UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

CRAIG JOSEPH EDGIN,

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 1:14-CV-14537-TLL-PTM

v.

PATRICK R. DONAHUE, DISTRICT JUDGE THOMAS L. LUDINGTON

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PATRICIA T. MORRIS

Defendant.

 /

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION PURSUANT TO 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

I. RECOMMENDATION

For the following reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the case be sua sponte 

DISMISSED because Plaintiff has failed to state a basis for this Court’s exercise of subject 

matter jurisdiction and has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. REPORT

A. Introduction

On December 1, 2014, Plaintiff Craig Joseph Edgin, filed this pro se Complaint, 

alleging,

The [United States Postal Service,] USPS had accom[m]odated my service 

connected disability[ie]s in excess of 19 years. When the USPS promoted 

me to a higher level (PS7) . . . . I could not perform the tasks of the job(s) 

for the promotion; failing the . . . math (pretest) and was fired. The USPS 

directed me to provide documents to support my request (to withdraw) 

from the position prior to their . . . terminating me, and would not provide 

an interactive process as required. Instead[,] the USPS refused to allow me 

to provide medical documentation (or determine what could be provided) 

and my [h]ealthcare provider (VA) stated they were provided what would 

be acceptable.

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(Doc. 1 at 1-2.) In the “Relief” section where he is asked to “[b]riefly state exactly what you 

want the court to do for you,” he writes

What I’ve always wanted, to work[.] I was hired as a preference eligible 

veteran (injured during wartime) and can work. The USPS (or any 

employer) must have a process that works for both them, and their 

employees. Due to this I would respectfully ask for all back pay, benefits 

from the position I held (PS6) and be returned to work.

(Doc. 1 at 2.) 

Plaintiff names only Patrick R. Donahue as a defendant in the caption on the General 

Civil Complaint form, and leaves the “Name of Defendant(s)” section blank. (Id. at 1.) In the 

“Additional Information” section he adds 

1) The Merit Service Protection Board (MSPB) has not investigated or 

allowed my protected status as a person with (service connected 

disability[ie]s (Army).

2) The USPS also did not fire a nonveteran, female who was sent to 

offic[i]al training (and failed). The USPS provided her a job she could 

work.

(Doc. 1 at 3.)

B. Screening Procedure and Standards

In enacting the original IFP statute, Congress recognized that “a litigant whose filing 

fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic 

incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. 

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). In 

1996, Congress enacted a screening procedure, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires 

that the court review all complaints where the plaintiff is proceeding IFP and that it sua sponte 

dismiss a case before service of process if it determines that the action is frivolous or 

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malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

When a plaintiff is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, the court is required to 

liberally construe the document and hold it to a less stringent standard than a similar pleading 

drafted by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 

F.3d 708, 715 (6th Cir. 1999). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) sets forth the basic federal 

pleading requirement that a complaint “shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Rule 8 requires only that the complaint 

give the defendant fair notice of the claim and its supporting facts.” E.E.O.C. v. J.H. Routh 

Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 854 (6th Cir. 2001). Despite this relatively low threshold, a 

complaint must nevertheless contain more than legal labels, conclusions, and a recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action; it must also contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

Federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction. 

U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995). Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

provides that, if a court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the 

court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

There are two ways this Court can obtain jurisdiction over such a case; first, the United 

States Code provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

This statute confers on the federal district courts what is known as “federal question 

jurisdiction.” Second, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction arises when the 

matter is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

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C. Governing Law and Analysis

I suggest that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted and because it fails to state a basis for this Court’s exercise of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not claim that any federal law or right was violated; 

the only place he even mentions a federal law is in his Civil Cover Sheet, under the section that 

asks him to cite to the statute under which he is filing—he cites to 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.404-

1614.407, (Doc. 1 at 4), a section dealing with Title VII civil actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 

Plaintiff also mentions having a “service connected disabilit[y],” (Doc. 1 at 1-2), which if the 

Court construed his Complaint extremely liberally, could implicate the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. However, even construing the 

Complaint extremely liberally, and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Complaint does

not contain allegations that give rise to either a Title VII discrimination claim or an ADA 

discrimination claim because Plaintiff was not qualified for the position and because he only 

named an individual who does not meet the definition of employer.

Title VII, reads in relevant part that, “it shall be unlawful . . . for an employer . . . to 

discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “Employer” means “a person engaged in an industry 

affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 

twenty or more calendar weeks . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 

When a plaintiff cannot demonstrate discrimination with direct evidence, Title VII 

claims fall under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) burden 

shifting framework. Idemudia v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 434 Fed. App’x 495, 499 (6th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of race discrimination exists by showing all 

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of the following elements: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) “an adverse employment 

action”; (3) qualification for the position; and (4) replacement by a person not in the protected 

class or treatment of the plaintiff that is different than treatment of a “similarly-situated, nonprotected employee[].” Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(citing DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d. 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2004)). If the plaintiff successfully 

establishes a prima facie case, then a presumption of discrimination arises and the defendant 

will have to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 

Id. If the defendant meets this burden then the burden will fall back on the Plaintiff to show 

that the defendant’s proffered reason is just pretext for discrimination. Id. 

For the first element, the only place that Plaintiff contends that he is a member of a 

protected class is when he asserts that a female who had also failed the test was not fired and 

was instead allowed to work in a position for which she was qualified. (Doc. 1 at 3.) 

Construing his Complaint extremely liberally then, he would meet the first and fourth prong. 

He also would meet the second prong because he was terminated. However, he fails to meet 

the third prong, because he specifically states that he failed the math test, (Doc. 1 at 2), which 

shows that he was not qualified. Therefore, I suggest Plaintiff has failed to make out any Title 

VII claim.

The Americans with Disabilities Act provides that “[n]o covered entity shall 

discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application 

procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 

training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-

12117. “Discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability,” includes, among 

other things, “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 

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limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 

12112(b)(5)(A).

ADA claims also utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when 

direct evidence is not available. Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, 542 F.3d 1099, 1104-

05 (6th Cir. 2008). “To prove a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must 

show that” he or she (1) “is disabled,” (2) “is otherwise qualified to perform the essential 

functions of a position, with or without accommodation,” and (3) “suffered an adverse 

employment action because of his [or her] disability.” Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & 

Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419, 433 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Talley, 542 F.3d at 1105). In this 

case, even if the Complaint is construed extremely liberally, that is Plaintiff could meet the 

first element by merely asserting he had “service related disability[ie]s,” Plaintiff’s claim again 

fails because he has not shown that he was qualified for the position. (See Doc. 1 at 1.) In fact, 

he was not qualified because he failed the math test. (Id. at 2.)

Furthermore, for both Title VII, and the ADA, when naming an individual, the named 

individual must meet the definition of “employer.” Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d. 

400, 404 (6th Cir. 1997). In this case, the only named Defendant is Donahue, an individual 

who clearly does not meet the definition of employer since Plaintiff worked for USPS and his 

employer was the federal government. 

Plaintiff’s claims also fail because the only place he mentions Donahue is in the caption 

of his Complaint—in the body of the Complaint he only discusses USPS’s conduct, not 

Donahue’s. However, because he does not name USPS as a Defendant, the only relevant 

conduct is Donahue’s. Plaintiff leaves it for the Court to assume that Donahue was a 

supervisor, perhaps the supervisor that told him he was terminated. However, even though 

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Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and his Complaint should be construed liberally, he still must 

plead enough facts to show how Defendant’s conduct violated Title VII or the ADA. It is too 

much to require a court to manufacture facts for a plaintiff. Therefore, I suggest, Plaintiff does 

not show how any of Defendant’s conduct amounted to discrimination under either Title VII or 

the ADA.

D. Conclusion

For the above reasons, I suggest that the Complaint should be sua sponte dismissed 

because it fails to state a basis for this Court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction and 

because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

III. REVIEW

Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[w]ithin 14 days after 

being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific 

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver 

of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155; Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 

(6th Cir. 1981). The parties are advised that making some objections, but failing to raise others, 

will not preserve all the objections a party may have to this Report and Recommendation. 

Willis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit 

Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). According to E.D. Mich. 

LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this magistrate judge.

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Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,” etc. Any 

objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it 

pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a 

concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in 

the objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule 

without awaiting the response.

Date: January 5, 2015 s/ PATRICIA T. MORRIS

Patricia T. Morris

United States Magistrate Judge

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