0

The Joint Military Intelligence College supports and encou

research on intelligence issues that distills lessons and impr

support to policy-level and operational consumers.

This series of Occasional Papers presents the work of faculty, students and others whose 

intelligence issues is supported or otherwise encouraged by the Joint Military Intellige

through its Office of Applied Research. Occasional Papers are distributed to Department 

schools and to the Intelligence Community, and unclassified papers are available to the pu

the National Technical Information Service (www.ntis.gov). 

Proposed manuscripts for these papers are submitted for consideration to the Applied Re

torial Board. Papers undergo review by senior officials in Defense, Intelligence, and occas

ian academic or business communities. Manuscripts or requests for additional copies of 

Papers should be addressed to Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Military Intelligence Co

of Applied Research, MCE, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100.
i

Occasional Paper Number Six

INTELLIGENCE ESSENTIALS

FOR EVERYONE

By Lisa Krizan

JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, DC

June 1999

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

This paper has been approved for unrestricted public release by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
iii

CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Prologue: Intelligence Sharing in a New Light. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Part 

I Intelligence Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

II Converting Customer Needs into Intelligence Requirements . . 

III Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

IV Processing Collected Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

V Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

VI Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

VII Managing the Intelligence Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

VIII Portrait of an Intelligence Analyst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

IX Defensive Measures for Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
v

Preface

The “importance of understanding” has become almost an obsession with 

portions of American business. There remain, however, many companies that 

operate as they traditionally have in the past — placing great faith in the owne

ager’s judgment as to what is required to remain competitive.

In this paper, the author has articulated clearly the fundamentals of sound i

practice and has identified some guidelines that can lead toward creation of a s

gence infrastructure. These signposts apply both to government intelligence a

ness. Good intelligence should always be based on validated requirements, bu

derived from a wide variety of sources, not all of which are reliable.

Understanding the needs of the consumer and the sources available enable 

to choose the correct methodology to arrive at useful answers. The author has 

clear, concise language a logical approach to creating an infrastructure for g

and business. Every system will have flaws but this discussion should help the r

imize those weaknesses. It is an important contribution to the education of g

and business intelligence professionals.

James A. Williams, LTG, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
vii

Foreword

Decades of government intelligence experience and reflection on that exp

captured in this primer. Ms. Krizan combines her own findings on best prac

intelligence profession with the discoveries and ruminations of other practition

ing several Joint Military Intelligence College instructors and students who pr

Many of the selections she refers to are from documents that are out of pr

wrongly been assigned to a dustbin.

This primer reviews and reassesses Intelligence Community best practices w

emphasis on how they may be adopted by the private sector. The government 

of referring to intelligence users as “customers” suggests by itself the demons

larities between government intelligence and business information support fun

The genesis for this study was the author’s discovery of a need to codify for 

gence Community certain basic principles missing from the formal training 

gence analysts. At the same time, she learned of requests from the private se

same type of codified, government best practices for adaptation to the busines

no formal mechanism existed for an exchange of these insights between the 

private sectors, Ms. Krizan developed this paper as an adjunct to her Mast

Benchmarking the Intelligence Process for the Private Sector. Her thesis e

rationale and mechanisms for benchmarking the intelligence process in gover

for sharing the resultant findings with the private sector.

The author and editor wish to acknowledge the constructive comments of t

ers from the business community, representing the Amoco Corporation and 

and Associates, Inc. of Sarasota, Florida.

Comments on this paper are welcome, and should be directed to the Office 

Research, MCE-2, Joint Military Intelligence College, DIAC, Bolling AFB, Wash

20340-5100. Telephone (202) 231-4193; DSN 428-4193; e-mail AFswerg@dia.os

Dr. Russell G. Swenson, Editor and Director, Office of Applied Research
1

INTELLIGENCE SHARING 

IN A NEW LIGHT

Education is the cheapest defense of a nation.

— Edmund Burke, 18th-century British phil

National Intelligence Meets Business Intelligence

This intelligence primer reflects the author’s examination of dozens o

government documents on the practice of intelligence over a period of nearl

For the national security Intelligence Community (IC), it represents a conc

and clarification of the national intelligence function. To the private secto

unprecedented translation into lay terms of national intelligence princip

application within and potentially outside of government.1

 Whereas “inte

ing” has traditionally been a government-to-government transaction, the e

now receptive to government-private sector interaction.

The widespread trend toward incorporating government intelligence met

commerce and education was a primary impetus for publishing this docu

nomic competition accelerates around the world, private businesses are i

own “business intelligence” (BI) or “competitive intelligence” services t

decisionmakers. Educators in business and academia are following suit, ins

cepts into professional training and college curricula.2

Whereas businesses in the past have concentrated on knowing the mark

the best product, they are shifting their focus to include knowing, and stay

competitors. This emphasis on competitiveness requires the sophisticated p

use of carefully analyzed information tailored to specific users; in other 

gence. But the use of intelligence as a strategic planning tool, common in g

a skill that few companies have perfected.3

Although BI practitioners refer to the national security model of intellig

not seek to conduct secret intelligence operations, which are limited by law 

1 For the purpose of this study, the author includes in national security intelligence 

activities conducted by law enforcement personnel at the federal, state, and local 

seeking further information on law enforcement applications of intelligence m

Marilyn Peterson, Applications in Criminal Analysis (Westport, Connecticut: Gr

1994). An additional resource is the International Association of Law Enforcem

Analysts. Local IALEIA chapters are listed on the Association’s web site: http://w

2 An authoritative guide to business intelligence practices is found in Larry Kahan

Intelligence: From Black Ops to Boardrooms — How Businesses Gather, Analyze 

mation to Succeed in the Global Marketplace (New York, NY: Simon and Schust

3 Richard D’Aveni, “Hypercompetition,” briefing to SCIP Conference, Alexandria, VA
2

the Washington, DC area, is an international organization founded in 1986 to a

bers in enhancing their firms’ competitiveness through a greater... understandi

petitor behaviors and future strategies as well as the market dynamics in wh

business.”4 SCIP’s code of conduct specifically promotes ethical and legal BI 

The main focus of “collection” is on exploiting on-line and open-source infor

vices, and the theme of “analysis” is to go beyond mere numerical and factual in

to interpretation of events for strategic decisionmaking.6

Large corporations are creating their own intelligence units, and a few are su

performing analysis in support of strategic decisionmaking. Others are hiring 

tors, or “out-sourcing” this function. However, the majority of businesses ha

familiarity with BI are not able to conduct rigorous research and analysis for v

reporting. According to University of Pittsburgh professor of Business Adm

John Prescott, no theoretical framework exists for BI. He believes that most st

lack the rigor that would come with following sound research-design princip

estimate, only one percent of companies have a research-design capability exp

BI applications.7

 At the same time, companies are increasingly opting to est

own intelligence units rather than purchasing services from BI specialists. Th

tion of this trend is that BI professionals should be skilled in both intelligen

business discipline of value to the company.8

On the other hand, as businesses come to appreciate the value of intellig

their competitors, they are increasingly realizing their own vulnerability to si

tiny. The private sector can therefore benefit from IC expertise in disciplines c

tary to active intelligence production, namely defensive measures. The whole 

openness regarding intelligence practices may hinge upon the counter-balanci

self-defense, particularly as practiced through information systems security (

and operations security (OPSEC).9

 Because the IC seeks to be a world 

INFOSEC and OPSEC as well as intelligence production, defensive measu

appropriate topic for dialogue between the public and private sectors.

The U.S. government INFOSEC Manual sums up the relationship between 

defense in a comprehensive intelligence strategy in this way:

In today’s information age environment, control of information and i

mation technology is vital. As the nation daily becomes more depende

4 SCIP, Competitive Intelligence Review, 8, No. 3 (Fall 1997), unnumbered 8th page. 5 SCIP, 1995 SCIP Membership Directory (Alexandria, VA: SCIP, 1995), xxvii. 6 Leila Kight, “Elements of CI Success,” briefing to SCIP Conference, Alexandria, VA, 28 

7 John Prescott, Professor of Business Administration, University of Pittsburgh, “Rese

ing to SCIP conference, Alexandria, VA, 28 March 1996. 8 Jan Herring, “Strides in Institutionalizing BI in Businesses,” briefing to SCIP Confe

andria, VA, 28 March 1996. 9 These concepts are addressed in Part IX.
3

tary operations, government functions, and national and internatio

nomic enterprises, information infrastructures are assuming in

strategic importance. This has, in turn, given rise to the concept of i

tion warfare (INFOWAR) — a new form of warfare directed toward a

(offensive) or defending (defensive) such infrastructures.10

Giving citizens the tools they need to survive INFOWAR is one of th

missions. This intelligence primer can assist that mission by offering a c

practical “common operating environment” for business and government al

Assessing and Exchanging Best Practices

In documenting the essentials of intelligence, this primer is an example 

ing, a widely used process for achieving quality in organizations, the use of 

terion for the business world’s Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award.12 B

normally assesses best professional practices, developed and refined throug

for carrying out an organization’s core tasks.13 An additional aim of bench

establish reciprocal relationships among best-in-class parties for the exchan

beneficial information.14 Because the IC is the de facto functional leader in t

profession, and is publicly funded, it is obligated to lead both the governme

sector toward a greater understanding of the intelligence discipline.

In the mid-1990s, as national intelligence agencies began to participate i

benchmarking forums, individuals from the private sector began to request p

mation on the intelligence process from IC representatives. The requesto

participants in the growing BI movement and apparently sought to adapt 

their own purposes. Their circumspect counterparts in the government wer

to respond to these requests, preferring instead to limit benchmarking re

common business topics, such as resource management.15 Concurrently, th

international conference highlighted the needs and capabilities of intelli

ments in the private sector.

10 National Security Agency, 1995 INFOSEC Manual (Ft. Meade, MD: NSA, 1995)

11 Readers in doubt of the need for INFOSEC in the private sector may wish to stud

examples of INFOWAR battles and their implications for economic and person

author Winn Schwartau reveals in Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic 

(New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994). 12 A useful reference to benchmarking within the U.S. government is Jerry Franken

sie Rumizen, A Guide to Benchmarking (Fort Meade, MD: National Security Ag

July 1995). An overview of benchmarking in the private sector can be found i

Hanus Kathawaia, and Scott J. Lloyed, “The Benchmarking Process: Assessin

Limitations,” Industrial Management, 39, No. 4 (July/August 1997): 12-19. 13 Elmuti, Kathawaia and Lloyed, 12. 14 Elmuti, Kathawaia and Lloyed, 13. 15 Melissie C. Rumizen, Ph.D., Benchmarking Manager, National Security Agency

the author, 2 April 1996.
4

of validated intelligence practices presented in this document. Conversely, th

oriented perspective on intelligence can be highly useful to government intell

fessionals. As a BI practitioner explains, every activity in the intelligence proc

related to a requirement, otherwise it is irrelevant.16 Government personnel wo

from this practical reminder in every training course and every work center. In 

sector, straying from this principle means wasting money and losing a compe

The consequences of inefficient national intelligence can be costly on an 

scale.

The basis for an IC benchmarking exchange with the private sector continu

The Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals is a clearinghouse for th

private business intelligence practices, and therefore a champion of informati

Leading colleges and universities are beginning to offer coursework in intellig

ods, and in many cases intend to expand their offerings. Curriculum exchang

private sector educators and the IC are encouraged by legislation and by Co

Commission recommendations,17 yet little such formal exchange has taken pla

Whereas government practitioners are the acknowledged subject-matter 

intelligence methodology, the private sector offers a wealth of expertise in part

such as business management, technology, the global marketplace, and skil

Each has valuable knowledge to share with the other, and experience gaps to 

basis of these unique needs and capabilities, the public and private sectors can f

partnership in understanding their common responsibilities, and this primer m

modest contribution toward the exchange of ideas.

The following chapters outline validated steps to operating an intelligence 

both the government and the private sector. In either setting, this document sh

useful as a basic curriculum for students, an on-the-job working aid for practit

a reference tool for experienced professionals, especially those teaching or men

ers. Although the primer does not exhaustively describe procedures for qua

gence production or defensive measures, it does offer the business 

fundamental concepts that can transfer readily from national intelligence to c

applications, including competitive analysis, strategic planning and the protec

prietary information. Universities may incorporate these ideas into their busin

cal science, and intelligence studies curricula to encourage and prepare 

become intelligence practitioners in commerce or government. For anyone ou

16 David Harkleroad, “Actionable CI,” briefing to SCIP Conference, Alexandria, VA

1996. 17 For example, the 1991 National Security Education Act (P.L. 102-183), the 1993 

Performance and Results Act (P.L. 103-62), and the Congressional Report of the Co

the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 2

An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 March 1996), 87. 
5

Department

of State

Central

Intelligence

Agency National

Security

Agency

Defens

Intelligen

Agenc

Unit

Stat

Arm

United

States

Navy

United

States

Marine

Corps

United

States

Air Force

National

Imagery

and Mapping

Agency

National

Reconnaissance Office

Federal

Bureau of

Investigation

Department

of the

Treasury

Department

of Energy

Independent Agency DoD Element Non-DoD OSD/DC

Director of Central

Intelligence

● Community

Management Staff

● Intelligence Community

Executive Committee

● National Intelligence

Council

● National Foreign

Intelligence Board

Source: Based on a Department of Defense publication.

government spends federal tax dollars on national intelligence.

Figure 1: The National Intelligence Community. 
7

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

[I]ntelligence is more than information. It is knowledge that has b

cially prepared for a customer’s unique circumstances. The word kn

highlights the need for human involvement. Intelligence collection 

produce... data, not intelligence; only the human mind can provide t

cial touch that makes sense of data for different customers’ requireme

special processing that partially defines intelligence is the continua

tion, verification, and analysis of information that allows us to unders

problem or situation in actionable terms and then tailor a product in 

text of the customer’s circumstances. If any of these essential attri

missing, then the product remains information rather than intelligence

The intelligence profession, already well established within governm

ing in the private sector. Intelligence is traditionally a function of govern

zations serving the decisionmaking needs of national security aut

innovative private firms are increasingly adapting the national security 

model to the business world to aid their own strategic planning. Altho

professionals may prefer the term “information” over “intelligence,” th

use the latter term to highlight the importance of adding value to 

According to government convention, the author will use the term “custo

to the intended recipient of an intelligence product — either a fellow int

vice member, or a policy official or decisionmaker. The process of co

information into actionable intelligence can serve government and bus

well in their respective domains.

The Intelligence Process in Government and Business

Production of intelligence follows a cyclical process, a series of repeate

lated steps that add value to original inputs and create a substantially transfo

That transformation is what distinguishes intelligence from a simple cyclica

government and private sector alike, analysis is the catalyst that converts in

intelligence for planners and decisionmakers.

Although the intelligence process is complex and dynamic, several compo

may be distinguished from the whole. In this primer, components are identi

gence Needs, Collection Activities, Processing of Collected Information, Ana

duction. To highlight the components, each is accorded a separate Part in thi

18 Captain William S. Brei, Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Proced

Paper Number Two (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, January 

19 Melissie C. Rumizen, Benchmarking Manager at the National Security Agenc

author, 4 January 1996.
8

dimensional and unidirectional process. [I]n fact, the [process] is multidimensi

directional, and — most importantly — interactive and iterative.”20

Figure 2: Process of Intelligence Creation and Use. 

20 Douglas H. Dearth, “National Intelligence: Profession and Process,” in Strategic 

Theory and Application, eds. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodden, 2d ed. (

DC: Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, 1995), 17.

Source: Modified from a Department of Defense publication.

Requirement/

Feedback

Planni

Taskin

Processing/

Exploitation

Dissemination

Production

Analysis

Colle

Evaluation

Evaluation

User
9

with tools, or products that assist them in identifying key decision factor

gence products may be described both in terms of their subject content and 

use.21

Any or all of these categories may be relevant to the private sector, depen

particular firm’s product line and objectives in a given industry, market env

geographic area.

A nation’s power or a firm’s success results from a combination of fact

gence producers and customers should examine potential adversaries an

situations from as many relevant viewpoints as possible. A competito

resources, political alignments, the number, education and health of it

apparent objectives are all important in determining the ability of a coun

ness to exert influence on others. The eight subject categories of in

exhaustive, but they are not mutually exclusive. Although dividing int

subject areas is useful for analyzing information and administering 

should not become a rigid formula. Some intelligence services structure p

geographic subject areas when their responsibilities warrant a broader pe

topical divisions would allow.22

Table 1: Types of Intelligence Product Categories

Source: adapted from Garst, “Components of Intelligence”

By Subject By Use

Biographic Research

Economic Current

Geographic Estimative

Military Operational

Political Scientific and Technical

Sociological Warning

Scientific and Technical

Transportation and Communications

21 Ronald D. Garst, “Components of Intelligence,” in A Handbook of Intelligenc

Ronald D. Garst, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence College, January 

tral Intelligence Agency, A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence (Washington, DC

Staff, July 1995), 5-7. 22 Garst, Components of Intelligence, 2,3.
10

and enterprise, and the categories again are exhaustive, but not mutually exclusiv

duction of basic research intelligence yields structured summaries of topics su

graphic, demographic, and political studies, presented in handbooks, charts, ma

like. Current intelligence addresses day-to-day events to apprise decisionmak

developments and assess their significance. Estimative intelligence deals with 

be or what might happen; it may help policymakers fill in gaps between availab

assess the range and likelihood of possible outcomes in a threat or “opportunity

Operational support intelligence incorporates all types of intelligence by use, 

duced in a tailored, focused, and timely manner for planners and operators of th

activity. Scientific and Technical intelligence typically comes to life in in-dep

assessments stemming from detailed physical or functional examination of obje

or processes, such as equipment manufacturing techniques.23 Warning intellige

an alarm, connoting urgency, and implies the potential need for policy action in r

How government and business leaders define their needs for these types of i

affects the intelligence service’s organization and operating procedures. Mana

intricate process, whether in government or business, need to decide whether t

intelligence unit responsible for all the component parts of the process or to cre

specialized organizations for particular sub-processes. This question is explo

below, and more fully in Part VII.

Functional Organization of Intelligence

The national Intelligence Community comprises Executive Branch agencies t

classified and unclassified studies on selected foreign developments as a prelu

sions and actions by the president, military leaders, and other senior authoritie

this intelligence is developed from special sources to which few individuals h

except on a strictly controlled “need-to-know” basis.24 The four categories of spe

gence are Human Resources (HUMINT), Signals (SIGINT), Imagery (IMINT

surement and Signatures (MASINT). The four corresponding national authoriti

categories are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Age

the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the Defense Intelligen

(DIA). DIA shares authority for HUMINT, being responsible for Department 

HUMINT management. Along with these four agencies, other members of the 

Community use and produce intelligence by integrating all available and releva

information into reports tailored to the needs of individual customers.

Private sector organizations use open-source information to produce intelligenc

ion similar to national authorities. By mimicking the government process of tran

tomer needs into production requirements, and particularly by performing rigorous 

gathered information, private organizations can produce assessments that aid thei

23 CIA, Consumer’s Guide, 5-7. 24 CIA, Consumer’s Guide, vii.
11

This primer will point out why private entities may desire to transfer into thei

well-honed proficiencies developed in the national Intelligence Community. At 

the Intelligence Community self-examination conducted in these pages may allo

managers to reflect on any unique capabilities worthy of further development an

Figure 3: National Intelligence Production Resources.

Source: Modified from a Department of Defense publication.

Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT)

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)

Signals Intelligence

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)

● Agents (Controlled Sources)

● Informants (Willing Sources)

● Observers (Attaches)

● Photo/Digital

● Electro-Optical

● Multispectral

● Public Documents

● Newspapers

● Television and Radio

● COMINT (Communications)

● ELINT (Electronic)

● FISINT (Telemetry)

● ACINT (Acoustic)

● RADINT (Radiation)

● Infrared

● Radar

● Books and

Journals

13

CONVERTING CUSTOMER NEEDS INT

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

The articulation of the requirement is the most important part of 

cess, and it seldom is as simple as it might seem. There should be a d

concerning the requirement, rather than a simple assertion of need. 

the customer knows precisely what is needed and what the produc

look like. Perhaps... not. Interaction is required: discussion between 

user and principal producer. This is often difficult due to time, dista

bureaucratic impediments, not to mention disparities of rank, persona

spectives, and functions.

25

Defining the Intelligence Problem

Customer demands, or “needs,” particularly if they are complex and t

require interpretation or analysis by the intelligence service before being 

intelligence requirements that drive the production process.26 This dialog b

gence producer and customer may begin with a simple set of questions, an

ate, progress to a more sophisticated analysis of the intelligence problem be

The “Five Ws” — Who, What, When, Where, and Why — are a good sta

translating intelligence needs into requirements. A sixth related question, H

be considered. In both government and business, these questions form the 

work for decisionmakers and intelligence practitioners to follow in formu

gence requirements and devising a strategy to satisfy them. Typically

intelligence requirements are expressed in terms of foreign threats to natio

tional security. In business, requirements may be expressed in terms of th

standing in the marketplace in comparison to one’s own posture. Representa

from each sector follow:

25 Dearth, “National Intelligence,” 17-18. 26 Dearth, “National Intelligence,” 18.
14

Examination of these basic scenarios should inspire further development of 

of determining customer needs in specific situations. The thoughtful researche

pose, for example, ways to gather information on additional aspects of the prob

What) and on customers (Who), as well as on the attendant motivations (Why) 

gies (How) of the target and the customer. Defining the intelligence problem in t

paves the way for the next step in the intelligence process — the developmen

gence collection, analysis, and production requirements, explained later in this c

Table 2: Illustrative Definitions of Intelligence Problems and Customer Ne

Source: Author

A Government Scenario

The Intelligence Problem

Who What When Where Why How

A foreign 

president

Refusing to 

allow weapons 

sites to be 

inspected

Now; for several 

months

Country X Unknown, 

possibly to hide 

illegal weapons

Bar

des

mo

equ

The Intelligence Need

Who What When Where Why How

U.S. President Wants info on 

Country X 

President

Now, and 

update

White House Determine 

power base and 

intent

All-

coll

ana

A Business Scenario

The Intelligence Problem

Who What When Where Why How

Company X Reorganizes 

production 

department

Sudden Saturated 

market

Unknown Unk

The Intelligence Need

Who What When Where Why How

CEO of similar 

Company Y

Wants to know 

why and how 

Company X 

changed

ASAP CEO’s office Determine if 

new structure 

gives advantage

Ope

ana

tailo

con

rep
15

omy of Problem Types. The table below illustrates the factors that custo

ducers may take into account in articulating the nature of the intelligence 

selecting a strategy for resolving it.

27 Morgan D. Jones, The Thinker’s Toolkit (New York: Random House, 1995), 44-4

by Thomas H. Murray, Sequoia Associates, Inc., Arlington, VA., in coursework a

tary Intelligence College.

Table 3: Taxonomy of Problem Types

Source: Analysis course material, Joint Military Intelligence College, 1991

Characteristics

Problem Types

Simplistic Deterministic

Moderately 

Random

Severely 

Random 

What is the 

question?

Obtain 

information

How much? 

How many

Identify and 

rank all 

outcomes

Identify 

outcomes in 

unbounded 

situation

Role of facts Highest High Moderate Low 

Role of 

judgment

Lowest Low Moderate High 

Analytical task Find 

information

Find/create 

formula

Generate all 

outcomes

Define 

potential 

outcomes

Analytical 

method

Search 

sources

Match data to 

formula

Decision 

theory; utility 

analysis

Role playing

and gaming

Analytical 

instrument

Matching Mathematical 

formula

Influence 

diagram, utility, 

probability

Subjective 

evaluation of 

outcomes

Analytic output Fact Specific value 

or number

Weighted 

alternative 

outcomes

Plausible 

outcomes

Probability of 

error

Lowest Very low Dependent on 

data quality

High to very 

high

Follow-up task None None Monitor for 

change

Repeated 

testing to 

determine true 

state
16

needs and capabilities in relation to a particular intelligence scenario. Thi

establish a baseline and set in motion a collection and production strategy i

conducting a successful intelligence effort. Too often, both producers and 

waste valuable time and effort struggling to characterize for themselves a give

or perhaps worse, they hastily embark upon an action plan without determinin

priateness to the problem. Employing a structured approach as outlined in the 

of Problem Types can help the players avoid these inefficiencies and take th

toward generating clear intelligence requirements by defining both the intellig

lem and the requisite components to its solution. Following are example sce

reader is encouraged to follow the scenarios down the columns of the taxon

then generate new scenarios in similar fashion.

Intelligence Problem Definition

A Government Scenario

The Severely Random problem type is one frequently encountered by the 

planning an operational strategy. This is the realm of wargaming. The initial i

problem is to identify all possible outcomes in an unbounded situation, so that 

ers can generate plans for every contingency. The role of valid data is relativ

while the role of judgment is great, as history and current statistics may shed li

how the adversary will behave in a hypothetical situation, and the progress an

of an operation against that adversary cannot be predicted with absolute accur

fore, the analytical task is to define and prepare for all potential outcomes. Th

method is role playing and wargaming: placing oneself mentally in the imag

tion, and experiencing it in advance, even to the point of acting it out in a reali

After experiencing the various scenarios, the players subjectively evaluate th

of the games, assessing which ones may be plausible or expected to occur 

world. The probability of error in judgment here is inherently high, as no one 

tain that the future will occur exactly as events unfolded in the game. Howeve

exercises can help to establish a measure of confidence, for practice in livin

scenarios may enable the players to more quickly identify and execute desired 

and avoid mistakes in a similar real situation.

A Business Scenario

The Indeterminate problem type is one facing the entrepreneur in the mode

munications market. Predicting the future for a given proposed new technology o

an extremely imprecise task fraught with potentially dire, or rewarding, consequ

role of valid data is extremely minor here, whereas analytical judgments about 

public’s future — and changing — needs and desires are crucial. Defining the 

influencing the future market is the analytical task, to be approached via the 

method of setting up models and scenarios: the if/then/else process. Experts in th

technology or market are then employed to analyze these possibilities. Their outp

thesized assessment of how the future will look under various conditions with re
17

sion is based entirely on mental models rather than experience; after all, n

product nor the future environment exists yet. Continual reassessment of the 

tors influencing the future can help the analysts adjust their conclusions and 

decisionmakers on whether, and how, to proceed with the new product.

Generating Intelligence Requirements

Once they have agreed upon the nature of the intelligence problem at ha

gence service and the customer together can next generate intelligence re

drive the production process. The intelligence requirement translates custom

an intelligence action plan. A good working relationship between the two 

stage will determine whether the intelligence produced in subsequent s

meets customer needs. However, the differing perspectives that each side 

negotiation process can make cooperation between them a difficult feat.28

Customers want intelligence to guide them clearly in making policy and op

sions. They may have little understanding of the intelligence process, and litt

the subjectivity and conditionality of intelligence judgments. For customers, in

be just one of many influences on their decisionmaking, and may be given 

comparison to other, more readily digested, familiar, or policy-oriented inp

intelligence is neither designed nor equipped to meet these customer expectati

As a discipline, intelligence seeks to remain an independent, objective 

decisionmaker. The realm of intelligence is that of “fact,” considered judgm

ability, but not prescription. It does not tell the customer what to do to meet 

rather, identifies the factors at play, and how various actions may affect out

gence tends to be packaged in standard formats and, because of its method

may not be delivered within the user’s ideal timeframe. For all these reasons

may not see intelligence as a useful service.30

Yet, somehow the intelligence producer and customer must reconcile 

perspectives in order to agree on intelligence requirements and make the p

cess work. Understanding each other’s views on intelligence is the firs

improving the relationship between them. The next step is communication

tion among the players will foster agreement on intelligence priorities and 

ucts that decisionmakers recognize as meaningful to their agendas, ye

rigorous analysis.31 In addition, as discussed below, customer feedback 

quality will lead to better definition of future intelligence problems and requ

28 Arthur S. Hulnick, “The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage: 

Approach,” Intelligence and National Security, 1, No. 2, (May 1986): 214-216. 29 Hulnick, “Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage,” 215-216. 30 Hulnick, “Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage,” 216. 31 Adapted from Michael A. Turner, “Setting Analytical Priorities in U.S. Intellig

tional Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 9, No. 3, (Fall 1996): 320
18

Having thus developed an understanding of customer needs, the intellige

may proactively and continuously generate intelligence collection and producti

ments to maintain customer-focused operations. Examples of such internally 

specifications include analyst-driven, events-driven, and scheduled requirem

table below briefly describes them.32

Further distinctions among intelligence requirements include timeliness an

level, of intended use. Timeliness of requirements is established to meet stan

term) and ad hoc (short-term) needs. When the customer and intelligence servi

define certain topics as long-term intelligence issues, they generate a standi

ment to ensure that a regular production effort can, and will, be maintained a

target. The customer will initiate an ad hoc requirement upon realizing a sud

term need for a specific type of intelligence, and will specify the target of i

coverage timeframe, and the type of output desired.

The scope or level of intended use of the intelligence may be characterized 

or tactical. Strategic intelligence is geared to a policymaker dealing with 

issues affecting the mission and future of an organization: the U.S. President

executives, high-level diplomats, or military commanders of major command

Tactical intelligence serves players and decisionmakers “on the ground” enga

rent operations: trade negotiators, marketing and sales representatives, deploy

units, or product developers.

Table 4: Types of Producer-Generated Intelligence Collection 

and Production Requirements

Source: Hulnick

Analyst-driven Based on knowledge of customer and issues

Events-driven In response to time-sensitive relevant events

Scheduled Periodic activities to document and update target s

32 Adapted from Arthur S. Hulnick, “Managing Intelligence Analysis: Strategies for 

End Game,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 2, No. 3 

327.

Table 5: Types of Customer-Defined Intelligence Requirements

Source: Author

Timeliness Short-term (ad hoc) Long-term (standing)

Scope Broad (strategic) Narrow (tactical)
19

Even when they follow this method of formulating intelligence requirem

decisionmakers and their intelligence units in the public and private sectors 

an incomplete grasp of how to define their needs and capabilities — until th

ated the resultant products. Thus, customer feedback, production planning a

well as any internal product evaluation, all become part of the process of d

and creating intelligence requirements. However, when intelligence produ

are not in nearly direct, daily contact, this process can consume a good dea

is why the national Intelligence Community is experimenting with compre

accustomed time and spatial dimensions of the intelligence process throug

tronic collaboration and production methods.33

Whether in business or government, six fundamental values or attribute

core principles from which all the essential intelligence functions are deriv

lary is that intelligence customers’ needs may be defined and engaged by in

fessionals using these same values. Table 6 offers a brief explanation 

intelligence customers and producers may use these values to evaluate how 

translated needs into requirements that will result in useful products.34

Interpretation of these values turns a customer’s need into a collection a

requirement that the intelligence service understands in the context of its o

However, illustrating the complexity of the intelligence process, once thi

next step is not necessarily collection.

Rather, the next stage is analysis. Perhaps the requirement is simpl

answered — by an existing product, by ready extrapolation from files or 

by a simple phone call or short desk note based on an analyst’s or man

edge. On the other hand, the requirement might necessitate laborious effo

lation, collation, analysis, integration, and production — but still the p

constructed and sent directly to the requester. Case closed; next problem..

analysis might well show, however, that while much data exists, becaus

hand is not a new one, gaps in information must be filled... Obviously, thi

lection. This brings up an essential point: consumers do not drive collectio

lysts do — or should.35 Part III explores this next step in the intelligence pr

33 The U.S. military has pioneered the concept of an electronic intelligence operating 

transcends organizational boundaries. Congress has recommended that the IC adopt 

gence Virtual Architecture model to take advantage of technological developments

cratic barriers, and thereby provide policymakers with timely, objective, and useful 

U.S. Congress Staff Study, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC

gence Community in the 21st Century, (April 1996): Section III, “Intelligence Requir

34 The six values are adapted by Brei from an earlier version of U.S. Department o

Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Opera

ton, DC: GPO, 5 May 1995), IV-15. 35 Dearth, “National Intelligence,” 18-19.
20

Table 6: Intelligence Values

Source: Brei

Accuracy: All sources and data must be evaluated for the possibility of technical error, misperc

hostile efforts to mislead.

Objectivity: All judgments must be evaluated for the possibility of deliberate distortions and ma

due to self-interest.

Usability: All intelligence communications must be in a form that facilitates ready comprehensi

immediate application. Intelligence products must be compatible with a customer’s capabilities 

receiving, manipulating, protecting, and storing the product.

Relevance: Information must be selected and organized for its applicability to a customer’s req

with potential consequences and significance of the information made explicit to the customer’s 

circumstances.

Readiness: Intelligence systems must be responsive to the existing and contingent intelligence 

requirements of customers at all levels of command.

Timeliness: Intelligence must be delivered while the content is still actionable under the custom

circumstances.
21

COLLECTION

The collection function rests on research — on matching validated intel

tives to available sources of information, with the results to be transform

intelligence. Just as within needs-definition, analysis is an integral function 

Collection Requirements

The collection requirement specifies exactly how the intelligence service 

acquiring the intelligence information the customer needs. Any one, or a

players in the intelligence system may be involved in formulating colle

ments: the intelligence analyst, a dedicated staff officer, or a specialized col

In large intelligence services, collection requirements may be managed 

specialists acting as liaisons between customers and collectors (people 

obtain the needed information, either directly or by use of technical mean

requirements staff, individual requirements officers may be dedicated to a p

customers, a type of collection resource, or a specific intelligence issue. T

lection requirements officers is prevalent in the government. Smaller servic

in the private sector, may assign collection requirements management to 

team within a multidisciplinary intelligence unit that serves a particular cu

is arrayed against a particular topic area.

Regardless of how it is organized, the requirements management functio

more than simple administrative duties. It requires analytic skill to evaluate 

customer has expressed the intelligence need; whether, how and when th

unit is able to obtain the required information through its available collectio

in what form to deliver the collected information to the intelligence analyst

Collection Planning and Operations

One method for selecting a collection strategy is to first prepare a list of 

get evidence. The collection requirements officer and the intelligence analy

get may collaborate in identifying the most revealing evidence of target a

may include physical features of terrain or objects, human behavior, or nat

made phenomena. The issue that can be resolved through this analysis i

looking for, and how will I know it if I see it”? 

Successful analysis of expected target evidence in light of the custom

determine what collection source and method will permit detection and c

evidence. Increasingly sophisticated identification of evidence types may re

lectible data are essential for drawing key conclusions, and therefore should 

ority; whether the evidence is distinguishable from innocuous information

the intelligence service has the skills, time, money and authorization to c
22

a format that is either usable in raw form by the intelligence analyst, or that c

verted practicably into usable form.

For example, in the case of the first business scenario presented in Part I

needs intelligence on why and how the similar, competitor company sudde

nized its production department. The collection requirement might specify that 

gence unit give first priority to this new issue; it will focus on collecting i

about the competitor’s reorganization. A list of relevant evidence might inclu

lowing: changes in personnel assignments, changes in supply of production co

budget deficit or surplus, age of infrastructure, breakthroughs in research an

ment, and changes in the cultural or natural environment. To exploit this ev

intelligence service would thus need direct or indirect access to information o

pany’s employees, its previous production methods, its financial status, its phy

its overall functional structure and operations, and the consumer market. The 

unit would choose from among the sources listed in Table 7 below those mo

provide timely access to this information in usable form.

Finally, upon defining the collection requirement and selecting a collectio

the intelligence unit should implement that strategy by tasking personnel and r

exploit selected sources, perform the collection, re-format the results if necessa

them usable in the next stages, and forward the information to the intelligence 

unit. This aspect of the collection phase may be called collection operations m

As with requirements management, it is often done by specialists, particularly 

intelligence service. In smaller operations, the same person or team may perfo

all of the collection-related functions.

The small, multidisciplinary intelligence unit may experience certain benefi

advantages in managing multiple phases of the intelligence process at the sam

comparison to the large, compartmentalized service, the smaller unit will lik

ence greater overall efficiency of operations and fewer bureaucratic barriers t

service. The same few people may act as requirements officers, operations ma

intelligence analysts/producers, decreasing the likelihood of communication an

ing problems among them. This approach may be less expensive in terms of in

and logistics than a functionally divided operation. On the other hand, the fin

time investment in training each individual in every facet of the intelligence p

be substantial. Furthermore, careful selection and assignment of personnel who 

multidisciplinary environment will be vital to the unit’s success, to help ward o

worker stress and overload. An additional pitfall that the small unit should stri

is the tendency to be self-limiting: overreliance on the same customer contacts

sources and methods, analytic approaches, and production formulas can lead to 

and irrelevance. The small intelligence unit should be careful to invest in new 

that keep pace with changing times and customer needs.
23

The range of sources available to all intelligence analysts, including th

government, is of course much broader than the set of restricted, special sou

only for government use. U.S. government collection of information for int

poses is channelled through the recognized intelligence collection discipline

Part I. From a different perspective, four general categories serve to identif

information sources available to the intelligence analyst: people, objects, em

records. Strictly speaking, the information offered by these sources may 

intelligence if the information has not yet been converted into a value-add

the government or private sector, collection may be performed by the repor

by a specialist in one or more of the collection disciplines. The following 

from Clauser and Weir, illustrates the distinct attributes offered by the fo

intelligence.36

Table 7: Categories of Intelligence Sources by Analytic Use

Source: Adapted from Clauser and Weir

Source

Related Collection Discipline(s) and 

Source Attributes Analytic Use

People HUMINT; subject-matter experts, 

professional researchers, information 

specialists, eyewitnesses or participants 

Transfer of first-hand kno

to other sources

Objects IMINT; physical characteristics of 

equipment, materials, or products, such 

as texture, shape, size, and distinctive 

markings

Basis for emotive but obj

on composition, conditio

human purpose

Emanations MASINT, SIGINT; detectable 

phenomena given off by natural or manmade objects; electromagnetic energy, 

heat, sound, footprints, fingerprints, and 

chemical and material residues

Scientific and technical a

Records IMINT, SIGINT, symbolic (written and 

oral reports, numerical tabulations) or 

non-symbolic (images, electro-magnetic 

recordings of data)

Research, background i

translation, conversion t

36 Jerome K. Clauser and Sandra M. Weir, Intelligence Research Methodology: An 

Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Research in Defense Intelligence (W

Defense Intelligence School, 1975), 111-117.
24

type.

The collection phase of the intelligence process thus involves several steps: 

of the intelligence need into a collection requirement, definition of a collectio

selection of collection sources, and information collection. The resultant colle

mation must often undergo a further conversion before it can yield intellig

analysis stage. Processing of collected information into intelligence info

addressed in the following Part of this primer.

Table 8: Comparison of Illustrative Intelligence Sources from Government and 

Source: Author

Source Information Provided Government Business

People Inadvertent or 

intentional revelation by 

a person in a casual 

encounter, official 

meeting, or informant 

relationship

A foreign diplomat A fellow exh

trade show

Objects Physical and functional 

characteristics of the 

item, discerned through 

physical or visual 

examination

Military equipment Products or 

components

Emanations Clues about the identity 

and activities of the 

originator

Intercepted 

communications

Trace chem

factory efflu

Records Evidence of existence 

and characteristics of 

target entities

Imagery, telemetry, 

documents

Product liter
25

PROCESSING COLLECTED 

INFORMATION

From Raw Data to Intelligence Information

No matter what the setting or type of collection, gathered information 

aged meaningfully before it can be used in the production of intelligenc

methods will vary depending on the form of the collected information an

use, but they include everything done to make the results of collection eff

intelligence producers. Typically, “processing” applies to the techniques us

ment intelligence services to transform raw data from special-source techn

into intelligence information.

37

While collectors collect “raw” information, certain [collection] dis

involve a sort of pre-analysis in order to make the information “read

the average all-source analyst. For instance: imagery analysts “read-

basic information on the image; foreign language broadcasts must be 

translated by linguists and analyzed for linguistic “context”; electro

nals require sorting out to be intelligible to the uninitiated in that arc

agent reports also need literal translations and perhaps comments as to 

context, assumed or proven past veracity.38

In the private sector, some processing activities are analogous to those 

ment. Interpreting and annotating open-source information for a business in

vice may include: marking locations of interest on a map or photograph

press releases or technical reports, transcribing the words of a speaker f

audiotape into text, or drafting a detailed commentary from a personal inter

Another term for processing, collation, encompasses many of the differ

that must be performed on collected information or data before further anal

ligence production can occur. More than merely physically manipulating 

collation organizes the information into a usable form, adding meaning wh

evident in the original. Collation includes gathering, arranging, and anno

information; drawing tentative conclusions about the relationship of "facts” 

and their significance; evaluating the accuracy and reliability of each item; g

into logical categories; critically examining the information source; and 

meaning and usefulness of the content for further analysis. Collation revea

37 The Department of Defense defines intelligence information as “unprocessed 

description which may be used in the production of intelligence.” (Department o

Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (W

23 March 1994), 184.) 38 Dearth, “National Intelligence,” 19.
26

organizing additional information.

Examples of collation include filing documents, condensing information by 

or relationships, and employing electronic database programs to store, sort, a

large quantities of information or data in preconceived or self-generatin

Regardless of its form or setting, an effective collation method will have the 

attributes:

1. Be impersonal. It should not depend on the memory of one analyst; ano

knowledgeable in the subject should be able to carry out the operation.

2. Not become the “master” of the analyst or an end in itself.

3. Be free of bias in integrating the information.

4. Be receptive to new data without extensive alteration of the collating crit

Evaluating and Selecting Evidence

To prepare collected information for further use, one must evaluate its rel

value to the specific problem at hand. An examination of the information’s 

applicability to the intelligence issue can determine whether that information 

ther employed in the intelligence production process. Three aspects to consider 

ing the relevance of information sources are reliability, proximity, and appropr

Reliability of a source is determined through an evaluation of its past perfo

the source proved accurate in the past, then a reasonable estimate of its likely 

a given case can be made. A human source’s own testimony of reliability m

taken into account; qualifiers such as “certain,” “believe,” and “guess” indicat

the source is of the information being conveyed. However, if the source is 

untested, then evaluation of the information must be done solely on its own m

pendent of its origin.41

Proximity refers to the source’s closeness to the information. The direct obse

ticipant in an event may gather and present evidence directly, but in the absen

firsthand information, the analyst must rely on sources with varying degrees of p

39 R.H. Mathams, “The Intelligence Analyst’s Notebook,” in Strategic Intelligence: 

Application, eds. Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodden, 2d ed. (Washingto

Military Intelligence Training Center, 1995), 85-86. 40 Mathams, 86. 41 adapted from Gary Harris, “Evaluating Intelligence Evidence,” in A Handbook of 

Analysis, ed. Ronald D. Garst, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Coll

1989), 34-35. For an in-depth treatment of evidence evaluation techniques and factor

A. Schum, Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst, Vols. I and II (La

University Press of America, 1987).
27

ondary source provides information twice removed from the original event

informs another, who then relays the account to the analyst. Such regression o

imity may continue indefinitely, and naturally, the more numerous the step

information and the source, the greater the opportunity for error or distortion.

Appropriateness of the source rests upon whether the source speaks from 

authority on the specific issue in question. As no one person or institution i

all matters, the source’s individual capabilities and shortcomings affect the 

ity or reliability assigned to the information it provides regarding a given to

The following examples illustrate the use of reliability, proximity, and ap

to evaluate a source.

The mail clerk at 3rd Army Headquarters told me that, according to 

Armored Division Supply Officer, the Division is being deployed to S

three days.

The reliability of the mail clerk as a source (questionable), his proximit

mation (secondary), and the appropriateness of the Supply Officer as a sou

of deployment (uncertain), make this information of little value to the int

duction process.

A major national newspaper published an interview with the CEO 

Company, quoting the CEO’s announcement of a merger the comp

just secretly concluded with Large Company.

The reliability of a major national newspaper as a source (good), its pr

information (secondary), and the appropriateness of the CEO as the source 

announcement (high) make this information of high value to intelligence pr

Three aspects of the information itself have a bearing on its applicabi

gence issues: plausibility, expectability, and support. Plausibility refers t

information is true under any circumstances or only under certain con

known or possible. Expectability is assessed in the context of the analyst’

edge of the subject. Support for information exists when another piece of 

roborates it — either the same information from a different source

information that points to the same conclusion.44

For example, a source contends that the President of Country X recently 

death is being kept secret from all but a few members of his regime. Alth

this information is plausible, and even has precedent in history. The scena

the expectability criterion, if the country or this particular regime is 

42 Harris, 35. 43 adapted from Harris, 36. 44 adapted from Harris, 36-38.
28

takeover movements. Support for this information may come from the same 

viding details on the President’s secret burial ceremony, or a different source, 

actor who was hired to play the part of the President in a false Presidential ad

vised to the nation.

All these factors of source and content contribute to an initial assessment o

of a particular piece of information to the intelligence production process. Th

that are judged to be useful may then undergo further scrutiny in light of custo

while items of questionable value may be rejected or set aside for further proc

comparison with other information. This initial selection of intelligence infor

the stage for intelligence analysis and production, as explained in the followi

the primer.
29

ANALYSIS

Analysis is the breaking down of a large problem into a numb

smaller problems and performing mental operations on the data in 

to arrive at a conclusion or a generalization. It involves close exam

tion of related items of information to determine the extent to w

they confirm, supplement, or contradict each other and thus to esta

probabilities and relationships.

— Mathams, 88.

Analysis is not merely reorganizing data and information into a new form

least, analysis should fully describe the phenomenon under study, accountin

relevant variables as possible. At the next higher level of analysis, a thorough 

the phenomenon is obtained, through interpreting the significance and effects 

on the whole. Ideally, analysis can reach successfully beyond the descriptiv

tory levels to synthesis and effective persuasion, often referred to as estimatio

The purpose of intelligence analysis is to reveal to a specific decisionmak

ing significance of selected target information. Frequently intelligence ana

estimating the likelihood of one possible outcome, given the many possibiliti

lar scenario. This function is not to be confused with prediction, as no one c

credited with predicting the future. However, intelligence analysis does 

involve forecasting, “which requires the explicit statement by the analyst of 

confidence held in a certain set of judgments, based upon a certain set of e

assumptions.”45 Different levels of analysis result in corresponding levels 

that may be traced along an “Intelligence Food Chain.”46 This concept, illustr

lowing table, is equally applicable in government and business intelligence.

45 Dearth, “National Intelligence,” 25. 46 Adapted from Jack Davis, Intelligence Changes in Analytic Tradecraft in CIA’

Intelligence, (Washington, DC: CIA Directorate of Intelligence, April 1995), 6.

Table 9: The Intelligence Food Chain

Source: adapted from Davis, Analytic Tradecraft

Facts - verified information related to an intelligence issue (for example: events, measured 

Findings - expert knowledge based on organized information that indicates, for example, w

increasing, decreasing, changing, taking on a pattern.

Forecasts - judgments based on facts and findings and defended by sound and clear argu

Fortunetelling - inadequately explained and defended judgments.
30

orous analytic thought  how far to go with their analytic judgments, and wh

the line. The mnemonic “Four Fs Minus One” may serve as a reminder of ho

this criterion. Whenever the intelligence information allows, and the customer

needs demand it, the intelligence analyst will extend the thought process as fa

Food Chain as possible, to the third “F” but not beyond to the fourth.

Types of Reasoning

Objectivity is the intelligence analyst’s primary asset in creating intell

meets the Four Fs Minus One criterion. More than simply a conscientious attit

tivity is “a professional ethic that celebrates tough-mindedness and clarity i

rules of evidence, inference, and judgment.”47 To produce intelligence obje

analyst must employ a process tailored to the nature of the problem. Four bas

reasoning apply to intelligence analysis: induction, deduction, abduction and th

method.

Induction. The induction process is one of discovering relationships amon

nomena under study. For example, an analyst might discover from systemati

tion of media reports that Country “X” had been issuing aggressive stateme

formally announcing an arms agreement with Country “Y.” Or an analyst may 

a characteristic sequence of events always precedes Country “Z’s” nuclea

tests.48 In the words of Clauser and Weir:

Induction is the intellectual process of drawing generalizations o

basis of observations or other evidence. Induction takes place when 

learns from experience. For example, induction is the process by which a 

son learns to associate the color red with heat and heat with pain, and to 

eralize these associations to new situations.

Induction occurs when one is able to postulate causal relationships. In

gence estimates are largely the result of inductive processes, and, of co

induction takes place in the formulation of every hypothesis. Unlike 

types of intellectual activities such as deductive logic and mathematics, 

are no established rules for induction.49

Deduction. “Deduction is the process of reasoning from general rules to parti

Deduction may also involve drawing out or analyzing premises to form a concl

the case of Country “Z” above, the analyst noted a pattern of events related t

nuclear weapons. Later, after noticing this series of events occurring in Count

analyst may conclude that another nuclear weapons test is about to take place in 

47 Davis, Analytical Tradecraft, 5. 48 Clauser and Weir, 81. 49 Clauser and Weir, 81. 50 clauser and Weir, 81.
31

tively  from specific observations to a conclusion. The second premise, th

was imminent, was derived deductively — from a generalization to a specific 

Deduction works best in closed systems such as mathematics, formal lo

kinds of games in which all the rules are clearly spelled out. For example, th

truthfulness of the following conclusion is apparent to anyone with a knowl

etry: “This is a triangle, therefore the sum of the interior angles will equal 

In closed systems, properly drawn deductive conclusions are always valid.5

However, intelligence analysis rarely deals with closed systems, so prem

to be true may in fact be false, and lead to false conclusions. For example, i

testing case above, Country “Z” may have deliberately deceived potentia

falsely staging activities similar to those usually taken before a real weapo

clusion that observed activities signalled a real test would be false in this 

human activities rarely involve closed systems, deduction must be used car

ligence analysis.53

Readers interested in further study into the use of deductive logic in esti

gence may wish to read the work of Israeli intelligence analyst Isaac Ben

subject.54 At the Joint Military Intelligence College, one student, Navy Lieu

Carney, explored the application of deductive logic to intelligence collectio

decisions in estimating the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Carney showed tha

“critical method” of inquiry could be applied prospectively to the collectio

tion to refute specific hypotheses, allowing for an unusually definitive estim

lihood of each outcome.55

Abduction. Abduction is the process of generating a novel hypothesis to 

evidence that does not readily suggest a familiar explanation. This proces

induction in that it adds to the set of hypotheses available to the analyst. In 

soning, the hypothesized relationship among pieces of evidence is con

already existing, needing only to be perceived and articulated by the anal

tion, the analyst creatively generates an hypothesis, then sets about exam

the available evidence unequivocally leads to the new conclusion. The latte

the evidence, is a deductive inference.56

51 Clauser and Weir, 82-83. 52 Clauser and Weir, 83. 53 Clauser and Weir, 83-84. 54 Isaac Ben-Israel, “Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of 

cess,” Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 4 (October 1989): 660-718. 55 LT Donald J. Carney, USN, Estimating the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Seminar P

ton, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, September 1991). 56 David A. Schum, Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst, Volume I 

University Press of America, 1987): 20.
32

ence. It characterizes the analysts occasional ability to come to a conclusion 

ously, often without a sense of having consciously taken definable steps to 

While the abduction process may not be easily defined or taught, it may be enc

providing analysts with a wide array of research material and experiences, a

porting the expenditure of time and energy on creative thinking.57

Examples of abductive reasoning in intelligence analysis include situation

the analyst has a nagging suspicion that something of intelligence value has h

is about to happen, but has no immediate explanation for this conclusion. The g

intelligence analyst may conclude that an obscure rebel faction in a target coun

to stage a political coup, although no overt preparations for the takeover are e

business analyst may determine that a competitor company is on the brink of 

shift from its traditional product line into a new market, even though its balanc

status in the industry are secure. In each case, the analyst, trusting this sense th

is right for a significant event, will set out to gather and evaluate evidence in 

new, improbable, yet tantalizing hypothesis.

Scientific Method. The scientific method combines deductive and induct

ing: Induction is used to develop the hypothesis, and deduction is used to tes

ence, the analyst obtains data through direct observation of the subject and for

hypothesis to explain conclusions suggested by the evidence. Experiments on 

are devised and conducted to test the validity of the hypothesis. If the experime

match the expected outcome, then the hypothesis is validated; if not, then the a

develop a new hypothesis and appropriate experimental methods.58

In intelligence analysis, the analyst typically does not have direct access to 

able subject, but gathers information indirectly. From these gathered data, the i

analyst may proceed with the scientific method by generating tentative explan

subject event or phenomenon. Next, each hypothesis is examined for plaus

compared against newly acquired information, in a continual process toward 

conclusion. Often the intelligence analyst tests several hypotheses at the 

whereas the scientist usually focuses on one at a time. Furthermore, intelligen

cannot usually experiment directly upon the subject matter as in science, but m

ate fictional scenarios and rigorously test them through mental processes su

suggested below.59

57 The relationship of this type of reasoning to Eastern philosophy is addressed in LC

G. Schmidlin, USN, Zen and the Art of Intelligence Analysis, MSSI Thesis (Wash

Joint Military Intelligence College, July 1993). 58 Mathams, 91. A seminal contribution to understanding scientific method is Abrah

The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco, CA: Chandler, 1964). The applicability of th

social science, and therefore, in intelligence, is developed in Earl Babbie’s The Pract

Research (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co, 1992). 59 Mathams, 91.
33

Opportunity Analysis. Opportunity analysis identifies for policy offi

nities or vulnerabilities that the customer’s organization can exploit to a

icy, as well as dangers that could undermine a policy.60 It identifie

interest groups, and key leaders in a target country or organization tha

intelligence customer’s objective; the means of enhancing supportive el

lenges to positive elements (which could be diminished or eliminated); l

cial, and other vulnerabilities of adversaries; and activities that could be 

rally resources and support to the objective.61 Jack Davis notes that in t

opportunity analysis,

[T]he analyst should start with the assumption that every policy 

can be transformed into a legitimate intelligence concern. What follo

this is that analysts and their managers should learn to think like a 

maker in order to identify the issues on which they can provide uti

they should always [behave like intelligence producers]. ... The firs

producing effective opportunity analysis is to redefine an intelligence 

the policymaker’s terms. This requires close attention to the policy

role as “action officer” - reflecting a preoccupation with getting thing

or stopped among adversaries and allies.... It also requires that analyst

nize a policy official’s propensity to take risk for gain....[P]olicymake

see, say, a one-in-five chance of turning a situation around as a sound 

ment of [organizational] prestige and their professional energies....[A

have to search for appropriate ways to help the policymaker inch t

upward - not by distorting their bottom line when required to make a 

tive judgment, or by cheerleading, but by pointing to opportunities as 

obstacles. Indeed, on politically sensitive issues, analysts would 

advised to utilize a matrix that first lists and then assesses both the pr

and discouraging signs they, as objective observers, see for... policy 

[P]roperly executed opportunity analysis stresses information and p

ties rather than [explicit] predictions.62

Linchpin Analysis. Linchpin analysis is one way of showing intellige

and policy officials alike that all the bases have been touched. Linchpin ana

ful term for structured forecasting, is an anchoring tool that seeks to reduce 

self-inflicted intelligence error as well as policymaker misinterpretation. A

linchpin tradecraft promotes rigor through a series of predrafting checkpo

below. Analysts can also use it to organize and evaluate their text when add

60 Jack Davis, The Challenge of Opportunity Analysis (Washington, DC: Center f

Intelligence, July 1992), v. 61 Davis, Opportunity Analysis, 7. 62 Davis, Opportunity Analysis, 12-13.
34

to ensure that the argument in such assessments is sound and clear.

Analogy. Analogies depend on the real or presumed similarities between 

For example, analysts might reason that because two aircraft have many featu

mon, they may have been designed to perform similar missions. The strength o

analogy depends upon the strength of the connection between a given cond

specified result. In addition, the analyst must consider the characteristics that a

lar between the phenomena under study. The dissimilarities may be so great th

der the few similarities irrelevant.

One of the most widely used tools in intelligence analysis is the ana

Analogies serve as the basis for most hypotheses, and rightly or wro

underlie many generalizations about what the other side will do and how 

will go about doing it.64

Thus, drawing well-considered generalizations is the key to using ana

tively. When postulating human behavior, the analyst may effectively use 

applying it to a specific person acting in a situation similar to one in which 

are well documented: an election campaign or a treaty negotiation, for exam

ever, an assumption that a different individual running for the same office or 

a similar treaty would behave the same way as his predecessor may be erro

key condition in this analogy is the personality of the individual, not the sim

tions. This principle of appropriate comparison applies equally to governmen

ness intelligence analysis.

Table 10: Steps in Linchpin Analysis

Source: Davis, Analytic Tradecraft

1. Identify the main uncertain factors or key variables judged likely to drive the outcome of the is

systematic attention to the range of and relationships among factors at play.

2. Determine the linchpin premises or working assumptions about the drivers. This encourages 

the key subordinate judgments that hold the estimative conclusion together.

3. Marshal findings and reasoning in defense of the linchpins, as the premises that warrant the 

are subject to debate as well as error.

4. Address the circumstances under which unexpected developments could occur. What indica

patterns of development could emerge to signal that the linchpins were unreliable? And what t

dramatic internal and external events could reverse the expected momentum?

63 Davis, Analytic Tradecraft, 8-9. 64 Clauser and Weir, 246-248.
35

military and political to industrial intelligence. For example, major U

makers purchase their competitors’ models as soon as they appea

showrooms. The new cars are taken to laboratories where they are com

and methodically disassembled. Reasoning by analogy, that is, assum

it would cost one producer the same amount to produce or purchase t

components used by another, the major auto producers can estima

competitors’ per-unit production costs, any cost-saving measures tak

how much profit is likely to be earned by the sale of a single unit.65

Customer Focus

As with the previous stages of the intelligence process, effective ana

upon a good working relationship between the intelligence customer and pr

nificant difference exists between the public and private sectors with rega

tomer-producer relationship. Government analysts typically benefit from clo

with policymakers by virtue of their well understood institutional position

not often true in the business world, where the intelligence analyst’s role i

institutionalized.

The government intelligence analyst is generally considered a legitimate 

policymaking resource, and even fairly junior employees may be accept

experts by virtue of the knowledge and analytic talent they offer to high le

Conversely, in the private sector, the intelligence analyst’s corporate ran

orders of magnitude lower than that of a company vice-president or CEO. T

analyst may have little access to the ultimate customer, and the intelligenc

whole may receive little favor from a senior echelon that makes little distin

so-called intelligence and the myriad of other decisionmaking inputs. When 

practitioners apply validated methods of analysis geared to meet specific cu

they can win the same kind of customer appreciation and support as that en

ernment practitioners.

Statistical Tools

Additional decisionmaking tools derived from parametric or non-parame

techniques, such as Bayesian analysis, are sometime used in intelligence. A

of them is beyond the scope of this study. Many of the statistically oriented 

to rely fundamentally on human judgment to assign values to variables, 

attention to the types of reasoning and methods of analysis presented here

fundamental analytical precondition to their use.66

65 Clauser and Weir, 248-250. 66 Editor’s note: A former JMIC faculty member, Douglas E. Hunter, explores 

applications of Bayesian Analysis in Political/Military Applications of Bayesian 

odological Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984).
36

Customer needs and collected information and data are not the only factor

ence the analytic process; the analyst brings his or her own unique thought 

well. This personal approach to problem-solving is “the distillation of the i

analyst’s cumulative factual and conceptual knowledge into a framework for m

mative judgments on a complex subject.”67 Mindset helps intelligence analy

situation into context, providing a frame of reference for examining the subjec

could not take place if thinking were not bounded by such constructs. Howev

can also lead analysts to apply certain viewpoints inappropriately or exclus

neglecting other potentially enlightening perspectives on an issue. While no on

step outside his or her own mindset, becoming aware of potential analytic 

enable intelligence analysts to maximize the positive effects of mindset while m

the negatives.68 Analysts can use the accompanying list of analytical pitfalls to 

which, if any, they may be applying in their work, and whether the relevan

accounted for in their analytic tasks.

Categories of Misperception and Bias69

Evoked-Set Reasoning: That information and concern which dominates o

ing based on prior experience. One tends to uncritically relate new informatio

current dominant concerns.

Prematurely Formed Views: These spring from a desire for simplicity an

and lead to premature closure in the consideration of a problem.

Presumption that Support for One Hypothesis Disconfirms Others: Ev

is consistent with one’s preexisting beliefs is allowed to disconfirm other vi

closure in the consideration of an issue is a problem.

Inappropriate Analogies: Perception that an event is analogous to p

based on inadequate consideration of concepts or facts, or irrelevant criter

“Representativeness.”

Superficial Lessons From History: Uncritical analysis of concepts or even

cial causality, over-generalization of obvious factors, inappropriate extrapol

past success or failure.

Presumption of Unitary Action by Organizations: Perception that behav

ers is more planned, centralized, and coordinated than it really is. Dismisses a

chaos. Ignores misperceptions of others. Fundamental attribution error, possi

by cultural bias.

67 Jack Davis, “Combatting Mindset,” Studies in Intelligence 35, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 1

68 Davis, “Combatting Mindset,” 13-15. 69 Excerpted from Dearth, “The Politics of Intelligence,” 106-107.
37

based on organizational norms or loyalties. Can result from functional 

Group-think or stereotypical thinking.

Excessive Secrecy (Compartmentation): Over-narrow reliance on sele

Based on concern for operational security. Narrows consideration of alte

Can result from or cause organizational parochialism.

Ethnocentrism: Projection of one’s own culture, ideological beliefs

expectations on others. Exaggeration of the causal significance of one’s ow

lead to mirror-imaging and wishful thinking. Parochialism.

Lack of Empathy: Undeveloped capacity to understand others’ perce

world, their conception of their role in that world, and their definition of 

Difference in cognitive contexts.

Mirror-Imaging: Perceiving others as one perceives oneself. Basis is e

Facilitated by closed systems and parochialism.

Ignorance: Lack of knowledge. Can result from prior-limited priorities o

osity, perhaps based on ethnocentrism, parochialism, denial of reality, 

hypothesis (see next entry).

Rational-Actor Hypothesis: Assumption that others will act in a “rati

based on one’s own rational reference. Results from ethnocentrism, mirro

ignorance.

Denial of Rationality: Attribution of irrationality to others who are pe

outside the bounds of one’s own standards of behavior or decisionmaking

rational-actor hypothesis. Can result from ignorance, mirror-imaging, pa

ethnocentrism.

Proportionality Bias: Expectation that the adversary will expend efforts 

to the ends he seeks. Inference about the intentions of others from costs and 

of actions they initiate.

Willful Disregard of New Evidence: Rejection of information that 

already-held beliefs. Results from prior policy commitments, and/or exces

consistency.

Image and Self-Image: Perception of what has been, is, will be, or sho

as subset of belief system). Both inward-directed (self-image) and out

(image). Both often influenced by self-absorption and ethnocentrism.

Defensive Avoidance: Refusal to perceive and understand extremely thr

uli. Need to avoid painful choices. Leads to wishful thinking.
38

from premature or rapid closure of consideration, or ignorance.

Wishful Thinking (Pollyanna Complex): Hyper-credulity. Excessive opti

of smugness and overconfidence.

Best-Case Analysis: Optimistic assessment based on cognitive predispo

general beliefs of how others are likely to behave, or in support of personal o

tional interests or policy preferences.

Conservatism in Probability Estimation: In a desire to avoid risk, tenden

estimating extremely high or extremely low probabilities. Routine thinking. In

judge new phenomena in light of past experience, to miss essentially novel situ

ments, or failure to reexamine established tenets. Tendency to seek confirmati

held beliefs.

Worst-Case Analysis (Cassandra Complex): Excessive skepticism. Refl

mism and extreme caution, based on predilection (cognitive predisposition), a

experience, or on support of personal or organizational interests or policy pref

Because the biases and misperceptions outlined above can influence analysi

also affect the resultant analytic products. As explained in the following Part, an

not cease when intelligence production begins; indeed, the two are interdependen

going overview of analytic pitfalls should caution intelligence managers and a

intelligence products should remain as free as possible from such errors of om

commission, yet still be tailored to the specific needs of customers. Consistently 

intelligence producers of the dangers and benefits of mindset may help them avoi

polish their analytic skills. In addition, managers may conduct post-production ev

intelligence products, using the biases and misperceptions listed above to identi

and weaknesses in individual analysts’ work, and to counsel them accordingly.
39

PRODUCTION

Creating Intelligence

The previously-described steps of the intelligence process are necessary 

production, but it is only in this final step that functionality of the wh

achieved. Production results in the creation of intelligence, that is, value-ad

information tailored to a specific customer. In practical terms, production re

ation, in any medium, of either interim or finished briefings or reports for o

or for decisionmakers or policy officials. As with elements of analysis dev

V, production principles described and explained here may apply to both go

private sector intelligence operations.

In government parlance, the term “finished” intelligence is reserved 

issued by analysts responsible for synthesizing all available sources o

resulting in a comprehensive assessment of an issue or situation, for use b

lysts or decisionmakers. Creating finished intelligence for national and milit

is the role of CIA and DIA analysts, respectively. Analysts within an intelli

cipline may also speak of a “finished” product from their point of view, 

intelligence from a single source, such as SIGINT, was interpreted as fully 

light of all other available intelligence from that source, plus any relevant p

ligence from other sources, and open source information. Analysts with

source intelligence agencies consider any information or intelligence not i

own organization to be “collateral.”

Similar designations for finished intelligence products may apply in 

world. Particularly in large corporations with multidisciplinary intelligen

business intelligence consulting firms, some production personnel may sp

creation of intelligence from a single source, while others specialize in finis

For example, there may be specialists in library and on-line research, “HUM

who conduct interviews and attend conferences and trade shows, or scien

form experiments on products or materials. The reports generated by such p

be considered finished intelligence by their intended customers within subd

larger company. The marketing, product development, or public relations d

corporation may consume single-source intelligence products designed to m

vidual needs. Such a large corporation may also have an intelligence synt

merges the reports from the specialized units into finished intelligence for u

planning by senior decisionmakers. Similarly, in the intelligence consulting 

the specialized production units may contribute their reports to a centra

intelligence unit which generates a synthesized product for the client.
40

The intelligence report or presentation must focus on the results of the a

make evident their significance through sound arguments geared to the custom

ests. In short, intelligence producers must BLUF their way through the pres

that is, they must keep the “Bottom Line Up Front.” This axiom applies not o

ten expression, but also to oral briefings, or any other medium of expression 

intelligence environment of government or business.

It is often difficult for... intelligence [producers] to avoid the temptati

succumb to the Agatha Christie Syndrome. Like the great mystery write

want to keep our readers in suspense until we can deliver that “punch 

After we have worked hard on this analysis... we want the reader to kno

the wonderful facts and analytical methods that have gone into our co

sions.... Most readers really will not care about all those bells and wh

that went into the analysis. They want the bottom line, and that is what 

ligence professionals are paid to deliver.70

Knowing the customer enables the producer to generate intelligence that hig

bottom line. Some customers are “big picture” thinkers, seeking a general over

issue, and guidance on the implications for their own position and responsi

appropriate intelligence product for such a customer will be clear, concise, 

and free of jargon or distracting detail.71 Conversely, some customers are deta

seeing themselves as the ultimate expert on the subject area. This type of cust

highly detailed and specialized intelligence to supplement and amplify know

tion. The broad-brush approach to intelligence will not only miss the mark wi

tomer, but may actually be perceived as an insult, lessening the chances 

products by the offending producer will be accepted or used.72 Producers shoul

tailor both the content and delivery of the intelligence to the customer. The fol

tion provides guidelines for creating intelligence products that meet customer 

Anatomy of an Intelligence Product

Whether it is produced within the government, or in the business setting

nature of the intelligence product remains the same. The analyst creates a prod

ument ongoing research, give the customer an update on a current issue or s

70 James S. Major, The Style Guide: Research and Writing at the Joint Military Intel

lege, (Washington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1994): 345. 71 Mathams, 88. 72 Davis, Analytic Tradecraft, 7. 73 The Central Intelligence Agency has published an unclassified collection of essays o

for producing finished national security intelligence. The purpose of the collection 

ment best practices, and to reach out to academia and the public. Its title emphasize

mentality of analysis to production. See Central Intelligence Agency, A Compendium 

Tradecraft Notes, (Washington, DC, Directorate of Intelligence: February 1997).
41

to cover one or more subject areas, or to be used by the customer for a part

tion. Along with these aspects, additional dimensions of the intelligence pro

marized in the table below. They are more fully described in the following p

Content

Determination of product content is done in close cooperation with 

sometimes at the initiative of one or the other, often in a cycle of give-and

Formal intelligence requirements, agreed upon by both producer and 

advance, do drive the production process, but the converse is also true. Th

unit’s own self-concept and procedures influence its choice of which topics 

which aspects to emphasize. As a result, the customer comes to expect a c

product from that unit, and adjusts requirement statements accordingly. In 

intelligence process may bring to light aspects of the target that neither the 

customer anticipated. When the parties involved have a close working relat

Table 11: Dimensions of an Intelligence Product

Source: Author

Dimension

Category Dimension Examples

Content Subject Biographical, economic, geographic

political, science and technology, so

transportation and communications

Intended Use Research, current, estimative, opera

and technology, warning

Features Timeliness Short-/long-term, opportune, routine

Periodicity Ad hoc/scheduled; analyst/custome

Scope Narrow/broad; detailed/summary; ba

Packaging Medium Hard/softcopy, written/oral, video

Format Formal/informal, textual/graphical

Customer Relationship to producer Intended/incidental recipient; interna

novice/expert

Distribution method Internal/external; direct/indirect; focu
42

ways to exploit the target.

Often, this dialogue centers around the pursuit of new sources associated w

lucrative sources. Examples from government include HUMINT targeting 

identified in SIGINT as having access to foreign leaders, and SIGINT targeti

munications equipment revealed in IMINT of a foreign military installation. Pa

ness examples might include intelligence personnel following leads to ne

revealed in original research or a published report: A pharmaceutical industry a

reads a business intelligence report about current breast cancer treatments may 

tigate how to access human and documentary sources mentioned in the report, 

information on new drug therapy options for the disease.

The basic orientation of the intelligence product toward a particular subject 

tion is also determined by the producer-customer relationship. Frequently, the i

service will organize the production process and its output to mirror the custom

zation. Government production by the single-source intelligence agencies is la

nized geographically or topically, to meet the needs of all-source country, regi

analysts in the finished-intelligence producing agencies, such as DIA or th

Counterintelligence Center. In the private sector, some intelligence consultan

specializing in one subject area, and gearing all production to one customer s

the petroleum industry.

In terms of intended use by the customer, both business and governmen

may generate intelligence to be applied in the current, estimative, operationa

science and technology, or warning context. Serendipity plays a role here, b

collected and analyzed information may meet any or all of these criteria. A goo

is warning intelligence. Military and political analysts are always alert for tar

tions that an emergency, such as outbreak of war, or a political coup, is immin

ing procedures dictate that routine operations switch to warning mode in this c

time-sensitive intelligence on the situation can be issued to all relevant custom

ness intelligence analysts may also find themselves in the warning role un

when they make discoveries that have significant time-sensitive implications fo

decisions and actions.

Features

Three key features of the intelligence product are timeliness, scope, and 

Timeliness includes not only the amount of time required to deliver the produ

the usefulness of the product to the customer at a given moment. Scope involv

of detail or comprehensiveness of the material contained in the product. 

describes the schedule of product initiation and generation.

74 Turner, 314-320.
43

customer requests specific support, and when actionable information 

through collection and analysis, the resultant intelligence product is irrelev

customer receives it in time to take action — by adapting to or influenc

entity. Timeliness therefore encompasses the short-term or long-term durat

duction process, and the degree to which the intelligence itself proves opp

customer. In addition, the relative priority of the intelligence contained i

affects the timeliness calculus. For example, a business intelligence analy

research for a consumer electronics corporation may produce short-term r

as new information becomes available. A long-term routine summary repo

final output from this project. However, a short-term priority report may 

time, if time-sensitive information on competitor capabilities or intentions c

The scope of an intelligence product describes both the amount of mate

and the depth of coverage it provides on the topic. Its focus may be narrow 

the content may be detailed or in summary form. The level of coverage m

exhaustive. All of these aspects are determined by the customer’s need

amount and extent of the source material available.

The amount of detail distributed will depend on the circumstances 

requirements of the user. Time constraints often will determine ho

detail is given. There may be such a wealth of detail on a particular 

that an analyst might spend a month or more making a detailed anal

the urgency of the need for the intelligence may be such as to make 

survey, produced in two days, much more valuable. It is important to 

ber that many users of intelligence have neither the time nor the pat

read through a voluminous study, however excellent it may be, an

much prefer to have the essential elements of the analysis set down 

succinct paragraphs. Some users, however, do require detail, and whe

the case it should be provided in a usable form.75

Periodicity is also linked to validated customer requirements. Intellig

correspond to requirements that specify responsiveness criteria, thus pr

occur on an ad hoc basis or on a schedule. Analysts may proactively gen

to meet known needs of specific customers, or they may respond to spo

tomer requests for tailored intelligence. Furthermore, “analysts, as ex

fields, are expected to initiate studies that address questions yet unformu

tomers].”76 By selecting from available source material, and determining 

an intelligence product, analysts have the potential to influence how their 

intelligence to make policy decisions.77 In the government, topic experts 

close advisors to National Intelligence Officers or directly to senior pol

75 Mathams, 92. 76 Turner, 319. 77 Turner, 320.
44

change in a retail companys focus, by identifying emerging consumer trends 

tizing management for the need to reorient the company. To effect this chang

pany would become dependent on intelligence about competitors in the sam

For example, an analyst’s assessment of consumer interest in buying natura

might stimulate requirements for further studies, and might lead a manu

change its products to meet consumer demand, before another company ca

market.

Packaging

Government intelligence products are typically packaged as highly structu

and oral presentations, including electrical messages, hardcopy reports, and 

Many organizations also generate video intelligence products, especially in t

live daily “newscasts,” or canned documentary presentations. However, the 

landscape is being transformed by technology, and today, a wide range of optio

able to both business and government. Modern telecommunications and soft

possible a whole new world of intelligence production, in which all the players

customers, are in constant interaction. The Department of Defense, for ex

devised the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) concept to acce

streamline the entire intelligence process. Under JIVA, intelligence personn

advanced communication and analysis tools to electronically collaborate with 

and their customers, resulting in improved timeliness and customization of De

ligence products.79 Part of the JIVA concept is the use of on-line product modu

stand alone as finished intelligence, or be synergistically combined with oth

for use by interim or ultimate customers.80 Similar collaborative production 

may be successful in large business intelligence units with geographically dis

sonnel and customers. However, the benefits offered by modern intelligenc

such as JIVA also present significant challenges, including the financial an

investment in new infrastructure, and the legal implications of the required c

between the government and technology firms.81

The format of the intelligence product, regardless of the medium used to 

affects how well it is received by the customer. Even in a multimedia prese

personal touch can make a positive difference. Therefore, the degree of formal

mix of textual and graphical material should match the customer’s preferences

78 A guide to orally presenting intelligence is found in James S. Major, Briefing with 

(Washington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1997). 79 Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21, A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intellig

(Washington, DC: Programs and Operations Staff, undated), 20. 80 Louis E. Andre, “Intelligence Production: Towards a Knowledge-Based Future,” Def

gence Journal 6, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 41. 81 William O. Studeman, “Leading Intelligence Along the Byways of Our Future: Acqu

Architectures for the 21st Century,” Defense Intelligence Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 19
45

a scheduled meeting, others want the analyst to be available at any time f

consultation. Often, verbally oriented customers request one-on-one exch

official travel in automobiles or in airplanes. Conversely, the visually orie

may prefer video clips, graphs, charts, and photographs, accompanied by br

text. Many customers prefer written analyses, often in the form of concise e

maries or point papers; some will ask for an in-depth study after consumin

periodic assessment. However, producers should be aware of the potential p

ing on the executive summary to reach key customers. If the product does 

the executive’s staff members who read it first, it may never reach the intend

Customer

In addition to understanding the customer’s intelligence requirements

may benefit from an awareness of the relationship between the customer org

the intelligence service itself. Status issues between the two parties may 

tone of the intelligence product. Aspects of the producer-customer relatio

whether the recipient is the intended or incidental customer, whether th

internal or external to the intelligence service, and whether the parties diffe

of subject matter knowledge.

The intelligence producer selects the product content and format to suit a 

vidual or customer set. However, the producer should beware of selectin

phraseology that is too esoteric or personal for a potential wide audienc

products are official publications that become official records for use by 

personnel within the producer and customer organizations. They should foc

mary customer’s needs, yet address the interests of other legitimate player

when the producer is struggling with how to meet the needs of both interna

customers, the solution is to create two different types of products, one fo

customer. Internal products contain details about the sources and methods 

ate the intelligence, while external products emphasize actionable targe

Similarly, the producer adjusts the product content and tone to the custo

expertise. For example, a SIGINT producer may issue a highly technica

product for fellow SIGINT service members, but for intelligence producers 

agency, a less technical but still producer-oriented product may be appropri

the business intelligence producer within a marketing department may gen

specialized report for the head of the department, but may issue an executiv

the company president.

Selection of the distribution method for the product is also closely tie

tionship between producer and customer. The ability to deliver specific t

ucts to internal and external customers depends upon available infra

82 Loch K. Johnson, America’s Secret Power, The CIA in a Democratic Society, (Ne

University Press, 1989): 98.
46

whether intelligence can be delivered by the individual analyst directly to the 

or only through a chain of command. Finally, the number of designated re

often determined by the sensitivity of the intelligence issue covered in the 

the intelligence is highly sensitive, such as a report on threats to the presi

then only the few involved persons (the president and a few key security pers

receive the report. A routine report may be broadly distributed to a large cu

Thus, the choice of distribution method is more a marketing decision than a m

exercise.83 Successful delivery of a truly useful intelligence product to a rec

tomer is the result of communication and cooperation among all the players.

Customer Feedback and Production Evaluation

The production phase of the intelligence process does not end with deliverin

uct to the customer. Rather, it continues in the same manner in which it began

logue between producer and customer.

If the product is really to be useful for policy-making and command

semination involves feedback, which is part of the marketing function...

ally, the “marketer” who delivers the product is the same individual 

accepts and helps to refine the initial requirement.84

Intelligence producers need feedback from end-users. If producers do not le

useful and not useful to customers, they cannot create genuine intelligenc

review procedures that focus on the format and style of intelligence products ar

cient for producers to judge their performance; they must hear from custom

intelligence value of their work. Then producers can modify their practices 

develop those activities that served the customer well, and improve or eliminat

did not.

Feedback procedures between producers and customers should include key 

such as: Is the product usable? Is it timely? Was it in fact used? Did the pr

expectations? If not, why not? What next? The answers to these questions w

refined production, greater use of intelligence by decisionmakers, and furthe

sessions. Thus, production of intelligence actually generates more requirem

iterative process.85 Producers and managers may use the framework develop

and summarized below as an initial checklist for evaluating their own work, an

for formal customer surveys to obtain constructive feedback.

Producers also need performance feedback from their own managers. Use

of such an internal evaluation may include whether the output met the con

down by customers and producers in formal intelligence requirements, whethe

83 Johnson, 97. 84 Dearth, “National Intelligence,” 20. 85 Dearth, “National Intelligence,” 20.
47

dard of analytic quality. To establish a formal internal review process for m

quality of analysis in intelligence products, managers could select experienc

serve on a rotating basis as “mindset coaches” — reviewing assessments 

mindset, uncertainty, and policy utility, or consider pairing with another pr

sion to swap personnel for this activity. As a rule, the less the critical reade

the substance of the paper the more he or she will concentrate on the quali

mentation. A reward for the best “mindset coaches” would be to make 

chiefs.87

Management’s role extends beyond fostering quality production, to bearing 

for organizing and administering the complete intelligence process. Managers m

sions that mirror the intelligence process and make production possible. In co

customers, managers determine what customer set the intelligence unit wi

sources it will exploit; what types of intelligence it will produce; and what met

tion, processing, analysis, production, customer feedback, and self-evaluation 

following Part of this primer explores best practices in managing the intelligen

86 Arthur S. Hulnick, “Managing Intelligence Analysis,” 338.

Table 12: A Framework for Intelligence Product Evaluation and Customer 

Source: adapted from Brei

Accuracy: Were all sources and data free of technical error, misperception, and hostile effo

Objectivity: Were all judgments free of deliberate distortions and manipulations due to se

Usability: Was all production issued in a form that facilitated ready comprehension and im

application? Were products compatible with the customer’s capabilities for receiving, manip

protecting, and storing the product?

Relevance: Was information selected and organized for its applicability to a customer’s req

potential consequences and significance of the information made explicit to the customer’s 

Readiness: Are intelligence systems responsive to the existing and contingent intelligence 

of customers at all levels of command?

Timeliness: Was intelligence delivered while the content was still actionable under the cu

circumstances?

87 Davis, “Mindset,” 17.

49

MANAGING THE INTELLIGENC

PROCESS

The Role of Management

Another discipline integral to the intelligence profession — but w

special consideration in this context — is that of management. The e

administration and direction of intelligence activities can be regarde

epitome of intelligence professionalism. Just as an untutored civilian 

be expected competently to command [a military unit], so an untr

inexperienced layperson cannot be expected effectively to direct [an 

gence operation]. But mastery of professional intelligence skills doe

itself, ensure that a person is able to direct intelligence functions comp

expertise in administrative techniques and behavioral skills is also ess

managerial effectiveness. Some facility in these areas can be a

through experience, but a professional level of competence requires f

ity with the principles and theories of management, and leadership.88

Moreover, supervisors and managers have a particular responsibility fo

professional development of their subordinates. When all the members of t

unit are competent, then the effectiveness of the group increases. Enabling sub

frees managers to thoroughly plan and administer the intelligence operati

redoing the work of production personnel. Meanwhile, managers may contin

their own knowledge of the intelligence process and its customer-service mis

Organizing the Intelligence Service

In the national Intelligence Community, federal laws form the basis f

coordinated but functionally organized system. The Director of Central Inte

leads the community with the aid of the National Intelligence Council (NIC

the NIC come from all the intelligence agencies plus academia and the priv

88 George Allen, “The Professionalization of Intelligence,” in Dearth and Good

Informed debate on the realities of analysts’ and managers’ intelligence respon

customers is ongoing in the International Journal of Intelligence and Coun

Examples of this literature are: Michael A. Turner, “Setting Analytical Priorities 

gence,” 9, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 313-327; H. Bradford Westerfield, “Inside Ivory Bun

lysts Resist Managers’ “Pandering” Part I, 9, no. 4 (Winter 1996/97): 407-424; a

Westerfield, “Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers’ “Pandering” 

1 (Spring 1997): 19-54. 89 Russell G. Swenson, An Office Manager’s Guide to Intelligence Readiness, O

Number Three (Washington, DC: JMIC, December 1996), 3-5.
50

National Intelligence Estimates for senior policymakers. Other senior bodie

assist the DCI in matters of policy, resource management, performance review

tion of elements, customer relations, and intra-community relations.90 Four top

gence centers staffed by multiple agencies coordinate intelligence prod

policymakers in the key areas of Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cou

ics, and Nonproliferation.91 Crisis situations may spark the formation of a tem

cial task force, integrating intelligence functions that are usually separate. Al

national Intelligence Community is centrally coordinated, each member o

develops some self-determined policies and procedures, and engages in compe

ysis with respect to the other organizations.

The unifying principle across government intelligence missions is the basi

monitor and manage threats to national interests and to the intelligence servi

both the national Intelligence Community and the business community, man

make a distinction between self-protective intelligence activities and competi

gence activities. Self-protection involves gathering and analyzing data abou

public, personal, or multinational mission members’ security, whereas compet

ties involve gathering and analyzing data about adversary organizations or co

business, the two functions are sometimes undertaken by entirely different co

groups within the same company.92 Government subordinates both functions 

intelligence infrastructure.

Threat analysis in the business environment depends on the open exchange 

tion between companies, as it is widely recognized that no one benefits from 

panies encountering unnecessary risk or danger to their personnel. On the oth

the corporate level, competitive business intelligence relies on the protection o

of important corporate data. In the public security environment, diplomatic s

90 CIA, Consumer’s Guide, 2-3. 91 Davis, Opportunity Analysis, 8. 92 Jonathan Tetzlaff, Area Director, Security Research and Analysis, Amoco Corporati

correspondence with editor, 24 October 1997.

Table 13: Three Contexts for Government and Business Intelligence Tas

Source: Author and Editor

Contexts: Individual Corporate Global

Government Tasks: Diplomatic Security/

Force Protection

Foreign Capabilities 

Assessment

Strategic W

Intelligence

Business Tasks: Threat Analysis, 

Personal Risk Analysis

Business/Competitive 

Intelligence

Business Sc

Planning
51

tions, is in the best interests of all. Conversely, foreign capabilities assessme

the context of a zero-sum game among countries, with potential winners an

tactical advantage.

When the very survival of a corporation or country is at stake vis-a-vis o

their respective environments, a global or strategic model applies. At this l

warning intelligence takes center stage in the government security setting, a

part — strategic scenario planning — achieves value in the private sector. 

ning has been used advantageously by some companies. The Shell Oil 

example, used scenario planning to justify disinvestment in oil exploitation 

prior to the worldwide fall in oil demand in the 1980s. The company rose 

2nd place among oil multinationals, as overinvested companies lost billion

native to taking global or strategic intelligence action is to allow threats to 

bring company or government officials to the realm of crisis management. 

mental government or business interests are at stake, and the outcome is mo

left to the vagaries of impulse and chance than to the considered judgment 

corporate or government leaders.

Private sector intelligence services can consider which elements of the n

gence model may apply in their own domain. Will the organization require ce

tion of diverse elements as the national system does, or might the intellige

closely resemble a single collector or producer agency with a simpler mana

ture? Will an advisory group mediate between intelligence producers and c

does the intelligence service require its own staff to coordinate operations? W

be organized functionally into collection and production elements, or perhap

93 Robbie E. Davis-Floyd, “Storytelling Corporate Futures: The Shell Scenarios,” Int

nal of Futures Studies 1 (1995-1997), on-line at http://www.systems.org/HTM

accessed 3 December 1997. The purpose of scenario planning is to force busines

executives to face future uncertainties squarely by elaborating and evaluating th

impact of alternative hypothetical business environments. Dissenters are valu

avoided, and, as in government intelligence channels, information is proactive

champion and refute the various scenarios as “controllable” pathways to the future

of business scenario planning include Kathy Moyer, “Scenario Planning at Britis

Case Study,” Long Range Planning 29, No. 2 (April 1996): 172-181; Francoise H

Factor,” Director 50, No. 12 (July 1997): 59; and Ian Smith, “Avoiding Future S

50, No. 12 (July 1997): 56-59.

A seminal work on the analytical environment for strategic warning in gov

gence is Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universit

Although Kam focuses on military attack scenarios, the arena for strategic war

ment intelligence work has expanded as international security concerns shift to

competition and away from military confrontation. The convergence of econom

signals a need for benchmarking the intelligence process, and could presage an er

laboration between cells of intelligence analysts and policymakers at the hig

unlike the give and take that characterizes successful business scenario planning.
52

operate within a parent organization? If the latter, does each department, such as 

Planning, or Research require its own tailored intelligence support? Does the chie

require a centralized intelligence service, by whatever name, to assist in corpo

making? Should the service develop contingency plans for providing time-sensit

in a crisis situation? On a larger scale, should intelligence services within an in

their resources for mutual benefit in a crisis environment, or to proactively adapt 

ing environment, as does the national Intelligence Community? The answers to 

tions may help private sector intelligence organizations determine how closely 

their structure after that of the national intelligence system.

Managing Analysis and Production

Intelligence managers in government and industry need to decide how to organ

duction process just as they need to determine the structure of the intelligence 

whole. Typical methods of assigning analysts are by target function, geograph

technical subject, or policy issue. The intelligence service may task analysts to con

one type of source information, or to merge all available sources to produce “finis

gence or estimates. Some industries will need analysts to specialize in certain tec

ject areas or complex issues, while large corporations may assign intelligence anal

of several departments such as Research or Product Development. Small indepen

gence services may require personnel to perform all the functions of the intellige

from needs assessment to production and performance evaluation. In that case, ana

be assigned to a particular customer account rather than a specific topic area. Part 

primer presents findings on the attributes of intelligence analysts that may prov

determining how to allocate human resources in the intelligence production proce

Some characterizations of the analytic mission...seem to emphasize se

the policymaking process as an abstraction: to tell it like it is, to level the 

ing field, to keep the policymakers honest, to be right on the record...

excessive adherence to these attributes can cause overproduction of assessm

that feature what analysts think policy officials should want to know, and u

production of assessments featuring what officials think they need from.

lytic specialists.... To provide the requisite benefits for policymakers

analytic assessments of the intelligence production unit have to deliver a 

order of understanding and insight that can support sound decisionmaking

should avoid a definition of effective analysis that emphasizes accurate pr

tion...or one that centers on whether or not a policy worked.94

Furthermore, managers can take the initiative in transforming intellig

into a proactive service. Managers who are isolated from the intelligence 

tomer tend to monitor the quantity of reports produced and level of poli

intelligence products, but not the utility of the intelligence itself.95

94 Davis, Opportunity Analysis, 2-3. 95 Davis, Opportunity Analysis, 10.
53

that provides it at the lowest personal cost, including the mass media, 

ter how much money the intelligence organization is spending to fun

sis on their behalf. Thus, managers need to learn to ask for and 

opportunity analysis included in intelligence products, not remove it 

propriate during the review process. One way to ensure that analysts 

truly useful intelligence is for managers to take an inventory, say tw

year, of the specific professional interests of their key [customers]

officials are more comfortable thinking in terms of outputs than of 

Thus, the inventory should be couched in terms of the policymaker

tives — their hopes and fears — and not in terms of their “intelligenc

ties.”... The intelligence manager should then take responsibi

converting the inventory into signals for the restructuring of co

research, and analytic production.96

Evaluating the Intelligence Process

Beyond organizing and monitoring intelligence production, an additiona

responsibility is to evaluate the intelligence service’s overall mission performa

manager’s perspective, intelligence products are not the only output from the in

cess; therefore, products are not the only focus of rigorous self-evaluation. In th

operations, the intelligence unit expends and generates significant amounts o

political capital. Careful examination of this commodity flow may yield key in

cess improvement. Internal review procedures may thus include measures of 

intelligence service and its components organize their work, use funds, alloca

human resources, and coordinate with parent and customer organizations, all 

interested perspective of the intelligence service itself. To assist them in this ef

may evaluate the sub-processes and interim products of the Needs Definition, C

cessing, Analysis, and Production phases of the intelligence process in terms o

gence Values: Accuracy, Objectivity, Usability, Relevance, Readiness, and Time

Furthermore, to put a human face on intelligence process, conscientious 

wish to include in their internal review a frank analysis of their own personne

record. Perhaps a new definition of “customer” is in order for carrying out this 

ligence evaluation. Seeing the members of the intelligence service as custome

ment, and of each other, can enable managers to create a work culture in which 

needs and talents are respected and incorporated into the organization’s mission

ing to the philosophy that a happy workforce is a productive workforce, man

achieve the organizational goal of satisfying external customer requirements. 

pose in mind, principles for matching intelligence personnel to appropriate jo

are discussed in the next Part of this primer.

96 Davis, Opportunity Analysis, 6.

55

PORTRAIT OF AN INTELLIGEN

ANALYST

The efficacy of the intelligence process described in the foregoing cha

upon personnel who are both able and willing to do the specialized w

Through the findings of several government studies, this section presents th

teristics of the central figure in value-added production — the intellig

According to these studies, the successful intelligence analyst brings to the 

tain requisite knowledges and abilities, or has a high aptitude for acquiring 

specialized training; is able to perform the specific tasks associated with 

exhibits personality traits compatible with intelligence analysis work. Th

remain valid in any setting modeled after the national security intelligence s

The cognitive, performance and personality attributes of the intelligen

explained below. Readers are encouraged to apply this information in ac

their own particular circumstances. For example:

Incumbents and individuals considering employment in intelligenc

sis may deepen their self-awareness and assess their potential for suc

satisfaction in this profession.

Educators and recruiters may identify and prepare candidates for 

ment in intelligence analysis.

Managers and supervisors may make enlightened decisions abou

tion, placement, tasking and evaluation of intelligence analysis person

Cognitive Attributes

An individual’s analytic skill results from a combination of innate qual

experience, and relevant education. Psychologists call these mental facu

attributes, and further divide them into two types: abilities (behavioral traits

perform a task) and knowledges (learned information about a specific subje

an individual’s cognitive abilities are relatively fixed by the time he or she 

market, knowledges are situation-specific and can be acquired through train

According to a recent formal job analysis of selected intelligence analy

by the NSA Office of Human Resources Services, important cognitiv

intelligence analysis include written expression, reading comprehension, 

soning, deductive reasoning, pattern recognition, oral comprehension, an

97 Mark H. Haucke, Industrial Psychologist, NSA, interview with the author, 25 Ma

98 Melissie C. Rumizen, Benchmarking Manager, NSA, interview with the author, 5 
56

agree that high levels of these abilities are necessary for performing the i

analysis job. The abilities are defined in the box below.

Cognitive Abilities Required of Intelligence Analysts100

Written Expression: The ability to use words and sentences in writing so others will un

Involves knowledge of the meanings and distinctions among words, knowledge of gramma

ability to organize sentences and paragraphs.

Reading Comprehension: The ability to read and understand written sentences and parag

Inductive Reasoning: The ability to combine separate pieces of information, or specific a

problems, to form general rules or conclusions. Involves the ability to think of possible rea

things go together. Also includes coming up with a logical explanation for a series of events 

unrelated.

Deductive Reasoning: The ability to apply general rules to specific problems to come up w

cal resolution. Involves deciding if the resolution makes sense.

Pattern Recognition: The ability to identify or detect a known pattern (a figure, word, or obj

hidden in other material. 

Oral Comprehension: The ability to listen and understand spoken words and sentences.

Information Ordering: The ability to follow a rule or set of rules in order to arrange things or 

a meaningful order. The rule or set of rules to be used must already be given. The things or 

be put in order can include numbers, letters, words, pictures, procedures, sentences, and ma

or logical operations.

One set of junior analysts and another of supervisors were separately ask

the importance of each of these abilities in performing the intelligence analy

Table 14). Junior analysts assign greater importance to two abilities (written 

and inductive reasoning), but significantly less importance to pattern recogniti

their supervisors. These results have implications for staffing the intelligence a

in both the government and private sector. For example, if junior analysts pl

importance on written expression than their supervisors do, they may be fr

receive less training, tasking and recognition than needed for this aspect of the

discrepancies in the rankings among the five abilities judged most important 

groups can be addressed individually by managers. However, the rankings pr

useful generalizations for identifying cognitive attributes applicable to any i

environment. In the case of the National Security Agency, the results present

99 Data were generated by Mark H. Haucke, Industrial Psychologist, using a M

Research Institute (MRI) survey instrument presented in Ability and Knowledge R

(Bethesda, MD: MRI, 1994). 100 Adapted from MRI, Ability and Knowledge Requirements.
57

analysts.

Unlike the abilities categories, areas of knowledge for government int

cialists do not necessarily apply to their private sector counterparts. The for

of government intelligence analysts revealed that knowledge of military-rel

nical subjects, not surprisingly, was prevalent among the individuals in 

group.101 However, in either public or private sectors, managers can hire an

nel to apply the requisite knowledges in a given job. A next logical step i

components of the intelligence analysis job, to be able to plan and assess 

performance.

Performance Factors

Even as the analysis described above examined cognitive inputs to the job

formance review project, also at NSA, described intelligence analysts’ outp

As part of this review, supervisors of intelligence analysts placed their subo

sion-essential job tasks into seven categories. Next, they evaluated the job p

Table 14: Comparative Ranking of Cognitive Abilities Thought to Be Re

 for Intelligence Analysis

(The lower the number on the 1 to 5 scale, the higher the perceived importance of 

Source: Author and Haucke Study

Cognitive Ability

GROUP 1 (23 Junior 

Analysts - less than 7 years 

experience)

GROUP 2 (18 Su

older generation

experienc

Written Expression 1 3

Reading Comprehension 2 1

Inductive Reasoning 2 3

Deductive Reasoning 3 2

Pattern Recognition 3 1

Oral Comprehension 4 4

Information Ordering 5 4

101 Data courtesy of Dr. Mark Haucke.
58

lation between aptitude for intelligence analysis (as measured in the knowledge

ties survey) and successful job performance (as rated by supervisors).102 Fol

brief description of the seven intelligence analysis performance categories:103

This concise inventory echoes the intelligence process and illustrates the com

the intelligence analyst’s job. It also serves as a blueprint for managers as t

intelligence organizations and individual personnel assignments. In particula

lyst’s job description should reflect these expected behaviors for purposes of r

selection, placement, training, and performance evaluation. The intelligence o

should also be structured physically and logically to enable these functions to o

agers should consider how all these factors combine to determine the effec

individual analysts, intelligence units, and even national agencies or private 

produce and use intelligence.

Personality Traits

The third component of the intelligence analyst profile, personality traits, ad

individual’s preferences for behaving in certain ways under specific conditio

tend to exhibit the same set of behavior preferences consistently in familiar 

This behavior pattern may be identified as a personality type. One well-known 

for identifying an individual’s personality type is the Myers-Briggs Typ

(MBTI).104 The following discussion of the intelligence analyst’s personali

upon MBTI research.

102 Haucke interview, 13 June 1996.

Data Collection - Research and gather data from all available sources.

Data Monitoring - Review flow of scheduled incoming data.

Data Organizing - Organize, format, and maintain data for analysis and technical report g

Data Analysis - Analyze gathered data to identify patterns, relationships, or anomalies.

Data Interpretation/Communication - Assign meaning to analyzed data and communic

propriate parties.

Computer Utilization - Use computer applications to assist in analysis.

Coordination - Coordinate with internal and external organizations.

103 Standardized categories are presented in an MRI performance evaluation booklet, 

sion Ratings (Bethesda, MD: MRI, 1995). 104 See Isabel Briggs Myers, Introduction to Type. (Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychol

1980), and Ronald D. Garst, Intelligence Types: The Role of Personality in the Intellig

sion. 2d printing, (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1995)
59

of behavior  meaning that people of different personality 

approach tasks differently and have different tastes, interests, li

dislikes. For example, some people would rather work alone whil

prefer to work with other people. Some enjoy working with c

information, others with abstract information. Some decide on the 

personal reasons, some on cold, hard logic. And finally, some 

enjoy making decisions while others are reluctant to decide bec

perceived information inadequacy.105

Research at the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) demonstra

ligence professionals exhibit a pattern of personality traits that sets the

the U.S. population as a whole. In this regard, intelligence professionals 

ent from many others, for every profession has its own distinct pattern o

traits. A significant percentage (21 percent) of those who choose to pu

ment in national security intelligence tend to express the following beh

ences: orientation to the inner world of ideas rather than the outer world 

people, tendency to gather factual information through the senses rather 

tion, proclivity to make decisions on the basis of logic rather than em

eagerness to seek closure proactively instead of leaving possibilities 

trast, researchers found that people who exhibit the opposite set of per

are almost non-existent among intelligence professionals. The chart b

rizes the terminology by which the MBTI describes personality traits. 

most frequently occurring type among the respondents to the JMIC surv

traits I, S, T and J.106

The JMIC data are based on a large sample of government intelligence 

practitioners. Persons engaged in the study or practice of other forms of intell

ularly in the private sector, should not expect their personality type to match 

file. However, intelligence practitioners who choose and successfully apply t

methodology presented in this primer are likely to exhibit the same perso

those identified in government practitioners. Because people tend to be satisfie

tive in their work if their own personalities match the corresponding behavi

their jobs, this research tying personality traits to the intelligence profession 

viduals consider their general suitability for certain types of intelligence work

105 Garst, Intelligence Types, 1. 106 Garst, Intelligence Types, 9.
60

Personality Aspects Measured by the MBTI

Orientation to the world

E=Extraversion I=Introversion

Orientation to the outer world of things Orientation to the inner w

and people, interacting with and ideas and concepts, solit

affecting them and self-awareness

Perception: non-rational processes; awareness of things, peop

events or ideas, selection of stimuli to attend to

S=Sensing N=Intuitive

Gather information by physical Gather information by ins

sensation; oriented to facts, detail unconscious processes; 

and the present to possibilities, relationsh

and the future

Judgment: ways of deciding, evaluating, choosing, selecting

T=Thinking F=Feeling

Decide on basis of logic, impersonal Decide on basis of subje

objective criteria, cause and effect, personal criteria and valu

laws and justice how decisions affect othe

and relationships.

Preference for Closure as manifested through behavior 

using S/N or T/F Functions

J=Judging P=Perceiving

Want to have an issue or project Leave decisions open to 

completed so they can move on; response in accordance 

work takes precedence over play; information; use play to m

proactive work more enjoyable; rea

107 Compiled from Garst, Intelligence Types, 4-9.
61

DEFENSIVE MEASURES FOR 

INTELLIGENCE

[A]s information becomes more and more a factor of production, o

ble worth for its own sake, the value of the special knowledge tha

essence of intelligence will command a higher price in the global info

age marketplace than will the generally available knowledge. Therein 

most ancient and, at the same time, the most modern challenge to th

of intelligence — protecting it.

— Goodden, in Dearth and Goodd

Beyond Intelligence Process: Protecting the Means and the 

An intelligence organization’s openness about its validated intelligence 

course tempered by self-defense considerations. Two arenas that are com

intelligence production, Operations Security (OPSEC) and Information Sys

(INFOSEC), focus on how practitioners can avoid revealing proprietary 

information. OPSEC measures protect the specific actions taken to produc

whereas INFOSEC protects from disclosure the intelligence information u

tion, as well as the resulting intelligence products.

In government circles, standard procedures guide the implementation o

INFOSEC measures. In the private sector, trial and error may predominate. C

emphasize methods for exploiting publicly available information about their co

show little regard for protecting themselves from being targeted by the same m

employed to target others. Furthermore, the trend toward greater compute

workplace, including on-line information systems and networked services, m

ernment and commercial organizations vulnerable to being exploited themselv

For example, the Boeing Corporation discovered in 1992 that amateur c

ers had found their way into the company’s computer network, and used sto

to open pathways to proprietary information stored in other computers in 

ernment, and education organizations.109 Prosecuting this case cost Boeing

other law-enforcement authorities considerable time and money.110 This c

108 Keen insights into such vulnerabilities are presented in Ira Winkler, Corporate E

It Is, Why It Is Happening in Your Company, What You Must Do about It, (Rock

Publishing, 1997). 109 Rhonda E. MacLean, Senior Manager, Boeing Computing and Communication

Boeing Hacker Incident,” DODSI Security Awareness Bulletin Number 1-94 (

Department of Defense Security Institute, August 1994), 19. 110 MacLean, 20-21
62

the March 1996 international SCIP conference, of 72 presentations held during 

only three specifically addressed counterintelligence or security.112 One reason 

that businesses may be reluctant to admit their own vulnerabilities in the presen

petitor firms. However, as a Boeing computer security officer has noted, corpo

beginning to realize that admitting flaws in information system defenses is th

toward preventing future violations, and business and government should wo

toward this goal.113

In light of the tendency to overlook OPSEC and INFOSEC implemen

remainder of this section develops an instructional overview of the basic infor

government and business personnel should know to protect their activities from 

rized exploitation. Indeed, for the health of U.S. commerce and national secu

ties, everyone needs user-friendly information on how to protect proprietary in

Even the most sophisticated corporations have difficulty keeping up with the 

the information age; it was not until 1992 that Boeing mandated that all com

puter users attend a security awareness briefing, and this was after the firm 

major breach of information security. Now Boeing sees “...the importance of i

security to our company’s long-term competitiveness...” and considers awaren

as the cornerstone to a good security program.114

Operations Security

OPSEC is essential to the intelligence function in both the national se

business environments. OPSEC denies adversaries information about one’s 

ational capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protect

tors associated with the planning and conduct of those operations and ot

activities. An adversary is not necessarily a belligerent enemy: In OPSEC 

adversary is any entity that acts against one’s own interest or actively opp

own goals.115

To protect an intelligence operation, practitioners can adopt an adversary’s p

For example, factors at risk in one’s own environment can be categorized i

information, indicators, and vulnerabilities, described briefly below.

111 Examples include those cited in Clifford Stoll, The Cuckoo’s Egg, (New York: Po

1990) and Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Su

(New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994). 112 SCIP, Conference Proceedings. Annual International Conference & Exhibit, March 

(Alexandria, VA: SCIP, March 1996). 113 MacLean, 22. 114 MacLean, 22. 115 National Cryptologic School, Information Security Department, Operations Secu

mentals, (Fort Meade, MD: 1994), 2.
63

gOp

Critical Information Details of capabilities and operations directed

against an adversary

Indicator Detectable actions and publicly available

information revealing critical information

Vulnerability Conditions making exploitable information

available to the adversary

Countermeasure options to prevent an adversary from exploiting these fa

eliminating the indicators altogether, concealing indicator activities, disgui

activities, and staging deceptive (false) activities.116

The practice of OPSEC is so important to national security that a federa

has been established as its advocate. As a result of the 1988 Presidentia

national operations security, the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS

with the National Security Agency as its director. The core membership 

includes the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Central Intellig

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and General Services Administration.117 O

and national security bodies, including the military services, have represe

National Operations Security Advisory Committee, which advises the Exe

on the practice of OPSEC.118 The IOSS may be contacted for assistance at:

Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, 6411 Ivy Lane, Suite 400, Greenbel

1405 Telephone (301) 982-2313/0323.

Information Systems Security

Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) refers to the protection of in

an organization uses and produces in the course of its operations. Today, th

tecting complex electronic networks. Government and business depend up

ized systems for everything from banking, communications, and data 

physical security and travel reservations. To the casual observer, INFOSEC 

domain of a few technical specialists, or the exclusive concern of the mili

gence agencies. But INFOSEC is the responsibility of everyone who has ev

phone, computer, or automatic bank teller machine.119

116 National Cryptologic School, 9. 117 National Security Agency, Introduction. 118 National Operations Security Advisory Committee, National Operations Sec

(Greenbelt, MD: Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, January 1993): unnumber

and second physical pages from beginning. 119 A basic reference on INFOSEC is the National Research Council book Compute

Computing in the Information Age, (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
64

offered by encryption. Network vulnerability to adversarial intercept, tam

ing, or destruction of data mandates INFOSEC solutions that ensur

authentication, integrity, and availability of classified and unclassified i

mation created, stored, and processed on [information] systems. ... Such 

tions must enable the interconnection of Command and Control, intellig

and support systems and must allow for the commingling of critical info

tion of different classification levels on a common transport backb

INFOSEC solutions must be flexible, configurable, and result from a 

management scenario that balances the costs and availability of counter

sures against actual threats to, and vulnerabilities of, networks and sys

Finally, INFOSEC must accomplish all of this in an environment in w

networks are neither owned nor controlled by [the government] and reso

are severely constrained.120

Each intelligence organization and activity must tailor its INFOSEC mea

particular technologies and operational practices, weighing the costs of such 

against their value in safeguarding the mission. A three-dimensional model of 

illustrated below, may guide the intelligence service in implementing protectiv

and assessing their adequacy. The first dimension addresses the need to und

vulnerability of information as it passes through different stages of use. T

dimension includes the key characteristics of information that must be preserv

remain useful and secure. The third dimension covers the general categories of 

tools that the intelligence service may employ. Each element of the model is de

the others.121 Together, these interlocking pieces make up a comprehensive 

strategy appropriate to the public or private sector.

Dimensions of INFOSEC122

Information States: Transmission, Storage, Processing

Critical Information Characteristics: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability to 

Legitimate Users

Countermeasures: Technology, Policy/Practice, Education

Role of the Federal Government

Federal agencies, including Intelligence Community members, play key ro

ing both government and businesses learn and practice INFOSEC. The tw

authorities for INFOSEC are the Department of Commerce and the Dep

120 National Security Agency, Introduction, para. D.2. 121 Lynn F. Fisher, “Defining the Threat to Information Systems,” DODSI Security Awar

tin 2-94, (August 1994), 4. 122 Fisher.
65

respective constituencies within the framework of national information p

lished by the Executive Branch. The following overview begins with a sum

utive Branch policy.

National Information Policy

The vision of the National Information Infrastructure — or NII — 

vast accessible network of networks that supports communications an

mation processing to create jobs, increase productivity, improve a

government services, and encourage community networking. The NI

the wide array of information of all kinds within the networks, whe

stored, processed, or communicated. Finally, it includes the people... 

today creating and using the NII.123

The federal government’s role in the NII is to provide a sound legal and 

work, in conjunction with state, local and Native American governments. 

tives include assuring universal service on the NII, thereby enabling o

government information; protecting intellectual property rights; protecting 

individual information; and stimulating the development of advanced info

nologies, including security technologies.124 The Office of Management 

(OMB) national information security authority covers the developmen

implementation and evaluation of government policies and practices fo

resource management.125

A multi-agency group, the national Information Infrastructure Task 

coordinates the federal role in the NII through three committees: the C

Applications and Technology, the Telecommunications Policy Commi

Information Policy Committee. The OMB’s Office of Information an

Affairs chairs the IITF’s Information Policy Committee. As noted below

the Commerce Department chair the other two IITF committees. In add

Security Issues Forum coordinates NII security activities throughout the 

federal government.126

Commerce Department

The Commerce Department’s Assistant Secretary for Communications 

tion heads the National Telecommunications and Information Administr

123 Sally Katzen, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, U.S

agement and Budget, Remarks prepared for delivery at the National Computer S

ence, Baltimore, MD, 11 October 1994. 124 Katzen. 125 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Information Security and Priv

Environments (Washington, DC: GPO, September 1994), 137. 126 Katzen.
66

utive adviser to the President on telecommunications and information policy

the principal federal telecommunications research and engineering laborato

the Institute for Telecommunication Sciences in Boulder, Colorado; and 

grants to programs that promote the development and provision of advance

munications technologies for the public. The NTIA chairs the IITF’s Teleco

tions Policy Committee.127

The Commerce Department’s Technology Administration includes two c

involved in information security, the Office of Technology Policy (OTP) and th

Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST).

The primary role of the OTP is to offer assistance to private secto

government communities in advocating and pursuing policies that maxi

the impact of technology on economic growth, and by exercising leade

to define the role of government in supporting U.S. industrial competitiv

in the post-cold war environment. ... NIST’s primary mission is to pro

U.S. economic growth by working with industry to develop and apply 

nology, measurements, and standards.128

NIST is the national authority for developing government-wide standards 

lines for protecting unclassified but sensitive information, and for developi

ment-wide training programs.129 NIST also chairs the IITF’s Committee on A

and Technology.130 Finally, NIST maintains the Computer Security Resourc

house (CSRC) as a resource for anyone with an interest in computer security

able on-line 24 hours a day, seven days a week at no charge. The CSRC provide

crisis response information on security-related threats, vulnerabilities, and sol

is a general index to computer security topics such as general risks, privacy, l

viruses, assurance, policy, and training.131

Defense Department

The Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for National Security Tel

cations and Information Systems Security.132 As a whole, Department of Defe

information and communications systems are termed the Defense Information 

ture (DII). Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, three DoD agenci

127 Katzen. 128 Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, The U

Government Manual 1995/96 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 July 1995), 167-168. 129 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 13. 130 Katzen. 131 Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), “The NIST Computer Security Res

inghouse,” DISSPatch 4, no. 1 (3rd Quarter 1996): 6. See CSRC home pag

www.csrc.nist.gov. 132 National Security Agency, Chapter 3, B.d.
67

tion Systems Agency (DISA), and the National Security Agency (NSA). Alt

ally the DII is a dedicated system for proprietary and classified nat

information, in fact over 95 percent of its communications are carried 

switched networks of the NII.133 Thus, DoD expertise in information sec

and technology makes the organizations explained below key resources for 

ment organizations and for the private sector.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, as the central authority for military int

vides INFOSEC threat analysis and support to the DII.134 Another age

responsible for planning, developing, and supporting command, control, com

and information systems that serve the needs of the National Command Au

all conditions of peace and war; it further ensures the interoperability of a

and those national and/or international commercial systems that affect th

sion.135 NSA acts as the National Manager for National Security Telecomm

Information Systems Security in the name of the Secretary of Defense. In 

NSA is the focal point for U.S. government cryptography and for the secur

security telecommunications and information systems.136 NSA provides D

tools, techniques, products, services, and security management structures 

DII, through its “V” Group, the customer service and engineering organiza

mation systems security.137 Within NSA, the National Computer Security C

conducts technical evaluation of the protection capabilities of commercially 

supported systems.138 Through its Information Systems Security Research 

ogy Office (ISSR-JTO), NSA coordinates with DISA and the DoD’s Adva

Projects Agency on engineering INFOSEC technologies. The ISSR-JTO p

line of defense for defensive information warfare, and permits electron

between DoD and its contractors. It also maintains research and technology i

the military departments, national labs, universities, and industry.139 NSA co

the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) in matters of 

cern.140 Together, DIA, DISA, and NSA operate the DoD Center for Inform

Security.141

133 LtGen Kenneth A. Minihan, “Intelligence and Information System Security,” 

gence Journal 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 20. 134 Defense Information Systems Agency, “INFOSEC and the DII,” DISSPatch 4, N

ter, CY 1996): 7. 135 Office of the Federal Register, 234. 136 NSA, Chapter 3, B.e.(2). 137 DISA, “Introducing NSA’s New and Improved V Group,” DISSPatch 4, no. 

1996): 2. 138 NSA, Chapter 6, para. 1. 139 DISA, “V Group,” 5. 140 INFOSEC Program Management Office (IPMO), DISSPatch, May 97, 14. 141 DISA, “INFOSEC and the DII,” DISSPatch 4, No. 1 (3rd Quarter 1996): 7.
68

joint DoD/DISA/NSA organization charged with executing centrally managed 

functions within the DoD.142 The IPMO provides operational protection an

capability for the DII against information exploitation, manipulation, or des

administers DoD-wide INFOSEC training and manages the DoD INFOSEC 

Services Contract. The IPMO conducts vulnerability, threat, and operational 

the DII, provides security policy guidance and oversight to DISA programs, a

DISA and non-DISA systems that connect to the DII.143 The IPMO also provi

to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication

ers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ASD/C4ISR).144 Another 

chaired by the ASD/C4ISR, also has a role in INFOSEC. Under the purv

National Security Council, the National Security Telecommunications and I

Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC) advises Executive Branch agencies a

ments on the status of national security systems. Its two subcommittees focus o

munications security and information systems security, respectively. NSA p

NSTISSC secretariat.145

In addition, the DoD Security Institute (DODSI) promotes security awa

compliance with security procedures in DoD by offering training courses to se

sonnel in DoD and DoD-related industry, publishing security awareness bu

disseminating information to security trainers on security and counterintelligen

INFOSEC for Everyone

The national authorities for INFOSEC described above evolved out of the n

tect the fundamental role of information in a democratic society and marke

They help strike the balance between free exchange of information and p

between free enterprise and regulation. Government-sponsored information 

technology set the standards upon which nearly every facet of public and pr

based. Citizens receive basic services through government-created or -regulate

tion infrastructure, including automatic payroll deposit to employee bank acco

lar telephone service, electronic commerce via the Internet, air and rail traf

emergency medical services, and electrical power supply.

Such services contribute not only to the citizen’s quality of life, but to the 

tioning of the nation. Information is the lifeblood of society and the economy. I

chaos that would reign if the government, the military, banks, businesses, sc

hospitals could not communicate reliably. Life would come to a halt.

142 IPMO, 14. 143 DISA, “INFOSEC,” 7. 144 U.S. Department of Defense Security Institute (DODSI), DODSI Security Awarenes

94 (August 1994): 25. 145 NSA, Chapter 3, B.a, B.b, and B.c. 146 DODSI, front cover, 12, 18.
69

key functions. The same free access to information that makes society flour

it vulnerable to damage, attack or exploitation. For example, passive th

shoddy equipment, faulty software, or negligent personnel can disrupt servi

information. Hostile threats include thrill-seeking computer hackers and b

eign adversaries who deliberately target sensitive government and public in

works with the aim of disrupting or destroying key operations, such as milit

power grids.147 Comparable scenarios within the business sector, to includ

sabotage and deception actions against competitors, are at least plausib

basic knowledge of INFOSEC may benefit citizens in all walks of life. A

phone numbers for the INFOSEC agencies that can assist the public are lis

of this chapter.148

Government expertise in information technology and policy has made i

specifically on protecting intelligence operations. The private sector ma

from this expertise by applying INFOSEC measures in business intellige

successful intelligence operations rely on secure transmission, storage, and 

the information used. The information itself must be exchanged only amo

users, and it must retain its intended meaning and be available to users 

Finally, intelligence information and products can be protected throug

(access control, encryption), through security policies and practices, and th

ing the workforce, as with this document.

Points of contact:

Commerce Department:

NIST, Public Inquiries Unit, 100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 208

975-6478 (voice); email: inquiries@nist.gov; Website: http://www.nist.gov/

DoD:

IPMO, 5111 Leesburg Pike, Suite 100, Falls Church, VA 22014-3206; 

DSN761-7944 (voice); 703-681-1386/DSN 703-761-1386 (fax); e-mail: cissa

Website: http://www.disa.mil/ciss.

DISA, Public Affairs Office, 701 South Courthouse Road, Arlington, VA 

703-607-6900 (voice); Website: http://www.disa.mil.

DODSI, 8000 Jefferson Davis Highway, Building 33E, Richmond, VA 

804-279-5314/DSN 695-5314 (voice); 804-279-5239/DSN 695-5239 (fax).

147 Gregory L. Vistica and Evan Thomas, “The Secret Hacker Wars, Behind the 

over cyberterrorism,” Newsweek (1 June 1998): 60. 148 In addition, the National Counterintelligence Center provides support to th

regarding economic espionage, economic intelligence collection, and threat 

NACIC website is http://www.nacis.gov.
70

4108594371 (voice); 4108594375 (fax).

NSA, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000, Attn: V1, Office of Custom

Services; 410-859-4384/DSN 644-0111; 800-688-6115 (voice); Websi

www.nsa.gov:8080/.
71

This primer has reviewed government intelligence production practice

block fashion. It has also explored the defensive measures comprising info

rity and operations security, which are integral to all the building blocks, a

applicable to private businesses and government organizations. Finally, t

drawn a cognitive, behavioral and personality profile of the central figure 

production — the intelligence analyst. In the spirit of benchmarking, t

invites a reciprocal examination of best practices that may have been develo

businesses, and of principles that may have been derived from other acade

intelligence-related processes.

Although this effort reflects a government initiative, in fact the gover

gence Community may receive the greater share of rewards from benchm

process. Potential benefits to the Community include an improved p

increased self-awareness, more efficient recruitment through more informed 

by candidates for employment, as well as any resultant acquisition of specia

tion from subject matter experts in the business and academic communities

Primary advantages for the government’s partners in the exchange of i

best practices could be greater understanding of how tax dollars are spent, a

tunity to transfer an appreciation of government professional intelligenc

security, and staffing methods into academic curricula and business operatio

For all participants in benchmarking, releasing information is actually 

trolling it, a way of depicting and fostering an accurate organizational ima

allowing others to draw and disseminate erroneous characterizations. For th

gence Community in particular, any initiative in benchmarking the intelli

fulfills a charge of the recently completed Report on the Community’s Role

ities: to improve its performance through closer relationships with custom

the private sector.
72

ASD/C4ISR Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control

Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillanc

Reconnaissance

BI Business Intelligence

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CISS Center for Information Systems Security 

CSRC Computer Security Resource Center 

DCI Director of Central Intelligence 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DII Defense Information Infrastructure 

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DoD Department of Defense 

DODSI Department of Defense Security Institute 

FISINT Foreign Instrumentation and Signature Intelligence

GPO U.S. Government Printing Office 

HUMINT Human Intelligence 

IC Intelligence Community 

IITF Information Infrastructure Task Force 

IMINT Imagery Intelligence 

INFOSEC Information Systems Security 

INFOWAR Information Warfare 

IOSS Interagency OPSEC Support Staff

IPMO INFOSEC Program Management Office

ISSR-JTO Information Systems Security Research Joint Technolo

JIVA Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture
73

MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence 

MBTI Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 

MRI Management Research Institute

NACIC National Counterintelligence Center

NCSC National Computer Security Center

NIC National Intelligence Council 

NII National Information Infrastructure

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency 

NIST National Institute for Standards and Technology 

NSA National Security Agency

NSTISSC National Security Telecommunications and Informa

Systems Security Committee

NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Adm

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPSEC Operations Security 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OTP Office of Technology Policy

SCIP Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

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81

Lisa Krizan has been a researcher with the Department of Defense sin

received a master’s degree from the Joint Military Intelligence College in 19

oped many of the ideas for this paper as part of her thesis on benchmaking th

process. A second-generation intelligence scholar, she follows the examp

father, 1972 Defense Intelligence College graduate Allen J. Montecino

USAF (Ret).

83

Occasional Papers

1. Classified paper.

2. Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure, Capt (US

S. Brei, 1996.

3. An Office Manager’s Guide to Intelligence Readiness, Russell G. Swe

4. Classified paper.

5. A Flourishing Craft: Teaching Intelligence Studies, Papers Prepared fo

1999 JMIC Conference on Teaching Intelligence Studies at Colleges a

Universities, 1999.

6. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone, Lisa Krizan, 1999.