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55–670 PDF 2010

SNOW DISASTERS FOR LOCAL, 

STATE AND FEDERAL 

GOVERNMENTS IN THE 

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION: 

RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 

PARTNERSHIPS WITH FEMA 

(111–98) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

March 23, 2010 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chair 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

VACANCY 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

VACANCY 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vii 

TESTIMONY 

Arcuri, Patricia, Acting Regional Administrator, FEMA Region III ................... 04 

Beckham, Steward, Director, Office of National Capital Region Coordination .. 04 

Berry, Honorable John, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management ........... 04 

Hartmann, James K., City Manager, City of Alexandria, Virginia ..................... 22 

Kimsey, Carter, President, American Federation of Government Employees 

Local 3034, National Science Foundation .......................................................... 04 

Kubicek, David, Acting Deputy General Manager Operations, Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ................................................................. 22 

Muth, Richard, Director, Maryland Emergency Management Agency, testifying on behalf of National Emergency Management Association ................... 22 

Petersen, Dr. R. Eric, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress .... 22 

Schwartz, Major General Errol R., Commanding General, District of Columbia 

Army National Guard .......................................................................................... 22 

Williams, Millicent, Director, District of Columbia Homeland Security and 

Emergency Management Agency ........................................................................ 22 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 55 

Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, of the District of Columbia ................................. 56 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 59 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Arcuri, Patricia and Beckham, Stweard ................................................................ 63 

Berry, Honorable John ............................................................................................ 84 

Hartmann, James K. ............................................................................................... 93 

Kimsey, Carter ......................................................................................................... 107 

Kubicek, David ......................................................................................................... 114 

Muth, Richard .......................................................................................................... 127 

Petersen, Dr. R. Eric ............................................................................................... 147 

Schwartz, Major General Errol R. .......................................................................... 157 

Williams, Millicent .................................................................................................. 166 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Arcuri, Patricia, Acting Regional Administrator, FEMA Region III, responses 

to questions from the Subcommittee .................................................................. 70 

Berry, Honorable John, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management: ..........

Memorandum from Chief Human Capital Officer ................................................ 88 

Responses to questions from the Subcommittee ......................................... 90 

Kubicek, David, Acting Deputy General Manager Operations, Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, responses to questions from the Subcommittee .............................................................................................................. 124 

Muth, Richard, Director, Maryland Emergency Management Agency, testifying on behalf of National Emergency Management Association, responses 

to questions from the Subcommittee .................................................................. 138 

Schwartz, Major General Errol R., Commanding General, District of Columbia 

Army National Guard, responses to questions from the Subcommittee .......... 164 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

WAMU 88.5 FM American University Radio, Caryn G. Mathes, General Manager, letter ............................................................................................................ 171 

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(1) 

HEARING ON SNOW DISASTERS FOR LOCAL, 

STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS IN 

THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PARTNERSHIPS 

WITH FEMA 

Tuesday, March 23, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC

BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Eleanor 

Holmes Norton [chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Ms. NORTON. Good afternoon and welcome to all, especially our 

witnesses, to today’s hearing to address the status of recovery efforts following this winter’s storms in the National Capital Region 

and the extent to which the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency is implicated. We also want to hear of the lessons learned 

from these severe storms that might apply to future disasters, regardless of cause. 

This season, the National Capital Region experienced an unusually high number, and severity, of winter storms. Between December 18 and 20, up to 20 inches of snow fell in the District of Columbia. According to the National Weather Service, this storm ranked 

among the top ten of all time, not only for the city, but also for the 

entire region, and was rated a Category 3 or ‘‘major’’ winter storm 

on the Northeast Snowfall Impact Scale, also known as NESIS. 

The December storm was quickly outdone in February by backto-back storms of blizzard proportions, which brought well over 30 

inches of snow in most areas of the District. The February storm 

was rated a Category 5 or ‘‘extreme’’ storm, the highest level on the 

NESIS scale, and only the third such storm in 60 years here. Snow 

was as heavy elsewhere in the region or more so, with up to 26 

inches in parts of Virginia and Maryland for the December storm, 

and a combined 50 to 60 inches in parts of Maryland for the February storms. 

Both storms had impacts that were demonstrably larger than expected in the Mid-Atlantic region, including the closing of schools, 

widespread property damage, and unusually severe power outages. 

The Metro bus and rail system, the backbone of our region’s transportation system, had to cease or curtail service during these 

storms. 

2 

All of these results of the snowstorms had serious effects on the 

operations of the Federal Government. The Federal Government 

was every bit as affected as the District of Columbia, Maryland, 

and Virginia. Thus, a disaster in the National Capital Region 

brings unique jurisdictional and operational challenges. Rarely, if 

ever, has a national disaster affected the heart of the Federal Government as the snowstorms of this winter have. Federal offices 

were closed for a day during December and for four days during 

the February snowstorms. 

We will be especially interested in the mitigation and response 

of the Federal Government, particularly questions raised that go to 

vital functions of the U.S. Government, such as security. We will 

assess the operations of the Federal Government during the snowstorms, both separately and as part of the National Capital Region, 

where it is the major job and economic sector. Closely related is the 

Metro rail and bus system, and how it was affected by FEMA and 

the region when there is a natural disaster. When Metro goes 

down, we know for sure so does the Federal Government. 

Most of our witnesses are charged with planning for all unusual 

or unforeseen events in the region. Their job is to prepare for, respond to, and ensure recovery from such events regardless of cause, 

and to mitigate their effects. In doing so they employ an ‘‘all hazards’’ approach, recognizing that while every disaster is unique, 

disasters have significant common elements. For example, the 

steps to plan for events such as a snowstorm or hurricane when 

residents cannot leave their homes are the same as for a pandemic 

or other incident when residents are told to stay in place. 

Today, the Subcommittee will be interested to hear about the approaches that Federal and regional personnel took in response to 

the December and February snowstorms and FEMA’S responses 

and work with all the affected jurisdictions since the snowstorms. 

We look forward to the testimony of all of today’s witnesses and to 

discussing how the Capital Region will address previous and future 

disasters. 

Now, a vote has been called and the Ranking Member is here 

anyway. I am very pleased to see him. I was going to make my 

usual joke about why this Committee Chair will not be on the floor 

voting, but I will now turn to the Ranking Member and ask for his 

opening remarks. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I 

apologize for being a little bit late. Usually I am on time, but you 

now what it was? It was the elevators to get here; I just couldn’t 

get an elevator. 

Ms. NORTON. It wasn’t a snowstorm, though. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. It was not the snowstorm that we were talking 

about today. 

Let me just thank you again, Madam Chairwoman, for your leadership on so many issues, but always on issues that are on the forefront that have to be dealt with. The Chairwoman has been a leader in really effectively advocating for D.C. on a number of areas— 

she doesn’t let us forget—and always working to ensure that our 

Nation’s capital is properly prepared for a disaster, again, whether 

it is a blizzard or a terrorist attack we hope will not come. So again 

I want to thank her for her work and her leadership. 

3 

In December, the National Capital Region was hit by a huge 

snowstorm resulting in, frankly, a major disaster declaration. I 

think it surprised everybody. Then in February this area was hit 

by a back-to-back storm that broke all snowfall records, is my understanding. Some parts of the region had more than three feet of 

snow. The Federal Government shut down, I guess it was four 

days, which is, frankly, without precedent. Businesses and stores 

closed, and those which didn’t close, which remained open, could 

not get supplies to replenish their shelves. The above-ground stations for Metro rail shut down and there were no Metro bus services for days. Roofs and homes and businesses even were damaged 

or collapsed, and mail delivery was even impacted. And, obviously, 

hundreds of thousands lost power and heat. And the schools across 

the area were shut down, as many streets and sidewalks were totally impassible by anyone in the area. 

So while today we are focused on snow disasters, we know that 

the all hazards approach to disasters, we can take the lessons 

learned from this experience to improve on the emergency management capabilities of this area to prepare not only for a snowstorm, 

which we hope will not come again for a long time, but for any future disasters. It is something that we have been speaking in this 

Committee for a long time. 

So in the D.C. area in particular emergency management can be 

very, very complex. As our capital, the Federal Government has a 

large presence, and its decisions during disaster here can have a 

significant impact on the planning and response of State and local 

governments in the entire region. For example, the decisions of 

OPM as to whether or not to close the Federal Government impact 

local plans for clearing streets, for emergency response, and also, 

if necessary, even for evacuations. So, again, it is a huge impact. 

With dozens of Federal law enforcement agencies operating in the 

area, Federal coordination with State and local first responders in 

a disaster obviously becomes a lot more critical. 

It obviously will be important, Madam Chairwoman, today to examine how well coordinated and how the coordination worked 

among all levels of the Government, and what are the lessons, if 

any—and I am sure there were many—that we can learn from 

that. So I hope we can examine these and other issues. I thank the 

witnesses for taking from your valuable time being here today. We 

do not take that for granted. We thank you for that. 

And once again I want to thank the Chairwoman for her leadership in advocating for D.C. But when we look at what happened 

recently, the impact actually really goes beyond D.C., and what can 

be learned here can be applied obviously in other parts of the 

Country and vice versa. So thank you very much. And I know that 

they did call a vote, so I will have to step out again, but then I 

will return. Than you. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Diaz-Balart. And you 

are right, it certainly affected the Nation’s capital. But when I 

wrote to FEMA, I wrote for the entire region, where the Federal 

Government is headquartered, and it is in fact the effect on the 

Federal Government that is as much the reason for this hearing as 

on the local jurisdictions. And, of course, we are interested in 

FEMA and how FEMA is relating to the local jurisdictions, includVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\55670.0 KAYLA
4 

ing the benefits that the local jurisdictions are entitled to because 

of the storms. 

I am going to ask the witnesses to speak in the order in which 

they are sitting at the table, beginning with Ms. Arcuri. Patricia 

Arcuri is the Acting Regional Administrator of FEMA Region III. 

TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA ARCURI, ACTING REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, FEMA REGION III; STEWARD BECKHAM, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION COORDINATION; THE HONORABLE JOHN BERRY, DIRECTOR, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; AND CARTER KIMSEY, 

PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES LOCAL 3034, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 

Ms. ARCURI. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Norton, 

and good afternoon, Ranking Member Diaz-Balart. I am Patricia 

Arcuri. I am the Acting Regional Administrator for the Region III 

Office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. I am here 

today with Mr. Steward Beckham, the Director of FEMA’S Office 

of National Capital Region Coordination. Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss the recent snow disasters 

in the National Capital Region and FEMA’S coordination and support of the National Capital Region for all hazards. 

As the Acting Regional Administrator, I oversee and coordinate 

FEMA’S all hazards preparedness and emergency management efforts in Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. These efforts include developing, implementing, and executing FEMA’S programs and initiatives in close coordination with a strong team of partners from all 

levels of government, volunteer and faith-based groups, and the 

business community. I am pleased to say that ours is a strong, capable, and responsive region. 

Helping me to carry out my duties are 116 dedicated full-time 

employees, along with 500 intermittent disaster assistance employees. The regional office has six divisions: Response, Recovery, National Preparedness, Mitigation, Mission Support, and the Office of 

the Regional Administrator. A defense coordinating element from 

the U.S. Army North is located with us in Philadelphia, providing 

expertise and support to our planning, response, and recovery efforts. 

Prior to and during an event, I coordinate FEMA’S programs and 

provide technical assistance to our States and the District. Should 

the President issue a Stafford Act declaration for a particular 

emergency or major disaster, a Federal coordinating officer will be 

named to direct Federal response and recovery activities in the affected jurisdictions. In the National Capital Region, there is an experienced Federal coordinating officer, his name is Regis Phalen, 

and he is assigned to the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia for the recent snow declarations. 

In response to the December and February snowstorms, FEMA 

Region III’s operations began with the deployment of a FEMA liaison to the District and emergency operation centers at the State 

and District levels, as well as the activation of the Regional Response Coordination Center in Philadelphia. Response personnel 

5 

provided 24-hour coverage as the States and the District were engaged in emergency activities. 

State and District emergency staff supplied constant updates and 

effectively shared real-time information with us. We hosted several 

conference calls with State and local officials to discuss the impacts 

of the storm and to answer questions about potential available Federal assistance. In addition to daily calls with the State Emergency 

Management Directors, we also reached out to the District’s mayor’s office and the Baltimore Emergency Management Director. 

From a preparedness perspective, we maintain strong relationships with the District, State, and local emergency management 

community. These relationships are cultivated through monthly 

conference calls with the directors of the emergency management 

agencies. We also host regional interagency steering committee 

meetings semiannually for Federal, State, ad District officials to 

plan for all hazards in the Region III jurisdictional area. Last 

week, our risk meeting focused on a regional response to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive event. 

Overall, these meetings have created an understanding of the various agencies’ roles, responsibilities, and restrictions in a pre-disaster or disaster scenario. 

I also lead the Region III’s Regional Advisory Council, consisting 

of 22 State and local emergency managers throughout the Mid-Atlantic Region. The Council meets twice a year to discuss issues pertaining to emergency management. Emergency Management Directors Millicent Williams and Richard Muth are Council members, as 

well as the director of the Virginia Department of Emergency Management. As an example of our all hazards planning efforts, we 

have an important role in national special security events. FEMA 

Region III and the Office of National Capital Region Coordination 

have supported the U.S. Secret Service in its roles as the lead Federal agency for the 56 presidential inaugurations and the G-20 

event summits in Washington, D.C. Currently, we are working to 

plan for the nuclear security summit in April. 

The Region III office routinely works in conjunction with the Office of National Capital Region Coordination to ensure seamless 

collaboration with the National Capital Region to understand and 

respond to any challenges faced in the National Capital Region, 

and to anticipate resource and information needs leading up to, 

during, and following a disaster event. 

In conclusion, we understand that the National Capital Region is 

unique in that it is the seat of our Government, and for that especially we are planning and exercising with our State and District 

partners for the unexpected. 

Thank you. We look forward to working with the Subcommittee 

and all of our stakeholders, and I would be pleased to take any 

questions. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Ms. Arcuri. 

Steward Beckham, Director of the Office of the National Capital 

Region Coordination. Mr. Beckham. 

Mr. BECKHAM. Good afternoon, Madam Chair. I am the Director 

of Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Office of National 

Capital Region Coordination, and I appreciate the opportunity and 

6 

the invitation to join my colleague, Patricia Arcuri and OPM Director John Berry to testify before you today. 

The National Capital Region Coordination was established by the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 882, to oversee and coordinate Federal programs for and relationships with State, local, and 

regional authorities within the National Capital Region. Among 

others, Congress directed NCRC to coordinate with Federal, State, 

and local officials and the private sector to enhance domestic preparedness and to provide information to its State and local partners. Along with other preparedness offices, NCRC was transferred 

to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 2007. 

The NCRC actively works with regional partners to enhance preparedness efforts within the region. On a daily basis, NCRC interacts with our Homeland Security partners within various coordination venues that have been established for this purpose. One example is the Senior Policy Group, SPG, which is comprised of the 

Homeland Security advisors and chief emergency management officials from Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia who 

represent their chief executives in jurisdictions. I am a member of 

the Senior Policy Group as well. The Senior Policy Group plays a 

key role in sustaining a coordinated regional approach to homeland 

security and strengthening integrated decision-making and planning. 

A second example is the Joint Federal Committee, JFC. The JFC 

and its associated Subcommittees provides a forum for policy discussions and information sharing regarding Federal preparedness, 

planning, training, and exercise activities in the NCR. The JFC 

serves as a conduit linking the Federal Interagency Committee 

with important information about and contacts within region, 

State, and local governments. Within the NCR, Federal, State, and 

local authorities have developed a regional snow plan which is supported by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, 

MWCOG. MWCOG is a regional organization of Washington area 

local governments. 

This snow plan is updated and briefed to all State, local, and 

Federal regional partners prior to each winter season. The snow 

plan discusses and informs them of the processes and the information that will be shared during a winter weather incident. When 

a significant snow is anticipated in the region, a conference call is 

initiated and led by MWCOG to discuss the weather forecast and 

anticipated actions. These calls may be held several times during 

the day, depending on the severity of the situation. During these 

calls, the weather service, transportation entities, and others share 

information in order to increase situational awareness and support 

decision-making regarding the status of Federal, State, and local 

governments within the NCR. 

Throughout the 2009-2010 winter season, NCR participated in 

these MWCOG snow calls. We also participated in the District, 

Homeland Security, and Emergency Management Agency, 

DCHSEMA, calls that they hosted and led. Following each call, the 

latest information was provided to our partners through the NCR 

spot reports. There are about 50 recipients of these spot reports, including Federal, State, and local authorities who have chosen to receive updates from the NCRC. 

7 

The Office of National Capital Region Coordination’s activities 

allow us to contribute to FEMA’S broader efforts to improve and 

maintain relationships with State and local partners in order to 

support all hazards preparedness within the NCR. As with any 

FEMA employee, we are subject to on-call duty for any disaster or 

event that may occur in support of FEMA’S mission. 

I look forward to addressing any questions that you may have. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Beckham. 

John Berry, the Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and my good friend. Glad to see you here, and hope you bring 

good news, Mr. Berry. 

Mr. BERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for your 

leadership. 

Ms. NORTON. We have known each other for a long time, so you 

will have to forgive these asides. 

Mr. BERRY. I won’t tell anyone how long, Madam Chair. 

I appreciate your leadership in holding this hearing today and I 

am very honored to be at this table with the distinguished panel 

that you have assembled. 

The snow storms of the winter of 2009 and 2010 brought, as you 

have mentioned, unprecedented snowfalls to the National Capital 

Region, essentially the highest since we began recording snows 

over the course of the winter since 1883. 

OPM has always worked with a network of stakeholders at both 

the Federal, State, and local levels to make decisions during weather-related emergencies. OPM maintains a 24-hour round-the-clock 

operational center to actively monitor and manage unfolding 

events, weather or otherwise, which could adversely impact Federal 

Government operations in the National Capital Region. 

To give a quick overview of the procedures, as emergency events 

arise, just as Steward has mentioned, OPM participates in the conference calls that are hosted by the Council of Governments in the 

region in order to assess conditions. Participants in the call include 

the weather service, the National Weather Service, FEMA, all of 

our State and local emergency management agencies, the city and 

suburban transit agencies, Departments of Transportation throughout the region, all levels of law enforcement, utility companies, and 

school districts. In weather events that occur during the overnight 

hours, these COG calls typically occur at 3:30 in the morning with 

over 100 attendees. Ultimately, OPM’s decision is made to carefully 

balance the safety of our Federal workforce and the public with the 

cost of the closure. 

Following the COG call, my OPM staff and I evaluate the information provided on road, transit, and other conditions. We analyze 

historical decisions that were made in similar circumstances, and 

then I ultimately make a final decision. That decision is disseminated no later than 4 a.m. to all agencies and the media. If conditions for the next day are clear the night before, the announcement 

can be made earlier. During this latest snow event, decisions on 

closures were routinely announced by 7 p.m. the evening before. 

On the whole, we believe the process worked and worked well. 

To analyze it and learn how we can do even better next time, the 

Council of Governments, along with FEMA and us, will be hosting 

8 

an after-action review on April 5th, and we will be an active participant at that process. 

We have also entered into a great partnership with FEMA here 

in the National Capital Region. Since the tragic events of 9/11, a 

variety of efforts have been undertaken to improve the emergency 

preparedness of our region. Our long-term goal is to test our region-wide preparedness through a real-time evacuation like that 

which occurred on September 11th. Such an effort, however, is not 

an easy feat, and so we have begun a very detailed planning process. 

While we work to achieve this goal, there are steps we can take 

in the meantime. Last spring, for example, we sponsored a town 

hall meeting with Federal, State, and local management officials to 

educate Federal employees on the various evacuation routes and 

plans throughout the region. We also conducted an emergency 

management and crime prevention fair. Our last event was with 

Steward and FEMA, where we jointly exercised a table-type exercise for Federal emergency managers throughout the region to test 

occupant emergency plans and evacuation capabilities and protocols. 

Prior to the start of the winter season, the National Weather 

Service predicted that this could be a particularly snowy region. To 

help prepare both our workers and the community, OPM conducted 

a press conference, together with all of the players we have already 

mentioned, to explain this process to the region and reaffirm our 

commitment to make decisions no later than 4 a.m. in the morning. 

Telework capabilities are a key aspect in responding to weather situations, as well as in continuity of operations planning generally. 

OPM has set a strategic goal of increasing the number of Federal 

employees who are eligible for telework by 50 percent before 2011. 

While our Federal offices were closed, Federal employees rose to 

the challenge and continued to work, making very good use of 

telework and other work flexibilities. 

While we are not able to isolate all of the numbers, during the 

snow event 30 percent of OPM and General Services Administration employees logged on to their respective networks. Our request 

for information on remote access during the storm to chief information officers throughout the Executive Branch revealed similar logon rates. After the storms, we did a data analysis looking at the 

lost productivity throughout this, and taking our savings and the 

savings into account, the formula number that you have often 

heard quoted of $100 million a day we hereby declare as out of 

date, and we are updating that as the estimated cost now being 

$71 million a day. This figure confirms the real-time data we received, which suggests that at least 30 percent of Federal employees worked during the snow days, mostly from outside the office. 

We believe this is actually a very conservative estimate and the actual number may have been much higher. 

We are strongly committed to raising that percentage in line 

with our strategic goal. I believe we can overcome managerial resistance and IT barriers, our two top stumbling blocks to making 

telework effective government-wide. We started working on this following up through many of the programs that you and the Committee have put into place. Your leadership has been outstanding, 

9 

and we will not rest until this is a regular way of doing business 

in the Federal Government. 

Finally, in partnership with the White House Task Force on 

Telework, which I chair, and the General Services Administration 

and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, we held a Telework 

Leadership Thought Forum earlier this month. The Forum had 60 

participants government-wide, including representatives from labor 

and management, and they gave us a lot of great ideas that we will 

be able to work on going forward. I believe that we can move 

telework forward to the point where snow emergencies are relatively small disruption, and, instead of closure, we can simply declare a mobile work day. 

Thank you for holding this important hearing. I will be happy to 

answer any questions that you might have. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Berry. 

Our final witness on this panel is Carter Kimsey, the President 

of the American Federation of Government Employees Local 3034, 

and she works for the National Science Foundation. Ms. Kimsey. 

Ms. KIMSEY. Thank you, Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee. On behalf of more than the 600,000 Federal and District of Columbia workers represented by AFGE, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today. 

Whether or not the snowstorms in the winter of 2010 in our area 

deserve the label ‘‘disaster,’’ they did make transportation to and 

from many Federal workplaces unsafe, impractical, and, in some 

cases, impossible. We believe that OPM acted prudently when it either closed or delayed the opening of Federal offices in the Metro 

D.C. region. Hundreds of thousands of workers were without 

power, had no access to public transportation, could not drive their 

own vehicles because neither side streets nor main roads had been 

plowed, and could not walk because sidewalks had not been shoveled or else were impassible by mounds of plowed snow. We can 

reasonably expect that the future will include challenges that resemble this year’s extreme weather, and it is therefore incumbent 

upon the Federal Government to put in place clear policies that 

will allow the greatest possible continuity of operations. 

There is one obvious answer to this question, and it is to put in 

place the material and policy infrastructure to vastly expand 

telework for Federal employees. Telework helps agencies find more 

efficient means of carrying out their missions in both normal and 

emergency situations, and it allows workers to balance better their 

work and family responsibilities. Experience in the Federal and 

private sectors has proven that effectively managed telework programs strongly support workforce recruitment and retention, manage office space and overhead costs, and address environmental 

and energy concerns, and they provide an invaluable means for 

continuity of operations during an emergency. 

Madam Chair, several weeks ago I represented AFGE at the 

OPM-sponsored Thought Forum on Telework that you have just 

heard about, where Director Berry brought up the concept of a mobile work day rather than closing Government offices and using unscheduled leave. This is an excellent idea and needs further exploration. 

10 

Another idea is to require managers to determine, before a job 

announcement is posted, whether and to what level telework opportunities would be available to the employee hired for the position. 

Making telework the norm for the Federal workforce can improve 

working conditions and guarantee continued operations, despite the 

weather. 

AFGE supports telework legislation introduced by Representative 

John Sarbanes, H.R. 1722, requiring that all Federal workers be 

considered eligible for telework unless the agency shows they are 

ineligible. Under current law, Federal workers must overcome the 

presumption that they are ineligible for telework unless the agency 

determines otherwise. 

AFGE members working at agencies with established telework 

programs, such as the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 

and the Citizenship and Immigration Services, report that those 

agencies have self-imposed an arbitrary cap on the number of 

workers allowed to participate in telework. At my own agency, the 

National Science Foundation, although we have succeeded in negotiating a telework program, the Union was forced to trade off the 

right to file any grievances on the matter, regardless of their merit. 

This makes it impossible to ensure that telework is applied fairly 

and uniformly to the workforce. 

Aside from telework, AFGE has tried, with mixed success, to negotiate collective bargaining agreements that address how to proceed in disasters and emergencies. In those cases where we have 

not persuaded agencies to agree to contract language, AFGE is proposing language that clarifies and makes consistent agency policies 

regarding emergencies and disasters. At the Social Security Administration, we are attempting to bargain language that would require the agency to follow OPM guidelines for disasters when evacuation occurs, such as pay continuation. AFGE’s Social Security 

Administration locals situated in earthquake zones have negotiated 

shelter and place agreements that include earthquake and shelter 

kits and require periodic earthquake drills. 

In other agencies, employees are required to be at work not because they are essential to the provision of public safety, but because the agency’s clients must meet legal deadlines. This type of 

issue has arisen at EEOC, where employees must come to work 

under even extremely adverse weather conditions in order to make 

time frames for filing charges. Outside of the D.C. area, EEOC regional directors have discretion to decide issues such as office closings and delayed openings. 

The problem with giving individual regional or local agency 

heads discretion to go it alone with respect to treatment of employees does lead to problems. As you know, the transportation security 

officers at Dulles and Philadelphia Airports were counted as AWOL 

when they couldn’t get to work during the snowstorms. 

I think I have exceeded my time. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Ms. Kimsey. You mentioned 

employees who were AWOL when they couldn’t get to work. Are 

you talking about TSA employees? 

Ms. KIMSEY. Yes, ma’am, I am. That was at Philadelphia and 

Dulles. Whereas, at Thurgood Marshall BWI Airport and Reagan 

National, the managers there realized the import of the situation, 

11 

that it was truly an emergency, and they did not put their employees on AWOL. There are times when employees need administrative leave during an emergency. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, Mr. Berry, I can certainly understand that 

agency-by-agency there must be a considerable amount of discretion, but when you have, in essentially the same region, with the 

same amount of snowfall, directors, agency heads making very different decisions, how can OPM justify discretion that in fact is that 

broad? And why is not there in place something, when we are talking about people in essentially the same region—I mean, Philadelphia, for example, many of the regional offices for this part of the 

region at in Philadelphia—why wouldn’t there be overall guidance 

so that the workforce wouldn’t feel that it was treated unfairly and 

so that you didn’t receive what I am sure had been a fair amount 

of feedback about uneven treatment as among employees doing the 

same work? 

Mr. BERRY. Madam Chair, I think it is a great question. There 

are sort of two levels to respond to. On one, in terms of the policy 

approach, the policies in terms of management and pay and those 

delegation, are consistent throughout the regions. Now, the employees that we described, that would have been described at the airports would have been defined most likely, I presume, as emergency personnel, right? 

Ms. KIMSEY. That is correct. 

Mr. BERRY. So emergency personnel, regardless of where their 

work location is, regardless of what the event is, the rules of the 

road are they need to show up. In other words, they have designated by their agency that—— 

Ms. NORTON. What does OPM do, in the face of two feet of snowstorms, to make sure that employees who indeed the United States 

of America does need get to their destinations when their own 

States haven’t cleared the way for them to move? 

Mr. BERRY. It is tough. Many need to come on foot. I, for example, came to work on foot. Other employees who are designated 

emergency need to show up. They are providing emergency public 

health and safety functions and they often put themselves—and we 

recognize they are putting themselves at risk. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Berry, where do you live? Where do you live? 

Mr. BERRY. 16th and R. That was a two mile walk. I do it regularly. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, try walking to Dulles from 16th and R. 

Mr. BERRY. I understand. 

Ms. NORTON. No, I understand what you are saying. Indeed, let 

me ask you who defines what an emergency worker or employee is? 

Mr. BERRY. Each agency has that authority to define what employees are forced to report for work regardless of—— 

Ms. NORTON. Now, that discretion, of course, needs to remain 

with the agency. I think we all would agree. Just let me ask you 

in the wake of a presidential disaster, should the agency do some 

investigation as to whether or not the employee was able, physically able under any circumstances, to reach the agency before 

docking that employee’s pay or otherwise sanctioning that employee? 

12 

Mr. BERRY. That, Madam Chair, is obviously a very good case. 

We would encourage, obviously, managers to use good common 

sense and good practice, and we will be working through the complaints and the charges throughout this very complicated region 

doing this. How it often works in terms of the real world is even 

employees who have been designated as emergency, if, for example, 

they can’t get in, their street is impassible, it is unsafe, for example, for that employee, what is expected and required is that they 

contact their supervisor, and their supervisor, that way, is at least 

informed of what workforce they can assemble to try to carry out 

the essential functions. So oftentimes people will trade, they will 

trade shifts, they will ask other people who might live closer, for 

example, myself, who can walk in, to ask those people to come and 

cover for those who might be too far away to get there. 

So a good manager works with their employees to try to address 

the situation and provide the flexibility you are discussing. Now, 

obviously, I can’t sit here in front of you and say that every manager is a good manager and makes good decisions every day of the 

year. And where that occurs, we will work with those agencies to 

try to make sure that a fair common-sense rule is applied throughout the agencies. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Berry. And remember 

this hearing is being called in no small part because of the all hazards rule of how we must operate, and it scares me a bit that agencies have not already mapped out who can get in and who cannot, 

because the hazard that we are most afraid of in this region, frankly, is not a snowstorm, but some kind of event, which will mean 

that somebody has to be on hand; and if employees stay at home, 

they stay at home because they have gotten no guidance, the kind 

of guidance that you have indicated. 

I am going to ask you if you would ask agency heads to in fact 

do an inventory of their employees to see who might reasonably be 

expected to trade off and come in with somebody who can’t possibly 

come in, so that we learn from this disaster and don’t simply repeat it in a disaster that may be far more costly in human life and 

injury. 

Ms. Arcuri, I would like to ask you—— 

So could you get us some sense, Mr. Berry, in 30 days, of how 

you will inform the agencies of the necessity in preparation for 

whatever is the next event, to make sure that at least some of their 

employees—now, the others will have to make up for it, but that 

is how employees are. Federal employees bond together, particularly those who are unionized. They bond together and they understand that X lives someplace and Y lives the other. Mr. Berry, we 

may have to ask you to do some jobs that would otherwise not be 

done by OPM. That is the kind of Federal family we have, I know. 

Ms. Arcuri, I am most interested in the role of the Federal Government in a disaster like this. Now, we know that the Federal 

Government—I am on the Homeland Security Committee, so 

Homeland Security Committee is prepared for all kinds of things 

to happen to us. But we haven’t been prepared for a snowstorm, 

even though we deal with all hazards. Therefore, we haven’t 

thought deeply, at least on the Committee on which I serve, about 

FEMA’S role when the Federal Government has a stake in its 

13 

heart, and I wonder what kind of mitigation planning, continuity 

planning goes on in the Federal Government or whether FEMA has 

anything to do with that or who is responsible for that. 

Ms. ARCURI. Madam Chair, separating the different functional 

parts of your question, we do have a plan, and our plan is basically 

the same as you said, whether it is a snowstorm, whether it is an 

impending flood, a pretty identifiable—— 

Ms. NORTON. With the Federal Government. I am now talking 

about the Federal Government, which obviously knows what to do 

if somebody lets loose with an explosive device and what would 

kick in in that notion. And I know that FEMA deals in mitigation 

with various jurisdictions before an event and, of course, it deals 

after an event. 

What I am trying to find out is whether or not the Federal Government is involved with the mitigation activities, the response activities that we will find in local jurisdictions across the Country 

in preparation for events just like this event, a natural event. It 

could be a hurricane here, because we do have those here. Does 

FEMA have any role with the Federal Government or is there 

somebody else who helps the Federal Government understand what 

the States commonly understand is their role in natural disasters? 

Ms. ARCURI. I would have to defer that question to my colleague, 

Mr. Beckham—— 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Beckham, than you. 

Ms. ARCURI.—from the Office of National Capital Region Coordination with the other Federal entities in the region. 

Mr. BECKHAM. Madam Chair, here in the National Capital Region, as you well know, we have all the various Federal agencies, 

as well as the Legislative and Judicial Branch, and we commonly 

and consistently reach out to those various agencies, primarily 

through our Joint Federal Committee, and have representatives 

come forward—— 

Ms. NORTON. Joint Federal Committee? 

Mr. BECKHAM. The Joint Federal Committee, which is comprised 

of the emergency managers from the various Federal agencies. We 

meet monthly and we come in and collaborate and coordinate programs and share information. Obviously, as a result of the events 

that occurred during this past winter season, we have and continue 

to discuss our issues in terms of coordination and preparation for 

the all hazard events. Obviously, this is a natural event, the snowstorm, but in a very similar or large measure the types of activities 

that we would undertake would be similar to the ones that would 

occur in a manmade—— 

Ms. NORTON. For example, what did you do with the Federal 

Government when it became clear that we were having something 

of a natural disaster here? 

Mr. BECKHAM. Well, I think it is safe to say that we obviously 

listened to and relied on and coordinated with OPM in terms of 

what would happen to the Federal workforce here in the National 

Capital Region. 

Ms. NORTON. Did you have anything to do with them? Yes, but 

OPM is not an expert agency in natural disasters, and OPM, if 

anything, is going to be looking to folks like you. For example, the 

14 

Metropolitan Washington Council of Government puts out calls. 

Were you in on these calls, Mr. Berry? 

Mr. BECKHAM. I misunderstood your question. I thought you 

were referring to what was done immediately prior to the winter 

storms that occurred and how we operated in accordance with that. 

Ms. NORTON. Immediately prior, during. 

Mr. BECKHAM. As I mentioned in my testimony, particularly for 

the winter season, we get together through the COG to go over the 

policies and procedures that are in place for the winter storms. 

Ms. NORTON. So you were on the calls with COG? 

Mr. BECKHAM. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. And, of course, OPM. Were the unions on the call 

with COG? 

Mr. BECKHAM. I can’t testify to that; I don’t know exactly who 

was on the call. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Berry? 

Mr. BERRY. No, I don’t believe so, Madam Chair. 

Ms. NORTON. Wouldn’t it have been helpful? Wouldn’t they have 

had more information so that workers wouldn’t be all disconcerted 

and confused? After all, they did get a day off. Is there any reason 

why they shouldn’t be? I mean, with the President’s new order that 

there be collaboration with employees, wouldn’t that be helpful? 

Mr. BERRY. The one thing we would have to discuss, and we 

would have to discuss this with the other members of the Council 

of Governments and others, these calls are not open to the public; 

they are there so that everybody can give an exact and accurate information—— 

Ms. NORTON. Were you in touch or anybody in touch with the organizations who represent workers after the calls were over? 

Mr. BERRY. Absolutely. And before and during the entire event. 

We were in touch with the three major Federal employee unions 

in the region throughout the event. And once the decision is made, 

it is disseminated very effectively and we also rely on our union 

partners to help us get that word out to their members. So we do 

stay in close communication. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, Ms. Kimsey, I was concerned about your testimony. I am the former chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and, therefore, I do understand that the time 

frames for filing charges are important, but I was concerned at 

your testimony about workers having to be there. First of all, how 

could people get there to file charges? And if they were filing 

charges technologically, why couldn’t some employees at home have 

taken care of that? And would you explain exactly what it is the 

EEOC required of these employees during the disaster? 

Ms. KIMSEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, I take it during the blizzard as well, the February blizzard as well as the December storm? 

Ms. KIMSEY. Yes, that is true. What I would like to say is I think 

the Honorable Berry, sitting right here next to me, made an excellent point—— 

Ms. NORTON. He is a very honorable gentleman. 

Ms. KIMSEY.—that we have two barriers to telework. The first 

one is management resistance and the second one is technology. 

15 

Ms. NORTON. Let me ask you are any employees at EEOC on 

telework? 

Ms. KIMSEY. I don’t have that number, but I would be happy to 

follow up with you on the exact number. I can do that. 

Ms. NORTON. Some of them could take charges, you think, from 

telework? 

Ms. KIMSEY. Well, that is the question. We certainly think that 

technology could be maximized at that agency and other agencies 

to allow the maximum telework—— 

Ms. NORTON. Wait, wait. Mr. Berry has a response. 

Ms. KIMSEY. He does. 

Mr. BERRY. Excuse me. I was just going to add, Madam Chair, 

it is not at EEOC, but I do have another example which gives you 

just how far we can go with this. The Patent and Trademark Office, which is just over across the river in Alexandria there, they 

maintained their productivity level. Their normal productivity level 

on a day is about 95 percent. During the snowstorm, during the 

blizzard, because of telework, they maintained 85 percent productivity rate. So a phenomenal example of how people work safely 

from home, they didn’t jeopardize their health or their community, 

and it was a great way to maintain continuity of operations. So I 

think we have a great example in the Patent and Trademark Office. 

Ms. NORTON. We do with some exceptions. Of course, confidentiality is necessary at Patent and Trademark too, but they are certainly statutorily required at EEOC. You are dealing with people 

who are filing legal complaints, and it is the same as a lawyer-client relationship. 

And I recognize, Ms. Kimsey, that they may not be to the point 

that we would like them to be with respect to telework, but let’s 

assume the present state of affairs. So somebody doesn’t plow some 

money in there and get them so that they can be brought up; and 

we can understand that given the present state of the economy. 

I still don’t understand that at the height of the blizzard, when 

people couldn’t get in to file complaints, perhaps they could at regional offices, but I am trying to understand here and in the region 

where, of course, the blizzard had occurred, why the agency would 

insist that employees be there if the very people who were to file 

the complaints would hardly have been able to get there. I am really at a loss here about what was required, what workers were told 

to do, and what it means to have time frames for filing, whether 

they are agency time frames or whether they are statutory, if they 

are talking about the 180 days or the 90 days, etcetera. 

Ms. KIMSEY. Yes, ma’am. And I would be happy to follow up with 

you on that. I am not myself an employee of the EEOC, but I know 

that there have been some issues in the regional offices as well, 

and we would be happy to provide that information to you very 

quickly. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, this is important because there are statutory 

time frames. 

Ms. KIMSEY. And I believe that this does refer to the statutory 

time frames, which then would suggest that the employees need 

the tools to help them operate within those statutory time frames. 

16 

Ms. NORTON. I also think there is something like called an act 

of God. 

Ms. KIMSEY. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. I cannot believe that when Louisiana went down, 

for example, the Gulf Coast went down—and, again, I am not sure 

how we deal with precedence in this world. But the fact is that the 

whole State of Louisiana and much of Mississippi went down in a 

worse way than what even we experienced here, and the same 90 

days and 180 days statutory deadlines were there. I cannot believe 

there are not act of GodMs. KIMSEY. Exemptions. 

Ms. NORTON.—extensions of some kind or the other, or that 

somebody wouldn’t be required to do so. Now, I am not going to ask 

you, I am going to ask Mr. Berry to inquire of EEOC how they 

dealt with this. Because guess what? I bet a lot of employees didn’t 

get there. I bet you that. And if they didn’t get to various parts of 

the region and somebody missed the statutory deadline, how did 

the agency deal with an act of God event? We would like to know 

that. And there must be other agencies that need to be informed 

of what to do, because, again, we may be facing another hazard 

and, remember, we are talking about all hazards; we are talking 

about hazards that could be events that were upon us. 

What steps is FEMA taking to ensure that WMATA is able to receive reimbursement rapidly, particularly given the dependence of 

the Federal Government on WMATA and its present very risky financial state? Have they applied? 

Ms. ARCURI. There have been declarations, as you know, in the 

District as well as in Maryland and Virginia, and they will be making application through the respective jurisdiction. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, let me ask you. The declarations—let us find 

the status of the declarations. Have all the jurisdictions asked for 

declarations for both storms, and have both storms had their declaration for all the affected jurisdictions? 

Ms. ARCURI. The declarations for the December events have been 

received. The President has declared those events major disasters. 

There has been a request from the mayor for the District; there has 

been a request from the governor of Virginia. They are in process. 

There has not been a presidential declaration for either of those as 

of yet. 

Ms. NORTON. When might we expect a decision, again, given the 

precarious states of these jurisdictions? 

Ms. ARCURI. Madam Chair, it is in process; it is in review. As 

soon as the agency is informed, they will be informed. 

Ms. NORTON. When might the benefits start flowing for the December declaration? 

Ms. ARCURI. The process for the public assistance program, the 

implementation of that program is that there are applicants’ briefings that are hosted by the State or the District and FEMA, and 

at those meetings the eligibility of both the work and the cost is 

described. Following that, there are what we call kickoff meetings 

where, at that point, they start to write these project worksheets 

which detail the scope, the eligible scope of work and the associated 

costs. Once those are completed and processed, they are the actual 

financial or obligating document, and soon after those sheets are 

17 

completed and processed, they will be able to draw down the funding for that specific work. 

Ms. NORTON. What is the usual time it takes to get to the point 

where the local jurisdiction can draw down some funds? 

Ms. ARCURI. Madam Chair, it is really very difficult to anticipate 

that time frame. There is a process that proceeds and it depends 

very much on the State or the District, as well as, in the case of 

the District, the State agencies and how quickly they can aggregate 

costs and they can get the documentation to support those costs. 

Ms. NORTON. So the problem now is with the jurisdictions? You 

are prepared to move as soon as they—and they haven’t, any of 

them, come to these, what is it, applicants—— 

Ms. ARCURI. Actually—excuse me. I am sorry for interrupting, 

but we have—the applicants’ briefing for the District took place 

yesterday and we are proceeding along in accordance with what I 

would say would be regular time frames. 

Ms. NORTON. How about the other two jurisdictions? 

Ms. ARCURI. Applicants’ briefings, as I understand, in Maryland 

are taking place today and tomorrow. 

Ms. NORTON. That is good news. But your testimony is that 

FEMA has not provided any reimbursements as yet for any of the 

jurisdictions after this snowstorm, is that correct? No reimbursements have yet begun? 

Ms. ARCURI. Madam Chair, I know that specifically for Maryland 

and for the District that is the case. I am not quite sure regarding 

Virginia, and I would be more than willing to get back to you with 

that. 

Ms. NORTON. I wish you would, within 30 days. 

Ms. ARCURI. Certainly. 

Ms. NORTON. Now under the statute, FEMA may be treated as 

a local entity. I am sorry, Metro. FEMA may treat Metro as a local 

entity. I am a little concerned, to tell you the honest truth, Ms. 

Arcuri, by making Metro go to each and every jurisdiction in what 

will be another whole mountain of paperwork, rather than treating 

them as a local entity, telling FEMA straight away, hey, how much 

did it cost and what did it cost, in as much as the statute says you 

may treat them as a local entity. Why take them through somebody 

else’s bureaucracy to get to exactly where you could get them to? 

Ms. ARCURI. Madam Chair, according to the FEMA regulations, 

they actually are treated as a sub-grantee. The State is actually 

the grantee—— 

Ms. NORTON. I know exactly how they are treated, and I am saying that they could be treated, under the words of the statute, now, 

as a local entity. Does that mean local entity is only like the City 

of X and is not like an entity that can be treated in its own regard? 

See, Metro doesn’t come under any of these local entities. Metro 

comes under Metro, and these local entities contribute to Metro. 

But now you are making Metro go to Maryland, go to the District, 

go to Virginia as if somehow they were responsible for Metro, when 

they are not. Metro must deal through Metro. Yes, they give money 

to this umbrella organization, but you are now taking them down 

to where neither the Metro statute nor, as we read it, necessarily, 

the FEMA statute would put them, and that is to where they cannot apply for money that would be due them. 

18 

Somehow, somebody is going to get charged with some overhead 

for dealing with Metro coming through them. Somebody is going to 

have a back and forth in these three States as to whether or not 

that is the amount. Somebody is going to wonder whether or not 

that takes from them. I am a little concerned about this bureaucracy on top of bureaucracy and whether they can be treated as a 

grantee rather than a sub-grantee, as if they were Indian tribes. 

Ms. ARCURI. Essentially, Madam Chair, that is exactly what the 

FEMA regulations say, that they would not be treated as a grantee; they are to be treated as a sub-grantee. And, historically, when 

we have had sub-grantees that have had costs incurred across multiple jurisdictions, they have been brought out by jurisdiction. So 

I would be more than happy to explore the option of having all the 

costs brought into or under one jurisdictional element and be able 

to get back to you with that. 

Ms. NORTON. I would very much appreciate it, because although 

Indian tribes are a sub-grantee, FEMA has used its discretion to 

treat them as a local entity, local government under the Stafford 

Act. 

Ms. ARCURI. Correct. 

Ms. NORTON. So I am looking to the statute itself and I am trying to cut down—remember, we do have a paperwork statute that 

says get to the point, and I am trying to get us to the point, and 

I can tell you, you are going to get into all kinds of sub-bureaucratic tangles with the jurisdictions, who don’t know a darn thing— 

remember, there is no experience, virtually no experience with 

FEMA in this jurisdiction in the first place, and here comes them. 

They are either going to lob it on top of theirs and leave it to you, 

which would mean you would have to do it anyway, or they are 

going to get involved in your business, about which they know 

nothing. So I would, first of all, ask you to eliminate some of this 

paperwork and to treat Metro as it is defined in the statute, as a 

local government under the Stafford Act. And I ask you to do this 

because the next time, remember, it may not be a snowstorm; it 

may be something else. 

And I would ask you in 14 days to get back to this Subcommittee 

as to whether or not Metro may be treated as a local government 

as defined by the Stafford Act. If there is any reason, we would like 

to know it.; we certainly don’t want you to do anything where there 

is a disagreement with what the law requires. But we do know that 

Metro is also a grantee, and we would prefer not to get into a contest of labels, particularly given what we read every day about the 

status of Metro. 

On telework, it was your testimony, Mr. Berry—I was just 

shocked—as much as we have been pushing telework—to know 

that only 5.2 percent of Federal employees regularly telework 

under a formal agreement. That is on page 3 of your testimony. 

And your conservative estimates are in this region a pitiful 10 percent. We have the most crowded roads, or virtually so, not entirely, 

in the Nation. What in the world is holding up telework in what 

amounts to a paper pushing jurisdiction, the Federal Government? 

What stands in the way of getting more regular telework so that 

perhaps the agency head doesn’t have so much discretion and is 

19 

perhaps not in tune with the changing times to in fact get us beyond these very shallow figures? 

Mr. BERRY. Madam Chair, I appreciate both your leadership and 

that of Congressman Sarbanes and Congressman Connolly and others who have been such leaders on this issue, and I am very happy 

to join you all in your efforts to try to improve upon those numbers. 

I really liked the idea of the interpretation that was raised here 

today by AFGE, and I have already asked our staff to go back and 

work with our lawyers, if we can do that, and flip—— 

Ms. NORTON. Do what precisely? 

Mr. BERRY. Flip the presumption so that I wonder if, through 

regulation, we could sort of flip the presumption and say that everybody is presumed to be eligible for telework, rather than having 

to be designated for telework. That way, agencies could designate 

employees who wouldn’t be eligible for telework. In other words, 

kind of flip it around from what it is now. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, has OPM put out any guidance on how agencies should decide who are? 

Mr. BERRY. We have been very aggressively pushing this, Madam 

Chair, and I think what you are going to find, what we are turning 

to right now is to get a little bit more muscle behind it. 

Ms. NORTON. Is there any muscle behind it now, Mr. Berry? 

Mr. BERRY. I would say, quite frankly, right now, obviously, the 

results show for themselves that there is not enough muscle behind 

it. The results are sad. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, what is the muscle? I am just trying to figure 

out—— 

Mr. BERRY. The President of the United States. 

Ms. NORTON. No, no. 

Mr. BERRY. No, that is who—— 

Ms. NORTON. He is a man. Muscle is a directive to the agency. 

Mr. BERRY. Right. 

Ms. NORTON. And I am sure he has not busied himself with this 

matter. 

Mr. BERRY. No. Actually, I would like to tell you a little story, 

if you have a second. During the snowstorm, when the President 

checked in with me about this event, we discussed telework and 

the importance of it, and I explained to him that in 1996, which 

was the last major event that revolved around this, less than 1 percent of us could telework at that time. At this storm, about 30 percent, as we said, were teleworking during this storm. 

Ms. NORTON. You said they were logging on. Does that mean 

they stayed on and worked? 

Mr. BERRY. Well, obviously, we would have to—and some people 

were working who weren’t, obviously, on the computer, too. So 

these numbers are hard—I can’t give you an exact, precise story. 

Ms. NORTON. But at 30 percent logged on, those were some people who were not even under agreement, formal agreement. 

Mr. BERRY. And that could well be the case. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you know how anxious Federal employees are 

to do to their work? 

Mr. BERRY. Absolutely. So that is a great point. So what the 

President and I discussed was wouldn’t it be great if, during the 

next event, we could get those numbers up to 80, 90 percent of peoVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\55670.0 KAYLA
20 

ple being able to operate. If we could have everybody meet the example of the Patent and Trademark Office that we just discussed, 

about 85 percent productivity, that is what we need to be striving 

for. 

Ms. NORTON. Are there security barriers or some—I mean, I am 

not even sure how you make the decision. Are there some employees who should not be expected because of the nature of their 

work? I am still in the dark as to who gets the presumption and 

who does not in favor, even if you do what Ms. Kimsey asks. 

Mr. BERRY. In the past, I would say back in 1996 days, 10, 12 

years ago, technology and security were the two main barriers to 

telework. Most of the technology and the security issues have been 

resolved. I can give you a good example with my agency alone. We 

do 95 percent of the background security investigations for this 

Government, including all of the Department of Defense, to establish eligibility for access to information that has classified, top secret, special code word, and secret designations, the investigations 

are done by the Office of Personnel Management. Those investigations, 95 percent of my staff are doing those out of their homes 

across the Nation, so they are teleworking, handling highly sensitive material. So we have solved the security and technology 

problems of this. 

Why we are not reaching those numbers of 80 and 95 percent 

today is two reasons primarily: managers who believe that unless 

they have the employee in front of them and are stuck in a sort 

of 19th century, 20th century mind-set that someone needs to be 

at their desk to be working I would put as our largest barrier; and 

the second is the remaining technology, the cost of getting people 

the right equipment, getting people, most people in our agencies 

now are not using desktop operations anymore, they are using 

their laptop as their desktop. So they can immediately, they boot 

in. At your desk you have a docking station, and they can take that 

home with them and remain as secure and as functional as they 

are at their desk. 

If we can make the investment—and we were figuring the cost 

of the latest computers between $1,000 and $2,000 tops to have the 

security and the sufficiency to operate. You look at the cost of—I 

explained to you here $71 million is the opportunity cost lost of a 

closure day in the Government. With two days we could have paid 

to outfit everybody in this region with the right equipment so that 

we could have accomplished telework. So we need to get there. We 

will get there. 

And when I say I want to bring the right muscle to this, the 

President is committed on this issue. The President has set up a 

task force, multi-agency task force which I am chairing for him, 

that we will be reporting back to the President with our recommendations so that he can issue the directive to the Federal 

community as to what needs to be done to get this over the hump 

and over those final speed bumps. So that is the muscle I am seeking to bring into this, and I think once we get it, that is when we 

will start to see those numbers significantly increase. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, a directive of the kind Ms. Kimsey suggested 

might be useful after one looks at the available workforce and what 

the workforce does, and gives the agency some guidance. I don’t 

21 

hear, Mr. Berry, that there is much guidance. All I hear is they 

have total discretion to decide. Now, many of these are babyboomers, old school baby-boomers who are not with the millennials 

yet, or not even with others who are not baby-boomers or others 

who are quite ready, no matter who they are, to work from home. 

I must tell you that I don’t see any reason for agencies to change 

their habits unless they are confronted with the muscle that you 

indicate. And we would appreciate, especially as we always are in 

preparation for the next event, I would think that at least during—— 

Well, let me ask Ms. Arcuri. Is there telework done by employees 

of FEMA, who are, after all, a giant emergency workforce? 

Ms. ARCURI. Yes, we do, Madam Chair. We have employees—— 

Ms. NORTON. How many? What percentage? 

Ms. ARCURI. I can’t speak on behalf of the agency, but I can tell 

you—— 

Ms. NORTON. What percentage of your agency’s employees here 

in the National Capital Region were designated as essential employees? 

Ms. ARCURI. I do not have that information for the agency. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Beckham? 

Ms. ARCURI. I do have it for the region. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, for the region and for the National Capital 

Region I would appreciate it. 

Mr. Beckham? 

Mr. BECKHAM. I don’t have the specific information available, but 

as it relates to the winter snowstorms of both December and February, we did in fact telework for those non-emergency response officials that are part of the headquarters agency here in the National Capital Region. Our emergency response officials continue to 

be in the posture of coming to work certainly where possible. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, what was the record of these emergency response officials coming to work given the severity-of FEMA workers 

coming to work given the severity of the snowstorm? 

Mr. BECKHAM. I will say it wasn’t 100 percent, but I would have 

to get back to you with the specific—— 

Ms. NORTON. Were any sanctions taken against those who were 

not able to come to work? 

Mr. BECKHAM. To my knowledge, I don’t know of any that were 

taken, but, again, I would have to check with our chief human capital officer to give you that specific or accurate information. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I am pleased at least I haven’t read of any 

in the newspaper, and Federal workers usually know how to speak 

up if they are being asked to do the impossible. 

I want to thank this panel; your testimony has been absolutely 

essential. I want to call the next panel before us now and excuse 

this panel. Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. BECKHAM. Thank you. 

Ms. ARCURI. Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. We are pleased to welcome the second panel. We 

are trying to use this to make the best of a very serious situation 

here by hearing as well from the jurisdictions and others who had 

responsibility within the jurisdictions for this unprecedented event. 

So I am pleased to welcome all of you from the second panel. And 

22 

may I ask that Major General Errol Schwartz, the Commanding 

General of the District of Columbia Army National Guard testify 

first? Then we will go down the line and hear from all of you in 

turn. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL ERROL R. SCHWARTZ, COMMANDING GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; MILLICENT WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; DAVID KUBICEK, ACTING 

DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OPERATIONS, WASHINGTON 

METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; RICHARD 

MUTH, DIRECTOR, MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION; JAMES K. HARTMANN, 

CITY MANAGER, CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA; AND DR. R. 

ERIC PETERSEN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

General SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you 

for inviting me here today to testify on this issue. I will focus my 

comments on the District of Columbia National Guard support to 

the Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency during the 

snowstorms of December and February. 

The District of Columbia National Guard comprises both Army 

and Air National Guard components. We both have a Federal mission and a District mission. We pledge to support the city in any 

emergency that arises. Our primary mission is to rapidly respond 

to any requests from the mayor’s office in the case of an emergency 

within the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia National 

Guard also took steps to mitigate any risks by placing a person in 

the D.C. Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency to 

help with the planning and coordination for an event. 

We work in accordance with the Homeland Security National Response Framework, and from that the District of Columbia has developed their own framework with 16 emergency support functions. 

The District of Columbia National Guard supports the District 

Homeland Response Framework with ESF 1-Transportation; ESF 

2-Communications; ESF 6-Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, 

Housing and Human Services; ESF 9-Search and Rescue; ESF 10- 

Oil and Hazardous Material Response; ESF 11-Agriculture and 

Natural Resources; ESF 13-Public Safety and Security; and ESF 

16-Donations and Volunteer Management. 

For the snowstorm of 2009 and 2010, we used ESF 1, which was 

primarily transportation. The District of Columbia Emergency 

Management Agency requested support to move personnel back 

and forth, either emergency personnel or personnel who were called 

to perform emergency duties within the District of Columbia. We 

supported them with our Humvees and personnel, and we also had 

the capability of extending our services to other National Guard 

elements from FEMA Region III to augment those services. We had 

a reasonable success with that. We also used our personnel to retrieve other individuals who we needed from their homes to the Armory in support of those missions. 

23 

The District of Columbia National Guard also has the capability 

of responding with our Civil Support Team. We express our appreciation to the Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency 

for their cooperation in working with us as we supported the city. 

In conclusion, the District of Columbia National Guard stands 

ready to support the city in any way we can and extend our services to any other agency within the District of Columbia. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, General Schwartz. I must 

here, for the record, thank you for your extraordinary service to the 

people of the District of Columbia and the Region. 

Millicent Williams, Director of D.C. Homeland Security and 

Emergency Management Agency. Ms. Williams. 

Ms. WILLIAMS. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Norton and Members of the Subcommittee. My name is 

Millicent Williams, as has been mentioned, and I am the Director 

of the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency, also known as HSEMA, and I may refer to it as such throughout my testimony. I appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony about the District of Columbia’s response to and recovery 

from this season’s historic snowstorms and the way in which local 

governments work with FEMA during periods of disaster, regardless of cause. 

Specifically, the Subcommittee’s request for testimony asked that 

my colleagues and I address the following: action that has been or 

could be taken by FEMA and the affected jurisdictions, and any response and recovery funds for which the jurisdiction may qualify; 

how FEMA and other agencies and jurisdictions in the National 

Capital Region might be expected to prepare for and respond to future disasters, whether another snowstorm, hurricane, pandemic 

event, or terrorist incident; and the means by which the Federal 

Government and the National Capital Region can work together as 

partners with FEMA. I applaud the Subcommittee for holding a 

hearing to address these critical issues and thank the Subcommittee for its continued support of the District of Columbia and 

the National Capital Region. 

I am pleased to report that despite the unprecedented challenges 

posed by the historic snowstorms this winter, the District of Columbia and our regional partners in the National Capital Region, 

including the Federal Emergency Management Agency, worked in 

a coordinated and collaborative manner to meet the needs of our 

residents. Successful collaboration allowed us to be both resilient 

and responsive, and I believe that this helped us achieve our primary goal, which is to protect the safety and welfare of our residents. 

The District of Columbia Government demonstrated its resilience 

in the face of challenging conditions by being open for business for 

all but two days during the December and February storms. In 

fact, the District Government never really fully closed, as we required essential personnel to report throughout the duration of the 

storm. Mayor Adrian Fenty set an early goal and communicated 

throughout the winter storms: unless there was a risk to the lives 

and health of District employees and residents, the District Government would continue to operate. 

24 

As the seat of the Federal Government, the District has a unique 

responsibility to remain operational to ensure the success of all entities that call the District home. Accomplishing this goal is no easy 

task, and I would like to take a brief moment to acknowledge the 

hard working men and women who worked tirelessly throughout 

the storms to ensure the continued operations of government operations. 

The District was successful in meeting the challenges posed by 

this winter’s storms for several reasons, but today I would like to 

focus on three in particular: strong leadership, effective regional coordination and cooperation, and the innovative use of technology 

for communication. 

There is no substitute for strong leadership during emergency 

situations, and Mayor Fenty demonstrated that principle during 

the recent snowstorms. The mayor made it clear early on that the 

District would be open for business and function as normally as 

possible during the snow events, and supported the accomplishment of the goal with concrete resources, directing each District 

agency to do whatever it took to get the job done. The mayor’s clear 

direction led to strong coordination between the District, our partners in the National Capital Region, and the Federal Government. 

For reasons we are all aware, the District maintains a high level 

of readiness for all hazards and has developed a District Response 

Plan to support planning, training, and exercise efforts to maintain 

readiness. Among the hazards to which we devote our particular 

attention is snow. The District has a designated leadership team 

that is tasked with both the planning and execution of the District’s Snow Response Plan. 

The District’s Interagency Snow Team, led by the Department of 

Public Works and the Department of Transportation seeks a comprehensive snow planning process year-round. The product of this 

effort is the District’s Snow Plan. During actual snow events, 

DDOT and DPW officials provide active operational management of 

the response from the Snow Command Center at 14th and U 

Streets, NW. 

Likewise, the HSEMA Emergency Operations Center remains 

fully operational throughout each the snow events or any emergency in the District of Columbia, and they did so in December and 

February, and coordinate all activities, with the exception of snow 

removal operations. 

During this year’s events, District agencies, regional infrastructure partners, and FEMA representatives were brought together 

for coordination and situational awareness on regularly schedules 

HSEMA conference calls chaired by City Administrator Neil Albert 

or myself. These calls provided an opportunity daily or more frequently, as necessary, to review agency needs, assess our progress 

in implementing the Snow Plan, the District Response Plan, and 

agency-specific emergency plans, and make necessary adjustments. 

Given the limitation of my time, I am going to skip a couple of 

the components of my testimony, but would like to state that specifically the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Homeland Security have provided tremendous support 

to the District of Columbia by lending staff to our effort during and 

after the storms. The District also appreciates the Presidential DisVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\55670.0 KAYLA
25 

aster Declaration made for the December 2009 snow event and 

anxiously await a final decision regarding the February storms. 

These efforts represent an excellent example of how the Federal, 

State, and local partnership worked as it should. 

Despite the success of the District in meeting historically unprecedented challenges, there are areas in which we can improve. 

I would like to conclude my testimony by expressing my appreciation to the residents, businesses, and visitors that endured the 

snow events in the District this winter. Though the storms posed 

challenges that were unprecedented in terms of their intensity and 

duration, we overcame these challenges as a community as a result 

of our preparedness efforts, flexibility in response, and plain old 

gold neighborliness. We will complete our review of the District’s 

response, coordinate our next steps with regional and Federal partners, and determine the best approach to ensure that we are prepared for comparable challenges, whether from snow or other hazards, in the future. 

This concludes my testimony and I would be happy to answer 

any questions that you and the Subcommittee may have. Thank 

you very much. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Ms. Williams. 

Next, Richard Muth. Mr. Muth, am I pronouncing your name correctly? 

Mr. MUTH. Muth. 

Ms. NORTON. Muth?—who is Director of Maryland Emergency 

Management Agency. 

Mr. Muth. 

Mr. MUTH. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Holmes Norton. Thank 

you once again for allowing me to appear before your Subcommittee 

and, in this case, discussing both our regional response to the 

record snowstorm and also of particular concern is the snow policy 

that is in effect now regarding the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

My written testimony goes into a good bit of detail about what 

we think went right in our response to this unprecedented storm 

and some things that we plan to do better in the future and, perhaps most important, how to improve the FEMA policy for snow assistance. But let me begin my oral testimony by giving you a sense 

of what we were dealing with. 

At BWI Thurgood Marshall Airport, which is the official weather 

station for the Baltimore Metropolitan area, they recorded 84 

inches of snow for this winter. The previous record was 62 inches, 

which was in 1995 and 1996. So we beat it by over 33 percent at 

that one location. We had, of course, three storms of more than 20 

inches. Each storm alone was more than the recorded BWI Marshall for the last two winters combined, and those totals were 

about the same as what we experienced in the National Capital Region. 

Then when you look from the State of Maryland’s perspective in 

Western Maryland, in Garrett County, Allegany County, they received up to 260 inches of snow this past winter, or somewhere in 

the area of 22 feet of snow, which is also about 30 inches higher 

than they have ever seen in any of their records going back over 

100 years. 

26 

So the first question, I guess, how did we fare during all this. It 

is kind of hard to judge in that we have never experienced storms 

of this magnitude before. And I spent 33 years at the local level 

of government before I went to the State, and certainly in my local 

experience we have never had to deal with these things either. 

I certainly look at these things as a public safety issue as more 

than just a snowstorm, and if you use that to give us a grade, we 

had very few fatalities that were attributed to the storm, and those 

were all traffic accidents. We were very concerned about building 

collapses due to the weight of the snow, and we had a few of those, 

but very little. We had some stranded vehicles that were stranded 

for hours before we could get in and remove the people from their 

cars just because of the severity of the storm. But overall I think 

from a public safety perspective we did pretty well. 

We did use the National Guard, as other States did. At one point 

we had over 600 National Guardsmen deployed throughout the 

State, doing everything from transportation to actually, in one case, 

delivering a baby. But all in all, with this magnitude—and I think 

that is one thing we have to keep in mind, this historic event of 

this snowstorm was taxing everybody, and I think we learned from 

that and do better from that, but I think next time we will probably still have a lot of issues that we have to deal with. 

You mentioned one thing earlier, and I think it is a very critical 

point, and that is the telecommuting, but at a greater sense, the 

actual continuity of operations planning. And I think that is the 

piece that really has to be driven home, and this storm is a great 

example of how all agencies, whether it is at the Federal, State, or 

local level, have to really look at their critical functions, what functions do have to continue and what functions can be done remotely. 

We have been working very hard for the last couple years. Governor O’Malley actually did an Executive Order a year ago mandating that all State agencies have a continuity of operations plan 

in place this past summer, which we do have in place now. So that 

is something that is very critical to all these things. 

And, if you don’t mind, I would like to talk just a little bit about 

the Federal policy that we are dealing with right now regarding reimbursement. You mentioned a couple times the storms, the one in 

December, which we have received a Federal Declaration. We have 

not yet applied for the Federal storms because we are still doing 

an assessment on that, but that will be coming very shortly. 

In November of this past year, a new policy went in place with 

FEMA, and the new policy basically says that unless you have a 

record snowfall or within 10 percent of a record snowfall, you do 

not qualify for Federal assistance. One of the key points there I 

think is important is if you look at all the other hazards we deal 

with, all the natural hazards—hurricanes, tornadoes, etcetera— 

none of them require a minimum amount of precipitation before 

you can open up that door; it is all based on damage and the impact it has on that jurisdiction. 

But a snow event, to qualify, you have to have an amount of 

inches that is a record snowfall. And based on where that snowfall 

amount is taken and who takes the snowfall amount really either 

opens that door for you or closes that door. So this is an area that 

we are going to be looking for a lot of assistance from Congress to 

27 

help us through these policies and to hopefully come up with a new 

plan that is gives us much more ability for the jurisdictions to recover. The jurisdictions are in fiscal emergency across the State 

and across our Nation, and this snowstorm certainly added to that 

concern they have from a fiscal perspective. 

So we certainly appreciate your allowing us to come before us 

today and hopefully, with Congress and with us working with the 

Federal Government, we can come up with a fairer policy. Thank 

you. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, thank you, Mr. Muth. 

Now, the next witness is Dave Kubicek, who is Acting Deputy 

General Manager of WMATA. Mr. Kubicek. 

Mr. KUBICEK. Thank you, Chairwoman Norton and Members of 

the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to appear today to provide 

a perspective regarding recovery efforts, operating posture, lessons 

learned, and coordinated reimbursement efforts in the National 

Capital Region related to the February 2010 snowstorms. I am 

Dave Kubicek, Acting Deputy General Manager for Operations for 

the Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, or commonly known as 

WMATA. I will use that acronym throughout my testimony. 

Consistent with the collaborative nature of the National Capital 

Region, WMATA has worked together with its State partners to respond to and recover from the February snowstorms. Our recovery 

efforts are ongoing and lessons learned are not just associated with 

WMATA, but with the region as a whole. Since preparedness, response, recovery efforts for any disaster require coordination across 

the regions, we are committed to reviewing our response efforts associated with the February snowstorms and implementing lessons 

learned. 

I would like to take a moment to discuss WMATA’s response efforts associated with the February snowstorms. 

Snow operations began days prior to the record-breaking snowstorms, which began on February 5th. We started the implementation of WMATA’s Severe Weather Plan. As we tracked the progress 

of the impending snowstorm, we prepared both equipment and employees, along with stockpiling deicer fluids, salt, and other materials. We stood up our new Emergency Operations Command Center at our WMATA headquarters to coordinate our efforts internally and with our local, State, and Federal partners. 

We also participated in the regional snow calls coordinated by 

the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. The snow 

calls allowed all local, State, and Federal entities within the National Capital Region to be briefed on current, future weather conditions by the National Weather Service, and each entity to report 

on their individual conditions and operational decisions, for example, whether schools or bus systems would open or would be closed. 

This facilitated situational awareness of the region’s response efforts and coordinated decision-making. 

As the severity of the snowstorm increased, so did WMATA’S 

snow response operations. WMATA personnel worked around the 

clock to clear rails of snow and ice and operate aboveground as long 

as possible. When WMATA snow commander determined it was unsafe to operate rail operations aboveground, we closed service, but 

still sustained underground service. Bus and paratransit vehicles 

28 

discontinued service once road conditions in the jurisdictions deteriorated and WMATA’S snow commander considered them too dangerous as well. 

WMATA’S recovery efforts continued with additional repairs and 

maintenance on railcars and buses due to damaging effects of the 

snow. WMATA has been able to develop a list of lessons learned, 

both positive and negative, from the February snowstorms which 

can be applied to future disasters, regardless of the cause. Quicker 

recovery of rail operations could occur if WMATA were to have the 

equipment and people, in-house or contracted, dedicated to perform 

such work during a disaster. To operate more effectively during 

any major disaster, WMATA follows the policies established in the 

National Response Framework and the command and the management structure outlined in the National Incident Management System. 

In December 2008, WMATA established an Emergency Management Office within Metro Transit Police Department. This office 

has been working to incorporate the principles, policies, and guidance of both of the NRF and NIMS into the disaster operations 

within WMATA. The result has been effective in coordinating response within the region, which was exemplified in the response to 

the February snowstorms. 

Recoupment of the entire costs associated with the WMATA snow 

response activities would require a change in FEMA’S snow policy. 

Based on the combined magnitude of the February snowstorms and 

the continuing snow recovery efforts, we expect that the region will 

request that FEMA consider drafting a disaster declaration which 

would allow all snow response activities to be considered for reimbursement for an extended period of time, namely, February 5th 

through February the 16th. This time frame reflects the period in 

which most local jurisdictions, along with WMATA, were performing snow response activities and realizing any infrastructure 

damage. WMATA intends to continue its close coordination with 

FEMA and the individual States throughout the reimbursement 

process. 

I appreciate the Subcommittee’s interest in the region’s response 

and recovery efforts, lessons learned, and status of reimbursement 

associated with the February snowstorms. I want to emphasize 

again the integration and cooperation that occurred within the National Capital Region to these snowstorms that the cooperation is 

continuing and we join with others in the region urging the President to draft a state of declaration that would allow for full cost 

recovery. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward 

to answering any questions you might have of me. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Kubicek. 

Next witness is James K. Hartmann, the City Manager of the 

City of Alexandria. 

Mr. HARTMANN. Thank you, Chairwoman Norton, for the opportunity to appear today before this Subcommittee and discuss the 

National Capital Region’s response to snow disasters. 

This hearing is certainly timely, given the unprecedented weather the National Capital Region has experienced, some of the worst 

weather experienced in this region since record-keeping began. 

29 

In December of last year, some 20-plus inches of snow fell on Alexandria, paralyzing our mobility and closing schools, businesses, 

and government. In February, an additional 40 inches of snow fell. 

The second set of storms severely tested our ability to respond to 

a natural disaster of this scale. Fortunately, in the span of time between December and February, the City of Alexandria, like other 

jurisdictions in the region, evaluated our earlier response and 

learned many things. 

Alexandria learned that our traditional priorities for snow clearing, oriented towards ensuring the integrity of the main transportation grid, didn’t make sense if a fire engine, ambulance, or utility 

truck couldn’t leave the primary road and travel into a tuckedaway cul-de-sac when a call for assistance was received. 

We learned that with more than 12 inches of snow, fire hydrants 

become inaccessible, particularly after streets are cleared and snow 

is piled along the curbs where the hydrants are located. 

We knew that we don’t have nearly enough snow removal equipment to respond to storms of this magnitude. We will never have 

enough equipment for such a Herculean task, and, therefore, our 

partnerships with contractors is critically important. 

We learned that the employees we depend on for keeping our 

communities safe don’t live in our city; they live in locations outside the urban core of the region, and getting to work in a major 

snowstorm is dangerous at best, impossible at worst. 

We learned that we need to be better prepared as a region to 

manage disasters like this one and other events that seriously 

threaten the well-being of our citizens, businesses, and visitors, as 

well as the seat of our Nation’s Government. 

And we learned that being accurate in our assessment of the 

threat is very important. 

So by the time the February storms arrived, we were wise and 

better prepared. We took seriously the predictions and we planned 

a response structure that would allow us to do a better job in February 2010 than we did in December 2009. Alexandria’s response 

to snow emergencies and all other incidents that threaten the public now begins with a National Incident Management System Incident Command System, or NIMS-ICS. Key staff in the organization 

has been trained in NIMS-ICS methods, and it is now our default 

mode of operation. ICS works; it takes away any blurriness about 

who is in command and what the priorities are for the City of Alexandria. 

When the threat dictates, we do not hesitate to open our Emergency Operation Center, our EOC, especially since we do not have 

a dedicated facility and must convert other space. It is there for 

emergencies and we use it. 

For the February snowstorm, we conducted a full activation of 

our EOC six hours before the first snow fell, and we kept the center open 24 hours a day for more than a week after the last flakes 

had fallen. An active EOC provides a touchstone for all of our efforts; it is vitally important to our continuity of operations and continuity of government during a disaster. It was also emblematic of 

our commitment to restoring our community to normalcy as quickly 

as possible. 

30 

Once the EOC was operational and our NIMS-ICS structure was 

in place, we could readily make decisions about priorities and resources, which we did continuously. 

From the December storm, we knew access to public safety was 

a far more important priority than access to the Capital Beltway, 

so our priorities began with the simple: make every street in the 

city passable for a fire truck, ambulance, or public utility truck. 

You have all been to Alexandria, and you know what a challenge 

that can be. 

In priority order, after accessibility of our streets came access to 

fire hydrants, access to sidewalks, particularly in high-density population areas, and Metro stations, and access to storm drains. Alexandria has been known to flood on occasion. 

The February storm also presented a challenge we did not experience in the December storm, a threat to our buildings and other 

structures from the crushing weight of three and a half feet of 

snow, with drifts up to ten feet in spots. Assessing and clearing 

snow from rooftops immediately drew tremendously on the resources of the city and our contractors. 

Our priorities were reassessed every 12 hour period, in sync with 

the 12 hour operational periods of the ICS structure. When threats 

could be cleared, we did so and we moved on to the next priority. 

I mentioned a majority of the employees and contractors we depend on to protect and assist our citizens in times of emergency do 

not live in the city, and with the help of our local business community and our partners in the hotel industry, many of our employees 

became residents of the city for the duration of the storms. 

As the snow began to fall, they stayed with us, working rotating 

12-hour shifts for as long as it was necessary, in some cases more 

than 15 days. They give all government workers a good name. 

In the same way that our business community stepped up, so did 

our contractor forces. Fortunately, for many years we have used 

contractors to scale-up our workforce when needed. To respond to 

the disaster, we called upon contractors from the region, but also 

as far away as Charlotte, North Carolina and Buffalo, New York. 

They gave us resources to do what we could not have done alone. 

Most importantly, they helped us to minimize the threat to our 

community. 

I realize I offer a somewhat upbeat picture of the conditions in 

Alexandria, and it is not an overstatement. The willingness to critically review our actions after the December storm gave us a tremendous boost in our preparation for the events of February 20th. 

Properly assessing the February event, having proper organizational structure in place to manage the response effort, clearly ordering priorities and using our partners to help made last month’s 

storm the least impactful it could have been for our community. 

Of course, not everything went as smoothly as it could have 

hoped, and it is only fair that I acknowledge those areas where improvements are yet to be made. 

While we anticipated this event would cause suspension of service of Metro, the closings of schools, and the shutting of the Federal 

Government, we were challenged to understand when and under 

what conditions these services would be restored. We were in some 

31 

instances equally challenged to provide the resources necessary to 

accommodate the restart of services. 

In the context of our emergency response to a snowstorm, a decision to open the Federal Government without adequate sidewalk 

clearing around Metro stations or a fully operational public transportation system resulted in hundreds of pedestrians literally in 

the streets of Alexandria, an unsafe condition that need not exist. 

Decision-making on when to open schools that occurs without the 

full benefit of information regarding roads, sidewalk, and bus stop 

conditions is troublesome. Racing to open schools to foster a public 

sense that a return to normalcy has been achieved is dangerous 

and threatens the very future of our communities and our children. 

For the sake of time, I am going to cut to the closing. 

From an administrative standpoint, the current restrictions imposed by the FEMA Snow Assistance Policy are unnecessarily burdensome on the local jurisdictions who must expend significant 

funds outside their approved operating budgets to address natural 

disasters of this magnitude. 

In closing, I appreciate the opportunity to testify and want to reiterate that the February 2010 snowstorms were not ordinary winter events for the City of Alexandria or the National Capital Region. Indeed, Snowmageddon or Snowpocalypse, as it is now being 

called, met every accepted definition of a natural disaster. This 

event quickly outstripped our local resources, interrupted the normal functions of our city for weeks, and led to a sustained recovery 

effort that continues to this very day. Our commitment to local, 

State, and regional and Federal partnerships is resolute, and we 

look forward to a continued dialogue about how we can sustain and 

improve our positive working relationships. 

I would encourage this Committee to recommend to FEMA a revision to their 48-hour reimbursement policy. 

Thank you for your time today and thank you for the opportunity 

to speak. I welcome any questions you may have. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Hartmann. 

We are going to go to the final witness. I would like to hear his 

testimony briefly because I would then like to go to Ms. Edwards 

for the first questions. 

Dr. R. Eric Petersen, the Congressional Research Service. Mr. 

Petersen. 

Mr. PETERSEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ms. Edwards. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

You have asked me to discuss experiences from recent winter 

storms that might apply to future natural or human-made disasters that affect the National Capital Region. I will discuss that 

briefly and some other preparedness issues that affect the region. 

Response to the winter storms of 2009-2010 may demonstrate 

preparedness capacity in the NCR in a couple of broad areas. First 

is the extent of emergency preparedness coordination and communications prior to and during the storms and during the recovery 

period. It appears that ongoing forecasts, recommendations to avoid 

unnecessary travel, and, in some instances, where to seek shelter 

or other assistance in the event of need were communicated as 

needed. At the same time, among the diverse group of municipal 

State, Federal, and regional entities, it does not appear that there 

32 

is a single entity that can speak authoritatively to all of the issues 

that may be of region-wide interest in an emergency. 

Recovery and resumption of normal activities is another area. 

Some governmental entities appear to have maintained their operations through the storm, notably, the smaller ones in compact geographical areas such as the United States Congress, while recovery 

of others may have been delayed or impaired because those entities 

are dependent upon critical services and access provided by other 

local or regional governments. While the area around the Capitol 

was accessible and the buildings open, surrounding roads throughout the region awaited treatment to make them passable and to 

allow resumption of routine activities. 

The storms highlighted a region-wide dependency on mass transit, about which we have already spoken. Also, the storms arguably 

presented an ideal opportunity for residents in the region to shelter 

in place according to whatever readiness plans they might have developed. 

Now, while those are things that we may have learned from the 

storm, there are some other elements that the response to the 

storm did not address. 

Storms may not provide emergency planners with an improved 

understanding about potential response to incidents that could 

occur with little or no notice, or scenarios that could cause widespread, long, catastrophic consequences of extended duration across 

the NCR. Shelter-in-place response protocols, by their very nature, 

do not necessitate significant evacuations; there isn’t required deployment of other emergency support processes such as decontamination protocols or need to test the surge capacity of regional 

medical assets. 

There are some other challenges unrelated to the storm. For example, it is unclear what regional plans have been developed; if 

they exist, to what extent they have been tested and validated 

throughout exercise and regular updating. If they do exist, it does 

not appear that they are very well publicized. 

It is not clear which entities within the NCR are authorized to 

order regional evacuations or whether they must consult with other 

entities before implementing their plans. In the non-Federal sections of the District of Columbia and Maryland and Virginia, it appears that emergency response follows the model specified for responding to disasters in the rest of the Country. 

Less clear are protocols for responding to incidents in and around 

facilities of the Federal Government. All three of the Federal 

branches—the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial—assert 

independent emergency planning and response authority to those 

places within the District and the NCR that are under their authority. Of particular note, and where the challenge may be especially acute, is Capitol Hill. Congress oversees a campus that is located in a critical nexus of roads and railways that serve as routes 

for evacuation and transport of resources to respond to an incident 

in the District. 

In the event of a widespread or long-term incident congressional 

facilities, it is unclear how that incident would be managed and 

who might manage it. Immediate response on Capitol Hill is likely 

to be provided by the United States Capitol Police. In a longer-term 

33 

response, authority to appoint an Executive Branch-based incident 

commander is unclear and may raise broader questions about the 

autonomy of the Legislative and Judicial Branches to plan and execute their own emergency preparedness programs. On the other 

hand, the mechanism by which the Capitol Police might acquire 

and deploy response assets it does not possess is unclear as well. 

Similar concerns arise around the White House, Federal court facilities, and some Executive Branch department and agencies. 

To conclude, communications and coordination challenges that 

appear inherent in emergency and disaster response appear to be 

orders of magnitude more complex because of the diverse responsibilities and independent authorities of the National Capitol Region governing entities and a core set of mutual interdependencies. 

I believe it will leave it at that for time purposes. 

I very much appreciate, again, the opportunity to testify and look 

forward to any questions you may have. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Dr. Petersen. 

Ms. Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you 

all for your testimony. 

I would like to direct my questions to Mr. Muth, as the Director 

of Maryland’s Emergency Management Agency—and, of course, a 

vote is being called. But I want to focus for a minute on the request 

that Governor O’Malley has made to the President, because I am 

unclear as to, one, that we will hear positively and the consideration of the snow events collectively. And I would argue that there 

needs to be flexibility even in the 48-hour rule because, when you 

look at the snow from December, then to the two storms later on, 

it is the collection of that that really had a tremendous impact on 

all of our services throughout the State and the two counties that 

I share in representing, Prince George’s and Montgomery County. 

So I wonder if you could share with us your view of how that 

flexibility could have assisted in some of our jurisdictions. I would 

note that Prince George’s County, in particular, doesn’t actually 

qualify, and yet there was a tremendous drain on services and response in Prince George’s County because of the collective snowfall 

that we received over this period of time. 

Mr. MUTH. Yes, ma’am. Every point you made is very valid, and 

that was my concern with the policy. Prince George’s County, with 

the new policy, was three inches short of being declared, and the 

inequity there is it all depends on where you take your measurement. And in this case the measurements have to be validated by 

the National Weather Service. There are three ways of doing it: 

you either have a station in your locality that is monitored by the 

National Weather Service or you have what they call a co-op with 

somebody that they verify or validate, and then the third is any 

other source that you have that they feel can be official. 

So, in my mind—I also mentioned earlier that this is the only 

natural hazard that requires a minimum amount of snowfall or, in 

the sake of a hurricane, you don’t have to have three inches of rain 

before you have a declaration; it is based on the amount of damage 

that it causes. Snow should be the same way. 

And your point is well taken. Both your counties were very heavily impacted. Montgomery County actually had the most power outVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\55670.0 KAYLA
34 

ages than anywhere in the State combined, so it was hit extremely 

hard. 

The letter that the governor wrote to the President asked for the 

snowfall amounts to be waived and base it on the impact. He asked 

for the 48-hour rule to be waived. Right now they will only cover 

48 hours of snow clearing, even though, in the February storms, we 

know that went on for six, seven, eight days, and some weeks they 

were still removing that. And then there were two other areas in 

that they have asked to be waived. 

So we are trying and we are hopeful that the President will see 

our response. I believe other States have joined us in writing and 

mentioning their concerns. 

The new policy just went into effect in November, and I think 

Maryland actually was the first State impacted with the storm 

since it went into effect. FEMA Region III, who we deal with, has 

been great; they certainly are working with us within the constraints of the regulations, and that would be what we would expect. But I am certainly hoping that Congress can have folks look 

at this one more time and really look at the impact it is having on 

the local jurisdictions, especially in these economic times. 

Ms. EDWARDS. But do you believe that even the current policy allows the President some discretion? 

Mr. MUTH. It absolutely does. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So the President could exercise his discretion 

today with respect to these emergencies. 

Mr. MUTH. On any policy. That is exactly right. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Let me just, before my—it looks like my time is 

running out, but before it does, one of the things that concerns me 

is that in a region like this metropolitan region, where we are simply not accustomed to experiencing these kind of events, that measuring it by the amount of snowfall or snowfall compared to some 

other time is not, I don’t believe, the most efficient way to determine that we have experienced an event that has placed a great 

burden on the jurisdictions; and that is my concern with having a 

fixed policy without exercising that discretion, because if we had 

had the same snowfall where I went to law school up in New 

Hampshire, no big deal. But it is a big deal for this metropolitan 

region. 

Mr. MUTH. Yes, ma’am, you are absolutely correct. The policy 

was designed and written, in my opinion, to remove snowfall as a 

declaration issue. They wanted to remove it altogether so you no 

longer could declare, and you can see that today, where you have 

to have a record snowfall. With this snowfall, it hasn’t had a snowfall in that degree in over 120 years, so they have successfully now 

taken the State of Maryland out of any future snowstorms, because 

we will probably never see it again in our lifetime, anyway. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

And thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

I am going to ask Mr. Diaz-Balart, in light of snow conditions in 

Florida, whether he has any questions for us. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Madam Chairwoman, I have such expertise of 

large snowfalls, coming from southern Florida. I actually don’t have 

questions. I do want to first once again apologize; I did have to go 

35 

to the floor and I did mention you because it was a bill that I know 

you care greatly about, and I know that if you weren’t chairing this 

very important Subcommittee, you would have been there as well. 

So I just want to apologize for not being here, but I know that you 

understand why I had to be on the floor. And I mention the fact 

that you would have been there as well if you didn’t have this very 

important Subcommittee, so I apologize. 

Ms. NORTON. I thank the gentleman for doing so. I could see by 

the monitor he was on the floor and the bill had to do with the 

naming of a courthouse in Mississippi where I went, as a student 

in SNICK, after the three slain civil rights workers. Only my official duties could have kept me from the floor, and I can’t thank you 

enough, Ranking Member, Mr. Diaz-Balart, for mentioning why I 

was not there. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And I want 

to thank again those who participated in this hearing for being 

here today, and I wanted them to know that I wasn’t here not because I didn’t think this was important. And if anybody could have 

learned something today, it would have been me, coming from 

South Florida, but, again, our other duties forced me to not be 

here. So thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Mr. Diaz-Balart. I want to say we have 

learned much from you and from, really, the model work that the 

State of Florida has done in all hazards, and although you have different kinds of hazards, the District of Columbia and the entire region has much to learn from the way in which Florida, over the 

years, has developed a system statewide and within its local jurisdictions for dealing with hazards much like what we experienced 

here this winter. So I certainly want to thank you. 

Let me go to General Schwartz first. How many members of the 

D.C. National Guard were deployed during the December and February snowstorms, General? 

General SCHWARTZ. Madam Chairman, we had 203 members of 

the D.C. National Guard that were involved in this snow blizzard. 

Not all of them were on the streets, but we had folks in our operation centers and trying to keep those Humvees running, the maintenance folks. 

Ms. NORTON. What kinds of things were they doing, General 

Schwartz? 

General SCHWARTZ. They were deployed to the precincts around 

the District. They were responsible for moving emergency personnel. Even emergency personnel from Maryland who work in the 

District, we covered some of them and took them to work. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, Mr. Muth and Mr. Hartmann, in your cases, 

were the Guards called out by the governor? 

Mr. MUTH. Yes, ma’am, in the State of Maryland they were 

called out by the Governor. 

Mr. HARTMANN. And the City of Alexandria, we made a request 

for assistance from the Virginia Guard and did receive that support. 

Ms. NORTON. So the governor did call out the Guard? 

Mr. HARTMANN. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, of course, the mayor of the District of Columbia cannot ‘‘call out the Guard,’’ and I do have a bill, as you are 

36 

aware, General Schwartz, to give the mayor of the District of Columbia the same authority to call out the Guard in a natural disaster, rather than to proceed through the President of the United 

States. If the mayor were to ask you, as he would—well, first of 

all, I want to know the difference between what the Guard could 

have done had it been called out and what it did, given the authority you have without a presidential call of the Guard. 

General SCHWARTZ. Madam Chairman, there would be no difference. What I have done within the D.C. Guard is to place a person working in HSEMA to support all of the planning efforts that 

they would need to use the Guard, and I was leaning forward to 

help them right from the beginning. 

In the case of an emergency, however, in the District, like the 

Metro situation, I have the authority to push Guardsmen out to 

that emergency immediately, without asking the President of the 

United States whether or not I can. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I think you are making a good case for why 

this is an artificial distinction in the District of Columbia between 

the President calling out the Guard and your simply going out and 

doing it. 

I take it did the mayor ask you to come forward and do these 

things, Ms. Williams? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes, ma’am, the mayor did make the request 

through the Homeland Security and Emergency Management 

Agency to the D.C. National Guard, and then the Guard went 

through their process of approval and informed us that they would 

be able to provide the necessary support that we would need 

throughout the duration of the snowstorms. 

Ms. NORTON. So I just want to say for the record that I believe 

this demonstrates that this antiquated notion that is a pre-home 

rule notion, when in fact the whole District of Columbia was a Federal entity, much to our regret, but it was, is now a home rule jurisdiction. It does seem to me that at the very least, in a natural 

disaster, when the President of the United States knows very little 

about what to do,—if he will forgive me, good friend of mine that 

he is—but the mayor of the District of Columbia knows more about 

what to do in a hurricane or a snowstorm, and just to go straight 

to General Schwartz and say bring the men and women out. I 

know well how extraordinary their service has been to our city and, 

indeed, to the Country. 

I know you welcomed home 100 soldiers from Iraq. I look forward 

to being at their official homecoming later on. Very glad to have 

them all back here safe and sound, particularly since most of what 

they do they do here, stateside in the District of Columbia and 

throughout the region. 

In that regard, if the mayor requested—and this is another irony, 

which is why it seems to me my bill is relevant to just put the 

Guard under the mayor as the Guard is under the governors of the 

adjacent States—if the mayor did in fact request personnel from 

Maryland and Virginia, if you look at the compact, the compact 

specifies that these Guard members from Maryland and Virginia 

would fall under the ‘‘operational control of the District’s Emergency Services Authority.’’ So it doesn’t say will fall under the operational control of the National Guard. And yet these are National 

37 

Guard troops, so, in effect, this compact would seem to supersede, 

if not override, the rather artificial process we have in place. 

I certainly appreciate the alacrity with which you have worked 

always, General Schwartz, within the rules, but quickly to support 

the District of Columbia. 

Mr. Kubicek—— 

General SCHWARTZ. May I respond to that, because—— 

Ms. NORTON. Certainly. 

General SCHWARTZ. As members of the National Guard coming 

to the District of Columbia to perform duties just like they did for 

the 56th Presidential Inauguration, they fall under the control of 

the commanding general of the District of Columbia National 

Guard, especially that they are coming in under 502(f) funding requirements, which is a Federal funding line. The way the Emergency Management Assistance Compact works is that they fall 

under State active duty if they go to other States, which means 

those States fund the services of those Guard members. But because they were under 502(f) coming into the District of Columbia 

under a Federal clause, they fall under the command and control 

of the commanding general of the D.C. Guard. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, General Schwartz. 

Mr. Kubicek, I think it was Mr. Hartmann who testified about 

severe stress put on the City of Alexandria because of the failure 

to clear around Metro stations. Could you comment on that? 

Mr. KUBICEK. On our part, we do keep our stations, around our 

general station areas, clear on our part, but you have to work, I 

guess, on a collaborative nature to get the streets and everything 

else cleared and—— 

Ms. NORTON. Collaborating with whom? 

Mr. KUBICEK. With all of the local jurisdictions throughout the 

region. 

Ms. NORTON. What do you do to make sure that your emergency 

personnel get to where they can clear the streets or, for that matter, operate the Metro or your buses? How do they get there? 

Mr. KUBICEK. On our part, for example, with the rail operation 

side, again, we get there via rail or heavy equipment. From a bus 

operations perspective—— 

Ms. NORTON. No, no. I am trying to find out how your workers 

get to where they could clear Mr. Hartmann’s Metro stations and 

how your workers get there so they can run the railroad, if you will 

forgive the expression. How do they get to work? They all would 

seem to be emergency workers of one kind or another. 

Mr. KUBICEK. Yes, that is correct. We do have various heavy 

equipment which permits us to operate through some very high 

snow areas. We do not have a full complement of it, so we have 

to work on our best case basis on where we can address areas with 

our equipment, and it just takes time—— 

Ms. NORTON. How do your workers get to work, Mr. Kubicek? 

Mr. KUBICEK. How do they get to work? 

Ms. NORTON. Yes. 

Mr. KUBICEK. During this snowstorm, for example, we operate 

12-hour shifts. We did afford opportunity for individuals, we put 

people up in hotels close to their work area. 

Ms. NORTON. That is what I am after. 

38 

Mr. KUBICEK. Okay. All right. 

Ms. NORTON. You do have a way, when you have the kind of notice—— 

Mr. KUBICEK. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON.—of a severe storm, to simply keep people where 

they can be reached and do their jobs. 

Mr. KUBICEK. Yes, that is correct. And then we also put up our 

individuals or employees at some of our work locations as well. So 

we try to keep them in their respective region, where they report 

out of. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, Mr. Hartmann, you talked about the crowding of your residents onto the streets of Alexandria. Would you 

elaborate so that we could have a clearer sense of what happened? 

Mr. HARTMANN. Certainly I will, because I was the incident commander for the city and I was on the ground at the time, each and 

every day, as we were doing our situational awareness and our various assessments. It was basically one that we had a lot of demands out there in the public and probably not as much resources 

for all the multiple priorities that we had. Certainly, our priority 

to make sure that we have emergency vehicle access to all the various residents and businesses in the city was a monumental task. 

But at the same time that meant that we had to divert those resources that would normally be doing sidewalks, even the Metro 

center lots and so forth. 

Ms. NORTON. Wait a minute. Who is supposed to do the Metro 

center lot, you or Metro? 

Mr. HARTMANN. There is a portion of it that Metro takes care of 

and, of course, we take care of all the infrastructure coming up to 

that. Sometimes there are some pretty seamless borders there, and 

I think our overriding—our joint priorities are done fairly well. But 

in a case like this, and with these storms—and I think what I was 

suggesting in my testimony—there is an expectation that one has 

to make with the reality of the amount of resources that we have 

and truly the public safety. So sometimes things are opened up earlier than were actually ready for them, and I think that is a lesson 

learned for all of us in the region that we need to do on a caseby-case basis. For instance, the Braddock Metro Station may have 

been ready much earlier than the King Street or vice versa and so 

forth. And I think we will certainly initiate that dialogue and have 

better dialogue. Hopefully we will never see another set of storms 

like this, but if we do, I think that was a lesson learned for us. 

Ms. NORTON. Was Metro on these so-called COG calls, Mr. 

Kubicek? 

Mr. KUBICEK. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. Why didn’t that help, for example, to divide out 

who would be clearing, who had employees near enough to clear 

some stations, whether it was a local jurisdiction, for example, or 

Metro employees? I mean, are those calls used for such practical 

nuts and bolts notions as that? 

Mr. KUBICEK. On the COG call at that level, it is generally a little bit higher level. Basically, you are trying to assist the overall 

status of the region as a whole. For example, with WMATA, we 

would focus on like our stations and our bus bays. That would be 

our primary response. But then we would also be coordinating with 

39 

all the other districts and regions to see where they are at with 

their streets. There is sharing of materials like salt and such. So, 

again, we would first prioritize bus bays, station access and stuff, 

and then we would also start evaluating the ability to get to and 

from the station via the bus bay with the local jurisdictions. 

Ms. NORTON. This gets to be quite complicated. 

Mr. KUBICEK. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. There is not a lot of discussions across jurisdictional lines. 

Mr. KUBICEK. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. I am concerned, for example, that Metro heroically 

opened its subways and then finds out that nobody can get to them 

because the snow may not be cleared because there hasn’t been sufficient communication on the ground to get to them. It does seem 

to me that the real test of emergency planning is detail and only 

detail. Everybody can get on the phone and talk about it is going 

to snow tomorrow. What residents want to know is what you are 

going to do about it on their block and at their Metro station. 

If that planning at that level has not gone on, and it is my impression from this testimony that the linking up, for example, of 

subway stations with on-the-ground conditions getting there, that 

that kind of detail has not had to be done before, I would certainly 

ask that perhaps through COG, and with Metro very much included, that that kind of very detailed on-the-ground planning— 

that is how the military does it. They don’t say let’s throw a bomb 

and just see where it hits; they are down to the ground of the 

ground of the ground level. Just ask General Schwartz. And I am 

afraid that that is what this is, it is a war against the snow, and 

the snow has a whole lot more on its side to win, as we have 

learned. 

Yes, you are right that we may never get this again, but this is 

the time to learn from what we have gotten, and our concern 

here—because we do have jurisdiction over not only natural events, 

but manmade terrorist events, is gets scarier and scarier as we try 

to apply what happened here to something that paralyzed the region against what would happen if this were a terrorist event. 

We really don’t expect that there would be a terrorist event that 

paralyzed the region the way a snowstorm does. We really don’t. 

We have all kinds of scenarios. But we don’t expect some kind of 

nuclear attack here that would send everybody. We do expect parts 

of the region to be paralyzed, to be incommunicado with other 

parts. So we are using this very much as a test for all hazards. 

And, of course, we are very concerned, Mr. Kubicek, about 

WMATA because WMATA is central to everything that happens, 

public and private, in this jurisdiction. Now, you have a so-called 

severe weather plan. What is that? 

Mr. KUBICEK. On our severe weather plan, we cover like snow 

events, ice events, hurricanes. Basically what it does is it puts us 

to a state of readiness and preparedness whenever we see an upcoming weather event that is going to impact our service. And we 

will get our plant maintenance people involved, our bus operations, 

our rail operations, our general maintenance staff, and it is a coordinated effort, and also it goes through multiple departments for 

resources, if we need support from our procurement side to go and 

40 

buy additional resources or you have to get a special exemption for 

us to go out and use additional P-cards. So it is really a readiness 

document. It is something that we evaluate on an annual basis. It 

is an evolving process and we kind of treat it as a living document. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Kubicek, I am a native Washingtonian who 

spent some of the best years of her life in New York City. I don’t 

recall ever seeing New York City’s subways ever close down. Hardly does the city close down, but I was there when there was a very 

severe snowstorm. I don’t recall ever seeing the subway close down. 

Now, that is a very much older system, maybe the first in the 

Country. I know Chicago’s is also older and gets far more inclement 

weather and snowstorms.—I also know that both systems ride significantly aboveground in parts of the system. Why can’t Metro ride 

overground and underground during a snowstorm? 

Mr. KUBICEK. Well, part of it on a storm this size, we have to 

really look at the type of equipment that we have been provided 

with to work with at this time. 

Ms. NORTON. So it had to do with the size of the storm. 

Mr. KUBICEK. Yes, the size of the storm. Typically, if we get two 

to four inches or upwards of six inches, we are going to do just fine. 

We have an area where we kind of call it like an eight inch rule. 

Whenever we start getting accumulation of snow above eight 

inches, that is when we start getting into a lot of problems. 

Ms. NORTON. What are the problems? You can ride the train. You 

clear the tracks, I guess, when they are two inches. Why can’t you 

clear the track when they are eight inches, as you say? 

Mr. KUBICEK. Depending upon the snowfall, if it starts getting 

above eight inches, then it starts coming into contact with the third 

rail, which provides the electrical supply to the railcars, and whenever you start running into that area, you are basically scraping 

water and you are creating direct shorts. 

Ms. NORTON. What do they do in New York? Don’t they have a 

third rail there too? 

Mr. KUBICEK. They do have that. They have different snow removal equipment. Some systems don’t have cover boards. We have 

cover boards on our system and those are good and bad; in one way 

they help us keep from snow falling on the third rail, but if you 

have a lot of blowing snow and stuff, it kind of catches it and it 

gets impacted. And then it also has the potential of damaging the 

equipment on the railcars, it can knock off the electrical collectors. 

Ms. NORTON. So your testimony is that absent a really heavy 

snowfall, you think that our trains can ride above and below 

ground at the same time? 

Mr. KUBICEK. Yes. Our system, in the 8 to 12 inches, we are 

going to be able to operate with what we have. It is just that whenever you get into an area where you are starting talking about 15 

to 20 inches of snow blowing and drifting—for example, we had 

areas of the system where we had our portals and we had kind of 

like a Venturia effect, and we had snowdrifts above 15 feet tall that 

accumulated very quickly. So there are going to be some interruptions to that. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Kubicek, what are your estimates of what 

FEMA may reimburse WMATA for? 

41 

Mr. KUBICEK. I know what we have submitted at this point in time has been around $9.4 million in our damages. We are still 

working on the collection or the finalization of our numbers, but 

that is at least what we have attributed to this storm at this point 

in time formally. 

Ms. NORTON. Are you talking about only the December storm or 

are you talking about both storms? 

Mr. KUBICEK. I am just talking about February. 

Ms. NORTON. Sorry? February? 

Mr. KUBICEK. The February storm. 

Ms. NORTON. What about December? 

Mr. KUBICEK. At this time, the estimate is around $1.7 million. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, let me ask you whether—I had assumed without knowing, therefore, I want to ask the question. Since WMATA 

is, under the Stafford Act classified as a local entity, and since it 

knows where it collected the snow and what the damage was, I 

want to know what your view is of having to go through each local 

jurisdiction in order to make you application for reimbursement. 

Mr. KUBICEK. On that, I guess I could see pros and cons. 

Ms. NORTON. Would you give us both, please? 

Mr. KUBICEK. Give both, okay. I guess the pro to that is that 

since we are intertwined with our respective regional partners 

here, we communicate on resources and staffing and stuff. 

Ms. NORTON. So have you used local resources sometimes in 

order to keep the trains running? 

Mr. KUBICEK. Not for the trains, to keep running and stuff, but 

say, for instance, in bus operations we might coordinate with other 

police departments and events. So there is a lot of intercommunication keeping these various systems running. So there is a lot of information that is shared. 

I guess from a pro standpoint, or looking at it from the opposite 

side, is that, us having the ability to apply for it directly in some 

ways would lessen our paperwork and processing going through the 

bureaucracy. But I am not really sure if that would deter from 

other regions. 

Ms. NORTON. I am literally trying to find, I exercise a presumption against paperwork. I am a Democrat. I like government. People hate government in part because they see barriers for which 

there has been no explanation. So if there is an explanation you 

have given of some sharing of funds, I can understand that, but I 

know he has jurisdictions. 

Would you prefer, given what you are having to do with respect 

to your own jurisdictions, Ms. Williams, Mr. Muth, Mr. Hartmann, 

would you, given your relationship with WMATA, prefer that 

WMATA come through you in trying to get its expenses due only 

to it? And if so, why? 

Ms. WILLIAMS. I can certainly speak, of course, for the District. 

We work very closely with WMATA every day, and so I believe that 

we have a tremendous relationship from everything to making sure 

that we notify residents in the area of train delays, to providing 

guidance to WMATA regarding places where we see there being 

problem areas related to snow removal. 

So that is something that was ongoing throughout each of the 

storms. And we worked very closely with them to try to provide inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\55670.0 KAYLA
42 

telligence that would help them to help us to inform residents 

about the capabilities of the system. 

As it relates to the reimbursement request for WMATA from 

FEMA, we have worked very closely, again, with WMATA representatives to ascertain the costs that were associated to the District or attributed to the District of Columbia’s rail lines that went 

either to Virginia or to Maryland, and have been able to very closely divide up that piece of the pie that is the District’s responsibility. 

Certainly, it is our hope that we would be able to work very 

closely with FEMA to be able to help WMATA to realize the full 

reimbursement or at least the allotted reimbursement. I don’t see 

it as being a tremendous challenge in terms of its practice. Theoretically, I can see it being burdensome for WMATA in that they 

would need to do the same exercise three times. So that could, of 

course, present a challenge. 

There has been an opportunity for WMATA to work very closely 

with the District to actually combine all of those efforts and use 

just one State administrative agent. I will use that term because 

we do that with other Federal funds, and that was back in 1996 

when all three jurisdictions actually did report through the District 

of Columbia for WMATA to be able to realize its reimbursement. 

Ms. NORTON. They report through the District of Columbia, then? 

Ms. WILLIAMS. That did happen one time. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. In relation to a snowstorm was that? 

Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes, actually, it was. 

Ms. NORTON. I wonder, Mr. Muth, Mr. Kubicek, is there any 

sense of that this time? Or is everybody just going to have to put 

in their funds? What is your view of this, Mr. Muth? 

Mr. MUTH. Yes, I actually agree with Ms. Williams. We just look 

at WMATA as another entity that is applying through us, another 

sub-grantee. 

Ms. NORTON. Just like Alexandria? 

Mr. MUTH. So it really would not impact us. I can certainly understand the additional paperwork, though. 

Ms. NORTON. You are a pass-through because whatever Mr. 

Kubicek tells you, you just have to pass that on. 

Mr. MUTH. That is correct. 

Ms. NORTON. You are not going to get into any arguments with 

them. 

Mr. MUTH. No, and actually FEMA is going to be coming and 

interviewing them, not us. So they will sit down with them, go over 

their records and that is what will be submitted. So we are just to 

pass through the SAA for them. So I think we are fine as far as 

it goes right now. 

Ms. NORTON. We are only interested in what is the fastest, best 

practice. 

Mr. Kubicek, you said in order to get what you are calling the 

full reimbursement, there would have to be a change of FEMA’s 

snow policy. In what respect are you speaking? 

Mr. KUBICEK. Just like everybody else, they are limited to this 

48 hour rule. And so whenever we go through and we do our cost 

assessment of this $9.4 million that we are looking at, it is really 

43 

over the span of the storm. It is also the impact of our project and 

any sustained damage. 

Ms. NORTON. Are you aware that FEMA can extend the 48 hour 

rule to 72 hours? 

Mr. KUBICEK. Yes, we are aware of it, but this point in time, that 

is what we are working off of and we are hopefully optimistic that 

it will be extended. 

Ms. NORTON. Are any of you in the midst of asking for an extension to the 72 hour rule? 

Ms. WILLIAMS. The District of Columbia is seeking to have some 

leniency as relates to the 48 hours, as well as to the snow of record. 

That is something that is probably more problematic for States in 

terms of contiguous counties and their snow record requirements. 

But in February, as we know, there were technically two storms, 

and we were given the opportunity to either file a request for a declaration as one storm or two storms. 

If you go with the two storm scenario, you actually only have one 

storm that allows you to have that snow of record because in the 

second storm, the one that started on the 10th, while you didn’t 

have the accumulation, you did have the blizzard conditions which 

is what made it more hazardous. 

So there were lots of challenges that made the February snow 

event much more challenging than the December snow event, down 

to the type of snow. It was a heavier snow. It was a wetter snow. 

It was much more difficult to remove, which was why you had so 

many snow-packed streets. 

As we have mentioned, there are obvious differences to our snow 

removal preparation just in terms of equipment versus a Northeastern State or location. I am originally from Buffalo, New York 

so I know that 20 inches is nothing. And I would be at school the 

next day and wondering how that happened so quickly. 

But you have a difference in the type of geography of the city, 

the layout of the city. We had driveways. We had wider streets. 

The city was prepared for snow events. In the mid-Atlantic, we are 

simply not prepared for that and I believe that most jurisdictions 

or all jurisdictions did as much as they possibly could, and sought 

resources through either the EMAC Compact or just relationships 

and reaching out and picking up the telephone and finding friends 

in neighboring States that would be able to provide support. 

We had support come in from Boston at the far end of the snow 

event, but there is the possibility that the expenditures that the 

District of Columbia would incur for having those additional capabilities brought in would not necessarily be covered, given the limitations of the FEMA snow removal policy. 

So there is some question around the interpretation of the policy, 

the 48 hours, the 100 percent versus 75 percent, and so that is part 

of why we have made requests, first of all, for clarification and 

then for extension of the time period that we would be able to request reimbursement for. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I am not sure it will be done, but there are 

circumstances under which the State share can be waived. 

Ms. Williams, there is a regulation in the District of Columbia, 

and understandably so, that residents must clear their own sidewalks. We don’t have any jurisdiction over the Federal GovernVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\55670.0 KAYLA
44 

ment. Did the Federal Government clear in front of Federal buildings systematically throughout the District of Columbia? 

Ms. WILLIAMS. It is my understanding that the Federal Government’s facilities were cleared. There were some instances where we 

received phone calls at our unified command center with some concerns around sidewalks, but it was just a matter of us picking up 

a telephone and making a phone call and asking that people give 

attention to areas that perhaps had not been given the appropriate 

attention. 

There were also several opportunities for the District of Columbia’s contractors and/or employees to provide support to Federal 

Government by helping with clearing activities of roads around facilities so that employees would be able to traverse to and from 

their places of business. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, for you and for Mr. Muth, I have a question 

about how the local jurisdictions decided to close down the government, because there was a difference, now we understand the different jurisdictions and the different rates of snowfall because all 

of that is understood. 

The District of Columbia, for reasons that also ought to be clear, 

is often able to stay open longer. That is the advantage of living 

in a city with public transportation. And even under the worst conditions, it is better public transportation than other places. 

And as I understand it, for all but two days, the District remained open, but one of those days seemed to show very little regard for the very questions I put to the Federal Government, which 

is: How in the world do you expect even your emergency service 

people to get to work? And apparently, the District incurred a lot 

of criticism on one of those days for keeping the government open 

when it looked like everybody else, including the Federal Government, was closed down. 

Now, let me ask you, have you had any communications with the 

other jurisdictions if you believe it might have been wiser to close 

it down for at least the day that the whole region was paralyzed? 

Would you do it differently on that day? 

And why you, Mr. Muth, decided to close on that day? Was there 

any conversation across jurisdictional lines so that people could 

have learned from others’ experiences? For example, Maryland and 

Virginia ultimately got more snowfall than the District of Columbia 

did. So if you could explain how you decide when the government 

when the government will be open? 

And I would also like to ask both of you how emergency service 

workers will get to work, because they apparently must come to 

work in any case. 

Ms. Williams, do you want to start? 

Ms. WILLIAMS. Sure. Certainly, we are reviewing our actions of 

both of the snow events to make sure that going forward, we are 

engaging in practices that, of course, or really do take into account 

what is reasonable and what we can fully expect employees to be 

able to do. 

I believe that part of our reason for moving forward with opening 

government was based on our assessment of the facilities that employees would be going to, and many of the main arterial roads 

45 

that there would be the opportunity for employees to make in to 

their places of work. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, of course, notoriously, much to our regret, but 

there is nothing you can do about it, the great majority of your 

workers don’t even live in the District of Columbia. So you can 

open all the arteries you want to, and nobody may be able to get 

to work. 

Ms. WILLIAMS. And again, that is something that we are looking 

at as we analyze our after-action reports and look at the information that has been provided to us not just from District government 

agencies, and not just from our partners in the region, but also 

from residents who are sharing with us their concerns about things 

that they felt that we could do better. 

We want to make sure that we are listening with very open ears 

and not looking with jaundiced eyes at the opinions of folks who 

may have felt that we probably should have done some things differently. We don’t claim to be perfect, and certainly we are learning 

every day. 

There was information that we had based on what we witnessed 

ourselves that made us feel confident in opening. If we had the opportunity to do it again, I am not sure that the decision would be 

the same. But our commitment was to make sure that we would 

be able to provide continuous city services to residents, businesses, 

partners of the city who needed to have that. And so that is why 

we worked very hard to make sure that we could open. 

But again, we are looking at all of our activities to ensure that 

in fact we were doing the things that were in the best interests of 

the communities that we serve. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I appreciate the way you are using the experience to try to figure out how to work the next time. 

Before you answer the same question, Mr. Muth, may I ask if all 

the jurisdictions, and it is Ms. Williams’ testimony that reminds me 

of this question, are doing after-action reports so that internally 

you can learn from this experience? 

Mr. MUTH. Yes. 

Ms. WILLIAMS. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. This is very important. It makes you think what 

to do again. 

Mr. Schwartz, if you won’t mind my constantly referring to the 

military, the military doesn’t even win a battle and said, okay, everybody, let’s pop the champagne. The military comes back and 

says, we won the battle; now, what did we do wrong? I am not trying to militarize the jurisdictions, but the reason that the National 

Guards and the Armed Forces of the United States have been so 

successful in their work is they are not in the self-congratulatory 

business. They leave that to us and they know we love them and 

appreciate them, just as we do our emergency service workers. But 

they come back even from a successful event, much less an untoward event like this, and yes, figure out what they did right, but 

are far more interested in what they could have done better. 

Mr. Muth, would you like to answer the same question I asked 

Ms. Williams? 

Mr. MUTH. Yes, ma’am. Regarding the decision to close government, that is basically made in concert with a bunch of different 

46 

directors of agencies, Department of Budget and Management. I 

was asked my opinion from a public safety perspective. 

Ms. NORTON. So that is raising an internal matter as opposed to 

whatever the other jurisdictions are doing. 

Mr. MUTH. Right. But what I found in even my experience at the 

local level, many times they will look for the State to be the lead. 

So if the State is going to close or liberal leave for their employees, 

many times the jurisdictions will follow suit, not always, but many 

times they will. 

But we do offer liberal leave, which an employee if they can’t 

come to work for whatever reason, they are just charged the leave 

day, a vacation day or whatever so it gives them that option. 

As far as essential employees go, though, we are required as essentials, as everybody else said, to be there. I spent 30 years in the 

Fire Department and I remember many times getting to work 12, 

15 hours before my shift started because a storm was coming because that was my responsibility. 

At our Emergency Operations Center, I spent over 96 hours 

straight there, as many of my staff did, and we bunk out in the 

offices, in the rooms and those types of things. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, who stays in place as a staff, is what you are 

saying. 

Mr. MUTH. You get there and you stay there. And that is the responsibility of the critical public safety agencies. I am not sure that 

will ever change from that degree. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Kubicek, you mentioned in your testimony an 

issue that raises a chicken and egg question for me. You spoke 

about the snowfalls, briefed by the National Weather Service, and 

then looked at individual conditions and operational decisions. For 

example, you say, are schools or other bus systems open or closed? 

Mr. Kubicek, I submit that they are looking first to see whether 

you are going to be open before they make a decision whether they 

should close. Who ought to act first, given the importance of 

WMATA to all that happens in the region, WMATA or the local jurisdictions? 

Mr. KUBICEK. It is WMATA. I mean, again, we understand our 

importance in this region. If we do close or we are opening up early 

or late, it has a ripple effect throughout the entire region. So this 

continuity of operations is very, very important for us, the overall 

communications. 

And again, we are also dependent upon the jurisdictions, be it 

Virginia or Maryland or the District of Columbia. As these storms 

and stuff role through here, we have to communicate with them in 

different factors to see what the status is taking place. We might 

be getting a lot of snow in Virginia. In Maryland, it might be a little bit clearer and a little bit slower. So it is really monitoring 

these things and communicating on an hour by hour basis sometimes. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Kubicek, given the fact that your Metro line, 

even your buses often travel through multiple jurisdictions, what 

difference would it make if the schools were closed in the District 

but open in Maryland? What difference would that make since you 

will have people from the District, for example, the personnel having to go. We have reverse commuting throughout this region. 

47 

I am not sure what difference it makes what is open in each jurisdiction to whether or not WMATA’s buses and Metro lines 

should in fact continue as if this were any other day of the week. 

I understand everybody needs to know whether WMATA is open 

or shut, but you see that even closing down your above-ground 

closed down the Federal Government. So if I am a local jurisdiction, what do I first want to know? The first thing I want to know 

is, is WMATA open and are the buses running. Then it seems to 

me a whole set of other things fall into place. 

Do you operate first and foremost understanding your effect on 

the rest of the region? Or do you look to the region and what it 

is going to do in its various locations in deciding how you should 

operate above ground, below ground, how much below ground, how 

much you can still operate, et cetera? I mean, which comes first? 

Do you see yourself as the first and primary actor? Or do you simply see yourself as a partner along with the rest of the other jurisdictions? 

Mr. KUBICEK. I see ourselves as a very important partner. We 

take our role extremely serious in this overall process. And as we 

evaluate our services, we also understand that we do not want to 

be operating in a condition where we could not be supported by 

them. 

For example, the operations of whenever we had like really 

heavy, aggressive deep snow, if we go out there and we strand a 

rail car or, say for instance, you have a catastrophic type event, 

you are going to tax these other regional services to support us. 

So we are doing our safety first, primary, to make sure that can 

operate efficiently and effectively. But at the same point in time, 

as we move forward with our operations, that we will task other 

resources and we have to very conscientious of that as well. So it 

is a very fine line. 

Ms. NORTON. I do know you to some extent tax other resources, 

and I do want to say for the record that I regard WMATA employees as nothing short of heroic. And I saw what you did during the 

unprecedented inauguration. I have never seen anything like it. 

That whole inauguration was an emergency for you. 

And I do know that you operate these trains when many think 

they would not be operating. But I am concerned that WMATA be 

understood for what it is, given a region without borders, perhaps 

the first among firsts. 

I do want to ask you, Ms. Williams, the difference between the 

District’s so-called snow plan and its response plan. Because as we 

understood it, the snow plan came under the Department of Transportation, which is not an emergency management agency. Whereas the direct response plan comes under you, does it, and your 

agency? 

Ms. WILLIAMS. The District response plan is administered and 

managed by the Homeland Security and Emergency Management 

Agency. He snow plan that is managed and developed by the Department of Transportation in close consultation with the Department of Public Works, is but a portion of the overall District’s response plan. 

So the District response plan does address the all hazards approach to preparedness. And so any agency that has an emergency 

48 

response plan or a COOP plan is subject to the District response 

plan. 

So depending on the type of event, there is a different lead entity 

for the actual response. In the event of a snow event, the lead entity for the District of Columbia was in fact the District’s Department of Transportation, in close cooperation with the Department 

of Public Works. And they helped to lead that effort in terms of 

snow removal. But every other aspect of the overall response was 

something that was managed by the District of Columbia’s Homeland Security and Management Agency. And in fact, we helped to 

inform the snow plan. 

We were involved in all of the snow planning meetings. Likewise, 

the Department of Transportation and the Department of Public 

Works are involved with all of our emergency planning meetings, 

as are all of the other 16 ESF, or emergency support functions, 

that are operating here in the District of Columbia. 

So it is a cooperation. It is a cooperative agreement. The snow 

plan is something that is a requirement. I would dare say that 

every jurisdiction has one or something similar to it, just as we 

have a flooding plan, just as we have a plan around removal of garbage. There is a plan for everything. 

The hope is that we are exercising those plans effectively and 

making sure that we are meeting the objectives of those plans. 

Ms. NORTON. Do the other jurisdictions have snow plans apart 

from their response plans or as part of their responsibilities? Ms. 

Williams has testified that essentially, as I take it, it is a subset 

of your emergency response plan to have a snow plan. 

Do the rest of you have a snow plan as well? 

Mr. HARTMANN. Madam Chairman, in Alexandria, I think we 

have our typical snow plan which is probably eight to 12 inches 

and less. But since December, we have developed a whole other set 

of planning which shifts us from a transportation-oriented plan to 

one that is definitely public safety-oriented plan. 

And I think we are all probably together reevaluating all our 

plans in light of this incident. And I think through the COG and 

a few of us meet on a monthly basis, Ms. Williams and Mr. Muth, 

we meet every month and we talk about these things. And we 

know that we want to prepare the best we can for this region. And 

this past occurrence has really kind of caused us to, I believe, and 

I will speak for all of us, and correct me if I am wrong, look back 

at these plans. And I think your calling this hearing today was another catalyst for that. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hartmann, I did want to clarify for the record how a city 

which, and a given State—let me give you the law professor’s hypothetical—an emergency may occur in one part of the jurisdiction 

and the rest of the State be left free of it. That certainly was the 

case in 9/11. 

So let us assume you have a snowfall that cripples, as this snowfall did most of the region, somehow manages to cripple Alexandria, but the rest, Fairfax is going fine and the rest of the State 

is fine. Yet you must go through the State because it is State entities that are recognized under FEMA, except for local entities like 

WMATA. 

49 

How does a city work to make sure that in your cases the Commonwealth in fact asks correctly for what has occurred? Has the 

Commonwealth been involved because it is a major event? Does 

that take care of it? How does the city make sure that it will be 

reimbursed for what it had to do and the expenses it laid out? Or 

does the State, in your case the Commonwealth, pick up most of 

the cost? 

Mr. HARTMANN. Well, a couple of nuances that are important 

with Alexandria. We operate under a charter and we are an independent city in Virginia, which means that we also have no county 

overlay for us. But we also a Dillon’s Rule State, which means that 

the State has a lot of control over what we do. 

The State is very much a partner with us. The State of Virginia 

Department of Emergency Management, we are able to request of 

them, as we had done in the February storms. Certainly through 

the EMAC process we did a request for additional resources and received those. 

They were not experiencing the same level of emergency in Richmond that we were, but they were very much a partner, and that 

really worked real well, frankly. 

On a typical basis, however, Northern Virginia has another system, especially where it involves mutual dispatching of fire and 

EMS assets. So at any one time among Fairfax, especially among 

Fairfax and Alexandria and Arlington, the closest available unit for 

any fire call or EMS is initiated through all three dispatch centers 

for Northern Virginia. It is something that is very good and robust. 

We don’t do it as much with law enforcement, but we have much 

better coordination. 

And in fact, the mutual aid agreements that we have with Maryland and D.C. are probably unmatched anyplace in the Country. 

And again, a lot of that I think goes back to how we operate as 

a regional system, the lessons learned from 9/11, our continuous 

partnerships with Maryland, Virginia, how we all coordinate together, the senior policy group and all the chief administrative officers. 

It is truly a robust system and I think part of the reason my 

name may have gotten on this list is because I am one of its biggest fans and champions. I think we have got great partnerships 

that we can only make better. And I think we also know that when 

we run into obstacles that don’t serve us, we can also collectively 

figure out how to get around those obstacles. 

So the Virginia piece is the Virginia piece, but we have the other 

side of the river as well that is just as important, because we all 

know that when big things happen, they happen to all of us and 

we all have to be in a position to support each other. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, thank you. It is good to hear because it is not 

unique that you have local entities within a region that must cooperate, but I do not believe that there is any region in the United 

States where you have three States essentially together. And what 

happens in one, especially with respect to natural events, happens 

in another, and you better realize it. To invoke jurisdictional 

boundaries then would be itself a disaster. 

I only have a couple more points. One is something that almost 

all of you have raised about criteria, the criteria for measuring 

50 

when a disaster occurs with respect to snow. Now, I want you to 

know the Subcommittee has sat through many hours of hearings 

from jurisdictions across the Country. They always want more 

money, and the Federal Government’s job is to contain disaster. 

The Federal Government is not there to do all that must be done 

to clean up for disasters. 

That is why you need a presidential—most emergencies don’t 

have anything to do with serious damage, flooding and ice storms, 

and yet we are not there because the State is supposed to take care 

of that. And believe me, coming from this region, I am with you to 

try to think whether or not this severe storm guidance is fair. And 

I would only invite you, because I have heard your testimony, to 

consider what the Subcommittee has to consider. If not X, then 

what? 

I heard Mr. Muth’s notion, well, the only event which measures 

it by a quantity, but that is because we have other ways to know 

whether or not a flood does damage. And it would not be, a heavy 

rain would not tell us if we measured by the inches of rain virtually anything about damage. So there are other criteria we can 

look for when it comes to flooding. 

And we know what we pay for since we pay for some property 

damage. We pay for some public works damage. And of course, in 

the case of snowfall, what are we really paying for? We are trying 

to get people from A to B. And so one of the things the Subcommittee has to consider and that FEMA has to consider is that 

is what we are basically paying for, removing the snow. 

They, of course, say it has to be 48 hours of snow because they 

have calculated that that is when, for the most part, the most serious snow falls. We always press FEMA to use its regulations maximally, so we do note that they can go to 72 hours. 

I would invite you all to at least submit for the record. I am unable honestly and intellectually to say to FEMA, here is an alternative criteria, except ones I would love because I happen to represent the District of Columbia. I have got to satisfy myself as a 

Federal official and as Chair of a Subcommittee looking for this 

disaster and in the future, that I am looking at a revision of criteria that is fair to all concerned. 

And the Subcommittee is very willing to look at this, but remembering that you suffer from having never had such an event before. 

But I do invite you to submit for the record, recognizing that we 

ourselves will be pressing for FEMA to use its maximum authority. 

And I am telling you, one of the reasons I am doing it. I am pressing for them to use their maximum authority because the Federal 

Government was as deeply implicated as any of you sitting before 

us today. 

So the point is for you to keep us all open, remembering that you 

open the Federal Government for us, too. As a Member of the 

Homeland Security Committee, I am concerned that some of the security personnel be able to get to where they are. And I know that 

that depends as much upon you. So we are most interested in this 

as almost a, so far as we can tell, first of a kind event where the 

Federal Government has been just as much incapacitated and in 

some cases more. The District was open more days. Maryland was 

open more days, more than the Federal Government. 

51 

And when you consider what is at stake, that this city and this 

region is headquarters for the United States of America, if you can 

submit to this Subcommittee a basis for judgment beyond what 

FEMA already uses, remembering that FEMA used it not having 

in mind the District of Columbia or the National Capital Region, 

but across the United States, using record snowfalls, if they don’t 

use record snowfalls, then what will you and I use? Whose guidance and uniform guidance is what we are interested in. 

When they say records, if they say eight inches, well look, Mr. 

Kubicek said they can even handle eight inches. So you have to 

watch out how you do your criteria. A severe snowstorm, we better 

say that because Ms. Williams comes from—is it Buffalo?—watch 

out. By all rights, they would be getting money every other week 

from FEMA. So we have to use words that capture the event, apply 

it fairly to the local jurisdiction, allowing for the greatest flexibility, 

keeping in mind the damage that was done. 

Now, we asked Dr. Petersen here because we liked two things. 

First, we want to hear from the Federal Government. Then we 

want to always hear from what we call real people. That is you, 

the people who are on the ground, because whatever the government tells us is what it does and what it always does. We want 

to know how those who are where the Federal Government either 

must go to determine reimbursement or delivers its services, how 

they fared. 

Then we try to find some global witness. And I was concerned 

at your testimony, Dr. Petersen, because you spoke about there 

being no single entity in charge of a disaster. You say in the District of Columbia. What do you mean by that? I mean, the Mayor 

got the National Guard to cooperate, it seems to me, fairly well. He 

got people here. He kept the government open more than others, 

almost beyond what he now thinks might have been best, but he 

wanted to keep the government open. Wasn’t the single entity in 

the District of Columbia the Mayor of the District of Columbia? 

Mr. PETERSEN. No, ma’am. What I was speaking to was the region. 

Ms. NORTON. So you are saying there is no single entity in 

charge of a disaster within the region? 

Mr. PETERSEN. There is no single entity. And this is a concern 

that has been raised by some entities related to communications 

issues where critical information will come from a variety of 

sources, including the Weather Service, including the Office of Personnel Management. 

Ms. NORTON. But what about that COG phone call that all of 

them were in on. Isn’t that good enough? 

Mr. PETERSEN. Well, ma’am, if they are tasked with public communications, it is not apparent that you go to MWCOG for official 

information regarding whether schools will be open, what roads are 

available from various jurisdictions. 

Ms. NORTON. But the schools close or open according to, in our 

system of government, what the jurisdiction decrees. 

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes, ma’am, and the larger point is that we look 

at it. We are at a confluence of several levels of government, all of 

which have pieces of information that may be of regional import, 

52 

maybe of only local import, and there is no mechanism for sorting 

what that information of regional import is. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, in what you have heard here today, do you 

think that there could be better coordination? I mean, these people 

are all on the line to one another. Ms. Williams, and Mr. Hartmann 

and Mr. Muth meet monthly, I believe. These folks get on a phone 

call. There’s been an emergency communications center since 9/11 

that all of them are a part of in the event of a disaster. 

What would you suggest is greater coordination? And as much as 

we are a system of local and State government, what do you suggest might be done to increase coordination? 

Mr. PETERSEN. At what level? I mean, I am not entirely clear. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, that is what I am asking you. I mean, they 

seem to talk to one another. They recognize that they will be held 

accountable in the District of Columbia alone. 

Mr. PETERSEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. And that Mr. Muth is going to be held or his job 

is going to be held, no matter what some other jurisdiction says, 

and even the President of the United States can’t say, maybe he 

could say to the District of Columbia, but he certainly can’t say to 

Maryland what to do unless it is an event, a terrorist event of some 

kind. And even then he is limited because the National Guard can 

be called out, unless he nationalizes it, by the Governor. 

So you have these things built in to make sure there is local control. I can see your criticism if you are talking about Federal areas, 

like Congress, like the courts. For example, I joked to my staff, 

don’t pay attention to anybody. If they tell you the government’s 

been closed, this is a separate branch of government. It is called 

the Legislative Branch. We are not controlled by local jurisdiction. 

Guess what? We are not even controlled by the Executive Branch 

because they can close down their units, and you may still have to 

come to work. 

Now, of course, if you close down the Federal Government, mean 

old Eleanor is not going to tell my folks to come because I am going 

to have a hearing the next day. But I hear you. I have a hard time 

understanding what these State and local entities could have done. 

I am not sure at the same time, since nobody told me, by the way, 

in the Congress, and I am not even sure of this, if the Speaker 

could tell us to stay at home. There are certain ways in which we 

are independent. 

But let’s assume the Speaker said nobody better be seen in the 

House of Representatives today. I can understand that that branch 

of government could work in that way. 

The courts may depend upon other branches of the Federal Government, the Executive. And I am not sure, I can understand the 

differences among the local jurisdiction and the States. What I 

don’t have a sense of in a snow emergency, a natural emergency, 

not a security emergency, I don’t have a sense of coordination 

among the entities of the Federal sector. 

And FEMA didn’t help me much to know that they bring the 

Federal sector together either. So I don’t know who it is in the 

event of a natural emergency is really in control here, although I 

am not sure I need to know when it comes to the States and localities since there are constitutional lines that decree that they will 

53 

have certain kinds of jurisdiction no matter what anybody else 

says. 

I am asking you about really the Federal sector. 

Mr. PETERSEN. Two things, if I could. I would argue that the 

communications have improved over time. For example, there is an 

opportunity for regional alerting systems, which are controlled at 

local level by each of the jurisdictions. You can go into a centralized 

Web site and be directed to the various jurisdictions within the 

NCR that provide it. And that is arguably an improvement over 

what has been in the past. 

Not everyone participates, and as a user, you need to know 

which sets of information that you have. And I would note that 

some are more forthcoming than others in terms of the sorts of 

alerts that they issue. 

Now, regarding the emergency preparedness and communications within coequal branches beyond the Federal Executive, each 

of those are controlled according to protocols and priorities established within each branch. So Congress has a set of plans and they 

tend to devolve according to chamber. And the Architect of the 

Capitol, for example, was responsible for keeping everything open 

throughout the weather events in December and February. The Judiciary has a separate plan. 

When incidents that affect those particular parts of the world are 

going to have a spillover effect on the rest of the region. That is 

one area where some observers have noted concerns about communications. 

Ms. NORTON. I hear you and I understand what you are saying. 

I would say to all of you one concern I have as I close this hearing 

is the way in which local media hype the weather. It must be good 

for the ratings, flip the channels, flip the stations and you can’t get 

anything but their version of the weather. 

If there were any consistency, I would like to see. I would like 

to see some kind of official notice. They do a fabulous job. I would 

say over-fabulous job. They do leave some of us, because they show 

us these graphics, and if you can figure it out for yourself. 

But frankly, I must tell you in both of these storms, I tended to 

discount them because I have had too many Chicken Littles called 

on us, particular, Ms. Williams, those of us in the District of Columbia. We really should discount them because it is difficult to, 

the weather is far different even in places in the region where you 

can get to in an hour than it is in the District of Columbia. 

And I don’t know if there is any way to do this, but I can’t imagine what it must be like for somebody with a five year old that 

needs to go to day care to hear these multiple versions of the 

weather without any official sense. So they have to wait until the 

schools open or close to really decide what the weather is. 

And to the extent that in your dealings across regional lines— 

I am sorry, jurisdictional lines—even recognizing that you would be 

saying different things in different jurisdictions. Ms. Williams 

might be wanting to tell local stations one thing in the District. 

The District of Columbia tells us that it expects far less X, so that 

people get an early sense of the notion which is usually based on 

bands. 

54 

They have to tell you it will be between, for example, I now know 

when they say it is 50 percent it is going to rain, it ain’t going to 

rain here; 50 percent really means it is probably not going to rain. 

So the rain just helps us to know, but to the extent that there is 

an ability in the local jurisdictions to interpret what the weather 

means in order to more fairly and fully inform local jurisdictions, 

I believe that would in fact be of some service to the local jurisdictions. 

The local WAMU has asked us to enter into the record their involvement in the disasters, or information about the disaster, and 

I do want to pay tribute to those I have just criticized for hyping 

the weather. I do want to pay tribute to them for keeping us informed, over-informed, and informed more than we ever wanted to 

be informed. But that is certainly better than not being informed 

at all. 

Your testimony, the testimony of all of you has been particularly 

important to this Subcommittee and I want to thank you on behalf 

of this region and the Subcommittee for appearing here today. 

This hearing is closed. 

[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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