UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

JOSEPH JONES, 

 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 14-14484 

 Honorable George Caram Steeh 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

 

J. WIERMAN and 

ALFRED JONES, 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANT 

JONES’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [24] 

This is a prisoner civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff 

Joseph Jones (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant J. Wierman (“Wierman”) who, as a nurse 

practitioner, provided medical treatment to Plaintiff, and against Defendant Alfred Jones 

(“Jones”), who, as an administrative assistant, denied a prison grievance that Plaintiff had 

submitted regarding his medical care. An Order of Reference was entered on December 3, 2014, 

referring all pretrial matters to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b). (Doc. #5). 

Presently before the Court is Defendant Jones’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. #24). The 

Court finds that the facts and legal issues are adequately presented in the docket filings, and it 

declines to order a hearing at this time. 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons set forth below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant Jones’ motion 

for summary judgment (Doc. #24) be GRANTED. 

2:14-cv-14484-GCS-DRG Doc # 30 Filed 06/24/16 Pg 1 of 6 Pg ID 278
2 

II. REPORT

A. Factual Background 

At the time he filed his instant complaint, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the G. Robert 

Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan (“JCF”). (Doc. #1 at 1). Plaintiff alleges that 

before being incarcerated he had been injured while at work. (Id. at 5-6). He claims that when 

he was sent to JCF he had been prescribed Ultram with Neurontin and that he “was given, this 

treatment until my MP [medical practitioner] felt that I should not be costing this privet [sic] 

medical Co., what she turmed [sic], a lot of money.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiff claims that his “reports 

from all other Dr. that I have seen...state that I need the Medication [i.e., Ultram with Neurontin] 

to be stable.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that instead of his desired medication, JCF medical staff 

prescribed him Tylenol to treat his pain. (Id.). 

Plaintiff sued Defendant Nurse Practitioner Wierman because she “has the last word” in 

terms of what medication Plaintiff receives. (Id.). Plaintiff sued Defendant Jones because he 

reviewed and denied a grievance appeal that Plaintiff had submitted regarding the medication 

change. Plaintiff alleges that in responding to his grievance appeal, Defendant Jones “simply 

read what reports he had from the Nurses, and he may or not, have talked to [Defendant] 

Wierman...I simply look to him to lead, not simply to read and agree with every word. I have 

not seen nor came into contact with [Defendant Jones] to seek [] imput [sic] on how to over 

come [sic] going to Court about the issue of medication!” (Id. at 8; see also id. at 12, Step II 

Grievance Appeal Response by Defendant Jones). 

B. Defendant Jones’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

In his motion for summary judgment, Jones presents two arguments as to why he is 

entitled to summary judgment. First, Defendant Jones argues that Plaintiff cannot show that he 

2:14-cv-14484-GCS-DRG Doc # 30 Filed 06/24/16 Pg 2 of 6 Pg ID 279
3 

was personally involved in any unconstitutional action because the “mere denial of an 

administrative grievance does not amount to active unconstitutional behavior.” (Doc. #24 at 6 

(citing Shehee v. Lutrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)). Second, Defendant Jones contends 

that he is entitled to qualified immunity. 

C. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides: “The Court shall grant summary judgment 

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Pittman v. Cuyahoga 

County Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 2011). A fact is material 

if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, 

the court assumes the truth of the non-moving party’s evidence and construes all reasonable 

inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ciminillo 

v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006). 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of 

the basis for its motion, and must identify particular portions of the record that demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

325 (1986); Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009). “Once the moving 

party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts 

showing a triable issue.’” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In 

response to a summary judgment motion, the opposing party may not rest on its pleadings, nor 

“‘rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact’ but 

2:14-cv-14484-GCS-DRG Doc # 30 Filed 06/24/16 Pg 3 of 6 Pg ID 280
4 

must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion.” 

Alexander, 576 F.3d at 558 (quoting Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 

1989)). 

D. Analysis 

In order to demonstrate liability under §1983 as to any particular defendant, a plaintiff 

must first establish that that defendant acted under color of state law and that his actions violated 

rights secured by the Constitution and/or laws of the United States. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 

U.S. 137 (1979). The plaintiff also must make a clear showing that the defendant was personally 

involved in the activity that forms the basis of the complaint. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 

362, 377 (1976); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Moreover, §1983 

liability cannot be premised upon mere allegations of respondeat superior, i.e., supervisory 

liability; rather, a defendant can only be liable under §1983 if the plaintiff shows that he 

personally participated in, or otherwise authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in, the 

allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 

658, 691 (1978); Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421. A supervisory official’s awareness of a complaint of 

allegedly illegal conduct, and his subsequent failure to take corrective action, is insufficient to 

trigger §1983 liability. See Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 429 (6th Cir. 1988). Rather, liability 

under §1983 must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior, not a “mere failure to act.” 

Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300. 

The law in this Circuit is also clear that the mere “‘denial of administrative grievances or 

the failure to act by prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability under § 1983.’” 

Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300). See also 

Alder v. Corr. Med. Servs., 73 F. App’x 839, 841 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The mere denial of a 

2:14-cv-14484-GCS-DRG Doc # 30 Filed 06/24/16 Pg 4 of 6 Pg ID 281
5 

prisoner's grievance states no claim of constitutional dimension.”); Lee v. Mich. Parole Bd., 104 

F. App’x 490, 493 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a 

defendant denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained 

in a grievance.”); Nwaebo v. Hawk-Sawyer, 83 F. App’x 85, 86 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); Simpson 

v. Overton, 79 F. App’x 117, 120 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he denial of an appeal cannot in itself 

constitute sufficient personal involvement to state a claim for a constitutional violation.”).1

As explained above, Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant Jones is that in denying 

Plaintiff’s Step II Grievance Appeal, Defendant Jones “simply read what reports he had from the 

Nurses, and he may or not, have talked to [Defendant] Wierman,” and that he “look[ed] to him to 

lead, not simply to read and agree with every word.”2

 (Doc. #1 at 8). This is consistent with the 

other record evidence. Plaintiff attached to his complaint a copy of his Step II Grievance Appeal 

showing that Defendant Jones reviewed and denied it. (Id. at 12). In his affidavit attached to his 

instant motion, Defendant Jones avers that his “only involvement in this matter was to respond to 

Plaintiff’s Step II grievance appeal.” (Doc. #24-2 at ¶ 5). Furthermore, Plaintiff admits that he 

 

1

 As highlighted above, a Section 1983 plaintiff must plead and show that each defendant was 

personally involved in the activity that forms the basis of the complaint – here, the decision by 

Plaintiff’s medical treaters to deny certain medication in favor of other medication. See Martin 

v. Harvey, No. 00–1439, 2001 WL 669983, at *2 (6th Cir. June 7, 2001) (“The denial of the 

grievance is not the same as the denial of a request to receive medical care.”); Diamond v. 

Jackson, No. 15-P164, 2016 WL 411112, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2016) (“A plaintiff’s claim is 

against the subjects of his or her grievances, not those who merely decided whether to grant or 

deny the grievances.”). Plaintiff’s own complaint makes clear that Defendant Jones played no 

role in that decision-making process. 

2

 To the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim against Defendant Jones due to his alleged failure to 

properly “lead” others, such claim fails as a matter of law. As discussed above, supra at 4, 

§1983 liability cannot be premised upon mere allegations of respondeat superior, i.e., 

supervisory liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421. A supervisory 

official’s awareness of a complaint of allegedly illegal conduct, and his subsequent failure to 

take corrective action, is insufficient to trigger §1983 liability. See Poe, 853 F.2d at 429; Shehee, 

199 F.3d at 300. 

2:14-cv-14484-GCS-DRG Doc # 30 Filed 06/24/16 Pg 5 of 6 Pg ID 282
6 

never met Defendant Jones, and that he never even sought any input from Defendant Jones as to 

how he could resolve the matter short of litigation. (Doc. #1 at 8) (“I have not seen nor came 

into contact with [Defendant Jones] to seek [] imput [sic] on how to over come [sic] going to 

Court about the issue of medication!”). In light of this evidence and Plaintiff’s admissions, he 

has failed to show that Defendant Jones was personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional 

activity – the actual decision by Plaintiff’s medical treaters to deny certain medication in favor of 

other medication. Accordingly, Defendant Jones’ motion for summary judgment should be 

granted.3

 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant Alfred Jones’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment [24] be GRANTED.

Dated: June 24, 2016 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 24, 2016. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager 

 

3

 Because the Court finds that Defendant Jones’ motion for summary judgment should be granted 

for the above reasons, it need not address his alternative argument that he is entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

2:14-cv-14484-GCS-DRG Doc # 30 Filed 06/24/16 Pg 6 of 6 Pg ID 283