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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CARON SPENCER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CRAIG MACDONALD, and 

JACK TAEFF, 

Defendants. 

 /

Case No. 14-cv-13858 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

R. STEVEN WHALEN

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE [30] 

I. INTRODUCTION

Caron Spencer (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on October 6, 2014 

against Craig MacDonald and Jack Taeff (collectively, “Defendants”). See Dkt. 

No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used excessive force against him and 

falsely arrested/detained/seized him during a traffic stop in Inkster, Michigan, in 

October 2012. See id. at 2. 

Plaintiff has filed a Motion in Limine in preparation for trial [30], which 

seeks to exclude three evidentiary issues. Dkt. No. 30, p. 2 (Pg. ID No. 506). The 

Court has reviewed and considered the Motion and supporting brief, and the entire 

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record of this matter, and also conducted a hearing on this matter on May 2, 2016, 

where the Court heard arguments on the issues. 

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY

in part Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [30]. The Court’s Opinion and Order is set 

forth in detail below. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion in limine refers to “any motion, whether made before or during 

trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually 

offered.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). The purpose of a 

motion in limine is to eliminate “evidence that is clearly inadmissible for any 

purpose” before trial. Ind. Ins. Co. v. GE, 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 

2004). A district court rules on evidentiary motions in limine “to narrow the issues 

remaining for trial and to minimize disruptions at trial.” United States v. Brawner, 

173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999). The guiding principle is to “ensure evenhanded 

and expeditious management of trials.” Ind. Ins., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 846. 

Although neither the Federal Rules of Evidence, nor the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure explicitly authorize a court to rule on an evidentiary motion in 

limine, the Supreme Court has allowed district courts to rule on motions in limine

“pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” 

See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 n.4. District courts are granted very broad discretion in 

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determining whether the probative value of evidence outweighs any danger of 

unfair prejudice. United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1989). 

A district court should grant a motion to exclude evidence in limine “only 

when [that] evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Ind. Ins., 

326 F. Supp. 2d at 846. In cases where that high standard is not met, “evidentiary 

rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and 

potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” Id. Denial of a motion to 

exclude evidence in limine does not necessarily mean that the court will admit the 

evidence at trial. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. “[E]ven if nothing unexpected happens 

at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter 

a previous in limine ruling.” Id. at 41–42. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [30] addresses three separate evidentiary issues: 

(1) that Plaintiff was alleged to have spit in the patrol vehicle; (2) that Plaintiff 

spent the night after this incident at a party and/or at a motel with a female friend; 

and (3) the criminal backgrounds of witnesses called by Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 30, p. 2 

(Pg. ID No. 506). A discussion of the Motion is below. 

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1. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Excluding 

Evidence of Plaintiff Spitting in the Patrol Vehicle 

First, Plaintiff seeks to exclude the allegation that he spit in Lieutenant 

Grady’s vehicle. Dkt. No. 30, p. 2 (Pg. ID No. 506). The fact that Plaintiff spit 

inside the patrol vehicle is not in dispute. See Dkt. No. 24-4, pp. 58–59 (Pg. ID No. 

199–200) (admitting to spitting in the patrol vehicle); Dkt. No. 24-2, p. 18 (Pg. ID 

No. 115) (recalling that Plaintiff spit in the patrol vehicle); Dkt. No. 24-3, p. 22 

(Pg. ID No. 140) (same); Dkt. No. 24-9, p. 14 (Pg. ID No. 350) (same). 

Nevertheless, the Court must examine whether this conduct is relevant to the 

claims in this case. 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that evidence is relevant if “it has any 

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence” and that fact “is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R.

EVID. 401. Only relevant evidence is admissible. FED. R. EVID. 402. 

Plaintiff cites to Sayler v. Gilbert, No. 2:08-CV-516, 2010 WL 4117453 

(S.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2010), in support of his argument that evidence of his spitting 

in the patrol vehicle should be excluded. Dkt. No. 30, pp. 6–7 (Pg. ID No. 510–11). 

In Sayler, the district court provisionally granted the plaintiff’s motion to exclude 

evidence of the plaintiff’s conviction for spitting on a police officer 45 minutes 

after the assault, stating that “[t]he significant lapse of time between the alleged 

assault and the spitting incident make the later event, which is not at issue, 

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unrelated to the earlier events.” 2010 WL 4117453, at *1. However, here, unlike in 

Sayler, the spitting occurred in close temporal proximity to the alleged use of 

force, lacking a “significant lapse of time” between the events. Additionally 

distinguishing is that Plaintiff was not convicted for harassment with a bodily 

substance, as Sayler was, so this evidence is not governed by standards for 

admissibility for criminal convictions against a plaintiff. 

In the present case, one of the issues to be litigated is whether Defendant 

MacDonald had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for drunk and disorderly conduct. 

Plaintiff asserts that he was sober at the time of the incident and politely complied 

with orders from the officers, whereas Defendants assert that Plaintiff was out of 

control that evening. Accordingly, due to this dispute of fact, Plaintiff’s conduct in 

the moments surrounding his removal from the car and his arrest are relevant to the 

case. See Edwards v. Thomas, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1073–74 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 

(finding that a plaintiff’s behavior “following so shortly on the heels of his arrest 

. . . [and] not so much ‘after’ the alleged excessive force incident” was “part of the 

continuing interaction” between the plaintiff and police officer such that it was 

relevant to whether the officer’s actions were reasonable). 

As the evidence of Plaintiff’s spitting is relevant, the inquiry then turns on 

whether it is unfairly prejudicial. “ ’Unfair prejudice’ means the undue tendency to 

suggest a decision based on improper considerations; it ‘does not mean the 

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damage to a [party’s] case that results from the legitimate probative force of the 

evidence.’ ” Doe v. Clairborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 515 (6th Cir. 1996) 

(quoting United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis 

added). Evidence of the spitting incident does not support Plaintiff’s claim that he 

politely complied with officers and was neither drunk nor disorderly that evening, 

such that there was no basis for his arrest. However, the fact that this relevant 

evidence damages Plaintiff’s claims is not sufficient grounds upon which to 

exclude it, since it is highly probative of the continuing interaction between 

Plaintiff and the troopers that evening. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s request to exclude evidence of spitting in Lieutenant 

Grady’s vehicle is DENIED without prejudice to renewal in the context of the 

trial. 

2. The Court Will Grant in Part and Deny in Part Plaintiff’s Motion in 

Limine as to Excluding Evidence that the Plaintiff Spent the Night at 

a Party and Motel with a Female Friend Following the Incident. 

Second, Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence relating to the fact that he spent 

the night following the incident at a party and a motel with a female friend. Dkt. 

No. 30, p. 2 (Pg. ID No. 506). Plaintiff asserts that this evidence is not relevant, as 

it pertains to conduct that occurred after the alleged use of excess force. Id. 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that “[a]s a result of Defendants’ illegal 

actions, [he] suffered injuries and damages.” Dkt. No. 1, pp. 3, 5 (Pg. ID No. 3, 5). 

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Accordingly, the issues in this case involve Defendants’ conduct and the injuries 

Plaintiff suffered. Specifically, Plaintiff has argued that he sustained bruises on 

both his wrists and had difficulty swallowing the night of the incident, making the 

extent of his physical injuries relevant to the present dispute. See Dkt. No. 26, p. 13 

(Pg. ID No. 389); Dkt. No. 26-2, p. 11 (Pg. ID No. 414). In the Joint Final Pretrial 

Order, Plaintiff also alleges damages from a “neck injury.” 

Since Plaintiff is alleging that he suffered physical injuries from 

MacDonald’s conduct, the extent of his physical injuries is relevant to the damages 

he seeks. Plaintiff’s ability to engage in social activities immediately following the 

incident—particularly those involving his ability to swallow, such as eating and 

drinking—is particularly relevant because there is no other evidence provided to 

document the extent of his injuries, such as medical records or photographs. Due to 

the absence of evidence regarding Plaintiff’s physical injuries, and the fact that the 

nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries are in dispute, the probative value of this 

issue far outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice. However, the fact that Plaintiff 

spent the night in a motel with a female friend, although relevant, is more 

prejudicial than probative, so the Court will exclude that part of the proffered 

testimony. 

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to exclude evidence that he spent the night 

after this incident at a party is and at a motel with a female friend is GRANTED in 

part DENIED in part without prejudice to renewal in the context of the trial. 

3. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Excluding 

Evidence of His Witnesses’ Criminal Backgrounds. 

Finally, Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence relating to the criminal 

backgrounds of witnesses he calls to testify. Dkt. No. 30, p. 2 (Pg. ID No. 506). 

Plaintiff argues that this evidence is more prejudicial than probative. Id. Plaintiff 

states that “any” evidence of his witnesses’ prior criminal history is irrelevant to 

the issues presented and in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Dkt. No. 

30, pp. 8–9 (Pg. ID No. 512–13). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that 

“[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 

presenting cumulative evidence.” 

However, while Rule 403 provides guidelines regarding relevance and 

potential prejudice that govern all evidence, Rules 608 and 609 are specifically on 

point with regard to this issue. Rule 608 prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to 

prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the 

witness’s character for truthfulness, with the exception of criminal convictions 

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under Rule 609. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Specifically, Rule 609 provides the 

following rules for attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness, utilizing 

evidence of a criminal conviction: “for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, 

was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence 

. . . must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 

609(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Evidence of criminal convictions over 10 years old 

may only be admissible if the probative value substantially outweighs the 

prejudicial effect and the adverse party has been provided reasonable written notice 

of the proponent’s intent to use the evidence. FED. R. EVID. 609(b). 

Rule 609 applies to the use of certain evidence of criminal conduct for 

impeachment purposes but does not bar the use of such evidence “for other 

purposes,” as allowed by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Thus, while the 

witnesses’ criminal history may not be admitted “to prove [their] character,” it may 

be admissible to prove things such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” FED. R. EVID. 

404(b). When considering the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), the 

Court must (1) make a preliminary determination as to whether sufficient evidence 

exists that the prior act occurred; (2) make a determination as to whether the “other 

act” is admissible for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); and (3) determine 

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whether the “other acts” evidence is more prejudicial than probative under Rule 

403. United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2001). 

In the present case, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with sufficient 

information to consider the issue in light of Rules 404(b) and 609. Specifically, 

Plaintiff has provided no evidence of criminal convictions or the sentences that 

may have been imposed in connection with those convictions. See Dkt. No. 30, pp. 

8–10 (Pg. ID No. 512–14). It would be improvident, in the Court’s opinion, to 

weigh the factors contemplated by Rule 403 based on the broad issue of “criminal 

history,” rather than on specific information regarding the offenses in question. See 

Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975) 

(“Orders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be 

employed [because a] better practice is to deal with questions of admissibility of 

evidence as they arise.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to exclude evidence of his witnesses’ 

criminal histories is DENIED without prejudice to renewal in the context of the 

trial. 

IV. CONCLUSION

These are the preliminary rulings of the Court. The Court emphasizes that 

“[a] ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or advisory, 

opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court . . . the district 

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court may change its ruling at trial for whatever reason it deems appropriate,” and 

“where sufficient facts have developed to warrant the change.” United States v. 

Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Luce, 713 F.2d 

1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983) aff’d, 469 U.S. 38 (1984)). 

Accordingly, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiff’s 

Motion in Limine [30]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 3, 2016 

 /s/Gershwin A Drain 

 HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN 

 United States District Court Judge

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