# C_2012025EN.01002502.xml

| 28.1.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 25/25 |
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28.1.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 25/25

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Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 10 October 2011 — UPC Nederland BV v Gemeente Hilversum

(Case C-518/11)

(2012/C 25/45)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Gerechtshof te Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: UPC Nederland BV

Defendant: Gemeente Hilversum

Questions referred

| 1. | Does a service consisting of the supply of free-to-air radio and television packages via cable, for the delivery of which both transmission costs and an amount relating to (charges for) payments made to broadcasters and copyright collecting societies in connection with the publication of their content are charged, fall within the scope of the new regulatory framework [for electronic communications networks]? |
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1.

Does a service consisting of the supply of free-to-air radio and television packages via cable, for the delivery of which both transmission costs and an amount relating to (charges for) payments made to broadcasters and copyright collecting societies in connection with the publication of their content are charged, fall within the scope of the new regulatory framework [for electronic communications networks]?

| 2. | (a) | Does the Municipality [of Hilversum], against the background of the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector and the objectives of the new regulatory framework, including a strict coordination and consultation process before a national regulatory authority acquires (exclusive) competence to intervene in retail tariffs by means of a measure such as price control, still have the power (task) to protect the general interest of its inhabitants by intervening in retail tariffs by means of a tariff-limiting clause? |
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2.

(a)

Does the Municipality [of Hilversum], against the background of the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector and the objectives of the new regulatory framework, including a strict coordination and consultation process before a national regulatory authority acquires (exclusive) competence to intervene in retail tariffs by means of a measure such as price control, still have the power (task) to protect the general interest of its inhabitants by intervening in retail tariffs by means of a tariff-limiting clause?

| (b) | If not, does the new regulatory framework preclude the Municipality from applying a tariff-limiting clause agreed in the context of the sale of its cable network operation? |
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(b)

If not, does the new regulatory framework preclude the Municipality from applying a tariff-limiting clause agreed in the context of the sale of its cable network operation?

| 3. | If Questions 2(a) and (b) are answered in the negative, the following question arises:
  Is a public authority, such as the Municipality, in a situation such as that at issue here, (still) bound by loyalty to the European Union (‘Union loyalty’) if, in entering into and then applying the tariff-limiting clause, it is not performing a public duty but is acting in the context of a private-law competence (see also Question 6(a))? |
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3.

If Questions 2(a) and (b) are answered in the negative, the following question arises:

Is a public authority, such as the Municipality, in a situation such as that at issue here, (still) bound by loyalty to the European Union (‘Union loyalty’) if, in entering into and then applying the tariff-limiting clause, it is not performing a public duty but is acting in the context of a private-law competence (see also Question 6(a))?

| 4. | If the new regulatory framework is applicable and the Municipality is bound by Union loyalty:






  (a) | Does the obligation of Union loyalty in conjunction with (the objectives of) the new regulatory framework, including a strict coordination and consultation process before a national regulatory authority can intervene in retail tariffs by means of a measure such as price control, preclude the Municipality from applying the tariff-limiting clause? |
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4.

If the new regulatory framework is applicable and the Municipality is bound by Union loyalty:

(a)

Does the obligation of Union loyalty in conjunction with (the objectives of) the new regulatory framework, including a strict coordination and consultation process before a national regulatory authority can intervene in retail tariffs by means of a measure such as price control, preclude the Municipality from applying the tariff-limiting clause?

| (b) | If not, is the answer to Question 4(a) different with regard to the period after the Commission, in its ‘letter of serious doubt’, expressed serious doubts about the compatibility of the price control proposed by [the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority] OPTA with the objectives of the new regulatory framework as set out in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, and OPTA consequently abandoned that measure? |
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(b)

If not, is the answer to Question 4(a) different with regard to the period after the Commission, in its ‘letter of serious doubt’, expressed serious doubts about the compatibility of the price control proposed by [the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority] OPTA with the objectives of the new regulatory framework as set out in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, and OPTA consequently abandoned that measure?

| 5. | (a) | Is Article 101 TFEU a provision relating to public policy, which means that the national court must apply that provision of its own motion beyond the ambit of the dispute within the meaning of Articles 24 and 25 of the Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure) (‘Rv’)? |
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5.

(a)

Is Article 101 TFEU a provision relating to public policy, which means that the national court must apply that provision of its own motion beyond the ambit of the dispute within the meaning of Articles 24 and 25 of the Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure) (‘Rv’)?

| (b) | If so, which of the facts that came to light during the proceedings would justify the national court proceeding of its own motion to examine the applicability of Article 101 TFEU? Is the national court bound to do so also if that examination might lead to the supplementation of facts within the meaning of Article 149 Rv, once the parties have been given an opportunity to comment? |
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(b)

If so, which of the facts that came to light during the proceedings would justify the national court proceeding of its own motion to examine the applicability of Article 101 TFEU? Is the national court bound to do so also if that examination might lead to the supplementation of facts within the meaning of Article 149 Rv, once the parties have been given an opportunity to comment?

| 6. | If Article 101 TFEU must be applied beyond the ambit of the dispute between the parties and having regard to (the objectives of) the new regulatory framework; the application thereof by OPTA and the European Commission; the alignment of concepts used in the new regulatory framework, such as significant market power and definition of the relevant markets, with similar concepts in European competition law, the following questions arise from the facts that have come to light during the proceedings:






  (a) | Is the Municipality, in its sale of its cable network operation and its agreement to the tariff-limiting clause in that context, to be regarded as an undertaking within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU (see also Question 3)? |
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6.

If Article 101 TFEU must be applied beyond the ambit of the dispute between the parties and having regard to (the objectives of) the new regulatory framework; the application thereof by OPTA and the European Commission; the alignment of concepts used in the new regulatory framework, such as significant market power and definition of the relevant markets, with similar concepts in European competition law, the following questions arise from the facts that have come to light during the proceedings:

(a)

Is the Municipality, in its sale of its cable network operation and its agreement to the tariff-limiting clause in that context, to be regarded as an undertaking within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU (see also Question 3)?

| (b) | Is the tariff-limiting clause to be regarded as a hardcore restriction for the purposes of Article 101(1)(a) TFEU and as defined in Commission Notice 2001/C 368/07 on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition [under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community] (de minimis) (1) (... point 11)? If so, is there thus an appreciable restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU? If not, is the answer affected by the circumstances mentioned in Question 6(d) (below)? |
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(b)

Is the tariff-limiting clause to be regarded as a hardcore restriction for the purposes of Article 101(1)(a) TFEU and as defined in Commission Notice 2001/C 368/07 on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition [under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community] (de minimis) (1) (... point 11)? If so, is there thus an appreciable restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU? If not, is the answer affected by the circumstances mentioned in Question 6(d) (below)?

| (c) | If the tariff-limiting clause is not a hardcore restriction, does it have an effect which restricts competition (purely) because:






  — | the Netherlands competition authority has ruled that UPC has not abused its dominant position by virtue of the (higher) tariffs it charged for performing the same services as the supply of the basic package via cable, in the same market; |
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(c)

If the tariff-limiting clause is not a hardcore restriction, does it have an effect which restricts competition (purely) because:

—

the Netherlands competition authority has ruled that UPC has not abused its dominant position by virtue of the (higher) tariffs it charged for performing the same services as the supply of the basic package via cable, in the same market;

| — | the Commission, in its letter of serious doubt, expressed serious doubts about the compatibility with the objectives set out in Article 8 of the Framework Directive of intervening (ex ante by means of price control) in retail tariffs for services such as UPC’s supply of the basic package via cable? Is the answer affected by the fact that OPTA abandoned the proposed price control as a result of the Commission’s letter? |
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the Commission, in its letter of serious doubt, expressed serious doubts about the compatibility with the objectives set out in Article 8 of the Framework Directive of intervening (ex ante by means of price control) in retail tariffs for services such as UPC’s supply of the basic package via cable? Is the answer affected by the fact that OPTA abandoned the proposed price control as a result of the Commission’s letter?

| (d) | Does the Agreement [on the future operation of the Hilversum cable network] containing the tariff-limiting clause appreciably restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU (also) taking into account that:






  — | under the new regulatory framework, UPC is considered to be an undertaking with significant market power (Commission Notice 2001/C 368/07, point 7); |
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(d)

Does the Agreement [on the future operation of the Hilversum cable network] containing the tariff-limiting clause appreciably restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU (also) taking into account that:

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under the new regulatory framework, UPC is considered to be an undertaking with significant market power (Commission Notice 2001/C 368/07, point 7);

| — | virtually all Netherlands municipalities which, during the 1990s, sold their cable network operations to cable operators including UPC, retained powers under those agreements with regard to the pricing of the basic package (Commission Notice 2001/C 368/07, point 8)? |
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virtually all Netherlands municipalities which, during the 1990s, sold their cable network operations to cable operators including UPC, retained powers under those agreements with regard to the pricing of the basic package (Commission Notice 2001/C 368/07, point 8)?

| (e) | Must the Agreement containing the tariff-limiting clause be regarded as (being capable of) having an appreciable effect on inter-State trade within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU and as further defined in the Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2004 C 101, p. 81), given that:






  — | under the new regulatory framework, UPC is considered to be an undertaking with significant market power; |
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(e)

Must the Agreement containing the tariff-limiting clause be regarded as (being capable of) having an appreciable effect on inter-State trade within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU and as further defined in the Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2004 C 101, p. 81), given that:

—

under the new regulatory framework, UPC is considered to be an undertaking with significant market power;

| — | OPTA has followed the European consultation procedure in order to take a price control measure in respect of services such as the supply of the basic package via cable by cable operators with significant market power such as UPC, a procedure which, under the new regulatory framework, must be followed if a proposed measure would affect trade between Member States; |
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OPTA has followed the European consultation procedure in order to take a price control measure in respect of services such as the supply of the basic package via cable by cable operators with significant market power such as UPC, a procedure which, under the new regulatory framework, must be followed if a proposed measure would affect trade between Member States;

| — | the Agreement at that time represented a value of NLG 51 million (over EUR 23 million); |
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the Agreement at that time represented a value of NLG 51 million (over EUR 23 million);

| — | virtually all Netherlands municipalities which, during the 1990s, sold their cable network operations to cable operators including UPC, retained powers under those agreements with regard to the pricing of the basic package? |
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virtually all Netherlands municipalities which, during the 1990s, sold their cable network operations to cable operators including UPC, retained powers under those agreements with regard to the pricing of the basic package?

| 7. | Does the national court still have the power under Article 101(3) TFEU to declare a prohibition under Article 101(1) TFEU inapplicable in respect of the tariff-limiting clause, in the light of the new regulatory framework and the Commission’s serious doubts in its letter of serious doubt about the compatibility with the objectives of competition law of (ex ante) intervention in retail tariffs? Is the answer affected by the fact that OPTA abandoned the proposed price control as a result of the Commission’s letter? |
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7.

Does the national court still have the power under Article 101(3) TFEU to declare a prohibition under Article 101(1) TFEU inapplicable in respect of the tariff-limiting clause, in the light of the new regulatory framework and the Commission’s serious doubts in its letter of serious doubt about the compatibility with the objectives of competition law of (ex ante) intervention in retail tariffs? Is the answer affected by the fact that OPTA abandoned the proposed price control as a result of the Commission’s letter?

| 8. | Does the European penalty of invalidity under Article 101(2) TFEU allow for some latitude in respect of its effects in terms of time having regard to the circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement (the beginning of the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector) and later developments in the telecommunications sector, including the entry into force of the new regulatory framework and the consequent serious objections expressed by the Commission against the introduction of price control? |
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8.

Does the European penalty of invalidity under Article 101(2) TFEU allow for some latitude in respect of its effects in terms of time having regard to the circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement (the beginning of the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector) and later developments in the telecommunications sector, including the entry into force of the new regulatory framework and the consequent serious objections expressed by the Commission against the introduction of price control?

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(1)  OJ 2001 C 368, p. 13.

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