UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MOHAMAD KHATTER,

Plaintiff, Case No.

v

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

V & J, INC,

ADAM MASSIE,

CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION,

POLICE OFFICER STEVEN ZACHARY, and

CITY OF DEARBORN,

jointly and severally,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

AND JURY DEMAND

Jurisdiction and Venue

1. This court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and federal

civil rights claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331.

2. Venue is properly laid in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) as all Defendants reside

in the State of Michigan, all Defendants are believed to reside in the Eastern District, and the

events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of Michigan.

3. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the related State law claims pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1367.

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Parties

4. At all time relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiff Mohamad Khatter is a resident of the City

of Dearborn, Wayne County, Michigan.

5. Defendant V & J, Inc. (“V & J”) is a Michigan corporation doing business in Wayne County,

Michigan.

6. Defendant, Adam Massie, is an employee and agent of the Defendant V & J.

7. Credit Acceptance Corporation (“CAC”) is a Michigan corporation doing business in

Oakland County, Michigan.

8. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants Massie and V& J were working as agents

for CAC.

9. Defendant Steven Zachary is a police officer and employee of the City of Dearborn Police

Department and was, at all times relevant, acting under color of law and in the course of his

employment; this Defendant is being sued in his individual capacity.

10. That at all times relevant to this Complaint, the City of Dearborn is an organized municipal

corporation existing under the laws of the State of Michigan.

Facts

11. The conduct complained of in this lawsuit occurred on or about August 22, 2014.

12. On August 22, 2014, Plaintiff owned a 2007 Chevrolet Trailblazer (“the vehicle”), which

was not encumbered by any lien.

13. On August 22, 2014, CAC had no valid lien on the vehicle.

14. On August 22, 2014, CAC did not have a legal right to repossess Plaintiff’s vehicle.

15. Moreover, Plaintiff, on that day possessed the exclusive right to the vehicle.

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16. Moreover, no court order had ever been obtained by any of the Defendants to this lawsuit that

would have allowed any person or entity other than Plaintiff to possess or repossess the

vehicle.

17. Prior to August 22, 2014, CAC hired V & J to repossess the vehicle in spite of the fact that

CAC had no right to possess of repossess the vehicle.

18. On August 22, 2014, Adam Massie and V & J showed up at night and began to repossess the

vehicle.

19. Plaintiff’s wife ran outside and explained to Adam Massie and V & J that Plaintiff had clean

title to the vehicle and asked Defendant Massie to stop repossessing the vehicle.

20. Plaintiff called the Dearborn Police Department and shortly thereafter, Defendant Steven

Zachary arrived.

21. Plaintiff showed the Defendants Massie and Zacharyhis title to the vehicle and demonstrated

to both that he had unencumbered right to possess the vehicle; as such, these Defendants had

actual notice that the vehicle belonged to Plaintiff unencumbered.

22. In spite of actual notice that the vehicle belonged to Plaintiff unencumbered, Defendant

Zachary ordered the Plaintiff to remove his plate and his belongings from the vehicle and

relinquish possession of the vehicle to Defendants Massie and V & J.

23. In spite of actual notice that the vehicle belonged to Plaintiff unencumbered, Defendants

Massie and V & J repossessed the vehicle with no present right to do so.

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24. Defendant Massie knew or should have known the limits of his lawful authority to repossess

a vehicle on private property when he is without legal process or other court order, and when

the vehicle’s owner is present, objecting to the repossession, and demonstrating that he has

clean, unencumbered title to the vehicle.

25. Defendant V &J knew or should have known the limits of its lawful authority to repossess

a vehicle on private property when it is without legal process or other court order, and when

the vehicle’s owner is present, objecting to the repossession, and demonstrating that he has

clean, unencumbered title to the vehicle.

26. A reasonably competent police officer properlytrained in the constitutional limitations of his

authority in interjecting himself into an obviously civil matter, or in the constitutional

limitations under the Fourth Amendment in seizing propertywithout an arrest warrant, search

warrant, court order, or other probable cause to believe the property is related to a crime

would have known that the seizure of Plaintiff’s vehicle was improper.

27. A reasonably competent police officer properly trained in the constitutional limitations of his

authority when confronted with the situation as it then appeared should have referred

Defendants Massie and V & J to their remedies through the court system, rather than by

repossession.

28. A reasonably competent police officer should have known that he had no lawful justification

or excuse to assist a repossession company, or a finance company, or its agents, under the

circumstances that were presented when he had actual notice of the vehicle’s clean title.

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29. Notwithstanding his inability to confirm that either V & J or CAC in fact had a proper legal

right to repossess the vehicle, and faced with demonstrative proof that Plaintiff had a superior

possessoryinterest, Defendant Zacharychose instead to interject himself into the dispute and

took sides.

30. Specifically, Zachary advised the Plaintiff that he was going to allow the repossession

company to take the vehicle, and ordered that the Plaintiff to relinquish possession of the

vehicle.

31. Instead of referring Defendants Massie and V & J to the court system, Defendant Zachary

chose to take sides and conduct a “curbside courtroom.”

32. Specifically, the Defendant Police Officer decided on the spot that Defendants CAC, V &

J, and Massie were entitled to possession of Plaintiff’s vehicle.

33. Plaintiff’s wife, children and neighbors witnessed this wrongful repossession.

34. Plaintiff was forced to purchase another vehicle after his vehicle was wrongly taken from

him.

35. CAC refused to return the Plaintiff’s vehicle for seven days; when CAC returned the vehicle,

it was severely damaged.

36. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, referred to more fully

throughout this Complaint, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer embarrassment,

indignation, humiliation, shame, outrage, anxiety, inconvenience, fear, disgrace, discomfort,

loss of the use of his vehicle, other expenses related to the use of his vehicle and its

repossession, and denial of cherished constitutional rights.

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Count I

Civil Rights Violation - §1983

(Individual Officer, CAC, Massie and Smart Recovery, L.L.C.)

37. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations as if set forth herein.

38. Defendant CAC, through its agents, servants, or employees, acted jointly and in concert with

the Defendant police officer.

39. Defendant V & J, through its agents, servants, or employees, acted jointly and in concert with

the Defendant police officer.

40. As a result of their unlawful, malicious, reckless, and indifferent acts or omissions, the

Defendant officer, CAC, Massie and V & J, both alone and in concert, conspired to and acted

under color of law but contrary to law and did deprive Plaintiff of his rights, privileges, or

immunities secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States and 42 U.S.C.

§1983, including:

a. Plaintiff’s right to be free from an unreasonable search or seizure of his person, as

guaranteed by Amendments IV and XIV of the United States Constitution, by seizing

and confiscating his vehicle and refusing to return it, even though it was seized

without benefit of an arrest warrant, search warrant, other legal process or court

order, or other probable cause to detain it; and

b. Plaintiff’s right to due process of law and to be free from egregious official

misconduct, as guaranteed by Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution, by

summarily repossessing his vehicle, without first giving him his day in court.

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Count II

§1983 - Municipal Liability

41. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations as if set forth herein.

42. That the City of Dearborn, through its police department, has established a practice, policy,

or custom which directly and proximately caused the injuries and harm suffered by Plaintiff,

as stated more fully throughout this Complaint by:

a. Deliberatelyfailing to adequatelysupervise or discipline its officers in general, or this

Defendant officer in particular, when it becomes known or apparent that the officers

have violated the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens in the manner complained of

in this lawsuit.

b. Deliberately taking no action when, upon information and belief, Defendant City

knew or should have known of the propensities of its officers in general, or this

Defendant officer in particular, to improperly intervene in a private legal dispute by

taking sides and conducting a “curbside courtroom,” instead of properlyreferring one

or all parties to their remedies under civil law.

c. Failing to properly train its officers in the limitations of their conduct as required by

the Constitution and laws of the United States.

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d. Knowingly, intentionally, deliberately, recklessly, or negligently failing to prevent

the violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of the Plaintiff, in the manner

complained of in this lawsuit, as it should or must have been known to the Defendant

municipality, prior to August of 2014, that its officers would be called to the scene

of a dispute between a repossession company attempting to take a motor vehicle, and

the owners of that vehicle protesting against the seizure.

43. Defendant municipality’s practice, policy, or custom, as set forth mor fully throughout this

Complaint, was the moving force that did deprive Plaintiff of his rights, privileges, or

immunities secured under the Constitution and laws of the United States and 42 U.S.C.

§1983, including:

a. Plaintiff’s right to be free from an unreasonable search or seizure of his person, as

guaranteed by Amendments IV and XIV of the United States Constitution, by seizing

and confiscating his vehicle and refusing to return it, even though it was seized

without benefit of an arrest warrant, search warrant, other legal process or court

order, or other probable cause to detain it; and

b. Plaintiff’s right to due process of law and to be free from egregious official

misconduct, as guaranteed by Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution, by

summarily repossessing his vehicle, without first giving him his day in court.

Count III

Statutory Conversion, Receipt or Concealment

(CAC, Massie and V & J)

44. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations by reference.

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45. These Defendants actions in converting the vehicle were wilful or intentional.

46. These acts constitute a willful or intentional conversion under M.C.L. § 600.2919a entitling

Plaintiff to recover treble the value of the vehicle converted.

Count IV

Common Law Conversion (CAC, Massie and V & J)

47. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations by reference.

48. CAC and its agents took the vehicle from Plaintiff.

49. CAC and its agents had no right to possess the vehicle.

50. These acts constitute a conversion of the vehicle.

Count V

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (V & J)

51. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations by reference.

52. V & J is a "debt collector" as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6).

53. V & J violated one or more provisions of the FDCPA, including, but not limited to 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692f(6).

54. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of V & J’s violations of the FDCPA.

Count IV

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Massie)

55. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations by reference.

56. Massie is a "debt collector" as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

57. Massie violated one or more provisions of the FDCPA, including, but not limited to 15

U.S.C. §1692f(6).

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58. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Massie’s violations of the FDCPA.

JURY DEMAND

59. Plaintiff demands a jury trial in this case.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court grant the following relief:

a. Assume jurisdiction over this case including all supplemental claims.

b. Award actual damages, jointly and severally, against all Defendants, and punitive

damages against each Defendant (except the Defendant municipalities) individually,

plus costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and actual attorney fees,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq.

c. Award treble damages pursuant to the conversion statute.

d. Such other statutory damages, costs, punitive damages, and attorney fees as the law

may provide.

Respectfully Submitted,

ADAM G. TAUB & ASSOCIATES

CONSUMER LAW GROUP, PLC

By: s/ Adam G. Taub

Adam G. Taub (P48703)

Attorney for Plaintiff

17200 West 10 Mile Rd. Suite 200

Southfield, MI 48075

Phone: (248) 746-3790

Email: adamgtaub@clgplc.net

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