UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CHESTER BODMAN, 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 2:14-cv-14420 

v. District Judge David M. Lawson 

 Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

ARAMARK CORPORATION, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 11) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should grant Defendant O’Bell 

Thomas Winn’s unopposed motion for summary judgment for Plaintiff’s failure to 

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to initiating this lawsuit. (DE 11.) 

II. REPORT 

 A. Background 

 

 Plaintiff, Chester Bodman, an inmate at the Kinross Correctional Facility 

who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, filed his complaint and 

application to proceed without prepayment of fees on November 18, 2014. (DE 1 

and 2.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s application on November 25, 2014. (DE 3.) 

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In his complaint, Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting: 1) 

violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth 

Amendment; and 2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment related to his employment as a food service worker at the Saginaw 

Correctional Facility (“SRF”). Specifically, he asserts that when the Aramark 

Corporation took over prison food service from the State of Michigan, the inmate 

food service workers were improperly terminated and transferred out of SRF. 

Plaintiff indicates that these improper transfers removed the inmates’ ability to file 

grievances against the individuals at SRF. (DE 1, ¶ 22.) He asks the Court to 

award injunctive relief, including reinstatement to his position, declaratory relief, 

and an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages. 

 Defendant O’Bell Thomas Winn, the Warden of SRF, filed the instant 

motion on December 26, 2014, asserting that he is entitled to a grant of summary 

judgment on three bases. (DE 11.) First, he contends that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his complaint. Second, he asserts 

that Plaintiff’s transfer from SRF to the Kinross Correctional Facility (“KCF”) 

moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Finally, he argues that he is 

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for Plaintiff’s claims for money 

damages against him in his official capacity. 

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 On January 22, 2015, the Court issued a scheduling order, requiring Plaintiff 

to respond to Defendant Winn’s motion on or before March 9, 2015. (DE 20.) To 

date, Plaintiff has not filed a response. 

 B. Standard 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing 

law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court 

“views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. 

Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 

 “The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of 

material fact exists . . . .” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 

(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e)(2) 

(providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of 

fact,” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the 

motion.”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the 

nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’” Wrench LLC 

v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. 

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Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The nonmoving 

party must “make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat 

the motion.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 

2011) (“The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . [T]here must be evidence 

upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving 

party to create a genuine dispute.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “a motion for summary 

judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond 

with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case. . . .” 

Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 371, 322-23 

(1986)). 

“[E]even where a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, a district 

court must review carefully the portions of the record submitted by the moving 

party to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists.” F.T.C. v. 

E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 630 (6th Cir. 2014). However, 

In the absence of a response, the court must review carefully those 

portions of the submitted evidence designated by the moving party. 

Neither the trial nor appellate court, however, will sua sponte comb 

the record from the partisan perspective of an advocate for the nonmoving party. Rather, in the reasoned exercise of its judgment the 

court may rely on the moving party’s unrebutted recitation of the 

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evidence, or pertinent portions thereof, in reaching a conclusion that 

certain evidence and inferences from evidence demonstrate facts 

which are “uncontroverted.” 

Guarino v. Brookfield Tp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 1992); see also 

F.T.C., 767 F.3d at 630 n.11. 

 C. Discussion 

 The Undersigned will address each of Defendant Winn’s arguments in turn. 

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

 a. Exhaustion Under the PLRA 

Under the PLRA, a prisoner may not bring an action “with respect to prison 

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law . . . until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Congress enacted this provision to address the “outsized share” of prisoner 

litigation filings and to ensure that “the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not 

submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203-04 (2007). Put another way, the purpose of 

§ 1997e(a) is to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). In addition, exhaustion “gives an 

agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it 

administers before it is haled into federal court, and it discourages disregard of [the 

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agency’s] procedures.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

 “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that 

unexhausted claims cannot be brought into court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. The 

prison’s grievance process determines when a prisoner has properly exhausted his 

or her claim. Id. at 219 (“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply 

with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system, but it is the 

prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper 

exhaustion.”). Even where a prisoner has made some attempts to go through the 

prison’s grievance process, “[t]he plain language of the statute makes exhaustion a 

precondition to filing an action in federal court.” Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 

641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). The prisoner “may not exhaust his [or her] 

administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit.” Id. (citations 

omitted); see also Woodford, 548 US at 95 (“A prisoner who does not want to 

participate in the prison grievance system will have little incentive to comply with 

the system’s procedural rules unless noncompliance carries a sanction . . . .”). 

However, “inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in 

their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Instead, failure to exhaust 

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administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA.1 As such, 

Defendants bear the burden of proof on exhaustion. Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 

452, 456 (6th Cir. 2012). 

 b. Grievance Procedures at the MDOC 

 Pursuant to its Policy Directive dated July, 9, 2007, the administrative 

remedies available at the MDOC are as follows. First, the inmate must attempt to 

resolve any issue with the staff member involved within two days of becoming 

aware of a grievable issue. (DE 11-2, ¶ P.) If the issues are not resolved within 

five days, the inmate may file a Step 1 grievance using the appropriate form. The 

inmate should receive a response within fifteen days of filing his or her grievance. 

If the inmate is dissatisfied with the disposition of the grievance, or does not 

receive a response ten days after the due date, he or she may file a Step II 

grievance using the appropriate form. (Id. at ¶ BB.) Similarly, if the inmate is 

dissatisfied with the Step II response or does not receive a response for ten days 

after the response was due, he or she may file a Step III grievance. (Id. at ¶ FF.) 

Step III grievances are “logged on a computerized grievance tracking system.” (Id. 

at ¶ GG.) The matter is fully exhausted after the disposition of the Step III 

                                                            

1

 Although Defendant Winn could have filed an answer asserting exhaustion as an 

affirmative defense, he instead appropriately raised the issue for the first time in 

the instant motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (“a party may file a motion for summary 

judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of discovery.”). 

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grievance. Surles, 678 F.3d at 455 (“A grievant must undertake all steps of the 

MDOC process for his grievance to be considered fully exhausted.”). 

c. Plaintiff Did Not Comply with the MDOC Policy by 

Failing to Pursue a Step III Grievance Before Filing 

Here, Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various federal 

laws, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1997, and 2000e-3, all of 

which are subject to the exhaustion requirement under the PLRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a) (requiring exhaustion for claims “with respect to prison conditions under 

section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law . . . .”).2

 Defendant Winn asserts 

that Plaintiff has not filed any Step III grievance appeals. He provides as evidence 

Plaintiff’s “MDOC Prisoner Step III Grievance Report” from May 2009 through 

December 8, 2014. (DE 11-3.) The report indicates that “[a] search of this 

database has been performed for the time period [l]isted on the title of this report 

and no records were found.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant Winn’s motion. Although the 

Court is not required to sua sponte comb the record to advocate for a non-

                                                            

2

 Plaintiff also outlines in his complaint portions of the Uniform Commercial Code 

and the Revised Uniform Trade Practices Act, but does not identify any breaches 

or damages associated with these laws, does not plead any discernible cause of 

action, and does not point to any provisions of Michigan or federal law to support 

such claims. It is unclear what, if any, claim Plaintiff attempts to make related to 

these doctrines and the Court will not attempt to guess at the nature of the claims 

asserted in counts 10 and 11 of his complaint. See Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. 

App’x 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (even in pleadings by pro se parties, “courts 

should not have to guess at the nature of the claims asserted.”).

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responding party, the Undersigned has reviewed the only substantive document 

Plaintiff has filed in his case thus far: his complaint. A review of his complaint, 

however, reveals no evidence to contradict Defendant Winn’s assertions. While 

Plaintiff is not required to specifically plead exhaustion in his complaint, he does 

not make even a cursory statement that he exhausted his administrative remedies 

pursuant to MDOC grievance procedure or otherwise with regard to any of his 

claims prior to filing this lawsuit. 

Plaintiff does indicate that he submitted an “Administrative Complaint” to 

give Defendants a notice of his claims (DE 1 at 4, 28-31), but that is insufficient to 

exhaust his administrative remedies under the MDOC grievance procedure. See 

Jones, 549 U.S. at 219 (“it is the prison’s requirements . . . that define the 

boundaries of proper exhaustion.”); MDOC Policy Directive, Prisoner/Parolee 

Grievances, July 9, 2007. Notably, the Administrative Complaint was signed on 

the same day as his first pleading in this case. (DE 1 at 31.) Moreover, neither this 

barebones allegation, nor the “Administrative Complaint,” give any indication as 

to which step in the three step process the “Administrative Complaint” relates, nor 

whether it in any way fulfilled the complete exhaustion requirements, or whether 

any of the three steps were even undertaken. Nor does he attach any exhibits 

which would enlighten the Court on this point. 

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It is notable that Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that Defendants’ actions in 

improperly transferring inmates took away “all of the inmates’ rights” and their 

“option to utilize the inmate grievance process by transferring them.” (DE 1 at 

7)(emphasis added.) The MDOC Policy Directive on prisoner grievances, 

however, does not preclude inmates from filing administrative grievances, even 

after a transfer. (See, e.g., DE 11-2, ¶ G(4), which indicates that a grievance will 

not be rejected as untimely “if there is a valid reason for the delay; e.g., transfer.”). 

By virtue of this allegation, Plaintiff seemingly concedes the fact that he did not 

compliantly utilize the inmate grievance process.3

 

While Defendant bears the burden of proving that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant lawsuit, in order to defeat the 

motion, Plaintiff must proffer competent evidence to create a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether he exhausted the administrative remedies described 

above. Here, however, Plaintiff failed to file a response to Defendant’s wellsupported motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff does not address the exhaustion 

requirements in his complaint, even in a conclusory manner. Accordingly, there is 

nothing in the record which would create a genuine dispute of material fact such 

                                                            

3

 Furthermore, he implicitly concedes the inadequacy of his “Administrative 

Complaint” as a mechanism for exhausting his administrative remedies by asking 

the Court to deem that it does constitute “lawful exhaustion,” at least as to 

Defendant Aramark Corporation, “where no procedure exist [sic] for plaintiff to 

redress grievances held . . . .” (DE 1 at 16.) 

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that his claims should survive summary judgment. See, e.g., Alexander v. 

Caresource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Conclusory statements unadorned 

with supporting facts are insufficient to establish a factual dispute that will defeat 

summary judgment.”). Defendant Winn has met the burden of proving his 

affirmative defense. The Undersigned therefore recommends that the Court 

GRANT Defendant Winn’s motion for summary judgment on this basis. (DE 

11.)2

 

2. Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief

 Even if Plaintiff’s claims were to survive summary judgment, his claims 

against Defendant Winn for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot.3

 A 

prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief from officials at a specific 

prison become moot when the prisoner is transferred from the prison about which 

                                                            

4

 To the extent Plaintiff purports to bring this as a class action (DE 1 at 18, ¶ 18), 

his failure to exhaust administrative remedies also acts as a bar to any such action. 

See, e.g., Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying 

“vicarious exhaustion” where at least one class member has exhausted his 

grievances). Here, Plaintiff notes that other prisoners may represent a class in this 

case. He has not, however, moved to certify a class. Nor has he asserted that any 

purported class members have exhausted their administrative remedies with respect 

to his claims. Nor has he met any other pleading or procedural requirements for a 

class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 

5

 As best as the Undersigned can discern, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from 

Defendant Winn in the form of a transfer back to SRF for re-employment at his 

previous food service position. (DE 1 at 18, ¶ 16.) Again, Plaintiff seeks 

reinstatement, not just for himself but for “each injured party,” as if he had 

standing to do so on behalf of non-parties, which he does not. (Id.) 

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he or she complains, in the absence of exigent circumstances which do not exist in 

this case. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Howard v. 

Dougan, 221 F.3d 1334, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that a reasonable showing 

that a prisoner will be subjected to the same conditions at his or her new institution 

of incarceration is an exception to the mootness doctrine). Plaintiff brings his 

claims against Defendant Winn, who serves as the SRF Warden, for events that 

took place while he was housed at SRF. When Plaintiff filed his complaint, 

however, he had already been transferred to KCF. (DE 1, ¶ 1.) Accordingly, to the 

extent that any of his claims against Defendant Winn survive, his claims for 

injunctive relief have been rendered moot.4

Furthermore, although Plaintiff attempts to assert that Defendants transferred 

him in violation of his right to be employed in prison, Plaintiff has no such right. 

See Majied v. Brown, 803 F.2d 720, 720 (6th Cir. 1986) (“an expectation of 

keeping a particular prison job does not amount to either a property or liberty 

interest cognizable under § 1983.” (internal quotation omitted)); Carter v. Tucker, 

69 F. App’x 678, 680 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A prisoner has no constitutional right to 

prison employment or a particular prison job.”). Accordingly, the loss of a prison 

                                                            

6 The analysis might well be different for Defendant Aramark, which Plaintiff 

asserts is “the company in charge of Food Services at the Saginaw Correctional 

Facility and the entire State of Michigan’s Department of Corrections.” (DE 1, ¶ 

4.) 

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job can hardly constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment.5

 

 3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 

 Furthermore, even if Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Winn were to 

survive summary judgment, to the extent Plaintiff sues Defendant Winn in his 

official capacity and for money damages, those claims are barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment. Where a plaintiff sues a defendant in his or her official capacity, it 

“is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” 

Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Here, Plaintiff 

brings his claims against all Defendants in their official and personal capacities.6

 

(DE 1 at 1.) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Winn in his official capacity, 

therefore, are claims against the State of Michigan, and “the Eleventh Amendment 

bars a damages action against a State in federal court.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Put another way, “[t]his bar remains in effect when State 

officials are sued for damages in their official capacity.” Id. at 169 (internal 

citation omitted). Thus, even if the Court disagrees with the foregoing 

                                                            

7

 Indeed, the Undersigned notes that the loss of jobs due to their being shifted to 

outside contractors, as is alleged here, is a daily occurrence in the non-prison 

world. DE 1, ¶4. 

8

 Plaintiff does not explain how the individuals could be personally liable. Nor 

does he indicate how such a pleading could survive an immunity defense. 

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recommendation, the Eleventh Amendment remains a bar to Plaintiff’s claim for 

money damages against Defendant Winn in his official capacity. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

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in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

Dated: April 30, 2015 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on April 30, 2015, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

(313) 234-5200 

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