ML091880072 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS 

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS 

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 

November 24, 2009 

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2009-29: POTENTIAL FAILURE OF FIRE WATER SUPPLY 

PUMPS TO AUTOMATICALLY START DUE TO A 

FIRE 

ADDRESSEES 

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor issued 

under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of 

Production and Utilization Facilities,” except those who have permanently ceased operations 

and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel. 

All holders of or applicants for an early site permit, standard design certification, standard 

design approval, or combined license issued under 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, 

and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.” 

All licensees and potential applicants for fuel cycle and fabrication facilities under 

10 CFR Part 70, “Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.” 

PURPOSE 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform 

addressees about recent NRC inspection findings concerning the potential for a fire to prevent 

the fire water pumps from starting automatically. The NRC expects addressees to review the 

information for applicability to their facilities and to consider taking actions, as appropriate, to 

avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, 

no specific action or written response is required. 

BACKGROUND 

The fire water supply system at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants typically consists of two 

or more redundant main fire pumps that are normally in a standby state. One pump is usually 

electrically driven, and the other pump is diesel-engine driven. These pumps discharge to a 

buried fire water main loop around the plant. A normally operating electric-driven jockey pump 

is a low-flow capacity pump that discharges to the fire water main loop to maintain its 

pressurized state. When a demand for fire water system flow occurs because a suppression 

system actuates or a fire hose is discharged, the jockey pump flow is not sufficient to maintain 

the fire water main loop in its pressurized state. The main fire pumps each have a fire pump 

controller that automatically starts the pump when it receives a low water pressure signal in the 
IN 2009-29 

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fire water main loop. The automatic start feature ensures that adequate water flow is available 

for a sprinkler or water spray system to control a fire and for a fire brigade to have adequate 

hose streams to suppress a fire. Each main fire pump can also be started manually, either 

locally at the pump or remotely from the control room. 

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES 

At South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, and at Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1, NRC 

inspectors identified that a fire could prevent the main fire pumps from starting remotely or 

automatically. The fire pump controllers have a remote start capability from the control room. A 

fire could cause a ground fault on the cable between the control room remote start pushbutton 

and the fire pump controller in the fire water pump house. The ground fault would cause 

electrical protective devices in the respective fire pump control panel to actuate. If this were to 

occur, the loss of control power to the panel would prevent the pumps from starting, either 

remotely or automatically. The licensees at both facilities located the remote start circuit cables 

for the fire pumps (i.e., three pumps at South Texas Project and the electrically driven pump at 

Wolf Creek, Unit 1) close to each other from the control room switches through various plant fire 

areas and to the respective control panels in the pump house. Because the cables are close to 

each other, damage from a single fire could prevent all fire water pumps at South Texas Project 

from starting remotely or automatically. 

As an interim measure, the licensees at South Texas Project and Wolf Creek revised their fire 

alarm response procedures for the fire areas that could affect the fire water pumps from starting 

remotely or automatically by adding a step to send an operator to ensure that the fire water 

pumps had started or to locally start the pumps as necessary. The licensee at Wolf Creek later 

determined that the diesel driven fire pump would still function as required. 

Additional information appears in “South Texas Project Electric Generating Station—NRC 

Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000498/2008008 and 05000499/2008008 and 

Exercise of Enforcement Discretion,” dated September 5, 2008, available on the NRC’s public 

Web site in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), ADAMS 

Accession No. ML082520793. Additional information also appears in “Wolf Creek Generating 

Station—NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000482/2008010,” dated 

January 2, 2009, ADAMS Accession No. ML090020490. 

DISCUSSION 

Failure of the automatic start feature of the fire water supply pumps would impair water-based 

automatic fire suppression systems. Furthermore, the failure of the pumps to start upon 

demand from a fire hose could impair manual suppression activities. The regulations at 

10 CFR 50.48, “Fire Protection,” and Appendix R, “Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power 

Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,” to 10 CFR Part 50 require licensees to install fire 

suppression systems in certain fire areas to protect redundant trains of safe-shutdown 

equipment and electrical circuits against fires. Section III.G.2 of Appendix R requires automatic 

suppression systems in some fire areas for certain fire protection methods for post-fire safeshutdown equipment. Plants licensed after January 1, 1979, have commitments for automatic 

suppression systems in their approved fire protection program. If a licensee has routed cables 
IN 2009-29 

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that can potentially prevent a fire pump from starting through one of these fire areas and has 

installed a water-based automatic fire suppression system in the area, it may not meet the 

automatic fire suppression requirement. 

National Fire Protection Association Standard 20, “Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal 

Fire Pumps,” 1983 Edition, states that control circuits leaving or entering the fire pump controller 

shall be so arranged as to prevent failure to start due to a fault. Licensees may have this 

standard as part of their approved fire protection program. 

CONTACT 

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this 

matter to the technical contacts listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation (NRR) project manager. 

/RA/ /RA/ 

 

Timothy J. McGinty, Director Daniel H. Dorman, Director 

Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

/RA/ 

Glenn Tracy, Director 

Division of Construction Inspection 

 and Operational Programs 

Office of New Reactors 

Technical Contacts: Phil M. Qualls, NRR John M. Mateychick, Region IV 

 817-276-6550 817-276-6560 

 E-mail: Phil.Qualls@nrc.gov E-mail: John.Mateychick@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, 

http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. 
IN 2009-29 

Page 3 of 3 

that can potentially prevent a fire pump from starting through one of these fire areas and has 

installed a water-based automatic fire suppression system in the area, it may not meet the 

automatic fire suppression requirement. 

National Fire Protection Association Standard 20, “Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal 

Fire Pumps,” 1983 Edition, states that control circuits leaving or entering the fire pump controller 

shall be so arranged as to prevent failure to start due to a fault. Licensees may have this 

standard as part of their approved fire protection program. 

CONTACT 

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this 

matter to the technical contacts listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation (NRR) project manager. 

/RA/ /RA/ 

Timothy J. McGinty, Director Daniel H. Dorman, Director 

Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

/RA/ 

Glenn Tracy, Director 

Division of Construction Inspection 

 and Operational Programs 

Office of New Reactors 

Technical Contacts: Phil M. Qualls, NRR John M. Mateychick, Region IV 

 817-276-6550 817-276-6560 

 E-mail: Phil.Qualls@nrc.gov E-mail: John.Mateychick@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, 

http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. 

ADAMS Accession Number: ML091880072 ME1663 

OFFICE AFPB:DRA TECH EDITOR BC:AFPB:DRA D:DRA LA:PGCB:DPR 

NAME PQualls KAzariah-Kribbs AKlein DFrumkin for MCunningham CHawes 

DATE 10/13/09 via e-mail 9/15/09 via e-mail 10/22/09 10/22/09 11/2/09 

OFFICE PGCB:DPR BC:PGCB:DPR D:DPR D:DCIP:NRO D:DFCSS:NMSS 

NAME DBeaulieu MMurphy TMcGinty GTracy DDorman 

DATE 10/30/09 11/3/09 11/24/09 11/13/09 11/23/09 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY