AGENDA DOCUMENT NO. 09-72 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463	 1~~q Gel \l\ P \2.: S1 

October 14, 2009 

MEMORANDUM AGENDA ITEM 

The Commission For Meeting of: 11- () 6-, 09 

FROM:	 Thomasenia P. DuncaifPD 

General Counsel 

Christopher Hughey fC

Deputy General Counsel II) 

Lawrence L Calvert AI 
 Associate General Cou~\
 General Law and Advice
 

Nicole St. Louis Matthis ,f\.W'
 

Assistant General Counsel,
 

Administrative Law
 

William F. Buckley H:B
 

Attorney
 

Eyana J. Smith )~(\ ~,
 Attorney ,}or V-I
 

Sally R. Bacon f)1I-~
 Law Clerk
 

Placing First General Counsel's Reports on the Public Record 

The Office of General Counsel ("OGC") has reconsidered the fairly recent practice of not 

placing First General Counsel's Reports on the public record and recommends that the 

Commission return to the prior practice of disclosing First General Counsel's Reports at the 

conclusion of an enforcement matter, provided that the Commission reserves the right to make 

appropriate redactions to these documents, or, in appropriate cases, to withhold them altogether. 

The current practice is rooted in concerns regarding the deliberative process privilege and 

in considerations regarding the difference between a General Counsel's Report, which is the 

General Counsel's document, and a Factual and Legal Analysis ("F&LA"), which, once 
Memorandum to the Commission 

First General Counsel's Reports and the Public Record 

Page 2 

approved, is the Commission's document. This memorandum provides historical background 

regarding the Commission's past disclosure practices and legal background regarding the 

deliberative process privilege. It then explains why we believe as a general matter the 

Commission should place First General Counsel's Reports on the public record while reserving 

the right to withhold or redact when appropriate. The memorandum then proceeds to identify 

some of the potential harms in returning to the prior practice and explains how we believe those 

potential harms may be adequately addressed. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Disclosure Policy History in General and the Deliberative Process Privilege 

For approximately the first 25 years of its existence, the Commission placed on the public 

record, at the close of an enforcement matter, all materials considered by the Commissioners in 

their disposition of a case, except for those materials prohibited from disclosure by the Federal 

Election Campaign Act ("FECA" or "the Act") or, in most instances, those exempt from 

disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). See Statement ofPolicy Regarding 

Disclosure ofClosed Enforcement or Related Files, 68 Fed. Reg. 70423 (Dec. 20, 2003) 

("Interim Disclosure Policy" or "IDP"). We say "most instances" because in practice the 

Commission disclosed virtually all General Counsel's Reports, even if those reports were exempt 

from disclosure as predecisional materials under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) ("Exemption 5"). 

Exemption 5 exempts from disclosure, among other things, "inter-agency or intra-agency 

memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in 

litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). This provision has been interpreted 

effectively to incorporate into FOIA's exemptions from disclosure all of the recognized litigation 

privileges. One of these privileges that is important in the context of Federal agencies is the 

"predecisional" or "deliberative process" privilege. This privilege shields from disclosure 

"predecisional" intra-agency documents in recognition of the fact that disclosure of such 

materials "would injure the consultative process within the government," United States v. Exxon 

Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 636 (D.D.C. 1980), and "represent an extraordinary intrusion into the 

realm of the agency." San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Comm 'n, 

789 F.2d 26, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 

However, not every document submitted by a government subordinate to a government 

superior is subject to the privilege. Staff documents that are either incorporated in a final agency 

decision or represent the only record of the reasons for that decision or the facts underlying the 

decision essentially lose their predecisional character when the agency makes the decision for 

which they provide the basis. Within the context of Commission decisions, the Supreme Court 

itself recognized a very similar principle when it looked to the General Counsel's Report to 

provide the legal basis for the Commission's dismissal of a complaint in DSCC v. FEC, 454 U.S. 

27,39 n. 19 (1981). Most of the General Counsel's Reports placed on the public record through 

most of the Commission's history contained recommendations adopted by the Commission, and 
Memorandum to the Commission 

First General Counsel's Reports and the Public Record 

Page 3 

in the absence of any other written record, became "post-decisional" documents not subject to 

the deliberative process privilege. 

Nevertheless, the Commission also released General Counsel's Reports in instances 

where the Commission did not accept, or was divided on the General Counsel's 

recommendation. Indeed, in the very first case in which a court required the Commission to 

produce a Statement of Reasons, one of the reasons it did so was because the released report did 

not "suffice[] to show the Commission's reasoning" where the Commission had followed neither 

the General Counsel's recommendation nor his reasoning. Common Cause v. FEC. 676 F. Supp. 

286,291 (D.D.C. 1986). 

Between the decision of the District Court in AFL-CIO v. FEC, 177 F.Supp.2d 48 

(D.D.C. 200 1), and the adoption of the IDP in response to the Court of Appeals decision in the 

same case, the Commission placed on the public record only those documents that reflected the 

very final action in an enforcement matter and the reasons for that action. Even then, however, 

the Commission would, from time to time, place on the public record General Counsel's Reports, 

including First General Counsel's Reports, when those documents reflected the rationales for the 

Commission's dispositive actions. 

After the Court of Appeals decision in the AFL-CIO case, the Commission adopted the 

December 2003 IDP, in which it said it would place on the public record, among other things, 

"General Counsel's Reports that recommend dismissal, reason to believe, no reason to believe, 

no action at this time, probable cause to believe, no probable cause to believe, no further action, 

or acceptance of a conciliation agreement[.]" IDP at 70,424. Although the IDP did not address 

First General Counsel's Reports specifically, all First General Counsel's Reports are covered, 

because all such reports will contain a recommendation of dismissal, reason to believe, or no 

reason to believe. Moreover, the Commission returned to its practice of placing General 

Counsel's Reports, including First General Counsel's Reports, on the public record even where 

the Commission rejected the General Counsel's recommendations or reasoning. 

B. Change in Practice Concerning First General Counsel's Reports 

In 2006, the Commission reconsidered its practice of placing First General Counsel's 

Reports on the public record after a case arose in which the Commission adopted a 

recommendation offered by OGC in a General Counsel's Report, but rejected one of the several 

underlying rationales for the recommendation. After considering a number of court cases 

applying Exemption 5, we determined that there was some doubt as to whether the portion of the 

General Counsel's Report with which the Commission agreed could be placed on the public 

record while the portion with which the Commission disagreed could be redacted. Accordingly, 

we concluded that the safest action would be for OGC to prepare, and the Commission to adopt, 

special F&LAs so that the General Counsel's Report could be withheld from the public record in 

its entirety. 

After the matter in question was released to the public record, OGC considered what 

changes to make in both the Enforcement and General Law and Advice Divisions practice in 
Memorandum to the Commission 

First General Counsel's Reports and the Public Record 

Page 4 

order to avoid creating situations in which predecisional material that it would be advisable not 

to disclose would nonetheless have to be disclosed. Although the case referred to above did not 

involve a First General Counsel's Report, we acted first with respect to those reports not only 

because a solution seemed straightforward and relatively uncomplicated for those reports, but 

because at the time OGC and Commissioners perceived benefits to placing Commission-adopted 

F&LAs on the public record in lieu of First General Counsel's Reports. 

Under Enforcement practice prior to January 2007, F&LAs were prepared only in those 

matters in which the General Counsel recommended that the Commission find reason to believe 

("RTB"). See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2). In matters where the recommendation was dismissal or no 

reason to believe, no F&LAs were prepared, and the First General Counsel's Report (assuming 

its recommendations were adopted) stood as the rationale for the Commission's action. As we 

considered the issue in late 2006 and early 2007, it seemed that if the Commission approved 

F&LAs in cases in which it dismissed matters or found no reason to believe, as well as in RTB 

cases, those documents would always serve as Commission-approved rationales, and First 

General Counsel's Reports could be withheld from the public record as predecisional in each 

case. The theory was that this practice would: 1) avoid troublesome redaction issues; 2) 

emphasize to the public the position ofthe Commission, as reflected in the Commissionapproved F&LAs; 3) allow for more candid analysis on the part of the General Counsel; and 4) 

allow the Commission to feel less reluctant about disagreeing with the General Counsel. While 

never adopted by formal vote, Commissioners acknowledged the benefits of the practice and 

agreed to adopt it. Accordingly, OGC began recommending the approval ofF&LAs in all cases, 

not just those with RTB recommendations, in January 2007, and from that point forward, First 

General Counsel's Reports were withheld from the public record in new enforcement matters. 

No similar approach was developed for other General Counsel's Reports, however. 

Unlike with First General Counsel's Reports, no document similar to the F&LA is routinely 

proposed for Commission approval at subsequent stages of an enforcement matter. Accordingly, 

we continued to place subsequent reports on the public record. 

After more than two years of this practice with respect to First General Counsel's 

Reports, we have examined and evaluated our experience with it. Based on that examination, we 

recommend that the Commission return to its prior practice. Withholding all First General 

Counsel's Reports from the public record was both an overbroad and an insufficient solution to 

the issues we perceived in cases where the Commission adopted OGC's recommendations while 

rejecting its rationales. The policy was overbroad in that most First General Counsel's Reports 

do not present that particular scenario, and it was underinclusive in that it only dealt with a 

portion of the reports in which that problem could arise. 

Part II of this memorandum explores the policy reasons for returning to the prior practice, 

the policy costs of doing so, and concludes that the benefits ofreturning to the prior practice 

outweigh the costs. Part III examines situations where a policy of general release of First 

General Counsel's Reports could pose specific problems, and describes how we believe those 

problems may be surmounted. 
Memorandum to the Commission 

First General Counsel's Reports and the Public Record 

Page 5 

II. DISCUSSION 

For a number of reasons, we believe a return to the prior practice is advisable. 

A. Transparency Considerations 

First and foremost, the release of First General Counsel's Reports, like the release of 

other reports, promotes transparency - about both the Commission's own operations and the 

actions of the political actors who are respondents in enforcement matters. 

Virtually since its inception the Commission's policy has been to make "the fullest 

possible disclosure of records to the public, consistent with the rights of individuals to privacy, 

the rights of persons contracting with the Commission with respect to trade secrets and 

commercial or financial information entitled to confidential treatment, and the need for the 

Commission to promote free internal policy deliberations and to pursue its official activities 

without undue disruption." 11 C.F.R. § 5.2. 

Placing closed enforcement files on the public record also "accords with the general 

policy favoring disclosure of administrative agency proceedings." FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 

279, 293 (1965). "In FOIA, after all, a new conception of Government conduct was enacted into 

law, a general philosophy of full agency disclosure." Dep't. ofthe Interior v. Klamath Water 

Users Protective Ass 'n., 532 US 1, 16 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). As with 

the full disclosure policy Congress enacted in the FECA itself, "Congress believed that this 

[FOIA] philosophy, put into practice, would help "ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the 

functioning of a democratic society." Id. (citations omitted). 

Furthermore, public confidence in the Commission's performance of its enforcement 

responsibilities is essential to FECA's goal of preserving public faith in our democratic electoral 

system. By making closed investigative files public, the Commission enables the public to 

review how effectively the campaign finance laws are being enforced to protect the integrity of 

the electoral system and to reassure themselves that the administration of those laws is being 

conducted in a fair, consistent, and nonpartisan manner. 

Disclosure of appropriate General Counsel's Reports also gives the public, and especially 

campaign finance practitioners, the opportunity to observe and adapt to the complete 

development of the law. Complaints and responses go on the public record, and those 

documents will frequently contain legal arguments. The General Counsel will find some 

arguments in those documents persuasive, and some not. The Commission will likewise find 

some of the General Counsel's arguments persuasive, and some not. Commissioners may also 

find unpersuasive arguments that carried the day before the Commission at an earlier time when 

there were other Commissioners. This process is how the law develops. Releasing the 

documents that demonstrate how the law develops promotes accountability by allowing the 

public to decide for itself whether it finds persuasive the same points the Commission finds 
Memorandum to the Commission 

First General Counsel's Reports and the Public Record 

Page 6 

persuasive. In addition, making these documents available to the public promotes compliance by 

giving practitioners the fullest possible education about how the Commission arrived at the 

outcomes of particular cases. We believe practitioners will find General Counsel's Reports 

helpful for the same reasons that there is now a demand not merely for the online reported 

decisions of courts, but for online copies of litigants' briefs. 

Disclosure of First General Counsel's Reports is particularly desirable because for many 

cases, the First General Counsel's Report is also the only General Counsel's Report. From the 

beginning of Fiscal Year 2009 through June 11,2009, OGC sent to the Commission 81 First 

General Counsel's Reports, and 56 cases closed at the First General Counsel's Report stage 

during that time. Fiscal Year 2008, in which the Commission lacked a quorum for six months, 

does not produce a good comparison; but in Fiscal Year 2007, 101 First General Counsel's 

Reports were sent to the Commission, and 58 cases closed at the First General Counsel's Report 

stage. Because a significant proportion of cases close at the First General Counsel's Report 

stage, disclosure ofthose reports is particularly important to fuller public understanding of those 

cases specifically and the Commission's enforcement practice in general. 

B. Other Considerations In Favor of Release 

Disclosing First General Counsel's Reports will ameliorate the confusion that can result 

in cases where a Statement of Reasons is required but is not ready when the rest of the case tile is 

released. In these cases, the public would benefit from disclosure ofthe First General Counsel's 

Report because, in the absence of the Statement of Reasons, the public record would have little 

explanation of the case aside from those arguments made in the complaint and response. While 

only a Statement or Statements ofReasons can explain the rationales for the Commission's (or 

the controlling group's) action, disclosing the First General Counsel's Report would give the 

public an early opportunity at least to read the facts and understand the issues, pending release of 

the Statement of Reasons. 

Moreover, through nearly three decades of practice - from 1975 to 2001, and again from 

December 2003 through December 2006 - disclosure of First General Counsel's Reports posed 

only limited problems in the relatively few cases litigated under 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8). Where 

the General Counsel's recommendation is not adopted by the Commission, it is the majority (or 

the control group's) Statement ofReasons that is the proper subject of review by the court in a 

case brought under Section 437g(a)(8); the General Counsel's Report is entitled to no deference. 

The court reviews whether the dismissal of the matter was contrary to law or arbitrary and 

capricious. DCCC v. FEC, 645 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1986). Thus, by definition the existence or 

more than one reasonable analysis of the case provides no reason for the court to find for an a(8) 

plaintiff. As long as the Commission's, or the control group's, rationale is reasonable it will 

survive review under this standard. As for offensive litigation pursuant to 2 U.S.c. § 437g(a)(6), 

no part of the enforcement file is released to the public until the entire enforcement matterincluding any offensive litigation - is concluded. The ultimate release of a First General 

Counsel's Report after offensive litigation should not affect the positions of the parties durillg 

that litigation. 
Memorandum to the Commission 

First General Counsel's Reports and the Public Record 

Page 7 

C. Policy Costs of Returning to Past Practice 

Returning to the past practice with respect to placing First General Counsel's Repolts on 

the public record is not without its costs. As noted above, the reasons for changing the prior 

practice in the first place included the perceived benefits of emphasizing on the public record 

F&LAs, which are Commission-approved documents, instead of First General Counsel's 

Reports, which are not. It was also thought that removing First General Counsel's Reports from 

the public record would enhance OGC's ability to be candid in its recommendations, analysis 

and written advocacy, and would diminish any reluctance Commissioners might have to disagree 

with the General Counsel's analysis that stemmed from the knowledge that analysis would 

eventually be publicly released. 

Moreover, although as noted above, "the arbitrary and capricious" standard should 

protect any reasonable rationale articulated in a Statement ofReasons, plaintiffs in 437g( a)( 8) 

cases will likely try to tum into whatever benefit they can the knowledge that the Commission's 

own counsel recommended going forward on their administrative complaints. Even if these 

arguments are uniformly unsuccessful, release of the First General Counsel's Reports may mean 

that our litigators have to expend resources meeting these arguments in instances where they 

otherwise might not have been raised. For example, in one case in the early 1990s, a district 

court held, inter alia, that the rationale of a controlling group of Commissioners "was not 

mandated by prior FEC precedent, was affected by a 3-3 tie vote and was contrary to the 

recommendation of the FEC General Counsel." Common Cause v. FEC, 720 F. Supp. at 152. 

While this holding was implicitly overturned later in NRSC v. FEC, 966 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 

1992), and while the district court judge should have given no weight to the General Counsel's 

position, he nevertheless seemed to do so. I 

Nevertheless, in our view the benefits in increased transparency of the Commission's 

enforcement operations outweigh these costs or potential costs, for the reasons stated herein. 

Although the disclosure of First General Counsel's Reports posed few apparent litigation 

problems in the past, there are a number of situations in which it would be advisable to invoke 

the deliberative process privilege or other FOIA exemptions to keep some or all of a First 

General Counsel's Report off the public record. We tum now to some of those scenarios and 

explain how we would propose to deal with them. 

The related Common Cause and NRSC cases had an unusual procedural history. Common Cause filed an 

administrative complaint alleging that the National Republican Senatorial Committee violated the Act. The 

Commission found probable cause and ultimately conciliated with NRSC regarding some violations, but split 3-3 as 

to another. Common Cause filed suit under 2 U.S.c. § 437g(a)(8) with respect to the violation on which the 

Commission split, and it was successful in the District Court. The Commission then split 3-3 on whether to appeal 

that decision. Unable to agree to appeal, the Commission then voted 6-0 to accept the remand. On remand, the 

Commission found probable cause that the NRSC violated the Act with respect to the remaining violation, and \vhen 

post-probable cause conciliation was unsuccessful it sued the NRSC. The same district court judge found for the 

Commission in the 437g(a)(6) enforcement litigation. The NRSC appealed that decision. Rather than reaching the 

merits of the appeal in the enforcement action, the Court of Appeals held that the district court's decision in the 

original 437g(a)(8) suit was erroneous. 
Memorandum to the Commission 

First General Counsel's Reports and the Public Record 

Page 8 

III. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS 

A.	 Commission Agreement Witb Tbe General Counsel's Recommendations 

But Not Her Reasoning 

1. First General Counsel's Reports 

As noted, we recommend that the Commission return to a general practice of releasing 

First General Counsel's Reports, even where the recommendations in the report are not adopted 

by the Commission. However, the one part of the January 2007 change in practice that we would 

propose to retain is preparing, and recommending that the Commission approve, F&LAs in all 

enforcement matters - not merely those in which the General Counsel recommends reason to 

believe. By retaining the practice of preparing F&LAs in all cases, the Commission can easily 

deal with any instances in which a majority agrees with the First General Counsel's Report's 

recommendation but not its rationale. In any such instance, the Commission would express its 

position simply by amending the proposed F&LAs (or by directing that OGC circulate revised 

ones). At the end of the case both the First General Counsel's Report and the Commissionapproved F&LA would go on the public record. 

2. Second and Subsequent General Counsel's Reports 

We recommend that the Commission follow a similar procedure where the Commission 

agrees with the General Counsel's recommendation but not the rationale of a second or 

subsequent General Counsel's Report. The Commission does not generally approve F&LAs in 

association with these reports unless they contain additional RTB findings. Moreover, our 

research has confirmed that we may redact as predecisional any portion of a General Counsel's 

Report that reflects reasoning not adopted by the Commission. However, we believe that in 

virtually all instances where the Commission adopts the General Counsel's recommendation on 

different reasoning, a better practice would be for the Commission to release the predecisional 

portion of the General Counsel's Report along with a "special" F&LA that explains the 

Commission's rationale? 

B.	 Otber Scenarios 

On occasion since January 2007, in light of the policy of not putting First General 

Counsel's Reports on the public record, we have included in First General Counsel's Reports 

information that has not been included in the F&LAs. 

For example, in a closed MUR where the Commission found no reason to believe that a 

loan was a contribution from a bank to a candidate, the First General Counsel's Report included 

specific information provided by the bank about the circumstances of the particular loan. The 

Of course, this analysis applies only to reports that would be released to the public record in the first place 

under the Interim Disclosure Policy. 
Memorandum to the Commission 

First General Counsel's Reports and the Public Record 

Page 9 

bank requested that the information not be made public; accordingly, the F&LA summarized and 

paraphrased this information but did not provide the detail that was in the First General 

Counsel's Report. Had the First General Counsel's Report been released to the public record. 

the specific infomlation would have been exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 4, 

which covers trade secrets and other confidential business information. Thus, we could have 

redacted these references. 

In other cases, we have identified certain witnesses in the First General Counsel's 

Reports but have been reluctant to do so in the F&LAs, which are provided to respondents, 

because of concems raised by those witnesses about potential retaliation against them if they 

were known to have cooperated with a Commission investigation. We have recognized - and 

candidly stated to the witness if asked - that depending on the circumstances of the particular 

case we might or might not be able to avoid disclosing their identity in response to a FOIA 

request once the matter is closed. However, FOIA Exemptions 6 (generally) and 7(C) (in the law 

enforcement context) permit agencies to withhold information the release of which would 

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and Exemption 7(D) permits agencies to 

withhold the names of confidential law enforcement informants under certain circumstances. 

When confronted with a similar situation, we would retum to the pre-2007 practice ofredacting 

witness names from publicly released First General Counsel's Reports if necessary, and asserting 

such FOIA exemptions as may be applicable in the event of a subsequent FOIA request. 

We believe that in most instances, if sensitive information is included in a First General 

Counsel's Report for the Commission's information only, that information can be redacted from 

the report under one of the FOIA exemptions. 

Moreover, we would continue to make routine redactions to released First General 

Counsel's Reports as we do to other General Counsel's Reports based on the FECA and the 

FOIA. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We recommend that the Commission retum to the general practice of placing First 

General Counsel's Reports on the public record. This recommendation covers both instances in 

which the recommendations in the First General Counsel's Report are adopted and instances in 

which they are not. It should be understood that to the extent these documents are predecisional, 

release under this practice would constitute a discretionary disclosure under FOIA. Thus, the 

Commission should continue to reserve the right to redact or withhold information that is exempt 

from disclosure under the FECA and the FOIA. In the ordinary case we would make such 

redactions to the First General Counsel's Report as are appropriate, which we do now with all 

documents that go on the public record. 

In extraordinary cases, we recommend withholding First General Counsel's Reports 

entirely. The circumstances where we recommend withholding a First General Counsel's Rep0l1 

are more appropriate for discussion in an Executive Session given that the premature disclosure 
Memorandum to the Commission 

First General Counsel's Reports and the Public Record 

Page 10 

of such information is likely to have an adverse effect on future Commission action. Thus, our 

discussion of this topic and our formal recommendation about it are included in a supplement to 

this memorandum that we have circulated for discussion in an Executive Session. 

We also recommend that the Commission place on the public record, subject to 

appropriate redaction, First General Counsel's Reports that had been withheld since January 

2007 pursuant to the practice that began then. The Commission should be advised that after 

adoption of the IDP, we did not retroactively place on the public record materials that had been 

withheld during the "AFL" period between 2001 and 2003 - a roughly comparable period of 

time to that between January 2007 and the present. However, in that instance, our practice 

between 2001 and 2003 had been mandated by a court, rather than being the result of a purely 

internal decision. Moreover, closeout letters had informed complainants and respondents in 

MURs closing during that period that only dispositive documents would be released to the public 

record; no similar consideration exists here. Finally, because only dispositive documents were 

placed on the public record between 2001 and 2003, the volume of documents that the 

Commission would have had to restore to the public record to be consistent with the IDP would 

have been larger than the volume of First General Counsel's Reports here. 

Where a FOIA request or appeal seeks a General Counsel's Report or accompanying 

F&LA that has not yet been restored to the public record, we would intend to release those 

documents, subject to appropriate redaction. Where a question arises as to whether to include 

such a document in an administrative record lodged with a court in defensive litigation, we 

would intend to include the document in the record unless there was an important litigationrelated reason not to do so. 

v.	 RECOMMENDATIONS 

1.	 Resume the practice of placing First General Counsel's Reports on the public record in 

closed enforcement matters provided that the Commission reserves the right to redact 

portions of such documents consistent with the Federal Election Campaign Act and the 

Freedom of Information Act in appropriate instances. 

2.	 Direct the Office of General Counsel to place on the public record, after appropriate 

review and redaction, First General Counsel's Reports that have been withheld since 

January 2007.