MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2018 ME	30

Docket: Pen-17-441

Submitted

On	Briefs: February	26,	2018

Decided: March	6,	2018

Panel: ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN, JABAR,	HJELM,	and HUMPHREY,	JJ.

IN	RE CHILD OF	NICHOLAS	M.

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]		Nicholas	M. appeals	from a	judgment	of	the	District	Court	(Newport,	

Budd,	 J.) terminating	 his	 parental	 rights to	 his child1 pursuant	 to	 22 M.R.S.	

§ 4055(1)(A)(1)(a)	and	(B)(2)(a),	(b)(i),	(ii),	(iv)	(2017). He	argues	that there	

is	 insufficient	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 court’s	 findings	 of	 unfitness, that	the	

court	abused	its	discretion	when	it	denied	his	motion	to	continue	the	hearing	

on	the	petition	to	terminate	his	parental	rights, and	that	the	court	abused	its	

discretion	when	it	denied	his	attorney’s	motion	 to	withdraw.	 We	affirm	 the	

judgment.		

 1		The	mother	consented	to	the	termination	of	her	parental	rights,	and	she	is	not	a	party	to	this	

appeal.		
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I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		The	court	made	the	following	findings	of	fact,	and	even	though	they	

are	expressed	in	 terms	of	witness	testimony,	all are	supported	by	competent	

evidence	in	the	record:	

The	final	hearing	in	this	matter	occurred	September	8,	2017	

and	was	relatively	brief.	.	.	.	

[The	father]	himself	did	not appear	for	the	final	hearing. In	

spite	of	this,	the	court	finds by	clear	and	convincing	evidence	that	

he	was	aware	of	the	hearing .	.	.	.		There	was	not	so	much	as	a	phone	

call	to	the	court	on	the	day	of	the	hearing.	.	.	.

[The	permanency	caseworker]	testified	that	she	has	worked	

for	two years	in	her	current	capacity,	and	has	been	involved	with	

this	 case	 for	 most	 of	 its	 history.	 She	 testified	 that	 [the	 father]	

maintained	somewhat	regular e-mail	contact	with	the	Department	

early	 in	 the	 case.	 	 According	 to	 [her], among	 the	 notable	

expressions	 made	 by	 [the	 father]	 during	 this	 time	 was	 his	

acknowledgement	in	December	2016	that	he	believed	he	was	[the	

child’s]	father.	 During	this	time,	[the	father]	expressed	interest	in	

participating	 in	 the	 reunification	 and	 rehabilitative	 services	 the	

Department	 could	 offer.	 	 However,	 beginning	 in	 May	 2017,	 [the	

father]	discontinued	his	communication	with	the	Department.	

[The	 permanency	 caseworker]	 testified	 that,	 to	 the	 best	 of	

her	knowledge,	[the	father]	had	contact	on	only	one	occasion	with	

[the	child]. That	supervised	visit took	place	on	February	23,	2017,	

and	was	largely	facilitated	by	the	Department,	which	scheduled	the	

visit,	arranged	the	supervision	and	provided	[the	father]	with	bus	

transportation	.	.	.	.		[The	permanency	caseworker]	testified	further	

that	 [the	 father]	 made	 no	 further	 expression	 of	 interest in	

participating	 in	 the	 various	 rehabilitative	 or	 other	 reunification	

services	the	Department	could	provide	him,	other	than	to	indicate	
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that	his	probation	restrictions	limited	his	ability	to	leave	the	state	

of	Rhode	Island	with	any	regularity.		

[The	 permanency	 caseworker]	 confirmed	 that	 [the	 child]	

entered	 Department	 custody	 on	 September	 12,	 2016	 .	 .	 .	 .	 [The	

child] is	 doing	 well	 and	 has	 established	 a	 loving	 bond with	 his	

foster	parents	and	foster	siblings.	

.	.	.	.	

[The	guardian	ad	litem’s]	final	report	.	.	.	indicates	that	he	had	

an	opportunity	to	speak	with [the	father]	the	week	prior	to	the	final	

hearing.		The	report	states	that	[the	father]	last	saw	[the	child] in	

February and [the	father] is	currently	on	probation	for	a	domestic	

violence	incident	that	occurred	just	after that	visit. [The	guardian	

ad	litem]	reports	that	[the	father]	was	also	arrested in	September	

2016	 following	 his	 involvement	 in	 a	 domestic	 incident	 with	 his	

then-girlfriend.	 [The guardian	 ad	 litem’s]	 report	 notes	 that	 [the	

father]	was	substantiated	in	2010	by	[the	Department] in	Maine	for	

physical	abuse	towards	[the	child’s]	older	brother.		

(Footnotes	omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted).	

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶3]	 	 The court	 found,	 by	 clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence,	 that	 (1)	 the	

father	is	unwilling	or	unable	to	protect	the	child	from	jeopardy, and	that	this	

circumstance	is	unlikely	to	change	within	a	time	which	is	reasonably	calculated	

to	 meet	 the	 child’s	 needs;	 (2)	 the	 father	 is	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 take	

responsibility	for	the	child	within	a	time	which	is	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	

the	child’s	needs;	and	 (3)	 the	 father	has	 failed	 to	make	a	good	 faith	effort	 to	

rehabilitate	and	reunify	with	the	child.		Contrary	to	the	father’s	contention,	each	
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of	 the	 court’s	 unfitness	 findings	 is supported	 by	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the	

record.	 	 See 22	 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i),	 (ii),	 (iv);	see	 also In	 re	 River	 B.,	

2017 ME	77,	¶	6,	159	A.3d	1222.	

[¶4]		We	are	not	persuaded	by	the	father’s	additional arguments that	the	

court	abused	its	discretion	in	denying	his	motion	to	continue	and	his	attorney’s	

motion	to	withdraw.	 On	the	record	before	us,	neither	the	court’s	denial	of	the	

motion	 to	 continue	 nor	 its	 denial	 of	 the	 motion	 to	 withdraw constitutes an	

abuse	of	discretion.		See	In	re	Trever	I.,	2009	ME	59,	¶	28,	973 A.2d	752; see	also

In	re	J.R.,	2013	ME	58,	¶	19,	69	A.3d	406.		

The	entry	is:

Judgment affirmed.

Randy	G.	Day,	Esq.,	Garland,	for	appellant	father

Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General, and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of	

the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human	

Services

Newport	District	Court	docket	number	PC-2015-10

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY