### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-11-00598- CR

Cort ez William s, Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 147 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -DC- 10- 3025 75, TH E H ONO RAB LE CLIF F ORD B ROW N, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury convicted Cortez Wil l i am s of indece ncy with a child by sexual contac t and indece ncy with a child by exposure, and assessed hi s punishment at confinement for 18 y ear s and
10 y ear s in the I nstitut ional Division of the Texas Depa rtment of Criminal J ustice, respe ctively

. See
Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a) (1), (a) (2 )( B) , (d ). I n a single point of err or on appea l, Wil liams challeng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to support his conviction for indece ncy with a child by
exposure. I n ad d i tion, throug h our own revie w of the record, we have found clerical error s in the written j udg ments of conviction. We will modi fy the judg ments to corre ct the clerica l err ors and, as modified, af

firm the judg ments of conviction.BACK GR OUND Thirteen- y ear -old K.H. met 33-y ear -old Wil liams one afte rnoon in November 2010

as she was walking home from school. Wil liams stopped his car next to K.H. and, to avoid looking suspicious to the police ca r down the stre et, told her to get in his car so they could talk. K.H. g ot

1
in and the two drove around for a while, smoking marijuana Wil liams provided. Wil liams g ave K.H. his phone number and, less than a n h o u r later, dropped her off where he had picked her up. K.H. finished walking home, chang ed clothes, and went to a friend’ s house. L ater , she called Wil liams 2
from her friend’ s to ask him to come smoke marijuana with them. Wil liams picked up the three g irls (K.H., her friend, and a friend of K.H.’s friend) and drove to a car wa s h wh er e all four of them smoked marijuana he provided. After less than an hour, Wil liams dropped the g irls back off at the friend’ s house. K.H. stay ed at her friend’ s for a few more h o u rs , u n til afte r dark, then called
W illiams ag ain to ask for a ride home. Wil liams picked K.H. up. I nstead of driving her home, h o we v er , h e d rove to a parking lot behind a business, closed for the day , and parke d behind a trash dumpster.

During that drive, Wil liams and K.H. ag ain smoked marijuana that he provided. At trial, K.H. testified that she was “uncontr ollably high.” Thoug h she had smoked marijuana befor e,

even in amounts simil ar to that day , s he had never felt like she did that night. Once they wer e parke d, Wil liams beg an touching K.H.—her shoulders, her brea sts ove r her clothing, and her leg s.

Acc o rd i n g t o K.H.’s testimony , Wil liams identified himself to her as “Shawn.” K.H. 1 identified Will iams in the courtroom a s the person she knew a s “Shawn.” Subsequent testimony indicated that K.H.’s friend actua lly lived in a n apar tment, but the 2 testimony ref ers to her friend’ s “house.” 2K.H. testified that Wil liams pulled her pants and underw ear down her leg s, not a ll the way off, but

far enoug h down so that h er “p ri v ate are a” was exposed. Acc ording to K.H., Wil liams stopped touching her when a police office r appea red on the scene . K.H. testified that when the police arr ived she was both scar ed, because she was under the i nfluenc e, and relieve d, beca use she did not want to have se x with Wi lliams.

J are d J ensen, a patrol office r with the Austin Police Depa rtment (APD), testified that he pulled into the closed business’s parking lot around 8 p.m. as part of his regular patrol and noticed

a white Cadillac Escala de parke d next to the dumpster in the ty pically em p t y parking lot. Considering the situation suspicious, he decide d to investigate and called for backup assistance

. He
approa ched the driver’ s side of the SUV and asked the driver, subsequently identified as Wil liams,
to roll down the window. Offic er J ensen testified that he immediately saw that the fema le passeng er, later identified as K.H., had nothing on from the waist down. Her jeans and underw ear wer e down around he r shins and her

“priva te ar ea” was visible. The office r had both Wil liams and K.H. step
out of the SUV. When Wil liams exit ed the car , Offic er J ensen observe d that his belt was unbuckled, his zipper was down, and his box er shorts wer e hanging out of t he bottom of one legof hi s pants. When Offic er J enkins inquired about the situation, Wil liams explained that he was “fixing to suc k on her” and later

expressed t hat he was “g oing to bang her.” Howeve r, t hroug hout the encounte r, Wil liams repe atedly insisted that all they had done was kiss beca use the office r’s arr ival interrupted their acti v i ties. Offic er J ensen identified K.H. as a minor and noted that she appea red highly 3

K.H. ini tially told Offic er J ensen that she was 17, but subsequently provided her cor rec t 3 date of birth which re veale d that she wa s 13 y ear s old. 3intox icated on some substance. At trial, he descr ibed her as being “pretty out of i t” and indicated

she wa s unable to provide ve ry much information. About the time Offic er J ensen had secur ed Wil liams and K.H., J ohn Rid enour, a patrol office r with APD, arr ived in response to J ensen’ s call for backup. He made the same observa tions about Wil liams’s appea ranc e, s p e c if

ic a ll y th e d is a

r r a y o f h is clothing. Offic er Ridenour testified that Wil liams explained that his clothing was like that beca use he and K.H. wer e “about to fuck.” Wil liams told Ridenour that he was with K.H. “to g et some pussy ” but that he had not done
any thing yet bec ause Offic er J ensen showed up. Ridenour testified that he believe d that Wil liams knew K.H. was y oung er than 18 y ear s old beca use he repe atedly told the office rs, “I didn’t touch her.
S h e told me she was 18.” Be cause there was nothing illega l about touching an 18-y ear -old, t h e office r considere d Wil l i am s ’s jux taposition of these statements, asser ted repe atedly , suspicious. Ri d e n o u r c o n f ir med J ensen’ s assessment reg arding K.H.’s intox icated state, saying th a t s h e a p p e a r e d to be hig hly

intox icated on some substance a nd that her r esponses to questions wer e ver y slow. The encounte r conclude d when Offic er J ensen arr ested Wil liams and took him to jail

on an outstanding war

rant and Offic er Ridenour took K.H. home. Ridenour informed K.H.’s mother about the situation, and hear d K.H. tell her mom that she was try ing to make money for the family

. She told her mother, in Ridenour’s prese nce, that “she was g oing to let the g uy lick her for money .”

Carey Chaudoir, a c hild abuse dete ctive with APD, was assigne d to investigate t he

case . As part of her i n v es t i gat ion, she interviewe d both Wil liams and K.H. I n his voluntary interview, Wil liams told Detec tive C h au doir that he went to pick up K.H. when she called the

4

A video re cording of the intervie w was a dmitted as evidenc e and published to the jury

. 4 4second time beca use she told him she was high and horny and he thought it was g oing to be “an easy

score ,” meaning sex. He told her that he had not y et touched K.H. when the police arr ived beca use he was still in the prepa

ration phase. He explained that he neede d to g et high befor e he was able to achie ve an ere ction. He admitted that he had been smoking marijuana with cra ck coca ine added to the blunt to “g et rea dy ” when Offic er J ensen arr ived. Wil liams told the detec tive that K.H. had pulled down her own pants while waiting for him to g et rea dy

. He further explained that he did not need to pull K.H.’ s pants down because if she was interested in him sex ually , she nee ded to show him by pulling her own pants down. Chaudoir testified that Wil liams also expressed in the interview that he did not need to have sex with a minor beca use, “eve n though i t m i gh t b e an ea s y piece of ass,” women wer e “a dime a dozen” for him. Detec tive Chaudoir did not testify about all the details of her interview with K.H. Howeve r, conce rning the particula r events surrounding the exposure of K.H.’s g enitals, she testified that K.H

. told he r that Will iams had unbuttoned her pants and pulled them down to her mid-thig h are a, pulling he r under wea r with them. Wil liams was subsequently char g ed by indictment with attempted ag g ravated sexual assault of a child (Count I ), indece ncy with a child by sexual contac t (Count I I ), and indece ncy with

a child by exposure (Count I I I ). At trial, K.H. and the three law enfor ceme nt office rs testified about the above -desc ribed e vents. The defense did not call any witnesses nor did Willi ams testify . The jury found Wil liams g uilt y o f indece ncy with a child by sexual contac t as alleg ed in Count I I and indece ncy with a child b y ex posure as alleg ed in Count I I I , but acquitted him of attempted
ag g rava ted sexual assault of a child as alleg ed in Count I

. During the punishment phase of trial, the
State prese nted evidenc e of Wil liams’s criminal history and his extraneous violent conduct toward

5sever al women. The defe nse called two witnesses, including K.H.’s mother, and Wil liams testified

on his own behalf

. The jury assessed Wil liams’s punishment at 18 y ear s in prison for indece ncy with a child by sexual contac t and 10 y ear s in prison for indecenc y with a child by exposure. The trial
court sentenc ed Wil liams in acc ordanc e with the jury ’s verdic ts, and, denying the State’s reque st for cumulative sente nces, or dere d the sentenc es to be ser ved conc urre ntly . Wil liams now appea ls.

NUNC P RO TUNC JUDG MENTS
I n this appeal, the district c lerk filed a supplemental cler k’s rec ord containing nunc
pro tunc judgme nts signe d by the trial court on November 6, 2012, appar ently in re s ponse to the State’s motion requesting such. 5

Rule 23

. 1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedur e vests a trial court with the authority to corr ect cler ical mistakes or err ors in a judgme nt throug h entry of a nunc pro tunc judgme nt so long as the defe ndant has not appea led. See Tex. R. App. P. 23.1. Absent cer tain exceptions not rele vant her e, once a def endant ha s filed a notice of appea l a nd the rec ord has been filed with the appellate court, the trial court lacks au t h o ri t y t o ac t on the case until it rec eives the appellate court’s ma

ndate. See Tex. R. App. P

. 25.2(g ); see also Gre en v. State , 906 S.W .2d 937,
939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (interpr eting former rule of appellate proce dure 40(b)( 2), prede cessor

The motion sought to cor rec t the lang uag e in the j udg ments conce rning the applica bility 5 of the sex offe nder reg istration require ments of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e and to re flec t the ag e of the victim a t the time of

the offe nses. The or igina l judgments in this case state that the sex offende r reg istration require ments do not apply to Wi lliams and indicate that the ag e of the victim at the time of the offe ns e wa s “n o t ap p l icable.” The nunc pro tunc judgme nts ref lect that the Chapter 62 sex offe nder reg istration require ments do apply to Wil liams and indicate that the ag e of the victim at the time of the off ense w as y oung er tha

n 17 y ear s. 6to curr ent rule 25.2). Thus, a trial court may not rende r a nunc pro tunc judgme nt afte r the appellate

rec ord is filed in the court of appea ls. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(g ); Martinez v. State , No. 01-12-00361- CR, 2013 WL 3957698, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] J uly 30, 2013,

no pet.) (mem. op., not desig nated for publication) (trial court l ac k ed authorit y to enter nunc
pro tunc judgme nt afte r appellate rec ord had been filed); Gree n v. S t ate , No. 03-12-00225- CR,
2012 WL 6097308, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec

. 6, 2012, pet. ref ’d) (mem. op., not desig nated for publication) (same) ; Hightower v

. State , No. 06-09-00057- CR, 2009 WL 1974396, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana J uly 10, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not desig nated for publication) (same) ; see also
Gree n , 906 S.W .2d at 939 (finding s of fac t and conclusions of law, enter ed afte r filing of appellate

rec ord, we re void).

Her e, the appellate rec ord had alre ady been filed in this Court when the nunc pro tunc judgme nts wer e signe d on November 6, 2012. Acc ordi n g ly , the trial court lacke d jurisdiction to
enter the nunc pro tunc judgme nts and they are void. Consequently , we disreg ard the nunc pro tunc judgme nts contained in th e supplemental cler k’s rec ord and revie w the orig inal judgme nts of convic tion. 6

The judgme nt of conviction for indece ncy with a child by sexual contac t contained in the 6 rec ord, signe d September 21, 2011, indicates that it is a nunc pro tunc judgme nt. We note, howeve r, that at that time this nunc pro tunc judgme nt was signe d, the notice of appea l had not y et been filed. Acc ording ly , the case had not y et been appea led by the defe ndant nor had the appellate rec ord been filed. Thus, the trial court had authority to enter this nunc pro tunc judgme nt. We revie w this nunc pro tunc judg ment as the “ orig inal” judg ment for that of fense

. 7SUF F ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE Count I I I of the indictment char ged W i l liams with indece ncy with a child by exposure, alleg ing tha t he

did the n and there intentionally and knowing ly with the intent to arouse and g ratify the sexual de sire of the said Cortez Williams ca use [K.H.] , a child y oung er than 17 y ear s of ag e and not the spouse of the said Cortez Wil liams, to expose any part of the g enitals of the sa id [ K.H.].

I n his sole point of err or, Wil liams asser ts that the evidenc e is insufficient to support his conviction for this offe nse bec ause of (1) c onflicting evidenc e at tria l and (2) inc onsistent verdicts.

Stan dard of Revie w

Due proce ss require s that the State prove, bey ond a rea sonable doubt, ever y element of the crime char g ed. Jack son v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979); Byrd v. State , 336 S.W .3d 242,
246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When revie wing the s u ff i ci en cy of the evidenc e to support a

co nviction, we consider all the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the verdic t to deter m i n e whether any rational trier of fac t could h av e found the essential elements of the offe nse bey ond a

rea sonable doubt. Jack

son , 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks v. State , 323 S.W .3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The standard of revie w on ap p ea l is the same for both direc t and circ umstantial evidenc e

case s. Kuciemba v . State , 310 S.W .3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

I n deter mining the leg al sufficie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e , w e mu s t consider all the evidenc e in the rec ord, whether direc t or circ umstantial, proper ly or improperly admitted, or submitt ed by the
prosec ution or the defe nse. See Clayton v. State , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Moff

8v. State , 131 S.W .3d 485, 489–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Allen v. State , 249 S.W .3d 680, 688–89

(Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.). We revie w all the evidenc e in th e l ight most favor able to the verdic t and assume that the tr ier of f act r esolved c onflicts in the testimony , weig hed the evidence , and drew rea sonable infere nces in a manner that supports the verdic t. Jack son , 443 U.S. at 318; see Laster v. State , 275 S.W .3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A leg al-suff iciency revie w require s

us to defe r to the jury ’s deter minations of the witnesses’ cre dibilit y and the weig ht to be g iven their testimony

. Brooks , 323 S.W .3d at 899. The jury , as the exclusive judg e of the fac ts, is entitl ed to weig h and resolve conflicts in the evidenc e and draw rea s o n ab l e i n fe renc es there from. Clayton , 235 S.W .3d at 778; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc

. arts. 36.13, 38.04. Thus, when f ace d with a re cord of historical fac ts that supports conflicting infere nces, we must presume that the trier of fac t resolved
any such conflicts in favor of the verdic t an d d ef er t o t hat resolution. Jack son , 443 U.S. at 326; Padilla v. State , 326 S.W .3d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Our role is tha

t of a due proce ss safeguard, e nsuring only the ra tionality

of the trier of fac t’s finding of the essential elements of th e o ff en s e bey ond a rea sonable doubt. Allen , 249 S.W .3d at 688; see Laster , 275 S.W .3d at 517–18. We consider only whether the jury rea ched

a rational decision. See Curry v . State , 30 S.W .3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Conflictin g Evidence

Wil liams challeng es the suf f ic iency of the evidenc e on the issue of causation. He first
arg ues the evidenc e is insufficient to show that he cause d K.H. to expose her g enitals beca use there

was c onflicting evidenc e about who pulled dow n her pa nts.

9At trial, K.H. testified that Wil liams pulled her pants, along with her underw ear ,

down, but not all the way off, exposi ng her “priva te are a;” though she admitted on cross examination that she had to “lift up” to help Wil liams g et her pants down. Detec tive Chaudoir testified that K.H. told her that Wil liams unbuttoned her pants and pulled them, along with her underw ear, down to about her mid-thigh are a. But, the rec ord also contained some evidenc e indicating that K.H. pulled her own pants down. On cross examination, Offic er J ensen testified that both W illiams and K.H. told him at t h e s ce n e that K.H. pulled her pants down and he documented these statements in his police repor

t. Wil liams later repe ated the asser tion that K.H. pulled her own pants down during his 7
interview w ith Detective Cha udoir.
I n his brief, Wil liams essentially conce des that K.H.’s trial testimony alone is sufficie nt to support h i s co nviction for indecenc y with a child by exposure. See Tex. Code Crim.
P ro c. ar t

. 38.07(a) , (b)( 1) (uncor robora ted testimony of child victim is sufficie nt to support conviction for sexual offe nse); see also Perez v. S tate , 113 S.W .3d 819, 838 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. ref

’d), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. State , 268 S.W .3d 571, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Neve rtheless, he argues that the i n co n s i s t encies in her statements about who pulled down her pants rende r the evidenc e insufficient to suppo rt the conviction. We disag ree . The inconsistencies or conflicts between s t at em en t s made at the s cene or during W illiams’s interview and K.H.’s statements to the detec tive or her trial testimony wer e all befor e the jury

. Reconc iliation of any conflicts or contra dict i o n s i n t h e evidenc e is within the exclusive province of the jury

.

On the dash-c am rec ording from Offic er J ensen’ s patrol car , Wil liams can be hear d sever al 7 t i m es t el l i n g the office rs that K.H. pulled her pants down. K.H.’s statements on the rec ording , howeve r, ar e diffic ult to dis cer n and ar e at times inaudible.

10Bowden v. State , 628 S.W .2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Jimene z v. State , 240 S.W .3d 384,
402 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d); see Tex. Code Crim. P roc. a rts. 36.13, 38.04. The jury is fre e to acc ept or reje ct any or all of t he evidence presente d by either side. S ee L a n co n v. State , 253 S.W .3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); W esbrook v. State , 29 S.W .3d 103, 111–1 2 (T ex. Crim. App. 2000). Her e, the rec ord ref lects a conflict in the evidenc e, and the jury , as the exclusive judge of the fac ts, wa s en t i t l ed to weig h and resolve these conflicts. See Jack son , 443 U.S.
at 326; Clayton , 235 S.W .3d at 778. We fi n d no flaw in the jury ’s resolution of this conflict
ag ainst Wi lliams.

Moreove r, contra

ry to Wil liams’s contention, the State did not have to prove that he pulled down K.H.’s p ants in order to prove that he cause d K.H. to expose her g enitals. Proof of

causation is sufficie nt if the evidenc e establishes that “but for” the defe ndant’s conduct, the alleg ed result would not have occur red. Barcene

s v. State , 940 S.W .2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 8
19 9 7 , p et

. ref

’d); see Tex. Penal Code § 6.04(a) ; see also W ooten v. State , 267 S.W .3d 289, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Whether such a causa l con n ection exis ts is a question for the jury ’s deter mination. See W

ooten , 267 S.W .3d at 295.

Whil e the Penal Code does not define “ca u s e, ” as the State notes in its brief, it does 8 expli citly addre ss the issue of when causation results in criminal responsibility for conduct. See Tex. Penal Code § 6.04(a)

. The conce pt of “but for” causation contained in this statute is consistent with the commo n m ea n i n g o f “ca use.” See, e.g. , W

ebster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 356 (2002) (def ining transitive verb “ca

use” as “to serve as cause or occa sion of; bring into exis tence ; make” ); American Heritage Dictionary 214 (1973) (def ining transitive verb “ca

use” as “to be the cause of; eff ect; make happen; bring about”) ; see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(a) (Code Construction Act provision requiring that “[w]ords and phrase s shall be rea d in context and construed acc ording to the rules of g rammar

and common usag e”)

. 11Her e, the evidenc e established that Wil liams, a 33-y ear -old man, picked up K.H., a

13-y ear -old child, that night knowing she was und er the i nfluenc e of drug s and believing she was “an easy score .” He provided her with y et more marijuana , possibly lace d with cra ck coca ine, that

re n d ere d her “uncontrollably high” such t hat s he felt like she di d not have control over her wo rd s

or her body

. He then drove her to a remote location to have sex with her. After parking behind the dumpster, he remove d (or beg an to remove ) his clothing, and was kissing and touching K.H

. i n a sexual manner when he was interrupted by the police. Fr om this evidenc e, a rational jury could have deter mined that—reg ardle ss of who phy s i ca l l y pulled down K.H.’s pants—“but for” Wil liams’s conduct, K.H . would not have been in the passeng er se at of his SUV with her pa nts down and her
g enitals exposed for the g ratifica tion of his sexual desire. Fur thermore , Offic er Ridenour’s testimony that K.H. told her mother she was “j u s t t ry ing to make money for the family ” and was “g oing to let the g uy lick her for money” sug g ests t hat Wil liams offe red or ag ree d to g ive K.H.
money in exchang e for sex. A rational jury coul d h av e conclude d that this monetary inducement

cause d K.H. to eng ag e in behavior that resulted in h er g enitals being exposed. I n addition, from Wil liams’s boastful comments to the detec tive, th e j u ry could have rea sonably inferr ed that he instructed K.H. to pull down her pants to prove her interest in eng ag ing in sexual activities with him there by causing her to e x pose her g enitals. Viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the verdic t, a rational jury could have found bey ond a re as o n ab l e doubt that Wil liams cause d K.H. to expose her g enitals for the
g ratification of his sexual desire. There fore , the evidenc e is leg ally sufficie nt to support Wil liams’s conviction for inde cenc y

with a child by

exposure.

12Inconsis tent V erdicts Wil liams nex t arg ues that bec ause the jury did not find him g uilty of the additional char g e of attempted ag g ravated sexual assault of a child, there is insufficient evidenc e to support the conviction for indece ncy

with a child by exposure. He maintains that the j ury ’s not g uilty verdic t demonstrates that the j ury conclude d that he did not pull K.H.’s pants down. I n ef fe ct , Wil liams 9
asks us to find the evidenc e leg ally insufficient beca use the jury ’s two verdic ts, acquitting him of attempted ag g ravated sexual assault o f a ch i l d and convicting him of indece ncy with a child by
exposure, are inconsistent.

Howeve r, as just discussed, the State was not require d to prove that Wil liams pulled down K.H.’s pants in order to prove that he cause d K.H. to expose her g enitals. More importantly , inconsistent verdic ts, even when based on the same evidenc e, do not require reve rsal on the g round of leg al insufficienc y . Dunn v. United States , 2 8 4 U. S

. 390, 393–94 (1932), overruled on other grounds by Sealfon v. United States , 332 U.S. 575 (1948); Thomas v. State , 352 S.W .3d 95, 101 (Tex. App.

— Ho u s ton [14t h Dist.] 2011, pet. ref ’d); Jack son v. State , 3 S.W .3d 58, 61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.); see Moore v. State , No. 04-12-00490-C R , 2 0 1 3 WL 3148650, at *1 (T ex. App.—San Antonio J une 19, 2013, pet. struck) (mem. op., not desig nated for publication).
I nconsistent verdic ts may simply result from a jury ’s desire to be lenient on some counts or to g rant

Count I of t he indictment cha rg ed Willi ams with attempted agg ravated s exual assault of 9 a child, alleg ing tha t Wi lliams with the i n t en t t o co m mit the offense of Ag g ravated S exual Assault of a Child did then and there commit an act that tended but failed to eff ect the commission of said offe nse, t o wit: by pulling down the pants of [ K.H.], a child y ounger t h an 14 y ear s of ag e and not his spouse. 13its own form of executive clemenc y . Thomas , 352 S.W .3d at 101; Ja ck s o n , 3 S.W .3d at 61; see Dunn , 284 U. S

. at 393. Even wher e an inconsistent verdic t might have been the result of compromise or mistake, the verdic t should not be upset by appellate specula tion or inquiry into such

m att ers. United States v. Powell , 469 U.S. 57, 64–67 (1984) (re aff irming Dunn rule); Ja ck

s o n , 3 S.W .3d at 61; see Dunn , 284 U.S. at 3 9 4

. C o n s equently , when an appellant asser ts a conflict betwee n a jury ’s verdic ts on the same fac ts, we are limit ed solely to deter mi n ing whether there is sufficie nt evidence to support the char g e on which a conviction is returne d. Jack son , 3 S.W .3d at 61–62; Moore , 2013 WL 3148 6 5 0 , at * 1 ; s ee Dunn , 284 U.S. at 393–94. We examine the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to support the verdic t rathe r than specula te on how the jury arr ived at its verdic t. Jack

son , 3 S.W .3d at 61–62; see Dunn , 284 U.S. at 394. What the fac t-finder did with the

rema inder of the char g e is immaterial. Jack son , 3 S.W .3d at 62; Moore , 2013 WL 3148650, at *1.
As previously discussed, and as W illiams conce des i n his b ri ef , the t rial t estimony of K.H. is sufficie nt to support Wil liams’s conviction for indece ncy with a child by exposure. Thus, it is i rre levant that the jury acquitted Williams of attempted ag g rava ted sexual assault of a c hild.
For the forg oing rea sons, we hold that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support Wil liams’s conviction for inde cenc y

with a child by

exposure. We overrule Wil liams’s sole point of err or.

1 0

Although a leg al-suff

iciency revie w require s us to defe r to the jury ’s deter minations of the 1 0 witnesses’ cre dibilit y and the weig ht to be g iven th ei r t es t i mony , see Brooks v. State , 323 S.W .3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), Wil liams urg es us to “disag ree ” with the fac t-finder ’s conclusion reg arding who cause d the ex p o s u re of K.H.’s g enitals (as demonstrated by the g uilty verdic t for indece ncy with a child by exposure). He maintains that we have authority to do so “whe n the rec ord clea

rly indicates that such a step is nece ssary to arr est the occur renc e of a m an i fe st injusti ce.” See Johnson v. State , 23 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Such authority , howeve r, was gra nted when the C ourt of Criminal Appea ls adopted a f actua l-sufficie ncy

revie w in criminal case s. See Clewis v. State , 922 S. W

. 2 d 1 2 6 , 1 3 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled by Brooks , 14CLERICAL ERRORS IN JUDGM ENT S
As discussed ear lier in this opinion, the trial court enter ed nunc pro tunc judgme nts in this case to corr ect err ors in the ju d gm en t s o f co n viction. But, beca use the trial court lacke d authority to enter those judgme nts, we have concluded that the nunc pr o tunc j udg ments are void.
Howeve r, this Court has the authority to modify incorre ct judgme nts when the nece ssary information is available to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W .2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The judgme nts in this case sta t e that the sex offe nder reg istration require ments of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e do not apply to Wil liams and indicate that the
ag e of the victim at t h e t i m e o f the offe nse was “not applicable .” Howeve r, when a defe ndant is convicted of an offe nse for which reg istration as a sex offe nder is require d under Ch ap t er 6 2 , the judgme nt must contain a sta t em en t t h at the reg istration require ment of that chapte r applies to the defe ndant and a st atement of the age of t he victim of t he offense. S ee T ex . C o d e C rim. Proc. art. 42.01, § 1(27). Her e, the rec ord demonstrates that Wil liams was convicted of offe nses that require
reg istration under Chapter 62. See id. arts. 62.001(5 )(A) , .051(a)

. Thus, the judgme nts wer e require d to r efle ct Wil liams’s duty to r eg ister as a sex off ender as well as K.H.’s ag e at the time of the offe nses. The tria l court had no discretion but to enter the requisite lang uag e in the judg ments

323 S.W .3d at 895, 912. We no longe r employ distinct leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy standards when revie wing the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to s u s t ain a criminal conviction. See Merritt v. State , 368 S.W .3d 516, 525 n.8 (Tex

. C ri m. App. 2012); Brooks , 323 S.W .3d at 912. I nstead, the only standard for deter

mining whether the evidenc e proves the defe ndant’s g uilt bey ond a re as o n ab le doubt is the Jack

son due-pr ocess standard. Brooks , 323 S.W .3d at 912; see Merritt , 368 S.W .3d at 525 n.8; Griego v. State , 337 S.W .3d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We decline Wil liams’s reque st to apply the fa ctual-suf

ficienc y standard in our

leg al-suff

iciency revie w in this case. 15of conviction, and the failure to do so was a cler ical err or. See, e.g. , Ex parte Poe , 751 S.W .2d 873,

876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (trial court had no discretion but to ref lect aff irmative dea dly

wea pon finding in judgme nt as mandated by article 42.12, § 3f(a )(2) of Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e; failure to do so was er

ror of cler ical natur e).
I n addition , we o b s erve that the j udg ment of conviction for indecenc y with a child by exposure states that the “Statute for Offe nse” is “21.11(a )(1) Penal Code.” The statute for indece ncy with a child by exposure as alleg ed here , howeve r, is section 21.11(a) (2)( B) of the Penal Code.
Acc ording ly , we modify both judgme nts of conviction to ref lect that the sex offe nder
reg istration require ments of C hapter 62 apply to Wil liams and to ref lect that the age of t he victim
at the time of the offe nse was 13 y ear s. We further modify the judgme nt of conviction for indece ncy with a child by

exposure to state that the “Statute for Offe nse” is “21.11( a)( 2)(B ) Penal Code.”

CONCLUSION
F in d in g th e e v id e n c e le g a ll y s u fficie nt to support Wil liams’s conviction f o r in d e c e n c y with a child by exposure, we modify the judgme nts of conviction as noted above and aff irm the trial court’s judg ments as modified.

16__________________________________________ Melissa Goodwin, Jus tice
Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Rose and Goodw in Modified and, a s Modified, Aff irmed Filed: De cembe r 31, 2013 Do Not Publish

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