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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

JORDAN SIMON HALL, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

 

Case No. 1:14-cv-13767 

Judge Thomas L. Ludington 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 13) and DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 14) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons that follow, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment (DE 13), GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (DE 14), 

and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision. 

II. REPORT 

 Plaintiff, Jordan Simon Hall, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 

42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his applications for disability insurance 

benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income benefits (SSIB). This matter is 

before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on 

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Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (DE 13), the Commissioner’s cross 

motion for summary judgment (DE 14) and the administrative record (DE 6). 

A. Background

 Plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSIB on August 31, 2011, 

alleging that he has been disabled since December 1, 2010, at age 20. (R. at 146-

150, 151-156.) Plaintiff alleges disability as a result of paranoid schizophrenia, 

panic, thought, and bipolar disorder. (R. at 168-179.) Plaintiff’s applications were 

denied. (R. at 122-126, 127-130.) 

Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). (R. at 131-132.) ALJ Christopher Inama held a hearing on March 13, 

2013, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel and Vocational Expert (VE) 

Timothy Shaner testified. (R. at 34-65.) On April 19, 2013, ALJ Inama 

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act. (R. at 16-33.) 

Plaintiff requested review of the hearing decision. (R. at 15.) On August 1, 

2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 1-4.) Thus, 

ALJ Inama’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. 

Plaintiff then timely commenced the instant action on September 30, 2014. 

(DE 1.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Medical History 

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 Plaintiff alleges that he has been disabled since December 1, 2010. (See R. 

at 166.) More than 500 pages of Plaintiff’s medical records were available to the 

ALJ. R. at 213-754 (Exhibits 1F-20F). Of particular import are hospitalization 

records and those of his treating psychiatrist, Joel Young, M.D. 

1. Hospitalizations 

Plaintiff was hospitalized at St. Joseph Mercy-Oakland from June 11, 2009 

to June 30, 2009 (R. at 449-555; see also, R. at 556-568 [Ex. 13F]), from July 1, 

2009 to July 14, 2009 (R. at 399-448 [Ex. 13F]) and from July 14, 2009 to July 24, 

2009 (R. at 325-398 [Ex. 13F]). However, each of these hospitalizations took 

place prior to December 1, 2010, Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date.1

Plaintiff was admitted to Havenwyck Hospital in Auburn Hills, Michigan from 

August 17, 2011 to September 13, 2011. (R. at 569-578 [Ex. 14F]). His GAF on 

admission was 25. On discharge, Plaintiff’s GAF was 42, and his diagnoses 

included bipolar disorder fair with psychotic features. (R. at 570.) 

 2. Treating Psychiatrist Joel Young, M.D. 

Plaintiff treated regularly with psychiatrist Joel Young, M.D. of Rochester 

Center for Behavioral Medicine in Rochester Hills, Michigan. (R. at 579-611 [Ex. 

15F], 616-716 [Ex. 17F], 717-722 [Ex. 18F], 723-728 [Ex. 19F], 729-754 [Ex. 

 

1 At Step 3, the ALJ implies Plaintiff was hospitalized for bipolar disorder on 

August 1, 2011. (R. at 22.) However, the August 1, 2011 records to which the 

ALJ referred are actually hematology and chemistry labs. (R. at 315-317 [Ex. 

13F]).

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20F].) On at least ten different treatment dates, between September 14, 2011 and 

January 29, 2013, Dr. Young diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder. (R. at 584, 

592, 619, 624, 660, 667, 679, 684, 688, 694, 697, 733, 739, 749.) 

Dr. Young’s diagnoses differed, at least somewhat, in other instances. For 

example, on August 1, 2011, Dr. Young diagnosed Plaintiff with AD/HD 

(combined type), and on August 17, 2011 Dr. Young diagnosed Plaintiff with 

bipolar disorder manic and a GAF of 40. (R. at 579, 582.) On January 25, 2012, 

Dr. Young diagnosed Plaintiff as schizoaffective, and on March 13, 2012, Dr. 

Young diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder vs schizoaffective disorder. (R. at 

651, 642.) Also, on January 14, 2013, Dr. Young diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar 

disorder psychosis. (R. at 743.) 

Meanwhile, on September 12, 2012, signed a medical source statement 

regarding ability to perform work-related activities. At the time, Plaintiff was not 

in a depressive or manic episode. (R. at 717, 723.) Dr. Young opined that Plaintiff 

was not currently disabled from all gainful employment, including sedentary or 

less than sedentary jobs; however, Dr. Young also opined that, due to his mental 

health issues, Plaintiff was unable to sustain employment in a competitive 

environment for an 8 hour day, five days per week on a consistent basis. (R. at 

719, 720.) According to Dr. Young, even when not in the midst of an episode, 

Plaintiff had certain limitations on his ability to perform work related activities. 

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For example, Plaintiff had unlimited or very good socially appropriate behavior, 

limited but satisfactory ability to understand, remember and carry out very short 

and simple instructions, and limited but satisfactory ability to maintain attention 

for two hour segment. (R. at 720-721, 726-727.) 

 C. Hearing Testimony (March 13, 2013) 

 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

 Plaintiff Jordan Simon Hall testified at the March 13, 2013 hearing. (R. at 

40-58.) He graduated from Waterford Kettering High School in 2008 and attended 

some college. (R. at 40-41.) Plaintiff’s past work included brief jobs as a cable 

technician and a buffet attendant, each of which were cut short because he could 

not perform on his medication. (R. at 41-42; see also, R. at 43.) At the time of the 

hearing, he was living with his parents and not working. (R. at 40-41.) 

 Plaintiff testified that he has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia 

and acute manic bipolar disorder. (R. at 43, 47.) He also claims to have adrenal 

and thyroid problems. (R. at 46, 55.) He is currently taking Zyprexa, lithium, 

Depakote, Ativan, and Synthroid. (R. at 50.) The side effects include restless leg 

syndrome, post-traumatic stress tremors, and night terrors. Plaintiff testified that 

his ability to focus and concentrate is not that good and is affected by the 

medication. He takes his medication every six hours. He has trouble remembering 

to take his medication, and his parents help him remember. (R. at 51.) Plaintiff 

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has good days and bad days, but “it just depends on how [his] medication is 

regulated . . . .” (R. at 53.) 

Plaintiff testified that he was hospitalized in two facilities. (R. at 44.) 

Plaintiff claims his hospitalization during 2009 at St. Joseph Mercy-Oakland was 

precipitated by the death of one of his friends; since then, he has had difficulty 

dealing with many aspects of his life. (R. at 45.) Plaintiff explained that his 

hospitalization during 2011 at Havenwyck was the result of his acute manic bipolar 

disorder. (R. at 45-46.) He fears places like these. (R. at 46.) 

 2. Vocational Expert Testimony

 VE Timothy Shaner also testified. (R. at 58-64.) The VE explained that 

only one job in Plaintiff’s history was performed for more than just a couple of 

months, namely, a cleaner/housekeeper job, which Plaintiff worked for a little 

over a year, classified as light exertion with a specific vocational preparation 

(SVP) of 2. (R. at 59, 61.) 

 The ALJ asked the VE about a hypothetical individual with the same age, 

education level, and work experience as Plaintiff who was limited to unskilled 

work at all exertional levels with the additional limitations of: never climbing 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; avoiding concentrated exposure to hazards such as 

heights and machinery; simple, routine, repetitive tasks with only simple workrelated decisions and few workplace changes; and occasional public contact. (R. at 

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58-59, 61.) The VE testified that such an individual could perform the work of 

housekeeper. (R. at 61.) In addition, such an individual could perform work as an 

assembler, laundry worker and packager. (R. at 62.) 

 In a second hypothetical, the ALJ added the condition of no fast-paced 

production requirements. (R. at 62.) The VE testified that such an individual 

could perform the work of a housekeeper, as well as a laundry worker and 

packager; however, to a certain extent, it would erode the ability to perform the 

assembler position. (R. at 62-63.) 

In addition, the VE testified that, with respect to an unskilled position, 

missing more than one day per month for a random or unexcused reason would 

lead to termination. (R. at 63.) The VE also testified that fifteen to twenty percent 

off-task beyond normal breaks and lunch periods would lead to disciplinary action. 

(R. at 64.) 

 D. The Administrative Decision2

 

2 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a 

five-step sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). 

Although a dispositive finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin 

v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential 

review considers and answers five questions: 

 1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

 2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

 3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet 

or equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

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 ALJ Inama rendered his decision on April 19, 2013. (R. at 16-33.) At Step 

1, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

December 1, 2010, the alleged onset date. (R. at 21.) 

At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairment of bipolar 

disorder. (R. at 21.) 

At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments. (R. at 21-23.) 

At Step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 

(RFC) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the 

following non-exertional limitations: he can never climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds. He must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards (e.g., heights and 

machinery). He is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, with only simple 

work-related decisions and few workplace changes, and occasional public contact. 

(R. at 23-27.) Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is capable of 

 

 4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the 

claimant perform his or her past relevant work? 

 5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the 

national economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th 

Cir. 2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 

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performing past relevant work as a housekeeper, as both actually and generally 

performed. (R. at 27.) 

Alternatively, at Step 5, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, 

education, work experience, and RFC, there are other jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff also can perform, including 

assembler, laundry worker and packager. (R. at 27-28.) 

 E. Standard of Review

 The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final 

administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case 

under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s decision 

if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal 

standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009) 

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. at 2007)); see 

also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as 

to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under 

this standard, “substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence 

but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 

(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 

1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

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court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide 

questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); 

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, 

to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). 

 Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. 

The Court must “‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from 

[the] weight’” of the Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 

395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 

(1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this 

Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that 

would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). 

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a 

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its 

own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or 

deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting 

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)). 

F. Analysis

In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff sets forth one statement of 

error: “The ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s treating doctor’s 

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professional opinion.” (DE 13-1 at 3-5; see also DE 13 at 2.)3

 The Commissioner 

opposes Plaintiff’s motion, asserting that: 

1. Plaintiff has not established that his overall argument has any 

relevance in light of the applicable standard of review. 

2. Plaintiff has not established that he meets Listing 12.04 (Affective 

Disorders). 

3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. 

 

(DE 14 at 3, 7-17.) 

The Undersigned will address each of the parties’ arguments in turn. 

1. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Weighing of 

Opinion Evidence. 

The ALJ relied upon the records of Dr. Young at several points in the 

sequential process: 

 At Step 2, where the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the 

severe impairment of bipolar disorder, the ALJ relied upon, 

among other records, Dr. Young’s September 12, 2012 medical 

source statement. (R. at 723-728 [Ex. 19F]). 

 At Step 3, where the ALJ found that the severity of Plaintiff’s 

mental impairment did not meet or medically equal the criteria 

of listing 12.04 (Affective Disorders), the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had mild restriction in his activities of daily living, 

moderate difficulties in his social functioning, and moderate 

difficulties regarding concentration, persistence or pace.4

 As to 

 

3 Similarly, in his Statement of Issues, he identifies only legal query: “Where

Plaintiff’s treating doctor’s opinion was consistent with a disability determination 

whether the ALJ gave proper weight [to] his credibility.” (DE 13 at 2 (emphasis 

in original).) 

4 As to each of these conclusions, the ALJ relied upon Plaintiff’s function report. 

(R. at 22, 180-187 [Ex. 4E].) 

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social functioning and concentration, persistence or pace, the 

ALJ relied in part upon Dr. Young’s September 12, 2012 

medical source statement. (R. at 723-728 [Ex. 19F]). 

 Within his Step 4 RFC determination, the ALJ noted that the 

objective medical evidence “documents a longitudinal history 

of treatment for mental illness including bipolar disorder with 

manic episodes.” Here, the ALJ considered several of Dr. 

Young’s notes. Ultimately, the ALJ rejected Dr. Young’s 

September 12, 2012 statement and assigned it little weight. 

(See R. at 21, 22, 24-26.) 

 Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s assignment of weight to the opinion 

evidence, alleging that the ALJ “decided to pick and choose when he would rely on 

the treating doctor, Dr. Young’s, professional opinion.” DE 13-1 at 4. In 

opposition to the ALJ’s characterization of Dr. Young’s statement as “internally 

inconsistent,” Plaintiff contends that the very nature of his bipolar condition is 

inconsistent. (DE 13-1 at 5.) 

However, the Court need not remand simply because the ALJ adopted some 

portions of Dr. Young’s September 12, 2012 statement while dismissing other 

portions. By way of background, on some issues, the ALJ relied favorably upon 

Dr. Young’s September 12, 2012 source statement. For example, in his Step 3 

finding of moderate difficulties in social functioning, the ALJ relied in part upon 

Dr. Young’s September 12, 2012 statement that Plaintiff has unlimited or very 

good mental abilities and aptitude to interact appropriately with the general public 

and to maintain socially appropriate behavior, as well as Plaintiff’s own report 

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about social activities. (R. at 22, 727; see also, R. at 184-185.) Moreover, in 

finding that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence or 

pace, the ALJ relied in part upon Dr. Young’s September 12, 2012 statement that 

Plaintiff had limited but satisfactory mental abilities and aptitudes to understand, 

remember and carry out very short and simple instructions and to maintain 

attention for a two hour segment, as well as Plaintiff’s own report that he can pay 

attention for an hour or two when watching a movie. (R. at 22, 726, 185.) Further, 

at Step 4, the ALJ acknowledged Dr. Young’s opinion that Plaintiff could manage 

benefits in his own best interest when not in a manic episode, and further 

acknowledged Dr. Young’s opinion that, when not in the midst of an episode, 

Plaintiff had “unlimited or very good,” “limited but satisfactory,” or “seriously 

limited” mental abilities and aptitudes in various functional areas. (R. at 26, 719, 

720-721.) 

Later, where the ALJ discounted Dr. Young’s source statement, he gave 

good reasons for doing so. (See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).) At 

Step 4, the ALJ explained that: 

 the source statement was “internally inconsistent,” because it 

states Plaintiff is not currently disabled from all gainful 

employment but also states Plaintiff cannot sustain employment 

in a competitive environment for an 8 hour day, five days a 

week on a consistent basis due to his mental health (R. at 717-

722 [Ex. 18F]); 

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 the source statement was inconsistent with Dr. Young’s 

progress notes indicating some GAF scores in the 70s (see, i.e., 

R. at 733, 739 [Ex. 20F]); 

 the source statement was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s selfreported activities of daily living, which, as cited elsewhere by 

the ALJ, include no problem with personal care, going outside 

every day, shopping in stores once every couple of months for a 

couple of hours, and regularly attending church on Sunday and 

his nephew’s football games, working on a house purchased by 

his friend, socializing with friends often, and smoking 

marijuana once in a while (R. at 25, 181-185 [Ex. 4E], 738, 

745, 753, 754 [Ex. 20F]); 

 the source statement “appeared to rely heavily on the claimant’s 

subjective reports of symptoms and limitations[;]” and, 

 the source statement “is also without support from other 

evidence in the medical file, which renders it less persuasive.” 

(See R. at 25-26.) 

In addition to the foregoing consideration of treating psychiatrist Dr. 

Young’s source statement, the ALJ gave other good reasons for his decision. For 

example, the ALJ gives some weight to the RFC assessment of non-examining 

State Disability Determination Services physician, presumably psychiatrist 

Leonard C. Balunas, Ph.D. (R. at 26, 104-106, 115-117.)5

 “[T]he opinions of 

State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians 

 

5 “State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program 

physicians, psychologists, and other medical specialists are highly qualified 

physicians, psychologists, and other medical specialists who are also experts in 

Social Security disability evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i), 

416.927(e)(2)(i).

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and psychologists can be given weight only insofar as they are supported by 

evidence in the case record . . . .” SSR 96-6P, 1996 WL 374180 (July 2, 1996). 

Among other things, Dr. Balunas opined that Plaintiff was “moderately limited” in 

his ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, carry out detailed 

instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, interact 

appropriately with the general public, and respond appropriately to changes in the 

work setting. (R. at 105-106, 116-117.) This opinion appears to be supported by 

evidence in the case record. Moreover, the ALJ observed, with appropriate record 

citation, that “the treatment has been generally successful in controlling [the 

allegedly disabling] symptoms[,]” “there is evidence the claimant has not been 

entirely compliant in taking prescribed medications,” “treatment has mostly been 

routine and conservative[,]” and “the side-effects are mild and do not interfere with 

the claimant’s ability to perform work activities in any significant manner.” (R. at 

25-26.) 

Finally, a quick comment about fairness is in order. Plaintiff asserts that “it 

is unfair and wrong to use a treating expert’s opinion when it furthers the ALJ’s 

agenda and then throw out his professional opinion when it negates.” DE 13-1 at 

5. This suggestion of the ALJ having “an agenda” implies a bias or prejudice 

against the claimant. However, “[w]e presume that judicial and quasijudicial 

officers, including ALJs, carry out their duties fairly and impartially. [Plaintiff] 

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has the burden of persuading us otherwise, which she can do only with convincing 

evidence that a risk of actual bias or prejudgment is present.” Bailey v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec., 413 F. App'x 853, 856 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted) (emphasis added). “[A]ny alleged prejudice on the part of the 

decisionmaker must be evident from the record and cannot be based on speculation 

or inference.” Collier v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 108 F. App'x 358, 364 (6th Cir. 

2004) (citation and quotation omitted). Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s 

treatment of Dr. Young’s opinion(s) was “unfair and contradictory,” (see DE 13-1 

at 4, 5), does not constitute “convincing evidence” of an “agenda.” Therefore, 

remand on the basis that the ALJ had an agenda, bias or prejudice is not warranted. 

In sum, as illustrated above, the ALJ properly addressed Dr. Young’s source 

statement, despite the alleged differential treatment at Step 3 and Step 4, and he 

offered good reasons for his decision denying benefits. “Through step four, the 

claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations 

caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her 

past relevant work . . . .” Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 

2003). Plaintiff has not done so here. 

2. The Court need not address Defendant’s argument that 

Plaintiff has not established that he meets Listing 12.04 

(Affective Disorders). 

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 Defendant argues that Plaintiff “fails to establish that he meets Listing 12.04 

(Affective Disorders).” (DE 14 at 10-15.) However, the Court should construe 

Plaintiff’s motion as solely challenging the ALJ’s assignment of weight to 

Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist’s opinion(s), as identified in his Statement of Issues 

and in the lone subheading in his Argument. (DE 13 at 2, 3-5.) Although Plaintiff 

does mention the ALJ’s Step 3 finding that “[t]he severity of the claimant’s mental 

impairment does not meet or medically equal the criteria of listing 12.04[,]” he 

does so only to illustrate the alleged different treatment given by the ALJ to Dr. 

Young’s source statement at Step 3 versus Step 4. (DE 13-1 at 4-5, R. at 22, 25-

26.) In other words, Plaintiff has not briefed a Step 3 statement of error. In re 

Squire, 617 F.3d 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2010) (“we do not address issues not briefed 

for us.”) (referencing Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 471 (6th Cir.2010)). 

G. Conclusion

 In sum, the Undersigned concludes that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s decision denying benefits. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the 

Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (DE 13), GRANT

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (DE 14), and AFFIRM the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s decision. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

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 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

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Dated: December 4, 2015 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on December 4, 2015, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

 Honorable Anthony P. Patti

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