UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

_______________________________

 

PATRICIA BOUCHER, on behalf of herself

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DYNIA & ASSOCIATES, LLC, an Illinois 

Limited Liability Company; ALFRED S. 

DYNIA, Individually and in his Official 

Capacity on behalf of DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES, LLC; ANTHONY CREWS, 

Individually and in his Official Capacity on 

behalf of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES, LLC; 

GREG NEELY, Individually and in his Official 

Capacity on behalf of DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES, LLC; MICHAEL PROWICZ, 

Individually and in his Official Capacity on 

behalf of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES, LLC; 

TERRENCE FOGARTY, Individually and in 

his Official Capacity on behalf of DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES, LLC; AHMAD MERRITT, 

Individually and in his Official Capacity on 

behalf of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES, LLC; 

SECOND ROUND LP, a Texas Limited 

Liability Company; and, JOHN AND JANE 

DOES NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 25, 

Defendants.

/

Case No.: __________________

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Patricia Boucher (“Plaintiff” or “BOUCHER”), on behalf of 

herself and all others similarly situated, and by way of this Class Action Complaint against the 

Defendants, says:

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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, and demanding a trial 

by jury, brings this action for the illegal practices of the Defendants DYNIA & ASSOCIATES, 

LLC (“DYNIA & ASSOCIATES”), ALFRED S. DYNIA (“DYNIA”), ANTHONY CREWS 

(“CREWS”), GREG NEELY (“NEELY”), MICHAEL PROWICZ (“PROWICZ”), TERRENCE

FOGARTY (“FOGARTY”), AHMAD MERRITT (“MERRITT”), SECOND ROUND, LP

(“SECOND ROUND”), and JOHN AND JANE DOES numbers 1 through 25 (collectively 

referred to hereinafter as “Defendants”) who, inter alia, used false, deceptive, misleading, 

unconscionable, and other illegal practices, in connection with their attempts to collect an alleged 

debt from the Plaintiff and others. 

2. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ collection practices violate the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”) and the Texas Debt Collection 

Practices Act, Tex. Fin. Code §§ 392, et seq. (“TDCPA”).

3. Such violative collection practices include, inter alia, sending consumers written 

communications that:

(a) make false, deceptive, and misleading representations that Defendants are 

allowed and permitted by law to collect a credit card processing fee for 

credit card payments; 

(b) Collecting and attempting to collect interest and other amounts that are not 

permitted by law or contract to be collected;

(c) fail to state the amount of the consumer’s debt; and 

(d) fail to identify the creditor of the consumer’s debt.

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4. The FDCPA regulates the behavior of collection agencies attempting to collect a 

debt on behalf of another. The United States Congress has found abundant evidence of the use of 

abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors, and has 

determined that abusive debt collection practices contribute to a number of personal bankruptcies, 

marital instability, loss of jobs, and invasions of individual privacy. Congress enacted the FDCPA 

to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to ensure that those debt collectors 

who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and 

to promote uniform State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. 15 U.S.C. § 

1692(a) - (e). 

5. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute, which provides for actual or statutory 

damages upon the showing of one violation. The Sixth Circuit has held that whether a debt 

collector’s conduct violates the FDCPA should be judged from the standpoint of the “least 

sophisticated consumer.” Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 2006).

This standard ensures “that the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.” 

Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC., 518 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2008).

6. The FDCPA applies to lawyers regularly engaged in consumer debt-collection 

litigation. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995); Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1173-74

(6th Cir. 1999); See also Kistner, 518 F.3d 433 (the law firm’s owner may also be individually 

liable).

7. To prohibit deceptive practices, the FDCPA, at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, outlaws the use 

of false, deceptive, and misleading collection letters and names a non-exhaustive list of certain per 

se violations of false and deceptive collection conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (1)-(16). Among these 

per se violations prohibited by that section are: false representations concerning the character, 

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amount, or legal status of any debt, 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A); and the use of any false representation 

or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a 

consumer, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 

8. To prohibit unconscionable and unfair practices, the FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, 

outlaws the use of unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt and 

names a non-exhaustive list of certain per se violations of unconscionable and unfair collection 

conduct. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f (1)-(8). Included among the per se violations prohibited in this section 

are the collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the 

principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly permitted by law, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (1).

9. The TDCPA, like the FDCPA, prohibits debt collectors from using deceptive, 

coercive, threatening, abusive, and other repugnant practices for the purpose of collecting a 

consumer debt. Cushman v. GC Services, L.P., 397 Fed. Appx. 24 (5th Cir. 2010)

10. The Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks statutory 

damages, attorney fees, costs, and all other relief, equitable or legal in nature, as deemed 

appropriate by this Court, pursuant to the FDCPA, TDCPA, and all other common law or statutory 

regimes.

11. This case involves an obligation, or an alleged obligation, primarily for personal, 

family, or household purposes, and arising from a transaction or alleged transaction. As such, this 

action arises out of “consumer debt” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(2)

II. PARTIES

12. Plaintiff is a natural person.

13. At all times relevant to this complaint, Plaintiff resided in the City of Livonia, 

County of Wayne, State of Michigan. 

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14. At all times relevant to this complaint, DYNIA & ASSOCIATES is law firm, which 

exists as a for-profit Limited Liability Company pursuant to the laws of the State of Illinois. 

15. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, DYNIA & ASSOCIATES maintains its 

principal business address at 1400 East Touhy Avenue, Suite G2, City of Des Plaines, Cook 

County, Illinois.

16. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that DYNIA is a natural 

person who resides in City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois.

17. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that CREWS is a 

natural person who resides in City of Naperville, DuPage County, Illinois.

18. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that NEELY is a natural 

person who resides in Village of Hainesville, Lake County, Illinois.

19. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that PROWICZ is a 

natural person who resides in Village of Hampshire, Kane County, Illinois.

20. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that FOGARTY is a 

natural person who resides in Village of Palos Park, Cook County, Illinois.

21. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that MERRITT is a 

natural person who resides in Village of Lake Bluff, Lake County, Illinois.

22. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, SECOND ROUND is a Limited Liability 

Company existing pursuant to the laws of the State of Texas.

23. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that at all times relevant 

to this lawsuit SECOND ROUND maintains its principal place of business at 817 The High Road, 

City of Austin, Travis County, Texas. 

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24. Defendants, JOHN AND JANE DOES NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 25, are sued 

under fictitious names as their true names and capacities are yet unknown to Plaintiff. Plaintiff will 

amend this complaint by inserting the true names and capacities of these DOE defendants once 

they are ascertained.

25. The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants, 

JOHN AND JANE DOES NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 25, are natural persons and/or business 

entities all of whom reside or are located within the United States who personally created, instituted 

and, with knowledge that such practices were contrary to law, acted consistent with, oversaw, and 

engaged in the illegal policies and procedures used by employees of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES 

and SECOND ROUND that are the subject of this complaint. Those Defendants personally control 

the illegal acts, policies, and practices utilized by DYNIA & ASSOCIATES and SECOND 

ROUND and, therefore, are personally liable for all of the wrongdoing alleged in this Complaint.

III. JURISDICTION & VENUE

26. Jurisdiction arises under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (d) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337. 

27. Supplemental jurisdiction for Plaintiff’s state law claims arise under 28 U.S.C. § 

1367. 

28. Declaratory relief is available pursuant to under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202.

29. Venue is appropriate in this federal district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because 

a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred within this federal judicial 

district, and because each of the Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of 

Michigan at the time this action is commenced.

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IV. FACTS CONCERNING PLAINTIFF

30. Sometime prior to June 30, 2014, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation 

to Synchrony Bank fka GE Capital Retail Bank (“Synchrony Obligation”).

31. The Synchrony Obligation arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, 

insurance, or services are the subject of the transaction that are primarily for personal, family, or 

household purposes.

32. At some point after Plaintiff’s alleged default, the original creditor of the Synchrony

Obligation determined that the debt was uncollectable, and therefore decided to “charge-off” the 

debt. 

33. Creditors charge-off debts in accordance with federal regulations that permit the 

creditor to remove the debt from their financial records. See Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical 

Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 707, 713-14 (2008) (“a credit card 

account is characterized as a ‘charge-off’ account (or worthless account for taxable purposes) when 

no payment has been received for 180 days.”). These charged-off accounts are treated as a loss 

and the creditor receives a tax deduction under the Internal Revenue Code.

34. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that after concluding 

that the Synchrony Obligation was in default, Synchrony charged-off the Synchrony Obligation

and, together with hundreds or thousands of other charged-off open-ended consumer credit 

accounts, sold the Synchrony Obligation, an unknown purchaser of defaulted consumer debts for 

pennies on the dollar.

35. Defendants contend that the Synchrony Obligation is in default.

36. The alleged Synchrony Obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5).

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37. The alleged Synchrony Obligation is a “consumer debt” as defined by Tex. Fin. 

Code § 392.001(2).

38. Plaintiff is, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, a “consumer” as that term is defined 

by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 

39. Plaintiff is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “consumer” as that term is 

defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(1).

40. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that sometime prior to 

June 30, 2014, an unknown subsequent creditor of the Synchrony Obligation either directly or 

through intermediate transactions, assigned, placed, or transferred the debt to an unknown 

purchaser of defaulted debt, but not to SECOND ROUND.

41. According to its website, SECOND ROUND markets itself as “a receivables 

management firm serving businesses of all types nationwide.”

42. According to its website, SECOND ROUND markets itself as providing “the most 

efficient and effective recovery engine for charged-off accounts in the industry” and that it 

“understand[s] our clients’ markets and challenges and will always treat their customers with the 

utmost respect during the recovery process.” (Emphasis added).

43. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that SECOND ROUND 

does not purchase debts itself, but rather it is a servicer of defaulted consumer debts that are owned 

by third-party debt purchasing entities who hire SECOND ROUND to collect debt. 

44. SECOND ROUND collects, and attempts to collect, defaulted debts incurred, or 

alleged to have been incurred, for personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of itself and 

other debt buyers using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and Internet.

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45. SECOND ROUND is, at all times relevant to this complaint, engaged in the act 

and/or practice of “debt collection” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(5).

46. SECOND ROUND is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “debt collector” as 

defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

47. SECOND ROUND is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “debt collector” as 

that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(6). 

48. SECOND ROUND is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “third-party debt 

collector” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(7).

49. SECOND ROUND is not a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4).

50. SECOND ROUND is not a “creditor” as defined by Tex. Finance Code § 392.001 

(3).

51. In connection with its debt servicing operations, SECOND ROUND routinely hires 

other debt collection companies and law firms, such as DYNIA & ASSOCIATES, to send dunning 

written communications to consumers in the State of Michigan and elsewhere in an effort to collect 

money on the defaulted debts it acquires.

52. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that sometime prior to 

June 30, 2014, and within the one year period immediately preceding the filing of this action, 

SECOND ROUND either directly or through intermediate transactions assigned, placed, or 

transferred the Synchrony Obligation to DYNIA & ASSOCIATES for collection.

53. DYNIA & ASSOCIATES is a law firm staffed with attorneys and non-attorneys 

who collect, and attempt to collect, debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for personal, 

family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and Internet.

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54. DYNIA & ASSOCIATES is, at all times relevant to this complaint, engaged in the 

act and/or practice of “debt collection” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(5).

55. DYNIA & ASSOCIATES is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “debt 

collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

56. DYNIA & ASSOCIATES is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “debt 

collector” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(6).

57. DYNIA & ASSOCIATES is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “third-party 

debt collector” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(7).

58. On information and belief, DYNIA is a principal owner, director, shareholder, 

and/or managing partner of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES.

59. DYNIA is an attorney who attempts to collect debts incurred, or alleged to have 

been incurred, for personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. 

Mail, telephone, and Internet.

60. DYNIA personally implemented, and with knowledge such practices were contrary 

to law, engaged in, acted consistent with, managed, oversaw, and benefitted financially from all 

of the illegal policies and procedures used by himself and other employees of DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES that are complained of herein.

61. DYNIA is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

62. On information and belief, CREWS is a principal owner, director, shareholder, 

officer, and/or manager of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES.

63. CREWS attempts to collect debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for 

personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and 

Internet.

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64. CREWS personally implemented, and with knowledge such practices were 

contrary to law, engaged in, acted consistent with, managed, oversaw, and benefitted financially 

from all of the illegal policies and procedures used by himself and other employees of DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES that are complained of herein.

65. CREWS is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

66. On information and belief, NEELY is a principal owner, director, shareholder, 

officer, and/or manager of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES.

67. NEELY attempts to collect debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for 

personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and 

Internet.

68. NEELY personally implemented, and with knowledge such practices were contrary 

to law, engaged in, acted consistent with, managed, oversaw, and benefitted financially from all 

of the illegal policies and procedures used by himself and other employees of DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES that are complained of herein.

69. NEELY is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

70. On information and belief, PROWICZ is a principal owner, director, shareholder, 

officer, and/or manager of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES.

71. PROWICZ attempts to collect debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for 

personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and 

Internet.

72. PROWICZ personally implemented, and with knowledge such practices were 

contrary to law, engaged in, acted consistent with, managed, oversaw, and benefitted financially 

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from all of the illegal policies and procedures used by himself and other employees of DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES that are complained of herein.

73. PROWICZ is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

74. On information and belief, FOGARTY is a principal owner, director, shareholder, 

officer, general counsel, and/or manager of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES.

75. FOGARTY is an attorney who attempts to collect debts incurred, or alleged to have 

been incurred, for personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. 

Mail, telephone, and Internet.

76. FOGARTY personally implemented, and with knowledge such practices were 

contrary to law, engaged in, acted consistent with, managed, oversaw, and benefitted financially 

from all of the illegal policies and procedures used by himself and other employees of DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES that are complained of herein.

77. FOGARTY is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

78. On information and belief, MERRITT is a principal owner, director, shareholder, 

officer, and/or manager of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES.

79. MERRITT attempts to collect debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for 

personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and 

Internet.

80. MERRITT personally implemented, and with knowledge such practices were 

contrary to law, engaged in, acted consistent with, managed, oversaw, and benefitted financially 

from all of the illegal policies and procedures used by himself and other employees of DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES that are complained of herein.

81. MERRITT is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

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82. On or about June 30, 2014, DYNIA & ASSOCIATES mailed a collection letter 

concerning the Synchrony Obligation, which is dated June 30, 2014, and which Plaintiff received 

in the ordinary course of mail. (“6/30/2014 Letter”). A true and correct copy of the 6/30/2014

Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A, except that the undersigned counsel has, in accordance with 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, partially redacted the financial account numbers and Plaintiff’s home address 

in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy.

83. The 6/30/2014 Letter was sent, or caused to be sent, by persons employed by

Defendants as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

84. The 6/30/2014 Letter was sent, or caused to be sent, by persons employed by

Defendants as a “debt collector” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(6).

85. The 6/30/2014 Letter was sent, or caused to be sent, by persons employed by a 

“third-party debt collector” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(7).

86. The 6/30/2014 Letter was sent to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of a 

“debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

87. The 6/30/2014 Letter was sent to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of a 

“consumer debt” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(2).

88. The 6/30/2014 Letter was sent to Plaintiff in connection with “debt collection” as 

defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(5)

89. The 6/30/2014 Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).

90. DYNIA & ASSOCIATES represented to Plaintiff that SECOND ROUND

purchased the Synchrony Obligation and, therefore, is the “current creditor” of the debt even 

though Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, this is untrue.

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91. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that SECOND ROUND

is not the “current creditor” of the Synchrony Obligation.

92. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the statement in 

the 6/30/2014 Letter that SECOND ROUND is the “current creditor” is false.

93. Prior to receiving the 6/30/2014 Letter, Plaintiff had neither never heard of, nor had 

any relationship with, DYNIA & ASSOCIATES or SECOND ROUND and, therefore, did not 

know if either was a legitimate company.

94. Regarding the content of the 6/30/2014 letter, DYNIA & ASSOCIATES informed 

Plaintiff that “if [she] want[ed] to resolve this matter,” DYNIA & ASSOCIATES was “offering 

an opportunity” to resolve the debt for a reduced amount (emphasis added). 

95. The 6/30/2014 Letter informed Plaintiff that if she was unable to afford to take 

advantage of the “opportunity,” she was to call DYNIA & ASSOCIATES to make “further 

arrangements.”

96. The 6/30/2014 Letter further stated, that the “offer shall be considered rescinded

upon the removal of your account by our client.” (Emphasis added).

97. Plaintiff presumed that the 6/30/2014 Letter was a one-time or limited time offer as 

it implies that should Plaintiff fail to take advantage of the “opportunity,” the Defendants would 

pursue legal and other “involuntary” remedies.

98. Plaintiff also reasonably inferred – as would a “least sophisticated consumer” – that 

the 6/30/2014 Letter was a one-time or limited-time offer as it implies that SECOND ROUND

might “rescind” the “opportunity” at any time and without notice and does not state that 

Defendants would renew the offer in the future.

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99. The statement in the 6/30/2014 Letter that SECOND ROUND would “rescind” the 

offer was false as SECOND ROUND will always accept the offer set forth in the letter and, in fact, 

will even accept a lower payment, even if it removes or recalls the account from DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES.

100. As Plaintiff understood the 6/30/2014 Letter, as would the least sophisticated 

consumer, the only way to settle the alleged Synchrony Obligation and avoid legal action (i.e., 

“involuntary resolution”) against her was to pay the amount demanded or call DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES. 

101. As Plaintiff understood the 6/30/2014 Letter upon receiving it, as would the least 

sophisticated consumer, the debt collection process has entered into a phase where SECOND

ROUND through its attorneys, will – at any moment and without notice – begin to use procedures 

established by law and known to attorneys to collect the Synchrony Obligation. 

102. As Plaintiff understood the 6/30/2014 Letter upon receiving it, as would the least 

sophisticated consumer, her property and other financial interests were in some potential jeopardy

unless she paid the amount demanded. 

103. As Plaintiff understood the 6/30/2014 Letter upon receiving it, as would the least 

sophisticated consumer,she believed that a quick payment of a reduced amount of money allegedly 

owed would save her several thousand dollars and legal and/or other “involuntary” action against 

her by SECOND ROUND.

104. As Plaintiff understood the 6/30/2014 Letter upon receiving it, as would the least 

sophisticated consumer, she believed that quick payment was the only way to take advantage of 

the “opportunity” as the offer would no longer be available to her if she first took the time to 

exercise his legal right and request verification of the alleged debt.

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105. Defendants’ attempt to vitiate their culpability by stating that “our client” may 

recall the account; thereby rescinding the lesser payment “opportunity” was a patently false 

statement in that SECOND ROUND would always accept the “offer” and, in fact, would later even 

accept a much lower settlement amount.

106. The only purpose of the 6/30/2014 Letter was to scare Plaintiff, and other least 

sophisticated consumers, into falsely believing that SECOND ROUND would hire attorneys who 

were prepared to, and regularly do, sue consumers such as Plaintiff in the State of Michigan if 

quick arrangements are not made to pay the alleged debt.

107. With respect to consumers in the State of Michigan, DYNIA & ASSOCIATES and

the other Defendants never pursue legal and/or “involuntary” action concerning the debts they seek 

to collect from consumers in the State of Michigan.

108. Defendants intended that their materially false statements contained in the 

6/30/2014 Letter would cause Plaintiff, and other least sophisticated consumers, confusion and a 

false sense of urgency with the obvious purpose of pushing Plaintiff and other least sophisticated 

consumers to make a rapid payment to take advantage of the purported limited time offer, while 

avoiding legal and/or other “involuntary” action.

109. Defendants intended that their materially false and deceptive statements contained 

in the 6/30/2014 Letter cause Plaintiff and other least sophisticated consumers to incorrectly 

believe they would benefit legally and financially by immediately sending payment for the amount 

demanded in Defendants’ collection letters rather than waiting to make such payment after 

investigating the debt. 

110. Defendants further violated the FDCPA in that the 6/30/2014 Letter also, inter alia, 

provides a box for the Consumer to complete and provide their credit card information in making 

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payment for the alleged debt. Immediately below the credit card information box is a statement 

that “a 3% credit card processing fee may be applied to your payment amount.”

111. Plaintiff is informed, and believes, and therefore alleges that the 6/30/2014 Letter 

is intended to falsely convey that Defendants are legally permitted to charge a 3% credit card 

processing fee for credit card payments, when in fact such a fee/charge is neither authorized by 

contract nor permitted by law.

112. The additional “3% credit card processing fee” charged and collected by 

Defendants constitutes the collection of an amount incidental to the principal obligation that is not 

expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

113. The Defendants’ characterization of the additional 3% charge as a “processing fee” 

is false, deceptive, and misleading in that it is well in excess of the actual amount, if any, 

Defendants might incur with respect to Plaintiff’s, or any other, credit card payment.

114. The Defendants characterization of the additional 3% charge as a “processing fee” 

is false, deceptive, and misleading in that it fails to disclose the true nature of the fee and 

misrepresents the actual amount, if any, of any fee Defendants might incur.

115. The Defendants’ characterization of the additional 3% charge as a “processing fee” 

is false, deceptive, and misleading in that it is well in excess of what any bank or paymentprocessing entity would charge to process Plaintiff’s credit card transaction.

116. The Defendants’ characterization of the additional 3% charge as a “processing fee” 

is false, deceptive, and misleading in that Plaintiff understood it to mean, as would the least 

sophisticated consumer, that Defendants are legally entitled to receive the fee when, in fact, they 

are not legally or contractually entitled to receive it.

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117. Defendants also violated the FDCPA in that the 6/30/2014 Letter, inter alia, states 

that Plaintiff’s “Current” Balance is $2,358.78, then state they seek “voluntary resolution of 

the Total Amount Due,” and then make a “Settlement Offer” by stating Plaintiff can “resolve [his] 

Current Balance of $2,358.78 for only $1,651.15.” 

118. Upon reading the 6/30/2014 Letter, Plaintiff was confused, as would the least 

sophisticated consumer, by the varying use of the terms “Current Balance,” “Total Amount

Due,” and “Settlement Offer.”

119. Nowhere in the 6/30/2014 Letter do Defendants disclose that late fees, interest, 

and/or other charges were accruing on daily and/or monthly basis on the Synchrony Obligation 

that Defendants were attempting to collect.

120. The 6/30/2014 Letter failed to disclose that the amount of the Synchrony Obligation 

would increase due to Defendants’ imposition of late fees, interest, and/or other charges that were 

accruing to the debt on a daily and/or monthly basis. 

121. Although the 6/30/2014 Letter states there is a “Current Balance” and further states 

there is an undisclosed “Total Amount Due” the letter does not disclose the date as of which those 

amounts were calculated and determined to be the full amount of the debt.

122. The 6/30/2014 Letter does not state the effective date as of which the amounts 

Defendants sought to collect would suffice to pay off the Synchrony Obligation in full, nor does 

it acknowledge that the amount to pay the debt in full would, and did, vary on the basis of account 

adjustments by SECOND ROUND to reflect accrued interest and/or other fees and charges.

123. The 6/30/2014 Letter was misleading to Plaintiff, as it would be to a least 

sophisticated consumer, who concluded that “Current Balance” stated as due ($2,358.78) and 

undisclosed “Total Amount Due” was due at any time, when in fact it was not and was instead 

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subject to an increasing adjustment by SECOND ROUND on a periodic basis.

124. Upon receiving the 6/30/2014 Letter, Plaintiff was uncertain whether the “Current 

Balance” was accruing interest, late fees, and/or other charges as there was no disclosure or 

admonition indicating otherwise. 

125. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the “Current 

Balance” and “Total Amount Due,” which is set forth in the 6/30/2014 Letter, and which 

Defendants sought to collect, contained undisclosed sums of interest and/or other fees that 

Defendants had no legal or contractual basis to collect.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that in the months following 

the 6/30/2014 Letter, SECOND ROUND added undisclosed sums of interest and other fees 

to the principal balance of the alleged Synchrony Obligation.

126. A debt collector has a duty to correctly state the amount of the debt owed in cases 

like the present matter where the amount varies from day to day. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1); see 

also, Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Patrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, LLC, 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir.

2000); Goins v. JBC & Assocs., 352 F.Supp.2d 262, 269 (D. Conn. 2005); Stonecypher v. 

Finkelstein Kern Steinberg & Cunningham, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 9, 

2011).

127. Defendants’ failure to correctly state the amount of the Synchrony Obligation 

allegedly owed left Plaintiff uncertain, as it would for the least sophisticated consumer, as to the 

amount of the debt actually owed.

128. Defendants’ failure to correctly state the amount of the Synchrony Obligation 

allegedly owed left Plaintiff uncertain, as it would for the least sophisticated consumer, as to the 

amount of savings and/or benefit gained, if any, by paying the purported “Settlement Offer.”

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129. At all times relevant to the collection of the alleged Synchrony Obligation, there 

existed a principal-agent relationship between SECOND ROUND and the other named 

Defendants.

130. At all times relevant to the collection of the alleged Synchrony Obligation, DYNIA 

& ASSOCIATES and the other named Defendants were also the agents for SECOND ROUND, 

acting within the course and scope of their employment at the time of the incidents complained of 

herein, and were under the direct supervision, control, and approval of SECOND ROUND.

131. As the principal and a debt collector, SECOND ROUND is also vicariously liable 

for the illegal collection activities of other debt collection companies and collectors, such as the 

other named Defendants, all of who are working on its behalf to collect debts from consumers like 

Plaintiff.

132. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that at all times relevant 

to this complaint SECOND ROUND had actual knowledge that the other Defendants repeatedly 

or continuously engages in acts or practices that are prohibited by the TDCPA.

V. POLICIES AND PRACTICES COMPLAINED OF

133. It is Defendants’ policy and practice to send written collection communications, in 

the form attached as Exhibit A in connection with the collection of alleged consumer debts, which 

fail to state the amount of the consumer’s debt, and which fail to identify the creditor of the 

consumer’s debt. Such policies and practices are in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 

1692g(a)(1), and 1692g(a)(2).

134. It is also Defendants policy and practice to collect amounts that are incidental to 

the principal obligation, which amounts are not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the 

debt or permitted by law. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(2)(B), and 1692f(1).

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135. It is further Defendants policy and practice to send written collection 

communications, in the form attached as Exhibit A in connection with the collection of alleged 

consumer debts, which make false, deceptive, and misleading representations regarding the current 

balance due on an alleged debt, while also failing to provide information on how to obtain the most 

up-to-date balance due, and which falsely make “one-time take it or leave it” settlement offers. 

136. On information and belief, the Defendants’ written communications, in the form 

attached as Exhibit A and as alleged in this complaint under the Facts Concerning Plaintiff, number 

in at least the hundreds.

VI. CLASS ALLEGATIONS

137. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of 

herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.

138. Plaintiff seeks to certify two classes as set forth, and defined, infra.

139. With respect to the First Plaintiff Class, this claim is brought on behalf of a class of 

(a) all persons with addresses in the State of Michigan; (b) to whom DYNIA & ASSOCIATES

sent a written communication materially similar to the form attached as Exhibit A; (c) in an attempt 

to collect a debt on behalf of SECOND ROUND that was incurred for personal, family, or 

household purposes; (d) which was not returned as undeliverable by the United States Postal 

Service; (e) during the period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 21 

days after the filing of this action.

140. With respect to the Second Plaintiff Class, this claim is brought on behalf of a class 

of (a) all persons with addresses in the State of Michigan; (b) to whom DYNIA & ASSOCIATES

sent a written communication materially similar to the form attached as Exhibit A; (c) in an attempt 

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to collect a debt on behalf of SECOND ROUND that was incurred for personal, family, or 

household purposes; (d) which was not returned as undeliverable by the United States Postal 

Service; (e) during the period beginning two years prior to the filing of this action and ending 21 

days after the filing of this action.

141. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the business 

records of DYNIA & ASSOCIATES, SECOND ROUND, and the unknown creditor of the 

Synchrony Obligation.

142. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officers, members, 

partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendants and each of their respective 

immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their 

respective immediate families.

143. There are questions of law and fact common to First Plaintiff Class, which common 

issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues 

are whether the Defendants’ initial written communications, in the form attached as Exhibit A, 

violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(2)(B), 1692e(10), 1692g(a)(1), 1692g(a)(2), 

1692f, and 1692f(1).

144. There are questions of law and fact common to Second Plaintiff Class, which 

common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The 

principal issues are whether the Defendants’ initial written communications, in the form attached 

as Exhibit A, violate Tex. Fin. Code §§ 392.303(a)(2), 392.304(a)(4), 392.304(a)(8), 

392.304(a)(19), and 392.304(a)(4).

145. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all claims are based upon 

the same facts and legal theories.

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146. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes

defined in this complaint. Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer 

lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have 

any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.

147. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action 

pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a 

well-defined community interest in the litigation:

(a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that 

the Plaintiff Classes defined above are so numerous that joinder of all members 

would be impractical.

(b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to 

all members of the Plaintiff Classes and those questions predominate over any 

questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is 

whether the Defendants’ written communications, in the form attached as Exhibit 

A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(2)(B), 1692e(10), 1692g(a)(1), 

1692g(a)(2), 1692f, and 1692f(1), as well as Tex. Fin. Code §§ 392.303(a)(2), 

392.304(a)(4), 392.304(a)(8), 392.304(a)(19), and 392.306.

(c) Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. 

Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Classes have claims arising out of the 

Defendants’ common uniform course of conduct complained of herein.

(d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class 

members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class 

members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff 

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has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex 

legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel has any 

interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action 

lawsuit.

(e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and 

efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members 

would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of 

similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum 

efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that 

individual actions would engender.

148. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of 

inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for 

Defendants, who collect debts throughout the United States of America. 

149. Certification of a class(es) under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure is appropriate in that a determination that SECOND ROUND’s written 

communications, in the form attached as Exhibit A, violates Tex. Fin. Code §§ 392.303(a)(2), 

392.304(a)(4), 392.304(a)(8), 392.304(a)(19), and 392.306 would permit Plaintiff and the Plaintiff 

Classes to obtain injunctive relief pursuant to Tex Fin. Code § 392.403(a)(1).

150. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes

predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to 

other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

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151. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at 

the time of class certification motion, seek to modify the class definition and/or certify a class only 

as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).

VII. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

152. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding 

paragraphs of this Complaint.

153. Defendants violated the FDCPA. Defendants’ violation, with respect to their 

written communications in the form attached as Exhibit A include, but are not limited to, the 

following:

(a) Using false, deceptive, and misleading representations or means in connection with 

the collection of any debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e;

(b) Making false, deceptive, and misleading representations concerning the character, 

amount, or legal status of any debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A);

(c) Making false, deceptive, and misleading representations concerning any services 

rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector 

for the collection of a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(B)

(d) Using false representations and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect 

any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer in violation of 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692e(10);

(e) Using an unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt 

in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f;

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(f) Collecting amounts that are incidental to the principal obligation, which amounts 

are not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law 

in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692f, and 1692f(1);

(g) Failing to correctly state the amount of the debt owed in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 

1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692g(a)(1); and

(h) Failing to provide the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed in violation 

of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692g(a)(2).

VIII. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

(AGAINST DEFENDANT, SECOND ROUND, LP)

154. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding 

paragraphs of this Complaint. 392.303(a)(2), 392.304(a)(4), 392.304(a)(8), 392.304(a)(19), and 

392.306.

155. SECOND ROUND violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.303(a)(2) by sending written 

communications, in the form attached as Exhibit A include, that attempt to collect interest or a 

charge, fee, or expense incidental to the obligation that is not expressly authorized by the 

agreement creating the obligation or legally chargeable to the consumer.

156. SECOND ROUND violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(4) by sending written 

communications, in the form attached as Exhibit A include, that fail to disclose the name of the 

person to whom the debt has been assigned or is owed when making a demand for money.

157. SECOND ROUND violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(8) by sending written 

communications, in the form attached as Exhibit A include, that misrepresent the character, extent, 

or amount of a consumer debt.

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158. SECOND ROUND violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(19) by sending written 

communications, in the form attached as Exhibit A include, that use and make other false

representations and/or deceptive means to collect a debt or obtain information concerning a 

consumer.

159. SECOND ROUND violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.306 by using DYNIA & 

ASSOCIATES to collect debts on its behalf despite having actual knowledge that the independent 

debt collector repeatedly or continuously engages in acts or practices that are prohibited by the 

TDCPA.

IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

160. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in her 

favor and in favor of the Plaintiff Class as follows:

A. For the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

(i) An order certifying that the First Cause of Action may be maintained as a class 

pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appointing Plaintiff

and the undersigned counsel to represent the First Plaintiff Class as previously set 

forth and defined supra;

(ii) An award of the maximum statutory damages for Plaintiff and the First Plaintiff

Class pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B);

(iii) An award of actual damages for Plaintiff and the First Plaintiff Class pursuant to 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

(iv) For declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 adjudging Defendants’ 

collection letter, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and which is complained of 

herein, violates the FDCPA;

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(v) Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 

and

(vi) For such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

B. For the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

(i) An order certifying that the Second Cause of Action may be maintained as a class 

pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Tex Fin. Code § 

392.403(a), and appointing Plaintiff and the undersigned counsel to represent the 

Second Plaintiff Class as previously set forth and defined above.

(ii) An award of actual damages for Plaintiff and the Second Plaintiff Class, including 

all amounts collected for the “3% processing fee,” pursuant to Tex Fin. Code § 

392.403(a)(2) in an amount to be determined at trial;

(iii) For injunctive relief for Plaintiff and the Second Plaintiff Class pursuant to Tex.

Fin. Code § 392.403(a)(1), including enjoining SECOND ROUND from engaging 

in further violations of Chapter 392 of the Texas Finance Code as complained of 

herein;

(iv) For declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 adjudicating that 

SECOND ROUND’s collection conduct complained of herein violates the violates

the TDCPA;

(v) Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs pursuant to Tex Fin. Code § 

392.403(b); and

(vi) For such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

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X. JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff hereby demands that this case be tried before a Jury.

Respectfully submitted this 17th Day of September 2014.

s/ Brian P. Parker

Brian P. Parker, Esq. (P48617)

LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN PARKER, P.C.

30600 Telegraph Road, Suite 1350

Bingham Farms, MI 48025

Telephone: (248) 642-6268 

Facsimile: (248) 642-8875 

E-Mail: brianparker@collectionstopper.com

Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.

THOMASSON LAW, LLC

101 Hudson Street, 21st Floor

Jersey City, New Jersey 07302

Telephone: (201) 479-9969

Facsimile: (855) 479-9969

E-Mail: andrew@thomassonllc.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Patricia Boucher, and 

all others similarly situated

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