U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

54–757 PDF 2010

FEMA’S URBAN SEARCH AND 

RESCUE PROGRAM IN HAITI: 

HOW TO APPLY LESSONS 

LEARNED AT HOME 

(111–85) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

February 3, 2010 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chair 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

VACANCY 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

VACANCY 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Bettenhausen, Honorable Matthew, Secretary of the California Emergency 

Management Agency, National Emergency Management Association ............ 5 

Carwile, William, Assistant Administrator for Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency ................................................................ 5 

Cover, Steven, Fire Chief, Virginia Beach Fire Department, Sponsoring Agency Chief, Virginia Task Force 2 .......................................................................... 24 

Downey, Dave, Division Chief, Training and Safety Division, Miami-Dade 

Fire Rescue Department, Task Force Leader, Florida Task Force 1 ............... 24 

Endrikat, Fred, Special Operations Chief, City of Philadelphia Fire Department, Task Force Leader, Pennsylvania Task Force 1 ..................................... 24 

Kramer, Mark, Assistant Chief/Operations, Orange County Fire Authority, 

Sponsoring Agency Chief, California Task Force 5 ........................................... 24 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 50 

Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, of the District of Columbia ................................. 51 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 53 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Bettenhausen, Honorable Matthew ........................................................................ 57 

Carwile, William ...................................................................................................... 68 

Cover, Steven ........................................................................................................... 79 

Downey, Dave .......................................................................................................... 87 

Endrikat, Fred ......................................................................................................... 99 

Kramer, Mark .......................................................................................................... 119 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Bettenhausen, Honorable Matthew, Secretary of the California Emergency 

Management Agency, National Emergency Management Association, responses to questions from the Subcommittee .................................................... 66 

Carwile, William, Assistant Administrator for Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, responses to questions from Rep. 

Norton, a Representative in Congress from the District of Columbia ............. 74 

Cover, Steven, Fire Chief, Virginia Beach Fire Department, Sponsoring Agency Chief, Virginia Task Force 2, responses to questions from Rep. Norton, 

a Representative in Congress from the District of Columbia ........................... 84 

Downey, Dave, Division Chief, Training and Safety Division, Miami-Dade 

Fire Rescue Department, Task Force Leader, Florida Task Force 1, responses to questions from the Subcommittee .................................................... 97 

Edwards, Hon. Donna F., a Representative from the State of Maryland, 

certification form .................................................................................................. 20 

Endrikat, Fred, Special Operations Chief, City of Philadelphia Fire Department, Task Force Leader, Pennsylvania Task Force 1, responses to questions from the Subcommittee .............................................................................. 115 

Kramer, Mark, Assistant Chief/Operations, Orange County Fire Authority, 

Sponsoring Agency Chief, California Task Force 5, responses to questions 

from Rep. Norton, a Representative in Congress from the District of Columbia .......................................................................................................................... 126 

vi 


Insert offset folio 1 here 54757.001
vii 


Insert offset folio 2 here 54757.002
viii 


Insert offset folio 3 here 54757.003
ix 


Insert offset folio 4 here 54757.004
x 


Insert offset folio 5 here 54757.005
xi 


Insert offset folio 6 here 54757.006
xii 


Insert offset folio 7 here 54757.007
(1) 

HEARING ON FEMA’S URBAN SEARCH AND 

RESCUE PROGRAM IN HAITI: HOW TO 

APPLY LESSONS LEARNED AT HOME 

Wednesday, February 3, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC

BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Eleanor 

Holmes Norton [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Ms. NORTON. Good afternoon and welcome to today’s hearing on 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s National Urban 

Search and Rescue program, its role in Haiti, and the lessons our 

Subcommittee can learn from the humanitarian work of our U.S. 

teams and their experiences that might be applied during disasters 

in the United States. The National Urban Search and Rescue System, which, for short, is sometimes called US&R, is an administrative creation of FEMA, using the authority of the Stafford Act, and 

is within the jurisdiction of this Subcommittee. 

Today, we will hear from FEMA, from officials from California, 

a State that faces risks for virtually every type of disaster, and 

from four participants in the National Urban Search and Rescue 

program, including two heroes who have just returned from their 

deployment in Haiti. 

FEMA’S US&R program was developed after the devastating results of the Mexico City Earthquake in 1985 and the Loma Prieta 

Earthquake, which struck California in 1989. It was clear, after 

many people were trapped in the aftermath of the Mexico City 

earthquake, that a national capacity was needed for large-scale rescues from structural collapses in the U.S. Today, we again look to 

a tragic earthquake in a neighboring country for lessons learned. 

FEMA, which established the Urban Search and Rescue program 

in 1989 to create a nationwide capacity with 25 task forces, has 

now grown to 28 task forces in 19 States. We are fortunate that 

two of them are here in the National Capital Region: Maryland 

Task Force-1, based in Montgomery County, and Virginia Task 

Force-1, based in Fairfax County. Every deployment of these task 

forces anywhere in the Country or abroad must be understood as 

preparation for disasters here as well. 

US&R is a classic ‘‘all hazards’’ response program, not an earthquake response program. Urban Search and Rescue task forces reVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:50 May 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\54757 JASON
2 

spond to the consequence rather than to the cause of disasters. It 

does not matter what causes a structure to collapse, whether it is 

an earthquake, a hurricane, gas explosion, terrorist attack, bomb, 

or structural failure. The essential elements of their operations remain the same. The expertise the Urban Search and Rescue teams 

build reinforces the breadth of their possible applications. 

The rescue and response network within the FEMA system is 

built on an efficient and economical Federal-State quid pro quo 

model. FEMA provides training and resources to the task forces, 

which in return are available to the Federal Government as needed. While we see Urban Search and Rescue task forces on television when they are deployed to large disasters, they are more 

often being using their expertise in their own States and communities, as well as in neighboring States, for events that do not reach 

the level of a major disaster or emergency declared under the Stafford Act. 

Among the incidents for which FEMA has deployed the Urban 

Search and Rescue teams: the Murrah Federal Building bombing 

in Oklahoma City, in 1995; the Vidal Building explosion in San 

Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1996; the DeBruce Grain elevator explosion 

in Wichita, Kansas, in 1998; the attacks on the World Trade Center 

and the Pentagon, in 2001; the four Florida hurricanes of 2004; 

and, of course, Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast in 2005; and 

Hurricane Ike in Texas in 2008. 

Two of the task forces also have agreements with the United 

States Agency for International Development, or USAID, for overseas deployments: the task forces based in Fairfax County, Virginia, and in Los Angeles, California. When task forces deploy overseas, they are using training and equipment provided by FEMA. 

USAID then reimburses these task forces for the replacement and 

refurbishment of the equipment that is used. 

However, the earthquake in Haiti marks the first time that task 

forces were sent that did not have an agreement already with 

USAID, and that, of course, reflects the need in Haiti, a particularly tragic and extensive earthquake. Four task forces, including 

two that are represented here today, were called upon by FEMA 

on loan to USAID for this tragedy, through an agreement between 

FEMA and USAID. In today’s hearing we will discuss whether this 

is a model that should be used again in the future. 

I am pleased to be a cosponsor of H.R. 3377, the ‘‘Disaster Response, Recovery, and Mitigation Enhancement Act of 2009,’’ along 

with Chairman Oberstar and Ranking Members Mica and DiazBalart. 

Section 105 of that bill reauthorizes the program and provides 

the US&R system, or the Urban Search and Rescue task forces we 

are discussing here today. It reauthorizes them as a matter of law, 

with many of the protections they will need, including a clear and 

specific authorization, as well as workers compensation and tort liability protection. H.R. 3377 was reported favorably to the House 

by the Full Committee in November, but we will revise or strengthen this legislation before the House takes it up if today’s hearing 

makes that necessary. 

I am also pleased today to have introduced a resolution expressing gratitude and appreciation to the personnel of FEMA’S Urban 

3 

Search and Rescue system for their unyielding determination and 

work as first responders to victims of disasters, including the recent earthquake in Haiti. This resolution is cosponsored by Chairman Oberstar, Ranking Members Balart and Mica, and a number 

of other members of Congress already. We will get more. I think 

we need 50 cosponsors—that will be very easy to get—in order to 

bring this resolution to Committee and to the floor. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of today’s witnesses and 

thank them in advance for being available to us, as this tragedy 

is ongoing, so that we can learn lessons now; not a year from now, 

not five years from now, but right now, because we do not know 

when a tragedy of this kind—not an earthquake, but a tragedy involving rescue and recovery—will occur in our Country, given the 

diversity of our population and of our terrain. 

Ms. NORTON. I am very pleased now to yield to the Ranking 

Member and to congratulate him. I believe that he has a team from 

Florida in Haiti now and that he was instrumental in bringing to 

the attention of the Administration that this team could be useful. 

Mr. Diaz-Balart. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

First, let me thank you for this very important hearing and very 

timely hearing. I also want to thank, obviously, the witnesses for 

taking of their valuable time to share some insight with us. 

And if I may be a little parochial, Madam Chairwoman, you mentioned Miami-Dade County. I would especially like to welcome 

David Downey, Division Chief of the Miami-Dade County Fire Rescue Department from obviously the area that I am blessed to represent. Thank you for being here. 

As you just said, Madam Chairwoman, the Miami-Dade Urban 

Search and Rescue team has a long successful track record of doing 

these sorts of operations, and I appreciate their work and the work 

of the other teams that are also represented here today. 

You mentioned, Madam Chairwoman, that we made some phone 

calls, but I think we also have to thank the Administration, because we know that bureaucracies are very difficult to break 

through, and we called the Administration and within the hours 

the Administration, not being too concerned about fiefdoms or kingdoms or walls, they broke down those barriers in order to get the 

job done; and I think it is important that we recognize that. 

The devastation and the destruction that occurred on January 

12th was really without parallel, and it is difficult to comprehend 

the level of devastation, of destruction, no matter how much you 

see it on television, unless you have been there, unless you have 

seen it, which is why it is so important to hear from those first responders that were there, and some of them are here today. 

I know the people of Haiti are very grateful for the selflessness 

and the bravery of these responders who responded to this horrible, 

horrific disaster. It also, by the way, says a lot about the greatness 

of our Country, the United States of America. I mean, we know 

that these are difficult economic times, but the American people, as 

always, have responded to the devastation of Haiti by donating millions upon millions of dollars, goods, and services, even donating 

time and physical labor to try to help the people who are struggling 

in Haiti. Obviously, then, through their Government also, as taxVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:50 May 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\54757 JASON
4 

payers also have contributed greatly to the efforts, and they are efforts that one can only imagine the difficulty that the people are 

going through right now. 

I would be remiss, Madam Chairwoman, if I didn’t recognize the 

contributions of the U.S. armed forces, the Coast Guard, the Department of State that you have mentioned, FEMA, that you have 

also mentioned, our State governments, and obviously the search 

and rescue teams for their unbelievable generosity. Working 

through those incredible challenges on the ground, including the 

limited airport capacity. It was impossible at first to get things in 

and out. The fact that the port was basically destroyed, the damage 

of the infrastructure. 

These search and rescue teams were in Haiti within hours of the 

earthquake and quickly began their efforts when they were there. 

Six search and rescue teams, comprising over 500 personnel, were 

sent from the U.S. to join other teams from other countries, again, 

to search for survivors and to try to save people from the rubble. 

And these efforts did result in numerous, numerous many lives actually being saved. In fact, just last week international search and 

rescue operations found a 16 year old girl still alive more than two 

weeks after the earthquake, which is just hard to believe. 

The efforts of the search and rescue teams resulted in the largest 

number of survivors of this type, this kind of effort, in history, is 

my understanding, so we can’t speak highly enough of the efforts 

they are doing. 

Now, it is going to take years before the response and the rebuilding process is complete. They will eventually be complete, but 

the scars never go away, and we know that. But it is my hope that 

we can learn from this disaster in order to be even better prepared 

to mitigate against and to respond to the next major event, whether it is in the United States or whether it is abroad. 

I really want to thank again the witnesses for joining us today. 

I know they have all been slightly busy, even busier than usual, 

in the last few weeks, and I appreciate all of you taking the time 

to travel here to the Capitol to share your experiences and your expertise with us today. 

As the Chairwoman said—and, again, I need to thank her for her 

leadership—whatever is learned—and I know that I have already 

heard some issues that we can improve on, and we will do what 

we can to try to incorporate it into the legislation. But, again, 

thank you all for being here and thank you, Madam Chairwoman, 

for this very important hearing. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart. 

We will go now to the panel. William Carwile, who is the Assistant Administrator for Response and Recovery at FEMA; and Matthew Bettenhausen, who is the Secretary of the California Emergency Management Agency and also a member of the National 

Emergency Management Association representing emergency managers across the United States. 

Why don’t you begin, Mr. Carwile? 

5 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM CARWILE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR RESPONSE AND RECOVERY, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; AND THE HONORABLE MATTHEW BETTENHAUSEN, SECRETARY OF THE CALIFORNIA 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION 

Mr. CARWILE. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking 

Member Diaz-Balart, and members of the Subcommittee. I am William Carwile, Associate Administrator of FEMA for Response and 

Recovery. 

After serving as an officer in the United States Army for 30 

years, I joined FEMA in 1996 and retired in 2005. I returned to 

FEMA last May in my present position. During my earlier years, 

I served in the field and senior management positions during major 

disasters, including the 9/11 World Trade Center and Hurricane 

Katrina in Mississippi. During these events, I worked closely with 

our Nation’s Urban Search and Rescue teams. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss 

our Nation’s Urban Search and Rescue teams and capabilities. 

The US&R system is an outstanding example of a highly effective local, State, and Federal partnership, a team approach that 

Administrator Fugate has stressed. In addition to focusing on the 

concept of team, one of Administrator Fugate’s highest priorities 

this year is to enhance the Nation’s overall preparedness to respond to a catastrophic event. 

The National Urban Search and Rescue Response System has 

been and will continue to be a critical part of this overall effort. 

The system plays a vital role in providing essential capabilities not 

only for the 28 teams themselves, but it has a multiplier effect 

through its establishment of standards for procedures and equipment. This has a very significant benefit, as many of the national 

methodologies are adopted by other departments, many of which 

have received substantial grants to increase capabilities under 

post-9/11 programs. 

Under the lead of the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, the lifesaving capabilities of the United States 

US&R teams were clearly demonstrated during the response to the 

catastrophic earthquake in Haiti. Our thoughts and prayers continue to be with the people of that devastated country as the recovery continues. 

Side by side with our colleagues from the international SAR community, to courageous Americans, including Fairfax, Virginia Task 

Force 1, the first international SAR team to arrive in Haiti, worked 

around the clock in dangerous conditions to locate and save survivors. For some of our U.S. team members, their efforts were very 

personal. 

Several French Creole speaking members of the Miami Fire Department were integrated into the deploying South Florida Task 

Force. Each one had family members in Haiti. These brave Haitian-Americans played an important role in recovering seven survivors under dangerous and unpredictable conditions. One of these 

firefighters remained in a void comforting a survivor for over 15 

hours. Another was on the scene of a collapsed market for 22 

hours, reassuring the survivor and gathering information, finally 

6 

able to touch the survivor’s hand as the teams broke through the 

concrete rubble. During this rescue, a 4.0 magnitude aftershock 

forced rescuers to evacuate the collapsed building momentarily, but 

immediately following the tremor the team continued rescue efforts 

under these precarious conditions. 

In another remarkable case, a member of the Miami US&R team 

helped to rescue a woman who had been trapped for over 100 

hours. It turned out that she had a son living but a few blocks 

away from the team member’s Pembroke, Florida home. 

Madam Chair, these are but a few of the countless examples of 

the courage and selflessness displayed by the US&R responders. In 

all, the United States task forces rescued 47 survivors. While there 

were over 40 international teams, this number represents one-third 

of all saves. 

The impressive performance of the United States teams was 

based on years of experience and annotation to changing threat environment. Coordination and planning between local, State, and 

Federal partners on the development of standards and methodologies have resulted in expanding the scope of search and rescue capabilities. These include operations in hurricane, flood, and aviation crash events. 

Based on our renewed focus on catastrophic event preparedness 

and the experiences of last year’s flooding in North Dakota and the 

Haiti deployments, the US&R community will conduct a comprehensive review of operations, training, equipment, and organization. This review will be conducted by those who best understand 

the Urban Search and Rescue system, including the task force 

sponsoring agencies, individuals who were responsible for establishing the system, and others with recent field experience. 

The goal of the review will be the development of recommendations on how to enhance the capabilities of the teams to respond 

to events of all kinds with additional flexibility and agility, and 

how team members with national expertise might be leveraged to 

quickly train others to perform light Urban Search and Rescue in 

large-scale events. 

Although it is premature to draw conclusions and lessons learned 

from the Haiti response, ultimately, we believe this experience will 

contribute to improving our future domestic response operations. 

In closing, on behalf of Administrator Fugate and the entire 

FEMA team, I want to express my admiration and appreciation to 

the courageous members of all the search and rescue teams for 

their humanitarian and lifesaving efforts in Haiti. 

I also want to thank you for your continued support and oversight of these important teams. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Carwile. 

Yes, Mr. Bettenhausen, you are next. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking 

Member Diaz-Balart, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to be here today to testify and share our 

experiences not only with the Urban Search and Rescue team, to 

speak more broadly, though, about mutual aid and the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact and the leadership of this Subcommittee and specifically you, Madam Chairwoman, in your supVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:50 May 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\54757 JASON
7 

port for emergency management and homeland security in H.R. 

3377, which is important for all of us. 

I am here on behalf of the California Emergency Management 

Agency, as well as the National Emergency Managers Association, 

which represents all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and our 

five U.S. territories. 

Let me begin by commending Secretary Napolitano, Administrator Fugate, and my good friend—well, Craig is also a good 

friend—and Bill Carwile for their help, their support, and their 

leadership. It has been a pleasure to work with them. And, as the 

Ranking Member knows, it seems Florida sort of has the monopoly 

over the Administrator with Chief Paulsen and the former administrator. 

This has been an important partnership. It is about the team effort, as Bill spoke to the Committee about. It is about those partnerships and the team effort because it is not a Federal effort, it 

is not a State or local effort, it is a national effort; and this is a 

wonderful opportunity for the Subcommittee and the public to 

learn about the great things that we are doing. 

But the bottom line is, when we look at emergency management 

and we look at preparedness, not only does it have to be a national 

program, we have to recognize that all incidents are local, and you 

need to build capabilities from the bottom up. And that is one of 

the things that the EMAC, the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact, and the Urban Search and Rescue teams are based on; 

it is that all incidents are local and, as you said, Madam Chairwoman, it is one for all and all for one in terms of sharing and 

leveraging these resources, which is critical for the wise investment 

and use of our scarce taxpayer dollars. 

I am pleased to come from a State who has gotten this and has 

led the Nation in terms of its mutual aid efforts. Governor 

Schwarzenegger makes clear to his cabinet all the time that public 

safety has to be government’s number one priority. Constitutionally, when you look at it, it is only government who can provide 

law enforcement services and the kinds of things the voters expect 

us and our constitutional form of government expect us to do, is to 

provide them with public safety. And one of the ways that we can 

effectively do this, and most effectively do it and efficiently, is 

through the mutual aid system. 

We are pleased, of the 28 teams that FEMA sponsors in terms 

of Urban Search and Rescue, eight of those are located in California. They have been vital for responding to all sorts of disasters, 

as well as building collapses, and day-in and day-out events where 

they are there 24/7, 365, saving lives and property. It is a wise investment that we have made both at the State, local, and Federal 

levels to support those teams. 

Those teams have been deployed to the Gulf States in 2005, after 

Katrina and Wilma; they also, with Gustav and Ike, were deployed 

to Texas and Louisiana as we had those earthquakes. Our teams, 

the eight that we have, have been built up with swift water rescue 

capabilities. It is something that all 28 of the US&R teams should 

have. 

Earthquake risks are not alone to California. I am originally 

from and did homeland security for the State of Illinois. The New 

8 

Madrid Fault that last went off in 1810 and 1811, which rang 

church bells out in Boston and Philadelphia, shows that the Midwest is also at risk for the type of catastrophic incident that these 

US&R teams would be important to support. 

One of the questions we all get, Madam Chairwoman, and that 

we often hear is why should the Federal Government support these 

State and local assets, and they are principally local assets. It is 

because the Federal Government doesn’t own these capabilities, 

and they shouldn’t build these capabilities to have them sitting 

around, waiting for the all like the Maytag repairman. Rather, instead, they should be built, as they have been, in local departments, where they are there working, training, exercising and saving lives 24/7, 365. 

The cost of these teams is shared, but the bulk of the expense falls on locals and States. FEMA currently provides $1 million a 

year to each of the 28 teams. We estimate the cost just for equipment and exercising, as you go through that, is about $1.7 million 

a year. That is not counting the cost of personnel. We as State and 

locals are assuming about a $10 million cost for these teams, which 

consist of 70 members in each of the positions, from medical, hazardous material, search and rescue capabilities. 

Those personnel costs, those insurance costs, those licensing 

costs, are picked up by State and locals, and having those 70 positions filled three deep is about 210 people for each of these task 

forces and about 6,000 people nationwide. If you add those up, it 

approximately costs about $10 million a year in personnel costs, 

equipment, and exercising to maintain these teams. 

So we need to have the support of FEMA to fully fund the operational costs, which would come to about an additional million dollars a year in support. 

In addition, there are liability issues that have not been resolved 

for our Urban Search and Rescue teams, and H.R. 3377 will go a 

long way to addressing them. Another way to deal with it would 

be to do it under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 

which has liability issues worked out. But these heroes who are 

going out and saving lives should not have to be worrying about 

may happen to them or their families if they are hurt and injured 

while they are rescuing, saving lives, and providing comfort to 

those who have been victims of a catastrophic incident. 

While I am here, I want to plug the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which is a way that not only can we share 

Urban Search and Rescue teams, but fire resources, swift water 

rescue teams, hazardous material response. All of that can be done 

through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which 

NEMA supports with FEMA. And the $4 million investment the 

two make to support the EMAC system, which is also in H.R. 3377, 

is a bargain for the American taxpayers. 

Let me conclude by saying that we in government continue to 

work very hard to get better prepared and do the work that we 

need to do to build our capabilities and resources, and leverage 

those resources efficiently and with value to the taxpayers through 

mutual aid. But citizens have a responsibility to get prepared 

themselves, and our paid response teams, in terms of the Urban 

Search and Rescue teams, are also supported by great volunteers 

9 

who are out there, such as Community Emergency Response 

Teams, a concept developed in Los Angeles and in California. We 

have those teams that are also there as a surge capacity to assist 

us. In these catastrophic incidents, it requires an informed and prepared public so that we have survivors, not victims. 

So I thank you for your support. I thank you for the opportunity 

to be here and welcome any of your questions. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Bettenhausen. 

Before I begin questioning, could I ask the members who have 

come in whether they have any brief opening remarks? 

Mr. CAO. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chair. First of all, 

Madam Chair, I would like to introduce to you a group of students 

from New Orleans. They are from the McKee School. They were in 

my office and we were discussing about the U.S. Government and 

how Congress operates and do our work up here, so I asked them 

to follow me to a Subcommittee hearing. 

And I just want to introduce to the students from New Orleans 

Congresswoman Norton. She represents the District of Columbia. 

And besides Congressman Diaz-Balart of Florida, Congresswoman 

Norton has been one of the greatest champions of the recovery effort in New Orleans. She has held many hearings in connection 

with FEMA and other Federal agencies to make sure that New Orleans gets the money that we need in order for us to rebuild and 

recover. So we owe a great debt of gratitude to Chairwoman Norton, and I hope that once you get back to your classes, you can 

write her a letter and thank her for the hard work that she is 

doing up here to make sure that we get what we need in New Orleans. 

Madam Chair, I give back my time. Thanks. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for the 

generosity of his remarks and thanks. It has been a pleasure to 

work with him, particularly given the great priority we believed 

that the Gulf Coast and especially New Orleans, which suffered 

this ravaging tragedy, should have. 

Would you raise your hands so we can see which—welcome. We 

just want to welcome you here. Mr. Cao is working very hard; he 

wants to make sure that Louisiana and New Orleans are brought 

up every moment he can. So I appreciate that he has invited you 

to this hearing, and I hope we are not boring you too much. 

Are there any comments from any other members? 

[No response.] 

Ms. NORTON. No? Let me then begin first with thanks, because 

already I think members have learned from your testimony. Mr. 

Carwile, could you tell us approximately how many personnel and 

urban rescue teams are deployed from the United States to Haiti 

at this moment? Some of them, I know, have returned. I am just 

trying to get a handle on about how many of our people have been 

there doing this work. We have seen them on television. 

Mr. CARWILE. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. The number was 564 

members of both Urban Search and Rescue teams—those are the 

two teams that came under the foreign teams—and the remaining 

teams that, under arrangement with USAID, we sent down. Additionally, we sent down parts of our Mobile Emergency Response 

System Communications to provide overall communications for 

10 

both the Urban Search and Rescue teams and other U.S. Government agencies. 

Ms. NORTON. Wait a minute, this is important. These are communication teams. 

Mr. CARWILE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. In a country which not only doesn’t have its basic 

infrastructure up, but I can’t believe that there is any communication. And Mr. Cao will understand, from Louisiana, that much of 

the tragedy stemmed from not being able to communicate. Was 

there any communication left? 

Mr. CARWILE. Ma’am, it was severely damaged, as you suggest. 

So without having sent down the Mobile Emergency Response System, it would have been much more difficult for our Urban Search 

and Rescue teams to communicate. 

Ms. NORTON. So they can stand up equipment that allows who 

to communicate with whom? 

Mr. CARWILE. Yes, ma’am. The teams set up three repeaters and 

it enabled the teams that were deployed, doing the rescue work, to 

communicate back to the Urban Search and Rescue team headquarters, if you will, the DART, Disaster Assistance Response 

Team, under USAID. It tied in the ambassador in the embassy, as 

well as Secretary Napolitano, of course, had other interests besides 

hers and FEMA there. ICE was there, the United States Coast 

Guard was there, as well as the Customs and Border Patrol. So it 

provided a command and control node for those elements back 

here. As a matter of fact, the moment we had been deployed there, 

we had video teleconferencing back to us here in Washington. 

We also provided external affairs and set up the joint information center for the U.S. Embassy in Haiti. 

Ms. NORTON. So we have to understand that everything was 

down; that there is no parliament, that the prime minister didn’t 

have a radio that he could talk to anybody with. And we have the 

kind of equipment that can set up communication in a country that 

essentially has none. If we can do that in Haiti, you can imagine 

how important that is in the United States, because we have States 

that are vast where whole millions of people, or certainly hundreds 

of thousands of people, would be left without any way to communicate; and we have already seen what happened in Louisiana. 

I am interested in cost. The people of the United States, not only 

through their Federal Government, but through their State and 

local governments, have borne this expense, and I think we need 

to understand how that occurs, especially since, on the question of 

tort liability, we have, in our reauthorization legislation, some sections that would deal with this. 

Now, as I understood your testimony, Mr. Bettenhausen, personnel liability costs are borne by the State? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Principally by our local governments, because these teams are based, like, for example, Task Force 2, from 

LA County that went to Haiti, that is borne by LA County. 

Ms. NORTON. While they are deployed in other States or in other 

countries? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. No. When they are deployed—it is probably 

easier just to talk about if it were domestically. That is usually 

going to come under a president’s disaster declaration, which 

11 

FEMA then would be reimbursing the cost for their time while on 

the scene. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, this is important to note for the record as 

well. These teams are your normal emergency management folks 

with a lot of expertise, and they acquire a lot of it, or more of it 

as they are deployed elsewhere. But these are people that the State 

or the local government pays for. But when these teams are in another State and you hear Fairfax County, for example, all over the 

Country and other places, or in Haiti, FEMA picks up the cost. All 

the cost? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Cost while they are deployed. 

Ms. NORTON. While they are deployed. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Of course, they will replace the equipment 

but, you know, on a 24/7 basis, these firefighters, these hazardous 

materials experts, these engineers, the paramedics, they are on the 

payroll to be ready and to be on call, and that is the expense which 

is the largest expense of maintaining those teams—— 

Ms. NORTON. This is wonderfully efficient way to do government. 

If you are in Fairfax County today, you are not going to get a lot 

of practice doing major disasters, I hope, since you are right across 

the river from us. So if a disaster comes, with all that expertise 

that you may have, you have not really had real-time experience. 

This way, when you go to Haiti or when you go to another State, 

in essence, that is helping you to not only acquire, but to maintain 

expertise you need in your local jurisdiction. You pay for it while 

they are there; we pay for it when you are deployed elsewhere. If 

you in California were needed in Nevada, who would pay for that? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. If there was a presidentially-declared disaster, FEMA would pick up the cost. Now, if it weren’t a presidentially declared disaster, as we deploy these throughout California or elsewhere, particularly within California, we have our 

own disaster systems act, where the State would pick up 75 percent of that cost. 

I think it is also important, when you talk about these real-life 

events that they respond to, these teams, these professionals, are 

training and exercising all of the time; and, as you talked about, 

construction accidents, trench collapses, train derailments, as we 

have seen here in D.C. These teams are equipped and prepared to 

respond to those and save lives and property. 

It is that training and exercising, though, and those local incidents that go through that equipment that requires the support 

from FEMA. It is a small price to pay for the Federal Government 

to have these assets and resources available as national assets in 

the time of catastrophe. And when we are talking about the expense, right now the Federal Government is picking up only about 

10 percent with the million dollars that they are funding each of 

those teams. They should fully cover the costs of the equipment, 

training, and exercising that goes on for these teams, which would 

require—— 

Ms. NORTON. Wait a minute. Would you clarify that? Picking up 

10 percent of the cost of what? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Of maintaining and supporting these teams. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I thought the Government does refurbish and 

help with equipment. 

12 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. A million dollars a year. It costs $1.7 million 

in equipment and training expenses each year to maintain each of 

these teams. 

Ms. NORTON. I see. 

Mr. CARWILE. Madam Chairwoman, if I might, a point of clarification. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Mr. Carwile. 

Mr. CARWILE. The teams that deployed under FEMA to Haiti, 

those were under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. We had an 

interagency agreement with USAID, so they are going to reimburse 

us for the cost. Just a point of clarification, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. No, that is an important point. 

Mr. CARWILE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. This will not come out of the FEMA budget, it will 

come out of the USAID budget? 

Mr. CARWILE. That is correct, ma’am. As well, the other big benefit, I think, of the teams is they set standards and procedures and 

doctrine for the rest of the Nation. I mean, that is one of the other 

added benefits to tag on what my friend Matt Bettenhausen talked 

about. 

Ms. NORTON. I have just one more question and then I will move 

to the Ranking Member. 

I was pleased to learn that the U.N., working with Haiti prior 

to the earthquake, was apparently trying to replicate something of 

the model we have, something called the Citizens Emergency Response Team Program that began in the States. Do you see the 

possibility that something like the Urban Rescue and Response 

teams can in fact be on the ground in a place like Haiti? And has 

any other jurisdiction where FEMA teams have served taken up 

this model on their own? 

Mr. CARWILE. Ma’am, the practice of the United States Agency 

for International Development, those two teams that deploy is to 

leave their equipment and then train the host nation individuals, 

in this case the Haitians, on that equipment. Moreover, I know several countries around the world have used the United States model 

for Urban Search and Rescue teams. I know before the Beijing 

Olympics, for example, the People’s Republic of China was looking 

to create that capability, and they used our teams as a model for 

that. 

So there will be an increased capability in the country of Haiti. 

Ms. NORTON. But you are leaving the equipment in Haiti? 

Mr. CARWILE. Yes, ma’am. The USAID teams, the two international teams, it is their practice—— 

Ms. NORTON. And this is teams from Fairfax and from Los Angeles? 

Mr. CARWILE. Those two teams, yes, ma’am, the international 

teams. 

Ms. NORTON. So what do they carry to Haiti? 

Mr. CARWILE. Well, they carried their basic load. There are 70 

individuals plus their other bioptic equipment, their medical equipment, and their jaws of life, all those kinds of pretty sophisticated 

equipment. But this is part of the USAID program to train the host 

country and give them the capability that remains there. 

13 

Ms. NORTON. So does that mean that people are being trained on 

the ground in Haiti now with Urban Rescue and Response, where 

you will leave equipment there with people who know how to take 

care of it and who can do the best they can? You will actually have 

trained people when you leave? 

Mr. CARWILE. Yes, ma’am, that is the practice of the USAID to 

do that. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cao? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Madam Chairwoman? 

Ms. NORTON. Oh, excuse me. Mr. Bettenhausen? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Specifically to the CERT teams, the Community Emergency Response Teams,—— 

Ms. NORTON. The citizen teams. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Yes. They are fantastic. They are our surge 

capacity in terms of what they do and train, and can come in behind the FEMA-sponsored Urban Search and Rescue teams. We 

have those located in communities throughout California. The governor created the first cabinet level position of service and volunteerism to help support this because the public is anxious and 

sometimes we in government just don’t ask them for their help and 

support, and these CERT teams are valuable. They come with the 

technical expertise. 

Three years ago we started a nationwide training exercise for 

CERT teams, so other States that have CERT teams have brought 

them out to California; they train and exercise together. But they 

bring radio communications abilities, they bring all—just like the 

Urban Search and Rescue teams, they bring those capabilities and 

they are used throughout the United States. There were CERT 

teams deployed to the Gulf States for Katrina. 

Now, whether they would be deployed internationally, it is not 

likely, just given the depth that we have with the 28 teams. You 

know, we had Task Force 1 and 2, the USAID teams. We had Task 

Force 5 and 7 at our airports, ready to go, from Orange County and 

Sacramento. With those 28 teams, I think that there is probably 

enough capacity and the logistics are a little bit harder on the volunteer citizen teams than it would be for these teams. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, Mr. Carwile, does FEMA encourage or have 

any program to encourage these Citizen Emergency Rescue Teams 

all across the United States? What is that program? 

Mr. CARWILE. Yes, ma’am, that is a program, the Community Response Teams, that has been active. Additionally, Administrator 

Fugate—in the whole urban search and rescue issue and my friend, 

Matt, is correct, 28 heavy teams is probably about the right answer. 

However, based on lessons learned—I happen to have been the 

Federal coordinating officer in the four hurricanes that hit Florida 

in 2004 and then in Mississippi in 2005—there is a real need for 

light Urban Search and Rescue, without all the very heavy equipment. So we are engaging in discussions as late as this morning 

with the National Guard to train others, including the National 

Guard, on how to do basic light urban search and rescue to get 

kind of a Force-Multiplier, and we have been working with sponsoring chiefs to develop a program instruction to expand the capaVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:50 May 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\54757 JASON
14 

bility of light urban rescue using National Guard. And in the State 

of Florida they use volunteer groups, as well, as I think much like 

California does. 

Ms. NORTON. But that is not a FEMA activity? 

Mr. CARWILE. Ma’am, the sponsors are putting together the program and instruction, marrying up the Urban Search and Rescue 

teams with National Guard units and others will be under our auspices. 

Ms. NORTON. Will be a FEMA program? 

Mr. CARWILE. It is very low-cost, actually. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes. And as Mr. Bettenhausen says, people are 

anxious to be useful, and here is a perfect opportunity. 

Mr. Cao? 

Mr. CAO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Carwile, I was driving through New Orleans several days 

ago and I was listening to one of the local radio stations, and one 

of the hosts was proposing why not use some of the FEMA trailers 

that we presently have, ship them to Haiti to help the people 

there? Can you comment on whether or not that proposal is actually workable, whether or not the cost benefit analysis would be 

something that we can ascertain? 

Mr. CARWILE. Congressman, we have been working extremely 

closely with our colleagues at USAID. As a matter of fact, Administrator Fugate and Administrator Shaw together went down to Haiti 

and visited the site of the destruction and visited many of our 

Urban Search and Rescue teams. We have provided a large amount 

of resources to USAID. As the lead Federal agency, they have not 

articulated any requirement for the trailers. I would tell you, having come from Hawaii and having been the director of the Pacific 

Area Office, that, in general, there are some issues. I don’t know 

what is in the lead Federal agency’s mind, but they have not considered, that we know of, sending FEMA trailers down. 

Mr. CAO. Well, I know that FEMA is in the process of auctioning 

out many of those trailers. The last number that I heard, FEMA 

was trying to sell about 100,000 trailers at pennies to the dollar. 

So I figured whether or not the trailers can be put in better use. 

Obviously, with the people of Haiti, they are presently living in 

tents. A lot of them don’t have shelter over their heads. I am pretty 

sure that these trailers would be very beneficial, even though we 

have to address the issue of formaldehyde in these trailers. 

Can you provide me, Mr. Carwile, maybe with an inventory with 

respect to how much FEMA still—how many numbers of trailers 

FEMA still has in its possession? 

Mr. CARWILE. We will provide that to you. 

Mr. CAO. And also a cost benefit analysis of shipping a trailer to 

Haiti? 

Mr. CARWILE. We might defer that to our colleagues at USAID. 

That would be under their auspices and not FEMA’S, of course. 

Mr. CAO. Sure. 

Mr. CARWILE. We can approach our colleagues over there with 

that. 

Mr. CAO. I would like to ask you how has FEMA implemented 

some of the lessons learned in Katrina? Have they applied that to 

Haiti in regards to certain rescue? Also, what have we learned in 

15 

Haiti that we can implement in future disasters in the United 

States? 

Mr. CARWILE. That is a really good question and that is why we 

are going to undertake and have a game plan to undertake a very 

detailed after-action review, as well as the Urban Search and Rescue teams have been conducting after-action reviews as they redeploy and demobilize. I can tell you there are a lot of differences. 

The basic blocking and tackling, the saving lives, the working in 

the rubble certainly in an overseas environment is very similar, 

whether it is Mexico City, Armenia, or Haiti and the United States. 

There are some differences, and I am sure my colleagues that follow on can address those. In terms of working in an international 

environment, under the United Nations, under USAID, there are 

over 40 teams from around the world that were down there, so 

some of those—some of the lessons learned may have to do with 

working in that different kind of environment. But certainly lessons learned, I think my colleagues, the chiefs that come up, are 

really experts in this and can address this, but it has been an 

evolving program and continues to mature and learn lessons 

through every single event, all the events that the Chairwoman referenced in her opening remarks. Every one of those has resulted 

in improvements to the system. 

Mr. CAO. Madam Chair, if you can allow me one more question. 

Ms. NORTON. Certainly. 

Mr. CAO. One of the students from the McKee School that are in 

here right now asked me a question that I did not really know the 

answer to, and it deals with hazard mitigation in regards to I guess 

individual homeowners rebuilding. There was an issue of qualification based on the cost to rebuild per square foot. I know that this 

hearing does not deal directly with recovery issues and with individual homeowners, but, still, if you can provide me with information regarding what is FEMA policy in connection with hazard 

mitigation in regards to individual homeowners. 

What are some of the qualifications? Is there a cost per square 

foot limit that FEMA can assist? All those issues that deal with individual homeowners applying for hazard mitigation that they 

want to apply to their homes. Obviously, here we are talking about 

homeowners in the 2nd Congressional District in Louisiana that 

were damaged by Katrina and other hurricanes. 

Mr. CARWILE. We will be happy to provide you information on 

that. We mixed a couple different programs, the Individual Assistance Program and then the Hazard Mitigation Program, but we 

will provide follow-on information for you, Congressman. 

Mr. CAO. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. If I could also add to that. In the discussions 

on H.R. 3377, while it doesn’t go to individual assistance for homeowners, the National Emergency Managers Association and in that 

bill supports the reauthorization for the pre-disaster mitigation 

funding, and that is critical. A dollar spent on prevention is going 

to save a lot in response and recovery costs. So, in H.R. 3377, it 

would help us a lot in government for the public assistance to have 

the reauthorization for the pre-disaster mitigation grant funding. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Cao. 

16 

Before I go to Ms. Edwards, in deference to the fact that we are 

fortunate that the Chairman of the Full Committee has joined us 

today, could I ask Mr. Oberstar if he has any statement or questions? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. [Remarks in foreign language.] That is in the language of Haiti, the Creole language, thank you, Madam Chairman; 

only in Creole and in French it is Madam President. I love to have 

the French come and visit and said Messr. President. It only means 

Chairman in our language, but it sounds good. But that Haitian 

Creole expression, you are a loaded mule means you have a lot of 

work, but with many hands the work is lighter. Or we say many 

hands make light work. The Haitians have an expression for just 

about everything. I lived there three and a half years and learned 

the language, and love it and treasure it and love the Haitian people. 

Mr. Cao suggested sending FEMA trailers to Haiti, not with the 

formaldehyde, though. We wouldn’t want to—in addition to the 

international problems of moving product from the U.S. overseas 

with foreign trade issues and others that attend this matter, and 

then the question of how you bring them back, what you are supposed to do at the end of their use for an emergency, we wouldn’t 

want to be exporting a source of illness, certainly not to our neighbors in the Caribbean. 

Lessons learned, I think the most important lesson learned from 

Haiti is to have building codes. They have never had building 

codes. If they had, there is no enforcement mechanism. The Haitian government has so many other things too be worried about 

that building codes are way down the list of their issues of concern 

and for enforcement. 

I think Haiti is on track to do that. I think the lesson learned 

in Haiti is more important for the Haitians than for us, and that 

is you need to have a building code, you need to have an enforcement mechanism in the rebuilding process. Don’t just put concrete 

block on concrete block, in many cases, without mortar, without 

rebar, without foundations. In light of what we know, this is one 

of the most active seismic areas in the hemisphere, and that issue 

never had raised itself. There was no preparation. 

Lesson learned from Minneapolis, when the bridge of I-35 over 

the Mississippi River collapsed, the response was impeccable because Mayor R.T. Reibach of Minneapolis had availed himself of 

FEMA’S pre-disaster planning funds, Madam Chair and colleagues, 

and put his entire city governance apparatus and that of the first 

responders of St. Paul through a three-day training exercise two 

years before—or was it a year? It was a year and a half before the 

collapse of the bridge. When it happened, they were prepared. They 

all knew what to do. They had communications, they had coordination, they had equipment available, they had hospitals prepared to 

accept the injured and the mechanisms to deal with the fatalities. 

There was no such planning in Haiti. The Coast Guard was the 

first on station, on response. They did everything they could. I 

would just like to read—I get a daily report from the Coast Guard. 

From Day 4, after the four Coast Guard cutters were offshore and 

two more enroute from Health Services Technician Larry Berman: 

Today gave my partner, Elias Gomez, and I the mental break we 

17 

needed from running the clinic for the past three days without any 

medical officers to team with. Elias ran the pharmacy and I ran 

the medical supply. I took a moment to pray and thank God for the 

surgeons as our emotions surfaced. We saw about 100 patients 

today. In four days our count is 350. 

In the next lines he says: I want to pass on the story of the miracle betadine, the surgical soap used to cleanse and prepare an 

area for surgery and to cleanse wounds. We started the day with 

two and a half gallons and we never ran out. Every patient had 

wounds requiring betadine. Some need lots of betadine. I’m telling 

you, it was God that kept that soap flowing; otherwise, the clinic 

would have had to stop seeing patients. 

What do they need? He said, here is what we need: morphine, 

Kerlix—which is gauze bandage—betadine by the gallon, triple antibiotic ointment, wash basins, medical supplies, medical staples, 

Ace wraps, crutches, canes, sutures, Zylocane, tubing, mops, 

brooms, thermometers, suture sets, headbands for lighting, and 

Gatorade for the team. 

Everything is needed and it is needed all at once in Haiti. 

An important lesson learned is coordination. There are a host of 

organizations, all working at the same time, from many countries, 

many cultures, many languages, many different practices, all within a government structure which largely was destroyed by the 

earthquake; government buildings collapsed, important ministers 

killed, staff personnel disrupted, the president having to operate 

out of inadequate quarters without communications. 

I recommended to President Obama that he bring James Lee 

Witt, who already was in Haiti under a contract with the Haitian 

government prior to the earthquake guiding and training people in 

disaster response. He didn’t have much time, he hadn’t been there 

very long before the earthquake struck; and his role now has been 

expanded under a contract with AID. But you need organization 

structures for long-term recovery of the infrastructure and I have 

had discussion with Chairwoman Norton and with our wonderful 

Ranking Member, Mr. Diaz-Balart, about long-term recovery, and 

we need to be doing some things here in this Committee to prepare 

for that. 

Command and control and coordination on the ground, that is 

still an issue, is still something that needs attention. Most of our 

U.S. Government agencies who respond are accustomed to operating under presidential directions, but AID is not in that mode; 

AID operates in a different structure. 

So we need to re-think the role of AID in a disaster response situation. You need coordination with the 10,000 NGOs, non-governmental organizations, that are in Haiti. Why do you have 10,000? 

Because during the Duvalier dictatorial era, no government was 

willing to deal with the corruption of Duvalier, so they went 

around the government and worked with the NGOs, which proliferated; and in that process government atrophied, it had little or 

no capability to respond to its own needs. 

Ms. Brown, the Chair of our Rail Subcommittee, can tell you. She 

has organized time and again shipments of goods to Haiti by the 

truckload, by the shipload, and then they have trouble getting the 

goods into Haiti; they get to the dock, they wait there for weeks. 

18 

Finally, we met with President Preval and he said, when you have 

that problem, call me. 

Well, she said, rightly, Mr. President, with all respect, we 

shouldn’t have to call you; you should have a governmental structure in place that responds. That is a failure of government, if the 

president has to be involved in getting goods off a dock and into 

the hands of people who need the food and the clothing and the 

other material that we are sending. 

So coordination among the NGOs and developing governmental 

structure is critical in this process. So I think the task on the 

ground is converting Haiti from a government of NGOs to a selfsustaining government with a structure and with personnel in 

place. There are more talented and gifted Haitians living outside 

the country, working for the International Monetary Fund, The 

World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank for African 

Nations. 

Haitians are gifted, talented, skilled, but because there was no 

future for them in their own country, they left. We need to bring 

them back and assure them there is going to be a solid, stable political future, and I think we have that opportunity now at our fingertips if we do this recovery right with the international community, but engaging the Haitian people at every step. This is their 

country, and they are proud of their country. 

I will just conclude with one of my favorite of the Haitian expressions. [Remarks in foreign language]. The pencil of God has no 

eraser. God’s pencil can’t erase the earthquake, but we can help, 

and that is what we have to do there. 

So I want to thank you for being—I thank Madam Chair for your 

foresight and holding this hearing. This Committee intends to stay 

on top of this issue in Haiti. 

Do you have any comment on the command, control, and coordination issue? 

Mr. CARWILE. Perhaps my colleagues who are going to follow, 

who were actually there, sir, may do so better, but I do know that, 

from observing it and having folks on the ground reporting back 

each day, I know that the international community—of course, led 

under the United Nations—is certainly a different environment in 

terms of command and control communications, and I know that 

USAID and the White House has been working very closely to put 

together a structure down there with the government of Haiti going 

forward to enable them to have the kind of recovery that you described, sir. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. I do think that, from what we learned from 

the teams, it is going to be one of the lessons learned from Haiti 

is those coordination issues. The international community hasn’t 

adopted, like we have here in the United States and in California, 

the National Incident Management System and standardized, as 

our teams have deployed, understand incident command and unified command, and I think you are going to hear some of the challenges with the international partners there who are not as familiar with that kind of unified command and the use of the National 

Incident Management System. 

19 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 

Bettenhausen. 

We are going to move on to Ms. Edwards and then quickly move 

on to our next panel before there is a vote called. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thanks so 

much for holding this hearing today. I actually want to go back to 

the earlier discussion about FEMA and these trailers, because it 

really does concern me that the recent news reports that indicate 

perhaps some consideration of using the formaldehyde-laden FEMA 

trailers in Haiti, and I would like to hear directly from FEMA and 

from Secretary Napolitano that this is absolutely off the table. I 

think that we owe that to the Haitian people and we owe it out 

of respect, frankly, to Mississippians and those in the Gulf who 

were subjected to these trailers. 

Also, Madam Chair, I want to enter into the record, so that we 

make sure that we have it, a certification that is actually required 

in the bidding process when these trailers are being sold in open 

bid that is essentially a hold harmless statement that purchasers 

are required to fill out with respect to the acquisition of these trailers. 

And there is a portion of it that says that requires the purchaser 

to acknowledge that ‘‘the sale and lot number may contain formaldehyde and I agree the United States shall not be liable for personal injuries to disabilities of or death of any persons arising from 

or incident to the sale of this property trailer, use or its final disposition, and to hold the United States harmless from and shall indemnify the United States against any or all debts, liabilities, judgments, cost, demands, suits, actions, or claims of any nature arising from or incident to the sale of the property.’’ 

Ms. NORTON. So ordered. It will be admitted into the record. 

[The information follows:] 

20 


Insert offset folio 8 here 54757.008
21 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. This hold harmless statement is required to be submitted, to be filled out by those who purchase the 

trailers, and yet there is this conversation about dumping—and I 

do use that word—dumping these trailers onto the Haitian people. 

You know, as Chairman Oberstar has pointed out, the Haitian 

people are resilient, they are smart, they are talented. Their expatriate community is all across the world and their talents spread 

every place and need to go back to Haiti. But just because you are 

poor and your immune system may be compromised and you don’t 

have someplace to live doesn’t mean that you want to live in a 

formaldehyde trailer. So I would really appreciate it if the Secretary and if FEMA would simply take it off the table, not make 

it a part of the discussion anymore, out of fairness to the Haitian 

people. 

I want to say also that—and to thank you because the service of 

our Urban Search and Rescue teams is really tremendous. Great 

people doing work that some of us couldn’t possibly do under the 

most difficult circumstances. We have seen that at work in Haiti; 

we have seen that at work here on our own shores. 

I am curious as to whether there are barriers to more of our 

Urban Search and Rescue teams being trained or certified, or whatever it takes, to do more international work, because I do think it 

provides the kinds of hands-on, on the ground work that isn’t always accessible here in the Untied States, and that we need the 

talents of multiples of these teams able to do that kind of work, 

and I wonder if you would respond to that. 

Mr. CARWILE. First, on the trailers, there is no intention of the 

Department of Homeland Security or FEMA. Trailers going to 

Haiti have never been in discussions with USAID, the lead Federal 

agency on that, just to take that off the table, ma’am. 

On other teams having the capacity to go overseas, we are going 

to hear from a couple of the folks that had the responsibility of 

USAID, but I think it was remarkable that we were able to stand 

up the other teams that weren’t off the teams and didn’t have passports and didn’t have shots and didn’t have those kinds of things 

very quickly to respond to an overseas deployment. So I think there 

will be a lot of lessons learned for our domestic teams as we come 

back. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

No further questions. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. 

I just want to establish for the record on this matter of Incident 

Command System. Now, when FEMA goes—that is what FEMA is 

trained in. Here is USAID, it is in its own jurisdiction and it is 

doing the best it can. Would it, in light of the expertise of the Federal Government and where it has placed the expertise, would it 

be better for FEMA to exercise that Incident Command—and let 

me explain what I mean—where multiple agencies get together, 

work on a single disaster, where there is no time to waste, there 

is no time to get together, how you get them all together and how 

you deploy them for the first time. 

If the Federal Government has a lead agency for doing that, 

wouldn’t it, by some memorandum of understanding or action by 

this Subcommittee, be best to say, when you are overseas and you 

22 

are using or need FEMA, FEMA’S help, FEMA will be your Incident Command System control? 

Mr. CARWILE. Ma’am, we would always be—and you correctly described our role in terms of the National Incident Management 

System and the Incident Command System, much of which came 

from our great State of California. But we would certainly offer up 

our assistance to help train others—— 

Ms. NORTON. No, no, I am asking another question. Government 

bothers me because government immediately goes into bureaucratic 

responses; wait a minute, who is supposed to do this. Look, we 

went through this with FEMA, where who was supposed to do it 

on paper seemed to be how it must be done, and where the flexibility to do what has to be done when there is nothing in the statute saying that you are forbidden from doing it, was not exercised. 

So this Committee and Subcommittee had to pass a post-Katrina 

act. FEMA already had the authority to do much of what was in 

it. 

Now, what I am trying to find out—this is a hearing, this is an 

oversight hearing. We do fact-finding here. I want to know what is 

the fastest and best way if you deployed overseas. If USAID says 

we need FEMA for your urban rescue teams, what would be lost 

and would be required in saying not only are we deploying some 

people and some expertise, we are deploying you the Incident Command Control to make sure they do in fact work together on the 

ground? Is that the best practice overseas, the way it is the best 

practice in the United States of America? 

Mr. CARWILE. I think it is the best practice to send an incident 

support team that provides the overhead management of the teams 

using the Incident Command System. And, actually, we did send 

augmentation to USAID to provide that expertise. They weren’t 

called an incident support team, but they were actually augmentation and performed that function. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I appreciate that and I have no criticism of 

USAID. All I know is these are response and recovery people, and 

that 10 minutes can mean a life. So to the extent that the bureaucracy is trying to decide, okay, make sure the USAID people, who 

really don’t know anything about incident command, gets stood up, 

that I would find quite frustrating, since quick action is what you 

are called upon to render. 

What would be your answer to that, Mr. Bettenhausen? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. In fact, the US&R teams that are going, 

they use the Incident Command, Unified Command. They have 

that. They also bring that kind of overhead support that is doing 

the—— 

Ms. NORTON. Who is the ‘‘they,’’ please? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. The US&R teams themselves have that capability within that. FEMA, on top of that, also sent in these overhead. The issue that I think is going to come out of this, though, 

is that while you are having good command, control, and communications with your teams that are deployed, the issue there was— 

you heard, for example, there were 40 international search and rescue teams there. The overall coordination—if we are talking about 

a lesson learned, some of these international responses, they are 

not using necessarily the same system we are. Plus, there was the 

23 

additional challenge that there was not COOP and COG, Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government, existing there, 

that it had completely collapsed. 

So in terms of our teams going over there, they were correctly 

following it. The challenge, I think, that you are going to have is 

sort of that coordination, when it is not things that we—— 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Bettenhausen, I don’t doubt that they were correctly following it. What you have said about the foreign teams 

only emphasizes my point. I can’t expect you all to take control of 

those teams. But if we have two agencies over there, we experienced this on the ground in Katrina. There was huge confusion 

about who on the ground is in charge. Now, the Incident Command 

System should be in the hands of somebody who has used it before 

and who has some practice in using it. And I am not suggesting 

even that a change in statute is necessary. 

I would ask you, Mr. Carwile, to go back and have discussions 

with USAID. I doubt that they would much care who dealt with a 

system foreign to them if it got the work done. 

Finally, let me ask does FEMA plan to support efforts in Haiti 

beyond what you are doing now? In other words, I am told you are 

near the end of recovery. Does that mean that the teams are coming home and they have done all they can do in Haiti? 

Mr. CARWILE. Ma’am, as far as the Urban Search and Rescue effort, there are 12 members that had not deployed down that have 

been deployed two days ago from Los Angeles and from Fairfax to 

provide technical assistance to the contractors who are undertaking 

the recovery efforts at the Hotel Montana and another. So that is 

the last of the United States commitment to the recovery efforts. 

We do have 15 members, both MERs that I referred to earlier, and 

a small Command and Control element down there—— 

Ms. NORTON. The MERs are the communication feeds. 

Mr. CARWILE. Yes, ma’am, the Mobile—— 

Ms. NORTON. And they are going to remain for how long? 

Mr. CARWILE. Well, probably for another two weeks, ma’am. We 

are trying to reconstitute that. It has some critical capabilities 

down there well prior to the hurricane season. 

Ms. NORTON. Is there not recovery from the overall disaster that 

American teams will be doing? If not rescue teams, who is going 

to be doing that? I mean, recovery, they are going to be in some 

kind of recovery. I recognize that is such an umbrella term. Are 

you a part of that or—— 

Mr. CARWILE. No, ma’am, we are not. USAID has the big part 

of that. I know a representative of the White House, Richard Reed, 

was down and helped craft an overall U.N. structure in which the 

United States had an appropriate role, but that will be an international situation under Secretary Clinton, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Carwile. Unless there are—oh, Ms. 

Edwards does have a question. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I do, just to follow up. Now, you mentioned earlier 

that when the international teams are deployed, they leave equipment on the ground and then there is training. So how many people are still on the ground in Haiti performing that function, training Haitians about the use of the equipment and maintaining it 

and doing services? 

24 

Mr. CARWILE. I believe some of duties of those 12 that are providing technical assistance, I believe they are doing some of that 

training as well, but some of that was—a great part of that was 

done before the teams redeployed back, as I understand it. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Before the teams came back this time, this first 

go-round. All right, thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. We may have a vote within 

a half hour, so we want to thank this panel, very valuable testimony, and ask the next panel, the last panel, to come forward. 

This is a panel we must hear from. This is the panel that has 

been on the ground here and elsewhere, and I am going to call 

upon them in this order: Back from Haiti has come the Task Force 

from Pennsylvania 1, Fred Endrikat, Special Operations Chief, City 

of Philadelphia Fire Department; Dave Downey, Division Chief, 

Training and Safety Division, Miami-Dade Rescue, both of whose 

task forces have been there; Virginia Beach Fire Department, Fire 

Chief Steven Cover, Virginia Task Force 2; and, of course, Mark 

Kramer, Assistant Chief/Operations, Orange County Fire Authority, California Task Force 5. 

Mr. Endrikat, why don’t you begin? 

TESTIMONY OF FRED ENDRIKAT, SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

CHIEF, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA FIRE DEPARTMENT, TASK 

FORCE LEADER, PENNSYLVANIA TASK FORCE 1; DAVE DOWNEY, DIVISION CHIEF, TRAINING AND SAFETY DIVISION, 

MIAMI-DADE FIRE RESCUE DEPARTMENT, TASK FORCE 

LEADER, FLORIDA TASK FORCE 1; STEVEN COVER, FIRE 

CHIEF, VIRGINIA BEACH FIRE DEPARTMENT, SPONSORING 

AGENCY CHIEF, VIRGINIA TASK FORCE 2; AND MARK KRAMER, ASSISTANT CHIEF/OPERATIONS, ORANGE COUNTY 

FIRE AUTHORITY, SPONSORING AGENCY CHIEF, CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE 5 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. Thank you, Chairwoman Norton, Ranking Member Diaz-Balart, Chairman Oberstar, and distinguished members of 

the Subcommittee. I have been a Philadelphia firefighter for 35 

years and I am speaking today as a first responder in relation to 

my duties in Philadelphia and a FEMA National US&R Response 

System member who arrived in Haiti on January 19th. As the 

FEMA US&R National Task Force Leaders representative, I also 

have the responsibility and privilege to speak on behalf of the nearly 6,000 members of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

US&R National Response System. 

With all due respect and condolences to the people of Haiti in the 

aftermath of this devastating disaster, it is important to look at the 

international emergency response to this incident and determine 

how to apply lessons learned in Haiti to our future operations here 

at home. The following observations and recommendations are in 

no way intended to serve as a criticism of the response operations 

in Haiti. They are submitted with the thought that we have an obligation to use this experience and leverage what we learned in the 

sole interest of better preparing our Nation and serving our citizens. 

There were many lessons learned, and I would like to focus on 

four main areas. 

25 

Tiered response. We must ensure that we continue to develop a 

structured tiered response capability that places an emphasis on 

first responders and common operating platforms. All disasters 

start as local level events. The faster we can engage technician 

level rescuers in a tiered response after a sudden onset event, the 

more likely it is that we will save many more lives. 

Haiti did not have a fully developed technical rescue US&R capability at the local, regional, or the national level, and precious time 

was lost in the immediate hours after the initial earthquake as a 

sufficient number of skilled rescuers were not quickly able to engage in rescue operations. 

It is vital for us to continue to fund local government technical 

rescue and US&R initiatives by way of the Homeland Security 

Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative Grants, Maritime 

Port Security Grant Program, and possibly other related Federal 

funding mechanisms that are not tied specifically to response to 

terrorism. It is important for FEMA’S National US&R system to 

continue our outreach to other responders, including the State 

Urban Search and Rescue Alliance, to assist them in building upon 

their good work as they continue to develop technician level response capabilities at the local, regional, and State levels. This will 

enable our Nation to put rescuers that are trained to the highest 

technical levels to work in the shortest amount of time possible. 

Second area is command and control. Strong unified command 

and control is essential for successful rescue operations at catastrophic events. In Haiti, US&R operations were coordinated by the 

United Nations On-Site Operations Coordination Center. At a similar event in the U.S., operations would be directed by the local authority having jurisdiction, with assistance from the Federal Government, with the FEMA US&R Incident Support Team having a 

significant role. The FEMA US&R system needs a structured formal mentoring and shadowing program for our less experienced incident support team members. We have an obligation to fully train 

and exercise these field managers before we assign them to critical 

roles at an actual disaster. 

One of the many observations that was communicated to me by 

FEMA US&R System Task Force Leaders operating in Haiti was 

that international teams of widely varying staffing and capability 

were assigned to similar sized large operational areas, which in 

Haiti were called sectors, and that certain sectors did not have 

enough resources assigned to adequately perform prioritize search 

operations in a given operational period. 

At home, we should continue to develop and implement the National Incident Management System resource-typing standard. We 

need to develop a comprehensive national catalog of all US&R resources in this Country and we need to catalog them in relation to 

the NIMS typing standard, and then eventually validate their readiness by the use of an assessment tool similar to the FEMA US&R 

National Response System Operational Readiness Evaluation Program. 

Two specific aspects of recognizance and search operations in 

Haiti warrant our attention here at home. The foundation of how 

we operate here in the U.S. for our concept of operations for effective search and rescue actions at large-scale catastrophic events is 

26 

effective recognizance. Sector assignments and corresponding mapping during the recognizance phase in Haiti presented a significant 

challenge. In the first days of operations, Florida Task Force 1 and 

some of the other FEMA US&R Task Forces deployed to Haiti were 

using tourist maps provided by the U.S. Embassy. Search assignments were developed along geographical borders rather than likesized grids. 

The FEMA US&R system has a strong working relationship with 

the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency. Their analysts and 

technicians are able to provide sophisticated mapping that contains 

detailed grid references with corresponding up-to-date satellite images, as well as Light Detection and Ranging, or LIDAR, graphics 

soon after a sudden onset disaster occurs. 

Included in your briefing packets in the section following my 

written testimony are examples of the mapping products developed 

by NGA. We have to continue to use their technology when we 

have disasters here at home. 

FEMA Administrator Fugate has recently shared his vision of a 

Force-Multiplier concept with the leadership of the FEMA National 

US&R Response System. This Force-Multiplier concept would use 

the 28 FEMA US&R Task Forces to assist impacted local and State 

governments at disasters when requested and build upon their 

operational capabilities and expertise by training selected Department of Defense assets and non-FEMA US&R assets. 

By pairing these trained resources with the 28 FEMA US&R 

Task Forces, recognizance and initial search operations at complex 

events could be accomplished in a much more efficient, uniform 

manner, creating a significant positive impact in the areas of 

search documentation and operational planning. 

It is vital that we continue to support and further develop our 

all-hazards National US&R system, which also serves as a best 

practices model for our local, regional, and State US&R teams, and 

it is important that we address a number of related administrative 

and funding concerns. 

Chairman Oberstar’s House Resolution 3377 addresses the current administrative concerns involving the National US&R program by consolidating the statutory authority for the system under 

the Stafford Act and explicitly authorizing the US&R system. As of 

January 26th, it was reported that a total of 134 people were rescued from collapsed structures in Haiti by rescue teams that responded from all over the world. Forty-seven of those people were 

rescued by the efforts of the six US&R Task Forces from the 

United States. 

Some of those rescue operations were extremely complex, with 

one of them taking a Task Force from the U.S. 30 hours to complete. Those rescues did not occur by chance; they were the direct 

result of the dedication of our personnel, the extensive training 

that is provided to them, the specialized equipment cache and 

logistical support package that the Task Forces deploy with, the 

framework of the National US&R system that enables them to operate in a uniform and efficient manner, and the unwavering support of the sponsoring agencies and participating agencies that furnish all of the nearly 6,000 members of our national system. 

27 

Based on our lessons learned and reinforced during the response 

to the earthquake in Haiti, I would respectfully ask that the Committee consider the continued support of the FEMA US&R National Response System. 

Thank you, Chairwoman Norton, Ranking Member Diaz-Balart, 

and distinguished members, and Chairman Oberstar for the opportunity to testify today. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Endrikat. 

We are going to hear next from Mr. Dave Downey from Florida 

Task Force 1. 

I am afraid we are going to have a vote shortly. If so, I will recess the hearing, if we don’t get to hear from everybody or to ask 

questions, and ask members to come back. 

Mr. Downey? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Thank you, Chairwoman Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. This is very important testimony. These are the 

people who have been there, done that, so I don’t want to give any 

short shrift to these witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Downey. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Norton, 

Ranking Member Diaz-Balart, Chairman Oberstar, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee for inviting me to be here 

today. Again, my name is Dave Downey. I currently serve as a Division Chief with Miami-Dade County Fire Rescue in South Florida, and also as a Task Force Leader for Florida Task Force 1. 

My written testimony and comments today are from my perspective as a Task Force Leader who led an 80-person search and rescue team to Haiti. I will discuss my direct observations from the 

mission, with the goal of identifying lessons learned that can be applied here at home. 

Shortly after the news that a magnitude 7.0 earthquake had 

struck the country of Haiti, Florida Task Force 1 alerted and 

rostered a search and rescue team, even though our task force is 

not currently designated for international response. Our close proximity to the island, coupled with our past international response 

and training experience, necessitated us being prepared if called 

upon. Based on the preliminary reports, it was clear that this 

would be a catastrophic event requiring tremendous amounts of 

international aid. 

After receiving our activation orders, we began what would turn 

out to be a day-long effort trying to secure transportation to move 

the 80-person task force and 62,000 pounds of rescue equipment to 

Haiti. Ultimately, we would be transported by a contracted carrier, 

one for personnel and a different carrier for our equipment. 

While the plane carrying the personnel landed without delay in 

Port-au-Prince the following morning, the two planes carrying our 

equipment cache were delayed and then diverted to Santo Domingo. Ultimately, one plane landed with primarily base camp supplies the next morning, almost 24 hours after we got there, and the 

other plane with our rescue cache, the equipment most essential to 

this mission, didn’t arrive until another 36 hours later. 

Pre-identification of specific airframes and providers capable of 

moving US&R assets rapidly and efficiently is essential. AdditionVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:50 May 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\54757 JASON
28 

ally, when airports are inundated with a myriad of flights, priority 

must be given in the early days to search and rescue. 

Once on the scene, the size of this disaster was overwhelming. 

My first thought was, where do we begin. Our priorities were already established. We first were directed to look at hospitals, universities and schools, multi-story buildings, and any other large 

structures. While the priorities seemed logical, the mapping and 

sector assignments were woefully inadequate. The maps that we 

used for the first two days were, as my colleague described, tourist 

maps like this one provided by the embassy. These maps lacked the 

sufficient detail, such as street names, and the locations of these 

significant structures we were supposed to prioritize. 

Search sectors were developed along geographical borders rather 

than like-sized grids. This created various shapes and sizes for 

each sector, and with the lack of adequate maps, sector boundaries 

were difficult to determine. 

Again, I have included in my testimony some examples of the 

mapping that we were using actually the first week. 

It is my recommendation that the capabilities of the National 

Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency be incorporated early on in disaster response. Prescripted mapping packages must be identified 

and adherence to the National Grid Reference System must be implemented for all search and rescue operations to ensure the priority areas are identified and grid searches are accomplished in the 

most expeditious fashion possible. 

Transportation was a daily challenge for search and rescue 

teams. This was probably the greatest struggle we had in performing our job. Every day the task forces competed for the use of 

a small contingent of transport vehicles. We should not expect a 

local infrastructure that is already devastated by a disaster to supply transportation. If a task force is deployed without their transportation assets, as was this case, then dedicated onsite transportation has to be secured. 

During collapse search and rescue, besides the type of construction we are confronted with, our greatest enemy is time. To be successful, we must be able to get the right resources to the right 

place as quickly as possible in order to save as many lives as possible. To this end, task forces must ensure operational readiness, 

and the implementation of pre-established transportation assets is 

essential. 

An ongoing issue that is yet to be resolved is the security for task 

forces operating in a disaster site. During this response, our personnel operated every day without any protection. While plans 

were made to evacuate an area if a confrontation developed, the reality was that, based on the damage and the topography and the 

lack of familiarity with the area, it would have been difficult to actually retreat. 

Let me conclude by saying that this mission wasn’t without success. The efforts of the six US&R task forces from the United 

States, coupled with the other 40 teams from around the globe resulted in the largest number of survivors rescued in history, and 

we should all be proud of this achievement. I was pleased to see 

that the years of work put into developing our equipment caches 

and training has paid off. 

29 

This year marks the 25th anniversary of the Mexico City earthquake and the first organized US&R response to such a disaster 

from the United States. Since that time, the United States has developed a robust national capability that today we know has incorporated the equipment, the training, and, most importantly, personnel to be successful. This capability is built on a foundation supported by the 28 sponsoring agencies, countless participating agencies and affiliated personnel that collectively provide the 6,000 

member ready reserve that we know as the National US&R Response System. 

These agencies support this national system sometimes at the expense of local service, and this can’t continue. Supportive legislation as defined in Chairman Oberstar’s House Resolution 3377, 

coupled with adequate funding, is necessary for the National 

US&R program to sustain current capabilities, as well as to explore 

new opportunities. 

Again, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the privilege 

of appearing before you today. I would be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Downey. 

Steven Cover, Fire Chief of the Virginia Beach Fire Department, 

Virginia Task Force 2. 

Mr. COVER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman Holmes Norton, 

Ranking Member Diaz-Balart, full Chair Mr. Oberstar, and distinguished Committee members. It is my pleasure and honor to appear before you today. 

As an introduction, I am Steve Cover, and I currently serve as 

the Fire Chief for the City of Virginia Beach Fire Department, and, 

as such, I am the Sponsoring Agency Chief for Virginia Task Force 

2, one of the 28 Urban Search and Rescue teams. I have also been 

asked to serve the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Program as 

one of three Sponsoring Agency Chief Representatives, representing the nine Eastern Region Team. 

I would also like to recognize Fire Chief Robert Khan from the 

Phoenix Fire Department, who represents the Central Division, 

and Fire Chief Raymond Jones, from Sacramento Fire, for both of 

their leadership along with me. 

I have served in various capacities within the Urban Search and 

Rescue program since its inception. 

I am speaking to you today as a Sponsoring Agency Chief and, 

as such, I want you to know how proud I am of this program. The 

men and women who serve our Nation through the Urban Search 

and Rescue Program are committed, competent professionals who 

care deeply for both the program and the citizens they serve. Every 

team member is a professional provider in his or her locale, whether a firefighter, a medical doctor, or a trained search dog handler. 

These professionals respond to natural disasters with the same 

skill sets that they apply every day in their home towns. The concept is fairly simple: utilization of an all-hazards approach to incident mitigation utilizing special training, special equipment, and 

special people. 

The Urban Search and Rescue System is part of a tiered approach to managing disasters. It has the capability to augment 

local and State resources with federally sponsored teams that can 

30 

readily plug into operations at the local level following the National 

Incident Management System. These Urban Search and Rescue 

Teams, made up of local providers who are on their local payrolls 

until activated, are far less expensive to maintain than a resource 

that may otherwise be fully funded by the Federal Government. 

The 28 Urban Search and Rescue Teams and their localities benefit from the training, equipment, and experience that comes from 

being part of this program. Just as the system members apply the 

skills learned at home to national disasters, they apply the lessons 

learned while on Federal missions in their local jurisdictions. The 

same search and rescue methods that were utilized and refined 

during the 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and Haiti responses are performed throughout America daily by our members. 

The recent Haiti response, just as FEMA Urban Search and Rescue deployments in the past, once again proved the value of the 

program to the people impacted by this disaster. The four FEMA 

Urban Search and Rescue Teams—Florida Task Force 1, Florida 

Task Force 2, New York Task Force 1, and Virginia Task Force 2— 

along with the two USAID teams—USA 1 and USA 2—which are 

also members of our Urban Search and Rescue System, as Virginia 

Task Force 1 and California Task Force 2, performed some 47 live 

rescues while in Haiti. Many of the international teams did not 

have the heaving breaking and breaching capabilities that our 

teams did. This, coupled with a rapid deployment of our teams, 

made a difference. 

Our training, equipment, and processes worked and lives were 

saved as a result. The deployed teams knew each other and operated from a common operating platform grounded in training, similar equipment, and common policies. Several of the remaining 28 

Urban Search and Rescue Teams were on standby at their points 

of departure, waiting to deploy as augmentation or in relief of the 

first teams that were deployed. 

The Urban Search and Rescue Program Office also worked diligently to coordinate the deployment of the teams and to ensure the 

practices applied to a domestic response would also be applied 

here. As a Sponsoring Agency Chief of one of the deployed teams, 

it was nice to know that support was there and spelled out in the 

activation orders. As with every deployment, there are areas for 

improvement, and we feel confident that after-action issues will be 

addressed by not only the Urban Search and Rescue Teams, but 

the Program Office as well. 

I would like to thank Mr. Carwile, Mr. Fenton, and the entire 

Urban Search and Rescue Program staff for their efforts and support. Mr. Carwile has clearly made an effort to make himself and 

his staff available to the Sponsoring Agency Chiefs Representatives 

and the Task Force Leaders Representatives. This increased spirit 

of cooperation will go a long way toward making the program even 

better. I feel that issues identified with the Haiti response, ranging 

from transportation, re-supply, and force protection, will be refined 

and improved upon. This will ensure our teams are mobilized and 

transported to the disaster site within the window of opportunity 

for successful search and rescue operations, whether in a domestic 

or foreign theater. 

31 

From a Sponsoring Agency Chief’s perspective, there are legal 

and financial liabilities that are of concern. We want to send the 

best trained teams to assist others while assuring our localities are 

not exposed. In this economic climate, expenses that have been 

borne by Sponsoring Agencies in the past are being more closely 

scrutinized by our localities. 

Many of the Sponsoring Agencies are facing staffing cuts that 

have not been seen in 30 years. We are continually being asked to 

do more with less in our municipalities. It is increasingly more difficult to place a fire company out of service for Urban Search and 

Rescue training or equipment maintenance when we do not have 

enough resources to protect our community to the levels we have 

in the past. 

We feel it important for this program to have recurring funding 

in order to support training and exercise, acquisition and maintenance of equipment and medical monitoring for our responders. 

Workers compensation and liability protection for our personnel is 

also very important. God forbid a member of our Task Forces is injured or killed while deployed on a mission. We want the proper 

protections in place for that member and their family. Additionally, 

we want to ensure our deployed members have proper liability protections in place and their jobs are secure. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Cover, could you summarize, with this vote on, 

please? 

Mr. COVER. Yes, ma’am. 

In conclusion, we are willing to explain the value of the Urban 

Search and Rescue Program to their communities for the reasons 

I have outlined, and your support through House Resolution 3377 

will assist in providing the needed funding and legal sufficiency for 

this worthwhile program. We stand ready to assist in making this 

proven system better now and into the future. 

Thank you again for your continued support. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Cover. 

Assistant Chief Kramer, Orange County, Fire Authority, we are 

going to let you begin according to the length of your testimony. We 

will try to hear your testimony. Even I have to vote on this one; 

I vote in the Committee of the whole. So we are asking members, 

to the extent that they can, please come back. But would you summarize your testimony, and we will try to hear you out? 

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman Norton, Ranking 

Member Diaz-Balart, and distinguished members of this Subcommittee. My name is Mark Kramer. I am the Operations Chief 

for the Orange County Fire Authority, one of California’s largest 

all-risk fire service agencies, as well as a Sponsoring Agency Chief 

for California Task Force 5. 

As a professional firefighter for the last 31 years, I have been involved in the Urban Search and Rescue Program since its inception 

in the early 1990s. I am here today to speak on behalf of the California Task Force 5, the nine task forces in the Western Region 

and the request of the US&R system. As a sponsoring agency, the 

Orange County Fire Authority is proud to be associated with the 

27 other teams comprising the National Urban Search and Rescue 

Response Program. 

32 

As one of the original US&R Teams, we have been this program 

evolve from responding to natural disasters, such as earthquakes 

and hurricanes, to all hazard mitigation response. Your US&R Program has been able to adapt primarily due to its 28 groups of professional first responders from across the Country who work together seamlessly to address the needs of this great Nation. Regardless of the cost, we respond with the intent to mitigate the impact and the consequences of the event. 

Last month, California Task Force 5 was one of the US&R Task 

Forces activated but not deployed to Haiti. Although disheartening 

for the Task Force, we understood the magnitude of this mission 

and we will be ready to ship out or to stand down as required. 

The quick response as a result of preparation, training, and dedication of our personnel, along with support from Federal, State, 

and local government. I strongly believe that without this support 

the Urban Search and Rescue Program would not exist and could 

not exist as it does today. However, we are facing fundamental 

challenges that need to be addressed if we are to continue to be the 

Federal’s first responders. 

There are difficult financial times. We would like you to consider 

the cost to the sponsoring agencies and their local taxpayers, and 

what the impact of the civilian professional personnel that make up 

these task forces. 

I would like to address the cost of the program. 

On January 31st, 2006, FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Program Office provided an overview of their report to Congress on the 

status of the Urban Search and Rescue Program. Based on this report to Congress, the average cost to maintain a national task force 

is approximately $1.7 million. In contrast, the actual project funding for that year was approximately $600,000, leaving the balance 

of $1 million for the sponsoring agency to incur. 

Orange County Fire Authority subsidizes this program in many 

ways, such as the allocation of overtime funds, the allocation of 

workload, insurance, and maintenance of vehicles. Our finance section estimated that the cost of the Fire Authority to sponsor this 

program is over $1.5 million. 

We believe that the funding of $52 million allocated in House 

Resolution 3377 would more accurately balance the partnership between the Federal and local governments. H.R. 3377 also addresses 

three fundamental flaws within our system that affect our sponsoring agencies, our professional personnel with licenses, and those 

not normally employed by government agencies. Therefore, we are 

very much in favor of this bill. These three fundamental flaws are 

workman compensation, protection of professional licenses, and reemployment rights. 

Workman compensation varies between States. So does the cost 

to the sponsoring agency if a task force member is injured during 

the deployment. If a task force member’s agency’s worker’s compensation is greater than the Federal Government’s protection, the 

sponsoring agency or participating agency is required to make up 

their difference. This not only becomes a financial burden to the 

local governments, but impacts the individual task force members. 

The second item. Several members essential to the mission of the 

task force are required to have professional licenses. These licenses 

33 

are not protected from tort liability while performing in accordance 

with the task force mission. Under the current system, each is risking their livelihood with every response. 

The last issue is re-employment rights. This is the re-employment rights of our civilian task force members. As a program manager during Hurricane Katrina, I was shocked when one of my 

heavy riggers, who was deployed to Louisiana, gave his heart and 

soul to the response, came home and was terminated by his employer. We need the same protection and safeguards that are afforded under USERRA and the task force members. 

In conclusion, the sponsoring agencies urgently request that the 

Federal Government codify this important national response program, in doing so, provide the necessary protections, adequate reoccurring funding by sponsoring and passing H.R. 3377. In 22 days, 

I will be retiring after 31 years as a professional firefighter. It has 

been my honor to serve the public and the Nation, but after my retirement I will probably not be involved at this level. However, it 

is still important to me, although on a selfish level, that the members of this great system are provided with the protections that 

they deserve, as my son, Kyle, is a member of Nevada Task Force 

1. 

Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Kramer. I certainly 

hope you will be involved, as all of you are involved, as we have 

heard incredibly important expertise from all of you. You are really 

the highlight of this testimony, testimony from people who have 

been on the ground in the United States and in other countries, so 

I will ask you to excuse us for a few minutes. 

There are five votes, maybe more, about that, but it could take 

a half hour or even maybe 45 minutes. But we do not intend to 

close this hearing without giving members an opportunity to ask 

you questions not only for the record, but so that we can use your 

answers for some of the very issues you have raised with respect 

to the reauthorization of the urban rescue bill now going to the 

House floor. 

We will return. The hearing is now in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. NORTON. I apologize again for the interruption for votes. I 

am looking at what looks to be—I am asking perhaps that it be put 

up. I am looking at a map or some maps of Port-au-Prince, except 

they are not tourist maps of the kind that you would expect the 

State Department to have; they provided by National Geo-Spatial 

Agency. I understand FEMA—it certainly states—uses Spatial 

Agency and they instantly get this kind of material. Now, one wonders how you were able to operate in Haiti without maps like this, 

which show not what the street is. This is what a tourist needs. 

You need to know where the major roads intersect so that you can 

get around. 

This far more technical—and one is up—which you would understand, but I would not—was apparently not available to you when 

our urban rescue teams first got there. Could I ask how did you 

know what to do? Or was the collapse so extraordinary that you 

just went where you could see with the naked eye? 

34 

Mr. DOWNEY. If you could put the other set of slide sup. Again— 

the other set. And you have that in my testimony. 

Ms. NORTON. That is what, the ordinary map? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Well, that was actually what was provided to us 

by the—— 

Ms. NORTON. State Department. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Well, this was actually provided to us by the 

United Nations, the coordinating team that my colleague spoke of. 

They divided—these heavy black lines were what they made up the 

sectors, and then those big white dots were supposedly the areas 

of interest that we had to focus on. 

Next slide, please. 

This is what we had to operate off of. We had to take the tourist 

map—— 

Ms. NORTON. This is what you initially had, this map? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes, for the first five to seven days. 

Ms. NORTON. Five to seven days you were working off this map? 

Mr. DOWNEY. That is correct. Yes, ma’am. We would take that 

map and then transpose the sectors onto that map, and then utilize. Fortunately, with handheld GPS units, we were able to at 

least fix our positions and, once we had internet access, we were 

able to use, quite honestly, Google Earth and use Google Earth and 

our GPS units to help fix the locations where we were working. So 

it was a very rudimentary method, but, quite frankly, the only 

thing we had available to us. 

Ms. NORTON. But you are used to having National Geo-Spatial 

Agency maps. This really goes to the question of who is in charge. 

Now, USAID, of course, gave you all USAID usually uses. Speaking 

as experts in emergency management, with some knowledge of 

what happened in Katrina, even given the extraordinary efforts, for 

which all applaud, of USAID and FEMA, would it have been easier 

to have had a central command already familiar with the usual 

maps used stateside, so that you would have those maps before five 

days, you were there five days in the country? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Absolutely. In fact, while there I was reflecting on 

my response to Katrina. I arrived in New Orleans the day after the 

storm with our team, and we, quite frankly, were using maps that 

we obtained from service stations, gas stations, as our original 

search and rescue maps in the early days, and that was when we 

were first made aware of the capability of the National Geo-Spatial 

Intelligence Agency. 

Ms. NORTON. So you used the spatial agency, Spatial Intelligence 

Agency for the first time in Katrina? 

Mr. DOWNEY. We used that in a few days following Katrina and 

we have used it successfully in other responses since Katrina. It 

felt as though I was going back to 2005 when I looked at the type 

of mapping that we were forced to use when we got to Haiti. I 

knew we had better technology; I knew it was there; and we just 

didn’t have it with us there in Haiti. 

Ms. NORTON. I ask this question because I am trying to avoid duplication of effort. When government has a special intelligence 

agency who has the maps, FEMA is more likely to know about the 

maps. We want to know—FEMA is on the ground. USAID, a heroic 

agency—I mean, it is overseas in the worst circumstances—does 

35 

not have access to these or doesn’t usually use them. I see duplication of effort and I see unnecessary duplication. 

Who would be in charge was a source of great consternation to 

this Subcommittee, and we had some trouble getting Homeland Security to understand that having somebody from Homeland Security and having somebody from FEMA produced confusion on the 

ground. Who really was in charge? And it took both Committees 

working to try to get some clarity on that. I would not like to see 

it repeated here. Nobody cares except somebody who knows how to 

do it best. We just want to make sure that we understand on the 

record. 

I would like to know about the heavy equipment. I am having 

difficulty understanding how you were able to move around Haiti 

at all. You took some heavy equipment, I take it, with you. What 

kinds and did you leave it there? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Our standard equipment cache has everything 

from the technical search equipment, such as search cameras, listening devices, to hand tools for breaching and breaking, all the 

way up to heavy hydraulic machinery that can break heavy reinforced concrete structures. 

Ms. NORTON. So is that like a truck? 

Mr. DOWNEY. It is not a truck. It is all packaged in containers 

and palletized so that it gives us the most flexibility, whether we 

have to load it in a truck, load it in an airplane. We are able to 

configure the equipment cache as best we can depending on the 

transportation. 

Ms. NORTON. How did you get from one point to another point 

with that heavy equipment? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Well, what we ended up doing in Haiti was organizing most of our rescue squads as recognizance squads with just 

some basic search and rescue equipment. Once they encountered a 

possibility of a victim, we would follow it with a truck that had the 

breaching and breaking capabilities, the heavier tools. 

Ms. NORTON. Where did you get the truck? 

Mr. DOWNEY. We had a pool of vehicles operating. There were 

four teams operating out of the U.S. Embassy. We had a pool of 

vehicles that were available to all four teams. The problem was we 

were all competing for the same pieces of equipment. There were 

only two flatbed trucks that could carry some of this equipment, so, 

for instance, if California or Florida 2 was working on another rescue site, we would have to recover that truck, have it come back 

to the embassy so that we could load our cache and go out to the 

new rescue site. So we had no dedicated—my task or any of the 

other task forces had no dedicated transportation assets that I 

knew I could use to move my team to the rescue sites. 

Ms. NORTON. Was any priority given to the fact that you were 

on rescue and recovery, which means whatever you have to do, you 

do it now or it probably doesn’t much matter? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Absolutely. 

Ms. NORTON. Were you prioritized for use among other uses that 

had to be done, or was that just impossible given the many missions that came together at one time? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I think the latter part of your statement. There 

were so many missions coming together. There was such a need to 

36 

get all these recognizance teams out that we just didn’t have 

enough vehicles. 

Ms. NORTON. Were there helicopters in service from the United 

States in the very early days, I mean in the first week, for example? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Absolutely. I would say within the first two days 

or so of our arrival there was a lot of military aircraft, helicopters. 

Ms. NORTON. Did you use any of them? Were any of them useful 

to rescue and recovery? 

Mr. DOWNEY. We used them one time for some aerial recognizance of the distance areas to look at. But the fact of the matter 

is the topography of Port-au-Prince and the amount of devastation 

trying to do any type of aerial recognizance was impossible by helicopter. And if we found something, it would have been impossible 

to land the helicopter in the area. I mean, over-the-road transportation was by far, although stressful trying to get through the traffic, especially in the daytime, was the only way to move around in 

the city. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, urban rescue teams are the quintessence of 

flexibility, of knowing how to adapt on the ground. That is why we 

have such enormous respect to you. I would like to know from each 

of you, particularly since I would venture to guess you had the 

toughest sort of disaster in Haiti. You had a country already without the basics; you had the worst disaster. In fact, if you look at 

California, California has had earthquakes of that kind and it does 

not fall down like that. 

I would like to know what lessons, what you found most significant that could be transferred here. I mean, assuming, for example—and California, by the way, is not the only State which has 

fault lines; Tennessee. We have fault lines all over the United 

States. And, of course, I am not referring only to earthquakes. But 

it is not difficult to envision a country which is prone to literally 

every kind of disaster. It is not difficult to conceive of entire counties, which would be the functional equivalent of this Country 

going down, where nothing was left up. The fact is we don’t often 

encounter that. But we didn’t often encounter Katrina, and we 

were not prepared for it. 

So looking back, those of you who went and those of you who 

know about Haiti and understand what has happened there, what 

do you think most significantly transfers to disasters involving rescue in the United States, whether they are rescued from water, as 

in Katrina, from collapse, from roads that go out, bridges that go 

out and you can’t get from here to there, but the hospitals are over 

there? If you give us some thought of how you might use what you 

understand from Haiti to train in the United States for similar disasters or disasters that are not similar. 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. Madam Chairwoman, one of the things I spoke 

about early in my testimony was a tiered response and the ability 

for us to put highly technician level trained rescuers to work as 

soon as possible. And I think Chairman Oberstar mentioned the 

bridge collapse in Minnesota and he used that analogy, that highly 

trained people had exercised that within two years before that 

event and they were able to successfully engage at a technical 

level, coupled with the incident command structures that we have 

37 

in a country. That is another important lesson learned, direct command and control of tactical operations is critical. 

Ms. NORTON. That is a lesson learned in what respect? You 

didn’t have quite the instant command that you have become used 

to in the United States. 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. Correct. 

Ms. NORTON. And you would benefit from that. 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. Yes. In Haiti—Dave, what would be the right way 

to say this?—probably a little bit looser. In the United States there 

is definitely an organizational structure; there is definitely responsibilities; there is definitely accountability for field actions. We 

have Incident Command System forms, there are divisions, operational areas that are broken out and specific assignments given 

with reporting and documentation that follow that. On the international response in Haiti, that wasn’t quite as evident. 

Dave, I will let you talk to that. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Again, the big topics, the take-home topics I had, 

we have touched on it and I will stress again: transportation. 

Transportation was an issue for us in Katrina because we didn’t 

have the boats. Transportation has been an issue for us in this 

Haiti response. In the—— 

Ms. NORTON. But that is an issue that you think could have been 

overcome with what? 

Mr. DOWNEY. I think pre-established air transportation assets, 

either knowing what military entity or commercial carrier is going 

to provide the transportation; having dedicated over-the-road transportation. All of the 28 teams were given money back in 2003 to 

purchase transportation for all of the equipment cache, you know, 

so we can move up to 1,200 miles across the U.S., but we haven’t 

had any money to sustain those transportation assets. We still 

don’t have our own—— 

Ms. NORTON. When things got bad enough in the United States, 

we recognized there was no way other way to do it. That is when 

the Coast Guard came in. 

Mr. DOWNEY. I am sorry? 

Ms. NORTON. During Katrina, when the usual agencies were not 

prepared to operate, the Coast Guard came in there. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Absolutely. 

Ms. NORTON. Some such agency that is not normally on the 

ground—we have all kinds of military and other agencies on the 

ground now—should simply be deployed so that you can do your 

job, rescue and recovery job. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Cover? 

Mr. COVER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Two areas, in addition to transportation, that concern me as a Sponsoring Agency 

Chief having a team deployed was re-supply of my personnel there, 

to make sure they had their basic needs met when—— 

Ms. NORTON. By that you mean that they ran out of certain supplies and it was difficult to get them supplies? Elaborate on that 

a bit, please. 

Mr. COVER. Okay. Our teams are self-sufficient when they go out 

the door. Certainly, we don’t want to be a load on the exact folks 

that we are going to help, so our folks went out the door with five 

38 

days worth of MREs and water. In checking back with my task 

force leader that was there, at one point re-supply was an issue; 

they were not sure, with the airframes in and out of the country, 

whether those needs would be met. 

Certainly, to have 80 personnel deployed there, that was an issue 

for me. I wanted to make sure that we had that covered. And they 

did, they worked it out. They got with the USAID folks; I am sure 

the folks over at the embassy. My team was deployed to an area 

separate from Chief Downey’s team. The Virginia 2 team and the 

New York team, as I understand it, were in a different area of the 

country, housed at the airport as their base of operations. 

So re-supply and making sure we have the basic needs met is 

something that has been an issue in the past as well, and we want 

to make sure that that is a lesson learned that we improve on. 

Another area of concern for me was force protection. When these 

folks come in to an area that has been just absolutely decimated, 

those people are hurting and after a certain period of time, when 

they don’t get their basic needs met, there is consternation that can 

occur and I worry about that, having folks over there that have 

supplies, have resources. So I want to make sure that they are protected not only while they are operating, but when they are there 

in their down time as well. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Cover. 

Mr. Kramer? 

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. The only thing 

that I would really like to add to this, because you brought in 

Katrina, is the ability for us to do water rescue. That is one of the 

things that the Secretary from California mentioned when he was 

talking, that we have swift water capability. All the task forces in 

California have that capability, and under EMAC they actually did 

respond. We responded, I responded, my swift water team, to 

Katrina within the first 24 hours. 

Ms. NORTON. That means emergency workers who are specially 

trained to do water rescue? 

Mr. KRAMER. Absolutely. 

Ms. NORTON. Including getting in the water if necessary? 

Mr. KRAMER. Absolutely. What we call live bait or the rescuers 

will get in the water with the victim and then pull them out. We 

have Zodiac type boats that we bring along when we take the swift 

water teams with us. That is one aspect of the task force that not 

all task forces enjoy that aspect. Because the State of California 

wanted us to have that resource, they trained us and made us to 

that level. 

Ms. NORTON. I think that maybe one of the bases upon task 

forces are deployed, if there were a task force that had that capability, since we have 28—and I am so proud of having so many— 

then I am sure what you are saying would come into effect. We will 

have to see how many others have that. 

Mr. KRAMER. I know that other task forces may be trained at 

that level. In fact, I am pretty sure that they are. It is just that 

we haven’t been given the nod to actually deploy that type of resource. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Diaz-Balart? 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

39 

And, again, thank you, gentlemen for this whole thing about democracy gets in the way, right? But thank you for your patience. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

We have heard, I think, some really, really, really good specific 

recommendations. Let me just kind of ask a couple questions, 

though. 

Katrina. Some of the issues that we have heard today that are 

kind of no-brainers for you all, but those of us that are not on the 

field don’t necessarily think about it all the time. I was aware of 

the job that you all did in Katrina, but I have to admit to you that 

I never asked myself the question how did they get there. Now, 

how did you get there from different parts of the Country? I am 

assuming that, from Florida, maybe you drove yourself there, but 

from California? So how did you all get there with all your assets? 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. Like Dave was describing to you, the ground 

transportation package that we have is the way the majority of the 

task forces traveled, and there was two distinct operational theaters in Katrina, Mississippi and New Orleans. I was assigned as 

the Operations Chief for Mississippi. We were flown in in advance 

of the storm hitting, flown in to a central location, then obtained 

vehicles and actually weathered the storm. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Who flew you in? 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. FEMA. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. FEMA did. 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. Yes, through national travel. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Okay. 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. So the Incident Support Team historically travels 

that way, sir, and the task forces travel usually by our ground 

transportation packages. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Okay. Now, domestically, that is the way it 

works. Now, it gets a little bit more complicated now when you 

travel internationally. Historically, whether it is in Mexico City or 

whatever, how has that been done? I mean, is it you are on your 

own, like some of you all were now, or does DOD take care of it, 

or how does it usually work? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Well, on this particular response, we were working 

directly with USAID in Washington, who was tasked with arranging the transportation. As I stated in testimony, it pretty much 

took all of that day, after we were activated, to figure out how we 

were going to get down there. 

Our equipment cache, our task force is housed at Homestead Air 

Reserve Base, so my initial assumption was that we would go out 

military, out of Homestead Air Reserve Base. We have done that 

before with responses to Turkey and the earthquakes in Turkey. 

There were aircraft there, but never had them dedicated to the 

movement of our team. 

Later in the day, a contract carrier was arranged through AID 

in Washington and we moved the entire cache up to Miami International Airport for movement out of the airport. So some of the 

task forces, California 2, Los Angeles, came by military airlift. 

Fairfax came by the same method we did, which was a contract 

carrier. Florida 2 came on U.S. Coast Guard. So it was—— 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Whatever could be found. 

40 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes, exactly. Nothing had a dedicated—we didn’t 

have a dedicated airframe that we knew our cache would fit on, we 

knew our personnel would fit and be able to move it, ideally, with 

one aircraft. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Now, when you were pre-positioned, I guess, 

before Katrina, you were flown in there by FEMA, was that charter 

airplanes? 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. It is a standard commercial carrier. They will just 

book flights on a priority basis for the Incident Support Team 

members. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Now, one of the things that was very difficult 

and was at first—we had a briefing when the Vice President was 

in South Florida—was the fact that—I guess there are only about 

46 airplanes that can be handled a day landing in Port-au-Prince, 

out of which I think something like, I don’t know, less than 20 percent were from the U.S., and those decisions were being made by 

the Haitian government—who was landing, who wasn’t—which just 

adds to the problem here. 

But it would seem to me that who does have the capability of 

doing that, particularly internationally, is the Department of Defense. But there isn’t a pre-existing compact, whatever, with DOD 

to have under specific cases, to have assets available, correct? 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. I think in the case of the two USAID teams that 

have the agreement with USAID and OFTA, there might be more 

of a priority, but as far as the FEMA use of our system, this deployment was way outside of our normal range of operations and 

we don’t have anything prescripted mission-wise. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. That would seem to me, Madam Chairman, 

that is one of the things that I know you have talked about that 

we need to look at to see how we can get a better handle on that 

and making sure that we can have something—yes, sir. 

Mr. KRAMER. If I could add. During 9/11 we did fly, California 

did fly military aircraft, obviously, because everything else was 

grounded. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. 

Mr. KRAMER. During Katrina we did fly our swift water teams 

military, and then our full task force drove. So our caches right 

now, all of our equipment are configured so we can either fly military or fly commercial or go by ground. We have military pallets 

that everything is loaded on. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. 

Mr. KRAMER. We have all the plans for each type of airframe. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. You all are ready to go. 

Mr. KRAMER. We are ready. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. The issue is that there doesn’t seem to 

be a set pre-established plan for how, in certain conditions—because I would imagine that in most cases, God willing, that you can 

drive there or you can hire USAID—and for domestic FEMA can 

hire some planes. But if it is a big one, it would seem to me that, 

under certain circumstances, there should be some pre-established 

norms where, if Department of Defense assets are required, that 

that is available; and there doesn’t seem to be that at this stage. 

Mr. KRAMER. No, there isn’t, and we do have local agreements 

and we train routinely with Ardner Air Force Reserve Base to actuVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:50 May 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\54757 JASON
41 

ally be able to fly military, but there aren’t the agreements that 

say that in the event you get a military aircraft. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. Right. So that is something I think we 

need to look at and see if we can get a handle on. And I know that 

the Chairwoman has been looking at that and will hopefully be 

able to come up with some specifics. 

Now, you all talked about a lot of issues and I took some notes, 

so I am not going to go through them all, but I do want to just hit 

on a couple of other ones. On the re-supply issue, domestically, 

again, it is easier, I would assume. Internationally, in a case like 

Haiti, where you had no port to speak of, because that was destroyed, and then we had, in essence, really one airport that was 

overtaxed, at best, it would seem to me that we have to have some 

sort of pre-arranged—the same kind of thing that we are talking 

about for initial equipment to have a re-supply chain ready to go 

with assets to be able to get the stuff in there, correct? 

Mr. COVER. Yes, sir, I agree. I think the bottleneck was the fact 

that the airport was small; there were many, many missions, from 

humanitarian aid to search and rescue that were competing missions. I think we spoke to that. The ports were damaged to a point 

initially that it is my understanding we couldn’t utilize that method. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. 

Mr. COVER. So having these plans in place will certainly be helpful. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Because in the case of Haiti, right, there was, 

frankly, one airport that was overburdened and the port was not 

available, and then eventually DOD did start putting ships off and 

then helicopters filling things in. Then, obviously, you have to compete with everything else, and we understand that. 

So as you all said, this is not criticism, this is just there seems 

to be—these are—Haiti was horrible. It is not necessarily, unfortunately, the worst case scenario. You always have to plan for a 

worse case scenario, if that is possible. Hopefully, it never will be 

possible, as horrible as that was. 

So one of the things that we need to think about is who has those 

assets. DOD has the assets, and that includes—obviously, when I 

talk about DOD, I am also including as a part of that the Coast 

Guard, which is kind of a separate but—and it seems to me, 

though, that there needs to be a pre—you know, basically some 

compacts are already established beforehand that if the worst case 

scenario happens and if you need assets, that you already have 

that so that USAID and others don’t have to start scrambling to 

figure out how we are going to get you there. Does that not sound 

like something that makes sense? 

Mr. COVER. It does exactly, yes, sir. And I think part of the afteraction process is going to be to drill in to some of those issues. I 

will tell you, in my mind, the reason that it worked is the resiliency of our people and their ability, whether it is maps or whether 

it is trying to figure out how to get re-supplied. These men and 

women are very capable, competent people that flex and apply 

their skill sets in an austere environment, and that is what makes 

it work. 

42 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Sure. And, again, I am obviously saying what 

you all are saying. I just want to make sure that I understood it. 

Another issue that you all talked about was security, force protection. Now, obviously, when you go domestically, you assume, I 

would assume, that it is the local law enforcement that provides 

the—or how does that happen? I know that in Katrina we had 

some issues there, but—so how does that work domestically? 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. Internally, in our program, there is a program directive generated by FEMA’S program office that assigns us force 

protection. Federal law enforcement officers are assigned to each 

Federal task force, theoretically and at the point of departure, all 

the way enroute and, when we get in theater, those needs are assessed and, dependent on the different options available to us, we 

could either use military, local, or Federal law enforcement officials. So since Katrina that has gotten much better as far as policy 

and procedure. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. So domestically it has gotten—because we all 

saw, we saw the visuals of people getting shot, your folks getting 

shot at and with no protection. That has gotten better domestically. 

But obviously, again, when we are dealing with international, we 

are dealing with now a totally different animal as well. Are there 

arrangements, pre-arrangements with—is it DOD again or embassies in different countries, whatever, to have a preset way to provide security? 

Mr. DOWNEY. There were in Haiti United Nations Peacekeeping 

Forces there that the—and, again, as Chief Cover spoke of, there 

was almost two separate operations, there was the operations run 

out of the airport and there were the operations run out of the U.S. 

Embassy. At the airport they had the U.N. Peacekeeping folks that 

they would try to send out with the task forces. At the Embassy, 

we really didn’t have those assets available to us. There were DOD 

assets, but it wasn’t something that was on a consistent basis. 

And I can only speak for my team that, in the 12 days we were 

there, we never operated with any security with us. Definitely 

something, as Chief Cover said, as the leader made me uncomfortable, but we tried to, as best we could, make sure our personnel 

were aware of surroundings, always posting a lookout. We were fortunate because three of our team members were Haitian-Americans, so we were able to communicate well and know the areas a 

little bit better than maybe some of the other teams. But I don’t 

know if it is a very easy answer. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Well, but is there—to your knowledge, is there 

a preset—I am talking about now for foreign deployment. Is there 

a preset, I don’t want to say standardized because this is not standardized stuff; every case is different. But is there a preset set of 

guidelines, rules, arrangements made so that, if you do deploy and 

you deploy in a place where—by the way, fortunately, there were 

7,000 U.N. troops in Haiti before, which was obviously a huge help, 

even though a lot of those, as we know, got hit hard, but there 

were—but if you are deployed someplace else where that doesn’t 

exist, to your knowledge, is there a preset way to—standardized 

way that you are going to have force protection? 

No, right? So that is something that we need to look at. I just 

want to make sure I understand how—what is there now, and right 

43 

now, to your knowledge, that is just not something that is really 

dealt with, per se—— 

Mr. DOWNEY. That is correct. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART.—in a comprehensive way, at least. 

Mr. DOWNEY. That is correct. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And, obviously, when you get there they deal 

with it because everybody understands it, but there is no preset 

way to do that. 

Mr. DOWNEY. No. The best we can do, in my experience with 

other international deployments, is work with the embassy, the 

U.S. Embassy security officer to identify areas that have potential 

hostile areas. We did that here. We had no-go areas where task 

forces would say, you stay out of that sector because it is just not 

a safe area without any type of force protection; and that is really 

the best we could come up with. There isn’t anything pre-established. 

Quite frankly, I am not sure what the answer is because one or 

two soldiers, when there is a crowd of three or four hundred people, 

I am not quite sure how much they are going to be able to provide 

for us. I go back to my roots as a firefighter. For the most part, 

everybody is happy to see us when we get there, and in the event 

things start to look like they are getting unsettled, we need to back 

out. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Except that if you don’t have transportation, 

easier said than done. So in a case like what happened in Haiti, 

luckily, again, people were very happy to see you, but if it would 

have not been that case, things could have gotten pretty interesting. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Absolutely. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. 

Lastly, Chief Kramer, I think it was you that mentioned about 

those that are civilians, and the fact that—did I hear you right, 

about the fact that people have lost their jobs when they come 

home? Is that correct? 

Mr. KRAMER. That is correct. After Katrina, we had one of our 

heavy riggers who, when he got home, was told that he was no 

longer employed. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Because he had been gone for? 

Mr. KRAMER. Because he had been gone for a couple weeks. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. 

Mr. KRAMER. Much of our task force, a lot of the task force, obviously, are firefighters that deal with the rescue, but we have specialties within the task force that aren’t necessarily firefighters; 

they are people that have other jobs. Some of our dog handlers 

have other jobs and we have physicians that may be working in the 

local emergency rooms; we have structural engineers that may 

have firms dealing with architecture and design and such. So if 

they are working for an employer, they are not protected if they go 

with us. We are lucky enough that we have people that are dedicated enough to go. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Madam Chairwoman, if I may—by the way, she puts up with me; 

she lets me go. So she is very generous with me, and thank you. 

44 

Let me just, before I close, let me thank you all. But when I 

thank you all, I hope you understand that I am thanking you all 

and all of the men and women that you represent. Obviously, being 

from South Florida and living in a State that, unfortunately, is 

used to lots of storm events, I have seen what you all do. I have 

seen it in South Florida, I have seen it when we had, what was 

it, four hurricanes in one year? 

And then to see what you all do not only domestically, but internationally is something that all Americans are proud of and grateful for your service and your incredible sacrifices, the men and 

women that you all are representing here today. That is time away 

from your families and at great risk, at great, great risk. So just 

thank you. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. NORTON. I would certainly like to be associated with your remarks, Mr. Diaz-Balart. We cannot say enough about these heroes 

stateside and abroad. And I know the people of Haiti feel that way 

because I saw a headline in The Washington Post that said, 

‘‘United States, Take Over’’. Now, when is the last time you heard 

that? They are talking about you. They are talking about who they 

saw go in at considerable risk for themselves and get things done. 

Mr. Diaz-Balart has raised the question of force protection. Very 

courageously you said, Mr. Downey, well, we go in. We figure that 

a few guns here wouldn’t be much protection anyway if the crowd 

got unruly. We are going to look at—we are aware that there were 

a great many troops down there. We also are aware we are in 

somebody else’s country. And we want to understand exactly how 

to behave, no matter what the situation is. 

Now, as I understand it, the troops do know how to behave and 

they were told that they weren’t law enforcement and they were 

not to engage unless they were at risk, and I take it to mean you 

at risk. In other words, you can’t go shooting people who even are 

doing bad things, because you are not the Haitian police. 

I am concerned, though, that people who are risking their lives 

don’t have at least that protection around them, and we will look 

at our legislation to see whether there could be at least some kind 

of memorandum of understanding that what apparently was the 

case anyway once they got on the ground, knowing when to shoot— 

they are well trained—whether those people could be on the ground 

earlier so that our emergency responders and rescue teams would 

not be at any risk, or would be at certainly less risk. 

The Ranking Member raises a very important point, about 

whether or not you are risking your own livelihood when you go either out of State or, for that matter, to a foreign country. Are you 

satisfied with what we have in the bill regarding re-employment 

rights, such as they have in the National Guard and the Reserves, 

for these rescue team members as well? 

Mr. KRAMER. Absolutely. Absolutely. The USERRA rights that 

are still afforded to National Guard, those are the same type of 

rights that we are looking for. 

Ms. NORTON. And for people who have already lost their job—is 

there somebody who in this deployment has lost his job that you 

know of? 

Mr. KRAMER. Not that I am aware of. 

45 

Ms. NORTON. That has happened before in the past? 

Mr. KRAMER. And just as a note, the person who lost his job after 

Katrina, it wasn’t long and he got another job. That profession is 

one that they needed people in, so he did well. 

Ms. NORTON. I guess all you have to do is let the word go out 

that somebody who was down there trying to do good in Katrina 

lost their job, and people will come forward and say, I will hire you. 

But we don’t want that to be necessary. 

I wish you would help us—because it will help us when we go 

to the Floor. The urban rescue teams are not being used in major 

disasters every day. Would you give us an idea of how the urban 

rescue teams are used, I take it locally, so that it can be understood what your real use in an ongoing basis amounts to, Haiti 

being rare and, for that matter, out of State being rare? 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. Madam Chairwoman, an example of this would 

be that the skill sets that we require our rescue specialists to maintain can be applied at the local level every day. 

Ms. NORTON. Go ahead, yes. 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. In April of 1997, we had—— 

Ms. NORTON. And the jurisdiction? 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. In Philadelphia. We had a significant fire in a 

boarding home. There was a subsequent structural collapse that 

buried seven firefighters. Without the training that we received 

through the FEMA US&R system, our specialized units there 

would never have been able to get them all out alive. 

So that is an example of the partnership or the type of partnership and the benefit of it when it comes to skill sets and a common 

operating platform and similar equipment, interoperability. And 

then you can take that a step further in that tiered response concept and do that at the regional level and the State level. The system has been used as a best practices model by all of the local, regional, and State assets that are developing this capability, so 

across the board it is very beneficial for a local jurisdiction to be 

involved with this system. 

Ms. NORTON. This is so typical of what you see in any big city. 

Do any of the rest of you have examples of when the urban rescue 

teams have been used locally? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Absolutely. Again, the skill sets either applied by 

our medical or surge personnel. Our canines, many of our search 

canines are owned and trained by fire department personnel, and 

we actually have used them multiple times in desolate areas of 

Miami-Dade County when there are car accidents and we have had 

victims that were thrown out of a vehicle, and it was our search 

canines that are trained to find live victims that found these people 

in the bush or away from the vehicle. 

We were used as a State asset—again, our search canines and 

our technical search capability—when a parking garage collapsed 

in Jacksonville and they were trying to recover three of the workers that they knew had been killed in this parking garage collapse. 

Again, it was the assets that were trained and utilized from the 

National Search and Rescue that were used at a State level. 

So it is occurring in all of the disciplines every day, and although 

we are not having earthquakes in Florida, we certainly have our 

share of storms, and the search techniques, the wide area search 

46 

that our people learn about and are trained on for the national 

level and international are applied right at home. So it is a great 

opportunity to hone your skills at home and then, in the chance 

that you are going to deploy either domestically or internationally, 

even can refine those skills better. 

Ms. NORTON. This is going to be very important for the public to 

understand how your Federal dollars are being used, and I recognize that there has been testimony that you could do with more 

money, that the grants go up to $1 million. You may spend $1.5 

million, and that must come out of State funds or local funds. 

But what I think most people don’t realize when they see a team 

from Fairfax or a team from California, I am afraid that they do 

not understand that is their own firefighter, their own EMS worker 

who has been trained by the Federal Government, who almost all 

the time is being used locally, even though the training and some 

of the material comes from the Federal Government. This joining 

of State and Federal resources is very unusual, where there is a 

grant, it comes from the Federal Government, but the fact is most 

of the time the people are used locally. 

And when people saw people going from Fairfax County, I am 

convinced that not until they saw people coming home, being greeted as if they were soldiers returning, that they understand that 

was their own firefighter, their own EMS worker. So we certainly 

will stress this as we go forward. 

Do either of the rest of you have examples you want to lay on 

the record? 

Mr. COVER. I will speak briefly. Just every day on the streets in 

many of our cities, in Virginia Beach, for example, hazardous materials technicians are utilizing many of the same monitoring and detection equipment on our streets daily for hazardous materials incidents, for example. 

Our team has been—our folks, on a regional basis, have been utilized in shipping and rail accidents. We responded across the State 

for a tornado, a Walmart collapse search was done in a tornado 

where our team was utilized. So, again, as these gentlemen have 

addressed, these skill sets, put together, while they may only be 

used, portions of them, on a daily basis in our towns and cities, 

when they all come together it is quite a fighting force, if you will. 

For example, this past weekend, in the city of Virginia Beach, we 

had a major snowstorm, a snowstorm that we haven’t had in, say, 

20 years. Many of the planning elements that we used to ready our 

city were—these skill sets were learned, the plans people that we 

used there in Virginia Beach were the same folks that will be 

working on plans on many of these deployments. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. We don’t have to deal with snowstorms in 

Miami, by the way. 

Ms. NORTON. No snowstorms. You have everything else in 

Miami, Mr. Diaz-Balart. 

Mr. Kramer? 

Mr. KRAMER. The only thing that I would like to add is pretty 

much echoing what they said, the skill sets are the same. And in 

California we, over the last couple years, had a couple major fires, 

and after the fires we have rainstorms. Rainstorms produce mud 

slides and debris flows. Debris flows cover houses, can cover areas, 

47 

neighborhoods and such, so we use those same capabilities that we 

are trained for on the Urban Search and Rescue dealing with winter events. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, same personnel, same capabilities, most of the 

time applied stateside, right in your own local community. Very important for people to recognize. Little bit of money to get a whole 

lot of rescue and lives saved and injuries no longer taking place. 

I want to make sure we understand that we are taking care of 

the basic needs for tort and other liability. Do you know of any 

member of an urban rescue team who has been injured while being 

deployed? If that were to happen, who would take care—what 

would be the liability? Who would take care of the liability, assuming there was liability, and who would take care of the team member’s medical care? 

Mr. KRAMER. We did have, in California, California Task Force 

6 with Riverside—in fact, the Task Force Leader Program Manager 

sitting behind me at 9/11 he had some respiratory injuries that 

caused him to retire. 

We did have some issues with the workman’s comp. As was stated earlier in my testimony, the workman’s comp, we are covered 

whenever we respond nationally under the Federal workman’s 

comp system. However, if you are a local agency and you have 

State workman’s comp that is at a higher level than the Federal, 

then that employee is going to be covered under that State, because 

we can’t give them less than what they are already negotiated to 

have. 

So there were some issues with Riverside, where it was Federal 

level that they were willing to cover, and then we had to go back 

and debate and argue to a higher level. 

Ms. NORTON. The worker’s compensation I think is taken care of 

in the bill. 

Mr. KRAMER. Yes, it is. In fact, I think the tort liability is also 

covered. 

Ms. NORTON. And the tort liability. 

Mr. KRAMER. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. When you leave your equipment in Haiti or elsewhere, the Federal Government replaces that equipment? 

Mr. DOWNEY. Yes. On this particular deployment, we were asked 

to leave, as a donation on behalf of AID, some of our equipment, 

and that all has already been catalogued and reimbursement being 

sought to replace all that equipment. It does create an operational 

shortfall, though, because some of our operationally necessary 

equipment we don’t have anymore. So we are trying to—— 

Ms. NORTON. I hope there are not delays in taking care of that, 

because we don’t want to short-change at home in order to make 

sure we take care of people abroad. 

Mr. DOWNEY. Right. No, we, at least from my task force’s perspective, what we left was already in the pipeline to be replaced 

and ours was strictly the tents, the cots, the sleeping bags, the generators, the lights. All of our vital rescue equipment, communications equipment, search equipment we didn’t leave. 

Ms. NORTON. Did you have something you wanted to add to that? 

Mr. ENDRIKAT. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. I just wanted to clarify. I think Mr. Carwile mentioned that only the two USAID task 

48 

forces left equipment, and just to clarify that, all six of the American task forces left equipment. Virginia 1 left their rescue equipment, and that is what they will be training the Haitian government on. 

But all of the other task forces, like Dave said, left primarily the 

logistical support equipment, the medical, the pharmaceuticals, and 

some other support things that were very important for the humanitarian side of the mission. 

Ms. NORTON. We are very pleased to hear that, and I think the 

people of the United States would have wanted it that way. 

Mr. Diaz-Balart wants to add something. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. One thing 

that I neglected to mention. 

One of the other issues, because you all have given us a lot to 

chew on here, was the issue of water rescue and obviously part of 

it is the training, we understand that, but then the equipment is 

the other part of it. 

One of the things, Madam Chairman, we are going to have to 

also try to figure out is how do you deal with that aspect of it. It 

even gets more complicated when you are dealing with now, because I guess there is water rescue assets and then there are water 

rescue assets, and, depending on the circumstances, they can be 

larger or smaller. So that is a little bit, that is kind of a difficult 

task to try to figure out who has those assets that you all can tap 

into. 

Mr. KRAMER. We actually did a study from the Urban Search and 

Rescue Program about probably four or five years ago, right after 

Katrina, what the cost of those water assets we need, and they 

were the Zodiac boats and such. As you mentioned, there are different levels of water rescue. 

Locally, at home, for the level that my team is at, we require a 

helicopter. Obviously, the task forces can’t have that, but just the 

capability to have boats to get into areas and rescue people. A lot 

of the rescues that my swift water teams did in Katrina during the 

early portion of it were simply removing people off of bridges, removing people off of houses, out of homes and places where they 

were trapped; not necessarily that they couldn’t have gotten out on 

their own, but we don’t know that. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Right. And that is going to be—because, for example, again, in Katrina you are saying obviously helicopters, and 

we saw the Coast Guard had a big role to play in helicopters. That 

was a specific Katrina kind of phenomena. So when you are talking 

about that, you are dealing mostly with inflatable Zodiacs? 

Mr. KRAMER. That is correct. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Is that what you are basically talking about? 

Mr. KRAMER. That is correct. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Okay, so it is less complicated in that sense 

than I thought. 

Mr. KRAMER. Fred, correct me if I am wrong, I think the cost for us to get to be to water rescue is like about $35,000 a task force. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Okay. 

Mr. KRAMER. Reasonably low because the task forces right now, 

although they are not, if you will, water rescue—— 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. But they are already there. 

49 

Mr. KRAMER. Yes. They do have the ability for self-protection, so 

we have PFDs, floatable devices, the helmets. We have things for 

our task force already that you would need for the swift water. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And, again, thanking the Chairwoman again 

for indulgence. I just do want to end on one note, and I know it 

has nothing to do with this issue, but I know that there are those 

who like to bash America. They have always existed and they continue to exist, and they will be there in the future. And I know that 

some of even our allies were bashing the United States for too 

much of a presence in Haiti, and so be it. You know, I, for one, am 

not apologetic about the fact that once again the American people, 

through our heroes and our first responders and our armed forces, 

were there to provide incredible humanitarian relief. And if our 

wonderful friends and allies like the French and the Italians don’t 

like it, tough luck. Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. I love those words, Mr. Diaz-Balart, and I join you 

in those words. 

Gentlemen, your service makes us proud to be part of a Federal 

union that also is joined to its component parts, and that those 

component parts adhere and come together, whether at home or 

abroad, in time of distress. You have made the whole notion of the 

Federal union, which has worked so well in our Country for more 

than two centuries, shine, because when we are most needed somehow the other—for all the differences among the States, the Federal Government and the States and localities come together and 

do really heroic work. 

And we know heroes is an overused word. You know, people use 

hero when a kid comes home with passing grades these days. We 

try, since we deal with very serious issues in this Subcommittee, 

to use it not in some generic sense, but to apply it appropriately. 

We think that it is not overuse of the term or inappropriate use 

to say that the work you perform every day is regarded by the 

American people as heroic, because we see you at home and people, 

when they saw you in Haiti literally identified with you because 

they know you and they know what you can do in this Country. 

So, Mr. Endrikat of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Mr. Downey of 

Miami-Dade, Florida, Mr. Cover of Virginia Beach, Virginia, and 

Mr. Kramer of Orange County, California, on behalf of our Subcommittee and our Committee—and I do not think it presumptuous 

to say on behalf of the American people—let me thank you for your 

testimony today, for what you do every day, for what you do under 

extraordinary circumstances even not in this Country. 

And let me assure you that your testimony has been instructive 

and you will see parts of it that are not already in the bill echoed 

from today’s hearing. Thank you again for taking the time to come 

on fairly short notice to testify before us today. We have learned 

much from you. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:59 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

50 


Insert offset folio 9 here 54757.009
51 


Insert offset folio 10 here 54757.010
52 


Insert offset folio 11 here 54757.011
53 


Insert offset folio 12 here 54757.012
54 


Insert offset folio 13 here 54757.013
55 


Insert offset folio 14 here 54757.014
56 


Insert offset folio 15 here 54757.015
57 


Insert offset folio 16 here 54757.016
58 


Insert offset folio 17 here 54757.017
59 


Insert offset folio 18 here 54757.018
60 


Insert offset folio 19 here 54757.019
61 


Insert offset folio 20 here 54757.020
62 


Insert offset folio 21 here 54757.021
63 


Insert offset folio 22 here 54757.022
64 


Insert offset folio 23 here 54757.023
65 


Insert offset folio 24 here 54757.024
66 


Insert offset folio 25 here 54757.025
67 


Insert offset folio 26 here 54757.026
68 


Insert offset folio 27 here 54757.027
69 


Insert offset folio 28 here 54757.028
70 


Insert offset folio 29 here 54757.029
71 


Insert offset folio 30 here 54757.030
72 


Insert offset folio 31 here 54757.031
73 


Insert offset folio 32 here 54757.032
74 


Insert offset folio 33 here 54757.033
75 


Insert offset folio 34 here 54757.034
76 


Insert offset folio 35 here 54757.035
77 


Insert offset folio 36 here 54757.036
78 


Insert offset folio 37 here 54757.037
79 


Insert offset folio 38 here 54757.038
80 


Insert offset folio 39 here 54757.039
81 


Insert offset folio 40 here 54757.040
82 


Insert offset folio 41 here 54757.041
83 


Insert offset folio 42 here 54757.042
84 


Insert offset folio 43 here 54757.043
85 


Insert offset folio 44 here 54757.044
86 


Insert offset folio 45 here 54757.045
87 


Insert offset folio 46 here 54757.046
88 


Insert offset folio 47 here 54757.047
89 


Insert offset folio 48 here 54757.048
90 


Insert offset folio 49 here 54757.049
91 


Insert offset folio 50 here 54757.050
92 


Insert offset folio 51 here 54757.051
93 


Insert offset folio 52 here 54757.052
94 


Insert offset folio 53 here 54757.053
95 


Insert offset folio 54 here 54757.054
96 


Insert offset folio 55 here 54757.055
97 


Insert offset folio 56 here 54757.056
98 


Insert offset folio 57 here 54757.057
99 


Insert offset folio 58 here 54757.058
100 


Insert offset folio 59 here 54757.059
101 


Insert offset folio 60 here 54757.060
102 


Insert offset folio 61 here 54757.061
103 


Insert offset folio 62 here 54757.062
104 


Insert offset folio 63 here 54757.063
105 


Insert offset folio 64 here 54757.064
106 


Insert offset folio 65 here 54757.065
107 


Insert offset folio 66 here 54757.066
108 


Insert offset folio 67 here 54757.067
109 


Insert offset folio 68 here 54757.068
110 


Insert offset folio 69 here 54757.069
111 


Insert offset folio 70 here 54757.070
112 


Insert offset folio 71 here 54757.071
113 


Insert offset folio 72 here 54757.072
114 


Insert offset folio 73 here 54757.073
115 


Insert offset folio 74 here 54757.074
116 


Insert offset folio 75 here 54757.075
117 


Insert offset folio 76 here 54757.076
118 


Insert offset folio 77 here 54757.077
119 


Insert offset folio 78 here 54757.078
120 


Insert offset folio 79 here 54757.079
121 


Insert offset folio 80 here 54757.080
122 


Insert offset folio 81 here 54757.081
123 


Insert offset folio 82 here 54757.082
124 


Insert offset folio 83 here 54757.083
125 


Insert offset folio 84 here 54757.084
126 


Insert offset folio 85 here 54757.085
127 


Insert offset folio 86 here 54757.086
128 


Insert offset folio 87 here 54757.087
129 


Insert offset folio 88 here 54757.088
130 


Insert offset folio 89 here 54757.089
131 


Insert offset folio 90 here 54757.090
132 


Insert offset folio 91 here 54757.091
133 

Æ 


Insert offset folio 92 here 54757.092