IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 122A20

Filed 11 December 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: R.L.D.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 9 

December 2019 by Judge S. Katherine Burnette in District Court, Franklin County. 

This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 23 November 

2020 but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 

30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

No brief for petitioner-appellees.

Edward Eldred for respondent-appellant mother.

HUDSON, Justice.

Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s orders terminating her

parental rights to R.L.D. (“Robin”).1 After careful review, we affirm.

Robin was born to respondent-mother in Illinois in 2006. After Robin was born, 

respondent-mother and Robin’s father resided together in a motel in Kankakee, 

Illinois. During this time, in November 2007, Robin’s leg was broken, and respondentmother and the father were investigated by Child Protective Services. Robin’s 

 

1 A pseudonym is used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of 

reading. 
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paternal aunt, G.D., testified that she visited the motel and observed that Robin did 

not have a crib to sleep in, that there was never any food in the room, that the room 

did not have a stove, and that respondent-mother and the father “were constantly 

doing drugs and [the father] was drinking a lot.” In 2008, respondent-mother and the 

father were evicted from the motel and they, along with Robin, moved into the home 

of the paternal uncle, R.D., and G.D.

Respondent-mother and Robin lived with R.D. and G.D. only for a short period 

of time before leaving. The father remained with R.D. and G.D. In 2009, respondentmother requested that R.D. and G.D. pick up Robin because respondent-mother was 

living with another man and Robin “was not safe around [respondent-mother’s]

boyfriend due to domestic violence and the boyfriend’s insistence that [Robin] sleep 

in the same bed as the adults.”

Robin lived with R.D. and G.D., along with the father, until December 2011. In 

December 2011, the father and Robin moved out of R.D. and G.D.’s home and moved 

in with the father’s girlfriend. However, in August 2012, Robin was exposed to 

domestic violence between the father and his girlfriend. The girlfriend called 

respondent-mother, and respondent-mother subsequently called G.D. to pick up 

Robin. In 2012, respondent-mother signed a notarized statement in which she 

granted custody of Robin to R.D. and G.D. Respondent-mother also signed a separate 

document authorizing R.D. and G.D. to approve any medical treatment deemed 

necessary for Robin.
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In 2014, with respondent-mother’s permission, R.D. and G.D. relocated with 

Robin to North Carolina, where they moved in with their daughter and son-in-law, 

the petitioners, who are also Robin’s cousins by marriage. In January 2015, R.D. and 

G.D. moved out of petitioners’ home and into their own residence. However, due to 

their own health issues, they decided along with petitioners that Robin would remain 

in petitioners’ home. Robin has remained in petitioners’ care since that time. In June 

2015, respondent-mother signed an agreement granting petitioners “guardianship”

of Robin.

On 15 March 2019, petitioners filed a petition to terminate respondentmother’s and the father’s parental rights to Robin. Petitioners alleged that grounds 

existed to terminate respondent-mother’s and the father’s parental rights on the 

grounds of neglect, dependency, and willful abandonment. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), 

(6), (7) (2019). On 11 June 2019, respondent-mother filed a response to the petition 

in which she opposed termination of her parental rights. On 9 December 2019, the 

trial court entered an order in which it determined grounds existed to terminate 

respondent-mother’s parental rights pursuant to the grounds alleged in the petition.

On the same day, the trial court entered a separate disposition order in which it 

concluded it was in Robin’s best interests that respondent-mother’s parental rights 
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be terminated. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent-mother’s parental 

rights.2 Respondent-mother appeals.

Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by adjudicating that 

grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. “Our Juvenile Code provides for a 

two-step process for termination of parental rights proceedings consisting of an 

adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 94 (2020) 

(citing N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019)). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner 

bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence 

of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General 

Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019)).

We review a trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate parental rights “to 

determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 

evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 

101, 111 (1984). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on 

appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019).

In this case, the trial court determined that grounds existed to terminate

respondent-mother’s parental rights based on neglect, dependency, and willful

abandonment. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (6), (7). We begin our analysis with 

 

2 The district court’s orders also terminated the parental rights of Robin’s father, but 

he did not appeal and is not a party to the proceedings before this Court.
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consideration of whether grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).

A trial court may terminate parental rights if it concludes the parent has 

neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile

whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not 

provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; or who has 

been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical 

care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or 

who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s 

welfare; or the custody of whom has been unlawfully 

transferred under [N.C.]G.S. 14-321.2; or who has been 

placed for care or adoption in violation of law.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).

Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory

ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the

termination hearing or, if the child has been separated

from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a

showing of . . . a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.

In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 (2016) (citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713–15

(1984)).

3 “When determining whether such future neglect is likely, the district court

must consider evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the period of

 

3 The Court in In re Ballard held that an adjudication of past neglect is admissible in 

subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights, but is not, standing alone, enough to 

prove that a ground exists to terminate parental rights on the basis of neglect. 311 N.C. at 

713–15. The Court in In re Ballard did not suggest that a showing of past neglect is necessary 

in order to terminate parental rights in every case. Indeed, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) does not 

require a showing of past neglect if the petitioner can show current neglect as defined in 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15). To the extent other cases have relied upon In re D.L.W. as creating 

such a requirement, we disavow such an interpretation.
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past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 212

(2019) (citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715). 

Here, Robin was not in respondent-mother’s physical custody at the time of the 

termination hearing and had not been since 2012. Additionally, because the 

Department of Social Services was not involved in this case, no petition alleging 

neglect was ever filed, and Robin had not been adjudicated neglected. Therefore, we 

examine whether the trial court’s findings support the conclusion that Robin is likely 

to be neglected again if returned to respondent-mother’s care.

Respondent-mother argues that the trial court’s orders fail to establish that 

Robin is neglected. We disagree. The trial court made the following findings: 

6. While pregnant with [Robin], G.D. saw [respondentmother] smoking marijuana. G.D. saw the [respondentmother] smoking marijuana every weekend.

. . . .

8. In November, 2007, [Robin’s] leg was broken and 

[respondent-mother was] investigated by Child Protective 

Services in Kanakee, Illinois. G.D. saw [Robin] with a cast 

on her leg and was concerned that there was a lack of food 

and the room in which they stayed was dirty. . . . .

. . . .

10. In April, 2009, [respondent-mother] asked G.D. and 

R.D. to pick up [Robin] because [Robin] was not safe around 

[respondent-mother’s] boyfriend due to domestic violence 

and the boyfriend’s insistence that [Robin] sleep in the 

same bed as the adults.

. . . .
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23. [Respondent-mother] has not seen [Robin] since June, 

2015.

24. [Respondent-mother] traveled to North Carolina in 

June, 2015, at the invitation and at the expense of the 

petitioners so that she could see where the petitioners and 

the juvenile lived in North Carolina.

25. At the time of her week’s visit with petitioners, 

[respondent-mother] entered into an agreement with the 

petitioners that they would take “guardianship” of [Robin].

26. In the agreement, dated [29 June 2015], [respondentmother] agreed that the petitioners could have 

guardianship of [Robin], and said agreement was to “. . . 

remain effective indefinitely unless otherwise notified in 

writing by the undersigned . . .”

27. Some of the decisions that [respondent-mother] 

specified that the petitioners could make for [Robin] 

related to her medical treatment, school, education, 

“decisions regarding all well-being including clothing, 

bodily nourishment, and shelter.”

28. Another agreement provision is that the petitioners are 

to “accept all financial obligations associated with caring 

for [Robin].”

29. The petitioners have abided by the terms of the 

agreement and provided care for [Robin].

30. [Respondent-mother has not] provided financial 

support for [Robin] since 2012.

31. The petitioners have provided financial support for 

[Robin], including therapy sessions needed by [Robin].

32. [Robin] is being treated for anxiety and depression, 

ADHD and PTSD.
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33. [Robin] has not lived independently with [respondentmother] since 2012

34. At no time since August, 2012, has [respondent-mother]

had physical custody of the child.

. . . .

38. [Respondent-mother] has intermittently texted 

[petitioner] F.J. and asked to talk to [Robin] which has 

been facilitated.

39. [Respondent-mother’s] conversations are monitored by 

petitioner F.J. to make sure that the conversations are 

appropriate. In the past, [respondent-mother] has called 

[Robin] “fat” and blamed [Robin] for not calling 

[respondent-mother]. [Respondent-mother] also cursed and 

screamed at [Robin] when [respondent-mother] received 

the notice of the petitioners’ intended adoption of [Robin].

40. [Respondent-mother] currently is living in a hotel room 

in Illinois and has a job at the hotel cleaning rooms. She 

needs more rooms to clean in order to make more money.

41. Most recently, [petitioner] F.J. heard that [respondentmother] was renting a room from a man.

. . . .

44. [Respondent-mother] has taken no steps to provide for 

[Robin’s] physical and economic needs.

. . . .

46. [Respondent-mother] took no steps to correct the 

conditions that led to the removal of [Robin] from her care.

47. [Respondent-mother did not take] any steps to remedy 

the conditions that led to [Robin] being placed first with 

G.D. and later with the petitioners.
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48. [Respondent-mother’s] contact with [Robin] has been 

sporadic. It has consisted of her texting [petitioner] F.J. to 

put [Robin] on the phone.

49. [Respondent-mother] has sent a total of three packages 

to [Robin] since she has been in the care of petitioners. The 

first one had candy and clothes that did not fit [Robin]. The 

second one had a $20 gift card. The final one was for 

Christmas 2018, and arrived in January, 2019.

50. The contents of the last package that [respondentmother] sent to [Robin] were age inappropriate and 

inappropriate in all regards as it primarily contained 

expired food and expired medications.

51. [Robin] is learning to cope with the trauma that she has 

experienced.

. . . .

65. Respondent-mother has not] put in place the support 

system that [she] need[s] in order to create an environment 

where [Robin] will not be neglected in the future.

66. [Robin] is at a substantial risk of harm and of 

impairment if she is removed from the petitioners’ home 

and is returned to [respondent-mother’s] care.

Respondent-mother does not challenge these findings, and they are binding on 

appeal. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019) (“Findings of fact not challenged 

by respondent are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on 

appeal.”). It is clear from these findings that when Robin was in respondent-mother’s 

care nearly a decade ago, Robin was “in an environment injurious to [her] welfare,”

and that those risks continue. N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15).

In addition to the findings shown above, the trial court also found the following: 
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42. [Respondent-mother] does not have stable housing at 

this time.

43. [Respondent-mother] does not have a stable job in that 

her most recent job at the wage of $2.00 [per hour] provides 

her with bare subsistence.

Respondent-mother argues that these findings are not supported by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence. However, petitioner F.J. testified that respondent-mother texted 

her that “she was living in the motel again, and she makes . . . $2.00 per room. And 

that . . . she doesn’t get a lot of rooms so she doesn’t work a lot.” Petitioner F.J. 

additionally testified that “at one point” respondent-mother had moved in with “some 

other guy” and was “renting a room from him.” Thus, we conclude there was clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence that respondent-mother had neither stable housing 

nor employment.

Consequently, we conclude the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that 

there was a substantial risk of harm or impairment to Robin and a likelihood of future 

neglect should she be removed from petitioners’ care and returned to respondentmother. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) to terminate respondent-mother’s parental 

rights.

The trial court’s conclusion that one statutory ground for termination existed 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) is sufficient in and of itself to support 

termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395

(2019). As such, we need not address respondent-mother’s arguments regarding 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) and (7). Furthermore, respondent-mother does not challenge 

the trial court’s conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in Robin’s best 

interest. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s 

order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.