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i 

53–569 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–53] 

REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL 

COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC 

POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 6, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

RUDY BARNES, Professional Staff Member 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, May 6, 2009, Report of The Congressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States ............................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, May 6, 2009 ......................................................................................... 31 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 2009 

REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC 

POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

Spratt, Hon. John, a Representative from South Carolina, Committee on 

Armed Services ..................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Perry, Dr. William J., Chairman, The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States ...................................................................... 5 

Schlesinger, Dr. James R., Vice Chairman, The Congressional Commission 

on the Strategic Posture of the United States ................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Perry, Dr. William J. ........................................................................................ 35 

Schlesinger, Dr. James R. ................................................................................ 43 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION 

ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 6, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Spratt presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SPRATT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SPRATT. I call the committee meeting to order. I welcome everyone here. Chairman Skelton, unfortunately, is not able to be 

here, but I am pleased to have the opportunity to chair this important hearing in his place instead. 

Led by the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, which is ably 

chaired by Ellen Tauscher, this committee has a long tradition of 

attention to the United States’ strategic posture and to nuclear 

weapons policy in particular. The National Defense Authorization 

Act of fiscal year 2008 calls for the establishment of a commission, 

a congressionally appointed, bipartisan commission, to analyze and 

make recommendations on our strategic posture. 

I am pleased to welcome the Commission chairman and vice 

chair and other members of the Commission, but in particular Bill 

Perry and Jim Schlesinger, to the hearing today. 

All of you deserve enormous credit for bringing this hearing, this 

investigative process, to the conclusion you have in the reports you 

filed today. 

In the interim reports you released last December, I agree with 

your broad definition of strategic posture and the priority you 

placed on dealing with the most urgent post-Cold War threat, 

which you termed in that report ‘‘catastrophic terrorism.’’ You went 

on to write or say, ‘‘A terror group cannot make a nuclear bomb 

from scratch, so the best defense against this threat is to prevent 

terror groups from acquiring a nuclear bomb or the fissile material 

from which they could perhaps make a bomb.’’ I have been making 

this argument since the demise of the Soviet Union, and I commend you for emphasizing it in your interim report. 

I have not yet had a chance to read your report in its entirety, 

but I can see that it places our most pressing strategic challenges 

in the right context. 

My friend and colleague, Ellen Tauscher, was the driving force 

behind the legislation that set up this commission, and I want to 

yield to her now for any opening remarks you may care to make. 

Ms. Tauscher. 
2 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon to 

everyone. 

This hearing will cover very important ground. Led by the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, which I have the privilege of 

chairing, the House Armed Services Committee has long called for 

a vigorous and open debate on the future direction of the United 

States’ strategic posture and a fresh examination of our nuclear 

weapons policy. 

In the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, 

which the House approved almost exactly two years ago, we created a congressionally appointed bipartisan commission to analyze 

and make recommendations on the United States’ strategic posture. The Commission was designed to foster and frame a debate 

on these critical issues. It was also designed to help forge a consensus on the United States’ nuclear weapons policy that has been 

lacking for too long. 

It is with great pride and anticipation that just 14 months ago, 

this committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee announced the names of the 12 individuals who agreed to serve on 

the Commission. I see several of the commissioners here, and I 

want to thank each and every one of you for your service. 

I am most delighted to welcome the Commission Chairman and 

Vice Chairman, Dr. William Perry and Dr. James Schlesinger, to 

this hearing. I also want to praise the United States Institute of 

Peace, its President, Richard Solomon, and Paul Hughes, the Commission’s Executive Director, for their vision, hard work, and shepherding of the Commission’s final product and the publishing of the 

final report. 

I would also like to thank Secretary Gates and the Strategic Systems Programs of the Navy, where we were able to get the funding 

for this very, very important commission. As you know, forming 

commissions is a part-time job of the Congress. Finding the money 

is the very, very difficult job of the Congress. And without Secretary Gates and the Navy coming forward, we would not have the 

final product that we have today. 

Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, both of you have brought a great 

wealth of experience and expertise in your service to the country 

of many decades; and it could not be more timely or more important for this work to be done now. 

As the Commission noted in both its interim and final reports, 

what the United States does with its nuclear weapons, and how it 

does it, is linked to our ability to dissuade other nations from pursuing nuclear weapons and to our efforts to stem the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear weapons. Of 

course, other nations will continue to make their own decisions 

about whether to pursue nuclear weapons for many reasons. As the 

Commission has noted, as long as there are nuclear weapons, the 

United States must maintain a strong, safe, secure, and reliable 

nuclear deterrent. 

But, as you have also said, how we maintain and manage our nuclear arsenal directly impacts how credible we can be when press-
3 

ing for nonproliferation. We have committed under Article VI of the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament. Both President Obama and Russian President 

Medvedev have recently reaffirmed this pledge. 

So the question we basically put before the Strategic Posture 

Commission was: How do we craft a nuclear weapons strategy that 

balances these fundamental challenges? How do we maintain an effective and credible deterrent, while trying to reduce our nuclear 

arsenal, and persuade other nations not to pursue nuclear weapons? Each of you has spoken eloquently about this need for balance 

in your testimony, and the Commission’s final report reflects that 

challenge as well. 

Dr. Schlesinger, I appreciate your emphasis on the stabilizing effect and nonproliferation benefits that accrue from the extended deterrence we provide our allies. 

And Dr. Perry, I am grateful for your forceful observations about 

the urgency of our efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Let me recite a part of your testimony, Dr. Perry. And I quote: 

‘‘All commissioners accept the view that the United States must 

support programs that both lead and hedge; that is, programs that 

move in two parallel paths—one path that protects our security by 

maintaining deterrence, and the other which protects our security 

by reducing the danger of nuclear weapons.’’ 

That is at the heart of the matter. I want to commend you all 

for your leadership in steering the Commission to consensus. 

Thank you, again, for your work and for being here today. 

I agree with you, Dr. Perry, that we are at a moment of both opportunity and urgency, and I look forward to a good discussion. 

Congratulations to you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 

time. And I yield back. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Ms. Tauscher. 

Let me turn now to the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. 

McHugh, for his opening remarks. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCHUGH. I thank the chairman. 

I certainly want to begin by adding my words of welcome to two 

most venerable witnesses; and we are deeply blessed to have both 

Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, sage national security and foreign 

policy experts, with us here today with such long and distinguished 

histories of public service. Joining these two gentlemen, as has 

been noted, on the Commission are ten other extremely accomplished individuals, and we are fortunate, as both a committee and 

as a Nation, to have the service of these great people on what has 

certainly been a long-standing and repeatedly difficult and complex 

task. 

It goes without saying that the report before us is thoughtful and 

it is thorough. And I want to add my words, Mr. Chairman, to 

yours of appreciation to our Strategic Force chair, Ms. Tauscher, 

and Ranking Member, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for 

their great work. They asked for recommendations as to the most 

appropriate strategic posture and the most effective nuclear weap-
4 

on strategy for the United States, and I think this great commission has really set the stage for delving into those answers. 

I expected, when this all began, widely divergent views on such 

matters as nuclear weapons and the policies associated therewith; 

however, it is, to say the least, unusual—and I would note, highly 

refreshing—to learn that this commission, embodied as it is with 

12 thoughtful individuals, could achieve bipartisan consensus on 

these issues. I said to Dr. Perry before the hearing, perhaps they 

could give us here in this Congress some lessons on how to come 

and to work together. 

I am, most of all, hopeful that the Administration, working with 

Congress on both sides of the aisle, can now build upon this bipartisan momentum as it works to define its nuclear policies and posture in the future. 

The report highlights some basic truths and realities. First and 

foremost, it reaffirms the need for the United States to maintain 

a nuclear deterrent capability to deter potential adversaries and, 

equally important, to reassure our allies who depend upon our nuclear umbrella and, as a result, forsake developing their own nuclear arsenals. 

One month ago, the President delivered a speech in Prague calling for a ‘‘world without nuclear weapons.’’ But, as the Commission 

rightfully noted in its interim report, no less than a fundamental 

transformation of world political order will be required to obtain a 

goal of zero. 

While no President has wanted nuclear weapons, all came to the 

stark realization that possessing them was necessary as long as 

others had sought or had them in their possession. In a speech last 

fall, Secretary Gates observed, ‘‘Try as we might and hope as we 

will, the power of nuclear weapons and their strategic impact is a 

genie that cannot be put back in the bottle—at least for a very long 

time.’’ 

While the President’s long-term vision is laudable, I fear its allure may be a distraction from the near-term nuclear security and 

proliferation challenges faced by our Nation and the international 

community. These challenges are multifaceted and start with how 

we bring an end to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs—two efforts that, at least in my view, pose a real and immediate threat. 

A month ago—and perhaps coincidentally on the same day as 

President Obama’s speech—North Korea launched a satellite atop 

a long-range Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, ignoring all international warnings. According to recent reports, some in the Administration expect that nation to conduct yet another nuclear test. In 

the meantime, Iran continues to perfect its assortment of longrange missiles and pursue key elements of a potential nuclear 

weapons capability, despite United Nations (U.N.) Security Council 

efforts. 

As the report before us observes, unless these programs are halted, ‘‘There is likely to be a proliferation cascade that would greatly 

increase the risks of nuclear use and terrorism.’’ 

We are also faced with the challenge of securing nuclear materials and facilities worldwide, implementing safeguards into civilian nuclear programs to prevent breakout weapons capabilities, 
5 

and preventing terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear bombs, 

weapons design, or fissile material. Both Russia and China are 

modernizing their strategic forces program and—as this report 

points out—ironically, our edge in conventional capabilities has induced the Russians to increase their reliance on both tactical and 

strategic nuclear weapons. 

A credible and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent will be required for 

the foreseeable future. However, senior government officials and 

many outside experts have expressed concern about our stockpile’s 

long-term condition and the confidence that many have in that 

stockpile and its supporting infrastructure. 

The commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) 

testified this spring, ‘‘The most urgent concerns for today’s nuclear 

enterprise lie with our aging stockpile, infrastructure, and human 

capital.’’ To that end, I believe we need a program to modernize our 

stockpile and infrastructure. 

I want to be clear; I am not calling for new weapons capabilities. 

However, I believe there are prudent steps we can and must take 

to introduce greater reliability, safety, and security features into 

our arsenal and, thus, create conditions for maintaining a highly 

reliable deterrent with fewer warheads. Furthermore, we should insist on conscious efforts to strengthen the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, support investments and stockpile stewardship, and sustain 

our exceptional scientific, engineering, and production workforce. 

What I find worrisome in this evolving nuclear policy is that they 

rest almost entirely on treaties and arms control measures. The 

previous Administration—wrongly in my view—appeared to have 

an aversion to arms control. I believe it is a valuable tool, but it 

must be practical, verifiable, and enforceable. Furthermore, actions 

taken to decrease our nuclear forces should be counterbalanced by 

other means to strengthen our security and that of our allies—missile defenses, advanced conventional capabilities, unconventional 

capabilities, intelligence, nonproliferation, and other aspects of a 

comprehensive strategic posture strategy. 

Lastly, Secretary Gates warned we cannot predict the future. 

That uncertainty cannot be underestimated as we weigh the nuclear policy and posture decisions ahead of us. 

The Commission has given us much to consider. I want to thank 

them again, and I look forward to their testimony. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Perry, the floor is now 

yours. Once again, thank you for the effort all of you put into this 

report. Your written testimony has been received; we will make it 

part of the record so you can summarize as you see fit. We welcome 

you to make a full statement of the positions that are taken in the 

report. 

By arrangement, Dr. Perry, I believe we will begin with you. The 

floor is yours. Thank you again for coming. 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CHAIRMAN, THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF 

THE UNITED STATES 

Dr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
6 

When the Congress formed this Commission, they formed it deliberately and consciously as a bipartisan panel, and we have functioned as such. At our very first meeting, Congresswoman Ellen 

Tauscher came out to join us and urged us to come forward—in 

spite of the fact that we are a bipartisan group—to come forward 

with a consensus report. Easy for her to say, but very difficult to 

execute. Nevertheless, we have come surprisingly close to that, as 

you will see in reading the report. 

I am going to use my time, Mr. Chairman, by trying to relate 

some of the major findings in our report to what I perceive to be 

the Administration’s emerging strategic policy. I base this judgment primarily on statements and speeches made by President 

Obama. 

First of all, he has said the country—indeed, the world—faces a 

new threat: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. But, at the 

same time, we need to hedge against the possible resurgence of the 

old threat. The Commission firmly agrees with that judgment. 

Secondly, he said that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 

NPT, is critical in dealing with this new threat. The United States 

should work to strengthen the NPT and it should agree to put more 

resources into the arms of the NPT, dealing with inspection and 

enforcements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

The Commission agrees with that judgment as well. 

Third, he has said that we—in order to get success in preventing 

proliferation, we need the effort of all nations; and to get their full 

cooperation entails that the United States and other nuclear powers make progress in disarmament. I agree fully with that judgment. The Commission members have different views on the extent 

to which our progress in disarmament and getting that full cooperation is really coupled together. Some of us think it is coupled 

quite closely—I am of that view—and others think the coupling is 

quite loose. 

Fourth, the President made a very clear statement in his speech 

in Prague that the United States seeks a world without nuclear 

weapons and, therefore, we should be reducing the number and the 

salience of our nuclear weapons. But, he went on to say, as long 

as nuclear weapons exist, it will be important for the United States 

to maintain safe, secure, reliable, and credible deterrent forces. I 

strongly agree with that full statement. 

Some of our members do not agree that we should be seeking a 

world without nuclear weapons or that it is even feasible to do 

that. But, even those members fully support the part of the statement of maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable deterrent, and they 

also support reduction in the numbers, provided that reduction is 

done bilaterally. 

Fifth, the President is seeking new treaties: the Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and 

seeking to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Our 

commissioners agree with the goal of moving for a new follow-on 

START Treaty, and we offer some comments in the report about 

how that might be done. We also agree that seeking a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is desirable. 

On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratification, I strongly 

agree with that move. Indeed, I believe that the U.S. will not be 
7 

able to assume leadership in the world if we do not actually make 

that ratification, but I must say that the Commission is split on 

that issue. About half of our members disagree with the goal of 

ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and, indeed, if the 

Senate proceeds to hold hearings on that, I suspect some of our 

members may be testifying on one side of the issue and others testifying on the other side. 

All of us, however, agree that there are certain steps that the Administration should take before they submit the treaty for ratification, most importantly, to get a clarification among the Permanent 

Five (P–5) as to exactly what is banned by the test ban treaty. 

There seems to be some ambiguity on that today. 

The sixth issue is missile defense. The President says he wants 

to move forward on the European missile defense system as long 

as the Iranian threat persists and he wants to seek a way to find 

cooperation on that with the Russians. The commissioners agree on 

both of those goals. I must say that our commissioners have a wide 

variety of views on the value and importance of missile defense. 

But on those two issues—at least on missile defense—we were able 

to reach an agreement. 

Seven, on civilian nuclear programs, the President has argued we 

should get and propose programs to get the loose fissile material 

under control, and stated we need a new international framework 

to discourage the spread of enrichment and processing in the civilian nuclear field. We strongly agree with both of those conclusions. 

And finally, the President has said we should roll back the North 

Korean nuclear program and prevent Iran from getting nuclear. 

The Six-Party Talks have failed to stop the North Koreans from 

building and testing the nuclear bomb, and the compliance with 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is in tatters. The President 

has argued there must be consequences under the NPT. We firmly 

agree with that. We do not offer him or you advice on how to 

achieve those goals but, quite clearly, those are very important 

goals. 

Now, beyond commenting to you on these policy issues, I wanted 

to highlight some specific recommendations we made on how to 

sustain the nuclear force; particularly, how to sustain this force in 

the face of American policies of no testing, no design of weapons 

of new capabilities, and with the budget limitations that have been 

existing. 

Under those three limitations, it is a challenge to sustain this 

nuclear deterrence. The key to that, I believe—indeed, all of our 

members believe—is the strength of the nuclear weapons laboratories. We are blessed in that they have outstanding technical 

staffs at these laboratories, and they have had remarkable success 

in what is called the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and the 

Life Extension Program (LEP). But as our weapons age, it is going 

to be harder and harder to sustain that success. 

Inexplicably, I believe our government has responded to that 

growing problem by cutting the staff at the weapons laboratories. 

We believe that that trend should be reversed and indeed, beyond 

that, we should add responsibilities for laboratories for other national security programs—for example, programs in energy technologies; programs in supporting our nuclear intelligence assess-
8 

ments; and, even more broadly, programs in research that have the 

effect of making a research lab—national research laboratory—out 

of the three weapons laboratories. 

If this is done, we believe it would be important to change the 

name of the laboratories. They are not just weapons laboratories, 

but they are national security laboratories. And they should be renamed, and they should be funded accordingly. We have a unique 

national asset in these weapons laboratories, and we should be 

treating it accordingly. 

Now, if that is done, they need to be given more freedom of action appropriate with that new mission. And we need, also, to look 

at their direction, which is at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), to whom the laboratories report. NNSA was 

created by Congress some years ago on the view that they would 

be able to provide that direction, but they have not had full success 

in doing that. We believe that the NNSA should have more autonomy of action than it has today, and it should be restructured so 

that it reports to the President through the Secretary of Energy instead of the present reporting arrangements. 

I would like to conclude my comments by looking briefly ahead. 

The future world out there is heading in the direction today in 

a very dangerous direction. There is a danger that we are going to 

have a collapse of the nonproliferation regime, the danger that 

there will be a cascade of proliferation in the world, particularly if 

Iran succeeds in going nuclear; and both of those will increase substantially the risk of nuclear terrorism. And there is a danger that 

the nuclear powers in the world will renew their nuclear competition. 

All three of those dangers are facing us right now quite seriously. 

But there is also a more hopeful future out there: that we will be 

able to contain the proliferation, that we will be able to stymie nuclear terrorism, and the nuclear powers, instead of competing in 

the nuclear field, will learn how to cooperate in that field. 

Our report tries to describe for you a strategy which leads to that 

more hopeful future rather than the more dangerous world that I 

have described. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Schlesinger, the floor is yours. We welcome your 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, VICE CHAIRMAN, 

THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC 

POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McHugh, and 

Ms. Tauscher, our godmother. 

The Congress established the Commission on Strategic Posture 

in order to provide recommendations regarding the appropriate 

posture for the United States under the changed conditions of the 

early 21st century. The appointed commissioners represented a 

wide range of the political spectrum and have had quite diverse 

judgments on these matters. 

Nonetheless, urged by Members of Congress—not the least of 

whom was Ms. Tauscher—the Commission has sought to develop 
9 

a consensus view. To a large and, to some, an astonishing degree, 

we have succeeded. 

Secretary Perry and I are here to present our consensus to this 

committee. We are, of course, indebted to the committee for this opportunity to present these recommendations. 

For over half a century, the U.S. strategic policy has been driven 

by two critical elements: to maintain a deterrent that prevents attacks on the United States, its interests and, notably, its allies; and 

to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The end of the 

Cold War and, particularly, the collapse of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, along with the substantial edge that the United States 

has now developed in conventional military capabilities, have permitted this country sharply to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, radically to reduce our nuclear forces, and to move away from 

a doctrine of nuclear initiation to a new stance of nuclear response 

only under extreme circumstances of major attack on the United 

States or its allies. 

On the other hand, the growing availability of nuclear technology, along with a relaxation of the constraints of the Cold War, 

have obliged us to turn increasing attention to the problem of nonproliferation and, in particular, to the possibility of a terrorist attack on the United States. 

Secretary Perry has just spoken on the diplomatic issues and the 

problems of arms control, of preventing proliferation, and the risks 

of nuclear terrorism. I, for my part, will focus on the need—despite 

its substantially shrunken role in the post-Cold War world—to 

maintain a deterrent reduced in size, yet nonetheless reliable and 

secure, and sufficiently impressive and visible to provide assurance 

to the 30-odd nations that are protected under the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella. 

Since the early days of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), the United States has provided extended deterrence for its 

allies. That has proved a far more demanding task than the protection of the United States itself. In the past, that has required a deterrent sufficiently large and sophisticated to deter a conventional 

attack by the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. It also meant that the 

United States discouraged the development of national nuclear capabilities, particularly during the Kennedy Administration, both to 

prevent proliferation and to avoid the diversion of resources away 

from the development of conventional allied capabilities. 

With the end of the Cold War and the achievement of the U.S. 

preponderance in conventional capabilities, the need for so substantial a deterrent largely disappeared. Nonetheless, the requirements 

for extended deterrence will remain at the heart of the design of 

the U.S. nuclear posture. Extended deterrence will remain a major 

barrier to proliferation; both the size and the specific elements of 

our forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we 

protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements 

alone. 

Even though the overall requirements of our nuclear forces have 

shrunk some 80 percent since the height of the Cold War, nonetheless, the expansion of NATO and the rise of Chinese nuclear 

forces—significant, if modest—have altered somewhat the requirements for our own nuclear forces. 
10 

Two: Even though the most probable source of a weapon landing 

on American soil increasingly is that of a nuclear terrorist attack, 

nonetheless, the sizing of our own nuclear forces, in addition to 

other elements of our deterrent posture, remains driven in large 

degree by Russia. Our NATO allies and, most notably, the new 

members of NATO, remain wary of Russia and would eye nervously 

any sharp reduction of our nuclear forces relative to those of Russia, especially in light of the now greater emphasis by Russia on 

tactical nuclear weapons. 

Consequently, the Commission did conclude that we should not 

engage in unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces, and that such 

reduction should occur only as a result of bilateral negotiations 

with Russia under a follow-on START Agreement. Any such reductions must, of course, be thoroughly discussed with our allies. 

Three: Our East Asian allies also view with great interest our capabilities relative to the slowly burgeoning Chinese force. Clearly, 

that adds complexity; for example, to the protection of Japan— 

though that remains a lesser driver with respect to overall numbers. Still, the time has come to engage Japan in more comprehensive discussions akin to those with our NATO partners in the Nuclear Planning Group. It would also augment the credibility of the 

Pacific Extended Deterrent. 

Four: The Commission has been urged to specify the number of 

the nuclear weapons the United States should have. That is an understandable question, particularly in light of the demands of the 

appropriations process in the Congress. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to focus unduly on numbers alone without reference to the 

overall strategic context. Clearly, it would be illogical to provide a 

number outside the process of negotiation with Russia, given the 

need to avoid giving away bargaining leverage. 

In preparation for the Treaty of Moscow, as with all of its predecessors, the composition for our prospective forces was subject to 

the most rigorous analysis. Thus, it would seem to be unacceptable 

to go below the numbers specified in that treaty without a similarly 

rigorous analysis of the strategic context, which has not yet taken 

place. Moreover, as our Russian friends have repeatedly told us, 

strategic balance is more important than the numbers. 

Five: Given the existence of other nations’ nuclear capabilities 

and the international role that the United States necessarily plays, 

the Commission quickly reached the judgment that the United 

States must maintain a nuclear deterrent for ‘‘the indefinite future.’’ It must convey not only the capacity, but the will to respond 

in necessity. 

Some members of the Commission have expressed a hope that at 

some future date we might see the worldwide abolition of nuclear 

weapons. The judgment of the Commission, however, has been that 

the attainment of such a goal would require a transformation of 

world politics. 

President Obama also has expressed that goal, but has added 

that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United 

States must maintain ‘‘a strong deterrent.’’ We should all bear in 

mind that abolition of nuclear weapons will not occur outside that 

‘‘transformation of world politics.’’ 
11 

Six: We sometimes hear or read the query: Why are we investing 

in these capabilities which will never be used? This is a fallacy. A 

deterrent, if it is effective, is in use every day. The purpose in sustaining these capabilities is to be sufficiently impressive to avoid 

their ‘‘use’’ in the sense of the actual need to deliver weapons to 

targets. That is the nature of any deterrent but, particularly so, a 

nuclear deterrent. It exists to deter major attacks against the 

United States, its allies, and its interests. 

Years ago, the role and the details of our nuclear deterrent commanded sustained and high-level national attention. Regrettably, 

today, they do so far less than is necessary. Nonetheless, the role 

of the deterrent remains crucial. Therefore, I thank this committee 

for its continued attention to these critical matters. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger can be found in the 

Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. SPRATT. I will start the questions. 

Unless there is another member of this panel that would like to 

have the opportunity to make a statement? Dr. Foster? 

Let me turn everyone’s attention to something that receives too 

little attention, I think, and that is tactical nuclear weapons. We 

tend to think and talk about Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and 

heavy-lifting systems, but these systems, if our principal concern is 

nonproliferation, may be a bigger danger to us than the larger systems which are subject to deterrence. 

In your report, you say ‘‘The imbalance of non-strategic nuclear 

weapons will become more prominent and worrisome as strategic 

reductions continue and will require new arms control approaches’’ 

that are assuring to our allies. 

Would you explain to us what your worries are about tactical nuclear weapons? Do we have a good count as to these weapons? Are 

we assured that they are securely held somewhere? Are we satisfied we know what we should know about the universe of nuclear 

tactical weapons abroad and in the world? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I believe that the Russians have removed, as 

they said they would, their tactical nuclear weapons to the Ural 

Mountains. Nonetheless, as the Soviet conventional forces have deteriorated—as the Russian conventional forces have deteriorated, 

the Russians have expressed increasing interest, doctrinally, on reliance of tactical nuclear weapons to protect the vast territories of 

Russia, which they fear are under potential attack from NATO 

and, notably in Siberia, underpopulated Siberia, China. As a consequence, they have maintained not only a doctrine but a sizable 

number of tactical weapons. 

We, in the United States, have tended to stress strategic weapons because we are reaching overseas, but we have a significant 

number of nuclear weapons that are tactical here in the United 

States. Nonetheless, as a result, our weapons are here in North 

America and the Russians are close to some of our allies in Europe, 

which causes them to be rather nervous. 

So I hope that our negotiators, as they deal with the strategic 

level, will also look at the total number of nuclear weapons, includ-
12 

ing tactical, so that there is some kind of balance that is maintained and, in consequence, reassure some of our allies. 

Mr. SPRATT. Do you think then, this requires a special approach 

different from that of larger systems? For arms control purposes, 

do we require—— 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that we need to have an inspection system that we can rely on, and that we need to have a clear declaration by the Russians where their tactical nuclear weapons are, and 

an inspection of those tactical nuclear weapons. 

The strategic weapons are easier to deal with because we can 

count them by overhead reconnaissance. 

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Perry. 

Dr. PERRY. I would emphasize one of the points that Dr. Schlesinger made, but I mostly want to emphasize the asymmetry between the U.S. position and the Russian position. 

The Russians perceive that they need their tactical nuclear 

weapons to buttress their conventional—decline in the conventional 

forces—and that leads them to put a major emphasis on tactical 

nuclear weapons. 

We, on the other hand, could meet our military requirements 

without any tactical weapons. The reason we keep tactical nuclear 

weapons is more a political reason, which is because our allies in 

Europe feel more comfortable when we have weapons deployed in 

Europe. So we do it to assure the credibility of our extended deterrence to our allies, not because we have a military necessity. We 

could meet the real needs of our allies—the military needs—with 

our strategic forces, but they feel much more comfortable if we 

have forces deployed in Europe. 

So it is a very different situation. There is great asymmetry between the two. Therefore, as we go into arms control and start to 

consider tactical weapons, we have to recognize it is going to be a 

difficult problem because of the asymmetry and the perceived need 

for tactical weapons between the United States and Russia. 

Mr. SPRATT. One further question from me, and that is, the Commission also found that ‘‘Missile defenses are effective against regional nuclear aggressors, including against limited long-range 

threats are a valuable component’’ of our strategic posture. Would 

you explain what you meant there? 

And you went on to say that you would be concerned about actions taken on our part that increase—that lead to counteractions 

by Russia and China. Would you elaborate on what you mean 

there? 

Dr. PERRY. We were focusing on the role of missile defenses to 

deter or, if necessary, defend against nuclear weapons in the hands 

of regional powers; for example, North Korea and Iran. But to the 

extent we build and deploy such systems, those systems also have 

some capability against Russia and China. 

So our concern here was that we do not want to have a missile 

defense so extensive and so capable that it threatens the Russians 

and the Chinese deterrent to the extent that they believe they are 

going to have to increase the number of missiles deployed. We do 

not want our missile defense systems to stimulate an increase in 

offensive missiles to be used against us. That was the point we 

were trying to make. 
13 

Jim, would you like to comment on that? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I would like to add one point: there is a distinction between Europe, in which some of the nations are relatively indifferent to missile defense, and Japan, which has gotten 

deeply into missile defense. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you again for being here. 

I would like to pursue a little bit further, for my own edification, 

this issue of deterrence, particularly with respect to our allies. I appreciate Dr. Schlesinger’s comments. 

Too often, perhaps understandably, when we think about our allies and the deterrence that our nuclear umbrella has provided, we 

think Europe. But there is another theater where Japan certainly 

has its limits as to how many questions they feel they can ask 

about the nuclear effectiveness or commitment of this Nation to 

continue to provide that umbrella before they strike out on their 

own. And the whole objective, it seems to me, of arms limitation, 

nuclear proliferation, is to try to keep those who don’t yet have 

them from wanting to get them. 

I understand the comments about a number. Clearly, we can reduce warheads. But how do we go about partnering with our allies 

to make sure that they still feel we have the structure and the 

forces necessary to continue to provide that umbrella and deterrence? 

Is it through consultation? Is it at some point a mathematical 

formula? Actual deployments? How do you pursue that? Because if 

you are not successful, then other nations will make themselves a 

part of the nuclear family, will they not? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, no nation that I know of is reassured by 

mathematical formulas. It will require direct consultation. In the 

past, as I indicated in my earlier comments, we have not had those 

kinds of direct consultations with Japan, which is the country that 

has, perhaps, the greatest leaning amongst the 30-odd nations that 

we have under the umbrella, to create its own nuclear force; and, 

therefore, intimate discussions with the Japanese, I think, are 

mandatory at this stage. 

In the past, the Japanese have not really worried about the Soviet nuclear threat. But as the Chinese have increased their capability, they have become increasingly concerned about China and, 

thus, they want to have direct consultation with us and reassurance from us. 

In the case of Europe, some nations are relatively relaxed and 

others are nervous. For the most part, given the attitude of the European public, they would prefer that this whole question of nuclear weapons be left out of the headlines. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Dr. Perry, any thoughts? 

Dr. PERRY. My comment is that this issue goes back many, many 

decades. There is nothing new about it. 

Back in the late 1970s, when I was Under Secretary of Defense, 

the Soviet Union was deploying their intermediate-range missiles 

in Europe, threatening Western Europe; and we were planning an 

offset to that, a deterrent force to that, which we were doing in consultation of our NATO allies. And our judgment at the time was 
14 

that we could provide that offset with what we call ‘‘strategic weapons’’—in this case, would be submarine-launched missiles. 

But it was very, very clear in consultation with allies that, although they saw the logic of the argument, they felt that it was 

necessary to have our forces deployed in Europe in order to give 

them the confidence that our deterrence would be upheld. And to 

a certain extent, that issue is still with us today even though conditions have changed quite a bit. 

So we still see great concern in both Europe and in Asia about 

the credibility of our extended deterrence. It is important for us to 

pay attention to their concern and not to judge whether deterrence 

is effective by our standards, but we have to take their standards 

into account as well. And the failure to do this, as suggested by Dr. 

Schlesinger, the failure to do this will be that those nations will 

feel that they have to provide their own deterrence—in other 

words, they will have to provide their own nuclear weapons. So 

that will lead to a failure of proliferation. 

Mr. MCHUGH. We discussed very briefly the CTBT. I would just 

be curious, Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Perry, if you would care to comment, your view of the future for that treaty, should the United 

States sign on. Obviously—it seems to me, at least—there will be 

a number of nations that will never sign, or certainly at this point 

in time have very few incentives to sign. And although the treaty 

calls for a certain number of nations having to sign before it is 

binding, there is probably a policy imperative the United States 

would almost unilaterally, once signing it, adhere to it. 

What is your opinion on the CTBT? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, a number of nations in Western Europe, 

in particular, and the President have both said that they would 

like to see the United States ratify and the treaty come into force. 

The likelihood of the latter is very low, because all of the nations 

on Annex 2 must ratify before the treaty comes into force. That includes China, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Iran and, most notably perhaps, North Korea in this connection. 

If we were—some suggest that American diplomacy can bring 

them around. I would point out that we have had extended diplomacy with respect to North Korea over nuclear weapons for approaching 20 years, which has not been a signal success; and that 

if we put pressure on them, we are likely to be asked for a bribe, 

to put it bluntly. 

I think that Dr. Perry will point out that there is value, even if 

the treaty doesn’t come into force, for diplomatic reasons. But my 

own judgment is that the substantive benefits of the treaty are 

modest and, therefore, I think that roughly half of the members of 

the Commission did not endorse ratification. 

Dr. PERRY. I will repeat again that I believe that the ratification 

of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty enhances America’s national security whether or not the treaty enters into force. 

I have had considerable discussion with leaders all over the 

world on this question, and I am persuaded that our signing will 

put substantial pressure on India, Pakistan, and China to ratify. 

I would be willing to bet that their ratification will follow ours if 

we do it in reasonable time. And that, itself, will be a substantial 

benefit to national security. 
15 

I cannot conceive of the circumstances under which North Korea 

would willingly ratify the treaty, and I do not believe it makes any 

sense for the United States or other nations to be in a position of 

trying to bribe them to do so. But with or without their signature, 

I still think this is an enhancement of U.S. security. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back. Thank you for the sidebar consultation. I would just note that when our side’s turn comes 

again, I will be yielding to Mr. Turner, who is the ranking member 

on Strategic Forces, to lead off the questioning after ours. 

And again I thank the two gentlemen. I think we have a lot of 

ground to cover on this issue of tactical nuclear weapons and how 

we approach discussion with our friends, the Russians, et cetera. 

But I am sure the other members want to talk about that as well. 

So I will yield back at this time. 

Dr. PERRY. Can I make one other comment relative to the points 

Mr. McHugh was making? 

Mr. MCHUGH. He will say ‘‘yes.’’ He is a nice man. 

Mr. SPRATT. Certainly, Dr. Perry. I beg your pardon. We are trying to resolve the problem of who speaks next up here, but you 

have the floor. 

Dr. PERRY. Assuming this treaty comes to the Senate for ratification, there will be safeguards on the treaty. We certainly advocate 

safeguards. Some of those safeguards will require legislation and 

funding, and the House will be as much involved in that as the 

Senate will be. So I think this is a very important issue for the 

House. 

Certainly, one of the most important safeguards is maintaining 

the vitality and the strength of our weapons laboratories; and that 

requires funding, which the House will have to play a major role 

in. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Doctor. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SPRATT. Ms. Tauscher. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, I would like you 

to elaborate—each of you, if you don’t mind—on your recommendations for the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

About 10 years ago, Mr. Thornberry was the chairman of the 

panel—and I was the ranking member—that helped create the National Nuclear Security Administration. It was a little bit of a compromise, to say the least. But we believed that it was very important to get the NNSA out from under what we considered to be a 

‘‘kudzulating’’ bureaucracy. 

As you know, the Department of Energy (DOE) regulates refrigerator coolant and also has the nuclear weapons. It takes quite a 

wide brain pan to manage all of that, and we believe that for national security reasons, intelligence reasons, and many other reasons that the weapons labs and the complex in general and its 

budget policies needed to be elevated in a way that could give it 

much more standing and much more of a national importance, not 

just also something that the Department of Energy did. 

So I would really be interested in your talking about—in your report, you basically talk about that the NNSA should now report to 
16 

the Department of Energy but, effectively, to the President. If you 

could expand a little bit on that, I would appreciate it. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. As you will recall, in 1985, the Blue Ribbon 

Task Force recommended greater autonomy for the nuclear enterprise within the Department of Energy. Congress passed legislation 

in 1999 after a lag, establishing the NNSA. 

The problem is that the NNSA has not escaped the large bureaucracy of the Department of Energy. Instead of really dealing 

with the NNSA, it is affected by general counsel’s office of the Department of Energy, environmental safety and health, and other 

elements within the DOE bureaucracy. And this bureaucratic tendency has trickled down to the NNSA itself, so that everything that 

is done out there in the labs or in the plants kind of gets examined 

not only by the site office, the successors to the operations office 

of the past, the NNSA, and by the Department of Energy, so that 

the costs keep rising. 

And one of our concerns in establishing national security laboratories is that who, elsewhere in the government, wants to pay those 

operating additional overhead costs, which can be quite excessive. 

We need to reduce the costs, the non-operational costs, of the laboratories and the plants in such a way as to provide some leeway 

with regard to the total budget. And the Congress, of course, can 

help in that regard. 

With respect to reporting to the President through the Secretary 

of Energy, our intent was to get the DOE bureaucracy out of the 

way. And we need to have clear-cut lines of authority. Whoever is 

the head of NNSA must take it on as a task to reduce the kind 

of bureaucratic interference that has marked these recent years. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Dr. Perry, can you also talk about the role that 

you imagine for the Cabinet officials that you recommend take on 

formal roles regarding the NNSA programming budget matters, 

like the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of 

Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI)? 

Dr. PERRY. When we talk about this expanded national security 

role for the laboratories, it is today performing some of those functions already, but it is doing it on a hit-or-miss basis from the point 

of view of funding, and there is no overall guidance or overall organization of how this is done. And as Dr. Schlesinger has already 

indicated, the different agencies who fund this are paying for the 

direct work, but they are not paying for the overhead costs of that 

work. 

So there needs to be a better way of doing that. And our view 

was that that would entail creating a broader responsibility for the 

laboratories. That was part of this stated mission. It also requires 

some oversight, then, on the part of the Defense Department, for 

example, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), which have 

the responsibilities for those programs. So we imagine there needs 

to be some form of a steering group of those various—formed of the 

secretaries of those various agencies which provide the oversight 

and the funding necessary to the providers of the programs. 

But the hit-or-miss program-specific funding that is done today 

is not an appropriate way to effectively and appropriately use the 

great skills where you have those laboratories. This is just one way 
17 

of doing it. We are open to other ways of doing it, but it needs to 

be approached—we need a fresh approach to it—tailored to that 

particular set of problems. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Dr. Schlesinger, I just want to state the obvious, 

and I am speaking as Congresswoman Tauscher, not somebody who 

is potentially nominated for another job in the State Department. 

I would like to chat with you a little bit about the CTBT. Since 

1993, we have had an executive order, presidential executive order 

that has put the United States in a place of suspending testing. In 

1999, when the CTBT was failed to be ratified, I think there was 

tremendous concern about science-based stockpile stewardship. The 

difference between 1993, 1999 and 2009 is not only a lot of time, 

but an overwhelming grade of ‘‘A’’ on the success of science-based 

stockpile stewardship. 

And effectively ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 

there is an out that says if you have a national imperative you can 

test. So since we have been living since 1993 without testing, since 

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratification allows for the out, 

could you talk to me and explain to us what the hesitancy is, considering that I think we have universal agreement that the stockpile stewardship program, the science-based program, is enormously successful and that in time since 1993, 1999 and now 2009, 

I think we have a lot more evidence that the safety, security and 

reliability of stockpile has been more than secured without testing. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, we don’t know the last. We have the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program which has given us some basis for 

encouragement. But as you know, the directors of the laboratories 

have pointed out that the stockpile continues to age and that there 

are greater uncertainties. The question before us is whether or not 

the United States should surrender the option to test, given the uncertainties. I might point out that there are other members of this 

commission who feel more passionately on this subject than do I. 

But it was—this issue has been around as a dialectical tilting 

ground at least since the signing of the underground test moratorium, test treaty. A question is whether we are completing something that is in the minds of the proponents of the last 60 years 

when it is not of any substantive benefit to the United States. 

It is, as Bill Perry points out, potential diplomatic advantage, as 

you will no doubt hear when you arrive in the Department of State. 

But symbolism has a role to play in diplomacy. It is not necessarily 

the ideal element in judging force posture. Years ago, somebody observed that the CTBT was a bad idea whose time has come. And 

the question that was posed to me the other day by somebody from 

the laboratory said, each element of that should be examined carefully, why is it a bad idea and why has its time come? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. Dr. Perry. 

Dr. PERRY. I was the Secretary of Defense at the time we signed 

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. All of these issues were considered at that time. No one in the Department of Defense, and 

certainly not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was willing to say me signing this treaty means we never again can conduct tests. It means 

we agree not to conduct tests. But the treaty has, as you all know, 

a provision by which we are going to withdraw if we see our supreme national interest at stake. We felt that wasn’t quite strong 
18 

enough at the time, so we added to it, as one of the safeguards, 

that the director of the weapons laboratory had to certify on a yearly basis the adequacy of the stockpile to perform the deterrence 

missions. 

And that the President, on receiving this then, if he got a statement that said they were unable to certify it, that was a clear signal where we would withdraw from the treaty and begin testing. 

So I don’t think it is an issue that we have forever given up our 

right to test. We are simply formalizing in a treaty the agreement 

we have already made—the policy we have already established— 

not to test. And we still have the—we will still have, even after 

signing the treaty, the provision that we can withdraw from it if 

we see the—national interest. 

Now, if I thought we were going to have to exercise that withdrawal provision any time in the foreseeable future, I would not be 

in favor of the treaty. As I look at what we are doing in the laboratories and on the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Life Extension Program, the considerable technical capabilities we have 

there, I am confident that that is not going to happen. That is contingent though on the Congress and including the House, not just 

the Senate, funding adequately the work that goes on at the laboratories. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SPRATT. By unanimous consent, we turn now to Mr. Turner. 

And after his questions we will recess momentarily to go to the 

floor. We have three votes. We beg your indulgence. We will be 

back as quickly as possible. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

Ranking Member McHugh for recognizing me. Dr. Perry, Dr. 

Schlesinger, thank you so much for taking your long legacy of great 

accomplishment in this field to give us some present guidance to 

Congress. I am the ranking member of the Strategic Forces Committee and I want to recognize our Chair’s work, our Chairman, 

Ellen Tauscher on this, and her leadership so that we could have 

this document for Congress to take a look at. In looking at both 

your testimony and the report, there is one area that I wanted to 

highlight. 

Dr. Schlesinger, you said in your written testimony, ‘‘why are we 

investing in these capabilities which will never be used?’’ And you 

said, ‘‘This is a fallacy. A deterrent, if it is effective, is in ‘use’ every 

day.’’ And then I look at the report and its writings in the executive 

summary. And the report says, ‘‘so long as it continues to rely on 

nuclear deterrents, the United States requires a stockpile of nuclear weapons that are safe, secure, reliable, and whose threatened 

use in military conflict would be credible.’’ 

You go on to cite, the controversy that occurred over the Reliable 

Replacement Warhead discussion, and indicate there appears to be 

some confusion as to what we need to do and how we go forward. 

And then you conclude with something to the effect of, ‘‘so long as 

modernization proceeds within the framework of existing U.S. policy, it should encounter minimum political difficulty.’’ Well, I thank 

you for those words because you contribute a great deal of insight 

with your report as how to get over the issue of political difficulty, 
19 

because this is an area that requires congressional attention and 

congressional investment. 

Even if we all have the goal of the future elimination of nuclear 

weapons, that investment of that strategic and important deterrent 

is echoed throughout your report. 

Another theme in your report on this posture review is the issue 

of strategic balance. And I have here some of the quotes that you 

have given in the report about Russia’s strategic forces modernization. For example, you say, ‘‘current strategic modernization programming includes various elements. Russia is at work on a new 

intercontinental ballistic missile . . . a new ballistic missile submarine and the associated new missile and warhead, a new shortrange ballistic missile, and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.’’ It 

was on page 12. 

And you say, ‘‘Russia’s military leaders are putting more emphasis on non-strategic nuclear forces’’ on tactical use in the battlefield, also on page 12. And you indicate, ‘‘senior Russian experts 

have reported that Russia has 3,800 operational tactical nuclear 

warheads,’’ and you expound by saying, ‘‘the United States does not 

know definitively the numbers of nuclear weapons in the Russian 

arsenal.’’ I would like if you would, both of you, to speak for just 

a moment on the need for strategic balance as we look to Russia’s 

efforts of modernization. 

I know we are all currently focused on Iran and North Korea, but 

what should we look to with what the Russians are doing and how 

that might be some impetus for us to look for investment in our 

own nuclear complex. Dr. Perry. 

Dr. PERRY. I would say, first of all, Mr. Turner, that Russia’s 

needs—security needs—are very different from the United States’ 

security needs. The most important element of the difference is the 

asymmetry in our conventional forces. We have, probably, the most 

powerful conventional forces in the world. Russia perceives, and I 

think correctly, that their conventional forces are quite weak, particularly relative to the neighborhood in which they live. So they 

have a totally different need for tactical weapons than have we. 

Having said that, when we consider any arms agreements with 

them, all of our commission believes at some level of reduction we 

should not go lower until or unless their tactical weapons are considered in the equation. Because there is, in terms of maintaining 

our extended deterrence, the perception in the minds of our allies 

is going to be very important on whether they believe we can continue to maintain that extended deterrence. And if they see an 

overwhelming superiority of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia relative to the United States, then we will lose some of the credibility 

of our deterrence. 

So indeed, the need is very different between Russia and the 

United States. But at some level, we have to consider their tactical 

weapons very seriously in any balance. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Schlesinger, on the issue of modernization and 

our deterrent? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that Dr. Perry has covered it to a substantial degree. We don’t need the same number of tactical nuclear 

weapons that the Russians have. We do not need to match them. 

In the strategic area, we do need to match them because the Rus-
20 

sians fear that they cannot defend their vast territories against a 

hypothetical NATO attack which they talk about publicly and an 

engagement with China which they talk about privately, given the 

underpopulation of Siberia. So they feel a need, and we do not have 

to match them. But we have to be responsive to the requirements 

of our allies. That involves the dual capable aircraft, which are in 

Europe at the present time, which some of our military folks have 

thought are cost-ineffective and should be removed. 

We must not remove those capabilities in Europe without careful 

consultation with our allies. The Japanese have different requirements that they have expressed to us with regard to the specific 

components of local nuclear forces, and they have to be taken into 

account in a different context. But overall, we do not need to match 

the Russians in terms of the aggregate number of tactical nuclear 

weapons. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, thank you. 

Mr. SPRATT. We have got about three minutes to make it to the 

floor. We will be back as soon as we possibly can. We appreciate 

your indulgence. And when we come back, Ellen Tauscher will take 

the gavel because I have a meeting with the Speaker. Thank you 

again for your participation and for your report. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER [presiding]. The committee will be in order. At 

this time I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from 

Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. If the timing was just right, Madam 

Chair, you could call the committee to order, then run down there 

and testify if they just timed this confirmation stuff just right. But 

I guess it is not to be. Thank you all, Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. 

Perry, for being here. I appreciate your patience with us as we 

went to vote. I think it is apparent to those that have studied your 

report and to those of us that have been more peripheral in our 

study of your report that it is a very serious compilation of these 

very important issues. 

I want to ask more, I guess, of a diplomatic question. It seems 

to me that the timing of your report is a good one in terms of the 

relationships between the United States and Russia that, I don’t 

know, in my amateurism, I have sensed, in the last six or eight 

months or so, that there seems to be renewed interest in the relationship, which, I think, over the last couple of decades, we Americans probably haven’t done enough to cultivate. But it seems like 

these issues that you have brought up, in all their complexity and 

detail, are an excellent starting point for a relationship between a 

new administration and leadership in Russia. And I would like to 

hear you both comment on that question in terms of a broader relationship between the United States and Russia. 

Dr. PERRY. I think that is a very important point, Dr. Snyder. 

I see that we have a major opportunity now in forming a new relationship with Russia. And what I think Vice President Biden referred to as ‘‘pressing the reset button,’’ which I would call it to be 

in computer terminology ‘‘rebooting.’’ I have talked with nearly 

every major leader in Russia about this in the last two months. 

The President, the foreign minister, the National Security Advisor, 

they are all very anxious to do that. 
21 

So this is a great opportunity. I must say, though, it is not an 

opportunity we foresaw when we were working on the report. This 

has only developed in the last few months. And by the time it developed, our report was already pretty much put together. In the 

report, we urged working to establish such a relationship. And by 

the time we put the final words down in the report, we were talking as if that was a great opportunity to do that. But we did not 

know that that opportunity was going to exist six months ago, 

eight months ago. So it is a big opportunity, though. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We are going to have our ups and downs with 

Russia, but the important thing is to focus on the priorities. With 

Russia, our priorities are dealing with terrorism, dealing with proliferation, and dealing with arms control. And that other issues 

that come up, for example, the controversy over Georgia should not 

mislead us about what is central—or should be central—in our relationship. If one can object to a tenor of American foreign policy, 

it is a tendency to start chasing rabbits off the main trail rather 

than focus on what is central to our relationship. That applies to 

Russia, it applies to China and to others. 

Dr. SNYDER. And I am sorry, I left for a while so you may have 

discussed this but, in the report, you talk about the Nunn-Lugar 

funds and that additional funding for Nunn-Lugar would be money 

well spent. And I probably should ask the Chair because she would 

probably be able to answer my question, but I will ask you. I have 

sometimes heard the argument over the last several years as somebody who has been very supportive of this program that it has not 

just been a funding issue; that, in fact, it has been, you know, are 

projects ready to use the funding? But you all concluded that the 

primary obstacle was funding the further progress, is that accurate? Or would you amplify on your statements about Nunn-Lugar, 

please? 

Dr. PERRY. I think two things are necessary to make further 

progress in Nunn-Lugar. The first is the funding. That is a necessary condition. It also requires a Russia that is motivated to fully 

cooperate. And so it gets back to your first point, that we seem to 

be developing a new relationship with Russia, and that new relationship should enable us to cooperate, and cooperate effectively, on 

things that can be done to reduce the risk of proliferation. I don’t 

believe that proliferation is at the top list of their priority of things 

that need to be done now—dealing with proliferation—but it is on 

their list, and therefore we ought to be able to find some way of 

cooperating in that field if we can get other things off the table. 

I believe, myself, that the main factor in souring a relationship 

between the United States and Russia in the last couple of years 

has had nothing, really, to do with this nuclear field as such; it has 

had to do with the NATO expansion, it has had to do with the dispute over Georgia. But if we can get those issues resolved, or at 

least set aside, then we ought to be able to deal effectively and cooperatively with them in the nuclear field. 

Dr. SNYDER. I think missile defense has probably been one of the 

issues that made the relationship difficult too. Thank you, Madam 

Chair. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Dr. Snyder, new relationship or old relationship, Nunn-Lugar overall has been a substantial success. Nothing 
22 

works perfectly. Of course, funding is not the only issue. It is difficult dealing with the Russians because of security problems. But 

if you look over the years, their nuclear weapons are now reasonably well protected. They haven’t done as well on fissile material. 

We would hope that they will do better. But the fact that their nuclear weapons are under good security is an accomplishment that 

would not have occurred without Nunn-Lugar. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am happy to yield five minutes to gentleman 

from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger, when you said in 

your testimony that a deterrent, if it is effective, is in use every 

day. I remembered the emotional response I had when I was privileged to spend an overnight on one of the big boomer subs. And 

standing there beside that missile tube, the captain said, you know, 

if we ever have to use one of these, we will have failed. Thank you 

for reminding us how important they are. I think in practice, everybody knows the rules of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If 

you don’t have nuclear weapons, you absolutely certainly cannot 

have nuclear weapons until you have them, and then it is okay and 

you are a member of the club. Witness India and Pakistan, North 

Korea, Iran tomorrow; certainly the threat is proliferating. 

I think that there is a very high probability that our antiballistic 

missile shield in Alaska will never be used. The only country, I 

think, that would use it to come over the pole today is Russia, and 

they would very quickly overwhelm our system there. There is no 

other country—I believe China may be tomorrow—but no other 

country that is going to come over the pole, no other country that 

is going to launch from their soil. We would certainly detect that, 

and we would vaporize them and they know that. 

I think that if a nuclear weapon is delivered by missile on us, 

it will certainly come from the sea. They will then sink the ship 

and they will believe there are no fingerprints. You may argue that 

there is a signature in the weapon or a signature in the missile 

that you could detect. I am not sure they believe that. And I am 

not sure we would be certain that it wasn’t a nonstate actor who 

was doing that, so our response would be very difficult to predict. 

Since this is true, and we have large coasts, how are we going to 

deter that kind of an attack, and how could we protect ourselves 

from it? 

Dr. PERRY. Mr. Bartlett, let me take one component of your question which has to do with North Korea. It is not the whole story 

you are talking about, but it is an important part of that story. I 

do not believe the United States should accept North Korea as a 

nuclear power. And I believe that the U.S. Government should 

make every effort to roll back nuclear weapons they have, and I 

think there is some possibility we can be successful in that. The 

possibility of success depends on being able to apply what, I think, 

could reasonably be called coercive diplomacy. Of course, for diplomacy to have a chance of success, it is going to require the cooperation of several other key nations, most importantly China. So the 

key that I see to having any success in rolling back the North 

Korea nuclear program is finding a way of getting a common strategy with China on how to do that. Because while we supply some 

of the—have some of the positive incentives for North Korea, or 
23 

more importantly South Korea and Japan have some of the positive 

incentives for North Korea, all of the negative incentives short of 

military action are in the hands of China. And so we have to have 

some cooperation from China to make that happen. Thank you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Jim. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Bill has outlined a world of hope about nonproliferation, and I hope that he is correct. But our—I am sorry. 

Bill has outlined some hope with regard to nonproliferation, and I 

hope he is correct. But as you have indicated—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Dr. Schlesinger, your mike is not on. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, I see. Bill has, the third time, outlined 

hope with regard to nonproliferation. I hope he is correct. Needless 

to say, I worry about the North Koreas and Irans of this world. But 

our record that you mentioned at the outset of your comments— 

about India and Pakistan are now part of the club—our overall 

record over the last 60 years has not been awe-inspiring. We attempted to deflect Israel. We were not particularly hardworking at 

that, but we were not successful. We attempted to deflect France 

and of course, as you mentioned, India and Pakistan. So we must 

work hard on seeing whether, in this new environment, nonproliferation becomes a higher priority for many of the countries of 

the world. But we must also recognize that it is not a certainty 

that we will be successful. And the—I think that is sufficient. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I remain concerned about 

the challenge of deterring nations that would attack us from the 

sea without any notions to where it came from. We have huge 

coasts on both sides. I am not sure how we protect ourselves there. 

I think this is a vulnerability that warrants considerable attention. 

Thank you all very much for your service and your testimony. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. I am happy to yield five 

minutes to the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair, and this is really a 

great day for us to arrive at this point after several years of working on this issue, and it is due largely in part, I believe, to your 

leadership. So it is pretty exciting to be here together doing this. 

Gentlemen, thank you, both of you doctors for being before us and 

for all of your service to our Nation. I think that one of the biggest 

threats the world faces today is the terrorist groups like al Qaeda, 

seeking and working to obtain nuclear weapons. And the IAEA has 

proposed strengthening the NPT safeguards to enhance protection 

of fissile material, but it is not getting the support that it needs 

for their proposals. 

So my question to you would be, considering—what should we do 

to try to prevent terrorists from obtaining these nuclear weapons? 

In particular, what are the reasons that the IAEA is not getting 

support for the proposals they put forward on this? 

Dr. PERRY. I believe that the proposals of the IAEA for strengthening the—for the so-called additional protocols and strengthening 

their ability to inspect, for example, are well founded and would 

have been very—would have enhanced the whole world’s security 

had they been accepted. Secondly, I have not yet given up on those 

proposals, or something like those proposals being accepted. To try 

to get to your question, what is the reason the nations have turned 

that down: it is not a very happy reason, but nations—Iran and 
24 

other nations—have been able to make the case that they have a 

right to enrich uranium, they have a right to reprocess plutonium, 

and that nuclear powers like the United States, Russia, and so on 

should not be trying to abridge that right. They have put it as an 

issue of unfairness. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So sort of a sovereign right and, who are we to 

have it and not they? 

Dr. PERRY. And that in my mind is a fallacious issue, but it is 

an issue which has gained quite a lot of resonance among 60 or 70 

countries—nonnuclear countries—who have been swayed by that 

argument. I think we need to be much more effective in addressing 

that argument. It is not—when they join the NPT, their rights 

come along with obligations, and those obligations, of course, have 

to do with not taking any actions that would use the facilities and 

equipment and technologies that have been given them to move towards nuclear weapons. 

So this battle—this debate is not yet over. And I think we should 

be much more effective in pursuing the move to get support for the 

additional protocols of the IAEA. Otherwise, the move to contain 

the uranium enrichment and protocol will be lost and the probability of a nuclear weapon falling in the hands of terrorists is 

greatly increased. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Doctor, do you have anything to add? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, we have had somewhat—we, the United 

States have had a somewhat checkered career with the IAEA. Unfortunately, we have allowed, in recent years, for our relations to 

deteriorate, which is a mistake. The IAEA is an independent body; 

it has been influenced by the United States effectively in the past, 

less so today. I hope with a change of certain personalities—both 

in the Administration and at the IAEA—that those relationships 

can be restored and that the United States can have an improved 

relationship. 

Unfortunately, in the eyes of many people, the IAEA is just another part of the United Nations, which many don’t like. The fact 

of the matter is that the IAEA is, has been and, potentially, will 

be a very effective part of nonproliferation and American foreign 

policy, and that we ought not to allow personal estrangements to 

affect our overall support. On a broader issue, going back to the 

Atoms for Peace Program 1956, it is my personal judgment that 

that was based upon the premise—and I think Bill may have covered this—that was based upon the premise that those who received technical information under Atoms for Peace had also accepted and embraced nonproliferation. If they failed to do that, 

they are not entitled to technical information, as in the case of 

Iran. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. My last question. Secretary Gates has 

stated that, currently, the U.S. is the only declared nuclear power 

that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead, and has called on the 

modernization of nuclear security complex and the stockpile itself. 

I agree with President Obama and Secretary Gates that as long as 

nuclear weapons exist, the United States needs to maintain a safe, 

secure and effective arsenal. However, I am concerned by what ex-
25 

actly maintaining an effective and modernized arsenal entails and 

how it would be perceived by the international community. 

So my question to the two of you is: What is the Commission’s 

recommendation for the most efficient way to maintain a credible, 

safe, secure and reliable deterrent and, with the comments of Secretary Gates, what has been your knowledge of what the rest of the 

international community has said to the fact that we might want 

to start back up? 

Dr. PERRY. A major section of the report goes into that in quite 

a lot of detail. I will try to summarize the main points from it. That 

an important key is maintaining robust, healthy, vigorous weapons 

laboratories. And related to that is a strong Stockpile Stewardship 

Program and effective Life Extension Program. As we proceed—but 

as our weapons continue to age, we may find that the things that 

they have done in the past to keep the credibility of our deterrence 

may not be adequate. 

And so I believe we should be open to, as we take each new 

weapon into its Life Extension Program, we should be open to a variety of approaches on how that should be done. If it can be done 

through the Life Extension Program techniques in the past, it 

should be done that way. If it requires mining other weapons for 

the components to get that reliability we could do it that way. But 

if it involves a new design, I think we should be open to doing that 

also. And the decision should be based on the technical necessity, 

not on a political judgment. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Doctor. Doctor, do you have a comment 

to add? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that we ought to drop phrases like 

‘‘modernization’’ and ‘‘new weapons’’ from our vocabulary, and that 

we just talk about refurbishment, maintenance of the stockpile. 

Some of these weapons are aging. As Bill mentioned, we need to 

have life extension systems. We ought not to be arguing about modernization, which has created more clouds than light. And, if we 

can get over what have been some unnecessary quarrels from the 

past, we would be far better off. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you, Madam Chair, for 

your indulgence. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. I am happy to yield five 

minutes to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. One question from 

both of you, and that is: to what extent are we still relying on the 

mutually assured destruction doctrine, and do you think that missile defense systems have to—or to what extent missile defense systems have a stabilizing or destabilizing impact on security? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. You are going to buck that one to me, Bill. 

With regard to mutual assured destruction: that has declined, and 

declined substantially, in importance. I do not expect that the Russians are prepared to attack us, and I do not expect that we would 

need to respond with a full strike. I think that both sides have 

learned from the past that a lot of our rhetoric got out of hand. So 

we are going to maintain an assured destruction capability as a 

hedge, as Bill might say, against the possibility—however remote 

it may be—that the Russians would engage in a strike against the 

United States, so as to deter them. 
26 

But I think that that possibility is vastly remote. With respect 

to the problems of missile defense, I think that we have to recognize that neither Russia or China are going to be put off by an 

American missile defense. They have already demonstrated the capacity of maneuverable warheads, penetration aids, against such a 

defense and they can penetrate it. 

Years ago, going back to the 1960s, when the Soviet Union deployed the missile defense around Moscow, Secretary McNamara 

said, no, we are not going to try and create a damage-limiting capability, we are not going to have a missile defense of our own; we 

are going to use offensive weapons to penetrate that defense. That 

was our strategy then, and that would be the strategy of Russia or 

China if they thought that we had a thick missile defense. And as 

a consequence, there is always this interaction with sophisticated 

nuclear powers that a missile defense that worries them will simply lead to an expansion of their offensive forces, which is something that we do not want to see. 

Dr. PERRY. I associate myself with the answer that Dr. Schlesinger just gave; the same answer. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. Does the success of mutually assured destruction assume that we are dealing with rational 

nation-states? 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Would you classify Iran as a rational nation-state? 

Dr. PERRY. Yes, I would. I can see many other instances where 

it does not apply; in particular, with a terrorist attack. But everybody can come to their own judgment about how rational Iran is. 

My own belief is that they understand that if they attack the 

United States, their country would be destroyed and that they are 

not seeking suicide. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Is North Korea a rational nation-state? 

Dr. PERRY. I think yes to that, also. And for the same reason, I 

do not think the regime in North Korea is seeking suicide. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. In my view, you hear irrational statements 

from the President of Iran. Whether or not he completely believes 

them or whether he is engaged in stirring up support—domestic 

support—for his position in the run-up to the election or whatever, 

the supreme leader in Iran maintains control. And it is not the 

President of Iran, who has, from time to time, been pulled back 

from some of his bolder statements by other Iranians. I worry 

about the degree of control that the Iranian government has over 

the Iranian guards who express flamboyant statements that exceed 

those of the President of Iran. 

And I think that one of the things that we ought to be doing in 

our own deterrent policy is to make sure that we know where the 

guards’ core bases are and, in the event of trouble, that they get 

wiped out. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you gentlemen. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am going to yield to Mr. Langevin for five minutes, the gentleman from Rhode Island. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Dr. Schlesinger, Dr. 

Perry, thank you for your testimony here today and the fine work 

you have done on this report. If I could go back to the discussion 
27 

just a minute ago about the role of missile defense and, in particular, the relations with China and Russia. Again, the Commission found that missile defense is effective against regional nuclear 

aggressors, including against limited long-range threats, are a valuable component of U.S. strategic posture. And you recommend the 

United States should ensure that its actions do not lead Russia or 

China to take actions that increase the threat to the United States 

and its allies and friends. Can you expand on that discussion a little more about the balance of missile defense before it provokes 

Russia and China to take action because we went too far with a 

strong missile defense program? 

Could you talk about the role that missile defenses play in 

achieving that objective, the strategic stability that the Commission emphasized throughout the report? And is there a way, by the 

way, to enlist Russia and China’s support for a missile defense system so that it would protect us against either accidental missile 

launches or an irrational actor who would launch a missile. 

Dr. PERRY. Well, a system to provide defense against a very limited Iranian capability should look very different from a system designed to defend against a Russian larger-scale missile attack. And, 

therefore, we ought to be able to have one without threatening the 

other. Moreover, to the extent we are focused on defense against 

Iran, a nuclear missile in Iran is actually a greater threat to Russia than a nuclear missile is against the United States. And, therefore, there ought to be some way of not only communicating with 

Russia on this problem, but maybe even cooperating in providing 

that defense. And to the extent you have that communication and 

even the possibility of cooperation, then there should be no basis 

for the Russians increasing or expanding their missile program to 

try to offset this missile defense which, in any event, is not directed 

against them. But it does require good communication with the 

Russians. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. If I could just interject there, what I find troubling, of course, is that when the previous Administration took 

steps to begin the process of putting the missile defense system 

somewhere in Europe, the Russians found that very provocative, 

and it clearly increased tensions between the United States and 

Russia. Is there no way to bring them to the table to support a limited defense, missile defense system? 

Dr. PERRY. Well, we have—I think the first step in getting that 

issue resolved is very close communications with the Russians 

which would start off with a joint threat assessment. We and the 

Russians, both looking at what Iran is doing, together assessing 

what the threat is and what should be done about that. Because 

I say, again, they are at least as much a threat to Russia as they 

are to the United States. And if we are working together on this 

issue, then it should not become—it should not morph into an issue 

in which the system is seen as posing a threat to Russia. I believe 

this is a solvable problem. And based on my own discussion with 

Russians over the last two or three months, I think we are probably already on the way to getting that problem solved. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There has been discussion over the course of 

the last 30 or 40 years about unauthorized launches; alternatively, 

accidental launches. I think that a missile defense for either China 
28 

or Russia clearly directed against that remote possibility would be 

acceptable to them. What would not be acceptable is a degree of deployment of missile defenses that clearly undermines their own deterrence. Now, there has been a good deal of unnecessary talk 

about our deployment in Poland and in Czech Republic. It seems 

to me that we decided to deploy before the Iranian threat really 

had developed. But the most important thing is: in the eyes of the 

Russians, they profess that this is a threat to their own deterrent 

and they go on and make speeches on that subject. 

The fact of the matter is they know full well that it is not a 

threat to their deterrent and they say privately, why in God’s name 

did you deploy in Poland and the Czech Republic? If you had deployed in France or Britain or Germany, we would not have this 

problem, but you are provoking us by deploying in former satellites 

of the Soviet Union, and we regard that as provocative. I think that 

that might have been avoided by the conversations with the Russians early on. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you both for your answers and your testimony today, and your invaluable service to our country. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. I am happy to yield 

five minutes to the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Dr. Perry, Dr. Schlesinger, I want to thank you 

for being here today and for all the work the Commission did. Gentlemen, the Commission concluded on page 62 that ‘‘the intellectual 

infrastructure is also in serious trouble. A major cause is the recent 

(and projected) decline in resources.’’ The report went on to say 

that, if funding for the NNSA does not increase, that the Agency 

will be unable to transform the weapons complex, perform the necessary life extension work, and sustain the scientific base of the 

weapons program. Indeed, the report points out that the NNSA is 

already planning to reduce lab budgets by 20 to 30 percent regardless of the impact on scientific capabilities, and without having 

even studied that impact. 

Recognizing that you believe that a funding study should be performed, I would like to ask: Did the Commission reach any consensus on the level of resources that should be allocated in the 

short-run to NNSA to ensure that these three key objectives can 

be achieved? 

Dr. PERRY. The short answer to your question is no, we have not 

done a detailed cost analysis. We have reached a clear judgment 

that it is a mistake to proceed with this decrease in the intellectual 

capital with the laboratories. Without any question, I have to add 

my own personal judgment that we should restore it to the previous levels. That can be done either by increasing the overall 

budget for NNSA, or by time-phasing out some of the physical infrastructure changes that are being made, and we gave a set of priorities on how that might be done. But, without question we ought 

to put first priority to maintaining the intellectual capital at the 

three laboratories. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The first point, of course, is: do no harm. And 

given the prospective budget levels, the labs are in for a 20 or 30 

percent cut, which would do damage. So we need to sustain at least 

the present level. The problem that we have had is that the plant 

infrastructure for many years has been starved in order to preserve 
29 

the laboratories. And now that infrastructure needs to be replaced. 

And against a level budget, all that we can do in the eyes of NNSA 

is to reduce the funding of the laboratories, and we think that that 

is a mistake. I think that you have to break out the restoration of 

the metallurgical lab at Los Alamos separate from the funding for 

the labs. 

Now, I would hope that there would be a careful analysis of how 

much money is required to sustain that intellectual capability, not 

this year, not next year, but over the decades ahead. And we have 

not done that. I don’t know whether we have the resources to do 

that in the Commission, but it needs to be done in a serious way. 

Otherwise, one faces these kinds of arbitrary cuts that, in this case, 

will damage the intellectual capital at a time that it is deteriorating simply because of the aging of those who have worked on 

this work in the laboratories for many years and who are now retiring. 

One other comment I would make is that the intellectual and the 

human capital, if we continue on the process of reducing the funding for the laboratories and the personnel at the laboratories, and 

we lose more laboratories, that is an irreversible move. It took us 

decades to build up that human capital, and it will take us many 

more decades to try to restore it. So it is a very serious concern. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Would you have any comments on the consequences of not funding the national security labs on the potential 

for future arms reduction attempts and negotiations? 

Dr. PERRY. Just one point I would make. 

I testified to this committee that I strongly support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That support is contingent, in my 

mind, on maintaining a strong intellectual capacity at the laboratories. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We have repeatedly made the point that one 

of the purposes of our posture is to provide reassurance to the allies who depend upon us. And to the extent that they watch the 

deterioration of our intellectual capital at the laboratories, their 

confidence in us diminishes and the willingness of some to develop 

their own nuclear capabilities may increase. 

So the overall impressiveness of the U.S. nuclear establishment 

is part of what maintains stability in the international environment. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you both. I yield back. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Heinrich. Dr. Perry, Dr. Schlesinger, members of the Commission, the United Institute of Peace, 

and staff that have worked so hard on this: let me tell you that this 

document that you have worked on is one of the finest I think I 

have ever seen, and far beyond meets my expectations when we 

created this commission two years ago. 

Let me thank you for your significant and extraordinary pedigrees that you have brought forward. You have done extraordinary 

service for this committee, for the Congress, and for the American 

people. Let me thank you for your patriotism. Some of you have 

been in service of this country all of your adult lives, and I will tell 

you that for all of the work that you have done, this, I think, is 

a fantastic culmination. 
30 

I will tell the American people and my constituents the most impressive thing about this is that, not only is it so important and 

timely, but it is readable. And I really commend this to average 

Americans who are interested in understanding where we are on 

this issue. 

When I met with you the first time, one of the things I asked 

you for was a narrative for the American people, for us to be able 

to lift this above partisan politics and ideology to a place where average Americans could understand exactly where we are, exactly 

what the threats are, exactly what our opportunities are, and to 

really lever the time of a new Administration—a time when we 

have a nuclear treaty review, when we have a new nuclear posture 

review coming out, nonproliferation treaty review, a potential for a 

CTBT, all of these coming together in this extraordinary time. 

And I think that you have given a road map by an all-star team, 

and I hope we can keep this team together. Perhaps we will find 

more work for you to do in the not-too-distant future. 

Thank you very much for your service, and the hearing is adjourned. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Madam Chairman, you are far too modest. 

Think of this as your baby. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. My baby, by the way, is graduating from high 

school and is going to Bucknell University to play Division I 

volleyball. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
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