UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JOSHUA J. TINSLEY, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Nos. 21-2057 & 21-2075 

(D.C. No. 1:18-CR-02634-WJ-1) 

(D. N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, BRISCOE, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

This appeal grew out of Mr. Joshua Tinsley’s motion for 

compassionate release. The district court denied the motion and a later 

motion for reconsideration. Mr. Tinsley appeals the denial of his motion 

for reconsideration, and we affirm. 

* Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have 

decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if 

otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 25, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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1. We have jurisdiction and exercise it. 

The threshold issue involves our jurisdiction. This issue arises 

because Mr. Tinsley missed the 14-day deadline to file a notice of appeal. 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). The district court denied an extension of time, 

prompting 

 the government to move for dismissal and 

 Mr. Tinsley to appeal the denial of an extension of time. 

But the government has withdrawn its motion to dismiss the appeal, and 

the failure to timely appeal does not create a jurisdictional defect. United 

States v. Randall, 666 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011). 

Though jurisdiction exists, we can dismiss the appeal when the 

government presses the delay. Id. But we generally do not dismiss the 

appeal in the absence of a motion to dismiss. See id. (stating that dismissal 

of a criminal appeal as untimely generally requires the government to 

assert the delay as a ground for dismissal). Because the government has 

withdrawn its motion to dismiss, we exercise our jurisdiction. 

Given this exercise of jurisdiction, the district court’s denial of an 

extension makes no difference, rendering the denial prudentially moot. So 

we dismiss Mr. Tinsley’s appeal from the denial of an extension of time 

(Case No. 21-2075). 

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2. The district court declines to reconsider its denial of 

compassionate release. 

Mr. Tinsley was convicted of possessing more than 500 grams of 

methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The conviction carried a 

mandatory minimum of 120 months, and the guideline range was 324 to 

405 months’ imprisonment. Despite the stiff guideline range, the court 

sentenced Mr. Tinsley to only 120 months—a downward variance of 204 

months. 

Months after sentencing, a global outbreak of COVID-19 emerged. 

The emergence of COVID-19 led Mr. Tinsley to move for compassionate 

release on two grounds: 

1. He had sleep apnea, which made him susceptible to serious 

physical harm from COVID-19. 

2. His girlfriend’s son had a degenerative bone condition, and the 

girlfriend had trouble caring for the boy and paying for a 

required operation. 

The district court denied the motion for compassionate release, 

reasoning that 

 Mr. Tinsley’s reasons were not extraordinary and compelling, 

 he continued to pose a danger to the public, and 

 the statutory sentencing factors weighed against early release. 

Mr. Tinsley sought reconsideration and presented extensive evidence of 

sleep apnea. The court denied the motion for reconsideration. 

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3. The denial of reconsideration fell within the district court’s 

discretion. 

In considering the denial of reconsideration, we apply the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. United States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917, 927 (10th Cir. 

2022). The district court could grant reconsideration if 

 the controlling law had changed, 

 Mr. Tinsley had discovered new evidence, or 

 the court had needed to correct a clear error or prevent manifest 

injustice. 

Id. 

We consider the availability of reconsideration against the backdrop 

of the standard for compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

Under this standard, compassionate release is available only upon the 

satisfaction of three requirements: 

1. The defendant has presented an extraordinary and compelling 

reason for early release. 

2. Early release would be consistent with the Sentencing 

Commission’s policy statements. 

3. Early release would be warranted under the statutory 

sentencing factors. 

United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir. 2021). The failure 

to satisfy any of these requirements would prevent early release. United 

States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 941–47 (10th Cir. 2021). 

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 Consideration of these requirements is discretionary in two respects. 

First, we apply the abuse–of–discretion standard to rulings on 

compassionate release. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 

(10th Cir. 2021). Second, irrespective of the standard in ruling on 

compassionate release, we review rulings on reconsideration only for an 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Randall, 666 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th 

Cir. 2011). For these reasons, we apply the abuse–of–discretion standard to 

the district court’s refusal to reconsider the denial of early release. United 

States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917, 927 (10th Cir. 2022). 

 In denying reconsideration, the district court concluded that Mr. 

Tinsley had failed to satisfy any of the three requirements. We agree as to 

the first and third requirements: (1) the failure to show extraordinary, 

compelling reasons for early release and (2) the failure to justify early 

release based on the statutory sentencing factors.1

 In our view, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reconsider the conclusions 

as to these two requirements. 

 When ruling on the motion for early release, the district court 

concluded that Mr. Tinsley’s reasons for early release were not 

extraordinary and compelling. Mr. Tinsley had argued that (1) he was 

suffering from sleep apnea, rendering him vulnerable to complications if 

1

 We need not address the second requirement. 

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he were to catch COVID-19, and (2) early release was necessary for him to 

help his girlfriend care for her son, who had a degenerative bone condition. 

The district court concluded that these reasons were not extraordinary and 

compelling for two reasons: 

1. Sleep apnea: Mr. Tinsley had relied on a possible impediment 

to his ability to care for himself—not a current, substantial 

diminution in his ability to provide self–care. In addition, Mr. 

Tinsley had not provided documentary evidence of his 

diagnosis with sleep apnea. 

2. The bone condition of the girlfriend’s son: The girlfriend was 

not a spouse or registered partner, Mr. Tinsley had not shown 

an inability of the girlfriend to care for her son, and Mr. 

Tinsley had committed many offenses—risking separation from 

the boy—knowing of the boy’s bone condition. 

When moving for reconsideration, Mr. Tinsley provided extensive 

documentation of his diagnosis with sleep apnea, argued that the district 

court had understated the extent of COVID-19 infections at his prison, and 

denied the existence of a requirement that he be married to the boy’s 

primary caregiver. The district court rejected these arguments, concluding 

that 

 it had not underestimated the extent of COVID-19 infections at 

Mr. Tinsley’s prison, 

 little information existed on the impact of sleep apnea on Mr. 

Tinsley’s ability to provide self-care, and 

 he had failed to show that he was the boy’s primary caregiver. 

These conclusions fell within the district court’s discretion. 

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 Mr. Tinsley’s new evidence did not suggest a failure to recognize the 

extent of COVID-19 infections. The court pointed out that 

 all of the COVID-19 cases at the prison had affected staff 

members and 

 no inmate had been infected by COVID-19. 

 Nor did the new evidence affect the district court’s consideration of 

sleep apnea. Mr. Tinsley presented extensive evidence of sleep apnea, but 

he did not show how it had affected his ability to provide self-care. 

 Finally, Mr. Tinsley did not justify reconsideration of the analysis 

involving the boy’s bone condition. The court had not questioned Mr. 

Tinsley’s concern for the boy. But the court had explained that 

 the girlfriend appeared able to care for the boy and 

 Mr. Tinsley committed many crimes, risking separation from 

the boy, with knowledge of the boy’s bone condition. 

Mr. Tinsley presents no reason to question the district court’s explanation. 

 Though Mr. Tinsley does not address the district court’s explanation, 

he argues on appeal that he was obese, increasing the risk of complications 

from COVID-19. But he did not raise obesity when moving for 

compassionate release or when seeking reconsideration. By omitting 

reliance on obesity in those motions, he forfeited reliance on his obesity. 

See United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019).2

2

 We typically consider forfeited arguments under the plain-error 

standard. Leffler, 942 F.3d at 1196. But Mr. Tinsley has not argued for 

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 Even if Mr. Tinsley had undermined the finding of no extraordinary 

or compelling reasons for early release, the court independently relied on 

the statutory sentencing factors. Mr. Tinsley had downplayed the 

seriousness of prior marijuana convictions, argued that he had selfmedicated with marijuana, and alleged racial targeting. In rejecting these 

arguments, the court reasoned that Mr. Tinsley had “a clear history of 

unlawfulness” and had already reduced his sentence exposure to the 

methamphetamine charge through his plea agreement. R. at 134. Mr. 

Tinsley does not address the district court’s reasoning, and that reasoning 

fell within the court’s discretion. 

4. Conclusion

The district court acted within its discretion when denying Mr. 

Tinsley’s motion for reconsideration. So we affirm the denial of 

reconsideration. We also grant Mr. Tinsley’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis and deny as moot his motion for an emergency ruling.

Entered for the Court 

Robert E. Bacharach 

Circuit Judge 

plain error. So we do not consider the possibility of plain error. Id. at 

1196, 1199–1200. 

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