UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ) 

et al., ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) Civ. No. 14-853 (CRC) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) REPLY 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

_______________________________________) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S REPLY 

IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO ALLOW TIME 

FOR DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 56(d) 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

Greg Mueller 

Seth Nesin 

 Charles Kitcher 

Attorneys 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

August 18, 2014 (202) 694-1650 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 1 of 15
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 Page

I. A RECORD IS REQUIRED FOR FACTUAL QUESTIONS 

 REGARDING THE DANGER OF CORRUPTION RESULTING 

 FROM UNLIMITED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR POLITICAL-PARTY 

 INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES ...............................................................................2 

II. THE COMMISSION HAS ESTABLISHED THAT A REASONABLE 

 DISCOVERY PERIOD IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE ........................................5 

A. Under Rule 56(d) Plaintiffs’ Distinction Between Formal 

 and Informal Discovery is Irrelevant ..................................................................5 

B. The Declaration the Commission Submitted Provides the 

 Requisite Level of Specificity ..............................................................................8 

C. Numerous Similar Cases Involve Similar or Lengthier 

 Discovery Periods and There is No Basis for Denying 

 Discovery in this Case .........................................................................................10 

III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................12 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 2 of 15
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The Court should grant the Federal Election Commission’s (“FEC” or “Commission”) 

Rule 56(d) motion requesting that it have an opportunity to conduct discovery in this case. In its 

opening brief and accompanying Rule 56(d) declaration (Docket Nos. 28-1, 28-2), the 

Commission demonstrated that plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment prematurely 

and that, without discovery, the agency cannot present facts essential to its opposition. In 

response to that motion, plaintiffs press their theory of the case on the merits, but have not 

undermined the Commission’s showing. Plaintiffs urge the Court to invalidate longstanding 

political-party contribution limits, prohibitions on receiving and spending soft money, and 

associated prohibitions on the solicitation of soft money, on the eve of a federal election, without 

permitting the government the benefit of any discovery. 

Plaintiffs fail to counter the Commission’s showing that their summary judgment motion 

— filed before the Commission had even answered their complaint — would deny the FEC the 

time for discovery that due process requires. And they entirely fail to distinguish the long line of 

cases similar to this one in which courts have allowed the Commission a period of discovery for 

development of such evidence. Plaintiffs instead claim that this case presents purely legal 

questions because independent expenditures cannot lead to corruption as a matter of law, but as 

explained below plaintiffs substantially misstate the holdings upon which they rely. Plaintiffs 

also claim that the detailed memorandum and declaration submitted by the Commission fails to 

establish additional discovery is necessary in this case, but the Commission’s showing readily 

meets the requirements of Rule 56(d). 

Accordingly, the Court should grant the Commission’s motion. 

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I. A RECORD IS REQUIRED FOR FACTUAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE 

DANGER OF CORRUPTION RESULTING FROM UNLIMITED 

CONTRIBUTIONS FOR POLITICAL-PARTY INDEPENDENT 

EXPENDITURES 

Plaintiffs’ opposition rests on the mistaken premise that evidence is completely 

unnecessary in this case because unlimited contributions for independent expenditures as a 

matter of law cannot lead to corruption or its appearance. (Pls.’ Opp’n to FEC’s Rule 56(d) Mot. 

(“Pls.’ Opp’n”) at 3, 17-22, 31 (Docket No. 30).) However, courts have found that contributions 

to political parties pose a danger of corruption, even if contributions to PACs for independent 

expenditures do not. Plaintiffs ignore this distinction, and premise their opposition on what 

amounts to an oversimplified slogan, repeated throughout their brief, that independent 

expenditures cannot corrupt as a matter of law. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3, 17-22, 31, 34-35, 39, 42.) The 

cases on which plaintiffs rely, however, only held that contributions to PACs do not pose a 

danger of corruption, specifically because they are not political parties. As a result, those cases 

undermine rather than support their position here. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 17-21(Docket No. 30).) 

Plaintiffs rely on SpeechNow.org v. FEC, in which the D.C. Circuit held that contribution 

limits could not constitutionally be applied to PACs that engaged solely in independent 

expenditures, explaining that “contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures 

also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.” 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(en banc) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals went on to acknowledge that the plurality 

opinion for the Supreme Court in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 

518 U.S. 604, 617 (1996), had indicated that independent expenditures could still lead to 

corruption or its appearance, but distinguished that case by noting that “Colorado Republican

concerned expenditures by political parties.” 599 F.3d at 695. The court concluded by 

cautioning that “[w]e should be clear, however, that we only decide these questions as applied to 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 4 of 15
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contributions to SpeechNow, an independent expenditure-only group.” Id. at 696. 

Plaintiffs also rely on Carey v. FEC, (Opp’n at 26-27), a decision in this District holding 

that a single nonconnected PAC could operate a segregated independent expenditure account that 

accepted unlimited contributions, while also accepting hard-money funds in a different account 

for the purpose of candidate contributions. 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125-26 (D.D.C. 2011). At the 

same time, however, Carey reaffirmed that contribution limits were constitutional for “political 

party committees because of the ‘close relationship between candidates and parties.’” Id. at 125 

(quoting EMILY’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). The court explained that “nonconnected non-profits are not the same as political parties and do not cause the same concerns.” 

791 F.Supp. 2d at 131 . 

Plaintiffs also fail to address the D.C. Circuit’s decision drawing a sharp distinction 

between PACs and political party committees. In EMILY’s List v. FEC, the Court of Appeals 

struck down FEC regulations related to mixed federal and nonfederal activities because they 

infringed upon the First Amendment rights of a PAC that wished to engage in “election-related 

activities such as advertisements, get-out-the-vote efforts, and voter registration drives.” 581 

F.3d at 5, 24. But the EMILY’s List opinion repeatedly stated that the outcome of the case would 

have been governed by McConnell and come out the other way if the challenge had come from a 

political party rather than a PAC. Plaintiffs suggest the Commission should not be allowed to 

“escape the controlling effect of matter-of-law holdings” or conduct discovery regarding “non-

‘relevant’ constitutional analysis” such as the potential for corruption stemming from unlimited 

contributions used to fund independent expenditures. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 18 (Docket No. 30).) The 

holdings to which they refer do not, however, apply to political party committees like the 

plaintiffs.

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 5 of 15
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EMILY’s List emphasized at length the uniqueness of political party committees. The 

Court of Appeals first noted that contribution limits to candidates could be limited and, due in 

part to “the close relationship between candidates and parties . . . the [Supreme] Court has held 

that the anti-corruption interest also justifies limits on contributions to parties.” 581 F.3d at 6. 

The court then characterized its constitutional analysis as a question of “whether independent 

non-profits are treated like individual citizens (who under Buckley have the right to spend 

unlimited money to support their preferred candidates) or like political parties (which under 

[McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)] do not have the right to raise and spend unlimited soft 

money).” Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). It concluded that “non-profit groups do not have the same 

inherent relationship with federal candidates and officeholders that political parties do.” Id. at 

14. The court approvingly quoted the plaintiff attorney’s conclusion that the FEC had 

mistakenly “brought to bear what was essentially a political party analysis to a non-connected, 

independent committee which is not under the control of, or associated with candidates in the 

fashion of a political party.” Id. at 15 (citation and internal quotations omitted). And the court 

noted that its holding would “permit non-profits to receive and spend large soft-money donations 

when political parties and candidates cannot.” Id. at 19. 1

Plaintiffs’ argument that “this case is based on the application of matter-of-law holdings 

to the present case” and that “no proof of quid-pro-quo corruption, or its appearance, is possible, 

as a matter of law” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 21 (emphasis omitted)) is unsupported by the authority on 

which it relies. None of the cases plaintiffs cited (id. at 10-27) support the view that parties 

                                                            1

    Decisions from other Circuits similarly make clear that parties should be treated 

differently from PACs. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 292-93 (4th 

Cir. 2008) (“McConnell specifically emphasized the difference between political parties and 

independent expenditure political committees, which explains why contribution limits are 

acceptable when applied to the former, but unacceptable when applied to the latter”). 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 6 of 15
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should be treated like PACs, and virtually all of the cases specifically state, to the contrary, that 

political parties do not have a constitutional right to collect unlimited contributions to spend on 

independent expenditures. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ conclusion that discovery is unnecessary 

because independent expenditures cannot corrupt as a matter of law and therefore the 

information sought “cannot exist as a matter of law” (id. at 31) is baseless. 

II. THE COMMISSION HAS ESTABLISHED THAT A REASONABLE 

DISCOVERY PERIOD IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 

In its opening brief, the FEC explained that because due process entitles parties to a full 

opportunity to present their case, summary judgment is appropriate only after adequate time for 

discovery. (See FEC’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Allow Time for Disc. Under Rule 56(d) and in 

Opp’n to Pls’. Mot. for Summ. J. (“FEC Mem.”) at 5-11 (Docket No. 28-1).) As explained 

below, plaintiffs’ unsupported interpretation of the Federal Rules governing discovery and 

unfounded challenge to the adequacy of the declaration supporting the Commission’s 56(d) 

motion fail to undermine the Commission’s motion. 

A. Under Rule 56(d) Plaintiffs’ Distinction Between Formal and Informal 

Discovery is Irrelevant 

To support their opposition, plaintiffs argue that the Commission did not show the 

requisite detailed need for formal discovery. (Pls’. Opp’n at 4-9.) Plaintiffs draw a meaningless 

distinction between seeking information between willing and unwilling parties, arguing that a 

discovery period is unnecessary for the former. (Pls’. Opp’n at 4-5.) Plaintiffs claim that “if 

third parties are willing to provide facts, they simply can do so, so ‘discovery’ is unnecessary

because no coercive power is required.” (Pls’. Opp’n at 5.) Rule 56(d) is not so limited 

regarding the methods that may be used to obtain evidence. The relief available under the rule 

provides “time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(2) 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 7 of 15
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(emphasis added). The rule is not limited to particular methods used to obtain the information 

and denying such a motion “is disfavored when additional development of facts might illuminate 

the issues of law requiring decision.” Seed Co., Ltd. v. Westerman, 840 F. Supp. 2d 116, 124 

(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Barnes v. D.C., 242 F.R.D. 113, 116 (D.D.C 2007)); McNair v. D.C., 

903 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying summary judgment in absence of discovery 

period). 

A complete denial of any discovery period would place before the Court review of 

longstanding statutory provisions without the benefit of a full record. When confronted with 

such an absence of a record, the D.C. Circuit explained in one case that “[u]nfortunately, neither 

we nor the district court are in a position to decide as a matter of law whether there is a genuine 

dispute here because the district court did not permit . . . any discovery before issuing its ruling.” 

Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated Printing Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). The Court of Appeals explained that “[u]nder these circumstances, it was inappropriate 

for the district court to grant summary judgment without first giving [the parties] a chance to 

conduct discovery.” Id. 

The cases upon which plaintiffs rely provided lengthy initial discovery periods followed 

by additional time for discovery pursuant to Rule 56(d), and thus are of little value in evaluating 

a case like this one where there has been no discovery period. Plaintiffs heavily rely on First 

National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Services Company, a case involving well over 5 years of 

discovery and 150 days of deposition time. 391 U.S. 253, 263 (1968). Plaintiffs suggest that 

Cities Services draws an important distinction between Rule 56(d) that “provides for 

comparatively limited discovery for the purpose of showing facts sufficient to withstand a 

summary judgment motion . . . [while] Rule 26 provides for broad pretrial discovery.” (Pls’. 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 8 of 15
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Opp’n at 8-9.) But that case did not provide for limited discovery in the way plaintiffs suggest. 

Cities Services actually serves as an example of a substantial discovery period pursuant to Rule 

26(d), augmented by an order providing for several additional days of deposition time pursuant 

Rule 56(d). 391 U.S. at 268. Rather than providing support for plaintiffs’ position that 

discovery should be denied entirely, the case highlights the reasonableness of the comparably 

short discovery period requested by the Commission here. 

Plaintiffs also rely on Libertarian Party of New Mexico v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1308 

(10th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that historical evidence cannot be assembled following a 

Rule 56[(d)] motion. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 10.) In that case, however, the court expressly did not 

reach the appropriate scope of discovery, holding that it “need not, however, resolve this issue.” 

Id. at 1308. The court explained that a summary declaration supporting a 56(d) motion was 

inadequate in that case based on standards easily satisfied by the Commission here. 506 F.3d at 

1309; see infra 8-10. None of this authority provides support for plaintiffs’ extreme position that 

no discovery is appropriate here.2

                                                           

2

 Other cases on which plaintiffs rely are far afield from the posture of this case. In 

Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Products, the movant relied “entirely on its having had no 

discovery at all” in its Rule 56(d) declaration and did not make the requisite showing of need. 

866 F.2d 1386, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs also rely on a FOIA case, Strang v. United 

States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 864 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.1989), but courts have a 

longstanding practice of resolving FOIA cases, which largely turn on the validity of FOIA 

exemptions, based on a detailed declaration and index. See Wheeler v. CIA, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 

139 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining “[d]iscovery is generally unavailable in FOIA actions”); Vaughn 

v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (establishing what became known at the Vaughn index). 

Plaintiffs also discuss Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 

2006), but in that case the court declined to permit additional discovery based on the extensive 

and clear record regarding the circumstances surrounding the specific individual arrest by law 

enforcement at issue. 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 9 of 15
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Plaintiffs fail to address the Commission’s showing that numerous similar constitutional 

challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act, including recent cases following Citizens 

United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), involved lengthier periods of time. (FEC Mem. at 6-7.) 

B. The Declaration the Commission Submitted Provides the Requisite Level of 

Specificity 

The Commission’s supporting declaration fully satisfies this Circuit’s requirements for a 

declaration under Rule 56(d). (See Decl. of Counsel in Supp. of FEC’s Mot. to Allow Time for 

Disc. Under Rule 56(d) (“56(d) Decl.”) (Docket No. 28-2).) Such a declaration must outline 

particular facts, show why those facts are not produced in opposition to the current summary 

judgment motion, and show that the information is discoverable. See Convertino v. United 

States Dep’t of Justice, 684 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The declaration the Commission 

submitted in support its 56(d) motion meets this standard. It outlines particular facts that are 

necessary to discover in light of the operative legal standards, explains why those facts have not 

been produced, and shows how they are discoverable. (See 56(d) Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 8(a)-(g), 9-10.) 

Specifically, the Commission seeks discovery regarding the following categories of facts to 

defend this case: 

 Evidence confirming that the political-party contribution limits continue to deter 

quid pro quo corruption as applied to funds to be raised in unlimited amounts to 

finance party independent expenditures in support of federal candidates. (56(d) 

Decl. ¶ 8(a).) 

 Evidence regarding the relationship between the political parties and federal 

officeholders and candidates, and the unique role political parties play in the 

organization of Congress, with a particular focus on the dangers of quid pro quo

corruption and its appearance. (Id. ¶ 8(b).) 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 10 of 15
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 Evidence regarding how the relationships between political parties and their 

candidates and officeholders are perceived by voters. (Id. ¶ 8(c).) 

 Evidence regarding whether plaintiffs contend they lack the resources for 

effective advocacy under the existing contribution limits. (Id. ¶ 8(d).) 

 Evidence that any constitutional burdens imposed by the challenged FECA 

provisions are justified, because the statutes are closely drawn to further an 

important government interest. (Id. ¶ 8(e).) 

These detailed areas for discovery are directly tied to the legal standards on which this 

case will be decided. (Id. ¶ 8.) The declaration shows those facts were not produced in 

opposition to plaintiff’s motion because plaintiffs prematurely filed their summary judgment 

motion just days after the Rule 26(f) conference and before the deadline for the Commission to 

file its responsive pleading. (See 56(d) Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Plaintiffs cannot deny the Commission 

discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) simply by filing a premature summary judgment motion. 

Such a practice would squarely run afoul of the general rule that “summary judgment is 

premature unless all parties have ‘had a full opportunity to conduct discovery.’” Convertino, 684 

F.3d at 99 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986)); see FEC’s 

Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to Expedite at 5-11 (Docket No. 18). Due process requires courts to “afford 

the parties a full opportunity to present their respective cases” before ruling on the merits. Univ. 

of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Finally, 

the declaration showed that this information is discoverable, describing within each paragraph 

how it could be obtained, e.g., through discovery of parties, third parties, or expert testimony. 

Because the Commission demonstrated that time for additional discovery should be granted as a 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 11 of 15
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matter of course, a point which plaintiffs failed to (and cannot) refute, the Court should permit 

the requested discovery. (FEC Mem. at 8 (citing Convertino, 684 F.3d at 99).) 

C. Numerous Similar Cases Involve Similar or Lengthier Discovery Periods and 

There is No Basis for Denying Discovery in this Case 

 

The Commission also demonstrated the fundamental importance of creating a full factual 

record in cases involving constitutional challenges to FECA, citing numerous federal campaign 

finance cases involving discovery periods similar to what the Commission has requested here. 

(FEC Mem. at 6-7 (citing 10 similar cases).) 

 The few cases cited by plaintiffs do not suggest otherwise. Plaintiffs rely (Pls.’ Opp’n at 

17-18) on the controlling opinion in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 551 U.S. 449, 

468 n.5, 469 (2007) (“WRTL”) (plurality) for its broad-brush endorsement of limits on discovery 

when determining whether particular communications are properly subject to regulation under a 

particular standard. WRTL does not address the type of discovery sought in this case, however. 

Unlike here, the plaintiffs in WRTL challenged a law that prohibited certain entities from directly 

financing certain types of political speech. Because the relevant question in WRTL was whether 

the plaintiff could be prohibited from spending its corporate funds to pay for particular 

advertisements, the Court applied strict scrutiny and set forth a standard consistent with its prior 

holding that BCRA’s spending restrictions on electioneering communications was constitutional 

“to the extent the speech in question was the ‘functional equivalent’ of express campaign 

speech.” Id. at 456 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204-05, 06). The controlling opinion in 

WRTL was specifically concerned about setting a workable standard that did not require 

discovery into the personal, subjective intent of persons financing certain communications. It 

said nothing about the propriety or scope of discovery in constitutional challenges generally, or 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 12 of 15
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in cases like this one challenging laws limiting the amount of contributions and not prohibiting 

any speech.3

Plaintiffs’ reliance (at 25-26) on Citizens United and McCutcheon is similarly misplaced. 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). Like 

WRTL, the quoted language from Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333-34, addresses the possibility 

of protracted litigation resulting from determinations about whether particular communications 

met a multi-factor regulatory test. McCutcheon similarly provides no guidance regarding 

discovery when sought in district courts. Although it is true that neither party sought discovery 

in McCutcheon, plaintiffs ignore the procedural posture of that case, which was before the 

Supreme Court after the Commission prevailed on its motion to dismiss in the district court. 

McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 142 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 

The Commission had chosen to move to dismiss rather than file an answer and pursue discovery 

based on its view (shared by the lower court) that the law in question was settled in the 

Commission’s favor. Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court suggested that discovery 

was foreclosed or would have been limited had the Commission pursued it. The Court declined 

to “remand for development of an evidentiary record” despite the case arriving as an appeal of a 

Rule 12(b)(6) decision under apparently controlling Supreme Court authority, concluding that 

“[w]e take the case as it comes to us.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1447 n.4. That statement 

indicates the Commission could have assembled a new record rather than file a motion to 

                                                           

3

   Plaintiffs also describe discovery in an enforcement action, FEC v. Christian Coalition,

(Pls.’ Opp’n at 23 n.14), but the volume of discovery in that case was significantly increased 

after the defendant failed to produce timely information, at times not until after relevant 

witnesses had already been deposed, necessitating numerous additional depositions. “The 

Coalition’s repeated inability to comply with reasonable discovery requests led Magistrate Judge 

Alan Kay, who oversaw discovery, to impose sanctions.” Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 

45, 51 (D.D.C. 1999).

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dismiss, and the effect of that new judicial approach is to increase the incentive for parties 

litigating settled questions of law to submit evidence and wait to file dispositive motions until 

summary-judgment briefing following the close of discovery, as the Commission intends to do in 

this case. Compare Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664-68 (1994) (remanding a First 

Amendment case for development of a more thorough factual record). 

Plaintiffs suggest that the McConnell record is available and that other discovery would, 

therefore, be unnecessary or cumulative. (Pls. Opp’n at 8.) The Commission agrees with 

plaintiffs that the McConnell record is relevant and useful in this case, but it does not directly 

address activity RNC wishes to engage in — soliciting and spending unlimited contributions for 

express advocacy — and is more than ten years old. Accordingly, the Commission is entitled to 

discovery regarding the specific claims plaintiffs present here and information that may have 

become available after the close of discovery in McConnell. There is no reason to depart from 

the norm where “[s]ummary judgment ordinarily is proper only after the [nonmoving party] has 

been given adequate time for discovery.” Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated Printing 

Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the Commission’s Rule 56(d) motion 

and deny plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment to allow the FEC time to take discovery. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Deputy General Counsel — Law 

 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 14 of 15
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Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

/s/ Greg J. Mueller 

Greg J. Mueller (D.C. Bar No. 462840) 

Seth Nesin 

Charles Kitcher (D.C. Bar No. 986226) 

 Attorneys 

 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

 Washington, DC 20463 

August 18, 2014 (202) 694-1650 

Case 1:14-cv-00853-CRC Document 32 Filed 08/18/14 Page 15 of 15