Supreme Court of Texas 

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No. 20-0700 

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City of Fort Worth, Texas, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Abdul Pridgen and Vance Keyes, 

Respondents

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On Petition for Review from the 

Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas 

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JUSTICE BOYD, dissenting. 

Perhaps the Whistleblower Act should limit qualifying reports to 

exclude reports like those made here. But it doesn’t. And because I don’t 

believe this Court has authority to amend the statute to impose such 

limitations, I generally agree with the court of appeals. __ S.W.3d __, 

2020 WL 3286753 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 18, 2020). 

As this Court acknowledges, the Whistleblower Act does not limit 

its protection to those who “report” information that is “novel” or 

“previously unknown” to the law-enforcement officials who receive the 

report. Ante at ___. Nor does it exclude reports made pursuant to the 

claimant’s “job duties.” Ante at ___. Instead, it only requires that the 
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claimant report conduct that the claimant reasonably believes 

constitutes a violation of law. Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 

784 (Tex. 1996). So, as the Court explains, the claimant must provide 

“facts” and “information” about another person’s conduct, not merely 

opinions, conclusions, or recommendations. Ante at ___. But here, the 

claimants submitted some evidence that they reported facts and 

information (in addition to opinions, conclusions, and recommendations) 

regarding conduct they reasonably believed constituted legal violations. 

The Court says the claimants’ reports were insufficient because 

they were not “geared toward exposing” information, did not “supply . . . 

new information” the police chief did not already have, and were based 

on sources to which the chief also had access. Ante at ___, ___. Yet the 

Court acknowledges the Act does not require that the information be 

“novel” or “previously unknown.” Ante at ___. 

The Court says the reports were insufficient because they were 

not “geared toward . . . corroborating” facts “that were unverified or 

subject to dispute,” ante at ___, ___, suggesting that the information 

must confirm or support some previously reported information that is 

doubtful or conflicts with other reported information. But the Act does 

not impose that requirement either. 

The Court says the reports were not “geared toward . . . providing 

information pertinent to identifying or investigating governmental 

illegality,” ante at ___, but that is exactly what the reports did. After 

reviewing the videos and affidavits, the claimants submitted reports 

describing the events and concluding that the officer had committed an 

assault, made a false arrest, used excessive force, committed official 
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oppression, and then committed perjury by lying about the events. To 

me, that seems pretty pertinent to investigating governmental illegality. 

The Court says the claimants’ communications consisted “largely” 

of recommendations and conclusions, ante at ___, but the Court concedes 

that the reports also included factual information regarding conduct the 

claimants reasonably believed constituted violations of law, see ante at 

___. Based on the Act’s language, I’m compelled to conclude that the 

claimants submitted some evidence that they made a “report” as the Act 

requires. 

Based on the current record, my best guess is the claimants would 

lose this case at trial because the City disciplined them for leaking 

information, not for making their reports. But even on that separate 

causation issue, I agree with the court of appeals that the claimants 

submitted enough evidence to avoid summary judgment. See 2020 WL 

3286753, at *8–9. I therefore respectfully dissent. 

 

 Jeffrey S. Boyd 

 Justice 

OPINION DELIVERED: May 27, 2022