UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

BRANDON RESCH, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 4:14-cv-13432 

v. District Judge Terrence G. Berg 

 Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

BAYDOUN, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY 

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 

41) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should grant in part and deny in part 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the motion should be 

denied with respect to the July 27, 2013 incident because there remains a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative 

remedies. The motion should be granted with respect to the June 27, 2013 incident 

and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Officer Moore, Seargeant Boros, Ronald 

Jones, Robert Galloway, Deon Hargrove, Officer Rogers, Philip Kozlowski, and 

Linton Dixon should be dismissed without prejudice. 

II. REPORT 

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 A. Background 

 

 Plaintiff, Brandon Marcus Resch, a state inmate, initially filed a pro se

complaint and application to proceed without prepayment of fees on September 3, 

2014. (DE 1 and 2.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s application on September 15, 

2014. (DE 5.) Plaintiff subsequently retained the assistance of counsel and filed 

an amended complaint on March 25, 2015. (DE 29.) In his amended complaint, 

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that deputies of the Wayne 

County Jail assaulted him on two occasions when he was housed as a pretrial 

detainee. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on June 27, 2013, he was attacked and 

assaulted by Defendants Moore, Boros, Jones, Galloway, Hargrove, Rogers, 

Kozlowski, and Dixon, and on July 31, 2013, was assaulted by Defendants Cross, 

Masai, Hall, and Baydoun. (Id. at 4, ¶¶ 24-34.) He brings a claim for excessive 

use of force against the deputies, and claims against Wayne County and the Wayne 

County Sheriff for unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices, and for 

inadequate training or supervision of its agents and employees. 

B. The Instant Motion 

 Defendants filed the instant motion on November 5, 2015, asserting that 

Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, in violation of the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (DE 41.) 

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Specifically, Defendants posit that Plaintiff did not follow the Wayne County Jail 

System Inmate Grievance Procedure (“grievance procedure”) because he recounted 

the incidents at issue on a separate form called the “Recipient Rights Complaint 

form,” which are handled by the Office of Recipient Rights. Because of this, 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s complaints failed to alert Wayne County of the 

problem and did not provide an opportunity to remedy the situation. Plaintiff 

opposes the motion, arguing that he followed the grievance procedure by signing 

and submitting written complaints about the incidents at issue in this lawsuit within 

ten days of the alleged incidents and placing those complaints in a lock box at the 

jail to be received by a jail social worker. 

 Additionally, Plaintiff urges the Court to treat this motion, which Defendant 

titles “Motion for Summary Judgment,” as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b). In support, he points to multiple cases in which motions for summary 

judgment based on failure to exhaust were converted to “unenumerated” motions 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). See, e.g., Neal v. Raddatz, No. 09-

13169, 2012 WL 488827, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 12, 2012) report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 09-13169, 2012 WL 488702 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 

2012); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 Interestingly, while Defendants label their motion as one for summary 

judgment, they indicate within the motion that it is brought under Rule 12(c). It 

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appears, however, that the motion is more appropriately brought under Rule 56, 

since it urges the Court to find that there are no material facts in dispute on an 

affirmative defense. Although the Court may take judicial notice of an 

administrative record reflecting a plaintiff’s exhaustion of administrative remedies 

without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, it must 

convert the motion to one for summary judgment where the parties rely on exhibits 

and matters outside of that administrative record. Kuriakose v. Veterans Affairs 

Ann Arbor Healthcare Sys., No. 14-12972, 2015 WL 2449232, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 

May 21, 2015). Here, the parties both rely on exhibits outside of the administrative 

record reflecting Plaintiff’s exhaustion of remedies, including deposition and 

hearing transcripts. Nevertheless, “[w]hether the Court treats this as a motion for 

summary judgment or an unenumerated 12(b) [or 12(c)] motion, the result will be 

the same: if granted, the dismissal will be without prejudice, and it will not count 

as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Neal at *3. 

 C. Standard 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing 

law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court 

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“views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. 

Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 

 “The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of 

material fact exists . . . .” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 

(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e)(2) 

(providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of 

fact,” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the 

motion.”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the 

nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’” Wrench LLC 

v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The nonmoving 

party must “make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat 

the motion.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 

2011) (“The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . [T]here must be evidence 

upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving 

party to create a genuine dispute.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

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Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence favoring the nonmoving 

party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. City Management Corp. 

v. United States Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 254 (6th Cir. 1994). In other words, 

summary judgment is appropriate when “a motion for summary judgment is 

properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a 

showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case. . . .” Stansberry, 

651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 371, 322-23 (1986)). 

 D. Discussion 

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under the PLRA 

Under the PLRA, a prisoner may not bring an action “with respect to prison 

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law . . . until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Congress enacted this provision to address the “outsized share” of prisoner 

litigation filings and to ensure that “the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not 

submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203-04 (2007). Put another way, the purpose of 

§ 1997e(a) is to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). In addition, exhaustion “gives an 

agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it 

administers before it is haled into federal court, and it discourages disregard of [the 

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agency’s] procedures.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

 “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that 

unexhausted claims cannot be brought into court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. The 

prison’s grievance process determines when a prisoner has properly exhausted his 

or her claim. Id. at 219 (“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply 

with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system, but it is the 

prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper 

exhaustion.”). Even where a prisoner has made some attempts to go through the 

prison’s grievance process, “[t]he plain language of the statute makes exhaustion a 

precondition to filing an action in federal court.” Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 

641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). The prisoner “may not exhaust his [or her] 

administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit.” Id. (citations 

omitted); see also Woodford, 548 US at 95 (“A prisoner who does not want to 

participate in the prison grievance system will have little incentive to comply with 

the system’s procedural rules unless noncompliance carries a sanction . . . .”). 

However, “inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in 

their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Instead, failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA. As such, 

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Defendants bear the burden of proof on exhaustion. Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 

452, 456 (6th Cir. 2012). 

 2. Wayne County Jail Grievance Procedures 

 Pursuant to its Operations Manual dated November 27, 2007, the 

administrative remedies available at the Wayne County Jail are as follows. 

Inmates may initiate the procedure by stating their concerns on an “Inmate 

Grievance Form” or on “a plain sheet of paper.” (DE 41-2 at 19.) Inmates must 

file this document within ten days of the date of the alleged incident of complaint. 

This can be accomplished by signing the document and giving it to “any officer, 

command staff, social services specialist, nurse, mental health staff or the Quality 

Assurance Administrator.” (DE 41-2 at 5.) A written answer to the grievance will 

be made within ten working days. Within ten days of receiving the grievance 

response, the inmate may appeal to the Director of Jails. Appeals will be answered 

in writing within ten working days. (DE 41-2 at 18-19.) 

3. Plaintiff’s Compliance with the Grievance Procedure 

Neither party disputes that Plaintiff is subject to the exhaustion requirement 

set forth in the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Nor do they dispute that Plaintiff 

timely completed “Recipient Rights Complaint” forms, describing the events set 

forth in his complaint. (DE 41-4 at 4 and 5, DE 43-2 at 2, and DE 43-3 at 2.) The 

issue here is a fairly narrow one: whether Plaintiff’s attempts to grieve the events 

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described in his complaint met the requirements of the Wayne County Grievance 

Procedure and the aims of the PLRA. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff wrote his grievances on Recipient Rights 

Complaint forms, which are “handled by a social worker in the jail and forwarded 

to the Office of Recipient Rights,” an entirely separate agency.1

 (DE 44 at 2.) 

Because of this, Defendants contend that the complaints failed to alert the relevant 

individuals of the issue in order to allow them to remedy the situations prior to the 

filing of this action, in violation of the aims of the PLRA. As support for this 

proposition, Defendants provide the affidavit of Charles Pappas, the Director of 

Internal Compliance for the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office during the relevant 

time period. (DE 41-6.) Mr. Pappas affirms that the Wayne County Sheriff’s 

Office “is not provided with Recipient Rights Complaint Forms.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff was aware of the proper procedure for filing 

grievances, given that he properly grieved previous issues using the correct 

“Inmate Grievance Form.” (DE 41-3.) 

Plaintiff asserts that he followed the grievance procedure as provided by 

Wayne County and accordingly exhausted his administrative remedies. Plaintiff 

points out that he filed two written complaints within ten days of each alleged 

                                                            

1

 Defendants provide a printout from the Office of Recipient Rights website, which 

explains that it “receives and investigates complaints involving alleged or 

suspected violations of the rights of people receiving mental health services.” (DE 

44-1.) 

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incident, and emphasizes that the grievance procedure does not dictate that a 

specific inmate grievance form be used. Instead, the policy allows inmates to 

submit their grievances either on an “Inmate Grievance Form” or “on a plain sheet 

of paper.” (DE 41-2 at 19.) In addition, Plaintiff provides an excerpt of Mr. 

Pappas’ testimony in a December 3, 2014 evidentiary hearing, in which he testified 

that the jail accepts grievances submitted on mediums other than the official form: 

Q. So for example an inmate could take – take a blank piece of 

paper, a napkin, or anything like that and – and the Wayne County Jail 

would not reject it for being non-conforming? 

A. That’s correct. And it has happened. 

(DE 43-4 at 8.) He also testified that inmates submit their completed grievances 

by placing them “in boxes” or turning them over to staff directly, including 

“officers, social workers, compliance workers[.]” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he 

followed the policy because, as Defendant notes, he in fact placed his complaints 

in the boxes made available for this purpose and Recipient Rights Complaint forms 

are likewise handled by social workers. (DE 44 at 2.) Moreover, he testified at 

deposition that, with respect to the July 31, 2013 incident, he was “positive that 

[he] filed a grievance on something additionally, aside from [the] mental health 

Recipient Rights forms.” (DE 41-5 at 20.) He noted that he “filed a formal 

grievance . . . concerning the July assault in the mental health ward.” (Id. at 21.) 

He further testified that he wrote his complaint out on a grievance form and turned 

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it in to a “regular on the mental health ward.” (Id.) Plaintiff conceded, however, 

that he was not positive he completed a grievance form for the June 27, 2013 

incident. I will address the grievance procedure for each alleged incident in turn. 

 a. June 27, 2013 

Plaintiff’s argument with respect to this incident is a somewhat compelling 

one, but ultimately must fail. Plaintiff specifically testified that he did “not believe 

that there is an additional grievance form filed with respect to the June 27, 2013 

incident.” (DE 41-5 at 20.) Thus, the Court only has Plaintiff’s Recipient Rights 

Complaint describing the June 27, 2013 incident as evidence that he has exhausted 

his administrative remedies. 

This District has held that the use of a Recipients Rights Complaint alone is 

not sufficient to provide notice to the Wayne County Sheriff’s Grievance 

Administrator. Washington v. Burks, (J. Lawson) No. 04-cv-10352, 2008 WL 

8694601, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2008) report and recommendation adopted, 

No. 04-cv-10352, 2011 WL 5375189 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2011). In Washington, 

as here, the plaintiff filed Recipient Rights Complaints describing the two incidents 

at issue in her complaint. The Plaintiff did not provide testimony that she had 

followed the proper procedure, and did not even attempt to argue that she followed 

the procedure until she filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation. Washington, 2011 WL 5375189 at **4. Accordingly, the 

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Court could only consider the Recipient Rights Complaints when determining 

whether the plaintiff had exhausted her administrative remedies. The Court held 

that “Plaintiff’s filing of a Recipient Rights Complaint regarding any of the above 

allegations could not substitute for proper exhaustion.” Washington, 2008 

WL8694601 at *5. Neither party addresses the Washington holding. Although the 

unpublished decision is not binding on the Court, I find it persuasive and wellreasoned. 

Further, Plaintiff’s testimony that he knew the difference between “tangible 

grievance forms” and Recipient Rights Complaint forms, weighs against him in 

this instance. (DE 41-5 at 20.) The fact that he knew the difference between the 

two forms and only undisputedly completed the Recipients Rights Complaint form 

concerning the June 27, 2013 incident demonstrates that Plaintiff did not 

“affirmatively endeavor to comply with” the grievance process. Risher v. Lapin, 

639 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, I conclude that Plaintiff has not 

exhausted his administrative remedies by merely filing a Recipient Rights 

Complaint form and recommend that his claims against Defendants Moore, Boros, 

Jones, Galloway, Hargrove, Rogers, Kozlowski, and Dixon be dismissed and the 

action proceed on the July 30, 2013 incident alone. 

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 b. July 31, 2013 

Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was “positive that [he] filed a 

grievance on something additionally aside from these mental health Recipient 

Rights forms, positive.” (DE 41-5 at 20.) He further clarified that: 

A. I can tell you I know I filed a formal grievance, if you will, 

 concerning the July assault in the mental health ward. 

Q. Okay. Who did you filed that grievance with? 

A. As far as who did I turn it in to? 

Q. Yes. 

A. It had been the—I don’t know his name but he was a regular on 

 the mental health ward, very large African American 

 gentleman. 

Q. What was that form filed on? 

A. If I’m not mistaken, a grievance form, but it didn’t look like 

 either of the two that you initially showed me. 

(Id.) This testimony seems to demonstrate two things: 1) Plaintiff was not 

confused about the difference between Recipients Rights forms and grievance 

forms; and 2) that Plaintiff testified under oath that he filed a grievance form 

related to the July 30, 2013 incident and provided it to jail personnel, as was 

consistent with the policy. 

 Although Defendant counters that it has produced all of the formal 

grievances filed, Plaintiff’s conflicting testimony under oath is sufficient to create 

a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the July 30, 2013 incident. See, 

e.g., Colton v. Cohen, No. 10-cv-13073, 2013 WL 3724835, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 

15, 2013) (concluding that a motion for summary judgment would necessarily fail 

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because “the deposition testimony of the Plaintiff upon which Defendant purports 

to rely . . . demonstrates that a genuine dispute of material fact still exists.”). 

Furthermore, the Recipient Rights form at issue describes an assault by jail 

officers, and does not “involve[e] alleged or suspected violations of the rights of 

people receiving mental health services.” (DE 41-4 at 4- 5 and DE 44-1 at 2.) 

 In this instance, Plaintiff’s ability to differentiate between the Recipient 

Rights and grievance processes, in addition to his testimony that he completed the 

correct form and gave it to jail personnel in a way consistent with the policy, 

weighs in his favor. Further, the Wayne County Inmate Grievance Procedure 

specifies that a written answer to a grievance will be provided within ten working 

days, to which the inmate may appeal to the Director of Jails, rendering the 

administrative grievance fully exhausted. (DE 41-2.) Here, Plaintiff does not 

testify that he received a response within the time allotted for reply and “[i]t is well 

established that ‘administrative remedies are exhausted when prison officials fail to 

timely respond to a properly filed grievance.”’ Risher, 639 F.3d at 240 (quoting 

Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

 Viewing the evidence, facts, and inferences in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, the nonmoving party, I conclude that Defendants have not met their 

burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claims are unexhausted with respect to the 

July 31, 2013 incident. See Surles, 678 F.3d at 457 (concluding that the plaintiff’s 

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failure to provide enough evidence to demonstrate that he exhausted his 

administrative remedies did “not mean that Defendants have met their[]” burden.); 

see also Lowe v. Prison Health Servs., No. 4:13-cv-10058, 2014 WL 4604469, at 

*6 (E.D. Mich. Augh 15, 2014) report and recommendation adopted, No. 13-

10058, 2014 WL 4605285 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2014) (denying defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine dispute of material fact 

as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his claims); Jones v. Jensen, No. 1:11-cv-468, 

2012 WL 4501261, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2012) (recognizing that a timely 

and properly sworn statement that he gave grievances to prison staff (which did not 

occur in that case) could have been used to create a genuine issue of fact); 

Knighten v. Mitcheff, No. 1:09-cv-333, 2011 WL 96663, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 

2011) (finding “sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record from which to 

conclude that [plaintiff] filed grievances” where plaintiff testified that he filed 

grievances and had copies of the same, and noting that the defendants’ “absence of 

records” defense put them in an “almost impossible bind in attempting to shoulder 

their burden of proof in an exhaustion affirmative defense.”).2

 

 

                                                            

2

 One case in this district has concluded that the plaintiff’s “mere testimony at his 

deposition [was] insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Kotewa v. Marshall, No. 

03-cv-74087, 2006 WL 273618, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2006). However, that 

case was decided prior to Surles, 678 F.3d at 456, which clarified that defendants, 

and not inmate plaintiffs, bear the burden of proof on exhaustion under the PLRA. 

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Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s testimony that he was not confused in this 

particular instance, I observe that Defendants’ grievance procedure has some 

troublesome aspects. Inmates are given access to Recipient Rights Complaint 

forms and inmate grievance forms, both of which are submitted to the jail by the 

same means, but their paths apparently diverge after that point, with one going to 

prison officials and the other being forwarded by a jail social worker to the Office 

of Recipient Rights. (DE 44-1.) The title of the Recipient Rights Complaint form 

could have an especially prejudicial effect upon prisoners who suffer from mental 

disabilities, who predictably may not appreciate such subtle differences, 

particularly when the different forms are submitted to the same people in an 

identical manner. In either case, regardless of the title of the form, the County 

would appear to have notice of the complaint being lodged by the prisoner, and to 

hinge the effectiveness of that notice entirely upon the caption of the document 

would appear to elevate form over substance. The fact that there is no mechanism 

for a jail social worker—who is charged with receiving both types of official forms 

or even complaints that are written “on a plain sheet of paper” (DE 41-2 at 19)—

receiving what are clearly civil rights or jail conditions complaints, and forwarding 

them to the appropriate jail official seems to warrant a rethinking of the policy, or 

possibly an explicit written warning to prisoners that Recipient Rights Complaint 

forms do not begin the process of administrative exhaustion. 

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E. Conclusion 

The undisputed fact that Plaintiff was aware of the difference between the 

Wayne County Jail’s grievance forms and its Recipient Rights Complaint forms 

cuts both ways in this case. With respect to the June 27, 2013 incident, this fact 

favors Defendants, since Plaintiff is unable to verify that he filed a grievance form 

with respect to that incident, and claims no confusion about the purpose of the one 

form that he did file, namely a Recipient Rights Complaint form. With respect to 

the July 31, 2013 incident, Plaintiff’s awareness of the difference between the two 

forms cuts in his favor, bolstering his statement that he filed both types of forms in 

one incident but not the other. Consistent with the above analysis, I recommend 

that the Court GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Moore, 

Boros, Jones, Galloway, Hargrove, Rogers, Kozlowski, and Dixon without 

prejudice. (DE 41.) If the Court agrees with this conclusion, I will issue a 

scheduling order for the remainder of this case upon final disposition of the 

motion. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

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72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Hum. Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers 

Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

Dated: February 19, 2016 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on February 19, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

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