United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 22-1918

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Andrew Scott Pierson

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

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 Submitted: February 17, 2023

Filed: July 11, 2023

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, STRAS and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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SMITH, Chief Judge.

The United States indicted Andrew Pierson for illegal exportation of firearm

parts from the United States to Mexico. Mexican authorities apprehended Pierson

while he was living in Mexico. In conjunction with his arrest, Mexican authorities

searched both his vehicle and his Mexican residence. They returned Pierson to the

United States’s border, allowing him to cross the border into the United States where

he was arrested by United States authorities. In response to the weapons charges,
Pierson filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the searches. He argued that

the evidence should be excluded because Mexican authorities seized the evidence

without a warrant in Mexico. In addition, he argued that statements he made to United

States authorities once he entered the United States should be excluded as

involuntary. He also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged

violation of his due process rights premised on his treatment by Mexican authorities.

The district court1 denied both motions. Pierson proceeded to trial and was found

guilty. The district court imposed an upward variance and sentenced him to 144

months’ imprisonment. Pierson appeals the denial of his suppression and dismissal

motions, as well as the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.

I. Background

In 2014, Pierson was indicted for illegally shipping firearms as a felon in the

Northern District of Oklahoma, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); an arrest

warrant was issued. Pierson, operating in Mexico at the time, remained in Mexico

once he learned of the warrant and continued his illegal activities. He began ordering

firearm parts from the United States, assembling the firearms in Mexico, and

providing them to Mexican drug cartels. In December 2018, Mexican authorities

apprehended Pierson and brought him to the United States-Mexico border. He crossed

into the United States without accompaniment and was taken into custody by United

States law enforcement. 

While in United States custody, Pierson was read his Miranda2

rights and

executed a written Miranda waiver. He was then interviewed by an agent from the

Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) as well as an

agent from the Department of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). During his

1The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

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interview, Pierson said that he had been “picked up,” had spent “three or four hours

in the back of a pickup truck waiting for you guys,” and had been “drug out by the

arms.” App. A, at 2–5. He also mentioned during the interview that he might be in

need of medical attention.

Pierson was charged in a five-count indictment for conspiracy to traffic in

counterfeit goods, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1) and (a)(2). He was also

charged with conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act, in violation of 22

U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2) and (c); 18 U.S.C. § 2; and 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.1, 123.17, and

127.1 along with other charges.3

Pierson moved to suppress the evidence seized when his vehicle was searched

by Mexican authorities and when he was personally seized along with statements

made when he was questioned by United States authorities after crossing the border.

He argued that the exclusionary rule should apply to these searches and seizures

because they “shocked the judicial conscience” and resulted from a “joint venture”

between Mexican and United States authorities. Other circuits have used the “shocked

the judicial conscience” and “joint venture standards” when considering the

exclusionary rule in relation to foreign law enforcement actions.4 Additionally,

3The indictment also charged him with attempt to violate the Arms Export

Control Act, in violation of the same provisions; smuggling goods from the United

States, in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778, 22 C.F.R. parts 120–130, and 18 U.S.C.

§ 554; and conspiracy to violate the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, in

violation of 31 C.F.R. § 598.203, 598.204, and 598.701, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1904 and 1906,

and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3551–3559. Section 598.203 of 31 C.F.R. is now reserved,

but it was in effect at the time of the superseding indictment. See Narcotics

Trafficking Sanctions Regulations and Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions

Regulations, 86 Fed. Reg. 26,667 (May 17, 2021). 

4

See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying

both doctrines); United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying the

joint venture doctrine); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974)

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Pierson argued that his post-Miranda interview was involuntary because it was the

product of torture and coercion by Mexican authorities and because it was the “fruit

of the poisonous tree” of the original illegal searches and seizure.5

The district court conducted a hearing on the motions to suppress and dismiss.

At the hearing, Pierson testified about his treatment in Mexico. He stated that the

Mexican authorities seized and searched him without a warrant. He was picked up by

armed men who pulled his t-shirt above his head and put him in the back of a truck

in cold weather. He was then driven outside of town to an abandoned building.

Outside the building, he saw barrels that he recognized as those a cartel would use to

dispose of bodies. He recalled being hit in the back of the head with what he believed

to be a gun, knocked unconscious, and dragged on the ground by his legs. He said

that the individuals threatened to put him into the barrels, struck him about the head,

and provided no food or water. He claimed that they threatened to douse him in cold

water and drive him around in the cold. Lastly, he said that he was kicked in the back

so hard that it took his breath away. 

The district court denied his motion to suppress. The court found that his arrest

and the subsequent searches of his vehicle and residence did not “shock the judicial

conscience” nor did the record support any “joint venture” between Mexican and

United States authorities. Additionally, it found his post-Miranda statements made

in the United States to have been voluntary. 

(applying the shocks the conscience doctrine), abrogated on other grounds by United

States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264–66 (1990); United States v. Valdivia,

680 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying both doctrines).

5Pierson additionally argued that the conduct by Mexican and United States

officials violated the 1978 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico

as well as the Rule of Speciality. Neither of these issues is before us on appeal.

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Pierson pleaded guilty to Count II, and the government dismissed the other

counts brought against him in the indictment. The district court determined Pierson’s

total offense level to be 25 with a criminal history category of III. The court

determined his Guidelines range to be 70–87 months’ imprisonment. The district

court then varied upward to 144 months’ imprisonment. In support of the variance,

it stated:

I think a variance is appropriate to deter future criminal activity by

others who may be thinking about going to Mexico and to reflect the

seriousness of the offense here, and to afford adequate deterrence, not

just to Mr. Pierson, but to those who might be thinking about doing this

in the future.

R. Doc. 294, at 148. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Pierson advances five arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the

exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment should apply to his arrest and searches

in Mexico. Second, he argues that his post-Miranda statements made in the United

States were involuntary. Third, he argues that the district court clearly erred in

concluding that he self-surrendered at the United States-Mexico border. Fourth, he

contends that the actions taken by both Mexican and United States authorities

violated his due process rights. Lastly, he argues that the district court abused its

discretion in varying his sentence upward. We address these arguments in turn.

A. Exclusionary Rule

 “In an appeal from a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence,

the court reviews factual findings for clear error, and questions of constitutional law

de novo. We may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any grounds supported

by the record.” United States v. Jackson, 811 F.3d 1049, 1051–52 (8th Cir. 2016)

(cleaned up).

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“Ordinarily, the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply to

foreign searches and seizures, for the actions of an American court are unlikely to

influence the conduct of foreign police.” Valdivia, 680 F.3d at 51 (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459–60 (1976) (“We

therefore hold that the judicially created exclusionary rule should not be extended to

forbid the use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a

criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign.”). However, some courts have

applied exceptions, allowing application of the exclusionary rule for foreign searches

and seizures. There are two main exceptions. First, if “the conduct of foreign police

shocks the judicial conscience,” then the exclusionary rule may apply. Valdivia, 680

F.3d at 51. Second, “where American agents participated in the foreign search, or the

foreign officers acted as agents for their American counterparts,” the exclusionary

rule may apply. Id. This circuit has not adopted these exceptions.

1. Shock the Conscience

Pierson argues that the conduct of Mexican law enforcement shocks the

judicial conscience. First, he argues that his treatment at the hands of Mexican

authorities amounted to torture. Alternatively, he argues that Mexican law

enforcement failed to obtain any warrant or judicial authorization for the searches of

his vehicle and residence which suffices to shock the conscience. 

Pierson’s first conscience-shocking argument fails. In support of his argument,

Pierson cites the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT),6 but the CAT

6The United Nations Convention Against Torture defines torture as:

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,

is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from

him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an

act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having

committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any

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provides no ammunition for his suppression claim in a criminal case. He fails to cite

any legal precedent of its use for that purpose. 

We also note that the district court did not credit his testimony about the

conduct he alleged. Pierson’s testimony lacked corroboration. Medical records

following his return to the United States show evidence of a back contusion, but the

injury did not require hospitalization. He was taken to the hospital while in United

States’ custody for symptoms not related to physical mistreatment but to his obesity.

During his interview with United States federal agents, he failed to mention the

alleged mistreatment, stating only that he had been picked up, driven outside the city,

and had seen the barrels used by the cartels. These corroborated portions of his

testimony are not conscience shocking. We defer to the district court’s credibility

assessment. Dat v. United States, 983 F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 2020).

Pierson’s other argument—that the failure to obtain warrants shocks the

judicial conscience—similarly fails. Pierson correctly avers that the search of his

vehicle and residence without a warrant could be a violation of Mexican law, as well

as a violation of other countries’ constitutions. But this is far from sufficient to

establish conduct that shocks the judicial conscience.

We decline to adopt the “shocks the judicial conscience” standard. This record

provides neither credible facts to warrant its use nor a convincing argument that we

should recognize it. The Supreme Court has made clear that the exclusionary rule’s

reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering

is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence

of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does

not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental

to lawful sanctions.

United Nations Convention Against Torture, Art. I, Sec. 1. 

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“sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” Davis v. United

States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,

141 (2009); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909, 921 n.22 (1984); Elkins v.

United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). When the conduct at issue is not proscribed

by the Fourth Amendment, which applies to United States law enforcement, the

exclusionary rule’s rationale is absent.

We hold that the district court did not err in declining to extend the

exclusionary rule’s application to the alleged conduct of the Mexican authorities.

2. Joint Venture

Pierson’s argument that United States law enforcement’s interaction with

Mexican authorities amounted to a joint venture warranting extension of the

exclusionary rule to his seizure and subsequent search in Mexico is unpersuasive. The

Seventh Circuit has held that the presence of a law enforcement joint venture could

support the suppression of evidence, “if U.S. agents substantially participate in an

extraterritorial search of a U.S. citizen and the foreign officials were essentially acting

as agents for their American counterparts or the search amounted to a joint operation

between American and foreign authorities.” Stokes, 726 F.3d at 890.

Pierson argues that email communications between Mexican and United States

authorities were sufficient to create a joint venture. Even construed most favorably

to Pierson, the most that the evidence demonstrates is that United States authorities

helped Mexican law enforcement to locate and identify Pierson, solicited a search of

Pierson’s residence and a mechanic shop associated with him, and requested that he

be turned over to United States authorities. 

Precedent, as developed by other circuits, however, requires more.

Identification and notification of a suspect in a foreign country does not rise to the

level of a joint venture. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 140–41(5th Cir.

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1976). Nor does being present at the scene of the search and being made aware of all

plans on arresting, searching, and seizing evidence. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1231.

Even videotaping parts of the search and seizure does not rise to the level of a joint

venture. United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 511 (11th Cir. 1994). Lastly,

“[t]o render foreign law enforcement officials virtual agents of the

United States, American officials must play some role in controlling or

directing the conduct of the foreign parallel investigation.” Contrary to

[Pierson’s] suggestion, “[i]t is not enough that the foreign government

undertook its investigation pursuant to an American . . . request.”

United States v. Aleem, 641 F. App’x 96, 97 (2d Cir. 2016) (unpublished summary

order) (third and fourth alteration in original) (quoting Getto, 729 F.3d at 230). 

Unlike the “shock the judicial conscience” standard, the joint venture doctrine

inherently contemplates the conduct of United States law enforcement. It, therefore,

aligns with the purpose of the exclusionary rule “to deter future Fourth Amendment

violations.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 236–237. Nonetheless, we opt not to, in this case, join

the other circuits who have adopted this extension of the exclusionary rule because

it is unnecessary to do so on these facts. The evidence in this case simply does not

establish a joint venture between Mexican and United States authorities. For a true

joint venture to have occurred, United States officials must have been, “controlling

or directing the conduct of the foreign parallel investigation.” Aleem, 641 F. App’x

at 97 (quoting Getto, 729 F.3d at 230). The record in this case is devoid of such

evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny exclusion of the

evidence based on Pierson’s allegation of a joint venture between the United States

and Mexican authorities.

B. Post-Miranda Statements

The holding of Miranda protects criminal defendants from self-incrimination

by requiring law enforcement to warn defendants of their rights prior to a custodial

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interrogation. It provides that a “defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,

provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Miranda, 384

U.S. at 444. “We review de novo whether the Miranda waiver was valid.” United

States v. Haggard, 368 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2004).

A waiver is “knowing and intelligent” where it is made with full

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the

consequences of abandoning the right, and a waiver is “voluntary”

where the court can determine that the waiver was a product of the

suspect’s free and deliberate choice, and not the product of intimidation,

coercion, or deception.

Thai v. Mapes, 412 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2005). “To determine whether a waiver

or a confession was voluntary, a court looks at the totality of the circumstances and

must determine whether the individual’s will was overborne.” United States v. Syslo,

303 F.3d 860, 866 (8th Cir. 2002). “A statement is involuntary when it was extracted

by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the

defendant’s will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination.” United

States v. Williams, 793 F.3d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Pierson argues that the conduct of the Mexican authorities was so egregious

that he could not “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” waive his Miranda rights

when read them by United States law enforcement. 384 U.S. at 444. However, the

district court did not credit his testimony about the conduct of Mexican authorities.

We agree with the district court that the record reflects Pierson made his Miranda

waiver “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 

C. Border Surrender

Pierson claims that he did not actually self-surrender when he crossed the

Mexican border into the United States. Pierson’s contention that the district court

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clearly erred in concluding he self-surrendered is merely an additional attempt to

show a joint venture. As Pierson acknowledges, “While this issue is not at the heart

of the appeal, it does go toward whether Mexican officials were acting at the direction

or request of American officials.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 10. Even assuming

Pierson did not self-surrender, that fact would not alter the inadequacy of his proof

to establish a joint venture under any cited precedent.

D. Due Process

Pierson argues that the district court erred in finding that his due process rights

were not violated and in denying his motion to dismiss. “In reviewing the district

court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment for alleged government

misconduct, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal

conclusions de novo.” United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 559 (8th Cir.

2012) (quoting United States v. Pumpkin Seed, 572 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir. 2009)).

Due process violations stemming from an international arrest have been found

to invalidate a prosecution by one circuit. In Toscanino, the Second Circuit concluded

that an abuse of process occurred where a narcotics smuggling suspect was abused,

tortured, abducted, and forcibly brought to the United States. 500 F.2d at 270. In that

case, United States agents actively participated in the interrogations, and members of

the Uruguayan police were actual paid agents of the United States. Id. at 269–70. The

court there concluded that “a federal court’s criminal process is abused or degraded

where it is executed against a defendant who has been brought into the territory of the

United States by the methods alleged here.” Id. at 276. 

United States v. Lira limited the holding of Toscanino to those actions that

were taken “by representatives of the United States Government.” 515 F.2d 68, 70 (2d

Cir. 1974). Similar to the joint venture analysis, the focus must be upon the conduct

of United States officials. Even if we were to accept the Second Circuit’s analysis,

which we decline to do today, there is no evidence in this case that United States

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officials tortured Pierson, knew of any torture, or paid the Mexican officials who

carried it out. Pierson’s claim of a due process violation fails.

E. Variance at Sentencing

We review a district court’s sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard. United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

First, the court looks to whether the district court committed any procedural error,

including failing to calculate the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, sentencing on clearly

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the sentence. Id. Here, Pierson argues

that the district court procedurally erred by varying upward based on testimony that

the guns he sold had been used to kill people and because the court did not consider

its responsibility to avoid sentencing disparities.

“If a district court references some of the considerations contained

in § 3553(a), we are ordinarily satisfied that the district court was aware of the entire

contents of the relevant statute.” United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir.

2008) (cleaned up). The record shows that the court did not ignore the § 3553(a)

factors. The court highlighted the seriousness of the offense and the need for

deterrence. The district court’s failure to specifically mention sentencing disparities

as a consideration is insufficient to show that the district court did not fulfill its

statutory obligation to consider all the relevant § 3553(a) factors. See United States

v. Richart, 662 F.3d 1037, 1049 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e do not require a district court

to categorically rehearse each of the section 3553(a) factors on the record when it

imposes a sentence as long as it is clear that they were considered.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Additionally, the district court, as Pierson notes in his brief, stated, “How do

I quantify the damage that was done with your work. I don’t think I have heard any

testimony about that. . . . I don’t think we heard specific testimony today about what

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[the cartels] do.” R. Doc. 294, at 127. The district court explicitly acknowledged the

absence of record evidence connecting Pierson’s crimes to specific injuries or deaths.

The court openly doubted its ability to take into account violence done by cartels in

varying upward because no evidence had been presented specifically as to gun-related

deaths. Pierson focuses on the court’s upward variance and assumes the resulting

sentence was based on improper considerations. While the district court could have

been more clear in its pronouncement, the record does not support a conclusion that

the court either legally erred or abused its discretion. 

Lastly, Pierson argues that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. As an

upward variance, this sentence is not granted a presumption of reasonableness as is

granted to those inside the Guidelines range. See Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461.

However, “it will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—

whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively

unreasonable.” Id. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the district

court explained that it was going above the Guidelines range in order to serve as a

deterrent to people going to Mexico to assist cartels. The resulting sentence, while

significantly above the Guidelines range, was well below the statutory maximum of

240 months and based on applicable § 3553(a) factors. While some judges might have

imposed less, Pierson has not shown the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion. 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court. 

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