J-S17011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ERIC D. HANCOCK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1465 WDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0012895-2007

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: July 10, 2023

Eric D. Hancock appeals pro se from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County, dismissing without a hearing his petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. After our review, we affirm.

This Court previously set forth a brief recitation of the facts and recent 

procedural history of this case: 

[I]n 2007, when [Hancock] was 16 years old, he robbed the 

A&E Deli in Carrick Borough and shot the store clerk in the 

chest, killing him. [Following a non-jury trial before the 

Honorable Jeffrey A. Manning, Hancock was found] guilty of 

Second-Degree Murder, Robbery, Possession of a Firearm 

by a Minor, and Carrying a Firearm Without a License. On 

July 3, 2008, [Judge Manning] sentenced [Hancock], in 

relevant part, to life imprisonment without parole (“LWOP”) 

on the Second-Degree Murder conviction. This Court 

affirmed the Judgment of Sentence, and the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Hancock, 984 A.2d 1013 (Pa. Super. 
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2009) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 996 

A.2d 491 (Pa. 2010). On March 22, 2016, [Hancock] filed a 

[PCRA p]etition [] asserting that his LWOP sentence was 

unconstitutional under Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460

(2012)1], and Montgomery [v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 

(2016)]. The PCRA court granted relief, vacated 

[Hancock’s] sentence, and scheduled the case for 

resentencing. 

At the resentencing hearing, [Judge Manning] heard expert 

testimony[, presented by Hancock,] from psychologist 

Samuel K. Schachner, Ph.D., victim impact testimony, and

[Hancock’s] allocution. After reviewing Dr. Schachner’s 

report, the sentencing court acknowledged, “that 

[Hancock], as he stands here, is a different man than he 

was when he was sentenced, and perhaps a different man 

[than] he was when he committed the crime.” N.T. 

Resentencing, 3/21/18, at 23. Nevertheless, the court 

stated that it must also consider the severity of the crime 

and the victim impact statement, and ultimately concluded 

that [a] sentence of 40 years to life was required for the 

protection of the public. 

Commonwealth v. Hancock, 851 WDA 2018 (Pa. Super. filed July 9, 2019)

(unpublished memorandum decision). 

Hancock filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied, and on appeal 

to this Court he challenged the legality of his sentence. Hancock argued the 

sentencing court did not articulate, on the record, how it considered each of 

the individualized factors set forth in Miller, supra, and Commonwealth v. 

Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 458 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II).2 This Court affirmed, finding 

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1 Miller held that mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile 

offenders violate the Eighth Amendment.

2 Batts was abrogated by Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021), 

which held that for purposes of Eighth Amendment, the state’s discretionary 

sentencing system is constitutionally sufficient. 
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no manifest abuse of discretion in the court’s imposition of a new sentence of 

40 years to life for second-degree murder.

3

 See Hancock, supra at 6. On 

December 4, 2019, our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Hancock, 221 A.3d 648 (Pa. 2019) (Table). 

On July 9, 2020, Hancock filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, which was 

later stayed on December 6, 2021. On May 17, 2022, Hancock filed a pro se

motion to proceed pro se and a motion for leave to file a supplemental petition. 

On May 23, 2022, Hancock filed a pro se supplemental PCRA petition and 

memorandum of law. On June 28, 2022, Hancock appeared before the 

Honorable Alexander P. Bicket, represented by counsel, and, following a 

colloquy, the court granted Hancock’s motion to proceed pro se and granted 

counsel leave to withdraw. The court ordered the Commonwealth to file a 

response to Hancock’s pro se supplemental PCRA petition and, on August 24, 

2022, the court issued notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907.

On November 23, 2022, the court dismissed Hancock’s petition. This 

appeal followed. Both the PCRA court and Hancock have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Hancock raises the following issues: 

1. Whether the PCRA court committed an error of law by 

failing to deem resentencing counsel (Ryan H. James,

Esq.) ineffective, or at the very least hold an 

evidentiary hearing, for his failure to object and/or 

raise on direct review that the resentencing court not 

only committed a reversible error of law, but also 

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3 Judge Manning imposed no further penalty on the remaining counts.
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violated Hancock’s procedural and substantive due 

process rights for failing to provide adequate reasons 

on the record at the time of sentencing for the 

sentence imposed?

2. Whether the PCRA court committed an error of law by 

failing to deem Hancock’s 40-years-to-life sentence 

illegal and/or unconstitutional for the lack of statutory 

authorization that exists for said sentence. 

Appellant’s Brief, at 2.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a PCRA 

petition is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by 

evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 

A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). In evaluating a PCRA 

court’s decision, our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA 

court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party at the trial level. Id. The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations are binding on this Court where the record supports those 

determinations. Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. 

2011). 

Here, Hancock claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

by failing to object to the sentencing court’s failure “to place on the record at 

the time of sentencing, adequate reasons for the judgment of sentence 

imposed.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (“In every case 

in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, modifies 

a sentence, resentences an offender following revocation of probation, county 

intermediate punishment or State intermediate punishment[,] or resentences 
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following remand, the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose 

in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons 

for the sentence imposed.”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(C)(2) (“The judge shall state 

on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed.”). 

It is well-settled that counsel is presumed to have been effective 

and that the petitioner bears the burden of proving counsel's 

alleged ineffectiveness. To overcome this presumption, a 

petitioner must establish that: (1) the underlying substantive 

claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel did not have a reasonable 

basis for his or her act or omission; and (3) the petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel's deficient performance, that is, a 

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s act or omission, the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different. A PCRA 

petitioner must address each of these prongs on appeal. A

petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong of this test is fatal to the 

claim. 

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (citations and 

quotations omitted).

With respect to Hancock’s underlying claim, we conclude that he has 

raised substantial questions meriting our review. See Commonwealth v. 

Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Super. 2017) (substantial question raised 

where appellant argues sentencing court failed to set forth adequate reasons 

for sentence imposed). 

Our standard of review for challenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge. The standard employed when reviewing the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing is very narrow. We may 

reverse only if the sentencing court abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law. A sentence will not be disturbed on 
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appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an 

abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised 

its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. We must accord 

the sentencing court’s decision great weight because it was in the

best position to review the defendant’s character, defiance or 

indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime.

Commonwealth v. Rosario, 248 A.3d 599, 613 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation 

omitted).

After our review, we conclude that Hancock’s claim is meritless. Judge 

Manning held a two-day resentencing hearing, heard testimony as outlined

above, and articulated, on the record, his reasons for imposing Hancock’s 

sentence. As this Court previously observed: “Although the [sentencing] 

court shared its opinion of, and disagreement with, precedential case law 

requiring consideration of [Hancock’s] current maturation as a factor in 

fashioning a new sentence, the court ultimately recognized that it must 

consider both the crime [Hancock] committed and the person he is today.” 

Commonwealth v. Hancock, 851 WDA 2018, at *6, citing N.T. Resentencing

Hearing, 3/21/18, at 15-16, 22-23. Judge Manning stated:

The [c]ourt has carefully considered this matter. Early on, in this 

proceeding, the [c]ourt challenged defense counsel on the issue 

of whether or not [Hancock] was to be sentenced for the crime he 

committed or for the person he is today. And [defense counsel] 

answered that both, and, I believe, legally, he is correct on the 

law, and that is the [c]ourt must consider both. I find it less than 

comfortable to consider the person that he is today, based upon 

the fact that we have centuries of law that deals with the concept

of punishment for commission[] of crimes. . . . While the [c]ourt 

has developed that concept and used that to make changes in 
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what would otherwise be the death penalty i[m]position, the 

bottom line here is that it would appear to me that []Hancock, as 

he stands here, is a different man when he was sentenced than 

he was when he committed the crime. The [c]ourt must always 

look back at the severity of the crime, and as you pointed 

out, I did say that it was willful and deliberate, and the 

question was[,] was the homicide premeditated. Well, we 

all know that the law says that premeditation can occur in 

an instant, and clearly it did here.

Id. at 21-23 (emphasis added). Because we find these reasons adequate, we 

conclude there was no manifest abuse of discretion and, thus, Hancock’s 

sentencing claim is meritless. See Rosario, supra. Consequently, Hancock’s

claim of ineffectiveness fails. Wholaver, supra. 

Next, Hancock argues that his sentence of 40 years to life is “illegal and 

without statutory authority.” Appellant’s Brief, at 21. He claims that the plain 

language of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 makes it clear that “only those juveniles

convicted after June 24, 2012, are to be sentenced/resentenced under those 

guidelines.” Appellant’s Brief, at 16. Hancock was convicted in 2008. He 

claims, therefore, that section 1102.1 is inapplicable to him. 

Hancock’s claim challenges the legality of his sentence. Challenges to 

the legality of a sentence present pure questions of law. Our standard of 

review, therefore, is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citations omitted). 

On June 24, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States issued 

Miller. Thereafter, our General Assembly enacted section 1102.1 

and made it retroactive for juveniles convicted of first or seconddegree murder after June 24, 2012. Moreover, our General 

Assembly amended section 1102 to clarify that it does not 
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apply to juveniles convicted of first or second-degree 

murder after June 24, 2012. Section 1102, therefore, 

applies to adults convicted of first or second-degree 

murder and juveniles convicted of first or second-degree 

murder prior to June 25, 2012.

Commonwealth v. Olds, 192 A.3d 1188, 1193-94 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(emphasis added).

Here, Hancock was convicted in 2008, prior to the effective date of 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 (which sets forth the mandatory minimum and maximum 

sentences for juveniles convicted of first and second-degree murder).4

Hancock is correct that section 1102.1 is inapplicable to him. However, 

because his conviction occurred “prior to June 25, 2012,” see Olds, supra, 

the court had “statutory authorization” when it sentenced him to a maximum 

of life in prison pursuant to section 1102(b).5Indeed, in Olds, “we 

reaffirm[ed] that trial courts must sentence juveniles convicted of 

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4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 provides, in relevant part:

(c) Second degree murder.—A person who has been convicted 

after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the second degree . . . 

and who was under the age of 18 at the time of the 

commission of the offense shall be sentenced as follows:

(1) a person who at the time of the commission of the 

offense was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to 

a term of imprisonment the minimum of which shall 

be at least 30 years to life.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(c)(1) (emphasis added).

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b) provides: “Except as provided under section 1102.1, 

a person who has been convicted of murder of the second degree . . . shall be 

sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.” 
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second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012[,] to a maximum term 

of life imprisonment under section 1102(b).” Id. at 1198 (emphasis 

added). We held “that such mandatory maximums do not violate the Eighth 

Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. See

Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 242 A.3d 667 (Pa. Super. 2020) (when 

resentencing defendant who was convicted of second-degree murder as 

juvenile prior to Miller v. Alabama, supra, post-conviction court had valid 

statutory authority to sentence defendant to 30 years to life imprisonment; 

constitutionally permissible to impose minimum term-of-years sentence and 

maximum sentence of life imprisonment under section 1102(b), thus exposing 

juvenile to parole eligibility upon expiration of minimum sentence). See also 

Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686 (Pa. Super. 2021) (in 

resentencing defendant for second-degree murder he committed as 17-yearold juvenile, sentencing court required to apply traditional sentencing 

considerations under Sentencing Code, rather than sentencing factors set 

forth in Miller and codified in Sentencing Code, where Commonwealth did not 

request LWOP sentence). Accordingly, we reject Hancock’s argument that no 

statutory authority exists for his sentence of 40 years’ to life imprisonment. 

See Derrickson, supra (rejecting argument that there is no statutory basis 

for sentencing juvenile convicted of second-degree murder committed prior to 

Miller).

The PCRA court’s determination is supported by evidence of record and 

is free of legal error. Burkett, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
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Order affirmed.

King, J., Joins the Memorandum.

Olson, J., Concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/10/2023