J-A19016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DAVID MATTHEW MAZZOCCO

Appellant No. 466 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 18, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004913-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2015

Appellant David Mazzocco appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas following his jury 

trial conviction for first-degree murder,1attempted murder,2aggravated 

assault,3and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).4 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as 

follows:

. . . [O]n Sunday, March 10, 2013, [Appellant] and his girlfriend, 

Samantha Snatchko, had dinner at a friend’s house. During 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
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dinner [Appellant] had between 4 and 6 beers. He also bought 

40 Xanax pills from a friend earlier that day and had taken 15 of 

them throughout the day. After dinner, [Appellant] displayed 

three (3) handguns and an AR-15 rifle to other guests at the 

party, who were gun enthusiasts. At the conclusion of the meal, 

[Appellant] took Snatchko home because she was uncomfortable 

with his drinking and drug use and also with the display of guns. 

He then went to the Fort Pitt Inn, a bar located on Steubenville 

Pike in North Fayette. While in the bar, he had 2 beers and 2 

shots of Crown Royal, at which point the bartender refused to 

serve him any more alcohol. Throughout the evening, 

[Appellant] was telephoning and texting Snatchko on his cell 

phone and repeatedly left the bar and then came back inside. It 

was subsequently revealed that Snatchko was attempting to end 

the relationship and [Appellant] was alternately upset and 

begging to come see her and jealous because he thought she 

had another man at her house. During one of the trips outside, 

[Appellant] returned with a smashed cell phone and then asked 

to use the bar phone. Later in the evening, [Appellant] went 

outside and returned with a bloody hand from breaking a window 

in his truck and told his friends Dave and Ryan Thomas, with 

whom he had been sitting, to leave the bar. He then reached 

into his pocket, pulled a handgun and fired two shots, hitting 

patrons James Adams and James Quirk in the head.[5] At that 

point, two other patrons, Gerald Maroni and Juan Rodriguez, 

rushed [Appellant] and attempted to subdue him. Another shot 

was fired, this time hitting Maroni in the arm. Eventually Maroni 

and Rodriguez managed to wrestle the gun away from 

[Appellant], and Maroni beat [Appellant] in the head several 

times with the gun in order to subdue him. Maroni and 

Rodriguez held [Appellant] down until the police arrived and 

handcuffed him. [Appellant] was taken to Mercy Hospital, where 

he was treated and released. He was then transported to the 

Homicide Division, where he was permitted to sleep and offered 

food. He told police that he had not been provoked, but rather 

began shooting for no reason and intended to keep shooting 

until the police arrived.

____________________________________________

5 The shot to the head killed James Adams. James Quirk survived, but with 

grievous and permanent injuries.
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1925(a) Opinion, pp. 2-3.

Following a trial conducted November 7-21, 2013, a jury convicted 

Appellant of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, two 

counts of aggravated assault, and one count of REAP.6 On February 18, 

2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without parole 

on the first-degree murder conviction and consecutive sentences of 10 to 20 

years of imprisonment for each of the attempted murder convictions. The 

trial court imposed no further penalties for the remaining convictions.

Appellant filed post-sentence motions7on February 25, 2014, which 

the trial court denied by order filed on March 4, 2014. Appellant filed a 

notice of appeal on March 24, 2014. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following four claims for review:

I. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err when it denied [Appellant’s] posttrial motion to vacate the verdict of guilty and enter judgment of 

acquittal as to first-degree murder, third-degree murder, 

attempted homicide, aggravated assault and recklessly 

endangering another person on grounds that the evidence was 

insufficient to support verdicts of guilty, in particular the 

[Commonwealth] failed to disprove the defenses of self-defense 

and imperfect self-defense?

____________________________________________

6 At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, the trial court granted 

Appellant’s motion for acquittal on four other counts of REAP.

7 Appellant’s post-sentence motions included a weight of the evidence claim.
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[II.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err when it denied [Appellant’s] posttrial motion to vacate the verdict of guilty and order a new trial 

as to first-degree murder, third-degree murder, attempted 

homicide, aggravated assault and recklessly endangering 

another person on grounds that [the] verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence, in particular the [Commonwealth] failed 

to disprove the defenses of self-defense and imperfect selfdefense?

[III.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err when it denied [Appellant’s] 

motion to suppress the statement he allegedly made to the 

Allegheny County Police because it was not a knowing and 

voluntary statement?

[IV.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err when it imposed a sentence of 

“life without the possibility of parole” because it is an unlawful 

sentence in that a sentencing court’s authority is limited to 

imposing a sentence of life imprisonment?

Appellant’s Brief, p. 6.8

A. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim

Appellant first claims that the Commonwealth adduced insufficient 

evidence to convict him of his various crimes. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 16. 

Specifically, Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to adequately 

disprove the defenses of self-defense and imperfect self-defense. See id. at 

19-24. He is incorrect.

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, this Court’s 

standard of review is as follows:

____________________________________________

8 The argument section of Appellant’s brief combines his sufficiency of the 

evidence and weight of the evidence claims into a single claim. See

Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6, 16-24. For the sake of clarity, we regard and 

discuss these claims as separate claims herein.
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The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa.Super.2014).

Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code governs self-defense, and provides, in 

relevant part, as follows:

§ 505. Use of force in self-protection

(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.--

The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable 

when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary 

for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful 

force by such other person on the present occasion.

(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.--

. . .

(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section 

unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect 

himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual 

intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:
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(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or serious 

bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in 

the same encounter; or

(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of 

using such force with complete safety by retreating, except 

the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or 

place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is 

assailed in his place of work by another person whose 

place of work the actor knows it to be.

. . .

(2.3) An actor who is not engaged in a criminal activity, who is 

not in illegal possession of a firearm and who is attacked in any 

place where the actor would have a duty to retreat under 

paragraph (2)(ii) has no duty to retreat and has the right to 

stand his ground and use force, including deadly force, if:

(i) the actor has a right to be in the place where he was 

attacked;

(ii) the actor believes it is immediately necessary to do so 

to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, 

kidnapping or sexual intercourse by force or threat; and

(iii) the person against whom the force is used displays or 

otherwise uses:

(A) a firearm or replica of a firearm as defined in 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9712 (relating to sentences for offenses 

committed with firearms); or

(B) any other weapon readily or apparently capable of 

lethal use.

18 Pa.C.S. § 505.

This Court recently explained justified use of deadly force in selfdefense in detail as follows:

According to our Supreme Court, the justified use of deadly force 

requires:
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a) the actor was free from fault in provoking or continuing 

the difficulty which resulted in the use of deadly force; b) 

the actor must have reasonably believed that he was in 

imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, and that 

there was a necessity to use such force in order to save 

himself or others therefrom; and c) the actor did not 

violate any duty to retreat or to avoid the danger.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 542 Pa. 134, 137, 665 A.2d 1172, 

1174 (1995). The defendant has no “burden to prove” his selfdefense claim. Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 219, 224, 

766 A.2d 342, 345 (2001). The Supreme Court explained the 

evidentiary burdens as follows:

While there is no burden on a defendant to prove the [selfdefense] claim, before that defense is properly at issue at 

trial, there must be some evidence, from whatever source 

to justify a finding of self-defense. If there is any evidence 

that will support the claim, then the issue is properly 

before the fact finder.

Smith, 97 A.3d at 787. The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it 

establishes at least one of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in 

danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused 

provoked or continued the use of force; or 3) the accused 

had a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with 

complete safety.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Hammond, 953 A.2d 544, 559 

(Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 743, 964 A.2d 894 (2009).

The requirement of reasonable belief encompasses two 

aspects, one subjective and one objective. First, the 

defendant must have acted out of an honest, bona fide 

belief that he was in imminent danger, which involves 

consideration of the defendant’s subjective state of mind. 

Second, the defendant’s belief that he needed to defend 

himself with deadly force, if it existed, must be reasonable 

in light of the facts as they appeared to the defendant, a 

consideration that involves an objective analysis.
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Smith, 97 A.3d at 787 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 617 Pa. 527, 

551, 53 A.3d 738, 752 (2012)). 

To claim self-defense, the defendant must be free from fault in 

provoking or escalating the altercation that led to the offense, 

before the defendant can be excused from using deadly force. 

Smith, 97 A.3d at 787 (quoting Mouzon, 53 A.3d at 751).

If the defendant’s own testimony is the only evidence of self-defense, 

the Commonwealth must still disprove the asserted justification 

and cannot simply rely on the jury’s disbelief of the defendant’s 

testimony:

The disbelief of a denial does not, taken alone, afford 

affirmative proof that the denied fact existed so as to 

satisfy a proponent’s burden of proving that fact. The trial 

court’s statement that it did not believe Appellant’s 

testimony is no substitute for the proof the Commonwealth 

was required to provide to disprove the self-defense claim.

If there are other witnesses, however, who provide accounts of 

the material facts, it is up to the fact finder to reject or accept 

all, part or none of the testimony of any witness. The 

complainant can serve as a witness to the incident to refute a 

self-defense claim. 

Smith, 97 A.3d at 788 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Further, 

[a]lthough the Commonwealth is required to disprove a claim of 

self-defense arising from any source beyond a reasonable doubt, 

a [fact-finder] is not required to believe the testimony of the 

defendant who raises the claim.

A number of factors, including whether complainant was armed, 

any actual physical contact, size and strength disparities 

between the parties, prior dealings between the parties, 

threatening or menacing actions on the part of complainant, and 

general circumstances surrounding the incident, are all relevant 

when determining the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief 
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that the use of deadly force was necessary to protect against 

death or serious bodily injuries. Furthermore, a physically larger 

person who grabs a smaller person does not automatically invite 

the smaller person to use deadly force in response.

Smith, 97 A.3d at 788 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In addition to self-defense, which, if successful, results in acquittal, a 

first-degree murder defendant may also claim that he committed an 

“unreasonable belief killing.” This defense, otherwise known as “imperfect 

self-defense,” if employed successfully, does not result in acquittal, but 

instead results in a conviction for voluntary manslaughter in lieu of firstdegree murder. The Crimes Code defines imperfect self-defense as follows:

Unreasonable belief killing justifiable.--A person who 

intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary 

manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the 

circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the 

killing under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general principles 

of justification), but his belief is unreasonable.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(b). “The derivative and lesser defense of imperfect belief 

self-defense is imperfect in only one respect—an unreasonable rather than a 

reasonable belief that deadly force was required to save the actor’s life. All 

other principles of justification under 18 Pa.C.S. § 505 must [be satisfied to 

prove] unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter.” Commonwealth v. 

Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa.2012) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). As with self-defense, a defendant must be free from 

fault to successfully employ the defense of imperfect self-defense. 

Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at 1124-25.
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Here, Appellant presented a justification defense of self-defense at 

trial. Appellant testified that Adams had earlier threatened to kill him 

because Appellant had taken Adams’ job. Appellant further testified that he 

saw Adams reach into his pocket and pull out a gun. He claims, fearing for 

his life, he shot Adams in the face and then accidentally shot Quirk. He also 

testified someone else fired the shot that hit Maroni in the arm. Appellant’s 

own testimony was the only self-defense evidence.

The physical evidence and the testimony of other witnesses, however, 

refute Appellant’s testimony. This evidence established that all three shots 

fired in the altercation came from the same weapon – Appellant’s gun – and 

that Adams did not have a gun at all. Further, the bartender and the other 

bar patrons all testified that they had not witnessed any interaction 

whatsoever between the two men prior to Appellant shooting Adams. 

The trial court correctly assessed the evidence presented in relation to 

Appellant’s self-defense and imperfect self-defense claims:

Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that was 

more than sufficient to disprove [Appellant’s] trial claim of selfdefense (and his appellate claim of imperfect self-defense). The 

Commonwealth was able to establish, through the testimony of 

the bartender and every patron who was at the bar at the time 

of the shooting, that there had been no confrontation between 

[Appellant] and Adams, and, in fact, there had been no contact 

or conversation at all between them. The Commonwealth was 

able to prove through physical evidence that Adams did not have 

a gun, and so could not have been pulling out a gun as 

[Appellant] claimed. Although [Appellant] claimed that someone 

else was shooting (presumably at him), the Commonwealth was 

able to prove through ballistics evidence that all three shots 

were fired by [Appellant], from his weapon. Moreover, the 
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Commonwealth was able to prove that once [Appellant] shot 

Adams – who [Appellant] claimed was the only threat or source 

of confrontation – he continued to shoot, hitting James Quirk in 

the head and Gerald Maroni in the arm.

Ultimately, the evidence very clearly demonstrated that 

there was no threat or confrontation that would have required 

[Appellant] to protect or defend himself. Rather, the evidence 

demonstrated that [Appellant], who had been drinking and 

taking prescription drugs was angered and upset over the breakup with his girlfriend, left the bar and went to his truck where he 

deliberately armed himself with three handguns. When he 

returned to the bar he told his friends to leave, then pulled out a 

gun and, without warning or provocation, began shooting.

These facts provide absolutely no basis for a claim of selfdefense or imperfect self-defense. The Commonwealth clearly 

established that [Appellant] was the aggressor, and so met its 

burden of disproving the claim of self-defense (as well as the 

[appellate] claim of imperfect self-defense). This claim must 

fail.

1925(a) Opinion, pp. 5-6.

Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim based on the 

Commonwealth’s alleged failure to disprove self-defense and/or imperfect 

self-defense fails.

B. The Weight of the Evidence Claim

Appellant next claims that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 16. Appellant bases this claim on his 

argument that the Commonwealth failed to adequately disprove the 

defenses of self-defense and imperfect self-defense. See id. at 19-24. He 

is again incorrect.

The denial of a new trial based on a lower court’s determination that 

the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence is one of the least 
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assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial. See

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa.2013). This Court 

reviews weight of the evidence claims pursuant to the following standard:

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary 

to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no 

obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial 

court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must 

do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege 

that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a 

juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth 

juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that 

notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of 

greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight 

with all the facts is to deny justice.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa.2000) (internal 

citations, quotations, and footnote omitted).

Stated differently, a court may award a new trial because the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence only when the verdict is so contrary to 

the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice,9“such that right must be 

____________________________________________

9 This Court has explained the notion of “shocking to one’s sense of justice” 

as follows:

When the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal, or when the 

jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge 

to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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given another opportunity to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Goodwine, 692 

A.2d 233, 236 (Pa.Super.1997). Moreover, appellate review of a weight 

claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a 

review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753. When reviewing the 

trial court’s determination, this Court gives the gravest deference to the 

findings of the court below. We review the court’s actions for an abuse of 

discretion. Id.

Simply stated, the jury’s verdict in this matter illustrates that the jury 

found credible the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses that 

Appellant was the aggressor and fired his weapon unprovoked, and 

incredible Appellant’s testimony to the contrary. This evidence, as discussed 

supra, clearly disproved Appellant’s defenses of self-defense and imperfect 

self-defense. The trial court agreed with the jury’s assessment in denying 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion for a new trial based on the weight of the 

evidence. See 1925(a) Opinion, p. 8. Nothing about the verdict or the trial 

court’s reasoning shocks the conscience. Thus, Appellant’s weight of the 

evidence claim warrants no relief.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the judicial 

conscience.

Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa.Super.2004) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted).
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C. The Suppression Claim

Next, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by not suppressing his 

post-arrest statement to police. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 24-30. 

Specifically, he claims the statement was not knowingly and voluntarily 

made because he was still suffering from the combined effects of a head 

injury, medication received at the hospital, and his drug and alcohol use 

from the previous day. See id. He is incorrect.

This Court’s well-settled standard of review of a denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence is as follows:

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth 

prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only 

the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court 

is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s 

legal conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if 

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. 

Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to [] 

plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

When a court is called upon to determine whether a confession is 

voluntary and, hence, admissible at trial, it examines the totality 
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of the circumstances surrounding the confession to ascertain 

whether it is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 

choice by its maker. In making this inquiry, a court is not 

concerned with the issue of whether the substance of the 

confession is true. Rather, a court is constrained to examine 

only whether an individual’s confession was the product of 

coercion, duress, or the use of other measures by interrogators 

deliberately calculated to overcome his or her free will.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 537-38 (Pa.Super.2014). “By the 

same token, the law does not require the coddling of those accused of crime. 

[The accused] need not be protected against his own innate desire to 

unburden himself.” Commonwealth v. Templin, 795 A.2d 959, 966 

(Pa.2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Graham, 182 A.2d 727, 730–31 

(Pa.1962)). 

When assessing voluntariness pursuant to the totality of the 

circumstances, a court should look at the following factors: the 

duration and means of the interrogation; the physical and 

psychological state of the accused; the conditions attendant to 

the detention; the attitude of the interrogator; and any and all 

other factors that could drain a person’s ability to withstand 

suggestion and coercion.

Commonwealth v. Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 434 (Pa.Super.2013), appeal 

denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa.2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Nester, 709 

A.2d 879, 882 (Pa.1998)). 

“The Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the defendant confessed voluntarily.” Harrell, 65 A.3d at 

434. “The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a conclusion 

of law and, as such, is subject to plenary review.” Commonwealth v. 

Roberts, 969 A.2d 594, 599 (Pa.Super.2009).
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The testimony at the suppression hearing revealed the following. 

Appellant had a blood alcohol level of 1.57% at 2:22 a.m. He was 

combative and needed to be restrained at 3:00 a.m. Additionally, he was 

given Haldol and Ativan to calm him so the medical personnel could 

administer a CT scan. Although Appellant was diagnosed with a concussion, 

the CT scan was negative for head injury. After receiving stitches for a head 

laceration, Appellant was discharged in an alert and stable condition, with a 

zero pain score, and with no evidence learning considerations or barriers 

prevented him from understanding discharge instructions. 

Upon his transport to the police station, police placed Appellant in a 

12-foot-by-12-foot interrogation room and shackled one of his legs to a bolt 

on the floor. Appellant declined food and drink. The police allowed him to 

sleep until 11:00 a.m.

At 11:00 a.m., two detectives entered the interrogation room and 

spoke with Appellant. Appellant requested and received a cigarette. The 

police explained that this would be Appellant’s opportunity to tell his version 

of the events, and advised him of his Miranda10 rights by reading Allegheny 

County Police’s “Rights Warning Waiver” form. Appellant had no questions 

about the form, which he initialed and signed in the appropriate places. In 

addition to executing the waiver form, Appellant indicated verbally that he 

____________________________________________

10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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wished to speak with police about the incident. Although he seemed tired 

during the conversation regarding his waiver of rights, Appellant asked 

appropriate questions. During the interview, Appellant gave responsive and 

appropriate answers to the questions posed. He did not appear intoxicated; 

his speech was not slurred, and he was not swaying in his seat. The 

interview concluded at 11:45 a.m. 

Based on this evidence, the trial court assessed Appellant’s 

suppression claim as follows:

. . . Gerald Maroni beat [Appellant] about the head in an attempt 

to subdue him after the shooting. However, [Appellant] was 

conscious, albeit belligerent and verbally abusive to the police at 

the scene. He remained so at the hospital and was sedated to 

permit medical treatment. However, upon his release from 

Mercy Hospital, [Appellant] was cleared for incarceration. He 

was permitted to, and in fact[] did, sleep for several hours and 

was offered food and beverages before questioning began. 

When the questioning began, [Appellant] gave responsive 

answers and did not appear to be impaired.

[Appellant’s] averment that he does not remember the 

interrogation remains suspect. It appears that he is attempting 

to claim that the memory loss was the product of the beating by 

Maroni, however, careful examination of the record reveals that 

[Appellant] has also claimed selective memory loss from before 

the shooting, particularly where he denied knowing how his 

phone got smashed. It seems clear to this [c]ourt that 

[Appellant] is attempting to use the “memory loss” to his benefit 

for “forgetting” any particularly damaging behavior or anything 

that he might otherwise not be able to explain.

Nevertheless, [Appellant’s] claim that he does not 

remember making a statement is not sufficient to defeat its 

admissibility. At the time of questioning, [Appellant] was 

coherent and gave appropriately responsive answers; the fact 

that the substance of the answers he gave was damaging to his 

case does not mean that the statement was involuntary or 
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inadmissible. Ultimately, that is the sum and substance of 

[Appellant’s] argument: the statement is damaging therefore it 

should not have been admitted. All credible evidence 

demonstrates that [Appellant] knowingly, voluntarily and 

intelligently waived his Miranda rights, and, as a result, the 

statement was admissible. This [c]ourt was well within its 

discretion in denying [Appellant’s] suppression and post-trial 

motions in this regard.

1925(a) Opinion, pp. 9-10 (record citations omitted).

The suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and its legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Therefore, 

Appellant’s suppression claim fails.

D. The Sentencing Claim

Finally, Appellant claims the trial court illegally sentenced him to serve 

a life sentence without parole. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 30-35. He is 

incorrect.

This Court’s scope and standard of review for illegal sentence claims is 

as follows:

The scope and standard of review applied to determine the 

legality of a sentence are well established. If no statutory 

authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is 

illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be 

vacated. In evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our 

standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining 

whether the trial court committed an error of law.

Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1001-1002 (Pa.Super.2006) 

(internal citations omitted).
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Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code provides, in pertinent part:

§ 1102. Sentence for murder, murder of unborn child and 

murder of law enforcement officer

(a) First degree.--

(1) Except as provided under section 1102.1 (relating to 

sentence of persons under the age of 18 for murder, 

murder of an unborn child and murder of a law 

enforcement officer), a person who has been convicted of 

a murder of the first degree or of murder of a law 

enforcement officer of the first degree shall be sentenced 

to death or to a term of life imprisonment in accordance 

with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (relating to sentencing procedure 

for murder of the first degree).

18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1). Additionally, Pennsylvania’s Prisons and Parole 

Code provides:

§ 6137. Parole power

(a) General criteria for parole.--

(1) The board may parole subject to consideration of guidelines 

established under 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154.5 (relating to adoption of 

guidelines for parole) and may release on parole any inmate to 

whom the power to parole is granted to the board by this 

chapter, except an inmate condemned to death or serving 

life imprisonment, whenever . . .

61 Pa.C.S. § 6137 (emphasis provided). Further, our case law 

“unequivocally bars all parole for first degree murderers whether the 

sentence is life or death.” Commonwealth v. Yount, 615 A.2d 1316, 1320 

(Pa.Super.1992).

Clearly, the trial court had the authority to impose the sentence it did. 

Based on the above law, Appellant’s claim that the trial court lacked the 
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authority to sentence Appellant to life imprisonment without parole is 

without merit and borders on frivolous.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/12/2015