IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–1808

Filed December 19, 2014

DENISON MUNICIPAL UTILITIES,

Appellee,

vs.

IOWA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence 

McLellan, Judge.

The Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner appeals from the 

order of the district court on judicial review, which we treat as a petition 

for a writ of certiorari, that reversed a $1000 assessment against 

Denison Municipal Utilities for its failure to file a first report of injury. 

WRIT ANNULLED.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Julie A. Burger, Assistant 

Attorney General, Des Moines, for appellant.

David Brian Scieszinski, of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, 

P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

In this case, we are presented with an appeal by the workers’ 

compensation commissioner (commissioner) from a district court order 

on judicial review holding the commissioner lacked the authority under 

Iowa Code section 86.12 (2013) to require the employer, Denison 

Municipal Utilities (DMU), to file a first report of injury. The district 

court accordingly reversed the commissioner’s $1000 assessment against 

DMU for its failure to file this first report of injury. Because DMU 

challenged the authority and legality of the commissioner’s actions in 

district court, the district court should have treated DMU’s appeal as a 

writ of certiorari. Consequently, we consider the district court’s order 

not as one on judicial review, but rather as an order sustaining DMU’s 

writ of certiorari.

Ultimately, we conclude that Iowa Code section 86.11 does not 

provide the sole basis for the commissioner to require an employer to file 

a first report of injury and that DMU was required to file a first report of 

injury in this case. Further, we conclude that the deputy commissioner’s 

decision that DMU failed to make a sufficient showing of good cause to 

avoid the $1000 assessment pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.12 was 

supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the $1000 assessment

against DMU was proper, and the district court erred in sustaining 

DMU’s writ of certiorari. Writ annulled.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On January 29, 2013, Kevin Fink filed an “Original Notice and 

Petition” for alternate medical care with the commissioner. The petition 

requested alternate medical treatment for knee injuries allegedly 

sustained during the course of Fink’s employment with DMU and alleged 

an injury date of July 13, 2012. That same day, the commissioner sent 
3

DMU a notice demanding that DMU either advise the agency of proof of 

filing a first report of injury for each alleged injury or immediately file 

such a report. The notice provided that pursuant to Iowa Code section 

86.12, DMU was required to file a first report of injury. It also advised 

DMU that if it failed to file this report within thirty days, it would be 

subject to a notice of hearing and a possible assessment of $1000. 

Both DMU and its insurance provider, Employers Mutual Casualty 

Company (EMC), were served with the original notice and petition by 

certified mail on January 30.

DMU did not file a first report of injury within the thirty-day 

period. Accordingly, on March 22 the commissioner sent DMU a notice 

of hearing and proposed assessment notifying it that a hearing was 

scheduled for April 9. At the time of hearing, DMU would be required to 

show cause why it had not filed the report and why a proposed $1000

should not be assessed against it for its failure to file the first report of 

injury as demanded.

The hearing was held as scheduled on April 9 before a deputy 

commissioner. The only witness to testify on behalf of DMU was the 

adjuster for EMC. Through the adjuster, DMU first argued that it was 

not required to file the first report of injury under Iowa Code section 

86.11 because Fink had not missed any time from work and Fink was 

not suffering from a permanent disability or impairment. Therefore, the 

commissioner had no authority to demand that it file the first report of 

injury. DMU next argued that Iowa Code section 86.12 only authorizes 

assessments of $1000 when the first report of injury is specifically 

required by Iowa Code section 86.11. Since the requirements for filing 

the report under Iowa Code section 86.11 had not been met, the 

commissioner lacked the authority to assess $1000 against DMU.
4

An employee from the division of workers’ compensation also 

testified at the hearing. In response to the deputy commissioner’s 

question why the demand letter had been sent, she testified: 

It was sent due to the fact that there was a petition filed by 

Mr. Fink on an alternate medical care. And when a petition 

is filed with our agency, if we don’t have a corresponding 

First Report, we require one to be filed.

No first report of injury had been filed as of the time of the hearing. The 

employee also testified that she was not aware of Mr. Fink’s injury, 

whether he had missed any time from work, or whether he had any 

permanent disability or permanent impairment. No other evidence was 

offered on the issue.

On April 26, the deputy commissioner issued her decision.1 In the 

decision, the deputy commissioner rejected the argument advanced by 

DMU that the agency lacked the authority to demand a first report of 

injury because it was not required under Iowa Code section 86.11. The 

deputy commissioner specifically noted that Iowa Code section 86.12 

authorizes the commissioner to require, by written demand, the employer 

supply the information required by Iowa Code section 86.10 or file a 

report required by Iowa Code section 86.11, Iowa Code section 86.13, or 

by agency rule. Thus, the deputy commissioner concluded the 

requirements for filing a first report of injury pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 86.11 did not provide the sole basis for the commissioner to 

require an employer to file a first report of injury. The deputy 

commissioner found DMU received the notice demanding it file a first 

report of injury and failed to file the report as demanded. The deputy 

1On February 5, DMU answered Fink’s petition for alternate medical care, 

disputing liability on the claim. As a direct result of the DMU’s denial of liability, a 

deputy workers’ compensation commissioner dismissed Fink’s petition.

 
5

commissioner further concluded that DMU provided no excuse why it 

had not filed the first report of injury and therefore failed to make a 

sufficient showing of good cause. Consequently, a $1000 assessment 

was authorized. 

DMU filed a petition for judicial review under chapter 17A, naming 

both Fink and the commissioner as opposing parties. In its petition, it 

reasserted its argument that the commissioner did not have the 

authority to assess $1000 against it because a first report of injury was 

not required by Iowa Code section 86.11. In addition, it argued the 

$1000 assessment violated its due process rights because it had no 

meaningful avenue for appeal given that Iowa Code section 86.29 

expressly precluded it from naming the commissioner as an opposing 

party in actions for judicial review, notwithstanding the fact that the 

commissioner is the only party interested in assuring that such 

assessments are upheld. See Iowa Code § 86.29 (2013) (“[I]n a petition 

for judicial review of a decision of the workers’ compensation 

commissioner in a contested case under this chapter . . . the opposing 

party shall be named the respondent, and the agency shall not be named 

as a respondent.”).

On November 5, the district court entered its order on judicial 

review.2 On the merits, the district court concluded that the deputy 

commissioner incorrectly interpreted Iowa Code section 86.12 as 

authorizing the commissioner to demand DMU file a first report of injury. 

It further concluded the written demand for the filing of the first report of 

2In its order, the court rejected DMU’s argument that its due process rights had 

been violated. It concluded that by naming Fink as an opposing party as required by 

Iowa Code section 86.29, DMU had complied with the statute so as to confer 

jurisdiction on the court. This allowed it to reach the merits and thereby provided DMU 

with a meaningful avenue for appeal, obviating due process concerns.

 
6

injury, alone, was insufficient to trigger the $1000 assessment under

Iowa Code section 86.12. In its review of the statutory language of Iowa 

Code sections 86.11 and 86.12, the district court concluded that under 

the clear language of the statute, there must first be a required report. It 

further concluded that the first report of injury was not required by Iowa 

Code section 86.11 since there was no evidence that Fink had been 

incapacitated for more than three days or that he had suffered any 

permanent total or permanent partial disability. Therefore, the deputy 

commissioner’s interpretation of the statute was incorrect, and the 

record lacked substantial evidence to support the $1000 assessment 

against DMU. The district court reversed the deputy commissioner’s 

$1000 assessment against DMU.

The commissioner appealed the order of the district court, and we 

retained the appeal.

II. Jurisdiction to Hear the Appeal.

In the proceedings below, DMU challenged whether the courts have 

jurisdiction to hear appeals from assessments made by the commissioner 

pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.12. Iowa Code section 86.29 prohibits 

parties from naming the commissioner as an opposing party in actions 

for judicial review, even though the commissioner is the only party 

interested in assuring that such assessments are upheld. See id. The 

district court resolved this issue by concluding the decision by DMU to 

name Fink in addition to the commissioner as an opposing party in its 

petition complied with the statute so as to confer jurisdiction on it. 

While we recognize that the question of whether Iowa Code section 86.29 

confers jurisdiction on the courts to hear appeals in such matters 

implicates issues concerning our own jurisdiction over this appeal, we 

need not resolve that issue today. Rather, because DMU challenged the 
7

authority and legality of the commissioner’s actions in district court, the 

district court should have treated DMU’s appeal as a writ of certiorari. 

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401 (“A party may commence a certiorari action . . .

when the party claims an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising 

judicial functions . . . exceeded proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted 

illegally.”); see Petersen v. Harrison Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 580 N.W.2d 

790, 793 (Iowa 1998) (“A county board of supervisors exercising a 

governmental function is an ‘inferior tribunal’ within the meaning of rule 

[1.1401].”); Norland v. Worth Cnty. Comp. Bd., 323 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Iowa 

1982) (“An illegality is established if a board has not acted in accordance 

with a statute, if its decision was not supported by substantial evidence, 

or if its actions were unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” (Citations 

omitted.)). Consequently, we will consider the district court’s order not 

as one on judicial review, but rather as an order sustaining DMU’s writ of

certiorari pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1401. See Iowa R. 

App. P. 6.108 (“If any case is initiated by a notice of appeal, an 

application for interlocutory appeal, an application for discretionary 

review, or a petition for writ of certiorari and the appellate court 

determines another form of review was the proper one, the case shall not 

be dismissed, but shall proceed as though the proper form of review had 

been requested.”).

III. Standard of Review.

Certiorari is an action at law “where an inferior tribunal . . . is 

alleged to have exceeded proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.” 

State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 728 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Appeal to this court from a 

certiorari judgment of a district court is treated as an ordinary action.” 

Norland, 323 N.W.2d at 252; see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1412. Thus, our 
8

review is for errors at law. Fisher v. Chickasaw County, 553 N.W.2d 331, 

333 (Iowa 1996). When an inferior tribunal’s findings of fact are not 

supported by substantial evidence, or when it has not applied the law 

properly, an illegality exists. Amro v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 429 N.W.2d 135, 138 

(Iowa 1988).

IV. Analysis.

This case presents two issues which require our analysis. First, 

whether the deputy commissioner properly concluded the commissioner 

has the authority to demand a first report of injury in circumstances 

beyond those expressly established by Iowa Code section 86.11. Second, 

whether the deputy commissioner’s decision that DMU failed to make a 

sufficient showing of good cause to avoid the assessment of $1000 

pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.12 was supported by substantial 

evidence. We address each of these issues in turn.

Before proceeding, however, we set forth several well-settled 

principles of statutory interpretation that arise here. First, the principal 

purpose of the workers’ compensation statute is to benefit the worker. 

Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 2002); IBP, 

Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001). To that end, we 

liberally construe the workers’ compensation statute in favor of the 

worker. Grundmeyer, 649 N.W.2d at 750; IBP, 633 N.W.2d at 325. In 

interpreting statutes, our task is only to determine the intent of the 

legislature. Andover Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 787 

N.W.2d 75, 81 (Iowa 2010). When statutory language is plain and its 

meaning clear, “we do not search for legislative intent beyond the express 

terms of the statute.” State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 663 N.W.2d 

413, 415 (Iowa 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We generally 

presume words contained in a statute are used in their ordinary and 
9

usual sense with the meaning commonly attributed to them.” Gregory v. 

Second Injury Fund, 777 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2010).

A. Workers’ Compensation Commissioner’s Authority to 

Demand DMU File a First Report of Injury. We begin our analysis by 

examining the statutory provisions in dispute. In relevant part, Iowa 

Code section 86.12 provides: 

The workers’ compensation commissioner may require 

any employer to supply the information required by section 

86.10 or to file a report required by section 86.11 or 86.13 or 

by agency rule, by written demand sent to the employer’s 

last known address. Upon failure to supply such 

information or file such report within thirty days, the 

employer may be ordered to appear and show cause why the 

employer should not be subject to assessment of one 

thousand dollars for each occurrence. Upon such hearing, 

the workers’ compensation commissioner shall enter a 

finding of fact and may enter an order requiring such 

assessment to be paid . . . .

By its plain language, Iowa Code section 86.12 empowers the 

commissioner to ensure that required information and reports are 

supplied to and filed with the agency. Id.; see DeShaw v. Energy Mfg. 

Co., 192 N.W.2d 777, 783 (Iowa 1971) (Becker, J., dissenting) (“It is the 

mandatory duty of the employer to supply such information. It is the 

duty of the . . . [c]ommissioner to see that this is done.”) Iowa Code 

section 86.12 also provides the commissioner with an enforcement 

mechanism to compel compliance. As set forth in Iowa Code section 

86.12, this starts with a written demand to the employer that it provide 

the agency with required information or reports.

The first question then becomes, when are information and reports 

required? Iowa Code section 86.12 answers this question. As it relates 

to required reports, Iowa Code section 86.12 delineates three bases by 
10

which reports may be required, namely: (1) Iowa Code section 86.11,

(2) Iowa Code section 86.13, and (3) agency rule. Iowa Code § 86.12.

Specifically relating to first reports of injury, Iowa Code section 

86.11 mandates that employers file a first report of injury with the 

commissioner in two circumstances. In relevant part, Iowa Code section 

86.11 provides:

If the injury results only in temporary disability, causing 

incapacity for a longer period than three days, then . . . the 

employer or insurance carrier . . . shall file a report with the 

workers’ compensation commissioner in the form and 

manner required by the commissioner. If such injury to the 

employee results in permanent total disability, permanent 

partial disability, or death, then the employer or insurance 

carrier . . . shall file a report with the workers’ compensation 

commissioner . . . .

From this language, the district court concluded that DMU was not 

required by Iowa Code section 86.11 to file the first report of injury

because there was no evidence that Fink had been incapacitated for 

more than three days or that he had suffered any permanent total or 

permanent partial disability. The district court concluded that Iowa 

Code section 86.11 provided the sole basis for the commissioner to 

require that an employer file a first report of injury. Therefore no written 

demand could be made by the commissioner to file this report. Without 

DMU being required to file the first report of injury, there was no ability 

to proceed with the enforcement procedures set forth in Iowa Code 

section 86.12. For the reasons set forth below, we think the district 

court interpreted Iowa Code section 86.12 too narrowly.

The plain language of Iowa Code section 86.12 grants the 

commissioner the authority to require that reports be filed in addition to 

those already required by Iowa Code sections 86.11 and 86.13. Id.

§ 86.12 (“The workers’ compensation commissioner may require any 
11

employer to . . . file a report required by section 86.11 or 86.13 or by 

agency rule . . . .”). The disjunctive language, “or,” in conjunction with 

the language “by agency rule,” of Iowa Code section 86.12, clearly grants 

the commissioner the authority to promulgate rules mandating reports 

be filed in circumstances beyond those already required by Iowa Code 

sections 86.11 and 86.13. See id.; Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1, 5–6 

(Iowa 2011) (noting that use of the disjunctive “or” necessitated 

conclusion that statute set forth a list of alternatives). Further, while 

Iowa Code section 86.11 mandates two circumstances in which a first 

report of injury must be filed with the commissioner, nothing in the 

language of section 86.11 either expressly or impliedly limits the 

commissioner’s authority to promulgate rules establishing additional 

circumstances in which a first report of injury must be filed. This is an 

express grant of authority under Iowa Code section 86.12. As such, the 

plain language of Iowa Code section 86.12 grants the commissioner the 

authority to establish, by agency rule, additional circumstances when 

employers may be required to file a first report of injury.

This is precisely what the commissioner has done here. In relevant 

part, rule 876—3.1(1) provides:

The first report of injury is to be filed when demanded by the 

commissioner pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.12 and 

when an employer is served with an original notice and 

petition that alleges an injury for which a first report has not 

been filed.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 876—3.1(1); see also id. r. 876—11.7 (“A reporter 

shall file reports as required by . . . subrule[] 3.1(1) . . . .”). This rule 

plainly requires that a first report of injury be filed: (1) when demanded 

by the commissioner pursuant to the procedure set forth in Iowa Code 

section 86.12 and (2) when the employer has been served with an 
12

original notice and petition alleging an employee injury and a first report 

of injury has not yet been filed.

Pursuant to this rule, DMU was required to file a first report of 

injury. First, it is undisputed that on January 29, an original notice and 

petition was filed with the commissioner. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 876—

4.1(14) (“Contested case proceedings before the workers’ compensation 

commissioner [include a]pplication for alternate medical care . . . .”); id.

r. 876—4.6 (establishing that “original notice . . . Form 100C is to be used 

for the contested case proceeding provided for in subrule 4.1(14)” 

(emphasis added)); id. r. 876—4.7 (“Delivery of the original notice shall be 

made by the petitioning party as provided in Iowa Code section 17A.12(1) 

. . . .”). This original notice and petition also advised the commissioner of 

an alleged injury date of July 13, 2012. Upon receipt, the commissioner 

sent DMU a written demand, demanding it file a first report of injury 

concerning Fink’s alleged injury. Second, it is undisputed that both 

DMU and its insurance provider, EMC, were served with an original 

notice and petition by certified mail. See Iowa Code § 17A.12(1) (“In a 

contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing 

after reasonable notice in writing delivered . . . by certified mail return 

receipt requested.” (Emphasis added.)). Third, it is undisputed that 

when the commissioner received the original notice and petition, there 

was no first report of injury on file with the agency regarding the alleged 

injury. Pursuant to rule 876—3.1(1), DMU was required to file a first 

report of injury.

Further, there is no reason to conclude Iowa Code section 86.11 

implicitly narrows the commissioner’s authority to promulgate rules 

requiring that an employer file a first report of injury. Rather, the 

workers’ compensation statute, read as a whole, supports the view that 
13

the commissioner has the authority to promulgate rules requiring that 

an employer file a first report of injury in circumstances beyond those 

already required by Iowa Code section 86.11.

First, in keeping with the principle that we interpret the workers’ 

compensation statute liberally in favor of the worker—and in this case in 

particular—it makes obvious, practical sense for the commissioner to 

require that an employer file a first report of injury after an employee has 

filed a claim with the commissioner. Pursuant to Iowa Code section 

85.23, an employee’s compensation claim is barred unless “within ninety 

days from the date of the occurrence of the injury,” the employer has 

“actual knowledge of the occurrence of an injury,” or the “employee . . . 

give[s] notice thereof to the employer.” Iowa Code § 85.23. One way 

employees can protect themselves is to notify their employer of a workrelated injury and to have the employer prepare a first report of injury or 

similar report. After an employee files a claim with the commissioner, 

the commissioner has an interest in obtaining the first report of injury 

from the employer to ensure the notice requirement of Iowa Code section 

85.23 has been satisfied and that the employee’s claim is not statutorily 

barred. See id. § 86.11 (“The report to the workers’ compensation 

commissioner of injury . . . shall not be admitted in evidence or used in 

any trial or hearing . . . except as to the notice under section 85.23.” 

(Emphasis added.)); Arndt v. City of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Iowa 

2007) (“Section 86.11 allows the first report of injury to be admitted in 

evidence or used in any trial or hearing . . . for the limited purpose of 

showing the employer had notice of the occurrence of an injury as 

required by section 85.23.”). Consequently, once a claim has been filed, 

the commissioner needs the first report of injury regardless of whether 

the injury falls under the umbrella of reports already required by Iowa 
14

Code section 86.11. Given that a first report of injury “shall be without 

prejudice to the employer,” Iowa Code § 86.11, allowing employers to 

ignore the commissioner’s request for a first report of injury after a claim 

has been filed serves only to hamper the commissioner’s ability to 

determine whether the statutorily required notice has been accomplished

and, consequently hampers the commissioner’s ability to proceed in an 

expedited fashion with employees’ potentially meritorious claims.

Second, the authority to require that employers file a first report of 

injury in circumstances beyond those expressly delineated in Iowa Code 

section 86.11 is further supported by the broad information gathering 

powers and reporting duties conferred on the commissioner in other 

sections of the Iowa Code. For example, in relevant part, Iowa Code 

section 86.10 provides:

All books, records, and payrolls of the employers, 

showing or reflecting in any way upon the amount of wage 

expenditure of such employers, shall always be open for 

inspection by the workers’ compensation commissioner . . .

for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of the wage 

expenditure, the number of persons employed, and such 

other information as may be necessary for the uses and 

purposes of the commissioner in the administration of the law.

(Emphasis added.) This broad grant of information gathering authority 

suggests that the legislature did not intend to tightly circumscribe the 

commissioner’s ability to procure information.

Accordingly, we conclude that Iowa Code section 86.11 does not 

provide the sole basis for the commissioner to require an employer file a 

first report of injury. Pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.12, the 

commissioner has the authority to promulgate agency rules mandating 

employers file first reports of injury in circumstances beyond those 

already required by Iowa Code section 86.11. Here, pursuant to rule

876—3.1(1), once Fink had filed his original notice and petition for 
15

alternative medical care with the commissioner, served DMU and EMC, 

and the commissioner demanded by written notice that DMU file a first 

report of injury, DMU was required to file the report. Consequently, the 

commissioner had the authority to demand this first report of injury, and 

the deputy commissioner properly applied the law in reaching this 

conclusion.

B. Whether DMU Made a Sufficient Showing of Good Cause to 

Avoid the $1000 Assessment Pursuant to Iowa Code Section 86.12. 

Having concluded the commissioner had the authority to demand that 

DMU file the first report of injury, we must next decide whether the 

deputy commissioner’s decision that DMU failed to make a sufficient 

showing of good cause to avoid the $1000 assessment was supported by 

substantial evidence.

We again turn to Iowa Code section 86.12, which, in relevant part,

provides:

The workers’ compensation commissioner may require 

any employer to supply the information required by section 

86.10 or to file a report required by section 86.11 or 86.13 or 

by agency rule, by written demand sent to the employer’s 

last known address. Upon failure to supply such 

information or file such report within thirty days, the 

employer may be ordered to appear and show cause why the 

employer should not be subject to assessment of one 

thousand dollars for each occurrence. Upon such hearing, 

the workers’ compensation commissioner shall enter a 

finding of fact and may enter an order requiring such 

assessment to be paid . . . . 

As it relates to reports specifically, in order for the commissioner to 

assess $1000 against an employer pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.12, 

several prerequisites must be met: (1) the commissioner must send a 

written demand to the employer’s last known address demanding the 

desired report be filed; (2) the report must be required by Iowa Code 

section 86.11, Iowa Code section 86.13, or agency rule; (3) the employer 
16

must then fail to supply the commissioner with the demanded report 

within thirty days; (4) the employer must then be notified that there will 

be a hearing at which time it will have the opportunity to show good 

cause why it failed to file the required, demanded report; (5) there must 

be a hearing; (6) after the hearing, the commissioner must enter a finding 

of fact whether or not the employer made a sufficient showing of good 

cause to excuse its failure to file the required, demanded report; and (7) if 

a sufficient showing of good cause has not been made, the commissioner 

may then assess $1000 against the employer. See id.

Applying the facts of this case to the requirements set forth in Iowa 

Code section 86.12, we find that the commissioner followed the proper 

procedures and that DMU failed to make a sufficient showing of good 

cause for its failure to file the required, demanded first report of injury. 

Consequently, the deputy commissioner’s assessment of $1000 against 

DMU was supported by substantial evidence.

First, the commissioner sent DMU a written notice demanding that 

DMU either advise the agency of proof of filing a first report of injury for 

Fink’s alleged injury or immediately file such a report. Second, as 

previously discussed, the report was required under rule 876—3(1). 

Third, DMU failed to file the required, demanded first report of injury 

within the statutorily proscribed thirty-day period. Fourth, the 

commissioner sent DMU a notice of hearing and proposed assessment 

notifying DMU that a hearing would be held on April 9, at which time 

DMU could appear and would be required to show good cause why it had 

failed to file the required, demanded first report of injury. Fifth, DMU 

participated at the scheduled hearing and was allowed to present 

evidence and testimony therein to show good cause why it failed to file 

the required, demanded first report of injury. DMU forwarded no good 

cause or excuse for its failure to file the first report of injury, except that 
17

it did not believe the report was required. As we have concluded, and as 

concluded by the deputy commissioner, the mere belief that a first report 

of injury was not required by Iowa Code section 86.11 is not a sufficient 

excuse so as to constitute “good cause” for failing to file a report required

by rule 876—3.1(1).3 Sixth, after the hearing the deputy commissioner 

issued her decision in which she found that DMU had failed to show 

sufficient good cause. Seventh, having found that DMU failed to make a 

sufficient showing of good cause, the deputy commissioner assessed

$1000 against DMU. Therefore, there is substantial evidence in the 

record to support the deputy commissioner’s $1000 assessment against 

DMU.

V. Conclusion.

The deputy commissioner properly applied the law in concluding 

Iowa Code section 86.11 does not provide the sole basis for the 

commissioner to require an employer to file a first report of injury

pursuant to rule 876—3.1(1). In this case, DMU was required to file a 

first report of injury. Further, the deputy commissioner’s decision that 

DMU failed to make a sufficient showing of good cause to avoid the 

$1000 assessment pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.12 was supported 

by substantial evidence. Consequently, the district court erred in 

sustaining DMU’s writ of certiorari. We reverse the decision of the 

district court and annul the writ.

WRIT ANNULLED.

All justices concur except Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., who 

dissent.

3We need not decide today whether, upon demand by the commissioner, an 

employer who fails to file a first report of injury that is neither required by Iowa Code 

section 86.11, nor agency rule, would be properly subject to a $1000 assessment 

pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.12. Rather, as previously discussed, the 

commissioner has promulgated a rule that required DMU to file a first report of injury 

in this case.

 
18

#13–1808, Denison Mun. Utils. v. IWCC

WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the district court ruling that 

correctly reversed the workers’ compensation commissioner. The 

commissioner lacked authority to penalize the employer for failing to 

provide a first report of injury when the employee missed no work. In my 

view, the controlling statutory provision is Iowa Code section 86.11 

(2013), which provides in relevant part: 

Every employer shall hereafter keep a record of all 

injuries, fatal or otherwise, alleged by an employee to have 

been sustained in the course of the employee’s employment 

and resulting in incapacity for a longer period than one day. 

If the injury results only in temporary disability, causing 

incapacity for a longer period than three days, then . . . the 

employer . . . shall file a report with the workers’ 

compensation commissioner in the form and manner 

required by the commissioner. If such injury to the 

employee results in permanent total disability, permanent 

partial disability, or death, then the employer . . . shall file a 

report with the workers’ compensation commissioner . . . .

It is undisputed the employee missed no work for the injury at issue and, 

at the relevant time, did not allege a permanent total or partial disability. 

Thus, the employer was not required under section 86.11 even to “keep a 

record” of this injury, much less file a report with the commissioner. As 

the district court concluded, 

[t]he statutory provision is straightforward. The employer 

must file a report required by section 86.11. Only if the 

employer fails to file the required report can the 

commissioner assess a penalty for that failure. 

The commissioner cannot amend a statute by rule. Iowa Dep’t of 

Revenue v. Iowa Merit Emp’t Comm’n, 243 N.W.2d 610, 615 (Iowa 1976) 

(“[T]he plain provisions of the statute cannot be altered by an 
19

administrative rule or regulation . . . .”).4 It is true the commissioner 

may impose additional reporting requirements by agency rule 

promulgated pursuant to section 86.12.5 But, that Code provision and 

the rule relied on by the commissioner and majority merely take us in 

circles. The rule provides the “first report of injury is to be filed when 

demanded by the commissioner pursuant to Iowa Code section 86.12.” 

Iowa Admin. Code r. 876—3.1 (emphasis added). Section 86.12 does not 

require such a report; rather this statute merely provides the 

commissioner may penalize employers who fail to supply reports required 

by sections 86.10, 86.11, or 86.13, or by rule. That is, section 86.12 

merely provides a procedural mechanism to enforce the reporting 

requirement in the other provisions, including section 86.11. No report 

was required by sections 86.10 or 86.13 in this case nor, as noted, was a 

report required under the plain language of section 86.11, directly on 

point. The majority concludes the agency rule imposes a new reporting 

requirement here. I disagree. Rather, the rule simply loops back to 

section 86.12, under which no such report is required.

4See also Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751, 764 (Iowa 2009) 

(“Regulations are required to be consistent with the underlying broader statutory 

enactment.”); Dunlop Care Ctr. v. Iowa Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 353 N.W.2d 389, 397 (Iowa 

1984) (“Rules which contravene statutory provisions or exceed an agency’s statutory 

authority are invalid.”); Sorg v Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 269 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Iowa 1978) 

(“Adoption of administrative rules which are at variance with statutory provisions or 

which amend or nullify legislative intent exceeds the Department’s authority.”).

5Iowa Code section 86.12 provides in relevant part: 

The workers’ compensation commissioner may require any 

employer to supply the information required by section 86.10 or to file a 

report required by section 86.11 or 86.13 or by agency rule, by written 

demand sent to the employer’s last known address. Upon failure to 

supply such information or file such report within thirty days, the 

employer may be ordered to appear and show cause why the employer 

should not be subject to assessment of one thousand dollars for each 

occurrence.

 
20

We must read the statutory provisions and administrative rule 

together and harmonize them if possible. The administrative rule is in 

conflict with the statute by requiring a report the statute does not. The 

statute trumps the rule. Moreover, section 86.11, as the more specific 

provision, controls over the more general language in section 86.12. See

Iowa Code § 4.7. No report was due, so the commissioner erred by 

imposing a $1000 penalty for failing to provide it. 

We owe no deference to the commissioner’s interpretation of the 

workers’ compensation statutes. Lakeside Casino v. Blue, 743 N.W.2d 

169, 173 (Iowa 2007). The majority relies on the principle that chapter 

85 is liberally construed for the benefit of the employees. But, a principle 

of liberal construction cannot override the plain meaning of the statute. 

At one level, this is a relatively unimportant case. The employer’s 

counsel stated at oral argument that the failure to provide the report 

when requested was an oversight and that the practice of the employer is 

to promptly comply with agency requests for such information. On 

another level, the principles at play in this case are quite important. 

When our elected legislature specifies the reporting obligations of Iowa 

employers, the commissioner should not increase regulatory burdens 

and impose fines for conduct that satisfied statutory obligations. The 

$1000 per-violation penalty in this case may be small change to some 

employers, yet significant to others. And, while the burden imposed in 

this case—supplying a first report of injury—is slight, the burdens 

imposed under other rules could be onerous.

For these reasons, I cannot join the majority opinion.

Mansfield, J., joins this dissent.