UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CRAIG SERAFINO, WALTER TRIPP, and 

MICHAEL J. SZYMANSKI, on behalf of 

themselves, and others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 Civil Case No. 14-14112 

v. Honorable Linda V. Parker 

CITY OF HAMTRAMCK and CATHY SQUARE, 

 Defendants. 

________________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

 Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action lawsuit against Defendants on 

October 24, 2014. In their Amended Complaint, filed November 12, 2014, 

Plaintiffs allege that by making changes to their retiree health care benefits, 

Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the United States Constitution and 

breached contracts with Plaintiffs. On April 9, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 

Class Certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. (ECF No. 20.) 

That motion has been fully briefed. (ECF No. 23, 26.) The parties also have filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56, to which response briefs have been filed. (ECF Nos. 35, 36, 44, 45.) 

“ ‘[C]onsiderations of fairness and economy’ ” lead this Court to conclude that it 

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should decide the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment before engaging in 

the time-consuming inquiry into certification. See Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 

29 F.3d 238, 240-41 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 545-

56 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 

1984) (“It has never been doubted that a complaint asserting a class action could be 

dismissed on the merits before determining whether the suit could be maintained as 

a class action.”); Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

(citing Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995)) 

(“[A]lthough a certification decision will usually be ‘practicable’ before the case is 

ripe for summary judgment, that will not always be so, and the word ‘practicable 

allows for wiggle room”-- enough to make the order of disposition of motions for 

summary judgment and class certification a question of discretion for the trial 

court.”). 

First, not all of the proposed class members retired under the same collective 

bargaining agreements (“CBAs”). Plaintiffs assert that all of the CBAs under 

which the proposed class members retired promised the same benefits for retirees, 

and they have filed excerpts from the various CBAs to demonstrate this point. In 

fact, however, the contract language is not identical. Moreover, the Court must 

evaluate the full instruments to ascertain the intent of the contracting parties with 

respect to the continuation of retiree health care benefits (including the duration 

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and scope of those benefits). See M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, -- U.S. --, 

135 S. Ct. 926, 937-38 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining that the “ ‘the 

intention of the parties’ ” is “gathered from the whole instrument. . . .”) (emphasis 

added). As a result, until this Court fully evaluates the relevant agreements, it 

cannot assess whether all of the retirees in the proposed class in fact were promised 

the same retiree health care benefits. The Court is not able to evaluate the 

commonality and typicality requirements for class certification until it makes this 

assessment. Certainly, the Court will need to fully evaluate the relevant 

agreements to evaluate the parties’ summary judgment pleadings. Thus it seems 

most efficient to start by doing so there. 

Further, while Plaintiffs seek to include all retirees in the class, the CBAs 

provide different coverage for individuals under the age of sixty-five and those 

over sixty-five who are eligible for Medicare. It is not evident from the parties’ 

pleadings with respect to class certification whether Defendants’ challenged 

conduct impacts these two groups in the same way. Further, none of the named 

Plaintiffs are over sixty-five years old. Thus until the Court is satisfied that the 

two groups are similarly situated, it cannot conclude that their claims are common 

and typical or that the named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of all putative 

class members. 

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Finally, Plaintiffs will suffer no prejudice if their motion for class 

certification is decided after the summary judgment motions. The named 

Plaintiffs’ claims must survive summary judgment regardless of whether this case 

is certified as a class action. If the claims do survive, the Court will be better 

equipped to decide whether class certification is appropriate and, if so, which 

retirees are properly in the class. If summary judgment is granted in Defendants’ 

favor, the absent class members will not be bound by the judgment, since no class 

was ever certified. 

For these reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification is 

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: March 23, 2016 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, March 23, 2016, by electronic and/or U.S. 

First Class mail. 

 s/ Richard Loury 

 Case Manager 

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