IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William J. Perroz, :

Appellant :

: No. 1133 C.D. 2015

v. : Argued: April 13, 2016

:

Fox Chapel Borough :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: July 13, 2016

In this appeal, William J. Perroz (Perroz) asks whether the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County1(trial court) erred in affirming a decision of 

the Fox Chapel Borough Council (Borough Council) that denied his application for 

a disability pension benefit. Perroz argues the trial court erred in: (1) upholding 

Borough Council’s denial of his application for a disability pension benefit; (2) 

failing to find Borough Council violated his constitutional due process rights by 

not providing a neutral and detached hearing officer at his disability pension 

review hearing; and, (3) failing to find Borough Council’s denial of his application 

for a disability pension benefit violated public policy. Upon review, we affirm.

 

1

The Honorable Michael A. Della Vecchia presided.
2

I. Background

Before the trial court, the parties stipulated to the following facts. Fox 

Chapel Borough (Borough) hired Perroz as a police officer in August 1990. He 

remained employed by the Borough until his honorable discharge in March 2014.

In 2010, Perroz suffered an on-duty injury to his right shoulder while 

apprehending a suspect. The injury necessitated medical treatment, and Perroz was

unable to work as a police officer for an extended period. Perroz underwent two 

surgeries on his right shoulder in 2011 and 2012. More particularly, he underwent 

a rotator cuff repair on his right shoulder in 2011 (first surgery).

Thereafter, Perroz suffered a tear in his deltoid at the repair site as

physical therapy progressed in his efforts to return to work as a police officer. He

underwent a deltoid repair in 2012 (second surgery). Dr. James P. Bradley, 

Perroz’s treating physician, opined that, as of August 2012, Perroz was unable to 

return to his job as a full-time police officer.

In March 2014, a workers’ compensation judge approved a 

compromise and release agreement. The Borough then proceeded with Perroz’s 

removal based on a physical injury that precluded his return to work. Ultimately, 

the Borough honorably discharged Perroz by reason of disability in March 2014.

Through a letter from Perroz’s then attorney to Borough Council, Perroz applied 

for a disability pension benefit.

Shortly thereafter, the Borough’s Pension Plan Administrator (Plan 

Administrator) acknowledged receipt of the letter and addressed the applicable 
3

deadlines under the Borough’s Police Pension Plan (Plan). The Plan Administrator 

also directed Perroz to the relevant Plan provisions, including the definition of 

“Total and Permanent Disability” requiring that it “qualifies the Participant for 

federal social security disability benefits.” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶10 (citing 

Certified Record (C.R.), Tab 1, Ex. 2); Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 31. The letter 

also stated:

The information submitted by [Perroz], and that which relates

to the prior proceedings under the Heart and Lung Act,[

2

] does 

not appear to address whether [Perroz] qualifies for ‘federal 

social security disability benefits.’ Please provide any 

information or documents relevant to this issue. As stated 

above, any additional information may be submitted by March 

27, 2014, or you may request a reasonable extension of time for 

this purpose. Upon review of this letter, please notify me of 

whether [Perroz] will be submitting additional information 

and/or requesting more time to do so.

Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶11 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. 2); R.R. at 32. Perroz’s 

attorney submitted a letter in furtherance of his application for disability pension

benefits and included three reports authored by Dr. Bradley.

In May 2014, the Plan Administrator issued a determination that 

denied Perroz’s application for a disability pension benefit. The determination 

quoted the definition of “Total and Permanent Disability” contained in Article I, 

Section 1.34 of the Plan and summarized Dr. Bradley’s April 2014 report. Section 

5.04 of the Plan vests the Plan Administrator with sole discretion to determine 

whether participants qualify for disability pension retirement. Section 5.02 of the 

 

2 Act of June 28, 1935, P.L. 477, as amended, 53 P.S. §§637–38.
4

Plan states the “Disability Retirement Benefit shall equal 50% of the Member’s 

Salary at the Time the Disability was incurred” (basic rate of pay during the year 

the disability occurred, Section 1.22 of the Plan), “provided that any member who 

receives benefits for the same injuries under [federal Social Security Disability]

shall have the Participant’s disability benefits offset or reduced by the amount of 

such benefits.” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶16 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. G); R.R. at 

32.

The disability pension Perroz applied for and which the Borough 

denied would encompass approximately 16 months, March 18, 2014 through 

August 2015, when Perroz’s deferred vested pension benefit would begin. Perroz 

did not apply for federal Social Security Disability benefits because he did not 

believe he was eligible. Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶18 (citing C.R., Tab 1 at 24, 

29); R.R. at 33.

The Plan defines “Total and Permanent Disability” as “a condition of 

physical or mental impairment due to which a participant is unable to perform the

usual and customary duties of [e]mployment, which is reasonably expected to 

continue to be permanent for the remainder of the Participant’s lifetime and which 

qualifies the Participant for federal social security disability benefits.” Joint 

Stipulation of Facts at ¶19 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Exs. 1, G); R.R. at 33 (emphasis 

added).

The Borough and the Police Department negotiated and entered into a 

Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in September 2013, which covered the 
5

period from January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2017. The 2013 CBA 

specifically addresses disability pension benefits through the following provision:

5. PERMANENT DISABILITY PENSION BENEFITS

Disability Pension Plan benefits shall begin on the date when a 

pension plan participant is determined by the Plan 

Administrator to be incapacitated due to total and permanent 

disability as defined in the pension plans, even if Extended Sick 

Leave has not been exhausted. Disability Pension Plan benefits

shall be in accordance with the provisions set forth in the

Pension Plan for Police.

Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶21 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. I); R.R. at 33-34. The 

CBA also states: “Each Police Officer shall be entitled to a pension following 

retirement or permanent disability, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in 

the official Police Pension Plan of the Borough.” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶22 

(citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. I); R.R. at 34.

During his employment with the Borough, Perroz served on the police

negotiation team every year. Perroz testified that the police bargaining unit never 

attempted to change the disability definition contained in the Plan.

At all relevant times, the Plan received state aid. Perroz contended the 

Borough’s receipt of state aid invoked the application of the Municipal Police 

Pension Law,3commonly known as Act 600.

 

3 Act of May 29, 1956, P.L. 1804, as amended, 53 P.S. §§767-778.
6

Perroz sought review of the Plan Administrator’s denial of his 

disability pension application. A hearing ensued at which both Perroz and the Plan 

were represented by counsel. The Borough hired Ira Weiss, Esquire, to serve as

hearing officer. After the hearing, both parties submitted proposed findings of fact 

and conclusions of law. Thereafter, Borough Council enacted Resolution 600, 

which denied Perroz’s appeal and sustained the decision of the Plan Administrator 

denying Perroz’s application for a disability pension. Attached to Resolution 600 

were the hearing officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and adjudication. 

Perroz appealed Borough Council’s decision to the trial court.

After briefing and oral argument, the trial court issued an order 

dismissing Perroz’s appeal and affirming Borough Council’s decision. In its order, 

the trial court adopted the parties’ joint stipulation of facts. It explained the 

definition of “disability” in the CBA between Borough Council and its Police 

Department was binding and the definition of “disability” in Act 600 was not 

binding. See Norcini v. City of Coatesville, 915 A.2d 1243 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); 

Breeden v. Borough of Crafton, No. SA 11-000582 (C.C.P. Allegheny 2012), 

aff’d, 57 A.3d 222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Perroz appealed to this Court, and the trial 

court directed him to file a concise statement of the errors complained of on 

appeal, which he did.

Thereafter, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 

1925(a). Initially, the trial court explained, because this was an appeal of a 

decision under the Local Agency Law,

4

its review of Borough Council’s decision 

 

4

2 Pa. C.S. §§551–555; 751–754.
7

was limited. Where, as here, a full and complete record is made before Borough 

Council, the trial court was required to affirm the adjudication unless it found the 

adjudication was in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, or not in 

accordance with law, or the provisions of Subchapter B of Chapter 5 (relating to 

practice and procedure of local agencies) were violated in the proceedings before 

Borough Council, or any finding of fact made by Borough Council and necessary 

to support its adjudication was not supported by substantial evidence. Section

754(b) of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §754(b).

Here, the trial court explained, Perroz did not specify any error of law 

or unsupported finding of fact. The trial court observed that Perroz’s application 

for a disability pension was denied based on his failure to meet the Plan’s 

definition of “Total and Permanent Disability” as defined in the parties’ CBA, an 

agreement Perroz negotiated with other members of the police bargaining unit

while he was employed as a Borough police officer for two decades.

The trial court explained the 2013 CBA states that each police officer 

shall be entitled to a pension following retirement or permanent disability, subject 

to the terms and conditions set forth in the Plan. Further, the Amended Police 

Pension Plan, adopted by the Borough in 1968, defines Total and Permanent 

Disability as “a condition of physical or mental impairment due to which a 

Participant is unable to perform the usual and customary duties of [e]mployment, 

which is reasonably expected to continue to be permanent for the remainder of the 

Participant’s lifetime and which qualifies the Participant for federal social security 
8

disability benefits.” Tr. Ct., Slip Op., 8/20/15, at 9 (quoting Joint Stipulation of 

Facts at ¶19; R.R. at 33) (emphasis added).

Ultimately, the trial court determined that the definition of disability 

in the CBA was binding and further that the definition of disability in Act 600 was 

not binding. See Norcini; Breeden. The trial court stated Perroz, along with his 

police department bargaining unit, negotiated and accepted the disability pension 

standard that he now claimed to be illegal. The trial court found no illegality or 

denial of constitutional rights, and it declined Perroz’s request to rewrite the CBA

between Borough Council and its Police Department.

This matter is now before us for disposition.

II. Issues

On appeal,5 Perroz states three issues. First, he argues the trial court 

erred in upholding Borough Council’s denial of his application for disability 

pension benefits. Next, he maintains the trial court erred in failing to find Borough 

Council violated his constitutional due process rights by not providing a neutral 

and detached hearing officer at his disability pension review hearing. Finally, he 

contends the trial court erred in failing to find Borough Council’s denial of his 

application for disability pension benefits violates public policy.

 

5 Our review is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, whether 

necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, whether constitutional rights 

were violated, and whether the procedure before the local agency was contrary to statute. 

Mulberry Mkt. v. City of Phila., Bd. of License & Inspection Review, 735 A.2d 761 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1999).
9

III. Discussion

A. Definition of “Disability”

1. Contentions

Perroz first argues Borough Council and the trial court erred in 

denying his application for disability pension benefits by failing to take into

account the controlling and prevailing law as set forth in Ridley Park Police v. 

Borough of Ridley Park, 524 A.2d 998 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). He contends the main 

issue here is whether he was disabled and what the terms “disabled” or “disability”

mean with respect to the disability pension plan. Perroz asserts Ridley Park

decided this issue in 1987, and it controls here. According to Perroz, Ridley Park

provided a roadmap for future courts to follow in deciding such issues. In 

following Ridley Park, Perroz maintains, this Court should find he was disabled 

and was entitled to benefits.

Perroz asserts that in Ridley Park, the borough and the Fraternal Order 

of Police (FOP) entered into negotiations for a new CBA and reached an impasse 

over the definition of “disability” for purposes of pension entitlement. The CBA 

stated that a police officer was entitled to a disability pension if the officer was 

“permanently and totally disabled from performing police work for the [b]orough.” 

Id. at 999. The FOP wanted to retain that language in the parties’ new CBA, while 

the borough insisted disability be defined as “the inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment.” Id. An arbitration panel found in favor of the borough. The 

FOP appealed to the common pleas court. The common pleas court struck down 

the panel’s definition, and the Borough appealed to this Court on the basis that Act 

600 did not prohibit such a definition of disability.
10

Section 1 of Act 600, 53 P.S. §767, authorized the borough to 

establish a police pension and prescribe its terms and conditions. To that end, the 

pension plan was governed by the Borough Code. Section 1190(a)(1) of the 

Borough Code provided: “No person employed in any police ... force of any 

borough shall be suspended, removed or reduced in rank except for the following 

reasons ... [p]hysical or mental disability affecting his ability to continue in 

service, in which cases the persons shall receive an honorable discharge from 

service ....” 8 Pa. C.S. §1190(a)(1).

Perroz maintains the borough in Ridley Park argued that police 

officers covered under the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System (PMRS) 

could retire on a disability pension only if they were unable to engage in any 

gainful employment, and the PMRS definition of disability should apply to 

borough officers as well. Perroz maintains this Court rejected that assertion, citing 

Crawford v. Borough of Lewisburg, 401 A.2d 385 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979), in which 

this Court interpreted the language “affecting his ability to continue in service” in 

the Borough Code to mean that the legislature “intended the disability to be one 

which rendered the officer incapable of performing his normal duties 

permanently.” Id. at 388 (emphasis added). Thus, Perroz asserts, the Court in 

Ridley Park concluded that, because the Borough Code controlled, any other 

definition would be inappropriate.

Perroz argues the pertinent language in Act 600 provides that a 

borough employing three or more full-time police officers “shall ... establish ... a 

police pension fund .... Such fund shall be under the direction of the governing 
11

body of the borough ... and applied under such regulations as such governing body 

... may prescribe for the benefit of such members of the police force as shall 

receive honorable discharge therefrom by reason of age and service, or disability.” 

53 P.S. § 767(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added). Perroz asserts Section 1 of Act 600 

authorized the borough in Ridley Park to establish a police pension and prescribe 

its terms and conditions.

Perroz asserts, as this Court stated in Ridley Park, the clear language 

of Act 600 mandates that all police officers honorably discharged for disability be 

eligible to receive a pension. Perroz contends Act 600 does not permit the 

Borough to prescribe its own regulations that would redefine pension eligibility. 

Thus, as long as the Borough may honorably discharge officers who cannot

physically perform police work and accept state aid for funding such pensions, it 

may not deny an officer his pension simply because he is able to obtain other 

gainful employment.

Perroz points out that this Court distinguished the central holdings of 

Ridley Park in Paupst v. Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Board, 788 A.2d 

1067 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). The Court in Paupst was tasked with assessing a 

scenario, on its face, akin to the ones in Ridley Park and the instant appeal. A 

dispute arose as to the applicable definition of “disability,” and whether its 

meaning was one based on the officer’s inability to undertake police work or his 

inability to undertake any “gainful employment.” Id. at 1070. The former 

definition was based on the Borough Code and CBA, while the latter was based on

a separate, binding agreement between the township and PMRS. This Court held 
12

that because the officer, through his employer, was bound by an agreement 

between the township and the PMRS, the PMRS definition of “disability” 

controlled. Id. at 1070-71. However, Perroz contends, absent a scenario such as

that in Paupst, the Ridley Park model controls; the definition of “disability” is

governed by the Borough Code and the terms of the CBA.

Just as in Ridley Park, Perroz asserts, his disability pension eligibility 

is governed by the Borough Code and the terms of the CBA. See 8 Pa. C.S. §1190; 

R.R. at 33-34. Perroz argues he was injured in the line of duty, resulting in his 

undisputed and indefinite inability to return to work as a police officer. R.R. at 30-

31. As a result, he was honorably discharged for physical disability. R.R. at 31. 

Perroz does not claim that he is unable to obtain gainful employment, and, more 

specifically, does not claim that he would qualify for federal social security 

disability benefits. However, he argues, it is not the language of the Plan that 

controls, but the mandates of the Borough Code. According to the Borough Code 

and Act 600, interpreted by this Court in Ridley Park, Perroz, who was honorably 

discharged for physical disability, is entitled to a disability pension.

Perroz anticipates the Borough will argue there are no statutory 

restrictions on how “disability” may be defined for purposes of pension 

entitlement. Therefore, the Borough will assert it may prescribe regulations that

would render some officers, honorably discharged from service pursuant to Section 

1190 of the Borough Code, ineligible for pension benefits. Perroz maintains this is 

in direct contravention of Pennsylvania law, and no Pennsylvania court ratified 

such action in this context. See Ridley Park.
13

Perroz further points out that the hearing officer relied on Norcini. He 

asserts the issue in that case was not whether the officer qualified for a disability 

pension under the pension plan language, but rather whether the officer could 

reject the disability pension he was offered in favor of a greater retirement pension

provided by statute. Perroz contends the two factual scenarios and the legal 

questions posed by the two cases are different. He argues the distinction between 

that case and the instant one is clear, especially as the Court in Norcini did not

distinguish, or even mention, its earlier precedential decision in Ridley Park.

2. Analysis

“[I]t is beyond peradventure that [police] pensions are a mandatory 

subject of collective bargaining. ...” Borough of Mahanoy City v. Mahanoy City 

Police Dep’t, 948 A.2d 239, 242 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (quoting Wilkes-Barre Twp.

v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 878 A.2d 977, 983 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)); see also

Norcini (police officer did not have individual right to reject disability pension 

provisions set forth in negotiated CBA in favor of allegedly greater retirement 

benefit provided by statute).

In addition, it is well-settled that “parties may not avoid limitations in 

a CBA, claiming that [they] conflicted with the law, after they voluntarily 

negotiated and agreed to the contracted provisions.” Norcini, 915 A.2d at 1246 

(citing Grottenthaler v. Pa. State Police, 410 A.2d 806, 809 (Pa. 1980) (“a 

municipality [can]not avoid the effect of a term of the [CBA] it had entered into, 

by asserting that the contract provision was in violation of State law.”)); see also

Pa. State Troopers Ass’n v. Pa. State Employes’ Ret. Bd., 677 A.2d 1329, 1331 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (“[p]etitioners are bound by the total result negotiated by the 
14

union on their behalf and cannot selectively choose or reject aspects of a negotiated 

agreement as they would wish. ... [T]he ... [a]ward is binding upon [p]etitioners, 

even though calculation of [the] ... pensions pursuant to the [a]ward formula yields 

a less beneficial result than the Retirement Code[6] formula.”).

Similarly, in Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Committee v. City 

of Pittsburgh, 391 A.2d 1318, 1322-23 (Pa. 1978), our Supreme Court explained:

To permit an employer to enter into agreements and 

include terms ... which raise the expectations of those 

concerned, and then to subsequently refuse to abide by those 

provisions on the basis of its lack of capacity would invite 

discord and distrust and create an atmosphere wherein a 

harmonious relationship would virtually be impossible to 

maintain.

Good faith bargaining would require that questions as to 

the legality of the proposed terms of a [CBA] should be 

resolved by the parties to the agreement at the bargaining stage.

Moreover, in Fraternal Order of Police, E.B. Jermyn Lodge No. 2 v. 

Hickey, 452 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Pa. 1982), our Supreme Court stated: “To permit a 

public employer to secure an advantage in the bargaining process by agreeing to a 

term and subsequently avoid compliance by belatedly asserting that term’s 

illegality is equally inimical to the integrity of the bargaining process and 

undermines the harmonious relationship it was designed to foster.” See also City 

of Allentown v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters Local 302, 122 A.3d 492, 506 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc) (“[T]he City cannot now avoid the application of the 

 

6

State Employes’ Retirement Code, 71 Pa. C.S. §§5101-5956.
15

purchase of time provisions of the CBA with respect to [firefighters who already 

retired under the CBA], but it properly contested its inclusion in the new CBA and 

its application to current employees in its appeal of the panel’s award issued in the 

instant interest arbitration proceedings.”); Borough of Mahanoy City, 948 A.2d at

242-43 (“A public employer who voluntarily agrees to a provision in a [CBA] may 

not later object to that provision on the basis of illegality.”). These principles 

apply regardless of whether it is the union rather than the public employer which 

seeks to disavow its bargain. Norcini.

Indeed, in Norcini, we applied the principles outlined above in a 

situation similar to that presented here. There, Norcini, a retired police officer,

challenged the city’s calculation of his service-connected disability pension on the 

ground that the Third Class City Code7provided for a greater benefit than that 

provided for in the parties’ negotiated CBA. In rejecting Norcini’s appeal, this 

Court explained (with emphasis added):

Here, the police pension plan at issue was in place, and 

outlined in the CBA, at all times during Norcini’s employment. 

Norcini worked within the [a]ssociation’s bargaining unit and 

was employed pursuant to the provisions and conditions of the 

CBA. Moreover, the CBA was voluntarily entered into by the 

parties. Norcini was bound by and benefited from the 

provisions of the CBA throughout the course of his 

employment, and was equally bound by the provisions of the 

CBA at the time of his retirement, including any shortcomings 

and limitations.

If this Court were to accept Norcini’s argument, 

essentially any officer who is represented by a recognized labor 

organization which negotiates a CBA would obtain the benefits 

 

7 Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 932, as amended, 53 P.S. §§35101-39701.
16

of the CBA while employed and then upon retirement bring suit 

to compel the [c]ity to provide a greater retirement benefit if it 

was provided by a statute that existed at the time of his 

retirement, rather than being bound by the retirement provisions 

contained in the CBA that directly addressed the terms and 

conditions of his employment. Here, the police pension plan 

was in place at all times during the course of Norcini’s 

employment, was outlined in the CBA, and was voluntarily 

entered into by the [c]ity and the [a]ssociation. Neither party to 

the CBA, nor Norcini has an individual right to reject to the 

disability pension provisions set forth in the negotiated CBA.

...

Id. at 1246-47. Nevertheless, this Court observed that there are two exceptions to 

this general rule, explaining (with emphasis added):

While a party may not assert illegality to avoid 

compliance with a voluntarily agreed to provision of a CBA, 

this general rule does not extend to cases where a dispute is 

resolved in a decision by an arbitrator rather than through a 

CBA. Municipality of Monroeville v. Monroeville Police 

Department Wage Policy Committee, 767 A.2d 596 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2001). For example, in Monroeville, the parties were 

in the process of negotiating a new CBA when a dispute arose 

regarding whether municipal pension benefits could exceed

those provided for in the statute. The parties reached an 

impasse so the dispute was submitted for arbitration. The 

arbitrators decided that the disputed provisions could be 

included in the new CBA, despite the fact that they were 

inconsistent with the statutorily defined benefits. Because it 

was the arbitrators’ decision to include the provisions in the 

CBA, rather than a joint agreement of the parties, this Court 

determined that the municipality could challenge the illegality 

of the provisions. This Court emphasizes the distinction 

between an illegality dispute involving a voluntarily entered 

into CBA and a dispute which is submitted and resolved by 

arbitration. The present controversy involves a provision of a 

voluntarily agreed to CBA, and therefore, Norcini was estopped 

from claiming that the disability pension benefit provision was 

illegal.
17

In addition, a second exception to the general rule was 

carved out by our Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Borough of 

Ellwood City v. Ellwood City Police Department Wage and 

Policy Unit, [825 A.2d 617 (Pa. 2003)], where the Court 

explained that a [CBA] may not incorporate a provision which 

conflicts with a statutory provision if the statute expressly 

prohibits such conflicts or provides a remedy should a conflict 

arise. Unfortunately for Norcini this exception also does not 

apply.

Id. at 1246 n.4.

Here, the parties’ 2013 CBA, which was in effect at the time Perroz 

sought the disability pension benefit at issue here, states:

5. PERMANENT DISABILITY PENSION BENEFITS

Disability Pension Plan benefits shall begin on the date when a 

pension plan participant is determined by the Plan 

Administrator to be incapacitated due to total and permanent 

disability as defined in the pension plans, even if Extended Sick 

Leave has not been exhausted. Disability Pension Plan benefits 

shall be in accordance with the provisions set forth in the 

Pension Plan for Police.

Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶21 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. I); R.R. at 33-34. The 

CBA also states: “Each Police Officer shall be entitled to a pension following ... 

permanent disability, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the [Plan].” 

Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶22 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Ex. I); R.R. at 34 (emphasis 

added).

In turn, the Plan defines “Total and Permanent Disability” as “a 

condition of physical or mental impairment due to which a participant is unable to 

perform the usual and customary duties of [e]mployment, which is reasonably 
18

expected to continue to be permanent for the remainder of the Participant’s lifetime 

and which qualifies the Participant for federal social security disability benefits.

...” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶19 (citing C.R., Tab 1, Exs. 1, G); R.R. at 33 

(emphasis added). In his brief to this Court: “[Perroz] makes no claim that he is 

unable to obtain gainful employment, and, more specifically, that he would qualify 

for federal social security disability benefits.” Appellant’s Am. Br. at 16. 

Instead, similar to the petitioner in Norcini, Perroz seeks to avoid the 

limitations on the definition of “disability” contained in the Plan and incorporated 

in the CBA in favor of what he claims is the more lenient standard provided for 

under Act 600 and the Borough Code. Based on Norcini, Perroz cannot do so. 

More specifically, similar to Norcini, the definition of disability contained in the 

Plan and incorporated into the CBA was agreed to by the Borough and the police 

bargaining unit, Perroz served on the police negotiation team “every year,” and the 

police bargaining unit never attempted to change the disability definition contained 

in the Plan. Joint Stipulation of Facts ¶¶20-21, 23-24; R.R. at 34. Thus, as the 

Hearing Officer determined:

5. The provisions of the [Plan] regarding disability pensions 

were negotiated and agreed to through the collective bargaining 

process and were not challenged by the members of the police 

bargaining unit.

6. Both the collective bargaining representative of the officers 

and the members of that unit as well as the Borough are bound 

by the provisions of the Plan and the Borough may not confer a 

benefit upon a police officer not provided for in the [CBA].

* * * *
19

10. The collective bargaining unit and the Borough agreed to be 

bound by the terms of the [Plan] and specifically agreed that the 

disability pensions would be governed by the definition in the 

contract.

11. [Perroz] is, therefore, precluded from now claiming that the 

disability language in question is contrary to law and is void.

Hr’g Officer’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Adj., Concls. of Law Nos. 

5-6, 10-11; R.R. at 297, 298.

Further, as in Norcini neither of the exceptions to the general rule 

apply here. First, like Norcini this appeal does not arise from a dispute over the 

language of a CBA that was submitted and resolved by arbitration (i.e., through

interest arbitration); rather, like Norcini, this case involves a CBA reached by 

voluntary agreement. Additionally, as in Norcini, the CBA here does not 

“incorporate a provision which conflicts with a statutory provision [where] the 

statute expressly prohibits such conflicts or provides a remedy should a conflict 

arise.” Id. at 1246 n.4 (emphasis added). Cf. Ellwood City, 825 A.2d at 622

(Court reached a different result because of Act 205’s

8

explicit statutory mandate 

that “in the event of an actual conflict between the statute and a collective 

bargaining agreement, the statute must be given effect ....”).

Nevertheless, Perroz asserts, based on our decision in Ridley Park, he 

is entitled to the disability pension benefit here. Perroz’s reliance on Ridley Park is 

misplaced.

 

8 Act 205 refers to the Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act, Act 

of December 18, 1984, P.L. 1005, as amended, 53 P.S. §§895.101–895.803.
20

In particular, in Ridley Park, the borough and the FOP entered into 

negotiations for a new CBA to replace an existing CBA that was set to expire. 

During negotiations, the parties reached an impasse over the definition of 

“disability” for purposes of pension entitlement. For several years prior to the 

negotiations for the new CBA, the parties’ CBA stated a police officer was entitled 

to a disability pension if the officer was “permanently and totally disabled from 

performing police work for the [b]orough.” Id. at 999. The FOP maintained the 

new CBA should retain that language, while the borough asserted disability should 

be defined as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” Id. The parties 

submitted the dispute to interest arbitration. Ultimately, an arbitration panel 

determined disability was to be given the definition the borough proposed. The 

FOP appealed. A common pleas court struck the award’s provision containing the 

borough’s proffered definition of “disability.” On further appeal, we affirmed.

We began by noting that the borough’s police pension fund was 

established under Section 1 of Act 600. The borough argued the language 

implemented by the arbitration panel was proper and there was no language in 

Section 1 of Act 600 that prohibited such a definition of disability. The borough 

further asserted, in administering the pension fund, it could prescribe substantial 

regulations that included defining disability as the arbitration panel did. 

Responding to these assertions, we noted an arbitration award could not require a 

governing body to carry out an illegal act and could only require a public employer 

to do that which it could do voluntarily. We further noted that Section 1 of Act 

600 stated, in pertinent part:
21

Each borough, town, and township of this Commonwealth 

maintaining a police force of three or more full-time members 

shall ... establish, by ordinance or resolution, a police pension 

fund or pension annuity.... Such fund shall be under the 

direction of the governing body of the borough, town or 

township, and applied under such regulations as such 

governing body, by ordinance or resolution, may prescribe for 

the benefit of such members of the police force as shall receive 

honorable discharge therefrom by reason of age and service, or 

disability ....

Id. (emphasis in original). Further, Section 1190 of the Borough Code provided 

for removal of a police officer for, among other things, “disability affecting his 

ability to continue in service, in which cases the person shall receive an honorable 

discharge from service.” Id. at 1001. As to an honorable discharge for physical 

disability, pursuant to Section 1190, this Court stated the legislature “intended the 

disability to be one which rendered the officer incapable of performing his normal 

duties permanently.” Id. (quoting Crawford, 401 A.2d at 388). This Court 

explained:

Although the [b]orough may discharge police officers 

who are permanently disabled from performing police work, it 

claims that it does not have to then award these officers a 

pension as long as they are able to engage in ‘substantial 

gainful activity.’ The [b]orough admits that it cannot prescribe 

regulations which contravene Section 3 of [Act 600], 53 P.S. § 

769, setting forth age and service requirements for pension 

eligibility. However, it claims that there are no such statutory 

restrictions on how disability may be defined for the purposes 

of pension entitlement. The [b]orough thus argues that it may, 

pursuant to Section 1 of [Act 600], prescribe a regulation 

defining disability as was done in ... the arbitration award. The 

[b]orough is thus contending that it may prescribe regulations 

which would render some police officers, honorably discharged 

from service pursuant to Section 1190 of [t]he Borough Code, 

ineligible for pension benefits. We disagree.
22

The pertinent language of Section 1 of [Act 600] 

provides that a borough employing [three] or more full-time 

police officers ‘shall ... establish ... a police pension fund or 

pension annuity.... Such fund shall be under the direction of the 

governing body of the borough ... and applied under such 

regulations as such governing body ... may prescribe for the 

benefit of such members of the police force as shall receive 

honorable discharge therefrom by reason of age and service, or 

disability....’ (Emphasis supplied.)

The clear language of this section mandates that all 

police officers honorably discharged for age and service, or 

disability, be eligible to receive a pension. It does not permit 

the [b]orough to prescribe regulations which would redefine 

pension eligibility. Therefore, as long as the [b]orough may 

honorably discharge a police officer who is disabled from 

performing police work, it may not deny that officer a pension 

simply because he is able to obtain other employment 

constituting ‘substantial gainful activity.’

Indeed, if we were to accept the [b]orough’s argument 

that Section 1 of [Act 600] authorizes it to prescribe regulations 

rendering some police officers honorably discharged for 

disability ineligible to receive a pension, we would have to find 

that it could likewise do the same with regard to those police 

officers honorably discharged for age and service. This is 

because the language in Section 1 of [Act 600], authorizing 

[b]orough regulations, is equally applicable to both categories 

of honorable discharge. Certainly we cannot say that the 

Legislature intended to permit the [b]orough to withhold 

pensions from those police officers who reached the mandatory 

retirement age and who served the minimum number of years 

on the force and are, therefore, entitled to a pension under 

Section 3 of [Act 600].

Id. 1001. Thus, we affirmed the common pleas court’s conclusion that the 

arbitration panel exceeded its authority by including the challenged language in the 

award.
23

Critically, unlike Ridley Park, the case presently before us does not 

concern a challenge to an interest arbitration award involving the legality of a CBA 

provision fashioned by an arbitration panel. Rather, in this case, Perroz seeks to 

avoid the limitation on “disability” contained in the Plan and incorporated into the 

CBA despite the fact that the challenged provision was negotiated and agreed to by

the Borough and the police bargaining unit, the police bargaining unit never 

attempted to alter the disability definition contained in the Plan and Perroz served 

on the police negotiation team “every year.” Joint Stipulation of Facts ¶¶20-21, 

23-24; R.R. at 34; see also Hearing Officer’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 

& Adj., Concls. of Law Nos. 5-6, 10-11. As set forth above, based on Norcini, he 

may not do so.

Further, unlike in Ridley Park, where the parties’ prior CBA stated a 

police officer was entitled to a disability pension if the officer was disabled from

performing police work, here there is no indication that the definition of disability

set forth in the Plan that requires that a Plan participant qualify for federal social 

security disability benefits in order to obtain a disability pension benefit, 

previously differed from the current definition. Compare R.R. at 180 (2008 CBA, 

covering the period from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2013, Article XXI 

(“Pension Benefits”); and R.R. at 200 (October 14, 1968 Borough of Fox Chapel 

Police Pension Plan (As Amended) setting forth definition of “Total and permanent 

disability”) with R.R. at 191 (2013 CBA, covering the period from January 1, 2014 

through December 31, 2017, Article XIX(5) “Permanent Disability Pension 

Benefits”) and R.R. at 146 (January 1, 2012 Borough of Fox Chapel Police 

Pension Plan setting forth definition of “Total and Permanent Disability”); Joint 
24

Stipulation of Facts at ¶24; R.R. at 34 (police bargaining unit never tried to change 

the Plan’s disability definition). As such, Ridley Park does not compel the result 

Perroz seeks here.

9

B. Due Process

1. Contentions

Perroz next asserts the Borough violated his constitutional due process 

rights by failing to provide a neutral and detached hearing officer. Perroz argues 

he had rights with regard to his vested pension benefits, and these rights could not 

be interfered with absent due process. Nevertheless, he contends he was not 

afforded a detached and disinterested fact-finder. Instead, Perroz maintains, his 

rights were deprived by a biased and interested party. In affirming the hearing 

officer’s improper findings, Perroz argues, the trial court upheld the 

unconstitutional deprivation of his property interests.

As they are a property right, Perroz argues, an employee’s pension 

rights may not be altered except by due process of law. Stuart v. Flynn, 380 F. 

Supp. 424, 426 (W.D. Pa. 1974). He maintains due process rights attach in 

administrative proceedings. Kreiger v. City of Phila., Bd. of Pensions & Ret., 408 

A.2d 170 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979). Constitutional due process requires a “neutral and 

detached judge in the first instance.” Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 

62 (1972). That mandate is no different when a legislative body delegates 

 

9 Although in Wright v. Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund, ___ 

A.3d ___ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1343 C.D. 2015, filed April 1, 2016), we recently applied our 

holding in Ridley Park Police v. Borough of Ridley Park, 524 A.2d 998 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), 

Wright did not involve a situation in which a party voluntarily agreed to a provision in a 

collective bargaining agreement and later sought to disavow it on the basis of illegality.
25

adjudicative functions to a private party. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 

(1982).

Before one may be deprived of a protected interest, whether in a 

criminal or civil setting, Perroz argues, he is entitled as a matter of due process to 

an adjudicator who is not in a situation “which would offer a possible temptation to 

the average man as a judge ... or which might lead him not to hold the balance 

nice, clear and true ....” Ward, 409 U.S. at 60 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 

510, 532 (1927)) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Perroz asserts he has 

a protected property interest in his disability pension benefits to which he is 

entitled. See Basciano v. Herkimer, 605 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978); McDarby v. 

Koch, 725 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).

Perroz further maintains that, as interpreted in Pennsylvania, disability 

retirement benefits cannot be denied without an administrative hearing that 

complies with all procedural due process requirements. Kreiger. Due process 

requires a fair hearing. Horn v. Twp. of Hilltown, 337 A.2d 858 (Pa. 1975).

“Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our 

system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. 

To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try 

cases where he has an interest in the outcome ....” Id. at 860.

Here, Perroz points out, the Plan Administrator initially denied his 

disability pension benefit application. He sought review of that decision, and a 

hearing was held in Borough Council Chambers at the Borough Municipal 
26

Building. The Borough hired Ira Weiss, Esquire, a private party, to serve as

hearing officer. Perroz asserts that Weiss, therefore, had a pecuniary interest in 

ruling in favor of the Borough that created at least a possible temptation to find 

Perroz ineligible for his pension benefits. See Ward. Perroz argues it is likely no 

coincidence that Weiss ruled in favor of the Borough, his employer for these 

purposes, and against Perroz, to whom he owed nothing. Perroz acknowledges 

there is no direct evidence that Weiss’ decision was the product of bias, but he 

argues, even the potential temptation for Weiss to rule in the Borough’s favor and 

his own pecuniary interest disqualifies him as a neutral and detached judge. Id.

Therefore, Perroz maintains, his constitutional due process right to a 

neutral and detached judge at his pension review hearing was violated, and the 

Borough’s pension eligibility determination should be reversed for this reason as 

well. 2 Pa. C.S. §754(b); Sparacino v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, City of Phila., 

728 A.2d 445 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (court can reverse agency determination where 

constitutional rights were violated).

Perroz argues the trial court affirmed Weiss’ improper findings, and it 

ignored this impropriety. Because the trial court based its opinion on the findings 

of an unfair hearing that deprived Perroz of his rights without due process, Perroz 

asserts, the trial court’s findings were also in error; thus, its findings and order 

must be reversed.

2. Analysis

At the outset, there is no indication that Perroz raised this issue either 

at the hearing before the hearing officer, R.R. at 66-80, or in his proposed findings 
27

of fact and conclusions of law submitted after the hearing. See C.R., Tab 10. 

Further, in his statutory appeal to the trial court, although Perroz vaguely asserted 

Borough Council’s decision “deprived [Perroz] of his constitutionally protected 

property interest without the necessary due process,” Perroz made no specific 

mention of the issue he now raises concerning the neutrality of the hearing officer. 

C.R., Item #1 at ¶15. Section 753(a) of the Local Agency Law incorporates the 

waiver doctrine by requiring all legal questions be raised before the administrative 

agency hearing the appeal. See 2 Pa. C.S. §753(a); Roomet v. Bd. of License & 

Inspection Review, 928 A.2d 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Thus, Perroz’s failure to 

raise this issue before Borough Council results in waiver.

However, even if properly preserved, we would reject Perroz’s 

assertion. Indeed, we rejected a similar argument in Krenzel v. Southeastern 

Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 840 A.2d 450 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). There, 

following a pre-termination hearing, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 

Authority (SEPTA) terminated one of its employees. The employee requested a 

post-termination hearing. SEPTA appointed a retired common pleas court judge to 

conduct the post-termination hearing. After the hearing and issuance of the 

decision, the employee appealed to the common pleas court. The common pleas 

court determined, among other things, because SEPTA selected and paid the

hearing officer to preside over a question of SEPTA’s treatment of an employee, 

there was an “appearance” that the employee was deprived of a hearing before an 

impartial tribunal. Id. at 453. Thus, the common pleas court remanded for a posttermination hearing before an impartial fact-finder. On SEPTA’s appeal, this 

Court held the trial court erred on this issue, stating (with emphasis added):
28

The first substantive issue is whether SEPTA’s 

appointment of Judge Goldman as hearing officer violated due 

process. The trial court acknowledged that it had no reason to 

question Judge Goldman’s integrity and, presumably, his 

impartiality. Nevertheless, the trial court held that there was an 

appearance of impropriety. The trial court reasoned that [the 

employee’s] right to an impartial tribunal was compromised 

where, as here, the propriety of actions taken by SEPTA would 

be decided by a person selected and compensated by SEPTA. 

Indeed, the trial court noted that SEPTA may hire Judge 

Goldman in the future, and it found the existence of this 

potentially on-going employment relationship to taint [the 

employee’s] post-termination hearing.

These circumstances are present, however, in virtually 

every case where an administrative hearing is conducted by the 

agency to review the agency’s action. The premise of the trial 

court’s holding is that SEPTA cannot review, and correct, its 

own decision. However, that is the very purpose of the 

administrative hearing, and we cannot presume its futility. 

Canonsburg General Hospital v. Department of Health, [422 

A.2d 141 (Pa. 1980)]. It has long been understood that a 

combination of the functions of investigation, prosecution and 

adjudication within a single agency does not violate due 

process. See Withrow v. Larkin, [421 U.S. 35] (1975); State 

Dental Council and Examining Board v. Pollock, [318 A.2d 

910 (Pa. 1974)]. However, due process does require a 

separation of functions within the agency, which is achieved 

when the inconsistent functions of prosecution and adjudication 

are assumed by different individuals within the agency. See, 

e.g., Stone & Edwards Insurance Agency v. Department of 

Insurance, [648 A.2d 304 (Pa. 1994)]; Marchionni v. 

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 715 A.2d 

559, 563-564 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Such ‘walls of division’ 

eliminate any ‘threat or appearance of bias.’ Lyness v. State 

Board of Medicine, [605 A.2d 1204, 1209 (Pa. 1992)].

Here, the function of prosecution was separated from the 

function of adjudication. Outside counsel was hired to 

represent SEPTA, and Judge Goldman was appointed to 

adjudicate [the employee’s] claims. This satisfied due process.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred. An appearance 

of impropriety cannot be inferred from the mere fact that 
29

SEPTA appointed and compensated the hearing officer 

assigned to adjudicate [the employee’s] claims against SEPTA.

Id. at 454-55 (footnote omitted).

Here, as in Krenzel, we will not infer an appearance of impropriety 

from the mere fact that Borough Council appointed and compensated Attorney 

Weiss to evaluate Perroz’s challenge to the Plan Administrator’s denial of his 

disability pension benefit. Id. Further, as in Krenzel, the function of prosecution 

was separated from the function of adjudication. To that end, Attorney Weiss 

served as hearing officer to evaluate Perroz’s claims, while separate counsel 

appeared on behalf of the Plan. This satisfied due process. Id.

Moreover, while Attorney Weiss issued findings of fact, conclusions 

of law and an adjudication, before approving Attorney Weiss’ decision, all 

Borough Council members reviewed the record as well as Attorney Weiss’ 

decision and, therefore, had the opportunity to correct any perceived error.

10

 

10 Indeed, Borough Council’s decision states, as relevant:

RESOLUTION 600

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF FOX 

CHAPEL ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 

LAW AND ADJUDICATION REGARDING [PERROZ].

WHEREAS, a hearing was held ... involving the [a]ppeal of [Perroz] from 

the denial of a disability pension by the Plan Administrator; and

WHEREAS, Ira Weiss, Esquire, legal advisor and Hearing Officer, has 

presented proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 

Adjudication which have been reviewed with Council; and

WHEREAS, all members of Council have read the transcript and exhibits.

(Footnote continued on next page...)
30

For these reasons, we conclude that, even if properly preserved, we 

could not afford Perroz relief on this issue.

C. Public Policy

1. Contentions

As a final point, Perroz contends public policy strongly favors a grant

of pension benefits here. He argues the Borough accepts state funding for his

participation in the Plan. Yet, he asserts, the Borough maintains sole discretion to 

honorably discharge an officer, injured in the line of duty, by reason of physical 

disability. Perroz maintains this result cannot possibly be the intent of the 

legislators or the officers of the Borough’s Police Department. Therefore, the 

Borough’s denial of his disability pension benefits in favor of its own pecuniary 

interests is against public policy, is an error of law, and should be reversed.

Perroz asserts that, in assessing the inequity of the trial court’s 

decision, it is essential to understand the nature and purpose of pension benefits for 

public servants:

Pensions are designed for the protection against economic 

insecurity, not only of the employee, but also of the employee’s 

 

(continued...)

NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved and it is hereby resolved as follows:

1. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Adjudication submitted 

by Ira Weiss, Esquire, Hearing Officer are hereby approved.

2. The Appeal of [Perroz] is denied and the decision of the Plan

Administrator denying disability pension benefits is hereby affirmed. ...

R.R. at 291.
31

family. One of the primary objectives in providing them is to 

induce competent persons to enter and remain in public 

employment and to render efficient service while in the 

employed publicly. It has also been said that a pension granted 

to a public employee is not a gratuity but is deferred 

compensation for services rendered.

3 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §12:173.36 (3d ed.).

Here, Perroz contends, allowing a borough to deny an officer who is 

physically unable to perform police work his disability pension would violate 

public policy. First, the Plan receives state funding based on the number of

officers it covers. Further, the Plan benefits from an offset of the pension for any 

social security disability payments arising from the same injuries that qualify an 

officer for a disability pension, so, effectively, every disability pension the 

Borough grants is less than full value. He argues that dramatically less Plan 

participants would qualify for federal social security disability benefits arising out 

of their work injuries as compared to those who are unable to physically perform 

police duties as a result of the more stringent social security disability standard. 

Perroz maintains that, even if he did qualify for social security disability, his 

disability pension benefits would be offset, which only profits the Plan into which 

he paid for almost 24 years.

2. Analysis

As with Perroz’s claim that Borough Council’s appointment of the 

hearing officer violated his due process rights, there is no indication that Perroz 

raised an issue that public policy entitled him to the disability pension benefit he 

seeks either at the hearing before the hearing officer, R.R. at 66-80, or in his 
32

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted after the hearing. See

C.R., Tab 10. Further, Perroz did not raise this issue in his statutory appeal to the 

trial court. C.R., Item #1. Thus, this issue is waived. 2 Pa. C.S. §753(a); Roomet.

Nevertheless, even if not waived, Perroz’s argument fails. To that 

end, in an analogous, unreported decision, 11 we explained: “Having voluntarily 

agreed to a pension benefit that is less than that available under the applicable 

statute, [the claimant] and the [u]nion cannot now claim that that very same 

provision in the CBA is illegal or void as against public policy.” Haines v. City of 

Warren (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2333 C.D. 2006, filed April 17, 2008), Slip Op. at 7, 

2008 WL 9408140 at *4 (unreported) (emphasis added). This statement applies 

with equal force here.

Moreover, Perroz’s assertions on this point fail to differentiate 

between the denial of his disability pension benefit and a scenario in which a Plan 

participant is denied a regular retirement pension benefit. Perroz suffered no 

deprivation of his regular retirement pension benefit here; in fact, at the hearing, 

Perroz testified he would reach his normal retirement date and begin receiving a 

regular pension benefit as of August 2015. R.R. at 71.

Further, while Perroz points to the fact that the Plan receives state aid, 

he offers no support for his assertion that this fact compels approval of the 

disability pension benefit he seeks here. Additionally, although Perroz takes issue 

 

11 Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure 414, 210 Pa. Code 

§69.414, an unreported panel decision of this Court, issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited 

for its persuasive value.
33

with the fact that a Plan participant’s receipt of a disability pension benefit is offset 

by the receipt of federal social security benefits, this offset is specifically provided 

for in Section 5(e)(1) of Act 600, which states:

(e)(1) In the case of the payment of pensions for permanent 

injuries incurred in service, the amount and commencement of 

the payments shall be fixed by regulations of the governing 

body of the borough, town, township or regional police 

department and shall be calculated at a rate no less than fifty per 

centum of the member’s salary at the time the disability was 

incurred, provided that any member who receives benefits for 

the same injuries under the Social Security Act (49 Stat. 620, 42 

U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) shall have his disability benefits offset or 

reduced by the amount of such benefits.

53 P.S. §771(e)(1) (emphasis added).

Finally, while Perroz suggests the Borough denied his disability 

pension benefit in order to aid its pecuniary interests, he cites no record evidence in 

support of this claim. In Shields v. Brentwood Borough (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 81 C.D. 

2013, filed January 29, 2014), Slip Op. at 16, 2014 WL 316589 at *8 (unreported), 

we rejected a similar assertion, stating: “As for [the claimant’s] assertion that [the 

borough’s pension plan administrator] denied his request because the [b]orough 

could not afford to pay him benefits, this Court rejects this argument because it is 

nothing more than speculation and without support in the record.”

Based on the foregoing, we affirm.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William J. Perroz, :

Appellant :

: No. 1133 C.D. 2015

v. :

:

Fox Chapel Borough :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13th day of July, 2016, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County is AFFIRMED.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge