1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ROCHELLE DANIEL, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 15-cv-10956 

v. 

 HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, et al., 

Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Dkt. 56) 

Before the Court is Plaintiff Rochelle Daniel’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 56), which 

asks the Court to reconsider its August 12, 2016 decision overruling Daniel’s objections, accepting 

the recommendation contained in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), 

granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and denying Daniel’s motion for leave 

to file an amended complaint. See 8/12/2016 Op. & Order (Dkt. 53). After reviewing Daniel’s 

motion, the Court finds no basis for reconsideration. 

I. ANALYSIS 

 Local Rule 7.1(h)(3) sets forth the grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration: 

Generally, and without restricting the court’s discretion, the court 

will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely 

present the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or 

by reasonable implication. The movant must not only demonstrate 

a palpable defect by which the court and the parties and other 

persons entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also 

show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition 

of the case. 

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E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). A “palpable defect” is one “which is obvious, clear, unmistakable, 

manifest, or plain.” Mich. Dep’t of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 

2002). 

Daniel begins by once again arguing that her claim brought pursuant to the Fair Debt and 

Collection Practice Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., against Defendant Asset Acceptance 

LLC (“Asset”) is not barred by res judicata because the court that previously ruled on the merits 

of the claim, Michigan’s 36th District Court, did not have jurisdiction to make such a ruling. It is 

well settled that “[a] motion for reconsideration or to alter or amend is not a vehicle to reargue the 

case or to present evidence which should have been raised in connection with an earlier motion.” 

Gascho v. Glob. Fitness Holdings, LLC, 918 F. Supp. 2d 708, 714 (S.D. Ohio 2013). While Daniel 

points to her status as a pro se litigant as the reason she “failed to expound” on her argument 

regarding the 36th District Court’s jurisdiction, this circumstance does not provide a basis for 

reconsideration. See Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 67 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[W]hile there is 

authority for the proposition that pleadings submitted pro se will be accorded a measure of leniency 

to assure that meritorious claims will not be dismissed for inartful draftmanship, there is no 

authority for the contention that pro se litigants are entitled to a more lenient application of 

substantive law.” (emphasis in original)); see also Rodriques v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 14-CV12707, 2015 WL 10635525, at *2 n. 1 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 2015), aff’d sub nom. 644 F. App’x 

629 (6th Cir. 2016) (denying motion for reconsideration where the plaintiff sought to expand on 

issue already litigated). 

Even if Daniel’s argument was properly before this Court, it is still without merit. As noted 

in this Court’s prior opinion and order, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) states that a FDCPA claim “may be 

brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, 

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or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.” (emphasis added). Daniel argues Michigan’s 

district courts “may only hear cases arising out landlord-tenant matters, most traffic tickets, and 

all misdemeanors criminal cases.” Pl. Mot. at 4. This is incorrect. Michigan law provides that 

“[t]he district court has exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does 

not exceed $25,000.” Mich. Comp. Laws 600.8301(1). Daniel does not allege that her FDCPA 

claim exceeded $25,000. As a result, the district court had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of 

Daniel’s claim. Because the court made its ruling, her claim is barred by res judicata. See Adair 

v. State, 680 N.W.2d 386, 396 (Mich. 2004) (res judicata bars a “subsequent action when (1) the 

prior action was decided on the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties or their privies, 

and (3) the matter in the second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first.”).1

 Daniel next argues that the Court erred in affirming the magistrate judge’s recommendation 

that her proposed amended complaint be denied because it would be futile. Specifically, Daniel 

argues that the Court erred in holding that her negligence/gross negligence and negligent 

supervision/training claims are barred by res judicata. She notes that, in her proposed complaint, 

she requests $150,000 from each Defendant, thus exceeding the district court’s jurisdictional limit. 

She argues that because she could not have brought these claims in the district court, they are not 

barred by res judicata. 

There is some authority under Michigan law that a failure to bring a counterclaim 

exceeding the district court’s jurisdictional limit does not prohibit bringing the claim in a 

subsequent proceeding. See e.g. Karakas v. Dost, 240 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976). 

 

1

 Daniel also argues that her FDCPA claim is not barred by the one year statute of limitations 

because Asset violated the statute on August 8, 2014 when it requested a release of liability from 

the 36th District Court. Because the Court has already ruled that Daniel’s FDCPA claim against 

Asset fails because of res judicata, it need not address this argument. 

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However, the Court found that res judicata was not the only basis to dismiss Daniel’s 

negligence/gross negligence and negligent supervision/training claims. The Court held that “even 

if [Daniel’s claims] were not barred by res judicata, Plaintiff released Asset from all liability with 

regard to the debt-collection lawsuit.” See 8/12/2016 Op. & Order at 15. The Court also noted that 

Daniel’s negligent supervision/training claim “fails for another reason: it consists of threadbare 

legal recitations of the claim . . . and the complaint does not contain any factual allegations to 

support those legal conclusions.” Id. 

Daniel next asks the Court to reconsider its ruling that Defendant Midland Funding, LLC 

(“Midland”) properly verified Daniel’s debt prior to filing suit in state court. Daniel once again 

argues that the 18 credit card statements provided by Midland “did not show charges, debits, or 

credits that would permit . . . a court to calculate the amount due.” Pl. Mot. at 6. However, as 

noted in the Court’s previous opinion and order, the itemized statements provided Daniel with an 

explanation of the source of the debt and when it was incurred, including the dates and nature of 

the transactions, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). See 8/12/2016 Op. & Order at 12; see 

generally Credit Card Statements, Ex. D to Defs. Mot. (Dkt. 26-5). While Daniel now argues that 

she continued to dispute a portion of the debt even after these statements were provided, she 

acknowledges that her subsequent requests for further verification were not filed until September 

2, 2014, and October 6, 2014, both of which were after Midland’s suit was commenced on August 

18, 2014. Therefore, Midland’s debt-collection suit was permissible because it was filed after it 

verified Daniel’s debt, in accordance with the FDCPA.2

 

 

2

 Daniel also argues that the Court erred in denying leave to file an amended complaint alleging 

Midland’s violations of the FDCPA. However, these claims would be futile because, as noted 

above, Midland complied with the requirements of the FDCPA by properly verifying the debt. 

Regarding Daniel’s proposed negligence claims against Midland, she has not demonstrated how 

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II. CONCLUSION 

Because Daniel has failed to identify a palpable defect by which this Court has been misled, 

the Court denies her motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 56). 

 SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 24, 2017 s/Mark A. Goldsmith 

 Detroit, Michigan MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

 United States District Judge 

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any 

unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail 

addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on July 24, 2017. 

 s/Karri Sandusky 

 Case Manager 

 

the Court erred in ruling that she waived any objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation 

that those claims be dismissed. As a result, there is no basis for reconsideration. 

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