UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 Although something of a challenge, the Court can discern how pro se Plaintiff Betty June 

Taylor, who also identifies herself as Betty June Taylor EL Trustee/Public Minister of the June 

Taylor EL Tribe, believes she was wronged. Apparently, in January 2014, a bankruptcy court 

ordered that Taylor could redeem her car if she paid Defendant Credit Acceptance Corporation 

$3,000. (Compl. at Pg ID 31.) Taylor says she paid, but Credit Acceptance refused to turn over 

the repossessed car. (See Compl. at Pg ID 3.)1

 The Court cannot discern, however, how these alleged facts violate federal laws. Her 

pro se complaint begins by asserting a “gross violation” of the United Nations Vienna 

Convention of Diplomatic Relations: that under Article 22 of the Convention, the Taylor EL 

Tribe “is immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.” (Compl. at 2 (capitalization 

altered).) (Apparently, Taylor assigned title to her car to the Tribe. (Compl. at Pg ID 8, State of 

 

1

 Since this suit was filed, it appears that Credit Acceptance sold the vehicle at a public 

auction because, according to Credit Acceptance, Taylor “broke promises in [their] agreement.” 

(See Dkt 4, Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at Pg ID 65.) 

BETTY JUNE TAYLOR, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

 

BLACK HAWK RECOVERY, 

CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, 

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 2:15-10143 

Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub 

OPINION AND ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF 

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 

2:15-cv-10143-LJM-MKM Doc # 6 Filed 03/20/15 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 67
2 

Michigan Certificate of Title.)) The Complaint also asserts that “pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 8; 31 

U.S.C. 392, 3123, 5103 and 5118[;] 12 U.S.C. 1813[;] Public Law 73-10 48 Stat 112, there is no 

lawful money so all these statutes were violated.” (Compl. at 1 (capitalization altered).) The 

Complaint further avers, “even though they [Credit Acceptance] closed my account and stated I 

had a zero balance, on September 30, 2014 they repos[sess]ed the vehicle. They contracted to 

pay $500,000.00 if they repos[sess]ed it. They violated 28 U.S.C. 1251 and 28 U.S.C. 1351.” 

(Compl. at 3 (capitalization altered).) 

None of these allegations state a non-frivolous federal cause of action. Article 22 of the 

Vienna Convention, as reproduced by Taylor, states, “The premises of the mission, their 

furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be 

immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.” (Compl. at Pg ID 29.) Taylor’s 

complaint gives the Court no clue as to how this case involves a “mission” as that term is used in 

Article 22. As for her statement that “there is no lawful money,” that assertion is also frivolous 

and fails to identify a viable federal cause of action. Cf. Carrington v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage 

Assoc., No. 05-CV-73429-DT, 2005 WL 3216226, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2005) (“Plaintiff 

is protesting the payment of his debt based on allegations that the nation’s banking system 

created money by its ledger entries and that the money needed to be paid in gold and silver coins. 

This contention is patently meritless and has been universally rejected by numerous federal 

courts.”). Finally, the assertion that Defendants violated 28 U.S.C. § 1251 and 28 U.S.C. § 1351 

is frivolous and fails to confer jurisdiction in this court. The former sets forth the original 

jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court while the latter grants original jurisdiction to the 

lower federal courts in cases against “consuls or vice consuls of foreign states[] or members of a 

mission.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1351. But it was Taylor who filed this lawsuit, not Defendants. 

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The Court is convinced that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction in this case because the 

federal “claims” in Taylor’s complaint are frivolous. Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 

1999) (“[A] district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the 

allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of 

merit, or no longer open to discussion.”). 

This case is thus DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.2

 Taylor’s 

preliminary-injunction motion (Dkt. 4) is denied as moot. 

SO ORDERED. 

s/Laurie J. Michelson 

LAURIE J. MICHELSON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: March 20, 2015 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on the 

attorneys and/or parties of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on March 20, 2015. 

 s/Jane Johnson 

Case Manager to 

 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

 

2

 The Court notes that Taylor has not paid the filing fee in this case, instead seeking to 

proceed without prepayment of that fee. (Dkt. 2.) But if the Court were to grant her request, this 

case would end in a similar way: the Court would apply 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and dismiss the 

Complaint as “frivolous or malicious.” Her request is DENIED as moot. 

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