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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

C.R. and J.R., individually and as 

Next Friends of Joe R., a minor, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Case No. 14-14531 

Hon. Terrence G. Berg 

Novi Community School District, et al., 

Defendants. 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION (Dkt. 99) 

 Plaintiffs in this action have asked the Court (Dkt. 99) to clarify the scope of 

its February 9, 2017 order resolving the parties’ cross-motions for summary 

judgment. (Dkt. 97). 

 There are two questions on which Plaintiffs seek clarification. First, 

regarding Count IV,1 which alleged individual liability for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 against Superintendent Matthews, Principal Shriner, Assistant Principal 

Comb, and Math Teacher Williams, Plaintiffs ask whether the Court’s order 

denying the Individual Novi Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that 

claim as to Principal Shriner and Math Teacher Williams was intended to likewise 

deny summary judgment as to Matthews and Comb. It was not. The only issues of 

 

1 In their motion for clarification, Plaintiffs invert the relevant Count numbers, identifying 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the individual defendants as “Count III” and against 

NCSD the entity as “Count IV.” (Dkt. 99 at Pg ID 8112-13). In the Amended Complaint, 

Count IV is against the individuals and Count III is against the entity. (Dkt. 12 at Pg ID 

133, 136). This Order will refer to the counts as they appear in Plaintiffs’ Amended 

Complaint. 

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fact that the record showed on the question of individual liability for a violation of § 

1983 were those related to the role and conduct of Math Teacher Williams and 

Principal Shriner. 

The second question relates to Count III, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for entity 

liability against NCSD. Plaintiffs ask whether the Court’s order denying NCSD’s 

motion for summary judgment on this claim under the failure to train theory was 

intended to mean that all of the other theories Plaintiffs mentioned may also go 

forward. The answer to this question is also no. Plaintiffs only produced sufficient 

evidence to create a question of fact under a failure to train theory. Plaintiffs’ § 

1983 claim for entity liability against NCSD survives summary judgment under 

that theory alone. 

 To explain in greater detail, the Court provides the following clarification. 

I. § 1983 Individual Liability (Count IV) 

In their Response to the Individual Novi Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Plaintiffs contended that there was “abundant evidence” to create issues 

of fact for trial as to § 1983 liability “against each individual defendant”. (Dkt. 87 at 

Pg ID 7375). Unfortunately, however, Plaintiffs’ broad assertion was not supported 

by references to the record or evidence tailored to the specific roles of any of the 

Individual Novi Defendants and how their conduct met the elements needed to 

prove individual liability for a violation of § 1983 based on peer-on-peer sexual 

harassment in a school setting. (Id. at 7373-75). Nor did Plaintiffs cite any Sixth 

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Circuit authority that would suggest their conduct was sufficient for such liability to 

attach, except for a parenthetical citation that discusses § 1983 municipal liability 

and is therefore inapposite in the context of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the 

Individual Novi Defendants. (Id.) (citing Williams v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dst., 

400 F.3d 360, 369 (6th Cir. 2005)).2 Given the lack of specificity of Plaintiffs’ 

contentions and the fact that they did not provide relevant case law, the Court 

undertook an independent review of Sixth Circuit authority on the issue of § 1983 

liability for teachers and school administrators in the context of peer-on-peer 

harassment and applied this authority to the evidentiary record adduced by the 

parties. (Dkt. 97 at Pg ID 8064-76). In light of the evidence presented, the Court 

concluded that, with respect to the alleged conduct of the Individual Novi 

Defendants, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant 

Vera Williams engaged in unconstitutional conduct in violation of § 1983—that is, 

regularly placing J.J. and Joe R. in a side-room where J.J. allegedly touched Joe R. 

inappropriately. (Dkt. 97 at Pg Ids 8068-72). 

 Though the evidence before the Court only raised a fact issue for trial with 

respect to primary liability under § 1983 against math teacher Vera Williams, a 

separate question that the Court considered was whether Superintendent 

Matthews, Principal Schriner, and Assistant Principal Comb are liable under § 

1983 pursuant to a theory of supervisory liability. As explained in the Court’s 

 

2 The cases Plaintiffs rely on in arguing for § 1983 liability against the Individual Novi 

Defendants are Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999) and Hill v. 

Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2015). 

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previous order, in the Sixth Circuit, to establish supervisory liability, a § 1983 

plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that a supervisor knowingly acquiesced in 

unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at Pg ID 8072) (citing Peatross v. City of Memphis, 

818 F.3d 233). The Sixth Circuit has found knowing acquiescence where 

supervisors: (1) fail to train their employees on a given issue, (2) fail to properly 

investigate a plaintiff’s allegation that he suffered a constitutional violation related 

to this failure to train, and (3) attempt to cover up their employees allegedly 

unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at 8072-73) (citing Peatross, 818 F.3d at 242-43; Coley 

v. Lucas Cty., 799 F. 3d 530 at 541-42) (6th Cir. 2015)). As explained in the Court’s 

order, in light of the test for showing knowing acquiescence, a reasonable jury could 

conclude that Principal Schriner knowingly acquiesced in Vera Williams’s conduct, 

and the Court therefore denied in part the Individual Novi Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Principal Schriner. (Dkt. 97 

at Pg ID 8074-75). 

 As to the Individual Novi Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Superintendent Matthews or Mr. Comb, the record 

does not contain evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the 

questions of whether Superintendent Matthews and Mr. Comb (1) were responsible 

to train NMS employees on sexual abuse issues and failed to do so, (2) were 

responsible for conducting an investigation into Vera Williams’s conduct and did so 

haphazardly, and (3) attempted to conceal the touching between Joe R. and J.J. that 

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allegedly occurred in the side-room.3 Although this result was implicit in the Court’s 

reasoning, and in the summary of the Order which granted in part and denied in 

part the Individual Novi Defendants’ motion, the Court acknowledges that the 

Individual Novi Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Defendants 

Matthews and Comb for individual liability under § 1983 should have been 

explicitly granted, and Plaintiffs were justified in seeking clarification on this point. 

By this Order, that ruling is explicitly stated. 

 

II. § 1983 NCSD Liability (Count III) 

 In their Response to NCSD’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs argue 

that NCSD is liable under § 1983 for J.J.’s harassment of Joe R. under the following 

theories: (1) NCSD’s failure to train its employees on sexual abuse issues and other 

deliberate indifference; (2) Joe R.’s constitutional deprivations were caused by the 

official customs and policies of NCSD; (3) Joe R.’s constitutional deprivations were 

caused by the actions of NCSD personnel with final policymaking authority; and (4) 

a state-created danger theory. (Dkt. 87 at Pg ID 7369). With respect to the 

Individual Novi Defendants named in Count IV, Plaintiffs’ error was that they 

failed to tailor their § 1983 arguments to address the roles of each of the Individual 

Novi Defendants. In Count III, charging entity liability, the shortcoming was that 

Plaintiffs failed to specify the constitutional violation to which their theories of § 

 

3 On the record before the Court, the evidence concerning the conduct of Matthews and 

Comb is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact that either of them took actions that 

would satisfy all three of the elements that the Sixth Circuit’s knowing acquiescence test 

requires. 

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1983 entity liability attached. Accordingly, the Court independently analyzed 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 entity liability claims in light of the only constitutional violation 

for which the evidence in this case creates a question of fact—that is, Vera 

Williams’ allegedly having exposed Joe R. to a state-created danger by placing him 

in a side-room with J.J, thereby violating Joe R.’s Fourteenth Amendment 

substantive due process right to bodily integrity. In its previous order, the Court 

made it clear that it was denying NCSD’s motion for summary judgment on 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims with respect to Plaintiffs’ failure to train theory. (Dkt. 97 at 

8076-77). Plaintiffs were justified in seeking clarification because the Court did not 

clearly address Plaintiffs’ three other theories of NCSD’s liability under § 1983. The 

reason that the Court did not address these theories is that Plaintiffs presented no 

evidence sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether Vera Williams’s alleged 

conduct in exposing Joe R. to a state-created danger by placing him in a side-room 

with J.J. was caused by NCSD’s official customs, policies, or personnel with final 

policy making authority, or that an NCSD official acted in concert with Ms. 

Williams in creating the danger of abuse. Due to the lack of evidence adduced 

supporting any of these theories, they do not survive NCSD’s motion for summary 

judgment, but there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact 

on Plaintiffs’ failure to train theory. 

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III. Conclusion 

 In sum, as stated in the Court’s Consolidated Order Resolving Cross-Motions 

for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 97), Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims that will proceed to trial 

are: 

 1. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 municipal liability claim against NCSD based on its 

 failure to train (Count III); 

 2. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 substantive due process claim against Vera Williams 

 based on a state-created danger theory (Count IV); 

 3. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 supervisory liability claim as against Principal Schriner 

 (Count IV). 

 (Dkt. 97 at Pg Id 8108). 

 As ordered by the Court previously, the Individual Novi Defendants’ and 

NCSD’s motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 83, 84) as to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims 

against them (Counts III and IV) are DENIED with respect to the three claims 

listed above and GRANTED with respect to all of the other claims Plaintiffs bring 

pursuant to § 1983. The Court does hereby CLARIFY its Consolidated Order 

Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 99) to ORDER that the 

Individual Novi Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt 83) is GRANTED

as to Defendants Matthews and Comb and NCSD’s motion for summary judgment 

(Dkt. 84) is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ theories that (1) Joe R.’s constitutional 

deprivation was caused by the official customs and policies of NCSD; (2) Joe R.’s 

constitutional deprivation was caused by the actions of NCSD personnel with final 

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policymaking authority; and (3) that an NCSD official acted in concert with Ms. 

Williams in creating the danger of J.J. abusing Joe R. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 8, 2017 s/Terrence G. Berg 

TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on March 8, 

2017, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to all parties. 

 s/A. Chubb 

Case Manager 

 

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