R u le 1 0 o f t h e T e n n e sse e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls p ro v id e s: 1

T h is C o u rt, w ith the c o n c u rr e n c e o f all ju d g e s p a rtic ip a ting in the c a se , m a y a ff irm , re v e rs e o r m o d ify t he act i o ns o f

t he t ri al co urt by me m o randum op i ni o n when a fo rma l op i ni o n w o u ld h ave no prec edent i al val ue. W hen a cas e i s deci ded by mem oran dum opi ni on i t s hal l b e d esigna t ed

" M E M O R A N D U M O P IN IO N " , sh a ll n o t be p ub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed or rel i ed on f o r any r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 11, 200 4 S es sio n ROS E C ONS TRU CTION CO MP AN Y, INC . v. RA INTR EE

DEV ELOP MEN T C OMP AN Y, LLC
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. 110162-1 Walte r L. Evans, Ch ancellor

No. W2003-01845-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Novem ber 16, 2004

Th is i s th e se c on d a

pp e a l of thi s c a se . In Jun e 19 99 , a n a rb itr a tio n p a ne l d ete rm ine d Ro se C onstruction was e ntitled to damag es under the parties’ contra ct. The tria l court vac ated the ar b i tr a t i o n a w ar d

. O n ap p e a l , t h i s C o u rt r e v e r s e d a n d c o n f i r m e d t h e ar

b i tr a t i o n a w ar d i n i t s e n t i r e t y. Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt de nie d Ra int re e De ve lop me nt’ s a

pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ionto a

pp e a l, issued a mandate, and remande d the ca se to the trial court for entry of judg ment. The trial c ourt e nte re d jud g me nt fo r Ros e Con str uc tio n a s or de re d by thi s Cou rt

. Ra int re e De ve lopm ent ag a in appea ls. W e af

firm. We also hold this appeal frivolous a nd awa rd Rose Construction damag es for a frivo lou s a

pp e a l.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d; and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., A L AN and E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.
L arry E. Parri s h and Robert P. Campbell, J r., Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Raintree De ve lop me nt C omp a ny , L L C.
J . Houston Gordon and Micha el I . L ess, Covington, Te nnessee , for the a ppellee, Rose Construc tion Company , I nc.
M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1-2-

This is the second appe al of this protrac ted arbitration c ase. The fac tual backg round g iving rise to this appeal is addr essed in Rose Construction Co. v. Raintree Dev elopment Co. , No. W2000- 01388-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1683746 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 31, 2001) perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Oc t. 7 , 2 00 2) , a nddo e s not ne e d to be re ite rate d he re . In Jun e 19 99 , a n a rb itr a tio n p a ne l e xpre ssl y determined Raintree D evelopment Company (“Raintre e”) had ac ted in bad faith. Ro se Con str

. , 2001 WL 168746, at *5. It further determined that Rose Construction C o m p an y , I n c. (“Rose”) w as entitled to a net aw ard of

$974,000, plus interest. Id. at * 2.
I n Marc h 2000, the t rial court vacated the entire arbitration awar d. Id. I n it s me mor a nd um, the trial court stated “[t] he aw ard of attorney fee s u n d er t h e Prompt P ay Act by the ar bitrators c on sti tut e d mo rethan a

mer e erro r i n c on str

uin g thepr e va ili ng la w, bu t w a s a c omp le te failu reto apply the law or

the contra ct.” Id. Ros e app e a le d a nd in De c e mbe r 20 01 , thi s Cou rt re ve rs e d. Th is Court held, “[t] he ar

bitration awa

rd must be conf

irmed in its entirety , and the c ause is re manded f or this purpose.” Id. at *6. We denied Raintre e’s pe tition t o rehe ar in January 2002. I n October

2002, the Tenne ssee Supre me C ourt denied Raintree’s application for pe rmission to appeal. It also denied Raintree’ s motion t o stay t h e mandate to permit appe al to the United States Supreme Court. The Tenne ssee Supre me Cou rt i ssued its mandate in Nove mber 2002, re mitti ng the cause to the trial court a nd signifying the end of the case
. Rose moved for e ntry

of the judg ment in November 2002. I n Dec ember 2002, Raintree f iled for bankruptcy . The ba nkruptcy stay was lifted in Nove mber 2003. On May 15, 2003, the trial court en t er ed j u d gm ent for Rose in c onformanc e with the orde r of this Court and the mandate of the supreme c ourt. Raintree filed a motion to alter or amend, which the tria l court denie d in J une 2003. Ra int re e fi le d a

tim e ly no tic e of app e a l to thi s Co urt. R os e fi le d a mot ionto d ism iss theapp e a l, which we denied. Rose now se eks dismissal and sanctions for a frivolous appe al.
Ra int re e no w p re se nts thefo llo wi ng iss ue s, a s w e -r e state the m, f or re vie w b y

thi s Co urt: (1) Whether the trial court e rre d in not vacating the ar bitration awa

rd bec ause the issues in dispute were not subject to arbitration. (2) I s Raintree e ntitled, as a matter of rig ht, to adjudicati o n o f questions p e rt a i n i n g t o ar

b i tr ab i l i t y? (3 ) I s Raint

re e e nti tle d to a dju dic a tio n o f i ts c ou nte r- c la ims ?
Ros e raise s th e fo llo wi ng a dd iti on a l is su e s: (1) Whether this matter wa s ended by the fin al d ec i sion and mandate of the su pr e me c ou rt

. (2 ) Whe the r R a int

re e ha s e xhaus te d o r w a ive d f urthe r a pp e a ls.-3-

( 3 ) W h e t h e r

t h i s ap p e a l i s f

r i v o l o u s a n d i s p arto f

a p a t t e r n o f

ab u s e a n d d e l a y. We ag ree with Rose that this m atter e nded with the Te nnessee Supreme C o u rt ’s denial of Raintree’ s application for permission to appea l. This Court confirme d the ar bitration awa

rd “ in i ts e nti re ty ,” the supre me court denied Raintree ’s application for permission t o appea l, and there re ma ine d n oth ing to l iti g a te . We a c c or din g ly a ff irm th e jud g me nt o f the tria l c ou rt

. We next turn to whether this appea l is frivolous. When it appea rs to any revie wing court that the appea l f

rom any court of rec ord was frivolous or taken solely for delay , the cou rt m ay , ei ther upon motion of a party or on its own m otion, awa rd just damag es ag ainst the appe llant, which may include, but nee d not be l i m i t ed to, costs, interest on the judg ment, and expenses incur red by the appelleeas a r esult of the appe al. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122( 2000). Courts construe this section of t he C ode st rictly in an effort not to discourag e legitimate appe als. Davis v. G ulf Ins. Group , 546 S.W .2d 583, 586 (Tenn.1977) . A frivolou s ap p ea l is one "de void of merit" and which c annot rea sonably

succe ed. Id. It i s o ne co mp let ely"lack in g in j us ti cia bl e is su es. " Id. We ag ree with Rose that this i s a frivolous appeal. This Court’s opinion of De cembe r 2001 unambig uously

confirme d the ar

bitration awa

rd in i ts e nti re ty

. This holding was implicitl y aff irmed by theTe nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt wh e n it den ied R a int

re e ’s app lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ionto a

pp e a l. Upon issuance of the supreme court’s mandate and rema nd to the trial court for enfor ceme nt of the arbitration awar d, thererema ined nothing to litigate. We acc ording ly awa rd Rose damag es for

a frivo lou s a

pp e a l pu rs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Code An no tate d § 27 -1 -1 22 . We a wa rdRos e da ma g e s in the a mou nt eq ua l to e xpe ns e s a ndre a so na blea tto rn e y ’s fe e s in c ur

re d b y thi s a pp e a l. We re ma ndto thetria l c ou rt

fo r d e te rm inatio n o f su c h da ma g e s. Cos ts of thi s app e a l areta xedto the Ap pe llant, R a i n tr e e D e v e l o p m e n tC o m p a n y, LL C , a n d i t s s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE