In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 05-3557

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

EDDIE LEE STRONG,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 04 CR 78—John Daniel Tinder, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2007—DECIDED MAY 14, 2007

____________

Before CUDAHY, RIPPLE and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A jury found Eddie Strong, a

felon, guilty of possessing ammunition but acquitted him

of possessing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was

sentenced to 62 months’ imprisonment. Evidence was

admitted at trial demonstrating that drugs were sold at

the house where the firearm and ammunition were dis-
2 No. 05-3557

1 Mr. Strong was not charged with any drug-related offenses.

covered.1 Mr. Strong challenges the admission of this

evidence as irrelevant and prejudicial. Because this evidence tended to prove Mr. Strong’s knowing possession of

the drugs and the firearm and because it was not unduly

prejudicial, we affirm his conviction.

I

BACKGROUND

In 2003, police in Muncie, Indiana, began investigating

alleged drug trafficking at a house located at 612 East 5th

Street. This residence belonged to Mr. Strong’s elderly

stepfather. The police had seen Mr. Strong there on numerous occasions. In January 2003, officers sent a confidential

informant into the house to purchase drugs from Mr.

Strong. The informant returned with crack cocaine; on the

same day, the officers obtained and executed a search

warrant for the house. The officers found recorded money

from the controlled buy in Mr. Strong’s pockets. The

officers videotaped the rest of their search in which they

found illegal drugs, two guns and ammunition in the

home.

Police officers returned to the house in April 2004 to

execute an arrest warrant for Mr. Strong. While conducting surveillance on the house prior to the arrest, the

officers observed “ten people, come up to the residence, go

inside, stay just a few minutes, two to four minutes and

leave the residence.” Tr. I at 220 (May 31, 2005). The

officers then observed Mr. Strong, his stepfather and a

third man step out on the front porch. They eventually
No. 05-3557 3

2 The new trial addressed Counts 1 and 3 of the original

indictment. The parties referred to the third count as “Count 2”

throughout this trial. For ease of reading, we shall use the

same terminology throughout this opinion.

arrested Mr. Strong and found $810 in his pocket. Because

they smelled “burnt marijuana,” id. at 208, the officers

asked for and received the stepfather’s consent to search

the house. Officers once again videotaped their search and

again found drugs and ammunition.

In May 2004, Mr. Strong was charged in a six-count

indictment with possessing two firearms and four types of

ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In March 2005, a jury

acquitted Mr. Strong of four of the counts but was unable

to come to a unanimous verdict on Counts 1 and 2.2

 Count

1 charged Mr. Strong with possessing an SKS rifle in

January 2003, and Count 2 charged him with possessing

multiple rounds of 9 mm ammunition in April 2004. The

district court scheduled a new trial on those remaining

counts.

In May 2005, the Government gave notice of its intent

to introduce several pieces of evidence related to crimes

that were not charged in Counts 1 and 2: information

relating to the January 2003 controlled buy, details of the

April 2004 surveillance of 612 East 5th Street and the drugs,

ammunition and second gun found in the house on both

occasions. At a pretrial hearing, Mr. Strong’s counsel

objected that this evidence was inadmissible. He contended

that the Government would have “the same problem in

proving that he possessed or sold these drugs that they do

in proving that he possessed the weapon, in that they don’t

have much evidence that he’s the one that possessed it.”

R.84 at 9. Counsel emphasized, for instance, that Mr. Strong
4 No. 05-3557

3 At trial, when the Government completed its opening statement, the court gave the following instruction:

[Y]ou may hear evidence during this trial about drugs and

guns which are not the subject of charges in the indictment.

You may consider this evidence only on the questions of

whether the defendant had knowledge of the firearm and

the ammunition that is charged in the two counts of the

indictment. Whether the defendant had the intention to

possess the firearm and the ammunition charged in those

two counts, and whether the defendant had a motive to

possess the firearm and ammunition charged in those two

counts, you may consider this evidence only for these

limited purposes.

Tr. I at 138-39 (May 31, 2005).

did not live at 612 East 5th Street. Counsel also briefly

commented that the evidence was not admissible under

either Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) or under the

“inextricably intertwined” doctrine because, in his view,

it was “a real stretch” to connect drug dealing to possessing

the weapons charged in the indictment. Id. The district

court ruled that all of the evidence was admissible under

the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine because the evidence “would go to the question of the defendant’s knowledge, motive, and intent with respect to the [charged

firearm and ammunition] . . . whether, he, in fact, possessed those things.” Id. at 19. The court then considered

the possibility of prejudice, but concluded that it was “far

outweighed” by the probative value of the evidence. Id.

Finally, the court added that it would give the jury a

limiting instruction.3

At trial, the Government’s witnesses recounted each

search in detail. The police officer responsible for managing
No. 05-3557 5

4 Immediately after the drugs were introduced, the court gave

a limiting instruction that mirrored the instruction it gave

during opening statements. Tr. I at 157-58.

5 After each piece of evidence was introduced, the court

repeated, on most occasions, its limiting instruction. Tr. I at 170,

208; Tr. II at 97, 99 (June 1, 2005).

the informant testified regarding the controlled buy

in January 2003, and the Government introduced both

the crack cocaine sold to the informant and the recorded

buy money found on Mr. Strong.4

 Another officer testified

about the April 2004 surveillance and Mr. Strong’s arrest

on the porch. The Government then played the videotapes

of each search for the jury. The videos showed the officers

finding the SKS rifle charged in Count 1 under the bed in

the southwest bedroom; the ammunition charged in Count

2 in both the southwest bedroom and the living room; crack

and powder cocaine, digital scales and other ammunition

in the southwest bedroom and the living room; and a

handgun in the northwest bedroom. The Government then

introduced into evidence the items shown on the videotapes.5

The Government also introduced several documents

that tied Mr. Strong to the house. In the southwest bedroom, officers found mail addressed to Mr. Strong at 612

East 5th Street, his driver’s license (bearing a different

address) and various documents pertaining to his cardetailing business. A gas bill bearing Mr. Strong’s name

was found in the living room next to more of the charged

9 mm ammunition that formed the basis of Count 2. In

addition, authorities discovered a satellite television bill

bearing Mr. Strong’s name in the kitchen.
6 No. 05-3557

6 Mr. Strong responded to the fingerprint evidence by testifying

that the rifle belonged to his brother-in-law who “showed it to

me one day . . . .” Tr. II at 171.

7 The court then interrupted and gave the following instruction:

I will remind the jurors that all of the evidence regarding

drugs and firearms and ammunition not charged in the

indictment was admitted only for a limited consideration

with respect to . . . whether the defendant had knowledge of

the firearm and ammunition charged in the two counts of

the indictment; whether the defendant had the intention to

possess the firearm and ammunition charged in those two

counts; and whether the defendant had a motive to possess

the firearm and ammunition charged in those two counts.

So with respect to Agent O’Boyle’s testimony about those

things, the drugs and ammunition and firearms not charged

in the indictment, they can be considered—his testimony

about that can be considered only for that limited purpose

as well.

Tr. II at 107.

A fingerprint expert then testified that he had found

Mr. Strong’s fingerprint on the SKS rifle.6

 Additionally,

John O’Boyle, a special agent with the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, testified that he knew

from his experience that drug dealers often possess firearms “to protect their narcotics” and as a “way of intimidation.” Tr. II at 106-07 (June 1, 2005).7

During his testimony, however, Mr. Strong reiterated that

he did not live at the house and that any possible connection between drugs and weapons was irrelevant because

none of the items found there belonged to him. His brother

Johnny testified that he had both lived and used drugs in

the southwest bedroom in 2003 and 2004 and that his
No. 05-3557 7

brother-in-law had “left behind” the SKS rifle before

he passed away. Id. at 129. Mr. Strong, testifying on his

own behalf, explained that he, his wife and their children

were living in a different house, one that he owned, when

the charged events occurred. He further explained that

he had spent time at 612 East 5th Street and had utilities

in his name there only because he was the primary caregiver for his elderly stepfather. On cross-examination,

however, Mr. Strong admitted that he had told the arresting officers that his address was 612 East 5th Street. The

jury ultimately acquitted Mr. Strong of possessing the rifle,

but found him guilty of possessing the 9 mm ammunition.

II

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Strong principally argues that, although

it was appropriate for the district court to permit the

police witnesses to provide a “general discussion” of how

the search warrants were obtained, most of the evidence

about the second gun and drug dealing at 612 East 5th

Street was not inextricably intertwined with the charged

firearm offenses because that evidence did not help

complete the story of the crimes or tend to prove any of

their elements. Appellant’s Br. at 24-25. Without elaboration, Mr. Strong concedes that “some” of the disputed

evidence “was blended” or connected with relevant

evidence, but he asserts that the “vast majority” was

irrelevant and could have been excluded without leaving

a conceptual void at trial. Id.

Because Mr. Strong argued at the pretrial hearing that

the inextricably intertwined doctrine did not apply, we

review the district court’s decision to admit the evidence
8 No. 05-3557

under that doctrine for an abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Holt, 460 F.3d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 2006). Acts “inextricably intertwined” with charged crimes are generally

admissible; they are “not evidence of ‘other acts’ within the

meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)” and are not subject to the

constraints of that rule. United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d

755, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 45

F.3d 1096, 1102 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also United States v.

James, 464 F.3d 699, 709 (7th Cir. 2006) (“If the evidence of

other crimes or bad acts provides direct or inextricably

intertwined evidence (often referred to as intricately

related evidence) of the acts charged, it is not subject to the

constraints of Rule 404(b).”). An act is “inextricably

intertwined” with the charged crime if it completes the

story of the crime, creates a chronological or conceptual

void in the story if omitted, helps to explain the circumstances surrounding the charged crime or tends to prove an

essential element of the charged crime. Senffner, 280 F.3d at

764.

When a defendant has been charged with possession of

a firearm by a felon, we repeatedly have held that evidence

of contemporaneous uncharged drug trafficking is admissible under the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine because

such evidence tends to prove “knowing possession” of the

firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Lott, 442

F.3d 981, 985 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Murray, 89 F.3d

459, 463 (7th Cir. 1996). As we have explained, “drug

trafficking supplies a motive for having [a] gun . . .

[b]ecause weapons are ‘tools of the trade’ of drug dealers.”

United States v. Stokes, 211 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 2000)

(internal citations omitted).

In this case, the evidence of Mr. Strong’s involvement in

drug trafficking at 612 East 5th Street tended to prove
No. 05-3557 9

8 Mr. Strong himself raised the issue of motive: He testified that,

when his brother-in-law showed him the rifle, Mr. Strong

responded, “I don’t like guns. My son got shot three times.” Tr.

II at 171. Mr. Strong repeated this sentiment on cross-examination, stating, “I’m not fond with guns . . . I’d rather not even be

around a gun.” Id. at 194.

his knowing possession of the rifle and ammunition

because the evidence helped tie him to the house (where

those items were found) and helped explain why he

would possess the items.8

 The district court, through its

repeated instructions, made it abundantly clear that the

evidence was to be considered solely for those purposes.

See Tr. I at 139, 146, 158-59, 169-70, 208; Tr. II at 97, 99, 107.

The inextricably intertwined doctrine applies despite trial

counsel’s submission that Mr. Strong denied living at 612

East 5th Street. At most, counsel’s contention goes to the

weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. See United

States v. Price, 418 F.3d 771, 781 (7th Cir. 2005) (weapons

found in house properly admitted to demonstrate defendant’s involvement in drug dealing over his objection that

he did not live in house); United States v. Duran, 407 F.3d

828, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2005) (cash found on defendant

properly admitted even though defendant denied earning it from charged conspiracy).

Mr. Strong also argues that, even if the drug trafficking

evidence was “inextricably intertwined,” the district court

should have limited the amount of such evidence because,

in the aggregate, it was unduly prejudicial. He contends

that the videotapes only “exacerbated” the prejudicial

effect of the evidence. Appellant’s Br. at 21. Considering

the sheer volume of this evidence, submits Mr. Strong, his

trial ceased to be about his possession of the one firearm
10 No. 05-3557

and ammunition charged in the indictment and instead

became a “mini series” about drug dealing. Id. at 25.

Even inextricably intertwined evidence must withstand

scrutiny under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which

allows a district court to exclude relevant evidence if its

prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its probative

value. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d

662, 670 (7th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, the district court

enjoys a great deal of latitude in determining whether

to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection. Our review

is for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 238

F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2001). Indeed, we have held that

“[t]he court’s admission of evidence under Rule 403 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence is entitled to special deference.

Only in an extreme case are appellate judges competent

to second-guess the judgment of the person on the spot,

the trial judge.” United States v. Gardner, 211 F.3d 1049,

1055 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

The district court’s conclusion that the probative value

of the drug trafficking evidence was not outweighed

substantially by the danger of unfair prejudice was not an

abuse of its discretion. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial

only if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an

improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than

on the evidence presented.” United States v. Hicks, 368 F.3d

801, 807 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Here,

there was nothing inherently emotional or incendiary about

the disputed evidence. See Price, 418 F.3d at 782 (videotape

displaying drug activity that witnesses had previously

described was not unduly prejudicial just because it gave
No. 05-3557 11

9 Compare United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“inextricably intertwined” evidence detailing defendant’s

multiple prior drug sales deemed not unduly prejudicial) with

United States v. Hite, 364 F.3d 874, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2004) (evidence that defendant played “Russian roulette” and pointed

gun at witness’ head deemed “inextricably intertwined” as

evidence of knowing possession of gun but excluded as unduly

prejudicial), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1103 (2005).

10 Agent O’Boyle explained that:

Individuals involved in narcotics trafficking would have

firearms to protect their narcotics from other drug dealers,

thieves. And they also use it as a way of intimidation. An

individual might show up wearing a firearm or have a

firearm at a location to intimidate the person coming to buy

narcotics to show that in case they needed something to use,

they would use the firearm.

Tr. II at 106-07.

the jury a “physical, as opposed to a mental, picture”).9

Nonetheless, the district court remained vigilant about the

possibility of prejudice; as we have noted, it gave many

limiting instructions. See Tr. I at 139, 146, 158-59, 169-70,

208; Tr. II at 97, 99, 107. We consistently have explained

that such instructions minimize the prejudicial effect of this

type of evidence. See United States v. Whitlow, 381 F.3d 679,

686 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Rollins, 301 F.3d 511, 520

(7th Cir. 2002). Without an indication to the contrary, we

assume that the jury followed those instructions. See United

States v. Jones, 248 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2001). We recognize that a sizeable amount of uncharged conduct was

admitted in this case. However, considering the significant

linkage of drug trafficking and firearms,10 we cannot say

that the district court abused its discretion by determining

that it was proper for the jury to be made aware of the
12 No. 05-3557

substantial likelihood that drugs were being dealt at 612

East 5th Street. See generally United States v. Thompson, 359

F.3d 470, 479 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “all probative

evidence is prejudicial to the party against whom it is

offered . . . the relevant inquiry is whether there was unfair

prejudice”) (emphasis in original).

Accordingly, Mr. Strong’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—5-14-07