2015 UT App 234

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

SEMISI HUFANGALUPE MAAMA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20130813-CA

Filed September 11, 2015

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Katie Bernards-Goodman

No. 121904203

Richard G. Uday, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Ryan D. Tenney, Attorneys 

for Appellee

JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and KATE A. TOOMEY

concurred.

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Semisi Hufangalupe Maama, among others,

robbed a victim in the parking lot of a Salt Lake City fast-food 

restaurant. The victim disarmed the robbers, but before fleeing, 

the robbers assaulted the victim and reclaimed their gun. The 

incident resulted in three convictions and three appeals, 

including this one.1 Maama appeals his convictions for 

aggravated robbery, riot, and misdemeanor assault. He 

 

1. The others are State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235, and State v. 

Pham, 2015 UT App 233, also issued today.
State v. Maama

20130813-CA 2 2015 UT App 234

challenges a jury instruction on coercion and the trial judge’s 

alleged lack of neutrality. We affirm.

BACKGROUND2

¶2 Maama was convicted of aggravated robbery, a first 

degree felony; riot, a third degree felony; and assault, a class B 

misdemeanor. All the charges arose from a parking-lot robbery. 

¶3 On March 30, 2012, Maama, his sister Mesia, her 

boyfriend Pham, and another friend stopped at a fast-food 

restaurant. While Mesia and her friend went inside, Maama and 

Pham stayed outside in the parking lot drinking alcohol and 

dancing.

¶4 At about the same time, a family of three pulled into a 

parking spot two stalls away. The mother went inside to order 

food while the father and their eleven-year-old son waited in the 

SUV. While waiting, the father noticed Maama and Pham and 

observed that ‚[i]t looked like they had been partying.‛ Maama 

had a bottle of whiskey in his hand. The father had become 

distracted by a portable video game that he and his son were 

sharing, but his son saw Maama and Pham approach the SUV.

¶5 Pham suddenly opened the father’s door, pointed a gun 

at the father, and demanded money. Maama was ‚[r]ight next to 

[Pham],‛ ‚standing right side by side.‛ The father told Pham to 

‚stay calm‛ and promised to give Pham ‚whatever you want.‛ 

 

2. ‚When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 

favorable to the verdict, and we recite the facts accordingly.‛ 

State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ¶ 2, 6 P.3d 1116. ‚We present 

conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand issues 

raised on appeal.‛ State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 2, 10 P.3d 346.
State v. Maama

20130813-CA 3 2015 UT App 234

But as he looked for his wallet, he remembered that the mother 

had taken it into the restaurant to buy food. As the father stalled 

for time, Pham ‚pistol whipped‛ him in the head. Maama 

remained ‚standing next to [Pham] the whole time.‛ The father 

turned to Maama and said, ‚[C]ome on dude . . . you’re going to 

do this to me?‛ . . . I got my son with me.‛ Maama responded, 

‚Give him the fucking money.‛ Maama ‚emphasized the F 

word.‛ The father interpreted Maama’s command ‚as like I’m 

screwed. Either they are going to get some money or . . . I’m 

going to get shot, I’m going to get killed right here in front of my 

son.‛ 

¶6 The boy ‚pleaded to [Maama and Pham], like what are 

you guys doing?‛ The boy cried and said, ‚I got some money 

right here.‛ The son then handed over his allowance money to 

Pham, $11 or $12. The father became ‚pissed off‛ that his son 

was parting with his allowance money, and when Pham took the 

money, the father grabbed the gun and ‚ripped it out of 

[Pham’s] hand.‛ The father then exited the SUV and ‚just started 

swinging, just kind of going crazy.‛ The father punched Maama, 

who fell straight to the ground. The father and Pham then ‚just 

started going at it,‛ but Pham soon disengaged, bleeding from 

his mouth.

¶7 At that time, Mesia came out of the restaurant, got into 

her friend’s car, and pulled up behind the SUV. She shouted, 

‚Let’s go, let’s get out of here,‛ and Maama and Pham got into 

the car. The son ran into the restaurant and told his mother, 

‚They’re fighting. They’re fighting. There’s a gun, mom. They 

have a gun.‛ By the time the mother had reached the SUV, the 

father had the gun and had taken control of the situation.

¶8 Rather than driving away, Mesia decided to take the 

situation ‚into [her] own hands‛ and retake the gun from the 

father before leaving. She got out of her friend’s car, approached 

the mother, and asked the mother to get the gun from the father, 
State v. Maama

20130813-CA 4 2015 UT App 234

promising to leave if the mother returned the gun. The mother 

and father each refused, and when the father looked back 

toward Maama and Pham, Mesia punched the father. Maama 

and Pham then approached and began attacking the father. 

Mesia got control of the gun, and with Maama and Pham got 

back into the car and drove away.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

¶9 First, Maama contends that the trial court erred by 

inadequately instructing the jury on the State’s burden to 

disprove compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶10 Second, Maama contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by issuing a curative instruction admonishing the jury 

to disregard the court’s facial expressions during trial, rather 

than ordering a mistrial sua sponte.

¶11 Finally, Maama contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by issuing a curative instruction admonishing the jury 

to disregard the court’s interjection correcting Father’s testimony 

on cross-examination, rather than ordering a mistrial.

ANALYSIS

I. Jury Instruction Claim

¶12 Maama first contends that ‚the trial court erred by failing 

to properly instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of 

compulsion.‛ Specifically, Maama argues that ‚[a]lthough the 

trial judge allowed a compulsion jury instruction‛ (Instruction 

61) on the aggravated robbery charge, the ‚instructions given 

failed to instruct the jury about the burden the affirmative 

instruction placed on the prosecution.‛ The State responds that 

Maama ‚was not entitled to a compulsion instruction at all‛ and 
State v. Maama

20130813-CA 5 2015 UT App 234

that, in any event, ‚the instruction was sufficient.‛ ‚Generally, 

we review a trial court’s ruling on a jury instruction for 

correctness.‛ State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, ¶ 8, 325 P.3d 855 

(citing State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 148, 299 P.3d 892).

¶13 ‚A [d]efendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on 

[the defense’s] theory of the [case] if there is any basis in the 

evidence to support that theory.‛ State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, 

¶ 12, 299 P.3d 1133 (alterations in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶14 Here, we see no basis in the evidence at trial to support a 

compulsion instruction. Utah Code section 76-2-302(1) governs 

the circumstances in which the compulsion defense applies:

A person is not guilty of an offense when he 

engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was 

coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent 

use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third 

person, which force or threatened force a person of 

reasonable firmness in his situation would not 

have resisted.

Utah Code. Ann. § 76-2-302(1) (LexisNexis 2012). Utah law 

requires that ‚the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful 

physical force upon [the defendant] or a third person,‛ id., 

constitute a specific threat, see State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 634

(Utah 1986), one where the defendant ‚had no reasonable 

alternative to the commission of the crime charged.‛ Id. at 635. 

Thus, ‚if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the 

law,‛ a compulsion defense ‚fail[s].‛ Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶15 Maama argues that after he accidentally stumbled upon 

Pham’s robbery attempt, Maama decided to ‚urge [the father] to 

cooperate‛ because Maama believed it was ‚the only way to 

prevent anyone from getting hurt.‛ Maama claims that he was 
State v. Maama

20130813-CA 6 2015 UT App 234

simply ‚in the wrong place at the wrong time,‛ that he ‚walked 

upon the robbery‛ with mere ‚seconds to react,‛ and that he 

‚felt compelled to de-escalate the incident by suggesting [the 

father] cooperate with the robbery demands of Mr. Pham.‛ But 

Maama identifies no threat, specific or otherwise, that could 

bring his conduct within the compulsion-defense requirements. 

Instead, Maama testified that when he realized that Pham was 

robbing the father and son, Maama thought that the father ‚was 

going to get hurt‛ if the father did not comply. Maama testified 

that ‚for [the father’s] safety, for . . . even my safety also,‛ 

Maama told the father, ‚[J]ust hand it to him, just listen to him, 

man.‛ Maama might have concluded that the best way for the 

father to avoid harm was to capitulate, but Maama does not 

claim that he, or anyone else, was the target of a specific threat 

forcing him to participate in the robbery. Accordingly, Maama 

was not entitled to a compulsion defense in the first instance. 

¶16 In any event, Instruction 61 adequately conveyed the 

State’s burden of disproving compulsion beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Jury instructions require no particular form so long as 

they accurately convey the law. See State v. Marchet, 2009 UT

App 262, ¶ 23, 219 P.3d 75. ‚To determine if jury instructions 

correctly state the law, we ‘look at the jury instructions in their 

entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as a whole 

fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.’‛ State v. 

Painter, 2014 UT App 272, ¶ 6, 339 P.3d 107 (quoting Maestas,

2012 UT 46, ¶ 148) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). ‚We generally presume that a jury will follow the 

instructions given it.‛ State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 

1994). 

¶17 Under Utah law, ‚[i]t is fundamental that the State carries 

the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element 

of an offense, including the absence of an affirmative defense 

once the defense is put into issue.‛ State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 45, 

192 P.3d 867 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 
State v. Maama

20130813-CA 7 2015 UT App 234

also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2012) 

(requiring the State to negate an affirmative defense ‚by proof‛

if the defendant has introduced evidence of the defense). 

¶18 Here, Instruction 61 adequately conveyed the State’s 

burden. Maama’s requested instruction highlighted the State’s 

burden to disprove compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt:

Before you can convict . . . Maama . . . of any crime, 

you must first be convinced beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he . . . was NOT acting because of 

compulsion. If the prosecution fails to convince 

you beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . [Maama] 

was NOT acting because of compulsion, . . . then 

you must find him . . . not guilty of all criminal 

charges.

Instruction 61 likewise emphasized the State’s burden to 

disprove compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt:

Once the issue of compulsion is raised, . . . the 

prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the act was not done because 

of compulsion. The defendant has no . . . burden of 

proof but is entitled to be found not guilty if there 

is any basis in the evidence . . . sufficient to create a 

reasonable doubt as to whether he . . . acted 

because of compulsion.

Instruction 61 unambiguously instructed the jury that the State 

had the burden to disprove compulsion beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Because jury instructions require no particular form so 

long as they adequately convey the law, see Marchet, 2009 UT 

App, ¶ 23, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in 

issuing Instruction 61 to the jury. Accordingly, Maama’s juryinstruction claim fails.
State v. Maama

20130813-CA 8 2015 UT App 234

II. Mistrial Claim

A. Improper Demeanor Incident

¶19 Maama next contends that ‚the trial court erred in failing 

to grant a mistrial in connection [with] the improper demeanor

of the trial court judge while evidence was being taken, which 

deprived . . . Maama of a fair trial.‛ Specifically, Maama 

challenges the judge’s ‚facial expressions and rolling of eyes‛ 

during the presentation of his defense. The State responds that 

Maama did not preserve this claim and that, in any event, he 

‚has not shown that he was prejudiced by the alleged error.‛

¶20 ‚[T]o preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be 

presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has 

an opportunity to rule on that issue.‛ 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, 

Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (brackets, citation, and internal 

quotation marks omitted). When a party fails to preserve an 

issue for appeal, we generally will not review that issue unless 

the party argues an exception to the preservation rule on appeal. 

See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ¶ 21, 61 P.3d 1062; id. ¶ 21 n.2

(identifying plain error, exceptional circumstances, and 

ineffective assistance of counsel as exceptions to the preservation 

rule). 

¶21 On the second day of trial, Mesia’s counsel asked for a 

judicial-neutrality instruction that included language about 

facial expressions. Mesia’s counsel then said something that was 

inaudible to the transcriber but which prompted the trial court to 

respond, ‚No, I am not. I spent my whole time [inaudible].‛ 

Mesia’s counsel responded, ‚[Inaudible] you roll your eyes.‛ The 

trial court said, ‚Oh, stop. [Inaudible] I rolled my eyes equally 

for the Defense and Prosecution, because everybody’s witnesses 

had a few eye-rolling moments. All right, I will watch it.‛

¶22 No party requested a mistrial on the basis of the trial 

court’s ‚facial expressions and rolling of eyes.‛ On the third day 
State v. Maama

20130813-CA 9 2015 UT App 234

of trial, Mesia’s counsel moved for a mistrial, a motion Maama 

later joined. But the parties based this motion on the trial court’s 

intervention during the father’s cross-examination, not on the 

trial court’s ‚facial expressions and rolling of eyes.‛ No party at 

any point moved for a mistrial based on the trial court’s facial 

expressions. A party who ‚makes an objection at trial based on 

one ground . . . does not preserve for appeal any alternative 

grounds for objection.‛ State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 17, 192 P.3d 

867. Because Maama did not present the facial-expression issue 

‚to the trial court in such a way that the trial court ha[d] an 

opportunity to rule on that issue,‛ 438 Main St., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), he has not 

preserved the claim for appeal. And Maama argues no exception 

to the preservation rule on appeal. Accordingly, we decline to 

consider the argument. 

B. Witness Correction Interjection

¶23 Finally, Maama appears to challenge as reversible error 

the trial court’s sua sponte interjection to correct the father’s 

rebuttal testimony on cross-examination and denial of a motion 

for mistrial on that basis. Maama contends that the trial court 

‚injected itself in a biased and prejudicial manner . . . directly 

into the testimony of [the father] correcting [the father] in a 

manner which assisted the [prosecution].‛

¶24 ‚A trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial will not be 

reversed absent an abuse of discretion.‛ State v. Widdison, 2001 

UT 60, ¶ 54, 28 P.3d 1278. ‚[W]e will not find an abuse of 

discretion unless a review of the record shows that the court’s 

decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced 

the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have a fair trial.‛ Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶25 On the third day of trial, Mesia’s counsel recalled the 

father as a rebuttal witness. Mesia’s counsel cross-examined the 

father about what he said on the first day of trial by referring to 
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20130813-CA 10 2015 UT App 234

counsel’s own notes about what the father had said. The trial 

court interjected to correct what it apparently felt was an 

inaccurate statement from Mesia’s counsel about the father’s 

earlier testimony. Mesia’s counsel objected to the trial court’s 

interjection.

¶26 After the trial court excused the jury, Mesia’s counsel 

moved for a mistrial based on the trial court’s interjection. 

Maama’s counsel later joined the motion:

I was just going to simply say, I join that motion or 

in the alternative would ask for a curative 

instruction that [the jurors] are to rely [solely] on 

their memories and no input from any of the 

attorneys or [inaudible].‛

The trial court denied the motion for mistrial but issued the 

requested curative instruction, admonishing the jury to 

disregard the interjection:

As you heard earlier today, we had our little 

discussion about notes and this is why you 

shouldn’t rely too heavily on notes because I’m not 

so confident that anybody is right or wrong. 

Luckily in this situation you have the witness on 

the stand who clarified himself and it’s up to you 

to remember his testimony the way you remember 

it and never be overconfident in your notes. Okay.

Maama did not object to the wording of the curative instruction 

in the trial court, nor does he challenge it on appeal.

¶27 The trial court does not abuse its discretion where a party 

asks for relief in the alternative and the trial court grants one of 

the alternatives, unless the party suffers ‚unacceptable 

prejudice.‛ See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994); see 

also State v. Murdock, 2011 UT App 71, ¶ 5, 253 P.3d 80. Here, 
State v. Maama

20130813-CA 11 2015 UT App 234

Maama moved for a mistrial or, in the alternative, a curative 

instruction. The trial court issued a curative instruction. Maama 

neither challenges the curative instruction nor claims that the 

curative instruction failed to do its job of curing any prejudice 

occasioned by the court’s actions. Because Maama received the 

relief he requested, albeit in the alternative, we cannot conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant his 

motion for a mistrial. Accordingly, Maama’s claim fails. 

CONCLUSION

¶28 We conclude that Maama has failed to carry the burden of 

persuasion on the claims he has raised on appeal. We therefore 

affirm his convictions.