1 

NOTICE

Decision filed 07/19/06. The text of 

this decision may be changed or 

corrected prior to the filing of a 

Petition for Rehearing or the 

disposition of the same.

 NO. 5-02-0342 

 IN THE 

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

 FIFTH DISTRICT 

___________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

) Circuit Court of 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. 

) 

v. ) No. 00-CF-69 

) 

DAWN WORKMAN, ) Honorable 

) Terry H. Gamber, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

___________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE McGLYNN1

 delivered the opinion of the court: 

Dawn Workman appeals her conviction and 40-year prison sentence imposed after a 

jury found her guilty of first-degree murder. Workman was accused of planning and 

covering up the murder of her boyfriend's father, Garrett Kubicki, and encouraging her 

boyfriend, Jason Kubicki, to commit the murder so the pair could be together. Jason Kubicki 

was also convicted of first-degree murder for bludgeoning his father to death with a baseball 

bat and received a 50-year prison sentence. 

 

1

Justice Kuehn participated in oral argument. Justice McGlynn was later substituted 

on the panel and has read the briefs and listened to the audiotape of oral argument. 

On appeal, Workman claims that she was not granted a speedy trial as mandated and 

defined by Illinois law. She also raises evidentiary issues and takes issue with the length of 

her sentence. This court originally wrote an opinion reversing Workman's conviction, 
2 

finding that the trial court had erroneously granted the State a continuance to complete DNA 

testing in spite of its lack of due diligence in obtaining the test results within the original 120-

day speedy-trial limit. People v. Workman, No. 5-02-0342 (July 1, 2005). However, we 

granted the State's petition for rehearing, thereby vacating our July 1, 2005, opinion (see PSL 

Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 305, 427 N.E.2d 563, 570 (1981)), and 

we now issue this opinion in its stead and affirm Workman's conviction and sentence. 

Workman raises five issues on appeal. The first two issues concern Workman's right 

to a speedy trial. Workman was arrested on February 25, 2000, but was not brought to trial 

until February 26, 2002Bjust more than two years later. Two of the delays in this case were 

occasioned by a lab-testing backlog and a substitution of Workman's counsel. On appeal, 

Workman argues that these delays were improperly allowed by the trial court and that, 

therefore, she was denied her right to a speedy trial. We disagree. 

Illinois law, in section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code), 

requires that "[e]very person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by 

the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody." 725 

ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2000). Specific delays are allowed, however, such as a delay to 

determine a defendant's fitness to stand trial or any delay occasioned by the defendant. 725 

ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2000). "Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant 

unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand 

for trial on the record." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2000). Additionally, if the trial court 

determines that the State has exercised due diligence but has been unsuccessful in obtaining 

the results of DNA testing that are material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds 

to believe that those results may be obtained at a later day, the trial court may continue the 

cause on the application of the State for not more than an additional 120 days. 725 ILCS 

5/103-5(c) (West 2000). "Every person not tried in accordance with *** this Section shall be 
3 

discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance." 725 

ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2000). 

As stated above, Workman was arrested and taken into custody on February 25, 2000, 

and 733 days elapsed until she was brought to trial. If more than 120 of these days are 

attributable to the State, Workman's statutory right to a speedy trial has been violated. 

In this case, Kubicki bludgeoned his father to death with a baseball bat and then 

dumped his body, with Workman's help, into Waltonville Lake as it laid inside the cab of his 

pickup truck. The body and the murder scene at the Kubicki house were discovered and 

processed by crime-scene technicians the day after the murder on February 24, 2000. 

Workman was arrested and taken into custody the next day. She was arraigned on a single 

charge of concealing a homicidal death, and after pleading not guilty, a jury trial was set for 

June 13, 2000. 

During the May 2000 final pretrial conference, the State filed an amended information 

that charged Workman with four counts of first-degree murder and a count of armed robbery, 

as well as the preexisting charge of concealing a homicidal death. Workman's attorney 

explained that his client needed more time to contemplate her predicament and to reevaluate 

things in light of the offer the State tendered along with the new charges. After the State 

agreed, the pretrial conference was postponed until the next day. 

The next day, Workman's attorney announced that plea negotiations were at a 

standstill and that Workman wanted to go to trial on June 13, 2000. In response, the State 

indicated that it needed a continuance in order to obtain lab results material to the trial. The 

State's Attorney requested that the June 13 setting be vacated for the following reason: 

"[A] tremendous amount of forensic examination has to be done, analysis at the lab of 

materials in this case. None of which, to my knowledge, is back. I spoke to Detective 

Kemp yesterday. He's been in contact with the crime lab repeatedly. The backlog of 
4 

other cases there has prevented them from analyzing that evidence yet. So we don't 

have that material evidence in hand." 

The State affirmed this request on June 5, 2000, by filing a formal motion to continue 

pursuant to section 103-5(c) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) (West 2000)), set forth above. 

 A hearing on the motion was held on June 6, 2000, at which the State argued as follows: 

"The People's motion to continue, your Honor, is based on the fact that there are 

numerous items in evidence that have been taken to the crime lab at Carbondale. 

Those items were transported almost immediately after the event in this case[,] with 

the bulk of them having been taken to the crime lab on March 1 of 2000. I have 

spoken with personnel there about the nature of these issues[,] and they have assured 

me that they can accomplish the analysis of these items within the time[]frame 

established in the motion, your Honor." 

The State's written motion further explained that the backlog had been created in part 

by the maternity leave of one lab technician and the inability of another pregnant lab 

technician to use the chemicals necessary to complete the testing, due to the dangers it posed 

to her unborn child. After making a finding that the State had exercised due diligence in 

trying to obtain the lab test results in time for the original trial setting, the trial court granted 

the State's motion to continue on June 6, 2000, and reset the trial for August 1, 2000. 

Thereafter, Workman's attorney was injured and could not work on his cases. A 

lengthy continuance was granted by the trial court, and the case was reset for a trial on 

February 27, 2001. In the meantime, Workman's attorney moved to have her evaluated to 

determine if she was mentally fit to stand trial. Workman was found fit on March 14, 2001, 

and the trial was again reset, for August 14, 2001. 

The trial actually began on August 14, 2001, but on the next day, Workman's attorney 

moved to withdraw due to a conflict of interest. Workman's attorney had also represented 
5 

William Russell Hall, Workman's uncle and a prosecution witness, when Hall was charged 

with child pornography in 1996. During his representation of Hall, Workman's attorney 

learned that Hall had sexually abused Workman when she was five years old. Since an 

inherent conflict of interest existed, the trial court permitted Workman's original attorney to 

withdraw and appointed her new counsel. Jury selection then ceased and the case was reset 

for a trial on September 18, 2001. After Workman's new counsel requested more time to 

prepare, the trial was rescheduled for February 26, 2002. 

The trial of Dawn Workman actually took place on February 26, 2002, and after a 

week of testimony, a jury found her guilty of first-degree murder. On May 2, 2002, the trial 

court sentenced Workman to 40 years' imprisonment. 

A look back at this procedural history shows that the delays in getting to trial can be 

described in five categories: (1) a one-day delay attributable to Workman after new charges 

were issued and plea negotiations were taking place, (2) a delay due to lab testing, (3) a delay 

due to Workman's first attorney's injury, (4) a delay due to a mental fitness evaluation, and 

(5) a delay caused by the substitution of Workman's counsel due to a conflict of interest. As 

stated above, Workman argues that trial delays were improperly allowed for lab tests to be 

completed and for the substitution of her attorney when no conflict of interest existed. 

We address the time allowed after her original attorney withdrew first. We flatly 

reject Workman's claim that her original attorney's motion to withdraw was improperly 

granted. Although we question why the conflict of interest could not have been determined 

earlier, Workman's original attorney clearly labored under a conflict that prohibited him from 

proceeding as her attorney. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's grant of 

continuances after Workman's original attorney moved to withdraw and new counsel was 

appointed. Accordingly, any delay that occurred after Workman's first attorney withdrew on 

August 15, 2001, is properly attributable to the defendant. 
6 

Since the trial delays for Workman's original attorney's injury and for Workman's 

mental fitness evaluation are properly attributable to Workman as well, we need only address 

the 139-day time frame between Workman's arrest on February 25, 2000, and July 12, 

2000Bthe date on which Workman's original attorney requested a trial continuance due to his 

injuries. The only delays during this time frame were the 1-day continuance requested by the 

defendant in order to contemplate the new charges brought against her and the 60-day 

continuance the trial court granted the State in order to complete DNA testing, which 

Workman argues was in error. Since the 1-day continuance is clearly attributable to 

Workman, we need only address the 60-day continuance for the DNA testing. Our review of 

the record reveals, however, that Workman's attorney failed to raise this issue before the trial 

court in a pretrial or posttrial motion. Therefore, we must determine, as Workman concedes 

at the end of her written argument on this first point, whether Workman was deprived of the 

effective assistance of counsel as a result. 

To determine whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, we 

apply the two-prong test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), and 

adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27, 473 

N.E.2d 1246, 1255-56 (1984). As instructed by these two high courts, in order to prevail on 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 

performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so 

that he or she was deprived of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 

104 S. Ct. at 2064. 

It is well-settled that the failure of counsel to move for the discharge of his client on 

the basis of a speedy-trial violation will constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when 

there is at least a reasonable probability that the client would have been discharged had a 
7 

timely motion been filed and there was no justification for the attorney's decision not to file 

the motion. People v. Peco, 345 Ill. App. 3d 724, 729, 803 N.E.2d 561, 565 (2004). Counsel 

also can be deemed ineffective if the issue is not raised in a posttrial motion. Peco, 345 Ill. 

App. 3d at 729, 803 N.E.2d at 565. However, counsel's failure to argue a speedy-trial 

violation cannot amount to constitutional incompetence if no basis for raising such a 

violation exists. People v. Garcia, 251 Ill. App. 3d 473, 478-79, 621 N.E.2d 1035, 1039 

(1993). 

Workman argues the trial court erred in finding that the State exercised due diligence 

in trying to procure the lab results before the original trial setting. Since the 60-day 

continuance allowed Workman to be tried after the 120-day speedy-trial limitation had 

expired, Workman argues that her right to a speedy trial was violated and that she should 

have been discharged. 

The State, on the other hand, maintains that there is no actual need to review the trial 

court's finding of due diligence because the 120-day speedy-trial limitation had not begun to 

run when the trial court ruled on the motion. The State argues that all the time that expired 

between the initial arraignment on February 25, 2000, and the original trial setting of June 

13, 2000, should be deemed delay that was agreed upon by the defendant because she made 

no oral or written demand for a trial. We disagree. 

The 120-day term for an in-custody defendant clearly begins to run automatically as 

soon as the defendant is taken into custody and without a need for the defendant to make a 

formal demand for a trial. Peco, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 731, 803 N.E.2d at 566-67. Adopting the 

State's position on this issue would render the defendant's right to a speedy trial as codified 

by section 103-5(a) of the Code meaningless. Peco, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 731, 803 N.E.2d at 

566. Accordingly, the speedy-trial "clock" began to run when Workman was incarcerated on 

February 25, 2000. 
8 

In the alternative, the State argues that if the speedy-trial "clock" began to run when 

Workman was incarcerated, it stopped after only 27 days when Workman agreed at a hearing 

on March 22, 2000, to the original June 13, 2000, trial setting. Again, we disagree with the 

State's calculation. 

Our review of the two-page transcript from this brief hearing shows that Workman 

was informed that the grand jury had returned an indictment which read exactly the same as 

the previous information. Workman then waived her right to a formal arraignment and 

entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court then stated that since Workman had been in 

custody since February 25, 2000, the trial should be set on June 13, 2000, "or sooner"Bwhich 

was within 120 days of February 25, 2000. Although we acknowledge that a defendant is 

considered to have agreed to any delay unless he or she objects by demanding a trial (People 

v. Ingram, 357 Ill. App. 3d 228, 233, 828 N.E.2d 763, 768 (2005)), we find that Workman 

had not agreed to any "delay" in this case. She had merely agreed that the original trial 

setting of June 13, 2000, which was within the speedy-trial time limit, was amenable with her 

schedule. This agreement, however, did not toll the speedy-trial "clock." 

Based upon these calculations, the speedy-trial "clock" read 102 days on June 6, 

2000,2

 when the trial court granted the State's motion for a continuance in order to complete 

the DNA testing. Because Workman specifically objected to this continuance on the record 

and indicated that she was "not going to waive any of her speedy[-]trial rights," the delay 

cannot be considered to be agreed upon and did not toll the speedy-trial "clock." See Ingram, 

357 Ill. App. 3d at 233, 828 N.E.2d at 768. Therefore, the question is whether the 60-day 

 

2

This calculation takes into account the only delay up until this pointBthe one-day 

delay on May 31, 2000, requested by and attributable to the defendant after the new charges 

were brought against her. 
9 

continuance was proper and tolled the 120-day limitation or whether it was improper and 

caused Workman to be deprived of her right to a speedy trial.3

 Accordingly, a review of the 

trial court's finding of due diligence is necessary. 

To that end, Workman argues the State showed no due diligence, and she compares 

the circumstances presented here to those we faced in People v. Battles, 311 Ill. App. 3d 991, 

724 N.E.2d 997 (2000). In Battles, we admonished our lower courts to require the State to do 

more than merely request additional time within which to complete forensic testing, by 

setting out any specific facts suggesting why the forensic testing in that case could not be 

completed within the time frame of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Battles, 311 Ill. 

App. 3d at 997-98, 724 N.E.2d at 1002. 

In this case, the State seemed mindful of the Battles requirements and explained that 

although it had exercised due diligence, it could not obtain the DNA results before the initial 

trial setting. The State's section 103-5 motion to continue contained four paragraphs that 

address the State's assertion that it exercised due diligence: 

 

3

If the DNA continuance was improper, the speedy-trial "clock" would have continued 

to run. Since the next delay attributable to Workman did not occur until July 12, 2000, when 

her attorney was injured, 138 days would have run up to this point (taking into account 

Workman's 1-day continuance discussed above). Because this was beyond the 120-day limit, 

Workman's right to a speedy trial was violated if the DNA continuance was improper. 
10 

"6. The People have acted diligently in obtaining laboratory analyses of the 

evidence in that the bulk of the items were taken to the crime laboratory on March 1, 

2000[,] in the week following the homicide. 

7. Owing to a backlog of work at the Crime Laboratory and to the complicated 

and multi[]step analysis required, the analyses have not been done nor have reports 

been received. 

8. On June 1, 2000[,] Gary Duncan spoke with laboratory personnel Dana 

Warren and Michael Norbut. Mr. Norbut does fingerprint and palmprint 

comparisons[,] and Ms. Warren does serology and biology. Mr. Norbut has not yet 

received the items for his analysis. Ms. Warren is presently engaged in analysis of the 

items[,] and her work must be performed prior to transfer to Mr. Norbet [sic]. 

9. Dana Warren told Gary Duncan she has a substantial backlog of work and 

just now is able to work cases from January and February of this year. She is the sole 

person in her section, her colleague, Stacey Spieth[,] is on maternity leave, and Ms. 

Warren herself is pregnant and cannot work with certain chemicals because of their 

known risk to pregnant women. For the latter reason, no DNA work is being done in 

her section at the Carbondale Laboratory. Any DNA analyses are transferred to other 

laboratories." 

After careful consideration, we find the facts that one of the technicians was on 

maternity leave and the only other technician at the Carbondale lab was also pregnant at the 

time and could not work with certain chemicals because of significant risks to her unborn 

baby provided a sufficient reason to excuse the State's delay in obtaining the test results. 

While an accused's right to a speedy trial should never be taken lightly, it would be 

unreasonable for the trial court to demand that a laboratory technician decide between the 

health of her unborn child and the need for the immediate processing of certain laboratory 
11 

results. Accordingly, we see no error in the trial court's finding of the State's due diligence 

despite the delay. 

After making this determination, we turn back to the issue of whether it was 

ineffective for Workman's attorney not to have objected to this motion to continue or to have 

raised it in a posttrial motion. Put simply, we find that it was not. The basis for the State's 

motion was more than reasonable. To require defense counsel to object to the motion or risk 

being labeled as inadequate or ineffective in the representation of the interests of his client 

seems to be an unreasonable burden for courts to impose. Therefore, we find the trial court's 

grant of the continuance was proper and tolled the speedy-trial "clock." Accordingly, 

Workman's right to a speedy trial was not violated. 

Workman next contends that she was denied a fair trial because she was unable to 

fully confront one of the State's witnesses, Workman's uncleBWilliam Russell Hall. Hall had 

admitted to sexually abusing Workman when she was a small child. Nevertheless, Workman 

lived with Hall voluntarily when she was not living with the Kubicki family. It is for that 

reason that Hall was called to testify against Workman. Workman returned to Hall's house 

the day after the murder and asked Hall questions about the disposing of a body in water. 

Workman contends she was unable to fully confront Hall as a witness because she was 

unable to use a 1996 psychological report, in which he admits that he had sexually abused 

Workman, to impeach him at the trial. We disagree. 

In 1996, Hall was psychologically evaluated after child pornography charges were 

brought against him by the State. During that evaluation, Hall admitted that he had sexually 

molested Workman when she was five years old. Workman sought to use the 1996 report to 

impeach Hall as he testified against her, but the trial court ruled that the report was a 

confidential mental health record and not subject to disclosure to Workman through 

discovery. Therefore, at the trial, Workman could only ask Hall whether he had ever 
12 

admitted to anyone that he had molested Workman as a child. After Hall testified that he had 

never mistreated Workman and that their relationship was a good and loving uncle/niece 

relationship, Workman asked Hall directly if he remembered telling the police that he had 

molested her when she was five years old. Hall asserted his fifth amendment right not to 

answer, and Workman concluded her cross-examination. 

We find no error in the trial court's restriction of the psychological report since it was 

privileged and confidential under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities 

Confidentiality Act (Act) (740 ILCS 110/3(a) (West 2000)). Hall never consented to the use 

of the report, and no other provision of the Act allowed its use. See People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 

2d 65, 89-101, 560 N.E.2d 258, 269-74 (1990). Additionally, it is unlikely that had the 

report been produced, it would have been admissible to impeach Hall. The abuse occurred in 

1985Bmore than 10 years before the trialBand never resulted in a criminal charge or 

conviction. We also find it clear that the jury knew that Hall had sexually abused Workman 

as a child. Workman testified about the abuse when she took the stand, and this fact was all 

but confirmed when Hall invoked the fifth amendment when asked about it. Accordingly, we 

find no error in the trial court's suppression of the 1996 Hall report. 

Workman next takes issue with the trial court's denial of her motion for a mistrial after 

a detective testified that a jailer had told him that he thought he saw gang symbols and 

writing on a pad of paper on Workman's jailhouse bunk. Workman contends this testimony 

deprived her of a fair trial because the trial court had issued a pretrial order barring testimony 

regarding gang affiliation. We disagree. 

First, the testimony was unsolicited by the State. Second, we find that the reference 

was brief and vague. Third, any error was cured by the trial court's instruction to the jury to 

disregard it. Fourth, the brief reference to gang symbols on the notepad was overshadowed 

by the reason the notepad was confiscatedBthe fact that it contained Workman's handwritten 
13 

account of her version of the murder. Lastly, the notepad was never tendered to the jury, and 

the jury never saw any of the supposed gang symbols. Accordingly, we find no error in the 

trial court's denial of Workman's motion for a mistrial based upon this evidence. It was 

within the trial court's discretion to deny the mistrial, and given the reasons set forth above 

and the trial court's admonishment to the jury to disregard it, we find no error. 

In her final point on appeal, Workman contends that her 40-year sentence is excessive 

in light of her youth, her negligible criminal history, her minor role in the offense, and her 

tumultuous social history. We disagree. 

The sentencing court is in the best position to consider matters relating to sentencing 

determinations and is vested with wide discretion in making a reasoned judgment on the 

penalty appropriate for the circumstances of each case. People v. Brown, 250 Ill. App. 3d 

767, 774, 620 N.E.2d 674, 679 (1993). A sentence within the statutory guidelines that is 

alleged to be excessive will not be disturbed on review unless it is manifestly 

disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Brown, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 774, 620 N.E.2d at 

679. 

In this case, testimony adduced at the trial showed that Workman was the instigator of 

the crime and that her boyfriend would have never killed his father had Workman not 

persuaded him. There was also testimony that the plan was to kill the entire Kubicki family. 

The murder was also premeditated since the pair bought supplies beforehand, such as gloves 

to conceal their fingerprints. It is also clear that the motive for the murder was trivial and 

selfish; Workman was angered that she was disliked by the Kubickis and could no longer live 

in their home. There was also evidence that Workman wanted the entire family dead so that 

the two could live in the family home. 

Workman also had a criminal history. She had been convicted of felony theft and 

obstructing a peace officer and was on felony probation, which she had already violated, at 
14 

the time of the murder. She had also dropped out of school in the eighth grade and had 

almost no work history. 

We also note that 40 years is the middle of the sentencing range for murder. Given 

the evidence in this case, the aggravating factors, and the lack of mitigating factors, as well as 

the trial court's broad discretion in sentencing matters, we find no abuse of the trial court's 

discretion in sentencing Workman to 40 years' imprisonment and find that it is not 

disproportionate to the crime. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed. 

GOLDENHERSH, J., concurs. 

JUSTICE DONOVAN, dissenting: 

I concur in the majority opinion in all aspects, save one. I do not agree that the State 

established that it had exercised due diligence to accomplish the testing of material evidence 

within the speedy-trial period, and therefore I must respectfully dissent. 

In People v. Battles, this court held that when the State files a motion to continue 

pursuant to section 103-5(c) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) (West 2000)), it has the 

burden to show that law enforcement authorities "have made a prudent and assiduous effort" 

to complete the testing of evidence before the expiration of the 120-day speedy-trial period. 

People v. Battles, 311 Ill. App. 3d 991, 997, 724 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (2000). After Battles, 

prosecutors and law enforcement personnel were on notice that the "rapid retrieval of testing 

materials and delivery of those materials to a crime lab," standing alone, would be considered 

inadequate to establish due diligence. Battles, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 1000, 724 N.E.2d at 1004. 

The prosecution team was also warned that it would be required to provide something more 
15 

than the mere assertion of a backlog to support a due diligence finding. Battles, 311 Ill. App. 

3d at 1001, 724 N.E.2d at 1004-05. 

In its oral and written arguments to the trial court in this case, the State sought a 

continuance of not more than 60 days due to the unavailability of material evidence. The 

continuance was not sought to obtain DNA analyses. In its motion, the State asserted that 

certain pieces of evidence had not been tested because one of the technicians at the 

Carbondale laboratory, Stacey Spieth, was on maternity leave and the only other technician, 

Dana Warren, had a substantial backlog. As of June 2000, Ms. Warren was conducting tests 

on evidentiary materials that had been submitted in January and February of that year. 

In my view, the information offered in support of the State's assertion of due diligence 

is substantively similar to that which we rejected in Battles. In this case, as in Battles, the 

State did not provide the trial court with any facts to explain the backlog, and more 

importantly, it did not identify what actions, if any, had been taken to deal with the backlog 

and to promote or expedite the testing of materials for this case. See Battles, 311 Ill. App. 3d 

at 999-1001, 724 N.E.2d at 1003-04. There is no indication that the prosecution or the law 

enforcement authorities impressed upon the Carbondale lab that the testing in this case 

should be expedited or that they otherwise acted with any sense of urgency. See Battles, 311 

Ill. App. 3d at 1001, 724 N.E.2d at 1004; People v. Durham, 193 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 

N.E.2d 259 (1990). While it is likely that there will always be some testing backlog and 

staffing issues, a detained criminal defendant who has demanded a speedy trial should not be 

required to bear the brunt of those conditions in the absence of some evidence that the State, 

prior to requesting a continuance, had made reasonable efforts to secure the testing and to 

obtain the results within the speedy-trial period. 

In this case, the majority finds that the State's delay in obtaining the test results was 

excusable because "one of the technicians was on maternity leave and the only other 
16 

technician at the Carbondale lab was also pregnant at the time and could not work with 

certain chemicals because of significant risks to her unborn baby." Slip op. at 10. The 

majority goes on to comment, "While an accused's right to a speedy trial should never be 

taken lightly, it would be unreasonable for the trial court to demand that a laboratory 

technician decide between the health of her unborn child and the need for immediate 

processing of certain laboratory results." Slip op. at 10. I am both perplexed and troubled by 

these findings. I have scrutinized the State's motion and its arguments before the trial court, 

and I find no assertion, nor any evidence, that the delay in obtaining the test results in this 

case occurred because the required testing posed any health risk to Dana Warren or her 

unborn baby. 

Paragraph 9 of the State's motion states as follows: 

"9. Dana Warren told Gary Duncan she has a substantial backlog of work and 

just now is able to work cases from January and February of this year. She is the sole 

person in her section, her colleague, Stacey Spieth[,] is on maternity leave, and Ms. 

Warren herself is pregnant and cannot work with certain chemicals because of their 

known risk to pregnant women. For the latter reason, no DNA work is being done in 

her section at the Carbondale Laboratory. Any DNA analyses are transferred to 

other laboratories." (Emphasis added.) 

The factual assertions set forth in paragraph 9 demonstrate that the Carbondale 

laboratory had taken steps to protect the health of Ms. Warren and her unborn baby by 

suspending any DNA testing in her lab and transferring all DNA analyses to other labs. 

There is no assertion that Ms. Warren was unable to safely perform the testing that was 

required in this case. There is no assertion that any aspect of that testing posed health risks to 

pregnant women. In this case, the trial court was not faced with a Hobson's choice between 

preserving the defendant's right to a speedy trial and protecting the health of the laboratory 
17 

worker and her unborn baby. Therefore, the majority's suggestion regarding how it may 

judge a trial court's action under such fictional circumstances seems to be an ill-advised 

prejudgment of an issue that is not before us. 

Based on the record, I conclude that the State failed to meet its burden to show due 

diligence and thereby violated the defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial. Because the 

defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel and because the State's speedy-trial 

violation cannot be undone, I believe that a reversal of the defendant's conviction is 

mandated. For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent. 
 NO. 5-02-0342 

 IN THE 

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

 FIFTH DISTRICT 

___________________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

) Circuit Court of 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. 

) 

v. ) No. 00-CF-69 

) 

DAWN WORKMAN, ) Honorable 

) Terry H. Gamber, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ___________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion Filed: July 19, 2006 ___________________________________________________________________________________

Justices: Honorable Stephen P. McGlynn, J. 

Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J., 

Concurs 

Honorable James K. Donovan, J., 

Dissents 

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Attorneys Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Paige Clark Strawn, Assistant Defender, Office 

for of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, 

Appellant Suite #1, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864 

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Attorneys Hon. Gary Duncan, State's Attorney, Jefferson County Courthouse, Mt. Vernon, IL 

for 62864; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Kevin D. 

Appellee Sweeney, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 

E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864 ___________________________________________________________________________________