UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

KARL F. VINSON, 

 Petitioner, Case No. 14-cv-14542 

v Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

THOMAS MACKIE, 

 

 Respondent. 

__________________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO SEAL 

AND DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO STRIKE 

 Petitioner Karl Vinson, presently confined at the Carson City Correctional Facility in 

Carson City, Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. In his application, filed through his attorneys, David A. Moran and Imran J. Syed of the 

Michigan Innocence Clinic, petitioner challenges his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual 

conduct (CSC), Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520(b)(1)(a)(victim under 13 years of age), and 

breaking and entering a building with the intent to commit a felony (CSC) therein, Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 750.110. 

On April 13, 2016 Respondent filed a motion to seal Petitioner’s psychological records 

from prison. See ECF No. 7. Then, on April 19, 2016 Petitioner has moved to strike the 

Respondent’s answer on the ground that it contains references to Petitioner’s prison 

psychological report. See ECF No. 8. In the report, Petitioner admits to sexually molesting the 

victim in this case on other occasions. 

I. 

1:14-cv-14542-TLL-RSW Doc # 14 Filed 11/08/16 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 2368
- 2 - 

Petitioner’s motion to strike references to the report will be addressed first. Petitioner 

claims that references to his post-conviction confessions are barred by the Supreme Court case of 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), in which the United States Supreme Court held that 

habeas review under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) is “limited to the record that was before the state court 

that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Id. at 181. However, the Pinholster Court indicated 

that it was not completely barring parties from presenting evidence during a federal habeas 

action that had not been previously presented to the state courts. For example, federal habeas 

courts still have the discretion to consider new evidence “when deciding claims that were not 

adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id. at 186; see also Ballinger v. Prelesnik, 709 F.3d 

558, 562 (6th Cir. 2013). 

 While neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit have yet resolved the issue, lower 

courts that have addressed the question have unanimously held that Pinholster’s limitation on 

new evidence does not apply to claims of actual innocence, especially when it is used to excuse a 

procedural default of another claim. See, e.g., Clemmons v. Warden, Lebanon Correctional 

Institution, No. 11-465, 2012 WL 4811122, at *8 (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 10, 2012) (“Pinholster does 

not by its own terms apply to the actual innocence exception to . . . procedural default . . . . The 

premise of the actual innocence exception is that the habeas petition is presenting new evidence 

not considered by the state courts.”); Pettus-Brown v. Warden, Correctional Reception Center, 

No. 14-292, 2015 WL 422557, at *1 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 2, 2015) (“A claim of actual innocence 

offered to excuse procedural default is not a substantive claim for habeas relief but a ‘gateway’ 

claim and therefore not subject to the Pinholster restrictions.”); Washington v. Beard, 07-3462, 

2012 WL 1033526, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2012) (finding that Pinholster did not bar a federal 

court from considering new evidence supporting a freestanding actual innocence claim that had 

1:14-cv-14542-TLL-RSW Doc # 14 Filed 11/08/16 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 2369
- 3 - 

not been decided on the merits in the state courts or a gateway actual innocence claim); High v. 

Nevens, No. 11-00891, 2013 WL 1292694, at *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2013) (“The rule in 

Pinholster of course has no bearing whatsoever on . . . non-merits factual development, under 

Schlup or otherwise.”); Hazel v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution, No. 13-332, 2014 

WL 4076152, at *25 (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 15, 2014) (“Pinholster does not prevent the Court from 

considering newly tendered evidence on a claim of actual innocence.”). 

 In the alternative, Petitioner argues that references to his post-conviction admissions to 

sexually molesting the victim should be stricken pursuant to Rule 12(f) because they are an 

“immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” This argument is without merit. Because 

Petitioner has raised a claim of actual innocence, evidence that he admitted to sexually molesting 

the victim on other occasions is relevant to adjudicating that claim. See Fed. R. Evid. 413(a) (“In 

a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child molestation, the court may admit 

evidence that the defendant committed any other child molestation.”). Petitioner’s motion to 

strike will be denied. 

II. 

Having determined that Petitioner’s motion to strike is without merit, Respondent’s 

motion to seal will be addressed. A federal court has the power to seal records when the interests 

of privacy outweigh the public’s right of access to those records. See Ashworth v. Bagley, 351 F. 

Supp. 2d 786, 789 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (internal citation omitted). Because the psychological 

records contain confidential information, Respondent’s motion to seal will be granted.

III. 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Respondent’s motion to seal, ECF No. 7, is 

GRANTED. 

1:14-cv-14542-TLL-RSW Doc # 14 Filed 11/08/16 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 2370
- 4 - 

 It is further ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to strike, ECF No. 8, is DENIED.

s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: November 8, 2016 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on November 8, 2016. 

 s/Michael A. Sian 

 MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager 

1:14-cv-14542-TLL-RSW Doc # 14 Filed 11/08/16 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 2371