*c-£iVEOAr THE FEC 

8?MATt| A9 : t 3 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

TAMPA DIVISION 

•'• '3? 

& 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff, 

-vsCESAR RODRIGUEZ, 

Defendant. 

CASE NO. 86-687 Clv-T-IO(B) 

-i 

ORDE R • • 

CO 

This i3 an action brought by the Federal Election Commission 

("FEC") against Cesar Rodriguez for declaratory, injunctive and 

other relief pursuant to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971, as amended and codified at 2 USC §§ il37d(a)(6), 

437g(a)(6)(A) and 441f. It Is alleged that the Defendant violated §U4lf by accepting a contribution to a political campaign 

by one person in the name of another person. After the Defendant's attorney was allowed to withdraw, the Defendant has elected 

to proceed pro se. 

Before the Court is the FEC's motion for summary judgment. 

The FEC's one-count complaint alleges a violation of §44lf which 

provides, in pertinent part, that "no person shall knowingly 

accept a contribution made by one peraon in the name of another." 

Although the facts are not in dispute, the Court cannot Grant the 

FEC's motion. 

0 72A 

^•v. 8/83) 

•/ir-r O /"^ 
Bei«fXr=^»t«tttd, Rodriguez acted as a go-between, a messenger, forllan Wolfson. Wolfson wanted to make campaign contributions in excess of the statutory limit, see 4 USC S44la(1)(A), so 

he had Rodriguez solicit people to make contributions which 

Wolfson would then reimburse. Rodriguez obtained some of the 

checks made payable to the order of the campaign committees, and 

subsequently delivered some of the reimbursement checks from 

Wolfson to the contributors. 

Rodriguez's actions do not appear to constitute "acceptance" 

of the checks within the meaning of S^Ulf. Nor does it appear 

that he aided and abetted anyone else who "accepted" the checks. 

Rodriguez (and Wolfson) may have committed other wrongs, but he 

could not have "accepted" any contributions because he was 

neither a candidate nor an agent of a candidate. 

The case cited by the FEC for Its acceptance argument, 

United States v. Chestnut. 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1975), is distinguishable. Chestnut involved an attorney, working on the 

campaign for a U. S. Senator, who arranged for a contributor to 

bypass the channels for direct contributions by having the contributor directly pay one of the campaign's creditors. The attorney 

also arranged for the creditor to directly invoice the contributor for services actually rendered to the campaign. In this 

manner, the attorney aided and abetted the creditor in accepting 

an unlawful campaign contribution. The FEC maintains that 

Chestnut stands for the proposition that a third-party may 

"accept" a campaign contribution. However, unlike the facts 

3 7aA 

lev. 8/82) 
involving Rodriguez, the creditor in Chestnut did not merely pass 

along the checks, but was the actual payee of the checks and a 

knowing participant in the scheme. 

Thus, in thia case, the correct charge would appear to be 

that Rodriguez aided and abetted the making of a contribution in 

the name of another person (Wolfson), not that he aided and 

abetted the person who "accepted" the contribution (the campaign 

committee which appears to be innocent of any wrongful acceptance). In short, Rodriguez aided and abetted a violation of the 

first clause of $44lf - - "No person shall make a contribution in 

the name of another person or knowingly permit his name to be 

used to effect such a contribution," rather than the last clause 

of §4Ulf - — "no person shall knowingly accept a contribution 

made by one person in the name of another person." 

It follows that the motion for summary Judgment is due to 

be, and is hereby, DENIED. This raises the question of whether 

the FEC can effectively amend the complaint and go forward with 

this case, or whether it must begin again under the governing 

statute at the administrative level. Therefore, the FEC is 

Directed to file a brief on this issue within twenty (20) days, 

and Rodriguez shall have ten (10) days thereafter to respond. 

The Court will raake an appropriate Order governing the future 

conduct of this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DONE and ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this ^ ^ day of 

May, 1987. 

(^:J\J^.^^^utjLX.yQnk^:^\^^ 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

<K0 73A 

(Rav. 8/82)