1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________

)

ROSEMARY LOVE, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 00-2502 (RBW)

)

THOMAS J. VILSACK, )

Secretary, United States )

Department of Agriculture, )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiffs in this civil action are female farmers who allege that the United States 

Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) discriminated against them on the basis of gender in the 

administration of its farm loan and disaster benefit programs, and that it failed to timely resolve 

their discrimination complaints. Fourth Amended and Supplemental Complaint at 3. The Black 

Farmers & Agriculturalists Association, Inc. (“Association”) has moved to intervene in this 

action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Motion of Black Farmers and 

Agriculturalists Association, Inc. to Intervene (“Mot.”) at 1. Upon careful consideration of the 

relevant submissions,1 the Court concludes that it must deny the motion for the reasons set forth 

below.2

 1 In addition to the Association’s motion to intervene, the Court considered the following filings in reaching its 

decision: (1) the Defendant’s Opposition to Motion to Intervene (“Def.’s Opp’n”); (2) the Plaintiffs’ Opposition to 

Motion of Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, Inc. to Intervene (“Pls.’ Opp’n”); and (3) the Reply of 

Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, Inc. (BFAA) to Opposition to Motion to Intervene (“Reply”).

2 The Court is contemporaneously issuing a memorandum opinion resolving the Association’s motion to intervene in 

Garcia v. Vilsack, No. 00-2445 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 13, 2000), which addresses claims of Hispanic farmers similar to 

those asserted in this case.
2

I. BACKGROUND

Between 1997 and 2000, African-American, Native American, Hispanic, and female 

farmers filed four similar class action lawsuits alleging that the USDA engaged in widespread 

discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender in the administration of its farm loan and 

benefit programs, and that it routinely failed to investigate complaints of such discrimination. 

See Pigford v. Glickman, Nos. 97-1978, 98-1693 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 28, 1997, July 7, 1998) 

(“Pigford I”) (African-American farmers); Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-03119 (D.D.C. filed 

Nov. 24, 1999) (Native American farmers); Garcia v. Vilsack, No. 00-2445 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 

13, 2000) (Hispanic farmers); Love v. Vilsack, No. 00-2502 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 19, 2000) (female 

farmers). Judge James Robertson, a former member of this Court, denied the plaintiffs’ motions 

for class certification in this action and in Garcia v. Vilsack.

3

 See Love v. Veneman, 224 F.R.D. 

240 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Love v. Johanns, 439 F.3d 723 

(D.C. Cir. 2006); Garcia v. Veneman, 224 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d and remanded sub nom.

Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The defendant has, however, developed an 

administrative claims process for Hispanic and female farmers to resolve their claims of 

discrimination against the USDA. See Defendant’s Status Report at 1, ECF No. 155; 

Defendant’s Eighth Status Report at 1, Garcia, No. 00-2445 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2012), ECF No. 

218. Participation in the administrative claims process is conditioned on dismissal of a farmer’s 

legal claims against the USDA. See Defendant’s Status Report, Exhibit (“Ex.”) 1 (Framework 

for Hispanic or Female Farmers’ Claims Process) at 6, ECF No. 155-1; Defendant’s Eighth 

Status Report, Ex. 1 (Framework for Hispanic or Female Farmers’ Claims Process) at 6, Garcia, 

No. 00-2445 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2012), ECF No. 218-1. 

 3 Upon Judge Robertson’s retirement from this Court, Garcia and Love were reassigned to the undersigned member 

of the Court.
3

The Association is “a not-for-profit organization created for the specific purpose of 

responding to the issues and concerns of Black Farmers in the United States and abroad,” Mot. at 

2, and it seeks to intervene in this action and Garcia on behalf of its members who asserted timebarred claims in Pigford I, see Mot. at 6; Mot., Ex. 1 (Proposed Complaint) ¶¶ 15, 19. A brief 

overview of the Pigford litigation is necessary to understand the Association’s asserted interest in 

this case and Garcia. 

On October 9, 1998, Judge Paul L. Friedman of this Court certified Pigford I as a class 

action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) for purposes of liability.4 Pigford v. 

Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 352 (D.D.C. 1998). Judge Friedman later vacated his original class

certification order on January 5, 1999, and certified a new class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).5 

Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 92 (D.D.C. 1999). Following the Court’s class certification 

rulings, the parties in Pigford I negotiated a class-wide settlement, which Judge Friedman 

approved in a consent decree issued on April 14, 1999. Id. at 113. The Pigford I consent decree 

established an administrative claims process “by which each class member would have an 

opportunity to demonstrate that he or she had been the victim of past discrimination by the 

USDA and therefore was entitled to compensatory damages.” In re Black Farmers Discrim. 

Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2011). 

The Pigford I consent decree imposed a deadline for African-American farmers to submit 

their claims for administrative adjudication, id. at 10, and many farmers tried, unsuccessfully, to 

file claim packages after the deadline expired, id. at 11. To address this problem, “Congress 

 4 Rule 23(b)(2) permits class certification where, among other things, “the party opposing the class has acted or 

refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 

relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

5 Rule 23(b)(3) permits class certification where, among other things, “the court finds that the questions of law or 

fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 

action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(3).
4

resurrected the claims of those who had unsuccessfully petitioned the Arbitrator for permission 

to submit late claim packages” with a provision in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 

2008 (“2008 Farm Bill”), id., which provides that “[a]ny Pigford claimant who has not 

previously obtained a determination on the merits of a Pigford claim may, in a civil action 

brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, obtain that 

determination,” id. (quoting Pub. L. 110–234, § 14012(b), 122 Stat. 923, 1448 (2008)). After 

this provision became effective, thousands of African-American farmers filed suit in this Court. 

Id. at 13. The Association also brought suit on behalf of its members who were eligible to file 

claims under the 2008 Farm Bill. Complaint to Determine Merits and Damages Pursuant to § 

14012 of the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 ¶ 1, Black Farmers & Agriculturalists 

Ass’n, Inc. v. Schafer, No. 08-1188 (D.D.C. July 9, 2008), ECF No. 1. These cases were all 

subsequently consolidated before Judge Friedman, and are collectively known as Pigford II. In 

re Black Farmers, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 13. 

The parties in Pigford II reached a class-wide settlement agreement on February 18, 

2010, id., which Judge Friedman approved, id. at 42. The settlement agreement largely 

maintained the administrative claims process utilized in Pigford I, with some modifications. Id.

at 22. Judge Friedman certified a settlement class consisting of “[a]ll individuals: (1) who 

submitted Late-Filing Requests under Section 5(g) of the Pigford v. Glickman Consent Decree 

on or after October 13, 1999, and on or before June 18, 2008; but (2) who have not obtained a 

determination on the merits of their discrimination complaints . . . .” Id. at 15. Notably, unlike 

the Pigford I class, Pigford II class members were not permitted to opt out of the class. See id. at 

9, 32–33. The order and judgment granting approval of the settlement agreement provided that 

the Class Representatives, the Class, and its members and their heirs, 

administrators, successors, and assigns release, waive, acquit and forever 
5

discharge the United States and the Secretary from and are forever barred and 

precluded from prosecuting, any and all claims, causes of action, or requests for 

any monetary relief . . . that have been or could have been asserted in the 

Consolidated Case by reason of, with respect to, in connection with, or which 

arise out of, any matters alleged in the Consolidated Case that the Class 

Representatives, the Class, and its members, and their heirs, administrators, 

successors, and assigns have against the United States or the Secretary, or any of 

them.

Order and Judgment ¶ 19, Pigford II, No. 08-mc-0511 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2011), ECF No. 231. 

The Association was terminated as a party in Pigford II, Amended Class Action Complaint to 

Determine Merits and Damages Pursuant to § 14012 of the Food, Conservation and Energy Act 

of 2008, As Amended at 1 n.1, Pigford II, No. 08-mc-0511 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2011), ECF No. 163, 

and is not a member of the settlement class, see Latham v. Vilsack, Nos. 11-5326, 11-5334, 12-

5019, 2012 WL 10236550, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2012). 

The Association seeks to intervene in this litigation to assert two claims. Mot., Ex. 1 

(Proposed Complaint) ¶¶ 16–23. First, it seeks a declaration finding that “both the Equal 

Protection Clause and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution mandate[] that its 

members who are eligible ‘Pigford claimants’ under the 2008 Farm Bill, but did not timely file 

claims are entitled to file claims, under the framework established for Hispanic and female 

farmers.” Id. ¶ 19. The Association’s second claim is for injunctive relief with respect to the 

USDA’s current loan approval process, specifically, “a permanent injunction against [the] USDA 

and its subordinate county level loan processing entities to refrain from discrimination in 

processing loan applications of Black Farmers,” id. ¶ 21, and “an order restructuring the present 

loan approval process that removes the [county]

[6] and local level aspects of the process and 

 6 Although the proposed complaint uses the word “country” here, the Court assumes that this is a typographical error 

and the Association intended to use the word “county” because the relief sought in paragraph 21 of the proposed 

complaint refers to “county level loan processing entities,” and the clause that immediately follows the term 

“country” in paragraph 22 itself is directed at “local level aspects of the [present loan approval] process.”
6

replaces it with a more equitable organizational structure,” id. ¶ 22. Both the defendant and the 

plaintiffs oppose the motion to intervene. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Association seeks to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 24(a), or, in the alternative, permissively pursuant to Rule 24(b). Mot. at 6. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides that “on timely motion,” a court must 

allow a party to intervene if it

claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the 

action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter 

impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties 

adequately represent that interest.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). In assessing a motion to intervene as of right, a court must 

consider the motion’s timeliness, whether the movant “claims an interest relating to the 

property or transaction which is the subject of the action,” whether the movant “is so 

situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [its] 

ability to protect [its] interest,” and whether the movant’s interest “is adequately 

represented” by the existing parties to the litigation. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 

322 F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). A party seeking to intervene as of 

right must additionally establish standing under Article III of the Constitution. Id. at 

731–32. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), “on timely motion,” a court may 

permit a party to intervene if it “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a 

common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). In determining whether 

permissive intervention is appropriate, a court “must consider whether the intervention will 

unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
7

24(b)(3). Permissive intervention is “inherently discretionary,” EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., 

Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and a court may deny a motion for permissive 

intervention even if the movant has met all of the requirements of Rule 24(b), id. at 1048. 

III. ANALYSIS

While the Court sympathizes with the Association members who failed to timely assert 

Pigford claims, the Association’s motion to intervene in this litigation fails on every score. The 

Court agrees with the defendant that the Association’s first claim is plainly barred by Pigford II, 

which unequivocally extinguished the right of any Pigford claimant to receive a determination on 

the merits of a claim outside of the claims process created by Pigford II.

7

 See Order and 

Judgment ¶¶ 1, 18–19, Pigford II, No. 08-mc-0511 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2011), ECF No. 231. The 

Association’s motion suffers from a more fundamental defect, however. In order to intervene as 

of right, the Association must establish that it has Article III standing. Fund for Animals, Inc., 

322 F.3d at 731–32. As alluded to by the defendant, Def.’s Opp’n at 6 n.1; see also Def.’s Opp’n 

at 5–6, the Association’s standing to pursue its first claim is far from evident.8

“‘The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: (1) injuryin-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.’” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 

6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “‘Thus, to establish standing, a litigant must 

demonstrate a personal injury fairly traceable to the [opposing party’s] allegedly unlawful 

conduct [that is] likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’” Id. (citation omitted). “The 

 7 The Association contends that Pigford II does not bar its claim because it was dismissed from the litigation and 

thus was not a member of the settlement class. Reply at 4. The Association brings its claim on behalf of its 

members, however, who are members of the Pigford II class. Order and Judgment ¶¶ 1, 19, Pigford II, No. 08-mc0511 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2011), ECF No. 231.

 

8 The defendant’s standing argument focuses on the Association’s failure to demonstrate redressability in light of 

this Court’s reasoning in its prior opinion in this case, Love v. Vilsack, 908 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D.D.C. 2012), Def.’s 

Opp’n at 5–6, to which the Association makes no response. Because the Court finds that the Association has failed 

to demonstrate Article III standing by its virtual silence on the topic, the Court need not address the merits of the 

defendant’s redressability argument.
8

absence of any one of these three elements defeats standing.” Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 

1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2010). An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members 

if “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it 

seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor 

the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Nat’l Ass’n 

of Home Builders, 667 F.3d at 12 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 In its proposed complaint, the Association asserts that it 

seeks a declaration that both the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clauses 

of the United States Constitution mandate[] that its members who are eligible 

‘Pigford claimants’ under the 2008 Farm Bill, but did not timely file claims are 

entitled to file claims, under the framework established for Hispanic and female 

farmers.

Mot., Ex. 1 (Proposed Complaint) ¶ 19. While it is apparent that the Association’s objective in 

intervening is to obtain an opportunity for its members to participate in the administrative claims 

process for Hispanic and female farmers, see id. ¶¶ 11, 19; Mot. at 6; Reply at 6, the nature of the 

Association members’ asserted injury, how that injury is fairly traceable to the USDA’s conduct, 

and how the requested relief will redress that injury is less clear. For example, if, as it appears, 

the harm that the Association seeks to redress is its members’ inability to obtain a determination 

on the merits of their claims, the Court is at a loss to discern how this injury is fairly traceable to 

the defendant’s actions in this case and whether the Association’s requested relief would likely 

redress this injury. See Mot. at 11 (describing the Association’s first claim as alleging that “the 

additional claim process is unconstitutional unless [the Association’s] members are permitted to 

intervene”). The Association’s motion yields no assistance here, providing only a recitation of 

the requirements for standing and the conclusory statement that it “has standing to sue based on 

injuries to itself or to its members.” Mot. at 7. The Association has therefore failed to 
9

demonstrate Article III standing to pursue its first claim, as it must to intervene as of right in this 

litigation.9

While the Association’s second claim10 does not present the same standing problems, the 

Court agrees with the plaintiffs that the Association’s motion does not satisfy the requirements 

for either intervention as of right or permissive intervention, see Pls.’ Opp’n at 3–5, because the 

Association’s motion is untimely, a prerequisite for both modes of intervention, see Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 24(a), (b). The timeliness of a motion to intervene 

is to be judged in consideration of all the circumstances, especially weighing the 

factors of time elapsed since the inception of the suit, the purpose for which 

intervention is sought, the need for intervention as a means of preserving the 

applicant’s rights, and the probability of prejudice to those already parties in the 

case.

Smoke v. Norton, 252 F.3d 468, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The plaintiffs filed 

their complaint on October 19, 2000, see ECF No. 1, and the defendant first announced its 

 9 The Court notes that several other obstacles preclude the Association from intervening here to pursue its first 

claim. As set forth below, the Association’s motion to intervene is untimely. In addition, as the plaintiffs note, see

Pls.’ Opp’n at 3–4, the Association fails to assert an interest sufficient to entitle it to intervene in this litigation. 

“[I]ntervention aims to protect interests which are ‘of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will 

either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.’” United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 

642 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Smith v. Gale, 144 U.S. 509, 518 (1892)). A judgment in this case 

will have virtually no effect on the Association’s members. It will not address the merits of the Association’s claim 

and will not preclude them from raising it in separate litigation. In its motion, the Association focuses on the 

flexible approach endorsed by this Circuit in Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967), which characterized 

the “interest” inquiry as “‘primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently 

concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process.’” Mot. at 8 (quoting Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700). 

The Association places more weight upon this language than it can bear. The Association seeks to interject a claim 

which appears to challenge the USDA’s creation of the administrative claims process for Hispanic and female 

farmers, involving a statute which has no bearing whatsoever on the plaintiffs in this litigation and in Garcia, solely 

on the basis of a history of similar allegations of discrimination by the USDA against African-American, Hispanic, 

and female farmers, allegations which have been to this point litigated in separate actions. While there may be a 

shared history of discrimination, the Court finds that the Association’s first claim, which appears to raise entirely 

new legal and factual issues, has little in common with the existing claims in this case. Moreover, inserting such a 

claim into this litigation at this late date is clearly incompatible with efficiency, as set forth in greater detail in the 

Court’s discussion of the timeliness of this motion. The Association’s motion to intervene to pursue its first claim 

thus fails on multiple fronts. 

10 The Court notes that while the Association’s proposed complaint includes a claim for injunctive relief relating to 

discrimination in the USDA’s present loan approval process, Mot., Ex. 1 (Proposed Complaint) ¶¶ 21–23, its motion 

to intervene focuses exclusively on its first claim regarding participation in the administrative claims process 

provided for Hispanic and female farmers.
10

intention to establish an administrative claims process for Hispanic and female farmers in 

September 2010, see Defendant’s Status Report at 1, ECF No. 112; Defendant’s Status Report at 

1, Garcia, No. 00-2445 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2010), ECF No. 181. The claims process was finalized 

in January 2012. See Defendant’s Status Report at 1, ECF No. 155; Defendant’s Eighth Status 

Report at 1, Garcia, No. 00-2445 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2012), ECF No. 218. The Association did not 

move to intervene for nearly thirteen years after the plaintiffs filed suit, almost three years after 

the USDA announced its intention to create the administrative claims process to settle the claims 

asserted in this litigation, and just over a year after the USDA finalized the claims process. The 

Association’s motion is untimely as measured from any of these points, see Moten v. 

Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int’l Union of Am., 543 F.2d 224, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 

(upholding denial of motion to intervene based on untimeliness because “[a]ny measure of 

timeliness of the motion to intervene must be cast against the backdrop of two years of 

controversy between the unions which now have reached settlement”), and the Association 

provides no reason for its delay. Indeed, it is apparent that its decision not to seek intervention 

earlier was a strategic choice to instead participate in the parallel Pigford litigation, a 

circumstance that weighs against intervention. See id.

The other factors the Court must consider also weigh in favor of finding the Association’s 

motion untimely. While the Association’s first claim relates solely to the administrative claims 

process, its purpose for intervention with respect to the second claim is to obtain injunctive relief 

relating to discrimination against African-American farmers in the USDA’s current loan 

approval process, a claim appropriately brought at the beginning, rather than the end, of this 

litigation. This litigation is quite advanced, and injection of new claims at this point will serve 

only to delay further the conclusion of this long-running case for the existing parties. 
11

Intervention would require further proceedings to address new issues and potentially new factual 

development since the Association’s second claim relates to the USDA’s “present loan approval 

process,” Mot., Ex. 1 (Proposed Complaint) ¶ 22 (emphasis added), and therefore is likely to 

prejudice the existing parties, see Roane v. Leonhart, 741 F.3d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(identifying further discovery and argument on additional issues as sources of prejudice in 

evaluating the timeliness of a motion to intervene). 

Moreover, the Association need not intervene here to pursue its second claim.11 While 

the ability to bring a claim in separate litigation is not in itself a sufficient reason to deny 

intervention, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the fact 

that the Association will suffer no harm if intervention is denied12 is very relevant to the Court’s 

assessment of the timeliness of its motion when all of the other considerations before the Court 

indicate that the Association’s intervention at this late date will serve only to disadvantage the 

existing parties, delay the resolution of this protracted litigation, and unnecessarily complicate an 

already-complex proceeding by injecting new issues when the litigation has advanced to the 

point it has reached here. Indeed, “the requirement of timeliness is aimed primarily at preventing 

potential intervenors from unduly disrupting litigation, to the unfair detriment of the existing 

parties,” Roane, 741 F.3d at 151, which is exactly what the Association’s intervention here 

would occasion.

 11 The Court expresses no opinion as to whether this claim is barred by Pigford II.

12 The Association contends that intervention “is necessary to prevent grave injury” and that it will suffer “great 

harm” if intervention is denied. Mot. at 12. However, the Association provides no explanation as to what that harm 

might be. Left to speculate as to what it might mean by these assertions, the Court concludes that the Association is 

likely referring to the denial of an opportunity for its members to participate in the administrative claims process 

established for Hispanic and female farmers because, as noted earlier, the Association’s motion focuses exclusively 

on this requested relief. However, the Court has already concluded it has not demonstrated its standing to bring such 

a claim.
12

The Association responds that since this litigation has been stayed while claimants seek 

resolution through the administrative claims process, the Association’s intervention “will not 

delay or otherwise prejudice the parties for the reason the litigation will resume and a new case 

schedule will be formulated.” Reply at 6. Accepting this reasoning would render Rule 24’s 

timeliness requirement meaningless because intervening at any time short of final judgment 

would constitute timely intervention due to the fact that intervention would generally require that 

the litigation proceed under a revised scheduling order. The Association also argues that the 

plaintiffs do not set forth any “specific grounds” in support of their contention that the motion to 

intervene is untimely. Id. at 6. But the plaintiffs argue that the Association’s motion is untimely 

for precisely the reason stated above—the fact that this litigation was already far advanced when 

the Association moved to intervene. Pls.’ Opp’n at 5. The Association cites no authority for the 

proposition that anything more is required of the plaintiffs, and the Court has found none. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Association’s motion to intervene is untimely and that 

neither intervention as of right nor permissive intervention is appropriate. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Association’s motion to intervene is denied. 

SO ORDERED this 13th day of June, 2014.13

REGGIE B. WALTON

United States District Judge

 13 The Court will contemporaneously issue an order consistent with this memorandum opinion.