J. E03006/16

 2017 PA Super 38

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

ANDREW JOSIAH GOSLIN, :

:

Appellant : No. 1114 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 2, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 

Criminal Division No(s): CP-36-CR-0005761-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, PANELLA, LAZARUS, OTT, STABILE, 

DUBOW, MOULTON, and RANSOM, JJ.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2017

Appellant, Andrew Josiah Goslin, appeals from the Judgment of 

Sentence entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas on June 

2, 2015. Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of one 

count of Possession of Weapon on School Property, a first-degree 

misdemeanor. 18 Pa.C.S. § 912(b). After reviewing the record and 

applicable law, we vacate Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence and order a new 

trial on the ground that the trial court erred in not properly interpreting and 

applying the plain language of the statutory defense to Possession of 

Weapon on School Property. 18 Pa.C.S. § 912(c). 

Factual and Procedural History

On August 28, 2014, Appellant’s son was suspended from elementary 

school for three days for bringing a knife to school. On September 4, 2014, 
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at 2:45 PM, Appellant and his wife attended a meeting at the school to 

discuss the disciplinary action with school administrators. N.T., 6/2/15, at 

19. Appellant arrived at the meeting directly from his job as a carpenter. 

N.T. at 29-31. 

When Appellant arrived at the conference, he had in his pocket a 3-4 

inch pocketknife that he uses not only at work as a carpenter, but also to 

sharpen pencils, whittle sticks with his sons, and “open tuna cans when my 

wife forgets to pack me a tuna can opener.” Id. at 26, 30-31.

During the meeting, Appellant removed the knife from his pocket and 

placed it forcefully on a conference table around which the meeting 

attendees were seated and asked whether he would be arrested. Id. at 20, 

31-32. 

Following the meeting, on September 14, 2014, the police charged 

Appellant with Possession of Weapon on School Property as well as 

Terroristic Threats with Intent to Terrorize Another.1 The trial court 

dismissed the latter charge on December 9, 2014. 

The court held a bench trial on June 2, 2015 on the charge of 

Possession of Weapon on School Property and rejected Appellant’s defense 

that he had the pocketknife on school property “for other lawful purpose[s]” 

because the ostensible lawful purposes were not related to school activities. 

The trial court found Appellant guilty and sentenced him to one year of 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).
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probation. Appellant timely appealed.2 Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Issues on Appeal

Appellant raises the following issues for review, which we have 

reordered for ease of disposition:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed 

an error of law, or violated constitutional rights of 

Appellant by finding that the defense of “other lawful 

purpose” in 18 Pa.C.S. § 912(c) did not apply to 

[Appellant] when:

A. The plain statutory language precludes 

[Appellant’s] conviction;

B. The General Assembly’s intent, as 

demonstrated by the [l]egislative [d]ebate, was not 

to criminalize [Appellant’s] conduct;

C. Article I, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and the Second Amendment of the 

Constitution protect [Appellant’s] conduct; and

D. In the alternative, the statutory language is so 

vague and[,] therefore, insufficient to establish 

criminal culpability.

 

2 While represented by counsel, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal and Rule 

1925(b) Statement pro se. On July 31, 2015, this Court directed the trial 

court to hold a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 

81 (Pa. 1988), to determine whether Appellant wished to proceed pro se, or 

to petition for the appointment of new counsel. The trial court held a 

Grazier hearing on August 11, 2015, after which it approved Appellant’s 

request to represent himself. Appellant obtained counsel after this Court 

granted his request for reargument before an en banc panel. 
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2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed 

an error of law or violated constitutional rights of Appellant 

by convicting [Appellant] when the record establishes that:

A. He did not have the requisite mens rea as 

established by this Court’s recent decision in 

Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d 998, 1006 

(Pa. Super. 2015), since he did not act “intentionally, 

knowingly, or recklessly;” and 

B. In the alternative, [Appellant’s] belief that his 

conduct is a mistake of fact that precludes his 

conviction.

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.

Legal Analysis

In his first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by 

improperly interpreting the defense to the charge of Possession of Weapon 

on School Property. Appellant argues that, in light of the plain language of 

Section 912(c), the trial court erred by limiting its interpretation of “other 

lawful purpose[s]” to require that the “lawful purpose must be related to the 

reason why one is on school property.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/15/15, at 4. 

Appellant avers that, contrary to the trial court’s holding, Section 

912(c) provides a defendant with a defense of possessing a weapon for 

“other lawful purpose[s],” and this defense is not contingent upon the 

defendant’s possessing the weapon in connection with a school activity. 

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant specifically argues that he came to the 

school conference straight from work, and uses the pocketknife at work as a 

carpenter, thus, he possessed the pocketknife for “lawful purpose[s].” Id.
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at 19, 22. Appellant concludes that the trial court should have accepted the 

defense that Appellant possessed the knife at the school conference for 

other lawful purposes and found him not guilty of Possession of Weapon on 

School Property. 18 Pa.C.S. § 912(c). 

Statutory interpretation is a question of law, therefore our standard of 

review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. 

McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1162 (Pa. 2009). “In all matters involving statutory 

interpretation, we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et 

seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and construction of 

statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General 

Assembly.” Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1166 (citation 

omitted). 

Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best indication of 

legislative intent. Id. We will only look beyond the plain language of the 

statute when words are unclear or ambiguous, or the plain meaning would 

lead to “a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Therefore, when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, 

if the language is clear, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. 

Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. 2013). 

In this case, the statutory language at issue provides: 

(c) Defense.—It shall be a defense that the weapon is 

possessed and used in conjunction with a lawful supervised 

school activity or course or is possessed for other 

lawful purpose.
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18 Pa.C.S. 912(c) (emphasis added). 

The trial court first concluded that the language of Section 912(c) is 

vague. After construing the language according to the canons of statutory 

construction, including engaging in an analysis of legislative intent, the trial 

court interpreted Section 912(c) to require that the other lawful purpose for 

which a defendant possessed a weapon on school property “must be related 

to the reason why one is on school property.” Trial Ct. Op., at 2-4. We 

disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the language of Section 912(c) 

is vague. 

Rather, we conclude that, in order to ascertain the meaning of Section 

912(c), we need not look beyond its plain language. The plain meaning of 

Section 912(c) provides two separate defenses: possessing and using a 

weapon on school property “in conjunction with a lawful supervised school 

activity” as well as possessing “for other lawful purpose.” At issue here is 

whether Appellant possessed the pocketknife “for other lawful purpose.”

While we cannot turn to a dictionary to ascertain the plain or ordinary 

meaning of the phrase “other lawful purpose,” we can analyze the 

component parts to determine the phrase’s definition. Something that is 

“other” is “distinct from the one or those first mentioned or understood,” or 

is “additional.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1986). 

A “lawful” act is one that is “allowed or permitted by law.” Id. at 1279. And 

last, a “purpose” is “something that one sets before himself as an object to 
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be attained,” “an end or aim to be kept in view in any plan, measure, 

exertion, or operation,” or “an object, effect, or result aimed at, intended, or 

attained.” Id. at 1847. Accordingly, for purposes of the instant case, the 

plain meaning of the phrase “other lawful purpose” is an aim or goal 

different from, or in addition to, an aim or goal described in the first clause 

of Section 912(c), i.e., in conjunction with “a lawful supervised school 

activity or course.” The second clause of this subsection, thus, serves as a 

catchall provision. 

Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the “other lawful purpose” 

language does not restrict the defense provided in Section 912(c). Instead, 

the phrase does just the opposite: it expands the defense to include any 

additional or different lawful reason not otherwise mentioned in the first 

clause of Section 912(c), regardless of whether it is school-related.3 To 

conclude otherwise, would make “possessed for other lawful purpose” 

redundant with “possessed and used in association with a lawful supervised 

school activity or course.”

We conclude that the language of Section 912(c), though broad, is 

unambiguous, and that Appellant possessed his pocketknife on school 

 

3 The parties do not argue, and the trial court did not assert, that Appellant’s 

possession of a pocketknife for use in his profession as a carpenter, or to 

open cans of tuna fish, is not a lawful purpose.
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grounds for “other lawful purpose.” Therefore, we vacate Appellant’s 

Judgment of Sentence and order a new trial.4

Because Appellant’s first issue on appeal is dispositive, we need not 

address Appellant’s other issue. 

Judgment of Sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/16/2017

 

4 Although we are concerned about individuals possessing weapons on 

school property, we are bound by the broad defense that the legislature has 

provided defendants in such cases. We would urge the legislature to review 

this language to ensure that the legislature’s view has not changed since it 

enacted this defense in 1980.