Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jonathan M. Young

Law Office of Jonathan M. Young, P.C.

Newburgh, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR 

APPELLEE RYAN DEJEAN

Laurie Baiden Bumb

Bumb Law Office, LLC

Evansville, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Bryan J. Jackson,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Samantha DeJean,

Appellee-Petitioner,

Ryan DeJean,

Appellee-Intervenor.

February 2, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-DC-1410

Appeal from the Warrick Superior 

Court

The Honorable Krista Hamby 

Weiberg, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

87D01-2101-DC-97

87D02-2002-JP-26

Opinion by Judge Mathias

Judges Tavitas and Foley concur.

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024 Page 2 of 14

[1] B.J., the biological father of M.D., filed a petition to establish paternity to 

M.D., who was born to S.D. (“Mother”) during her marriage to R.D. After 

S.D.’s marriage to R.D. was dissolved, B.J. and Mother married and had 

another child, J.J. Mother later filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to B.J. 

R.D., Mother’s former husband and the putative father of M.D., was allowed to 

intervene in B.J.’s paternity action. 

[2] In B.J.’s separate paternity action concerning M.D., the trial court denied R.D. 

any custodial or visitation rights to M.D., awarded Mother “modified legal 

custody” of M.D., and awarded B.J. parenting time with M.D. In the 

dissolution action between Mother and B.J., Mother was awarded custody of 

J.J. with B.J. having parenting time. Shortly thereafter, the trial judge resigned. 

Mother and R.D. then filed motions to reconsider and to correct error in 

Mother’s dissolution action with B.J. and in the paternity action, which were 

considered by the successor trial judge. 

[3] The successor trial judge reviewed the transcripts and issued modified orders in 

both cases. The subsequent order in the paternity case awarded joint custody of 

M.D. to Mother and R.D. and allowed those parties to determine B.J.’s 

parenting time. In the dissolution proceeding between Mother and B.J., the 

successor trial judge reduced B.J.’s parenting time with J.J.

[4] B.J. appeals, raising the following dispositive issue: whether the successor trial 

judge erred when the judge reweighed the evidence and the credibility of the 
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witnesses in issuing her orders granting Mother’s and R.D.’s motions to correct 

error and reconsider.

[5] Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse and remand for 

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

[6] Mother and R.D. were married for seven years and they had two daughters. 

During the marriage, Mother became pregnant with M.D., a son, who was born 

in October 2018. R.D. believed he was M.D.’s biological father but shortly after 

M.D.’s birth, R.D. took a paternity test and learned that he was not M.D.’s 

biological father. 

[7] Mother and R.D.’s marriage was dissolved in November 2019. In the 

dissolution decree, the parties agreed that R.D. was not M.D.’s biological 

father.

[8] In Fall 2019, Mother, her two daughters and M.D. moved into B.J.’s residence.

On February 12, 2020, B.J. (hereinafter “Father”) filed a petition to establish 

paternity to M.D. Mother and Father were married in July 2020 and had 

another child, J.J., who was born in October 2020. 

[9] On January 20, 2021, Mother filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to 

Father.1 Shortly thereafter, Mother and R.D. modified their dissolution decree 

1 During Mother’s and Father’s marriage, Father’s oldest child, S.J., alleged that Father molested her. 
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and agreed that M.D. was a child born of the marriage, and the trial court 

approved of their modification of the decree. Thereafter, R.D. began to pay 

child support for M.D.

[10] The trial court consolidated the paternity case and Mother and Father’s 

dissolution case for the purpose of conducting hearings. However, each case 

retained its own case number. In August, R.D. filed a motion to intervene in 

both cases and argued that he was M.D.’s legal and/or de facto custodian. The 

trial court granted R.D.’s motion to intervene in the paternity case.

[11] The court held evidentiary hearings across several days in early 2022. The 

parties presented conflicting evidence concerning Father’s and R.D.’s roles in 

providing care and support for M.D. Mother presented evidence that Father 

had not seen M.D. and J.J. for several months, while Father claimed that 

Mother had refused to allow Father to have parenting time with either child.

[12] On June 8, 2022, the trial court issued a consolidated final order in both cases. 

With respect to the issues presented in this appeal, the trial court found:

1. This Order is in the best interest of the children.

***

4. The Mother shall have modified joint legal custody of the 

minor children, [M.D. and J.J.]. The Mother shall consult and 

discuss major decisions regarding the minor children concerning 

the upbringing of the children, including decisions regarding 

education, healthcare, religion, and extracurricular activities. In 

the event of a dispute between the parties, the Mother’s decision 
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regarding the children shall be final until further order of the 

court. Mother shall consult and discuss major decisions regarding 

the child with the Father, and shall only make a major decision 

regarding the children after significant and meaningful 

communication between the Father and the Mother. Any 

decision by the Mother regarding the minor child is subject to 

review by the Court.

5. The Father shall have Parenting Time with the children one 

time per week for a period of up to three (3) hours, supervised by 

a third-party supervisor such as Mike Jones or similar. These 

visits can occur at a place as determined by the Father. The 

Father shall pay for the supervisor. The visits shall occur on 

Saturdays unless the Father has to work on Saturday and as 

otherwise agreed to between the parties.

6. The Father shall be allowed to attend school functions, extracurricular activities, and other functions involving the minor 

children that occur at school or other businesses/entities without 

the necessity of a supervised parenting time provider present.

***

23. [R.D.] shall have no custody or visitation rights to the minor 

child [M.D.].

Appellant’s App. pp. 66-69. The court also ordered Father to pay child support 

in the amount of $207 per week. Finally, the court concluded that the de facto 

custodian statute did not give the court authority to grant visitation between 

R.D. and M.D. Id. at 69. Shortly after issuing the final orders in this case, the 

trial judge resigned.
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[13] Before the successor judge was appointed, Mother and R.D. filed joint motions

to reconsider and to correct error. They argued that the trial court’s ruling was 

not supported by the evidence presented, and that the trial court erred as a 

matter of law when the court concluded that R.D. was not M.D.’s de facto 

custodian. Mother and R.D. claimed that the evidence established awarding 

joint legal and physical custody of M.D. to Mother and R.D. was in M.D.’s 

best interests. Father filed a timely response, and the trial court scheduled a 

hearing on the motion.

[14] The successor judge was appointed on November 28, 2022. The new judge held 

a hearing on Mother’s and R.D.’s motions on January 11, 2023. The parties 

informed the judge that the basis of the motions was whether the originally 

presented evidence supported the judgment. The court told the parties it would 

listen to the recorded hearings before ruling on the motions. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 170-

71, 174.

[15] The court held another hearing on April 5. At that hearing, the court stated that 

it had listened to the original evidentiary hearings, and the court then allowed 

the parties to present argument on the pending motions. Father argued that the 

court should deny the motions because the prior trial judge was in a better 

position to weigh the evidence after observing the demeanor of the witnesses. 

Id. at 201.

[16] On May 26, the trial court issued its order granting Mother’s and R.D.’s 

motions to reconsider and correct error in the paternity case. In its order, the 
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court initially addressed the fact that it did not preside over the evidentiary 

hearings but had listened to the recorded evidentiary hearings. After listening to 

the hearings, the court concluded that a new trial was not necessary. 

Appellant’s App. p. 30. The court then issued its own findings of fact, which are 

set forth below in relevant part:

3. Following [M.D.’s] birth, R.D. believed he was the biological 

father of the child, due in part to the deception of both [Mother] 

and [Father], at [Father’s] insistence, that [R.D.] be convinced 

that he was the child’s father.

4. [R.D.] and Mother have jointly and consistently provided the 

primary care for [M.D.] since his birth. When not residing 

together, they have alternated weeks with [M.D.] and [R.D.] has 

cared for [M.D.] many other times.

5. [Father] has provided minimal care for [M.D.].

6. [Father] had no contact with [M.D.] at all until he was 6 

months old. [Father] exercised no parenting time and had no 

contact with the child for extended periods of time, including 

from January, 2021 through at least June, 2022, and he made no 

effort to see [M.D.].

7. [R.D.] has been the primary provider for [M.D.’s] needs since 

birth. He has provided for [M.D.’s] housing and he assisted 

[Mother] financially to obtain her own home after [Father] 

evicted [Mother] and the children out of his home.

8. [R.D.] has provided for [M.D.’s] other needs, including food, 

clothing, health insurance, health care expenses, child care and 

other expenses. He also pays weekly child support for [M.D.]. 

[Mother] has contributed financially to [M.D.’s] needs as her 

income would allow. [Father] has provided very little for [M.D.]

and does not pay any child support for [M.D.], despite earning a 

fairly substantial income.
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9. Before [M.D.’s] birth, [Father] made it clear that he did not 

want to be [M.D.’s] father. [Father] acquiesced in [R.D.’s] 

parental relationship with [M.D.] since [M.D.’s] birth. [Father] 

did not request the amendment of [M.D.’s] birth certificate that 

showed [R.D.] as the father. [Father] did not request that [M.D.] 

be given his last name. [Father] did not object to [R.D.] caring 

for the child in alternate weeks, even during his marriage to 

[Mother]. [Father] did not object to [R.D.] coming to his home 

during [Mother’s] parenting time on alternate weeks to see 

[M.D.] and [R.D.’s] other children. [Father] did not intervene or 

correct [M.D.] when he called [R.D.] “Daddy”. [Father] 

acquiesced in [R.D.] being the primary provider for [M.D.’s] 

needs and did not contribute or offer to contribute to the support 

of [M.D.].

10. [R.D.] and [M.D.] have a very close and loving relationship. 

The emotional bond between them has grown even stronger over 

time. [M.D.] also has close and loving relationships with his 

Mother, . . . his siblings, [R.D.’s] parents and other family 

members, and [Mother’s] family members. [R.D.] provides 

stability and security for [M.D.]. [R.D.’s] love, devotion, and 

care for [M.D.] has never wavered. He has continued to provide 

and love [M.D.] without interruption and without change.

11. [Father] has no relationship with [M.D.]. His involvement in 

[M.D.’s] life has been minimal at best. [Father’s] family members 

are not close to [M.D.] and would focus on [Father’s] other child, 

[S.J.], and ignore [M.D.] during his marriage to [Mother].

12. [Father] has been determined to have sexually abused his 

daughter, [S.J.], which [sic] she was 6 years old. The Warrick 

County Department of Child Services substantiated these 

allegations and [Father] failed a polygraph test administered by 

the Indiana State Police. [Father] agreed to participate in a 

therapeutic program for sex offenders, and his parenting time 

with [S.J.] and his younger child with [Mother], [J.J.], w[as] 

limited and supervised. [Father] exercised such parenting time 

inconsistently and sporadically.
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13. [Father] is not a fit and proper person to have custodial rights 

with respect to [M.D.], who will be 5 years old in October 2023.

14. The trial court erred in its June 8, 2022 Order by ruling that 

[R.D.] has no custody and visitation rights to [M.D.]. The trial 

court erroneously based its ruling on the inaccurate premise that 

[R.D.] sought visitation rights with [M.D.] The evidence is 

undisputed that [R.D.] has consistently requested that he and 

[Mother] share equal joint 50-50 legal and physical custody of 

[M.D.], as they have done since his birth. The statute and case 

law cited in the June 8, 2022 Order in support of this ruling are

not relevant or applicable to the facts of this case.

Appellant’s App. pp. 30-33. 

[17] The court also found that R.D. had met the statutory criteria to be considered 

M.D.’s de facto custodian. Id. at 33. The court concluded that it was in M.D.’s 

best interests to award equal legal and physical custody of M.D. to Mother and 

R.D. Id. at 36. Finally, the court found that Father would not be awarded any 

custody rights to M.D. but would have “such supervised parenting time with 

[M.D.] as may be agreed upon by [Mother and R.D.]” Id. at 36-37.

[18] On June 1, the court issued a separate order granting Mother’s post-trial motion 

in Mother’s and Father’s dissolution proceeding. The court reduced Father’s 

parenting time with J.J. from three hours of supervised time per week to one 

hour every other week.

[19] Father now appeals. R.D. filed an Appellee’s brief, but Mother does not 

participate in this appeal.
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Discussion and Decision

[20] Father presents the following dispositive issue for our review: whether the 

successor trial judge erred by reweighing the evidence and the credibility of the 

witnesses when ruling on the parties’ post-trial motions. In the June 8, 2022,

order, the original trial court judge did not issue factual findings in support of 

the judgment, but the judge specifically found that its custody decision was in 

the best interest of M.D. and J.J. Appellant’s App. p. 66. Mother and R.D. filed 

motions to reconsider and to correct error. In part, Mother and R.D. claimed 

that the evidence established awarding joint legal and physical custody of M.D. 

to Mother and R.D. was in M.D.’s best interests. Mother also challenged the 

trial court’s decision to award Father parenting time with J.J.

[21] The successor judge informed the parties that she would listen to the evidence 

presented during the original evidentiary hearings that the first trial court judge 

had presided over. Indiana Trial Rule 63(A) provides that 

The judge who presides at the trial of a cause or a hearing at 

which evidence is received shall, if available, hear motions and 

make all decisions and rulings required to be made by the court 

relating to the evidence and the conduct of the trial or hearing

after the trial or hearing is concluded. If the judge before whom the 

trial or hearing was held is not available by reason of death, sickness, 

absence or unwillingness to act, then any other judge regularly sitting in 

the judicial circuit or assigned to the cause may perform any of the duties 

to be performed by the court; but if he is satisfied that he cannot perform 

those duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, 

he may in his discretion grant a new trial or new hearing, in whole or in 

part.
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(Emphasis added.)

[22] Citing Rule 63(A), Father acknowledges that a new trial is not required in every 

case. However, Father directs our attention to Urbanational Developers, Inc., et al. 

v Shamrock Engineering, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 416, 372 N.E.2d 742 (1978), wherein 

our court considered the problem that arises under Trial Rule 63(A) when “the 

successor judge is confronted with issues involving the trial judge’s familiarity 

with the evidence.” Id. at 420, 372 N.E.2d at 746. In Urbanational, our court 

observed that, in many cases, the successor judge may resolve post-trial issues 

and motions by reviewing the trial transcripts. Id. at 420-21, 372 N.E.2d at 746. 

On the other hand, a successor judge may be “ill-equipped to perform the 

functions of the regular trial judge” when the successor judge “is confronted 

with an issue which requires for its resolution a determination of the credibility 

of witnesses or the weight to be accorded certain evidence.” Id. at 421, 773 

N.E.2d at 746. 

[23] In the latter circumstance, Rule 63(A) allows the successor judge to grant a new 

trial or hearing, in whole or in part, when the judge believes he or she cannot 

perform the duties of the regular trial judge because he or she did not preside at 

trial. Id. Our court observed that,

[w]hen a successor judge attempts to resolve questions of 

credibility and weight of evidence without having had an 

opportunity to hear the evidence and observe the demeanor of 

witnesses, he [or she] is depriving a party of an essential element 

of the trial process. Such an undertaking by the successor judge is 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before 
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the court and amounts to an abuse of discretion. To hold 

otherwise would be to grant a power of review to the successor 

judge that is not even claimed by appellate courts.

Id. (citation omitted). 

[24] More recently, in In re I.P., 5 N.E.3d 750, 752 (Ind. 2014), our supreme court 

held that, where the magistrate who presided over a termination-of-parentalrights fact-finding hearing resigned before reporting its findings and conclusions 

to the trial judge, the trial court was required to hold a new evidentiary hearing. 

The trial court’s failure to do so violated the parent’s due process rights. Id. In 

particular, our supreme court noted:

A party is entitled to a determination of the issues by the judge 

who heard the evidence, and, where a case is tried to a judge who 

resigns before determining the issues, a successor judge cannot 

decide the issues or enter findings without a trial de novo. When 

a successor judge who did not hear the evidence or observe the 

witnesses’ demeanor attempts to weigh evidence and make 

credibility determinations, the judge “is depriving a party of an 

essential element of the trial process.” 

It is precisely because the judge or magistrate presiding at a 

termination hearing has a superior vantage point for assessing 

witness credibility and weighing evidence that we give great 

deference to a trial court’s decision to terminate a parent’s rights. 

But in this case, the magistrate who reported recommended 

findings and conclusions to the judge did not hear the evidence 

or observe the witnesses firsthand.

Id. at 752 (citations omitted). Although our supreme court’s analysis was not 

under Trial Rule 63(A) as there was no final judgment issued by the trial judge, 

the violation to the parent’s due process rights occurred for the same reasons 
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discussed in our court’s Urbanational decision and is entirely consistent with the 

logic and policy underlying Rule 63(A).

[25] Father’s claim of error must also be considered in light of our well-established 

preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in 

family law matters because the judge presiding at a family law evidentiary 

hearing has a superior vantage point for assessing witness credibility and 

weighing evidence. E.g., Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). Our 

supreme court has also observed that reviewing courts “‘are in a poor position 

to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who 

saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as 

it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of 

the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)). 

[26] Father raised these precise concerns with the successor trial judge because the 

judge had only reviewed the transcript of the hearings. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 201. For 

example, the parties had presented conflicting evidence at the original 

evidentiary hearings with respect to the care and support Father had provided 

during M.D.’s life after the parties determined that R.D. was not M.D.’s 

biological father. The parties also presented conflicting evidence as to R.D.’s 

role in M.D.’s life while Father and Mother resided together before and during 

their marriage. While Mother presented evidence that Father had not seen 

either M.D. or J.J. for several months prior to the evidentiary hearings, Father 

testified that Mother refused to allow him to see the children while the paternity 

and dissolution matters were pending.
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[27] Mother’s and R.D.’s post-trial motions argued that the trial court’s original 

order in the paternity and dissolution hearings was not supported by the 

evidence. In ruling on the motions, the successor judge improperly reweighed 

the evidence and improperly reassessed the credibility of the witnesses based on 

her reading of the transcript. The successor judge did not hold a new 

evidentiary hearing in whole or in part, and, thus, she did not have an 

opportunity to hear the evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses for 

herself.

[28] For all of these reasons, the trial court abused its discretion when it deviated 

from the direction provided under Trial Rule 63(A) and issued new findings of 

fact and new conclusions of law based only upon a review of the transcripts. 

“To hold otherwise would be to grant a power of review to the successor judge 

that is not even claimed by appellate courts.” See Urbanational, 175 Ind. App. at 

421, 372 N.E.2d at 746. 

[29] Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s orders granting Mother’s and R.D.’s 

post-trial motions and remand for a new, consolidated trial on the parenting 

time and custody issues presented by Mother’s and Father’s divorce case and 

paternity case concerning M.D.

[30] Reversed and remanded for a new, consolidated trial.

Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.