribe” and such a claim is “clearly delusional”. See Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff appears to be asserting these same allegations in the current action because he persists

5

2:15-cv-10715-PDB-MJH Doc # 4 Filed 03/31/15 Pg 5 of 7 Pg ID 15
in seeking relief through the “Vienna Convention” and refers to this previously dismissed action. 

(Compl. at 1-2). Just as it did previously, this Court again holds that such allegations are

factually and legally frivolous.1

 See Belle v. FBI, 46 F. App’x 326 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that

allegations that plaintiff was a victim of a conspiracy among the President of the United States,

Osama bin Laden, the Supreme Council of the World was delusional within the meaning of

section § 1915(e)(2)). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

IV. Conclusion 

For all these reasons, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed without

Prepayment of Fees or Costs (ECF No. 2); DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) (ECF No. 1); and DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff’s request for service by the U.S.

Marshal (ECF No. 3).

SO ORDERED.

s/Paul D. Borman 

PAUL D. BORMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 31, 2015

1

 While not attached to the current action, in case number 14-13754, Plaintiff attached

documents setting forth that Monroe Wright El Tribe was allegedly affiliated with the United

Commonwealth of Moors and was established as a foreign state through mailing “Minister John

Kerry/Pres. Barack Obama” a notice declaring the same. (See Case no. 14-13754, ECF Nos. 1,

4).

6

2:15-cv-10715-PDB-MJH Doc # 4 Filed 03/31/15 Pg 6 of 7 Pg ID 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or

party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on March 31, 2015.

s/Deborah Tofil 

Case Manager

7

2:15-cv-10715-PDB-MJH Doc # 4 Filed 03/31/15 Pg 7 of 7 Pg ID 17