UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CHESTER BODMAN, 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 2:14-cv-14420 

v. District Judge David M. Lawson 

 Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

ARAMARK CORPORATION, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS (DE 23) AND TO SUA SPONTE DISMISS THE 

REMAINDER OF THE ACTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should grant Defendant Aramark 

Corporation’s motion to dismiss because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. (DE 23.) In addition, the Court should sua sponte 

dismiss the remainder of this action because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted as to the remaining Defendants. 

II. REPORT 

 A. Background 

 

 1. Factual Background 

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 The Court set out the factual background in this case in its Report and 

Recommendation dated April 30, 2015. (DE 27.) I incorporate the April 30, 2015 

Report and Recommendation and will only set out the facts necessary to dispose of 

the instant motion. For the purposes of deciding this motion to dismiss, I accept 

the facts in Plaintiff’s complaint as true. 

 Plaintiff, Chester Bodman, an inmate at the Kinross Correctional Facility 

(“Kinross”) who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings claims 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of the Due Process and Equal 

Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment related to his employment as a 

food service worker at the Saginaw Correctional Facility (“Saginaw”). In addition, 

he brings claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, 1988, and 2000e-3, and 

under the “Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,” and Articles 2 and 9 

of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). 1 Specifically, he asserts that when the 

Aramark Corporation (“Aramark”) took over prison food service from the State of 

Michigan in December 2012, the inmate food service workers were improperly 

terminated and transferred out of Saginaw. (DE 1 at ¶ 6.) In February 2013, 

                                                            

1

 Plaintiff also mentions 42 U.S.C. §1997 in his complaint, but does not indicate on 

what grounds he could possibly bring suit under this statute, which merely outlines 

the process by which prisoners file suit. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff 

attempts to bring a claim under § 1997, I recommend that it be dismissed for 

failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

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Aramark supervisors eliminated bonus pay for inmate workers and began 

transferring the inmates who were formerly the top-paid food service workers. 

According to Plaintiff, this represented a conspiracy between the Michigan 

Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) and Aramark to “force a transfer on so 

many inmates, only to achieve whatever agenda they were striving toward[].” (Id. 

at ¶ 19.) In support of his complaint (and in an apparent attempt at a class-action), 

Plaintiff provides the affidavits of several other inmates similarly impacted. In his 

own affidavit, Plaintiff explains that he began working in food services at Saginaw 

on May 15, 2013. (DE 1 at 25.) He describes multiple promotions and pay raises 

until his April 8, 2014 transfer to Kinross. (Id.) He attributes his transfer to the 

conspiracy between the MDOC and Aramark. 

 Plaintiff names as Defendants MDOC personnel, as well as Aramark, its 

founder, its former Regional Vice President, and its former CEO.2

 He asks the 

Court to award injunctive relief, including reinstatement to his position, 

declaratory relief, and an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive 

damages. 

 2. The Instant Motion 

 On June 5, 2015 the Court granted MDOC Defendant O’Bell Thomas 

Winn’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against him 

                                                            

2

 Aramark Defendants Davre Davidson, Bob Marshall, and Joseph Neubauer have 

not been served in this matter. 

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for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (DE 29.) On April 17, 2015, the 

Aramark Corporation (“Aramark”) filed the instant motion to dismiss. (DE 23.) 

Aramark asserts that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for multiple 

reasons. First, it asserts that Plaintiff cannot maintain civil rights and Due Process 

claims in this matter because there is no constitutional right to or liberty interest in 

prison employment. Next, Aramark argues that Plaintiff cannot state a § 1983 

claim against a private entity that is not a state actor. Third, it contends that 

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a). Fourth, Aramark asserts that Plaintiff cannot maintain a civil rights 

claim under the Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act or under the UCC 

because he failed to allege deceptive trade practices. Finally, Aramark argues that 

Plaintiff lacks standing to allege claims on behalf of other inmates. 

 On June 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Plaintiff[’]s Answer 

to MDOC Defendant Winn’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (DE 32), and a 

second document entitled “Plaintiff[’]s Answer to Defendant Aramark’s Motion to 

Dismiss (DE 33). Each of these were one page documents with no brief attached. 

On June 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant Winn’s motion for 

summary judgment. (DE 34.) In this response, Plaintiff asserts that he timely 

responded to Defendant Winn’s previously granted motion for summary judgment, 

despite that document not appearing on the Court’s docket. Nevertheless, 

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Plaintiff’s response is not a request for reconsideration of the Court’s final decision 

on Defendant Winn’s motion. The Undersigned is therefore left with Plaintiff’s 

two-sentence response to the instant motion, which states the following, in its 

entirety: 

Plaintiff, Chester Bodman, in the above case moves this court to grant 

this Answer and Brief in Support of the Plaintiff’s Answer to the 

Defendant Aramark’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Plaintiff submits this brief in support for the following court action 

and relief sought. 

(DE 33.) 

 B. Standard 

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 

plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 

608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (concluding that a plausible claim need not 

contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and 

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”). 

Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

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misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility of an inference 

depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of 

competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., 

P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Furthermore, the Court holds pro se complaints to “less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972). However, even in pleadings drafted by pro se parties, ‘“courts should not 

have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.”’ Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 

F. App’x 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 

(6th Cir. 1989)). 

 C. Discussion 

 The Undersigned will address each of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant 

Aramark’s arguments in turn. 

1. Plaintiff Does Not Have a Constitutional Right to 

 Employment 

 

 Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, pursuant to § 1983, allege that he and his 

fellow inmates were improperly transferred when they began making higher 

wages, due to a conspiracy between the MDOC and Aramark.3

 In order to state a 

                                                            

3

 Plaintiff does not, however, describe the possible goal of this conspiracy and I 

can only speculate that he sees it as a money-saving measure. However, “costcutting alone is not a constitutional violation.” Snead v. Mohr, No. 12-cv-739, 

2015 WL 1208304, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2015). 

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claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he or she was deprived of a right 

‘“secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States’ by one acting 

under color of law.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting 

Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978)). “[E]ach defendant’s 

liability must be assessed individually based on his [or her] own actions.” Binay v. 

Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010). 

Here, as Aramark points out, Plaintiff does not have a Constitutional right to 

work or earn wages in prison. Instead, “[t]he classifications and work assignments 

of prisoners are matters of prison administration, within the sound discretion of 

prison administrators.” Majed v. Brown, 803 F.2d 720, at *1 (6th Cir. 1986) 

(citing Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812, 813 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Newsom v. 

Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Existing precedent confirms that ‘[t]he 

Constitution does not create a property or liberty interest in prison employment . . . 

[and that] any such interest must be created by state law by language of an 

unmistakably mandatory character.’”) (quoting Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 

596-97 (10th Cir. 1986)).4

 “Further, as the Constitution and federal law do not 

                                                            

4 Prison administrators have broad discretion in the administration of prisons. 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987). In describing the deference provided 

to prison officials in the management of their institutions, the Sixth Circuit has 

stated that: 

because the daily operation of a correctional facility poses difficult 

and unique management problems, prison official should be accorded 

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create a property right for inmates in a job, they likewise do not create a property 

right to wages for work performed by inmates.” Carter v. Tucker, 69 F. App’x 

678, 680 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 

1991) and James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629-30 (3d Cir. 1989)). Even taking 

all the facts in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, he has not alleged a constitutional 

violation because he is not constitutionally entitled to work and wages while 

incarcerated. Nor is he entitled to such under federal statutory law. See Williams,

926 F.2d at 997 (concluding that an inmate is not an employee for the purposes of 

Title VII “because his relationship with the Bureau of Prisons, and therefore, with 

the defendants, arises out of his status as an inmate.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff 

cannot make a claim under § 1983. 

 Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to make a claim under the Due 

Process clause, that claim must also fail. “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; 

and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of 

these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). As 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

substantial deference in the adoption and implementation of policies 

and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal 

order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. 

Brown v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). 

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addressed above, Plaintiff is not constitutionally entitled to work and wages and 

accordingly does not have a liberty or property interest at stake. See Carter, 69 F. 

App’x at 680. As such, Plaintiff has failed to plead a Due Process claim. 

 2. Plaintiff Does Not Set Forth a Claim for Conspiracy 

Plaintiff also attempts to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), asserting 

that Aramark conspired with the MDOC to interfere with his civil rights, and those 

of other inmates. Section 1985(3), prohibits a conspiracy 

for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person 

or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 

privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of 

preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or 

Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or 

Territory the equal protection of the laws[.] 

To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1) a conspiracy; 

(2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of 

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 

under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a 

person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or 

privilege of a citizen of the United States.” United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners 

of Am., Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983). 

 Here, as addressed above, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he was deprived 

of any constitutional rights or privileges. Again, there is no constitutional right to 

work as an inmate. He also fails to plead that he is part of a protected class. In 

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fact, he impliedly asserts that all of the food service workers were treated in the 

same way. (See DE 1 at 20-27.) To the extent Plaintiff attempts to argue that 

prisoners are a protected class, such an assertion is invalid. See Carnes v. Engler, 

76 F. App’x 79, at *2 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that inmate plaintiffs were not 

members of a protected class). Moreover, his pleadings fail to demonstrate how he 

was deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim under 

§ 1985 fails.5

 

 3. Plaintiff Does Not Set Forth a Claim for Discrimination 

 Plaintiff seems to assert claims of employment discrimination under 42 

U.S.C. § 1981, but merely copies and pastes the wording of the statute. He makes 

similar allegations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (“Title 

VII”). Section 1981 “prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and 

enforcing of contracts involving both public and private actors.” Amini v. Oberlin 

Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under §1981, a plaintiff 

                                                            

5

 As a result, Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. §1986 also must fail, because it is 

limited to persons “having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done 

and mention in section 1985 of this title . . . .” See also Radvansky v. City of 

Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 315 (6th Cir. 2005) (‘“where plaintiff has stated no 

cause of action under § 1985, no cause of action exists under §1986.’”) (quoting 

Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d at 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1990)). Likewise, 

Plaintiff can bring no independent cause of action under §1988 because it is 

derivative of his other claims under §§ 1982, 1985, and 1986. See Allemon v. Bair, 

No. 04-72925, 2005 WL 1684153, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 15, 2005) (“§ 1988 does 

not provide an independent cause of action. Because Plaintiff cannot prevail on his 

civil rights claims, he cannot obtain attorneys fees under § 1988.”). 

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must plead that: “(1) he belongs to an identifiable class of persons who are subject 

to discrimination based on their race; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate 

against him on the basis of race; and (3) the defendant's discriminatory conduct 

abridged a right enumerated in section 1981(a).” Id. Here, Plaintiff fails under all 

three elements. He does not allege in his complaint that he has been discriminated 

against on the basis of race. Instead, he indicates that all food service employees 

were treated in the same way when they were transferred out of Saginaw shortly 

after Aramark’s arrival. Accordingly, his claims pursuant to § 1981 fail. 

 As Defendant argues, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under Title VII 

because he is not (and was never) an employee of Aramark. As Plaintiff quotes in 

his complaint, it is an “unlawful employment practice for an employer to 

discriminate against any of its employees . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis 

added). An inmate is not considered an employee for the purposes of Title VII. 

Williams, 926 F.2d at 997. Plaintiff therefore fails to make a claim under Title VII. 

 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under §§ 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-3, his § 1981a claim also fails, as that statute deals with damages in cases of 

intentional discrimination in employment. 

4. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim under Either the Revised 

 Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act or the UCC 

 Plaintiff attempts to bring a claim under the Revised Uniform Deceptive 

Trade Practices Act and the UCC. He does not, however, point to any federal or 

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state law identifying how those statutes apply to his transfer from Saginaw to 

Kinross. His claims under these provisions are so conclusory as to be 

unrecognizable as actual claims. See Frengler, 482 F. App’x at 976-77 (‘“courts 

should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.”’) (quoting Wells, 891 

F.2d at 594). Even liberally construing the pleading in the light most favorable to a 

pro se Plaintiff, he has failed to state a claim under either of these statutes. 

5. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust his Administrative Remedies 

On June 5, 2015, the Court granted Defendant Winn’s motion for summary 

judgment on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) prior to filing his lawsuit. Specifically, 

I concluded that Plaintiff failed to pursue a Step III grievance before filing the 

instant action, which did not comply with the Michigan Department of Corrections 

(“MDOC”) policy. (DE 27 at 8-11.) In making such a finding, I relied on the 

evidence provided by Defendant Winn, including Plaintiff’s “MDOC Prisoner Step 

III Grievance Report.” (Id. at 8.) I further noted that Plaintiff’s submission of an 

“Administrative Complaint” was insufficient to exhaust his administrative 

remedies. (Id. at 9.) Finally, I concluded that Plaintiff’s assertion that his transfer 

removed his option to utilize the grievance procedure was contradicted by the 

MDOC Policy directive on prisoner grievances, which does not preclude inmates 

from filing grievances, even following a transfer. (Id. at 10.) 

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In Count 8 of his complaint, which Plaintiff identifies as “42 U.S.C. 1997e, 

Suits by Prisoners,” Plaintiff acknowledges the duty to exhaust administrative 

remedies and alleges the definition of a prisoner. (DE 1 at 13, ¶ 8.) Nothing 

further is alleged. 6 Elsewhere in his pleading, specifically in his prayer for relief, 

he passively alleges that “no procedure exist[s] for [P]laintiff to redress grievances 

as outlined in [his] civil rights complaint.” (Id. at 16, ¶ 3.) In the instant motion, 

Aramark sets out the relevant case law, outlines the exhaustion process in the 

MDOC, and incorporates by reference Defendant Winn’s motion for summary 

judgment with respect to exhaustion. Although I do not see a reason that this issue 

should be decided differently for Aramark, I decline to convert the instant motion 

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment for that purpose. Instead, I 

recommend granting Aramark’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings. 

6. The Remaining Defendants 

The following individuals remain named as Defendants, but are as yet 

unserved in this action: Davre Davidson, Bob Marshall, Joseph Neubauer, Erick J. 

Foss, and Chrissy Sharp. Plaintiff brings this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

(DE 2.) Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915 seeking to “lower judicial access 

barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing 

                                                            

6

 Likewise, Count 7 of the complaint, referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1997, alleges 

nothing more than legal definitions for the terms “Institution” and “person,” 

without more. 

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so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs 

are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to 

refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Id. at 31 (quoting 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress 

included subsection (e) as part of the statue, which requires sua sponte dismissal of 

an action upon the court’s determination that the action is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. 

Here, based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s pleadings fail to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Specifically, Plaintiff does not make any additional 

allegations (other than those addressed in this Report and Recommendation) 

against the as-yet unserved Defendants. Instead, all of his allegations relate only to 

his removal from employment and transfer to Kinross. As noted above, Plaintiff 

has not alleged any Constitutional violations upon which this Court can grant 

relief. 

Notably, the only remaining Defendant even referenced in the facts section 

of Plaintiff’s complaint is Chrissy Sharp, who he alleges “put [his] name on a list 

to be transferred out of Saginaw.” (DE 1 at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff does not have a 

constitutional right to remain incarcerated at Saginaw, and therefore he has not 

alleged that Chrissy Sharp violated a constitutional right by putting his name on a 

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list for transfer. See Ward v. Dyke, 58 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Prisoners do 

not have a constitutional right to be incarcerated at any particular institution.”); see 

also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976) (“Whatever expectation the 

prisoner may have in remaining at a particular prison so long as he behaves 

himself, it is too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process 

protections as long as prison officials have discretion to transfer him for whatever 

reason or for no reason at all.”). 

Accordingly, and for the reasons outlined in this Report and 

Recommendation, I conclude that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. I recommend that the Court: 1) grant Aramark’s motion to 

dismiss (DE 23); and 2) sua sponte dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the remainder 

of the Defendants pursuant to § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

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issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

Dated: October 13, 2015 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the forgoing document was sent to parties of parties 

of record on October 13, 2015, electronically or U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

 Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

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