www.cops.usdoj.gov

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Response Guides Series

No. 7

Asset Forfeiture

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

by

John L. Worrall

John L. Worrall

This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 

2007-CK-WX-K008 by the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions 

contained herein are those of the author and do not necessarily 

represent the official position of the U.S. Department of 

Justice. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or 

services should not be considered an endorsement by the author 

or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are 

illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of 

November 2008. Given that URLs and web sites are in constant 

flux, neither the author nor the the COPS Office can vouch for 

their current validity.

©2008 Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, Inc. The U.S. 

Department of Justice reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and 

irrevocable license to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use, and 

authorize others to use, this publication for federal government 

purposes. This publication may be freely distributed and used for 

noncommercial and educational purposes.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

ISBN: 1-932582-90-8

November 2008

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Response Guides Series

Guide No. 7

Asset Forfeiture

About the Response Guides Series i

About the Response Guide Series

The Response Guides are one of three in the series of ProblemOriented Guides for Police. The other two are the Problem-Specific 

Guides and Problem-Solving Tools. 

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police summarize knowledge about 

how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime and 

disorder problems by preventing problems and improving 

overall incident response. They are not guides to investigating 

offenses or handling specific incidents. Neither do they 

cover the technical details about how to implement specific 

responses. The guides are written for police—of whatever 

rank or assignment—who must address the specific problems 

the guides cover. The guides will be most useful to officers 

who are capable of the following:

•	 They understand basic problem-oriented policing 

principles and methods.

•	 They can look at problems in-depth.

•	 They are willing to consider new ways of doing police 

business.

•	 They understand the value and the limits of research 

knowledge.

•	 They are willing to work with other community agencies to 

find effective solutions to problems.

Publications in the Response Guide Series summarize 

knowledge about whether police should use certain responses 

to address various crime and disorder problems, and about 

what effects they might expect. Each guide offers the 

following:

•	 Describes the response 

•	 Discusses the various ways police might apply the response 

•	 Explains how the response is designed to reduce crime and 

disorder 
ii Asset Forfeiture

•	 Examines the research knowledge about the response 

•	 Addresses potential criticisms and negative consequences 

that might flow from use of the response 

•	 Describes how police have applied the response to specific 

crime and disorder problems, and with what effect.

The Response Guides are used differently than the ProblemSpecific Guides. Ideally, police should begin all strategic 

decision-making by first analyzing the specific crime and 

disorder problems they are confronting, then using the 

analysis results to devise particular responses. Certain 

responses are so commonly considered and have such 

potential to help address a range of specific crime and 

disorder problems that it makes sense for police to learn more 

about what results they might expect from them. 

Readers are cautioned that the Response Guides are designed 

to supplement problem analysis, not to replace it. Police should 

analyze all crime and disorder problems in their local context 

before implementing responses. Even if research knowledge 

suggests that a particular response has proved effective 

elsewhere, that does not mean the response will be effective 

everywhere. Local factors matter in choosing which responses 

to use.

Research and practice have further demonstrated that, in 

most cases, the most effective overall approach to a problem 

is one that incorporates several different responses. A single 

response guide is unlikely to provide sufficient information 

on which to base a coherent plan for addressing crime and 

disorder problems. Some combinations of responses work 

better than others. How effective a particular response is 

depends partly on what other responses police use to address 

the problem. 
About the Response Guides Series iii

The Response Guides emphasize effectiveness and fairness 

as the main considerations police should take into account 

when choosing responses, but recognize that they are not 

the only considerations. Police use particular responses for 

reasons other than, or in addition to, whether they will work 

or will not work, and whether they are deemed fair or not fair. 

Community attitudes and values, and the personalities of key 

decision-makers, sometimes mandate different approaches to 

addressing crime and disorder problems. Some communities 

and individuals prefer enforcement-oriented responses, 

whereas others prefer collaborative, community-oriented, or 

harm-reduction approaches. These guides will not necessarily 

alter those preferences, but are intended to better inform 

them.

The COPS Office defines community policing as “a 

philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which 

support the systematic use of partnerships and problemsolving techniques, to proactively address the immediate 

conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, 

social disorder, and fear of crime.” These guides emphasize 

problem-solving and police-community partnerships in the 

context of addressing specific public safety problems. For 

the most part, the organizational strategies that can facilitate 

problem-solving and police-community partnerships vary 

considerably and discussion of them is beyond the scope of 

these guides.

 The guides in the Response Guides Series have drawn on 

research findings and police practices in the United States, 

the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the 

Netherlands, and Scandinavia. Even though laws, customs and 

police practices vary from country to country, it is apparent 

that the police everywhere experience common problems. 

In a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected, it 

is important that police be aware of research and successful 

practices beyond the borders of their own countries.
iv Asset Forfeiture

Each guide is informed by a thorough review of the research 

literature and reported police practice, and each guide is 

peer-reviewed anonymously by a line police officer, a police 

executive, and a researcher before publication. The review 

process is managed independently by the COPS Office, which 

solicits the reviews. 

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to provide 

feedback on this guide and to report on your own agency’s 

experiences dealing with a similar problem. Your agency may 

have addressed a problem effectively using responses not 

considered in these guides and your experiences and knowledge 

could benefit others. This information will be used to update 

the guides. If you wish to provide feedback and share your 

experiences, e-mail the information to askCOPSRC@usdoj.gov.

For more information about problem-oriented policing, visit 

the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at www.

popcenter.org. The web site offers free online access to the 

following:

•	 The Response Guides Series

•	 The companion Problem-Specific Guides and Problem-Solving 

Tools Series 

•	 Special publications on crime analysis and on policing 

terrorism

•	 Instructional information about problem-oriented policing 

and related topics 

•	 An interactive problem-oriented policing training exercise

•	 An interactive Problem Analysis Module

•	 Online access to important police research and practices

•	 Information about problem-oriented policing conferences 

and award programs. 
Acknowledgments

The Response Guides for Police are produced by the Center 

for Problem-Oriented Policing, whose officers are Michael S. 

Scott (Director), Ronald V. Clarke (Associate Director), and 

Graeme R. Newman (Associate Director). While each guide 

has a primary author, other project team members, COPS 

Office staff, and anonymous peer reviewers contributed to 

each guide by proposing text, recommending research, and 

offering suggestions on matters of format and style. 

The project team that developed the guide series comprised 

Herman Goldstein (University of Wisconsin Law School), 

Ronald V. Clarke (Rutgers University), John E. Eck (University 

of Cincinnati), Michael S. Scott (University of Wisconsin Law 

School), Rana Sampson (Police Consultant), and Deborah 

Lamm Weisel (North Carolina State University.) 

Members of the San Diego, California; National City, 

California; and Savannah, Georgia, police departments 

provided feedback on the guides' format and style in the early 

stages of the project.

Cynthia Pappas and Debra Cohen, Ph.D., oversaw the project 

for the COPS Office and research for the guides was conducted 

at the Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University by Phyllis 

Schultze. Katharine Willis edited this guide.

Acknowledgments v

Contents

About the Response Guides Series. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Target Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Need for Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Origins and Varieties of Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Criminal Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Civil Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Theories of Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Forfeiture of Contraband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Forfeiture of Proceeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Facilitation Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Enterprise Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Forfeiture Laws and Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Federal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Equitable Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Adoptive Forfeiture Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

State Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Generous States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Restrictive States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Alternative Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Benefits of Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Crime Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

More Drug Arrests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Budget Boost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Contents vii
viii Asset Forfeiture

Possible Criticisms and Negative Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Profit Motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Budget Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Neglect of Other Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Appearance of Impropriety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Threats to Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Problems for Which Forfeiture Is a Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Illegal Drug Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Nuisance Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Street Racing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Drunk Driving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Drivers with Revoked Licenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Prostitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Implementing a Forfeiture Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Ethical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Avoiding the Negative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Bringing the Community on Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

The “Planning Unit” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Evaluating Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Appendix A: Select Federal Forfeiture Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Appendix B: Disposition Statutes by State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Appendix C: National Code of Professional Conduct for Asset Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . 39

Appendix D: National District Attorneys Association 

Guidelines for Civil Asset Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Introduction 1

Introduction

Designed to weaken the economic foundations of the illicit drug 

trade, asset forfeiture laws allow for the seizure (and eventual 

forfeiture) of property connected with criminal activity.1 Supporters 

of the practice see it as an essential law enforcement tool.2 Forfeiture 

has also helped generate considerable revenue for police agencies.

Today there are literally hundreds of federal and state forfeiture 

laws,3 and such laws continue to be enacted at near record levels. 

This response guide explains the advantages and disadvantages 

to police of using asset forfeiture as a response to various crime 

problems. It also reviews several of the possible novel uses of 

forfeiture. 

To be of practical use, this guide also examines legal arrangements 

from state to state and discusses steps agencies can take to improve 

the prospects of receiving forfeiture proceeds. It concludes with a 

brief how-to guide that agencies should consider when deciding to 

launch an asset forfeiture program.

Target Audience

The target audience for this response guide is, first and foremost, 

any law enforcement official who is contemplating starting an asset 

forfeiture program in his or her agency. This guide also serves 

as a refresher for those currently engaged in the practice. Finally, 

researchers and others who are interested in the issues surrounding 

asset forfeiture should find this guide helpful.
2 Asset Forfeiture

The Need for Forfeiture

For many years, law enforcement agencies around the nation 

have faced shrinking budgets.4 Police administrators have 

been forced to develop creative budgeting strategies, such 

as securing federal grants and partnering with community 

foundations.5 Though it is an enforcement tool, asset 

forfeiture can assist in the budgeting realm by helping to 

offset the costs associated with fighting crime. Doing what it 

takes to undermine the illicit drug trade is expensive and timeconsuming. Forfeiture can help agencies target these difficult 

problems, sometimes without the need to seek additional 

outside resources to offset their costs. 
Origins and Varieties of Forfeiture 3

Origins and Varieties of Forfeiture

Traditionally, forfeiture actions have proceeded upon the 

fiction that the inanimate objects can be guilty of wrongdoing. 

Simply put, the theory has been that if the object is “guilty,” 

it should be held forfeit.6 This can shift the attention from 

the people responsible for the crime (as with a criminal 

prosecution) to the property that was derived from or used to 

facilitate the crime.

Criminal Forfeiture

When criminal forfeiture is used, it accompanies a criminal 

conviction. For example, if a high-profile drug trafficker 

is convicted of controlled substance law violations, the 

convicted’s property that was connected with such activity 

may be forfeited. Criminal forfeiture is, by some accounts,7

less common than civil forfeiture, mainly because of the 

burden of proof in criminal cases, namely proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt.8 Criminal forfeiture is a sentencing option 

only if the statute used to convict the offender also provides 

for forfeiture. Also, when a third party has an interest in the 

property subject to forfeiture, ancillary hearings are often held 

to ascertain the nature of that interest and make adjustments 

as deemed necessary.

Civil Forfeiture

Civil forfeiture has seen its share of controversy not just 

because the property rather than its owner is targeted 

(illustrative cases include United States v. One Mercedes 560 

SEL and United States v. One Parcel of Land at 508 Depot 

Street9) but because the standard of proof is considerably 

lower. In a civil forfeiture action, the government need prove 

only by a preponderance of the evidence that the property in 

question was used or obtained illegally, thus making it subject 

to forfeiture. Civil forfeiture proceedings are independent of 
4 Asset Forfeiture

criminal proceedings, and it has been estimated that as many 

as 90 percent of civil forfeitures are not accompanied by 

criminal charges,10 either intentionally or due to insufficient 

evidence to support a criminal prosecution.

Civil forfeiture can occur via three mechanisms: 

1. Summary forfeiture occurs when property is summarily 

seized. Property subject to summary forfeiture is 

typically contraband, such as illegal narcotics and drug 

paraphernalia. 

2. Administrative forfeiture is usually commenced against 

property valued at less than $500,000, or against cash of 

any value. Administrative proceedings are conducted by 

the seizing agency; the government initiates a forfeiture 

action and will take ownership of the property if no one 

steps forward to contest the forfeiture.§ Real property is 

not subject to administrative forfeiture, even if it is valued 

at less than $500,000. Probable cause is the requisite 

standard in administrative forfeiture (as it is roughly 

analogous to preponderance of evidence). 

3. Civil judicial forfeiture proceedings occur before a judge. 

It is akin to a trial. If the value of the property in question 

exceeds $500,000 (or a claim of ownership is filed or real 

property is involved), this is the mechanism of choice. 

The authors of one study11 found that the assets sought 

in civil-judicial proceedings were most commonly (48.6 

percent) real property. More specifically, of the cases where 

investigations were proactive (e.g., a drug bust was planned 

in advance), the assets were primarily real property. Of the 

cases where investigations were reactive (such as when a 

traffic stop gave rise to forfeiture), most assets were monetary 

instruments. The researchers also studied the values, both real 

and estimated, of the assets in civil-judicial forfeiture cases. 

They found that the real property was the most valuable, 

followed by currency, conveyances, and other property, 

respectively. 

§There are four steps to an 

administrative forfeiture: (1) Notice 

of the forfeiture action must be 

served on all potentially interested 

parties; (2) Notice of the forfeiture 

proceeding must be published in a 

newspaper of general circulation; 

(3) If no claim opposing the 

forfeiture is filed during the 

statutorily required period of 

actual or published notice, the 

item is declared forfeit by the 

administrative agency; and (4) If a 

claim opposing forfeiture is filed, 

then the administrative forfeiture 

proceeding halts and the matter is 

converted into a judicial forfeiture 

action (Edgeworth, 2004).
Theories of Forfeiture 5

Theories of Forfeiture

There are four forfeiture theories. Property is subject to 

forfeiture if it is (1) contraband; (2) the proceeds of criminal 

activity; (3) used to facilitate criminal activity; and (4) 

connected to a criminal enterprise.

Forfeiture of Contraband

Contraband property is illegal to possess and, as such, is 

subject to forfeiture. No one can assert a legal interest in 

contraband property, so any property interest in it cannot 

exist. Again, this is why summary forfeiture of contraband is 

acceptable.12

Closely connected to contraband is so-called “derivative 

contraband.”13 To use a drug example, derivative contraband 

might be scales used to weigh substances before sale. Such 

property is lawful to possess but is subject to forfeiture 

because it is used to facilitate crime. It cannot be summarily 

forfeited, however. Due process protections apply because one 

can assert legal interest in such property.

Forfeiture of Proceeds

The ability to target the proceeds of criminal activity is 

what makes forfeiture particularly attractive from a police 

standpoint. The proceeds of criminal activity can be several, 

including “...all interest, dividends, income, or property 

derived from the original illegal transaction..., including the 

appreciation in the value of the property.”14 Proceeds can 

be targeted for forfeiture if they are connected to criminal 

activity in general. That is, there is no requirement that the 

proceeds be obtained directly from an illegal act. For example, 

if an individual sells drugs for cash, uses the cash to buy a car, 

sells the car, and then uses the money to contribute to a down 

payment on a home, the latter could be considered proceeds—

but only the portion purchased with illicit funds.15
6 Asset Forfeiture

Although the ability to target proceeds of criminal activity 

is attractive, it can be difficult for the government to prove 

a connection between the property sought and the initial 

criminal act. The current requirement is that the government 

prove a “substantial connection” between the property to be 

forfeited and the criminal activity from which it is considered 

a proceed. A general suspicion of criminal activity is not 

sufficient to take an asset forfeiture case forward. 

Facilitation Forfeiture 

Forfeiture extends beyond criminal proceeds to include 

property that is used to facilitate, or carry out, criminal 

activity. Such forfeitures can include property that “is used 

or intended to be used in any manner or part to commit or 

facilitate the commission of a violation...”16 A facilitation 

forfeiture is sometimes called an instrumentality forfeiture, 

meaning the property targeted for forfeiture was instrumental 

to the commission of the crime. An example is a car used to 

transport illegal drugs for sale. 

Enterprise Forfeiture

Enterprise forfeiture targets an offender’s interest in any 

enterprise involved in criminal activity. Federal law provides 

that “... in the case of a person convicted of engaging in 

a continuing criminal enterprise..., the person shall forfeit, 

in addition to any property described in (1) proceeds or (2) 

instrumentality, any of his interest in, claims against, and 

property or contractual rights affording a source of control 

over, the continuing criminal enterprise.”17 This is sweeping 

language because it reaches the offender’s entire interest in 

a criminal enterprise. An example is the case of United States 

v. Cauble,

18 where the government forfeited a partnership 

interest in a ranch on the theory that the defendant used it 

for his drug smuggling operation. This type of forfeiture is 

relatively rare and tends to be limited to racketeering cases.19
Forfeiture Laws and Sharing 7

Forfeiture Laws and Sharing

Forfeiture laws engender considerable controversy because 

many of them have sharing provisions. Federal law and most 

state laws provide that a certain amount of forfeiture proceeds 

can go back to the police agency (or agencies) that set the 

wheels in motion. There is also considerable collaboration 

between federal officials and local police, for reasons this 

section summarizes.

The amounts of money that move between state governments 

and the federal level are significant. In FY 2007, for example, 

more than $1.5 billion20 was deposited from the states into the 

U.S. Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund. However, 

this figure does not reflect the total amount of proceeds 

forfeited, because, as the following section explains, pursuing 

federal forfeiture is not always attractive to local agencies.

Federal Law

When cash is forfeited, it is transferred to the appropriate 

asset forfeiture fund.§ Personal and real property is sold 

at auction, and, once sales costs are deducted, remaining 

proceeds are deposited into the fund. In FY 2007, more than 

$71 million in real property was sold, the proceeds from which 

were placed in the Justice Department’s Assets Forfeiture 

Fund. Federal agencies can also retain personal property, such 

as certain conveyances, for law enforcement purposes. In FY 

2007, 465 items valued at more than $6.7 million were placed 

into law enforcement use from the Justice Department’s 

Assets Forfeiture Fund.21 Forfeiture fund monies are also 

retained to care for real property, pay informants, and fulfill 

other obligations related to property (such as paying off lien 

holders). 

§The Comprehensive Crime 

Control Act of 1984 (Public 

Law 98-473) established the U.S. 

Department of Justice Assets 

Forfeiture Fund (see Appendix 

A for other relevant federal 

forfeiture laws). The fund is set 

up to receive the proceeds from 

forfeiture resulting from the Justice 

Department law enforcement 

agencies (e.g., the FBI, DEA, 

ATF). Another fund, housed in the 

Department of the Treasury, is the 

Treasury Forfeiture Fund (31 U.S.C. 

§ 9703[a]). Treasury Department 

law enforcement agencies (e.g., the 

Secret Service) participate in this 

fund.
8 Asset Forfeiture

Equitable Sharing

Numerous federal statutes22 provide that local police agencies 

can team up with federal law enforcement officials in a 

practice known as adoptive forfeiture. An adoptive forfeiture 

occurs when local police officials effectively hand a case over 

to federal officials (e.g., Drug Enforcement Administration, 

which then passes it off to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the 

case of civil-judicial forfeiture). A key restriction is that the 

property in question is forfeitable under federal law. Proceeds 

from successful adoptive forfeitures are managed by the 

appropriate federal forfeiture fund and, important, as much as 

80 percent of adoptive forfeiture proceeds can be returned to 

the initiating state or local police agency (or agencies).§

The Adoptive Forfeiture Process

The process begins with a request for adoption,§§ which 

is then reviewed by the appropriate federal agency. If a 

forfeiture is adopted, the process continues to unfold as 

follows:

An agreement is signed, in which the local law 

enforcement agency promises the proceeds “shall be used 

for law enforcement purposes in accordance with the 

statutes and guidelines that govern equitable sharing” and 

also that they will be used as the local agency specified in 

the application it submitted requesting equitable sharing 

in that case. The agreement also states that “the misuse or 

misapplication of shared resources is prohibited” and will 

subject the local agency to sanctions.23

When the proceeds from an adoptive forfeiture are shared 

with the participating local agency (or agencies), this is 

known as equitable sharing. Equitable sharing proceeds are 

considerable. During FY 2007, for example, more than $400 

million was paid out by the U.S. Justice Department’s Assets 

Forfeiture Fund to state and local police agencies. 

§The federal share is 20 percent if all 

the preseizure activity was conducted 

by a state or local agency. This does 

not necessarily mean, however, that 

80 percent automatically goes to such 

agencies. The share is based on the 

number of agencies involved and on 

each agency’s degree of participation 

in an investigation. This is usually 

determined by the number of hours 

contributed by personnel.

§§A request for adoption form is 

at www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/

foia_reading_room/usam/title9/

crm02288.htm
Forfeiture Laws and Sharing 9

Despite the possible windfall that can result from an 

equitable sharing payout, there are a few restrictions on how 

the proceeds can be spent. First, payments are intended 

to enhance and supplement police resources and activities. 

Second, property and funds awarded must be used in 

accordance with specific federal guidelines: “Permissible uses 

of shared property include activities designed to enhance 

future investigations, such as payment of overtime, provision 

of police training, purchase of equipment, improvement 

of police facilities, upgrading of detention facilities, and 

conducting drug education awareness programs.”24 Third, 

there is an express requirement that the funds are not to be 

used to supplant agency resources.

State Law

State laws vary considerably in terms of how forfeited assets 

are to be disposed. At the risk of simplification, there are 

basically three distribution formulas. First, a number of 

states, such as Nevada, permit the return of all forfeiture 

proceeds to the initiating agency.25 At the opposite extreme, 

a number of states do not permit the return of proceeds 

to law enforcement. Missouri, for example, requires that 

forfeiture proceeds be placed in an education fund.26 All 

other states allocate forfeiture proceeds based on complicated 

formulas that involve multiple agencies, restrictions, and 

other limitations. Therefore, it is useful to think in terms 

of “generous” states, “restrictive” states, and states with 

“alternative arrangements” (see Appendix B for a list of 

disposition statutes by state).
10 Asset Forfeiture

Generous States

Generous forfeiture states allow forfeiture proceeds to be 

retained for official use. Nevada, for example, requires that 

the governing body controlling a police agency that pursues 

forfeiture open a special account known as the 

“... Forfeiture Account” and requires, simply, that “The 

money in the account may be used for any lawful purpose 

deemed appropriate by the chief administrative officer of 

the law enforcement agency.”27 To avoid having too much 

money accumulate in the fund, the law mandates that at the 

end of each fiscal year a percentage of the fund in excess of 

$100,000 be distributed to local schools.

Several other generous forfeiture states (e.g., Montana, 

Oklahoma) permit local agencies to retain forfeited property 

for official use; however, if they sell such property, the law 

may require that the proceeds be deposited into some type 

of law enforcement fund. For example, South Dakota’s law 

requires that “All moneys seized or remaining proceeds from 

the sale of any forfeited property shall be paid into the drug 

control fund” or forwarded to the state’s Bureau of Narcotics 

and Dangerous Drugs.28 Local agencies can then apply for 

and receive any or all of the funds they were required to 

deposit in the drug control fund.29

Restrictive States

Restrictive forfeiture states either (1) have no laws governing 

the disposition of forfeited assets, or (2) place the funds in a 

law enforcement trust fund of sorts, or (3) require that funds 

be paid into other nonlaw enforcement funds. For example, 

Maryland and Vermont require forfeiture proceeds be paid 

into a state or county general fund,30 whereas Minnesota 

requires the proceeds be paid into a state general fund.31
Forfeiture Laws and Sharing 11

Asset forfeiture critics have argued that officials in restrictive 

forfeiture states are most inclined to pursue adoptive 

forfeitures due to the prospect of receiving proceeds. A 

series of articles in The Kansas City Star detailed examples of 

law enforcement officials in Missouri, a state that allows no 

forfeiture proceeds to go to law enforcement,32 bypassing 

state law in favor of adoptive forfeitures.33 A recent study 

reached similar conclusions, namely that police agencies in 

restrictive states receive more equitable sharing payments than 

their counterparts in generous forfeiture states.34

Alternative Arrangements

In states whose forfeiture disposition formulas permit less 

than 100 percent but more than none go to law enforcement 

agencies, the percentages range from 25 percent, as in 

Hawaii,35 to 90 percent, as in West Virginia.36 Some states 

also allow certain percentages to go to prosecutors. For 

example, Colorado permits 10 percent,37 and California 

permits as much as 25 percent.38 Still other states combine 

these percentages with distributions based on the level of 

involvement by each investigating agency,39 the role each 

agency plays,40 or local agreements. Texas is an example of 

the latter; distribution is based on agreements established by 

prosecutors.41 

Benefits of Forfeiture 13

Benefits of Forfeiture

Asset forfeiture is beneficial for at least three reasons. First, 

it is intended to reduce criminal activity by denying offenders 

the profits from their crimes. Second, a byproduct of asset 

forfeiture is more drug arrests. Third, yet perhaps most 

controversially, forfeiture helps cash-strapped law enforcement 

agencies augment their discretionary budgets to further target 

criminal activity. 

Crime Reduction

Much of the language surrounding forfeiture is couched in 

terms of removing the profit from criminal activity, but at 

its core, forfeiture’s objective is crime deterrence. Because 

incarceration (or the threat of such) does not deter all 

offenders, forfeiture is intended to pick up where traditional 

punishments leave off. It has been said that “[t]he criminal 

views the prospect of a jail sentence as a calculated cost of 

generating revenue...” and that “[r]ecidivism is encouraged 

because the subject has learned that crime does pay.”42

Unfortunately, not a single published study has linked 

forfeiture activities to the prevalence of criminal activity. A 

team of economists recently offered up a theoretical argument 

concerning the possible deterrent effect of forfeiture, but 

they also argued that a mix of sanctions, not just forfeiture, 

would be most ideal: “by employing a mix of sanctions, with 

harm-based fines (or other punishment) plus confiscation of 

illegal gain [i.e., forfeiture], courts will be able to get closer 

to efficient deterrence than they can when constrained to use 

punishments in isolation.”43

Despite the lack of evidence that forfeiture can reduce a 

variety of crimes, there is some evidence that forfeiture can 

effectively address a number of specific problems. This guide 

considers several such problems in the “Problems for Which 

Forfeiture is a Remedy” starting on page 21.
14 Asset Forfeiture

More Drug Arrests

As is clear by now, there are financial incentives for police 

agencies to pursue asset forfeiture. This raises a proverbial 

“chicken or the egg” question: Do forfeiture laws increase 

enforcement activity, or does enforcement activity increase 

the prospects for asset forfeiture? One study found that 

state forfeiture laws are closely connected to drug arrests, 

and, secondarily, to forfeiture. In other words, states with the 

most generous forfeiture laws, those that return the greatest 

percentage of forfeiture proceeds to police, saw the greatest 

arrest activity: “police focus relatively more effort on drug 

control when they can enhance their budgets by retaining 

seized assets.”44 Controversially, this takes the focus from 

finding solutions to specific crime problems to revenue 

generation. Yet it is difficult to fault police departments for 

seeking revenue to support continued crime fighting.

Whether more drug arrests are desirable depends, of course, 

on the particular drug-related problem. Careful analysis of 

a local drug problem should be conducted before making 

this judgment. If, for example, high-volume drug arrests 

overwhelm the courts and/or compromise public support 

for law enforcement efforts, then more drug arrests (and, by 

extension, forfeiture) may be undesirable. 

Budget Boost

The obvious advantage of asset forfeiture is its potential to 

boost an agency’s bottom line. Although forfeiture can yield a 

profit, it can be sufficient for forfeiture to simply yield enough 

proceeds to offset the costs of drug enforcement, such as the 

operation of a multijurisdictional drug task force. Researchers 

have found, indeed, that forfeiture can assist agencies by 

augmenting their discretionary budgets.45 
 Possible Criticisms and Negative Consequences 15

§Referring to one case where a drug 

dealer received a large quantity of 

cocaine, Miller and Selva reported 

the following: “The researcher...was 

surprised when he was instructed to 

observe the suspect’s transactions 

to determine the rate at which the 

cocaine was being resold. Less drugs 

meant more cash, and the agent’s 

objective was to seize currency rather 

than cocaine. The case was successful 

as to proceeds, but perhaps not in 

view of the quantity of cocaine that 

officers knowingly permitted to reach 

consumers” (Miller and Selva, 1994, 

p. 328).

Possible Criticisms and Negative 

Consequences

Forfeiture also has been fairly heavily criticized. Critics point 

to the “drug war’s hidden economic agenda”46 and refer to 

the means by which forfeiture compromises due process 

protections47 and encourages law enforcement blunders.48

Critics further claim that forfeiture circumvents proper 

appropriations channels, threatens due process protections, 

and guarantees a conflict of interest between effective crime 

control and creative financial management. 

The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA)49

made several changes to federal forfeiture law. Key provisions 

of the law include the creation of an innocent owner defense 

(for cases in which an innocent individual’s property is 

targeted for forfeiture) and a shift in the burden of proof 

from the property owner to the government. Concerning the 

latter, property owners were previously required to prove their 

property was not subject to forfeiture. Now the government 

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that property 

is subject to forfeiture. Although CAFRA minimized much 

of the controversy associated with asset forfeiture, several 

criticisms of the practice still stand out.

Profit Motive

In a rather creative study, Miller and Selva50 used covert 

participant observation to document asset forfeiture activities. 

One of the authors acted as a confidential informant for 

a city’s undercover narcotics operation after he established 

a relationship with drug enforcement officials in the area. 

The results of the study were startling: agents were selective 

in their enforcement efforts, and the goal of seizing assets 

took precedence over the goal of taking narcotics out of 

circulation.§
16 Asset Forfeiture

The Miller and Selva study was published in 1994, well before 

federal forfeiture reforms were put in place. Even so, some 

more recent studies have raised similar concerns. For example, 

the author of one study surveyed 1,400 law enforcement 

administrators from around the nation and found that more 

than 60 percent of them either agreed or strongly agreed 

with the statement that “forfeiture is a necessary budgetary 

supplement for my agency.”51 The authors of another study 

found that law enforcement agencies in restrictive forfeiture 

states receive considerably more equitable sharing payments 

than their counterparts in generous forfeiture states.52 The 

logic is that the agencies in restrictive forfeiture states teamed 

up with federal officials to participate in adoptive forfeitures, 

in an effort to enhance the prospects of receiving forfeiture 

proceeds. 

In fairness, at least one published study showed that 

forfeiture activities have no apparent connection with state 

legal arrangements.53 In particular, “asset forfeiture does not 

have a substantial impact on the policing priorities of local 

agencies.”54 The study, which was limited to jurisdictions in 

Ohio, also found that agencies pursued criminal forfeiture 

more often than civil forfeiture. The reason for this is that 

Ohio civil forfeiture laws require that a criminal prosecution 

accompany a civil forfeiture action.55

Budget Consequences

One of the advantages of forfeiture identified earlier is 

its ability to augment discretionary budgets. This can be a 

disadvantage, too, particularly if budget-setting authorities 

catch wind of an agency’s successes with forfeiture. Some 

jurisdictions have reportedly supplanted (or shorted) regular 

police operating budgets on the assumption that police could 

make up the shortfall with asset forfeiture.56 As the authors of 

one study observed:
 Possible Criticisms and Negative Consequences 17

Local governments capture a significant fraction of 

the seizures that police make by reducing their other 

allocations to policing, partially undermining the statutory 

incentive created by seizure laws... Police, in turn, 

respond to the real net incentives for seizures once local 

offsets are taken into account, not simply the incentives 

set out in statute. When police are really allowed to keep 

the assets they seize, they increase antidrug policing.57

Neglect of Other Crimes

Forfeiture laws tend mostly to target “consensual” crimes 

and those with the greatest potential for profit. To the extent 

law enforcement agencies are drawn to forfeiture due to the 

potential to receive proceeds, this could discourage them from 

channeling resources into areas where the potential to receive 

forfeiture proceeds is nil. At the least, generous forfeiture laws 

appear to increase agencies’ enforcement activities in areas 

where the chances of receiving proceeds are greatest. As one 

study concluded, since the Comprehensive Crime Control 

Act of 1984, “[t]he relative allocation of state and local law 

enforcement resources has shifted dramatically towards drug 

enforcement, the major source of asset confiscations.”58 In 

fairness, though, it can be argued that much of the nation 

was focused on waging a war on drugs during that time, 

irrespective of forfeiture laws.

Appearance of Impropriety

Forfeiture windfalls can also reek of impropriety. For 

example, some small town agencies have received an excess 

of forfeiture proceeds and used the money to purchase 

items that some considered unnecessary.59 Some jurisdictions 

have also received negative publicity for controversial plea 

agreements with known drug offenders. In one case, a dealer 
18 Asset Forfeiture

faced 15 years in prison under one state’s tough antidrug 

laws. The dealer surrendered his interest in $31,300 in cash 

seized from his apartment and received only a 5-year prison 

term. Plea agreements such as these raise several questions, 

and, to some, seem like a version of sanctioned extortion. 

Researchers have uncovered many other examples of 

questionable forfeiture-related plea agreements that look at 

least somewhat questionable.60

Threats to Due Process

Asset forfeiture has been extensively criticized on 

constitutional grounds.61 Critics allege that forfeiture 

violates, among other constitutional provisions, (1) the Fifth 

Amendment’s double jeopardy clause; (2) the due process 

clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) the 

Eight Amendment’s excessive fines and punishment clauses.

Concerning the first challenge, the U.S. Supreme Court 

held that civil asset forfeiture does not violate the Fifth 

Amendment’s double jeopardy clause.62 In other words, asset 

forfeiture does not constitute “punishment” in the traditional 

sense. In contrast, the Supreme Court held that forfeiture 

can violate due process.63 At one point, there was no federal 

requirement that interested owners be notified before their 

property was forfeited. The Court held:

the seizure of real property...is not one of those 

extraordinary instances that justify the postponement 

of notice and hearing. Unless exigent circumstances 

are present, the Due Process Clause requires the 

Government to afford notice and a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard before seizing real property 

subject to civil forfeiture (p. 62).
 Possible Criticisms and Negative Consequences 19

In another important case,64 the Supreme Court addressed 

a challenge to a civil forfeiture action on the grounds that it 

violated the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment. 

It held that “forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture 

in particular, historically have been understood, at least in 

part, as punishment” and that “[w]e therefore conclude that 

forfeiture under these provisions constitutes ‘payment to a 

sovereign as punishment for some offense,’ and, as such, 

is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment’s 

Excessive Fines Clause.”65

Problems for Which Forfeiture Is a Remedy 21

Problems for Which Forfeiture 

Is a Remedy

Asset forfeiture is not limited to drug enforcement. It can be 

used to target a wide range of crime-related phenomena.66 

This section briefly reviews asset forfeiture laws that target 

illegal drug markets and those that target profits from other 

types of criminal activity. These are some of the most 

promising areas in which law enforcement officials can pursue 

asset forfeiture.

Illegal Drug Markets

The 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 

Control Act provided for the forfeiture of property used in 

connection with controlled substances. Since then various 

federal statutes have been enacted and extended the reach 

of asset forfeiture.67 This legislative progression has made 

forfeiture a viable enforcement option for a wide variety of 

drug-related offenses.

In terms of specific drug-related problems, forfeiture has been 

used in response to everything from drug dealing at apartment 

complexes§ to the operation of clandestine methamphetamine 

laboratories.§§ Officials must take care, however, to ensure 

that the property targeted for forfeiture is sufficiently valuable 

in relation to the time and effort required to execute a wellplanned bust. 

Nuisance Properties

Fulton County (Atlanta), Georgia’s Neighborhood Fresh 

Start is an example of law enforcement officials’ use of state 

forfeiture laws to target nuisance properties.68 Prosecutors 

target houses plagued with drug activity for at least 2 years. 

Ideally, the house has had at least five arrests for drug-related 

activity or two previous search warrant incidents in which 

§See Problem-Specific Guide No. 

4, Drug Dealing in Privately Owned 

Apartment Complexes.

§§See Problem-Specific Guide No. 

16, Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs, 

2nd Edition.
22 Asset Forfeiture

drugs were found. They weigh the value of the house 

against the amount of drugs and contraband seized—mainly 

due to Eighth Amendment concerns. The chief of police 

then sends the owner a cease-and-desist letter. The letter is 

followed by additional surveillance, undercover drug buys, 

and enforcement. If the activity continues, forfeiture is 

pursued. In a successful forfeiture, ownership of the house 

is transferred to the state and the district attorney, and the 

county moves a police officer into the home. The officer 

pays a nominal amount of rent and serves as a community 

resource officer, working only the beat in which the house 

is located. After the officer lives in the house for a year, 

the county works with the United Way and other charitable 

organizations to move a low-income family into the home.

Another class of nuisance properties includes so-called 

“budget motels.”§ In some communities, these properties 

are responsible for a disproportionate number of calls for 

service. Because these motels offer cheap accommodations, 

usually accept cash, do not take many steps to limit certain 

types of clientele who frequent the premises, and tend to 

be located in already crime-prone areas, it is no surprise that 

problems occur. Prostitution, drug dealing, loud parties, 

and other activities seem to happen frequently. The usual 

strategies of patrolling the properties and arresting offenders 

may not be as effective as targeting the assets of owners who 

turn the proverbial “blind eye” to problems at their motels. 

Several jurisdictions have used state nuisance laws to forfeit 

such properties. In many cases, however, the mere threat of 

forfeiture encourages property owners to take steps toward 

cleaning up and otherwise improving their properties.

§See Problem-Specific Guide No. 30, 

Disorder at Budget Motels.
Problems for Which Forfeiture Is a Remedy 23

Street Racing§

In response to a surge in illegal street racing fatalities on 

city streets, San Diego enacted the nation’s first anti-street 

racing forfeiture ordinance.§§ In general, the law provides for 

forfeiture of vehicles used in illegal speed contests. Before 

forfeiture is pursued, however, law enforcement must confirm 

that the person whose vehicle is targeted has a previous 

Vehicle Code conviction. Despite this additional restriction, 

research suggests the ordinance has reduced the street racing 

problem in San Diego. In particular, an evaluation of the 

program revealed that the ordinance did more to reduce the 

street racing problems than other law enforcement activities 

(such as increased arrests and prosecutions for Vehicle Code 

violations), negative press coverage of street racing, and 

sanctioned races at a local stadium on weekends.69

Drunk Driving§§§

The federal Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, 

enacted in 1998,70 requires that state laws contain provisions 

for seizure and/or forfeiture of the vehicles used by repeat 

drunk driving offenders. States that fail to do so risk losing 

federal funding. Although most of the laws provide for 

temporary impoundment, such as in an impound lot, 

some provide for permanent forfeiture of the vehicles. No 

matter the means of depriving repeat drunk drivers of their 

vehicles, researchers have found that such statutes result 

in considerable deterrent effects. For example, an Ohio 

study found that the reduction in DWI offenses for firsttime offenders was 80 percent during the impound period, 

followed by 56 percent after.71 Similar results were reported in 

California72 and Portland, Oregon, evaluations.73

§See Problem-Specific Guide No. 28, 

Street Racing.

§§“...a motor vehicle shall be 

declared a nuisance and forfeited 

subject to this division if...[i]t is used 

in violation of California Vehicle 

Code §§ 23109(a) or (c); and...it is 

being driven by the registered owner 

of the vehicle, the registered owner 

is a passenger, the registered owner’s 

immediate family members is driving 

or riding in the car, or the driver or 

passenger lives at the same address 

as the registered owner” (San Diego 

Municipal Code, Chapter 5, Article 2, 

Division 52.5301).

§§§See Problem-Specific Guide No. 

36, Drunk Driving.
24 Asset Forfeiture

New York City’s Vehicle Forfeiture Initiative74 is perhaps the 

most punitive in the United States. It provides for forfeiture 

for first-time offenders. Since 1999, the ordinance has been 

used to forfeit more than 6,500 vehicles, leading some to 

conclude that it “has saved many lives by encouraging people 

to refrain from drinking and driving.”75 Critics, though, feel 

the prospect of forfeiture following a first-time offense is 

excessive: “The policy is an obvious attempt to punish, and 

it operates by subjecting the automobiles of DWI offenders 

to forfeiture regardless of their value or the harm that the 

offender caused.”76

Drivers with Revoked Licenses

Forfeiture laws have been expanded to cover vehicles driven 

by those with revoked licenses. For example, California’s 

Vehicle Code77 provides that “a motor vehicle is subject to 

forfeiture as a nuisance if it is driven on a highway in this 

state by a driver with a suspended or revoked license, or by 

an unlicensed driver, who is a registered owner of the vehicle 

and has a previous misdemeanor conviction...” under one of 

several other related Vehicle Code provisions. 

Researchers have been hesitant to claim that forfeiture 

laws such as those in California are effective.78 Why? The 

explanation one team of researchers offered is that officials 

in California readily use the state’s temporary impoundment 

provision (for first-time offenders) much more often than 

they use the forfeiture provision. The researchers found two 

reasons for this: there is little support of forfeiture from 

district attorneys and the costs of moving forward with 

forfeiture actions often exceeded the value of the vehicles 

targeted.79
Problems for Which Forfeiture Is a Remedy 25

Prostitution

Prostitution is a significant problem for many jurisdictions. 

A wide range of enforcement options are available: intensive 

enforcement, banning prostitutes from certain areas, imposing 

curfews, manipulating the physical environment, offering 

services to prostitutes, and, of course, targeting the “johns” 

and their property.§ Portland, Oregon, is credited with being 

among the more aggressive jurisdictions when it comes 

to targeting the property—particularly the vehicles—of 

prostitution clients. The vehicles are often seized up front, 

but many are returned to prostitution clients who submit to 

deferred prosecution arrangements. The prospect of losing 

one’s mode of transportation has apparently resulted in low 

recidivism rates.80

§See Problem-Specific Guide No. 2, 

Street Prostitution, 2nd Edition.

Implementing a Forfeiture Program 27

Implementing a Forfeiture Program

Three steps should be followed in setting up an asset forfeiture 

program.81,§ First, police administrators should formulate a 

mission statement conveying the purpose of the forfeiture 

program. Second, with the help of appropriate legal counsel, 

adopt appropriate policies and procedures to ensure the 

forfeiture program operates within legal boundaries. As this 

response guide has made clear, forfeiture’s legal requirements 

vary considerably from one jurisdiction to the next and can be 

rather complicated. Third, consider the resources necessary to 

start and sustain a forfeiture program. The department needs 

to be committed to launching the program because, at least 

in the beginning, the costs associated with personnel training, 

administration, and investigation will surely exceed any 

financial benefits from forfeiture actions. 

Once a mission statement and appropriate policies are adopted, 

investigators can pursue forfeiture actions in consultation 

with the attorney (e.g., prosecutor) who will represent the 

government if the case goes to trial. This individual should 

be updated throughout the investigation, as he or she will be 

helpful in determining whether to pursue civil or criminal 

forfeiture. It is also worthwhile for agencies to consider 

collaborating with other agencies that have successfully 

forfeited assets in the past. Once a program is launched and 

assets are successfully seized, it is critical for the department 

to safeguard the property in question until all legal disputes 

are resolved. This can include everything from appraising 

automobiles and storing jewelry to depositing cash into a bank 

account and maintaining real property.82

§For more details on the mechanics 

of setting up a forfeiture program 

and engaging in investigations, see 

Goldsmith (1988), Booth (1988), 

Gallagher (1988), Stolker (1989), 

Bryant (1989), Morley (1989), 

Murphy (1989), Ferris (1989), 

Holmes (1989), and Stolker et al. 

(1989).
28 Asset Forfeiture

Ethical Considerations

In response to negative publicity and criticism of forfeiture 

(especially civil forfeiture), the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury’s Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture drafted a 

National Code of Professional Conduct for Asset Forfeiture 

(see Appendix C). It consists of “ten commandments” to 

federal agencies on the proper use of asset forfeiture. Not 

long after the National Code of Professional Conduct was 

drafted, the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) 

assembled a task force that developed its Guidelines for Civil 

Asset Forfeiture (see Appendix D). The NDAA guidelines 

have been adopted in several states.83 In general, these 

documents emphasize that the core purpose of forfeiture 

is enforcement, not revenue generation. They also place 

great emphasis on avoiding corruption, ensuring procedural 

fairness, and maintaining accountability. 

Avoiding the Negative

The “Possible Criticisms and Negative Consequences” section 

above may give the impression that forfeiture’s negatives 

outweigh its positives. Nothing could be further from the 

truth. First, it is important to be at least aware of forfeiture’s 

possible downsides. Second, many of the criticisms were 

offered up well before major forfeiture reform (i.e., CAFRA) 

was enacted. Such reforms have made significant strides in 

terms of protecting property owners’ due process rights 

and ensuring that forfeiture practices remain ethical and 

effective. Third, any effective crime-control strategy needs to 

be balanced against the possible argument that it threatens 

people’s rights. Whether the specific strategy is intensive 

street-level enforcement, aggressive use of investigative 

detentions, putting more police officers on the streets, or 

carrying out sting operations, it is almost always likely that 

there will be critics who oppose the practice. Forfeiture is 
Implementing a Forfeiture Program 29

no different. It is controversial because it has such potentially 

powerful economic consequences. Finally, no matter the 

pros or cons associated with forfeiture, it is difficult to fault 

financially strapped law enforcement agencies for seeking 

resources to continue their crime-fighting efforts.

Bringing the Community on Board

One possible strategy to minimize any potential fallout 

associated with forfeiture is to bring the community on board 

from the outset. This occurred in the early days of Atlanta’s 

Neighborhood Fresh Start initiative (see above). There, from 

the start, prosecutors met with and engaged residents to 

identify problems. Rather than take a top-down approach of 

defining what problems should be targeted, prosecutors went 

to community meetings and gatherings to learn residents’ 

problems and concerns. The program’s success may also 

be attributed to the fact that prosecutors went into the 

community first, and the police department had little to no 

involvement at the beginning. Relationships between the police 

and residents of the Fresh Start neighborhood were strained, 

but prosecutors were unfamiliar faces in the community. Their 

appearance on the scene afforded an opportunity to build trust 

and communication right from the start without having to deal 

with any strained relationships that could have interfered with 

progress.

The “Planning Unit”

Before enacting a forfeiture program, consider forming a 

planning unit that consists of representatives from various 

government agencies, including the police department, the 

code enforcement agency, the city council, the mayor’s office, 

the city attorney’s office, or any combination of these and 

other local agencies. Such a unit, however composed, should 

then hold scheduled meetings with community members to 
30 Asset Forfeiture

identify problems and formulate appropriate solutions. Then 

the planning unit representatives can pool their resources and 

determine (especially with consultation from the city attorney 

or the prosecutor’s office) whether forfeiture is a viable option 

for the problem in question. This grassroots, ground-up 

approach could pay huge dividends in terms of getting the 

word out that forfeiture is an option and securing community 

support for its use—in the beginning.

Evaluating Success

There is no “one best way” to evaluate asset forfeiture success, 

but at least four important issues should be considered. First, 

because forfeiture can offset the costs associated with targeting 

certain crime problems, agencies should weigh assets forfeited 

against the actual costs of enforcement. When forfeiture 

proceeds outweigh enforcement costs, forfeiture can be 

declared a success—at least from a budgetary standpoint. 

Second, community feedback should be secured along 

the way, particularly when assets such as real property and 

other valuables are subject to forfeiture. This may not be of 

particular concern to some agencies, but community members 

may get upset if it appears the government is taking people’s 

property unfairly. This happened in the early days of Fulton 

County’s Neighborhood Fresh Start (again, see above). 

Third, agencies should weigh seizures against forfeitures. 

Because most forfeitures are finalized following a court 

proceeding, it is worth knowing how many items targeted for 

forfeiture through seizure actually end up forfeited. This is 

akin to the relationship between arrests and convictions. A 

significant drop-off in forfeitures relative to seizures would 

be not unlike a significant drop-off between arrests and 

convictions.
Implementing a Forfeiture Program 31

Finally, one of the goals of forfeiture should be to promote 

fairness. This raises the question of whether case dispositions 

are appropriate for the offense in question. Reasonable 

care can help agencies overcome the problem of forfeited 

property values, significantly outweighing the seriousness of 

the underlying offense. As mentioned earlier in this guide, 

excessive forfeiture can constitute an Eighth Amendment 

violation.

Conclusion 33

Conclusion

Asset forfeiture provides a valuable tool for law enforcement 

officials, as it helps strike at the economic foundations of 

criminal activity. It has been used successfully to target a 

variety of crime problems, ranging from illegal drug sales 

and street racing to nuisance properties and drunk driving. 

Forfeiture can also help agencies offset the costs of reducing 

crime through laws that permit them to receive forfeiture 

proceeds and equitable sharing arrangements. Yet forfeiture 

is a controversial practice. Critics cite excessive use of civil, in 

lieu of criminal, forfeiture due to the former’s lower standard 

of proof, though some studies revealed that this does not 

occur. Critics also oppose the practice of distributing asset 

forfeiture proceeds among law enforcement agencies. Indeed, 

researchers and reporters have uncovered some examples 

of dependence on forfeiture in law enforcement circles 

and possible distortion of goals in the ongoing war against 

crime. With due diligence and attention to appropriate 

codes of professional conduct, law enforcement officials 

can implement asset forfeiture programs that meet all legal 

requirements, protect property owners’ rights, and effectively 

target criminal activity. 

Appendix A 35

Appendix A: 

Select Federal Forfeiture Laws

18 USC § 492: Forfeiture of counterfeit paraphernalia. 

18 USC § 844: Forfeitures relating to explosive law violations. 

18 USC § 924: Forfeitures relating to firearms violations. 

18 USC § 1955: Forfeitures related to illegal gambling 

businesses. 

18 USC Chapter 96: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations (RICO). 

18 USC § 1963: Criminal forfeitures under RICO. 

18 USC § 2253: Criminal forfeiture provisions related to 

sexual exploitation and other abuse of children. 

18 USC § 2254: Civil forfeiture provisions related to sexual 

exploitation and other abuse of children. 

18 USC § 981: Civil forfeiture. 

18 USC § 982: Criminal forfeiture. 

19 USC § 1607: Forfeiture provisions for seizures valued 

$500,000 or less. 

21 USC Chapter 13: Controlled Substances Act (CSA). 

21 USC § 853: Criminal forfeiture under the CSA. 

21 USC § 881: Forfeiture provisions under the CSA. 

28 USC § 2461: Criminal forfeiture authority. 

49 USC § 80303: Forfeitures of conveyances carrying 

contraband. 

Appendix B 37

Alabama Ala. Code § 20-2-93 (e)

Alaska Ak. Stat. §§ 17.30.112 & 17.30.122

Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4315

Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-64-505 (h) & (i)

California Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11489

Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-13-311

Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-36i

Delaware Del. Code Ann. Title 16 §4784(f)

District of Columbia D.C. Code Ann. § 48-905.02 (d)(4)

Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. § 932-7055 (4)

Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-49 (u)(4)

Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712A-16 (2)

Idaho Idaho Code §37-2744 (e)

Illinois 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 550/12 (g)

Indiana Ind. Code Ann. § 34-24-1-6

Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 809A.17

Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-4117

Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 218A.435

Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2616

Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann Title 15 ch. 517, § 5822

Maryland Md. Ann. Code Art. § 12-403

Massachusetts Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 94C, § 47 (d)

Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7524

Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.5315

Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-181

Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. § 513.623

Appendix B: Disposition Statutes by State
38 Asset Forfeiture

Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 44-12-206

Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat § 28-1439.02

Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 179.118 & 179.1187

New Hampshire N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318-B:17-b (V)(a)

New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann § 2C:64-6

New Mexico N.M. Code Ann. § 31-27-7A

New York N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1349 (2)(e-h)

North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat § 90-112 (d)

North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 19-03.1-36.5

Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2925.44 & 2933.43(D)

Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. §§63-2-503E & 63-2-5061

Oregon Oregon Const. Art. XV, § 10(7)

Pennsylvania Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. Title 35 §§6801 (e)-(f)

Rhode Island R.I. Gen Laws § 21-28-5.04 (b)(3)(A)

South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-530 (e)

South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 34-20B-89

Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-420

Texas Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 59.06

Utah Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-15

Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. Title 18, § 4247

Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-386.14

Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69-50-505 (j)

West Virginia W. Va. Code § 60A-7-706

Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 961.55 (5)

Wyoming Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1049 (e)
Appendix C 39

Appendix C: National Code of 

Professional Conduct for Asset Forfeiture

1. Law enforcement is the principal objective of forfeiture. 

Potential revenue must not be allowed to jeopardize 

the effective investigation and prosecution of criminal 

offenses, officer safety, the integrity of ongoing 

investigations, or the due process rights of citizens.

2. No prosecutor’s or sworn law enforcement officer’s 

employment or salary shall be made to depend upon the 

level of seizures or forfeitures he or she achieves.

3. Whenever practicable (excluding border searches, 

exigent circumstances, etc.) and in all cases involving real 

property, a judicial finding of probable cause shall be 

secured when property is seized for forfeiture. Seizing 

agencies shall strictly comply with all applicable legal 

requirements governing seizure practice and procedure.

4. If no judicial finding of probable cause is secured, the 

seizure shall be approved in writing by a prosecuting or 

agency attorney or by a supervisory-level official.

5. Seizing entities shall have a manual detailing the statutory 

grounds for forfeiture and all applicable policies and 

procedures.

6. The manual shall include procedures for prompt notice to 

interest holders, the expeditious release of seized property 

where appropriate, and the prompt resolution of claims 

of innocent ownership.

7. Seizing entities retaining forfeited property for official law 

enforcement use shall ensure that the property is subject 

to internal controls consistent with those applicable to 

property acquired through the normal appropriations 

process of that entity.
40 Asset Forfeiture

8. Unless otherwise provided by law, forfeiture proceeds 

shall be maintained in a separate fund or account subject 

to appropriate accounting controls and annual financial 

audits of all deposits and expenditures.

9. Seizing agencies shall strive to ensure that seized property 

is protected and its value preserved.

10. Seizing entities shall avoid any appearance of impropriety 

in the sale or acquisition of forfeited property.
Appendix D 41

Appendix D: 

National District Attorneys Association 

Guidelines for Civil Asset Forfeiture84 

1. The removal of unlawfully obtained proceeds of criminal 

activity and the elimination of the instrumentalities 

used to commit crimes are the principal goals of asset 

forfeiture. Potential revenue must not be allowed to 

jeopardize the effective investigation or prosecution of 

criminal offenses.

2. Where multiple agencies in a geographic region have 

jurisdiction to pursue asset forfeiture, every effort should 

be made to cooperate to advance the public interest.

3. Every government entity with the authority to seize 

property should ensure that its asset forfeiture program 

provides for: (a) Prompt prosecutorial review of the 

circumstances, and propriety of the seizure; (b) Timely 

notice of seizure to interest holders of seized property; 

and (c) Expeditious resolution of ownership claims and a 

rapid release of property to those entitled to the return of 

the property.

4. Absent exigent circumstances, a judicial order is advisable 

for all seizures of real property. When real property in 

residential use is sought to be forfeited, the least intrusive 

means that will preserve the property for forfeiture and 

protect the public should be employed. A notice of lis 

pendens or an order restraining alienation should suffice to 

preserve the government’s interest in forfeiture pending 

final judicial determination of the forfeiture action.

5. Every entity retaining forfeited property for official 

law enforcement use should ensure that the property is 

subject to controls consistent with those applicable to 

property acquired through the normal appropriations 

process.
42 Asset Forfeiture

6. No seized property should be used without judicial 

authorization and/or supervision. A use order may be 

obtained from the court in appropriate circumstances. 

Otherwise the property should not be used unless the 

forfeiture action has been completed and title to the 

property has vested in the receiving agency. Forfeited 

property not used in an undercover capacity should be 

sold or added to the regular inventory of the agency. All 

property should be used and disposed of in a manner 

consistent with the use and disposition of similar property 

by that agency.

7. The disposition of forfeited property retained by the law 

enforcement agency should not be determined by any 

person who directly supervised or exercised discretion in 

its forfeiture.

8. Forfeiture proceeds shall be maintained in a separate fund 

or account subject to appropriate accounting controls and 

annual financial audits of all deposits and expenditures.

9. Every seizing agency should maintain seized property 

to preserve value for successful claimants as well as the 

taxpayers.

10. To the extent possible, civil forfeiture actions should be 

initiated as independent cases which are not controlled 

or influenced by the criminal prosecution. Prosecutors 

should avoid plea agreements in a criminal case which 

involve agreements to dismiss forfeiture proceedings. 

The converse is also true. Prosecutors should avoid 

settlements in a forfeiture case which involve concessions 

in a criminal proceeding.
Appendix D 43

11. Every prosecutor should establish procedures to ensure 

expeditious resolution of ownership claims if challenges 

to the asset forfeiture proceeding are made and timely 

return of the property to the known owner or interest 

holders if the forfeiture action is dismissed or is 

unsuccessful.

12. Salaries and personal benefits of any person influencing 

or controlling the selection, investigation, or prosecution 

of forfeiture cases must be managed in such a way that 

employment or salary does not depend upon the level of 

seizures or forfeitures in which they participate.

13. Agency employees and their families should be prohibited 

from purchasing forfeited property directly or indirectly 

from the agency, or any property forfeited by any other 

agency, if the employee participated in any aspect of the 

investigation or litigation involving that property.

14. Agencies receiving forfeiture funds should make annual 

budget requests based on agency funding needs without 

regard for anticipated or projected asset forfeiture 

revenues.

15. Prosecutors should pursue forfeiture actions to further 

the remedial goals set forth above. A prosecutor should 

not consider any personal or political advantages or 

disadvantages or gains or losses that the initiation of 

a forfeiture action may bring to the prosecutor’s office 

in deciding whether to initiate or dismiss a forfeiture 

proceeding. Nor should a prosecutor improperly 

consider the race, gender, social, or economic status of 

any person in deciding whether to initiate or dismiss a 

forfeiture proceeding. This guideline should not be read 

to preclude the initiation of forfeiture proceedings, which 

contribute to the fulfillment of the official mission of the 

prosecutor’s office.

Endnotes 45

Endnotes

1. United States Department of Justice (1994).

2. Myers and Brzostowski (1982).

3. President’s Commission on Model State Drug Laws 

(1993).

4. Grosskopf, Hayes, and Hirschberg (1995).

5. Coe and Wiesel (2001).

6. United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 

(1971), p. 720.

7. Hyde (1995); but see Clingermayer, Hecker, and Madsen 

(2005) who found that in Ohio criminal forfeiture is 

more common than civil forfeiture.

8. Hyde (1995); Warchol, Payne, and Johnson (1996), pp. 

53-4.

9. United States v. One Mercedes 560 SEL (1990); United States

v. One Parcel of Land at 508 Depot Street (1992).

10. Hyde (1995).

11. Warchol and Johnson (1996).

12. Cooper v. Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 304-5 (5th Cir. 1990).

13. Edgeworth (2004), p. 10.

14. Edgeworth (2004), p. 11.

15. United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, p. 

1158 (2nd Cir. 1986).

16. 21 U.S.C § 881(a)(7).

17. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(3).

18. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983).

19. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2).

20. www.usdoj.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/2007affr/

report1.htm

21. www.usdoj.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/2007affr/

report3.htm

22. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(e)(1)(A) and (e)(3); 18 U.S.C § 

981(e)(2); 18 U.S.C § 1963(g); and 19 U.S.C § 1616a.
46 Asset Forfeiture

23. Worrall and Kovandzic (2008); for more details on the 

process see: www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_

room/usam/title9/116mcrm.htm

24. Edgeworth (2004), p. 173.

25. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 179.118 and 179.1187.

26. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 513.623.

27. Nev. Rev Stat § 179.1187(2).

28. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 34-20B-89.

29. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 34-20B-64.

30. Md. Ann. Code Crim. Proc. § 12-403(c)-(e); Vt. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 18, § 4247.

31. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.5315 sub. 5(3).

32. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 44-12-206 (1995).

33. Dillon (2001).

34. Worrall and Kovandzic (2008).

35. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712A-16(2).

36. W. Va. Code § 60A-7-706(a).

37. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-311(3)(a)(V).

38. Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11489(b)(2)(B).

39. See Ala. Code § 20-2-93(e).

40. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-49(u)(4).

41. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 59.06(a).

42. Hartman (2001), p. 1.

43. Bowles, Faure, and Garoupa (2000), p. 547.

44. Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen (2000), p. 301.

45. Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars (1995), p. 39.

46. Blumenson and Nilsen (1997).

47. Jensen and Gerber (1996).

48. Hyde (1995).

49. 106 Pub. L. No. 185.

50. Miller and Selva (1994).

51. Worrall (2001).

52. Worrall and Kovandzic (2008).

53. Clingermayer, Hecker, and Madsen (2005).

54. Clingermayer, Hecker, and Madsen (2005), p. 319.
Endnotes 47

55. Clingermayer, Hecker, and Madsen (2005), p. 322.

56. Dillon (2000).

57. Baicker and Jacobson (2007), p. 2135.

58. Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars (1995), p. 38.

59. Hyde (1995).

60. Colquitt (2001).

61. Rosenburg (1988).

62. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996).

63. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 

(1993).

64. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).

65. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), p. 622.

66. Kessler (1993).

67. Hyde (1995), p. 25.

68. Wolf and Worrall (2004).

69. Worrall and Tibbetts (2006).

70. Public Law 105-178.

71. Voas, Tippetts, and Taylor (1998).

72. DeYoung (1998).

73. Crosby (1995).

74. New York City Code § 14-140(b) (1999).

75. www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/outreach/safedige/

spring2004/SPR04_W04_NY.htm

76. Terry (2000), p. 1840.

77. California Vehicle Code § 14607.6(a).

78. Voas and DeYoung (2002).

79. Peck and Voas (2002), p. 255.

80. Weitzer (1999).

81. Hartman (2001).

82. Hartman (2001), p. 2.

83. Edgeworth (2004), p. 219.

84. As found in Edgeworth (2004), pp. 221-226.

References 49

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Polygraph. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 

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1989.

Clingermayer, J., J. Hecker and S. Madsen. “Asset Forfeiture 

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16 (2005): 319–335.

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(2001): 695–776.

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50 Asset Forfeiture

DeYoung, D. Deterrent Effect of Vehicle Impoundment on 

Suspended, Revoked, and Unlicensed Drivers in California.

Sacramento, California: California Department of Motor 

Vehicles, 1998.

Dillon, K. “Cash in Custody: A Special Report on Police and 

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———— “Cops and Money.” IRE Journal 24 (2001):33–34.

Edgeworth, D Asset Forfeiture: Practice and Procedure in State 

and Federal Courts. Chicago: American Bar Association, 

Criminal Justice Sectionm, 2004.

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Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1989.

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Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1988.

Goldsmith, M. Civil Forfeiture: Tracing the Proceeds of Narcotics 

Trafficking. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 

Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 

1988.

Grosskopf, S., K. Hayes and J. Hirschberg. “Fiscal Stress and 

the Production of Public Safety: A Distance Function 

Approach.” Journal of Public Economics 57 (1995) :277–96.

Hartman, V. “Implementing an Asset Forfeiture Program.” 

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 70 (2001): 1–7.

Holmes, C. Developing Plans to Attack Drug Traffickers’ Assets.

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Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1989.

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Jensen, E. and J. Gerber. “The Civil Forfeiture of Assets and 

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Rosenburg, J. “Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture 

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Worrall, J. “Addicted to the Drug War: The Role of Civil 

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(forthcoming), 2008.

About the Author 55

About the Author

John L. Worrall

John L. Worrall is an Associate Professor of Criminology at the 

University of Texas at Dallas. He received his Ph.D. in political 

science from Washington State University in 1999. He has written 

a number of studies on policing, courts, and legal issues, including 

asset forfeiture. Dr. Worrall currently serves as Editor of Police

Quarterly and as the Associate Director of the W.W. Caruth Dallas 

Police Institute, a collaborative research and training program 

involving the Dallas Police Department, the University of North 

Texas, and the University of Texas at Dallas.

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 57

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Problem-Specific Guides series:

1. Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 

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2. Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-01-0

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5. False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001. 

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6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

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7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1

8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 

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10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. 

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17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 

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18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 

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19. Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-18-5
58 Asset Forfeiture

20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly.

Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3

21. Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 

ISBN: 1-932582-27-4

22. Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 

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23. Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. 

Anthony A. Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2

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29. Cruising. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 

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37. Juvenile Runaways. Kelly Dedel. 2006. 

ISBN: 1932582-56-8
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 59

38. The Exploitation of Trafficked Women. Graeme R. 

Newman. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-59-2

39. Student Party Riots. Tamara D. Madensen and John E. 

Eck. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-60-6

40. People with Mental Illness. Gary Cordner. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-63-0

41. Child Pornography on the Internet. Richard Wortley 

and Stephen Smallbone. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-65-7

42. Witness Intimidation. Kelly Dedel. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-67-3

43. Burglary at Single-Family House Construction 

Sites. Rachel Boba and Roberto Santos. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

44. Disorder at Day Laborer Sites. Rob Guerette. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-72-X

45. Domestic Violence. Rana Sampson. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-74-6

46. Thefts of and from Cars on Residential Streets and 

Driveways. Todd Keister. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-76-2

47. Drive-By Shootings. Kelly Dedel. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-77-0

48. Bank Robbery. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2007.

ISBN: 1-932582-78-9

49. Robbery of Convenience Stores. Alicia Altizio and

Diana York. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-79-7

50. Traffic Congestion Around Schools. 

Nancy G. La Vigne. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-82-7

51. Pedestrian Injuries and Fatalities. Justin A. Heinonen 

and John E. Eck. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-83-5

52. Bicycle Theft. Shane D. Johnson, Aiden Sidebottom, 

and Adam Thorpe. 2008. ISBN: 1-932582-87-8

53. Abandoned Vehicles. Michael G. Maxfield. 2008.

ISBN: 1-932582-88-6

54. Spectator Violence in Stadiums. Tamara D. Madensen 

and John E. Eck. 2008. ISBN: 1-932582-89-4
60 Asset Forfeiture

Response Guides series:

1. The Benefits and Consequences of Police 

Crackdowns. Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X

2. Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime: Should 

You Go Down This Road? Ronald V. Clarke. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

3. Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety 

Problems. Michael S. Scott and Herman Goldstein. 2005.

ISBN: 1-932582-55-X

4. Video Surveillance of Public Places. Jerry Ratcliffe. 

2006 ISBN: 1-932582-58-4

5. Crime Prevention Publicity Campaigns.

Emmanuel Barthe. 2006 ISBN: 1-932582-66-5

6. Sting Operations. Graeme R. Newman with assistance 

of Kelly Socia. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-84-3

7. Asset Forfeiture. John L. Worall. 2008

ISBN: 1-932582-90-8 

Problem-Solving Tools series: 

1. Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory 

Guide for Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-19-3

2. Researching a Problem. Ronald V. Clarke and Phyllis A. 

Schultz. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-48-7

3. Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police ProblemSolving. Scott H. Decker. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-49-5

4. Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Deborah Lamm 

Weisel. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-54-1

5. Partnering with Businesses to Address Public Safety 

Problems. Sharon Chamard. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-62-2

6. Understanding Risky Facilities. Ronald V. Clarke and 

John E. Eck. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-75-4

7. Implementing Responses to Problems. Rick Brown 

and Michael S. Scott. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-80-0
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 61

8. Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental 

Design in Problem-Solving. Diane Zahm. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-81-9

9. Enhancing the Problem-Solving Capacity of Crime 

Analysis Units. Matthew B. White. 2008. 

ISBN: 1-932582-85-1

Special Publications:

Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps,

Ronald V. Clarke and John Eck, 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-52-5

Policing Terrorism: An Executive's Guide, 

Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke, 2008

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides

Child Abuse and Neglect in the Home

Transient Encampments

Street Robbery

Fencing Stolen Property

Thefts from Cafés and Bars

Aggressive Driving

Theft of Scrap Metal

Problem-Solving Tools

Displacement

Response Guides

Assigning Police Officers to Schools

Dealing with Crime and Disorder in Urban Parks

Improving Street Lighting to Reduce Crime in Residential 

Areas
62 Asset Forfeiture

Special Publications

Effective Policing and Crime Prevention: A Problem-Oriented 

 Guide for Mayors, City Managers, and County Exectives

Intelligence Analysis and Problem Solving

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for 

Police series and other COPS Office publications, call the 

COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770, via e-mail at 

askCOPSRC@usdoj.gov or visit COPS Online at www.cops.

usdoj.gov. 
Got a Problem? We’ve got answers!

Log onto the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing web site at 

www.popcenter.org for a wealth of information to help you deal 

more effectively with crime and disorder in your community, 

including:

•	 Recommended readings in problem-oriented policing 

and situational crime prevention

•	 A complete listing of other POP Guides

•	 A listing of forthcoming POP Guides.

Designed for police and those who work with them to address 

community problems, www.popcenter.org is a great resource for 

problem-oriented policing.

Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office).

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing
For More Information:

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS Office programs, call the

COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov

November 2008

e110810177

ISBN:1-932582-90-8 

Asset Forfeiture reviews the application of asset forfeiture to 

specific crime problems, examines legal arrangements for its use,

discusses the benefits and consequences to its use, and provides

recommendations for launching an asset forfeiture program.