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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DARNITA MCGHEE, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 14-cv-12753 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

MILLICENT WARREN, et al., 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #18)

 Plaintiff Darnita McGhee (“McGhee”) was an inmate at the Women’s Huron 

Valley Correctional Facility (“WHV”). She has brought a civil rights action under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against WHV’s former Warden and Deputy Warden, Defendants 

Millicent Warren and Jodie DeAngelo respectively (collectively “Defendants”). 

McGhee claims that the Defendants violated her Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights by reassigning her to administrative segregation – where she 

spent 22 hours per day in her cell – and leaving her there for ten months without a 

full classification review hearing. (See ECF #1-1 at 6-8, Pg. ID 10-12; ECF #18-9 

at 3-6, Pg. ID 149-152.) McGhee also claims that she did not receive adequate 

medical care while she was in administrative segregation. (ECF #19-1 at 46-47, Pg. 

ID 226-27.) 

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 Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. 

(See ECF #9 at 5, Pg. ID 51.) On September 14, 2015, the Court held a hearing on 

the motion and announced on the record that it would GRANT the motion. At that 

same time, the Court explained the basis for its decision and indicated that it would 

issue a written order memorializing its ruling. For the reasons explained on the 

record at the conclusion of the hearing and in more detail below, the Court 

GRANTS the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety and 

DISMISSES this action with prejudice. 

ESSENTIAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 On March 21, 2013, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Michael Nowak 

(“Nowak”) reviewed WHV video footage and saw McGhee engage in a drug 

transaction and also expose herself to other prisoners. (See ECF #18-2 at 2, Pg. ID 

106.) That same day, WHV Corrections Officer Donald (“Donald”) strip searched 

McGhee and found four pills of Tegretol (a prescription medication for preventing 

and controlling seizures) on her person. (See ECF #18-3 at 2, Pg. ID 108.) Nowak 

issued McGhee a Class I misconduct violation for smuggling and for sexual 

misconduct (see ECF #18-2 at 2, Pg. ID 106); Donald issued McGhee a Class I 

misconduct violation for substance abuse. (See ECF #18-3 at 2, Pg. ID 108.) On 

March 25, 2013, a Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) Hearing 

Officer found McGhee guilty of the substance abuse charge and sentenced her to 

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ten days in segregation – from March 25, 2013 until April 4, 2013. (See ECF #18-4 

at 2, Pg. ID 110.) 

On April 1, 2013, while McGhee was in segregation, another Hearing 

Officer found McGhee guilty of sexual harassment. (See ECF #18-4 at 2, Pg. ID 

112.) That Hearing Officer sentenced McGhee to an additional fifteen days in 

segregation – from April 4, 2013 until April 19, 2013. (Id.) 

Next, on April 16, 2013, WHV’s Security Classification Committee 

(“SCC”) reclassified McGhee to administrative segregation on the basis that she 

“[d]emonstrate[d] an inability to be managed with general population privileges.” 

(See ECF #18-6 at 2, Pg. ID 114.) The SCC did not conduct a classification 

hearing before transferring McGhee to administrative segregation because McGhee 

had been found guilty of more than one Class I disciplinary offense. MDOC 

regulations provide that “[a] prisoner may be classified to administrative 

segregation after being found guilty of major / Class I misconduct” without an 

additional hearing following the inmate’s initial misconduct hearing. (ECF #18-7 

at 4, Pg. ID 118.) 

McGhee remained in administrative segregation for approximately ten 

months after the reclassification. (See ECF #18 at 8, Pg. ID 89.) During McGhee’s 

first 60 days in administrative segregation, the SCC reviewed McGhee’s status on 

a weekly basis. (See ECF #18-8 at 2-3, Pg. ID 129-30.) Thereafter, the SCC 

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reviewed McGhee’s status on a monthly basis. (See ECF #18-8 at 17, Pg. ID 144.) 

For nearly every “Segregation Behavior Review,” SCC officials interviewed 

McGhee to determine whether she was prepared to return to general population 

based her responses and her level of cooperation with prison staff and other 

inmates. (See ECF #18-8 at 1-19; Pg. ID 128-46.) Each Segregation Behavior 

Review concluded that McGhee demonstrated a “medium” “potential to honor the 

trust implicit in less restrictive confinement.” (Id.) McGhee was ultimately 

returned to the WHV general population on February 14, 2014. (See ECF #18 at 8, 

Pg. ID 89.) 

On July 15, 2014, McGhee filed her two-count Complaint in this action 

against Defendants Warren and DeAngelo. She alleges that her status 

reclassification and the resulting time she spent in administrative segregation (1) 

violated her rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth 

Amendment; (2) violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment; and (3) violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Additionally, McGhee now claims (but did 

not allege in her Complaint) that during the ten months she spent in administrative 

segregation, Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

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GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD 

A movant is entitled to summary judgment when it “shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact....” SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services, Inc.,

712 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)) (quotations omitted). When reviewing the record, “the 

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 

and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. “The mere existence of a 

scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for 

[that party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Summary judgment is not appropriate 

when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury.” Id. at 251-252. Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the 

evidence, and the drafting of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge...” Id. at 255. 

ANALYSIS 

A. The Court’s Two-Pronged Qualified Immunity Analysis

 “In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts 

engage in a two-part inquiry.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014). 

“[B]oth [parts] must be answered in the affirmative for the case to go to a 

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factfinder . . . . If either one is not satisfied, qualified immunity will shield the 

officer from civil damages.” Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 

957 (6th Cir. 2013). “[U]nder either prong [of this inquiry], courts may not resolve 

genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan, 

134 S. Ct. at 1866. The Court is “permitted to exercise [its] sound discretion in 

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson 

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 

 “The first [prong] asks whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to 

the party asserting injury show the officer’s conduct violated a federal right.” 

Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1865. “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis 

asks whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the 

violation.” Id. at 1867. 

“Governmental actors are shielded from liability for civil damages if their 

actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known.” Id. “The sources of clearly established 

law to be considered are limited. [This Court must] look first to decisions of the 

Supreme Court, then to decisions of [the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit] 

and other courts within [that] circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits.” 

Martin, 712 F.3d at 961. 

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B. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on McGhee’s 

Procedural Due Process Claim 

 McGhee alleges that the Defendants violated her procedural due process 

rights by confining her in administrative segregation for ten months without 

affording her a full classification hearing. The Defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity on this claim because it was not clearly established that the Due Process 

Clause required Defendants to give McGhee such a hearing. 

 “The Due Process Clause does not protect every administrative slight that 

occurs behind prison walls. It requires process only when a ‘life, liberty, or 

property’ interest is at stake.” Hardin-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 

2008) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.) A prison inmate does retain “a 

‘liberty’ interest, guarded by due process, with respect to state-imposed prison 

discipline that rises to the level of an ‘atypical and significant hardship on the 

inmate.’” Id. (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Thus, prison 

officials must provide some process before subjecting an inmate to an atypical and 

significant hardship. Id. The question in this case is whether McGhee’s ten-month 

confinement in administrative segregation amounted to an atypical and significant 

hardship so as to trigger due process protection. 

 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit have provided a clear 

answer to that question. The Supreme Court has held that thirty days in 

segregation is not so atypical as to create a liberty interest protected by the Due 

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Process Clause, see Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, but that Court has not addressed the 

due process implications of confinement in administrative segregation for more 

than thirty days. The Sixth Circuit has held that 117 days in administrative 

segregation in a Michigan prison is not so atypical as to create a liberty interest 

subject to due process protection, see Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 

1997), but that court has also held that an inmate may have a protected liberty 

interest where he has served three years of an indefinite assignment to 

administrative segregation. See Hardin-Bey, 524 F.3d at 791. There are also a 

number of unpublished Sixth Circuit decisions holding that an inmate’s placement 

in segregation for several months does not impose an atypical and significant 

hardship that gives rise to a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., McMann v. Gundy, 

39 Fed. App’x 208, 210 (6th Cir. 2002) (five months in segregation did not give 

rise to a liberty interest); Collmar v. Wilkinson, 187 F.3d 635 (Table), 1999 WL 

623708, at *3 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding “six to eight months in Administrative 

Control was not an atypical hardship” and did not give rise to a liberty interest). 

Given these decisions from the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit, it 

would not have been clear to a reasonable prison official that a ten-month 

placement in administrative segregation gives rise to a protected liberty interest. 

Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on McGhee’s claim that they 

violated her procedural due process rights by confining her in administrative 

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segregation without providing sufficient process.1 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 202 (2001) (“The relevant inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable 

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”). 

 In support of her argument that her confinement in segregation gave rise to a 

clearly-established liberty interest, McGhee cites only the decision of the United 

States Court of Appeals in Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2000). In 

that decision, the Second Circuit held that placing an inmate in segregation for 305 

days “was ‘atypical’ and a ‘severe hardship’ within the meaning of Sandin.” Id. at 

229. But this lone decision from another circuit is not enough to clearly establish 

that McGhee’s ten-month stay in segregation gave rise to a protected liberty 

interest. See, e.g., Eugene D v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[A] 

single recent case from the court of appeals of another circuit is hardly sufficient to 

make the law ‘clearly established’ in this circuit.”) Because McGhee has not 

established that she had a clearly-established liberty interest sufficient to due 

                                                            

1

 Even if McGhee could establish that she had a protected liberty interest, she 

would face a formidable obstacle in establishing that the process provided by 

Defendants was insufficient. As described above, Defendants reviewed McGhee’s 

placement in segregation on a weekly basis for the first 60 days of McGhee’s 

confinement in segregation and then on a monthly basis thereafter. Defendants 

completed reports documenting their reviews and the reasons for continuing to 

confine McGhee in segregation. (See ECF #18-8 at 1-19; Pg. ID 128-46.) The 

Sixth Circuit has held that similar reviews provide sufficient process to satisfy the 

Due Process Clause. See Harris v. Caruso, 465 Fed. App’x 481, 485 (6th Cir. 

2012). 

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process protections, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on her 

procedural due process claim. 

B. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on McGhee’s Equal 

Protection Claim 

McGhee claims that her confinement in administrative segregation also 

violated her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See ECF 

#1-1 at 6, Pg. ID 10.) In support of this claim, McGhee argues that other inmates 

who were found guilty of Class I misconduct offenses were not reclassified to 

administrative segregation, but she was placed in segregation for ten months after 

being found guilty of such violations. (See ECF #19 at 10, Pg. ID 177.) 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because McGhee has 

failed to demonstrate that she was similarly-situated to the other inmates and 

because Defendants had a rational basis for their decision to place her in 

segregation. 

 The Equal Protection Clause is “a direction that all persons similarly situated 

should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 

439 (1985). “Thus, to prevail on [her] equal protection claim,” McGhee “must 

demonstrate” that her placement in segregation “constitutes disparate treatment of 

similarly-situated individuals.” Robinson v. Jackson, __ Fed. App’x __, 2015 WL 

3650196, at *4 (6th Cir. June 15, 2015) (rejecting inmate’s equal protection claim). 

She has not carried that burden. While she asserts that other inmates were not sent 

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to segregation after being found guilty of Class I misconduct violations, she does 

not provide sufficient information from which the Court could conclude that those 

inmates were, in fact, similarly-situated to her. For instance, she provides no 

information concerning the specific violations committed by the other inmates nor 

does she provide any information concerning the other inmates’ disciplinary 

history and/or adjustment to prison life. The Court cannot conclude that inmates 

found guilty of similar offenses with similar disciplinary and adjustment records 

were treated differently than McGhee, and thus Defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity on McGhee’s equal protection claim. 

 Defendants are further entitled to qualified immunity on that claim because 

they had a rational basis for assigning McGhee to segregation. See Jackson v. 

Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Without question, prisoners are not 

considered a suspect class for purposes of equal protection litigation.”); Trihealth, 

Inc. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding rational 

basis review applies to claims in which no suspect class or fundamental right is 

implicated). The Defendants had a rational basis for placing McGhee in 

segregation because she had a history of committing serious misconduct offenses 

and a history of poor adjustment to confinement in the general population. Thus, 

McGhee cannot prevail on her equal protection claim. 

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C. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on McGhee’s Eighth 

Amendment Claims 

The bases for McGhee’s Eighth Amendment claim are unclear on the face of 

her complaint. However, McGhee appears to allege that (1) the conditions of 

confinement in administrative segregation were so deplorable that her continued 

confinement there constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and (2) the 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs while she 

was in administrative segregation (which McGhee alleges in her deposition 

testimony, not her complaint). Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity 

on these claims for the reasons stated below. 

1. McGhee’s Placement in Administrative Segregation Was Not 

Cruel or Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment 

 In order to prevail on a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth 

Amendment, an inmate must establish that she was deprived “of the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 

(1981). The restrictive conditions of administrative segregation do not impose 

such an extreme deprivation. On the contrary, “placement in administrative 

segregation is part of the routine discomfort that is part of the penalty that criminal 

offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Harden-Bey, 524 F.3d at 795 

(quoting Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 Fed. App’x. 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003)). 

Thus, the Defendants did not violate McGhee’s Eighth Amendment rights by 

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confining her in administrative segregation. Id. (affirming dismissal of Eighth 

Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim that was based upon placement of 

inmate in administrative segregation). 

2. McGhee Has Failed to Establish That the Defendants Were 

Deliberately Indifferent to Her Serious Medical Needs 

 Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials are prohibited from 

unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on an inmate by acting with deliberate 

indifference toward the inmate’s serious medical needs.” Baynes v. Cleland, __ 

F.3d __, 2015 WL 5000615 at * 14 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2015) (quoting Blackmore v. 

Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)). To establish deliberate 

indifference, an inmate must satisfy “both an objective and a subjective 

component.” Id. The Sixth Circuit recently explained an inmate’s burden with 

respect to the two components as follows: 

To satisfy the objective component, Plaintiff must show the existence 

of a sufficiently serious medical need, meaning he is “incarcerated 

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious 

harm.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976); Brown, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)). A serious medical 

need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating 

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily 

recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.“ Harrison v. Ash, 539 

F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008). 

The subjective component is met “where a plaintiff demonstrates that 

prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a serious 

medical need,” which “is the equivalent of ‘recklessly disregarding 

that risk.’” McCarthy v. Place, 313 Fed. App'x 810, 814 (6th Cir. 

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2008) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). In other words, “[s]atisfying 

the objective component ensures that the alleged deprivation is 

sufficiently severe, while satisfying the subjective component ‘ensures 

that the defendant prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind.’” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 681 (6th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183–84 (2d Cir. 

2003)). 

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when “the official 

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety.” Harrison, 539 F.3d at 518 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

837). An official “must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

Baynes, 2015 WL 5000615 at * 15. 

 Here, McGhee has presented evidence that (1) she suffered from fibroid 

tumors before, during, and after her time in administrative segregation and (2) the 

tumors caused her great pain while she was administrative segregation. (See ECF # 

18-9 at 8, Pg. ID 154; ECF #19-1 at 17, Pg. ID 197.) The Court will assume 

without deciding that these tumors amounted to a serious medical condition which 

satisfied the objective component of her claim. 

 But McGhee has not presented any evidence that either of the Defendants – 

both high-ranking prison administrators who had no involvement in the direct 

delivery of healthcare to inmates – knew that she was afflicted with the tumors or 

that she was suffering serious health issues while in administrative segregation. 

McGhee says that a jury could infer Defendants’ knowledge from the fact that 

someone in the prison administration authorized McGhee to be temporarily 

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removed from the prison in order to obtain medical testing relating to her 

condition. (See ECF #19 at 12, Pg. ID 179.) However, even if the Defendants 

knew that McGhee had been taken for testing, that would not amount to knowledge 

that McGhee was, in fact, suffering from a serious condition – especially in light of 

the fact that there is no evidence in the record that the Defendants were ever made 

aware of the test results. Moreover, if, as McGhee stresses, the Defendants 

authorized her to leave the prison for medical testing, that authorization would cut 

sharply against McGhee’s claim that Defendants disregarded her medical needs. 

The point of the test would have been to address those very needs. Simply put, 

there is no evidence that the Defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive 

risk to inmate health or safety,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), and 

thus McGhee cannot prevail on her deliberate indifference claim. 

D. McGhee Has Withdrawn Her Fourth Amendment Claim

 McGhee has withdrawn this claim (see ECF #19 at 6, Pg. ID 173.), and thus 

the Court dismisses it. 

 

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CONCLUSION 

 It is HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment (ECF #18) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: September 24, 2015 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties 

and/or counsel of record on September 24, 2015, by electronic means and/or 

ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5113

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