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LEGACIES OF WAR:

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE IN LAOS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND 

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 22, 2010

Serial No. 111–117

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

VACANT 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Ambassador 

for ASEAN Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 11

Ms. Channapha Khamvongsa, Executive Director, Legacies of War .................. 28

Robert Keeley, Ph.D., Country Program Manager for Laos, The Humpty 

Dumpty Institute ................................................................................................. 40

Mr. Virgil Wiebe, Member of the Board, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) America .......................................................................................................................... 48

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and 

the Global Environment: Prepared statement ................................................... 5

The Honorable Mike Honda, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 10

The Honorable Scot Marciel: Prepared statement ................................................ 14

Ms. Channapha Khamvongsa: Prepared statement ............................................. 33

Robert Keeley, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 43

Mr. Virgil Wiebe: Prepared statement ................................................................... 51

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega: Material submitted for the record ...... 64

The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 88

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega: Additional material submitted for 

the record .............................................................................................................. 89

(1)

LEGACIES OF WAR: UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE 

IN LAOS 

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC

AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The hearing will come to order. This is the 

hearing on the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific 

and the Global Environment. Today’s particular hearing is on the 

subject of the legacies of war concerning unexploded ordnance in 

the country of Laos. 

Unfortunately my ranking member is also under the weather, 

Congressman Manzullo from Illinois. I am extremely happy that I 

have one of my colleagues who traveled with me to Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Japan recently, Congressman Mike Honda 

from California. 

I am going to begin with an opening statement, and then we will 

proceed from there. 

Ironically, 39 years ago to the day, in 1971, the late Senator Edward M. Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee 

on Investigative Problems, connected with Refugees and Escapees, 

held a hearing on April 21 and April 22 in 1971 to address warrelated civilian problems in Indochina, which includes Laos. 

Testifying before the subcommittee was the Honorable Paul 

McCloskey, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, who had just recently returned from a visit to Laos, where 

he and his colleague, Congressman Waldie, also of California, had 

obtained certain facts that totally contradicted testimony that had 

been submitted to the subcommittee by the Departments of State 

and Defense on May 7 of the previous year, which was 1970. 

At issue was the causation of refugees and impact of U.S. Air 

Force bombing operations in Laos. The Departments of Defense 

and State suggested that U.S. bombing operations had been carefully directed and that very few inhabited villages were susceptible 

to being hit by U.S. air power. 

But as Senator Kennedy learned that day, and as we now know, 

the Departments of State and Defense submitted testimony that 

was incorrect and misleading. The truth is, widespread bombing 

had taken place and Lao refugees were succinct in describing the 

2

destruction of their homes, as well as the use of the CBU cluster 

bombs and white phosphorus. 

How extensive were the U.S. bombing raids, was the question. 

According to the Congressional Research Service,

‘‘Laos has been characterized as the most heavily bombed 

country in history, on a per-capita basis. From 1964 through 

1973, the United States flew 580,000 bombing runs over Laos 

and dropped more than 2 million tons of ordnance on the countryside, double the amount dropped on Germany during World 

War II. Estimates of the number of unexploded submunitions 

from cluster bombs, range from 8 million to 80 million, with 

less than 1⁄2 of 1 percent destroyed, and less than 1 percent of 

contaminated lands cleared.’’

To be clear about what this means, I want to display a map of 

the U.S. Air Force bombing data that I obtained from our U.S. Embassy in Laos 2 years ago. This map tells it all. Looking at this 

map, can anyone honestly believe that there was no impact on the 

civilian population? 

What makes this so sickening is that cluster bombs and white 

phosphorus were used against a civilian population of a country 

against whom the United States was not at war. As Congressman 

McCloskey stated, ‘‘The bombing was done under the direction and 

control of the State Department, not the U.S. Air Force.’’

In fact, the bombing was directed and controlled by the U.S. Ambassador to Laos. ‘‘Both the extent of the bombing and its impact 

on the civilian population of Laos have been deliberately concealed 

by the State Department,’’ Congressman McCloskey stated. And for 

historical purposes, I am submitting the complete text of the 1971 

hearing record to be made a part of this record some 39 years later. 

Some 39 years later, in my humble opinion, it is shameful that 

the U.S. State Department has not taken a more active role in 

making things right for the people of Laos. But for the first time 

in 39 years, I am hopeful that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 

may be willing to champion their cause. 

However, I am deeply disturbed that the State Department is 

planning to request lower amounts of unexploded ordnance removal 

in Laos for Fiscal Year 2011 than it spent in 2010. In my humble 

opinion, this is a totally unacceptable course of action. 

During the Vietnam War, I served at the height of the Tet offensive. And for as long as I live, I will continue to do all I can to help 

the victims of Agent Orange as well as those who are and were affected by U.S. bombing operations in Laos. 

Calling for an official public hearing is one way to draw more attention to the matter, but Vietnam and Laos deserve more than a 

hearing. These countries deserve a concerted effort on the part of 

the United States Government to help them rebuild, especially 

since their civilian populations were wrongfully targeted. Yes, we 

know that the U.S. bombing campaign in Laos was designed to cut 

off North Vietnamese supply lines that ran through Laos; but, no, 

the American people were not aware that the United States had 

undertaken, ‘‘the most protracted bombing of civilian targets in history,’’ as Fred Branfman put it in his statement which was included in the 1971 hearing record. 

3

To this day, America does not support the bombing of civilian 

targets. And after every war, America has always helped countries 

rebuild. Even after Japan attacked the United States, U.S. assistance to Japan from 1946 to 1952 was about $15.2 billion in 2005, 

of which 77 percent was in grants, 23 percent was in loans, according to the Congressional Research Service. 

Also, according to the Congressional Research Service, from 2003 to 2006, the USA appropriated $35.7 billion for Iraq reconstruction. 

For Germany, ‘‘in constant 2005 dollars, the United States provided 

a total of $29.3 billion in assistance from 1946 to 1952, with 60 percent in economic grants and nearly 30 percent in economic loans, 

and the remainder in military aid.’’

What have we done for Laos as a government? For now, the United States has been contributing about $3 million per year 

since 1994 for unexploded ordnance clearance operations in that 

country. As every single one of us knows, this pittance is as disgraceful as the compensation we paid when the United States 

accidently bombed the Ban Long village in Laos in January 1968, 

which resulted in 54 persons killed. At the time, we compensated 

the village, or villagers, $55 for every person who had been killed. 

Senator Kennedy found that to be distressing. I do too. So 

enough is enough. Justice demands that these wrongs be set right; 

yet our own State Department is planning to request lower 

amounts for unexploded ordnance removal in Laos for Fiscal Year 

2011 than the meager amount barely spent in Fiscal Year 2010. 

This is unconscionable. Laos is one of the poorest countries in 

Southeast Asia and one of the smallest recipients of U.S. assistance. As a country founded on Judeo-Christian principles, we can 

and should do better. 

I visited Laos again last year, and I can tell you I will not rest 

until the U.S. Government begins to take action and accepts moral 

and financial responsibility for the mess we left behind. Children 

in Laos are counting on us. And I want to especially recognize 

those who are being cared for at the COPE Center, and applaud 

the work of nongovernment organizations from around the world 

who are making a difference. 

I thank our witnesses from Legacies of War, the Humpty Dumpty Institute, and the Mines Advisory Group for their leadership, 

and I assure them that they have the full support of this subcommittee as we work together to make this right. 

I also want to commend His Excellency Phiane Philakone, the 

Ambassador of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, for the service he has rendered on behalf of his country. It is because of him 

that I was able to gain a firsthand understanding of how catastrophic U.S. Air Force bombing operations really were and are. To 

this very day, Thursday, April 22, 2010, these deadly unexploded 

ordnance continue to claim the lives of a people who are not and 

never were at war with us. And unless we rectify this now, the loss 

of life will go on and on tomorrow, the next day, and every day 

thereafter. 

As a matter of record, I am including a statement prepared by 

Minister Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission Mai Sayavongs of 

the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to the United States. I recognize the historic nature of this statement, and I pledge to do all I 

4

can to provide assistance for the unexploded ordnance clearance 

issue, mine awareness and victims assistance programs, which is 

an investment in the future of the lives of millions for the people 

of Laos. 

Joining us today is the Honorable Scot Marciel, my dear friend 

and Deputy Assistant Secretary and Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the State 

Department. Hopefully, my good friend, Ambassador and Secretary 

Marciel, can explain to us why the Bureau is not increasing the 

money that is so clearly needed to clear up unexploded ordnance. 

Scot Marciel has served in posts in Vietnam, the Philippines, 

Hong Kong, Brazil, Turkey, as well as with the Economic Bureau 

with the Office of Monetary Affairs. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary, he has done an excellent and remarkable job, and I sincerely hope that we will continue to work together on this issue 

and find resolution not only for the people of Laos, but for our Government. 

Secretary Marciel is a graduate of the University of CaliforniaDavis and also from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He 

is the father of two daughters, and I am very, very happy that we 

have the opportunity of having him testify this afternoon. 

As I said earlier, I am very, very happy to have my good friend 

and colleague here, the gentleman from California, Congressman 

Mike Honda, who serves on the Committee on Appropriations, and 

who I would like at this time to give an opportunity for an opening 

statement if he has one. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

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Mr. HONDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank Secretary 

Marciel for being here. 

I don’t have too much to add to what Congressman 

Faleomavaega had shared, except to add my sentiments, one of 

shock, one of dismay and one of a sense we are not doing enough 

and we are not doing quickly enough. If we expect to be helpful in 

that country in terms of food security and its development, then we 

have to address first the issue of unexploded ordnance. 

The fact that we allow ourselves to go daily, knowing full well 

what is out there and knowing full well that children are playing 

in those areas and knowing full well that there are families who 

want to convert a lot of this land into productive land for food, and 

still be exposed to these types of unexploded ordnance, is beyond 

belief. 

We don’t send anybody in this country to any worksite that is 

dangerous, and yet we know things are existing in other places 

where we are responsible, and it doesn’t seem that the level of urgency is met with the same amount of effort in terms of providing 

the right resources to address it. So I will be very interested in 

hearing a report. 

I just have to say one more thing. It appears that we are seeing 

that we are spending X amount of dollars per year, as if it were 

adequate, as if it were a favor. I am hoping that is a misreading 

of the print and not actually the sentiment or attitude that we 

have. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for putting this hearing together. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Honda follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman from California for 

his comments and statement. I am just trying to figure it out. I am 

no expert on Air Force strategic military strategies and all of this, 

but I suspect that all of these red dots or all the—I think we had 

them on the screen there. Can we have that on the screen again? 

Could we have our red dots again? 

I don’t know what direction the bombing raids come from. I suspect either from China, or also from Guam, and you are talking 

about B–52s. And if you ever see how they go out there, and what 

happens if they bomb the north, going up to near Hanoi, then 

whatever amount of ordnance that is left, rather than bringing 

them back to the station, they just drop them off in Laos. That is 

exactly what they did. 

And if they were going up north, fine. And if they find that they 

still had ordnance left and they were on their way down, they were 

on their way south, that is what happens. 

If you look at the southern portion of where all those red dots 

are—they are literally obliterated with bombing operations. I cannot fathom or even to believe or suggest; and I am not one to be 

pointing fingers here, but 39 years later we find out that these people were devastated, literally, by the bombing operations that we 

conducted. 

They never attacked us, they never declared war against the 

United States, but we did exactly what we felt like doing, and we 

did. The same thing also happened to Cambodia. 

I know that Secretary Marciel is an excellent student of history, 

and maybe he could give me a better insight of what took place 

during the Nixon administration. It is known as Nixon’s secret war, 

and the American people were never aware of it until years later. 

But I would like to take this time now to give Secretary Marciel 

a chance for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR FOR ASEAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Honda, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting 

me to testify today on the subject of unexploded ordnance in Laos. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you also for your leadership on this 

issue, which, as you stated, has not received enough attention. 

If I could, I do have a slightly longer written statement I would 

like to submit for the record and then do a brief oral statement, 

if that is okay with you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Without objection, your statement will be 

made part of the record. 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Thank you. As Secretary Clinton observed 

last year, the United States is back in Southeast Asia. And our efforts to build the United States’ relationship with Laos should be 

seen in the context of our efforts to deepen our engagement in the 

region. We are making important progress in the relationship with 

Laos, exchanging Defense attaches, upgrading our bilateral dialogue, and working together on a broader range of issues. 

12

Our foreign assistance program in Laos is modest, but it has 

grown in both size and scope. Our efforts in terms of assistance are 

aimed at supporting economic reform and good governance, building a vibrant civil society, and improving health for the people of 

Laos. 

One of the most important elements of our programmatic engagement is in supporting the removal of unexploded ordnance, or 

UXO. As you stated, Mr. Chairman, during the Vietnam War, over 

2.5 million tons of U.S. munitions were dropped on Laos. This is 

more than was dropped on Germany and Japan combined in World 

War II. Up to 30 percent of the bombs dropped over Laos failed to 

detonate. 

The U.S.-origin aerial weaponry accounts for a large proportion 

of the unexploded ordnance that is still a significant threat to public safety in Laos. The explosive remnants of war continue to impede development and cause hundreds of casualties a year. 

While Laos also has a land mine problem, unexploded ordnance 

is a much greater threat to the population, especially because of 

the value of UXO scrap metal, the pursuit of which brings people 

into direct contact with the weapons. Population growth in rural 

areas and other socioeconomic trends are increasing demand to put 

UXO-contaminated land into production, a development that also 

increases human contact with all these dangerous remnants of the 

war. 

With U.S. and international support, the Laos Government is 

creating a much-needed comprehensive national database to consolidate different data sets and accurate and up-to-date information 

on the scope of the contamination. Current statistics on contamination, clearance, and casualties are not always reliable, but efforts 

to refine the data are revealing the continued seriousness of the 

problem. 

The effects of the contamination are pervasive. The U.N. Development Program has reported that, ‘‘UXO/mine action is the absolute precondition for the socioeconomic development of Lao PDR’’ 

and because of UXO, ‘‘economic opportunities in tourism, hydroelectric power, mining, forestry and many other areas of activity, 

considered the main engines of growth for the Lao PDR, are restrictive, complicated, and made more expensive.’’ At the level of 

individual victims, of course, the consequences of death or maiming 

are catastrophic for entire families. 

Despite the grim scope of the problem, it would be a mistake to 

be pessimistic about our ability to help resolve it. Our goal is not 

to remove the last bit of UXO from Laos, anymore than Western 

Europe has removed any of its explosive remnants from World War 

II, and even World War I. Instead, our goal is to help Laos become 

as impact-free of its explosive contamination as possible, and the 

country has made major strides in that direction. 

For example, international support to the solid Lao effort 

amounted to about $15 million this year, resulting in the clearance 

of hundreds of thousands of explosive items from about 70 square 

kilometers of high-priority land. If international support continues 

at that same level for a decade, the results will be dramatic: Vastly 

reduced casualty levels and the clearance of virtually all of the 

country’s highest-priority land areas. 

13

To address this problem, the Department of State supports a variety of humanitarian demining and unexploded ordnance clearance 

projects with funding from the NADR appropriation account. One 

of the top goals of that program is to clear all high-priority areas, 

specifically agricultural land, health and education facilities. Another is to develop indigenous mine and UXO abatement capacity. 

Although the bulk of U.S. NADR funds goes to UXO Lao, the 

Government of Laos’ quasi-independent government agency 

charged with conducting clearance operations, we also fund NGOs 

that conduct independent clearance operations and run schoolbased campaigns to educate children about the dangers of tampering with UXO. We view our programs in Laos as successful 

overall and one in which the national authorities have established 

a credible and effective UXO action system. 

The United States is the single largest donor to the UXO sector 

in Laos. From 1993 to 2009, U.S. assistance has totaled more than 

$25 million. In Fiscal Year 2009, our total assistance for Laos UXO 

projects was $3.7 million and in Fiscal Year 2010 we will provide 

$5 million in UXO funding for Laos. 

In addition to this direct funding for UXO programs, the Department of Defense has provided technical and research assistance to 

aid in the clearance of unexploded ordnance. At the end of 2009, 

the Department of Defense provided UXO Lao with a searchable 

database known as the Combat Air Activities Southeast Asia Database, which is the most comprehensive collection of strike information from the Vietnam War. This information is critically important 

to the UXO sector for identifying contaminated areas and for planning and prioritizing clearance efforts. 

Individual victims, who have been injured by UXO, also require 

both our compassion and our support. The U.S. Agency for International Development provides critical disabilities assistance to 

help those whose lives have been irrevocably altered by the explosive remnants of war through the Leahy War Victims Fund. To 

date, USAID has provided more than $8 million in support for programs for survivors. 

We are now considering a program that would assist in the establishment of a UXO demining capacity in the Lao People’s Army. 

The project would be phased in, and the initial activities would be 

to train two Lao People’s Army UXO demining sections and fund 

initial operations in two provinces. The project would eventually include more advanced training, as well as expanding the number of 

Laos People’s Army UXO demining sections to five. 

This capacity building may eventually lead Laos to be able to 

contribute—not only in Laos but to international peacekeeping efforts in UXO clearing and demining operations. 

The United States has worked closely with Laos on the issue of 

unexploded ordnance since 1993. Our aim has been to strengthen 

the clearance and capacity development of UXO institutions in 

Laos, along with providing victims assistance and risk-education 

programs in public schools. 

Through these joint efforts, we hope to improve the ability of Lao 

authorities to protect the environment and promote public health 

for future generations. As we continue forward, we will work hard 

14

to ensure U.S. Government assistance helps builds a safer society 

for the Laos people. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today, and I know from your opening remarks that 

you have some questions. I will do my best to try to answer them. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Marciel follows:]


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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I am just curious, as you mentioned, that we didn’t begin our assistance program in dealing with Laos until 1993. What happened 

between the span of 1960s and the 1970s and the 1980s, because 

that is when when we continued the bombing, I guess. 

Would you care to comment on that? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, you gave me probably too 

much credit earlier for being an expert historian, and I am not sure 

I am in all of this period. 

Certainly from 1975 and the end of the war, until I began working on Laos in 1990, relations were minimal; very limited until the 

late 1980s, and there was minimal interaction between our governments until the late eighties, really. But I would have to go back 

and get you a more authoritative answer as to when this was first 

looked at and discussed between our two governments. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Could you? I would appreciate that because 

there seems to be a void here. 

Ambassador MARCIEL. I would be happy to do that, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

Unlike Vietnam and Cambodia, diplomatic relations with the United States never 

were broken after the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party assumed control in 1975. 

However diplomatic representation in Vientiane and Washington was reduced to the 

level of charge d’affaires, and the United States Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency were forced to withdraw. Following 

the war, the Lao government was not receptive to the formerly large United States 

assistance program, which had supported the previous government. Western aid 

was replaced by assistance from Soviet bloc countries during the 1970s and 1980s. 

Beginning in the late 1980s, the United States and Laos began to cooperate on 

accounting for persons classified as prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) 

and on counternarcotic issues. Diplomatic relations were restored reciprocally to the 

ambassadorial level in the summer of 1992. That same year, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development made a $1.3 million grant for a prosthetics project in 

Laos.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA Between our bombing raids and operations 

and then, all of a sudden, oh, yeah, we started our assistance program since 1993. And I am curious; the bombing went on in the 

1960s and 1970s, and I was wondering why the lapse. Is there anything that we did that caused this problem or we may have just 

simply forgotten about this? You had mentioned other international 

organizations that are helping, addressing the problem. 

As I understand these unexploded ordnance, do we have a record 

in terms of how many women, children, or even men, for that matter, die every year as a result of unexploded ordnance? Is there a 

record from the Lao people or the Lao Government? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, the information I have is 

that we think there are approximately 300 casualties from UXO in 

Laos every year. I am not sure that I have a number for deaths 

per year, but we will seek to get that as well as confirm the source 

of that information. 

[The information referred to follows:]

21

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

In 2009 the National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao 

PDR (the ‘‘NRA’’) published the National Survey of UXO Victims and Accidents. 

That report states that in recent years approximately 35 percent of UXO accident 

victims are killed, while approximately 65 percent are injured but survive. Using 

the same report’s figure of approximately 300 victims per year would mean that as 

a result of UXO/mine accidents, roughly 100 persons die each year and another 200 

are injured.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That was the figure that was given to me 

also. It was approximately 300 people die every year as a result of 

unexploded ordnance. 

I know that this is also a very controversial issue when you talk 

about cluster bombs, and the nature of these cluster bombs is that 

it is like a canister, and when it opens up you have a little—they 

call them ‘‘bombies.’’ It may end up with 30 or 50 at a time. And 

so it doesn’t necessarily explode, but you could have these 30 to 50 

bombies that explode in a wide range, catching everything and anything in its path. It is like a grenade, but smaller in scale. But this 

one is a big one. This one is a big one. 

Have you had a chance to review the proposed budget for how 

much—that maybe we could afford a little more than $3 million a 

year in helping out with the unexploded ordnance? To me, I am 

sure our Government can do a lot better than this. We have got 

a $58 billion proposed budget in the State Department this coming 

year. 

I didn’t mean to put you on the spot, Mr. Secretary, but I think 

the bottom line here is that without the financial arm of people 

that could be given the opportunity to address these issues, that we 

are going to continue doing this for the next 100 years at $3 million 

a pop. 

It is a tremendous injustice, in my humble opinion. I am just 

wondering if our good people there in the State Department have 

had a chance to reevaluate. In fact, it is being proposed that we 

even decrease the funding, less than $3 million. Whose bright idea 

was that? I talked to our Ambassador there in Laos. He wasn’t 

very forthcoming and it was always like, well, we don’t have 

enough information. I would kind of like to think that we are a lot 

better than that in addressing the issue. I have a couple more 

questions. 

Mr. Honda. 

Mr. HONDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In our arsenal of technologies, do we have the ability to be able to detect metal from the 

air and metal or explosive kinds of chemicals that are on the 

ground by sweeping over the terrain? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Mr. Congressman, I am afraid I don’t 

know the answer to that. I am not aware that we do, but I will 

certainly check and see if that is something—certainly if we had 

that technology it would be very useful for something like this. But 

I don’t want to hazard a guess because I am probably the most 

technologically illiterate person in the room. 

[The information referred to follows:]

22

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ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE MIKE HONDA

No existing technology can reliably detect mines or UXO from the air.

Mr. HONDA. I must be, too. So I would appreciate it if somewhere 

along the line we could get some information on that. I saw your 

head nodding ‘‘no,’’ but it seems to me we have all kinds of technology from satellites that we could pinpoint individuals in terms 

of body heat. It seems to me that with some work on programming, 

we would be able to detect metal objects on the ground. 

The other question is, Do we know how much money we spend 

on food security to help Laos to sustain a level of—I guess, a source 

of food for their own country? Do we know how much we spend on 

that? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Thank you, Congressman. In response to 

the first question about the technology, I am told we do not have 

the technology from the air to do this. But if I could, I will take 

this question back and get you a definitive answer, the one on the 

technology. 

In terms of economic and food security, I am just looking at the 

numbers here, we have been spending about $1 million a year on 

global health and child survival. That is , frankly, more health 

than it is food security. And then about—just several hundred 

thousand dollars on promoting economic growth; that is, again, less 

directed to food security and more on promoting, helping Laos get 

into WTO, the idea being that this will contribute to overall economic development. 

I don’t believe there is a specific budget for food security, but I 

will double-check and get back to you with that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE MIKE HONDA

The State Department does not provide food security assistance through the Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative. Since 2007, USDA has awarded three 

McGovern-Dole Food for Education Programs in Laos. The McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program helps promote education, 

child development, and food security for some of the world’s poorest children. It provides for donations of U.S. agricultural products, as well as financial and technical 

assistance, for school feeding and maternal and child nutrition projects in low-income countries. 

In FY 2008 the World Food Programme (WFP) was awarded 540 metric tons (MT) 

of canned salmon, 1,250 MT of corn-soy blend, 4,890 MT of milled rice, and 330 MT 

of vegetable oil to implement a three year school feeding program in Laos. The total 

value of this program is approximately $10.3 million. Additionally, in FY 2008, a 

private voluntary organization (PVO) was awarded 170 MT of black turtle beans, 

20 MT of canned salmon, 190 MT of corn-soy blend, 250 MT of milled rice, and 20 

MT of vegetable oil to provide direct feeding and take-home rations to targeted 

beneficiaries. This two-year program was valued at approximately $3.8 million. In 

FY 2010 the PVO was awarded an additional $4.2 million to continue and expand 

its school feeding program. Donated commodities under FY 2010 funding will include 300 MT of beans, 40 MT of canned salmon, 140 MT of corn-soy blend, 460 

MT of milled rice and 30 MT of vegetable oil.

Mr. HONDA. The petition given to the WTO, I would be curious, 

which arena does the country see themselves pursuing in terms of 

being involved and active in WTO? Perhaps somewhere along the 

line that question can be answered. 

23

The reason I ask is because if we have that kind of a scattering 

of unexploded arsenals throughout that country, how is it that they 

are going to be able to become active in the world economy? I understand that we spent approximately $2 million a day dropping 

the bombs in Lao; that is, the value of the dollar at that time. In 

today’s dollars it is about $17 million a day. And yet we are still 

talking about single digit. I know that Congresswoman McCollum in 2004 secured $2.5 million for Laos for cluster munition removal. In 2007, 2008 and 2009, 

the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement allocated less than 

$2 million for Laos. And then this year, Tim Reiser was able to request $5 million for Laos, yet only $1.9 million was spent. I put in a request last year for $5 million, I think; and then this year, this coming budget, to put in $7 million to be added with the 

other countries’ efforts. And I understand that we have to get to 

about $24 million for the next 10 years to have some sort of adequate program of removal. 

I don’t know what that means, because we don’t talk about the 

rate at which we want to remove these unexploded ordnance. 

It is curious that we are looking at the military to remove these 

unexploded ordnance, and perhaps the assumption is that they are 

better equipped to do this. 

I wonder whether this is not an opportunity, if we want to create 

an economic development activity, that people will be engaged and 

taught how to use up-to-date technology to remove, detect and remove these unexploded ordnance and then also be able to enjoy the 

sale of those unexploded ordnance, either the metal—I understand 

there are some activities, economic activities around that. It seems 

to me that should be something that should be specifically done for 

the folks there, and it appears that there is plenty of work there. 

But the issue is training and having the state-of-the-art equipment. And if food security is the issue, then we should be on a very 

fast track in training, removal, and then the sale of the metals, 

that all go back to the coffers of the people in Lao. I don’t know 

whether you have a comment to that. 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. A couple of 

comments, if I could. In terms of the numbers, we have a breakdown of the amount that we have spent from State Department 

money on UXO removal since 1997. I won’t read the whole list, but 

I am happy to submit it.

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

NADR bilateral lines for Laos are as follows: 

FY97 = $1M 

FY98 = $1.7M 

FY99 = $1.8M 

FY00 = $1.486M 

FY01 = $993K 

FY02 = $1.323M 

FY03 = $1.2M 

FY04 = $1.412M 

FY05 = $2.5M 

FY06 = $3.3M 

FY07 = $2.55M 

FY08 = $2.953M 

FY09 = $3.7m (1.9m bilateral and an additional $1.8m Global NADR funds) 

FY10 = $5M

24

Ambassador MARCIEL. But just for the last few years, Fiscal Year 2008 was just under $3 million; Fiscal Year 2009, $3.7 million. In 

that case we had $1.9 million that was actually a line item in the 

budget request, but an additional $1.8 million was pulled out of the 

global NADR fund, if you will, for this and spent in Laos. And then 

for Fiscal Year 2010, I have to say with a lot of help from people 

up here, $5 million being spent. 

In terms of the second question about the military doing it 

versus civilians, it has been a civilian organization, the Lao UXO, 

quasi-governmental, as I mentioned, that has been doing the bulk 

of the work on this under the guidance of the Lao National Regulatory Authority. And we have been funding them, and I have gone 

there and met with them on a couple of occasions. 

What we are talking about with the military is to supplement 

that; not to suggest that the military should take over, but we 

think the military might be able to play a helpful role 

supplementing it, and so the Defense Department is looking at 

that. 

Mr. HONDA. If I may, to the chair, if we are looking at economic 

development, it seems to me that we should try to put that into the 

purview of the civilian sector rather than the military, and this is 

about creating technology and knowledge and skills among folks 

that we may be able to use in other parts of the world where these 

skills are needed. The comment about not completely eliminating 

or not completely eliminating the unexploded ordnance, this doesn’t 

sit well with me. I think that we did it; we clean it. Our parents 

taught us that. Our parents taught us to leave a place better than 

you found it. 

I think that should be incumbent upon us, even though in Western Europe they didn’t do it. Well, that is there, this is here, and 

this is more of an undeveloped country that is more agricultural. 

And to leave even one behind, where a child or a person may become maimed or killed because of that, is not acceptable. 

The fact that we talked about 2.5 million tons of ordnance that 

was dropped, 26–30 percent have not exploded, sort of speaks to 

the idea that we left behind on purpose this kind of a situation so 

that it creates some sort of a psychological edge for us in a land 

where we did not have those folks become our enemy combatants, 

but we were trying to nail down the Ho Chi Min Trail. 

And I guess I wonder whether the practice of dumping the rest 

of the arsenal after they do the bomb run, there is that space in 

the middle where it is hardly any red dots, and then there is a 

mass of red dots where we dumped the rest of our ordnance. 

Whether that was a practice that was accepted by the military, or 

whether it was a practice so that you go back empty-handed so you 

can load up again and incur further costs. I just don’t know what 

the rationale behind that is except that have it leaves it open to 

a lot of questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman for his questions. 

I always try to remind myself, Mr. Secretary, you condemn the 

act but not the person. So, please, just look at my questions as the 

situation rather than any personal aspersion against you, my dear 

friend. 

25

Question. It seems that members of the international community 

are more concerned about the unexploded ordnance than our own 

Government, as it is reflected by the fact they donate $15 million. 

I have met with some of those people, I think either from the European Commission and from the European community, and we are 

putting in a paltry $3 million; and yet we are the ones that caused 

the whole problem, we are the ones that caused the mess. It would 

have been nicer if we had suggested we were the ones putting in 

$15 million and the rest of the world committed and put in what 

they could; at least a lot better than in terms of how we have been 

able to do this. 

I just cannot perceive that the most powerful Nation in the world 

can only afford $3 million to rectify or to clear this problem that 

has been in existence now for over 40 years, not of their doing. I 

don’t know whether it is because we had displaced such a tremendous amount of arrogance on our part, thinking that we can beat 

anybody, we are the big kid on the block, and therefore that is all 

we can do. 

But when I met with the children and the people that have been 

affected by these unexploded ordnance, I know the position of our 

Government is currently that we will not support any international 

convention to get rid of cluster bombs altogether. Am I correct on 

that? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I believe we are probably one or two of the 

only countries in the world that is not a subscriber or signer to the 

international cluster bomb elimination or prohibition or whatever 

we call it. 

Ambassador MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, it is true that the United 

States is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, that 

is true. 

If I could just mention briefly a couple of other things, and also 

in response to Congressman Honda’s points, first, I mean, I take 

your points and will take them back to the State Department and 

to the Secretary of State, particularly about the issue of cleaning 

up all the ordnance as opposed to a part of it or a good part of it, 

as well as the amount of money that we are spending. 

As you know, you mentioned earlier our Ambassador in Laos, 

Mr. Chairman, and we are not supposed to talk about who suggested money and this sort of thing, but I can say with confidence 

that it is not our Ambassador in Laos who is suggesting we spend 

less. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It is the OMB. I know that. 

Ambassador MARCIEL. He is very committed on this issue. And 

another point. If I could just mention the question of was it purposeful in some way to leave behind these munitions. Again, I was 

not involved in the 1960s and early 1970s in this, so I can’t say 

with certainty, but I think the fact that about 30 percent of the 

munitions didn’t explode was not intentional as far as I understand. But in the end, for the people who are living in Laos—and 

I have been there and I have seen people, you know, using these 

bombies and so on, I mean, actually using the shells to build fences 

and build houses. So for them it doesn’t matter, to be honest, 

26

whether it is intentional. It is still a threat to them. And so I very 

much share in your view to do everything we can to address it. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I believe the Humpty Dumpty Institute has 

been one that has been very, very actively engaged on this whole 

issue of getting rid of unexploded ordnance. It seems that there is 

always a passing-the-buck going on between the Department of Defense and the State Department. If we want to get something, ‘‘Oh, 

no, check with the DoD.’’ And then we would get to DoD and they 

would say, ‘‘No, check with the State Department.’’

It gets to the point where playing this yo-yo game doesn’t seem 

to make it any better, I suppose. We have used between 8–80 million cluster bombs, and according to the records that I have, less 

than 1 percent of the contaminated lands have been cleared. Yet 

I would say that a tremendous amount of economic development in 

this country lies in agriculture development. 

Could you provide for the record, Mr. Secretary, what exactly is 

the status of the available agricultural land that has now been 

cleared as a result of this program of cleaning up the areas? I 

would appreciate it if we can provide that for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

The 2009 Landmine Monitor Report states that all operators in Laos in 2008 

cleared a total of over 54 square kilometers of land, most of which was for agriculture. This figure represents a 29 percent increase from 2007, and that increase 

is typical of what recent improvements in methodology have made possible. For example, UXO Lao (the largest clearance operator in the country) reports that from 

1996 through 2008 it has cleared 145 square kilometers, of which 27 were cleared 

in 2008 alone.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Secondly, I would like to know if we have 

any experts in the Department of Defense that know how to dismantle these bombies so that perhaps something could come out of 

the Department of Defense to be of help in this effort. 

With a $756 billion budget, I would hope that a couple million 

here or there should be sufficient—or even sending experts, demolition experts that know how to clear up these farmlands that are 

now contaminated simply because people are afraid to go there and 

to conduct any harvesting or any agricultural development because 

of the presence of these harmful munitions. What is your sense of 

the Department of Defense; they do not claim any responsibility for 

what has happened? 

Ambassador MARCIEL. We actually do work and coordinate with 

the Department of Defense on this. As you suggested, the idea—

they do have expertise, certainly. And as I mentioned earlier, there 

was the idea that we had been considering with the Department 

of Defense, of them providing training, capacity building, if you 

would, based on their own expertise. It is not a program that is in 

effect, but it is one that I know they were considering. 

As I mentioned, it would be to train folks in the Lao military. 

As you know, in a similar—well, somewhat different situation, 

there was a lot of training done for Cambodians that was in mine 

removal. It has been very helpful in Cambodia, but actually now 

the Cambodians are actually clearing mines in Africa in a major 

27

contribution under U.N. Auspices. So I think there is a potential 

here, certainly. 

I will get back to you. I will check and see what information we 

have about, you know, land that has been cleared. I have a little 

bit of information about the pieces of ordnance, apparently 

400,000—400,000 pieces of ordnance have been cleared over the 

last 3 years. That is the combined effort. It is hard to attribute just 

to the U.S. assistance because these programs have been combined. 

But needless to say, there is a lot more still to do and I will see 

if I can find any information on the land. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Will the State Department be objecting to 

anything that we may want to request through the appropriations 

process, that perhaps a little increase on the funding that is needed 

to be part of this munitions clearance program could be better than 

what we have done now? So rather than decreasing the amount, we 

ought to be increasing the request in some way or form. I know 

that you are not in a position to tell me whether or not you agree 

with my assessment but, Mr. Secretary, I have got the record here. 

And I just hate to see that when I am gone, another 39 years 

later the problem is still there. This is not the America that I know 

of. This is not the America that I know of, and its efforts to make 

or to correct the mistakes that we have made in the past. And I 

don’t think it requires billions of dollars to do this but rather a little humanitarian view—and I realize that some policymakers, I am 

sure here in Washington, look at these people as backward and 

therefore have an attitude of who cares? 

I remember when we were negotiating the issues dealing with 

the Micronesian countries. I believe it was Henry Kissinger who 

made a statement, ‘‘There is only 90,000 of them. Who gives a 

damn?’’ So that is the kind of attitude that I think that if he does 

it for these lowly Micronesians, I can imagine that that is the same 

attitude that prevails throughout major departments like the State 

Department and the DoD. 

But these people are human beings. They may live on the other 

side of the world, but they have the same wants and desires and 

hopes for a better life, and for their children to get a better education, as all of us here will do. 

I am not a pacifist, Mr. Secretary but, doggone it, I know our 

country can do a lot better than what we are doing now concerning 

this issue. 

And I will appreciate if you could give me the best and the highest person at DoD that I can talk to, I think our Assistant Secretary for International Security—what is the gentleman’s name? 

I am sure you know him; he is in the Department of Defense. I will 

definitely make contact with him concerning this issue. 

With that, Mr. Secretary, thank you so much. And I deeply appreciate your taking the time to come and be with us this afternoon. We will follow up on this. There are more questions that 

other members will submit to you in writing. Thank you, we appreciate it. 

We have our next panel. We have three more distinguished visitors here on our next panel: Channapha Khamvongsa, Dr. Robert 

Keeley, and Mr. Virgil Weibe. 

28

Channapha Khamvongsa is the executive director of Legacies of 

War. It is an organization that seeks to address problems of 

unexploded cluster bombs in Laos, provide space for healing the 

wounds of war, and to create greater hope for the future of peace. 

She was previously appointed to the Seattle Women’s Commission 

and served on the boards of the Refugee Women’s Alliance Conference in Asia Pacific American Leadership; currently interim 

board chair of the Mines Advisory Group, USA. Ms. Channapha’s 

father is from Luang Prabang and her mother is from Thakhek, 

both from Laos. She was born in Vientiane, came to the United 

States at the youthful age of 7; studied at George Mason University 

and also at Oxford. She received her master’s in public policy from 

Georgetown University. 

Doctor Keeley is a former British armed bomb disposal officer 

who has been working in humanitarian mine actions since 1991. 

His work has taken him to several countries, including Kuwait, 

Bosnia, Croatia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Colombia. He was the first humanitarian deminer 

to be sent to the former Yugoslavia to help transition from the U.N. 

Peacekeeping mission, and was the head of the U.N. Mine Action 

Center in Croatia until 1997. Dr. Keeley conducted research and 

completed his doctorate from the Imperial College in London. His 

thesis was the economics of land mine clearance. His thesis has 

now been published in a book form and I hope to get one copy from 

Dr. Keeley soon. He is very, very actively engaged in the issues of 

land mines as well as unexploded ordnance. 

Professor Virgil Weibe is from from Saint Thomas and received 

his doctorate from the New York University School of Law, LLM 

from Georgetown, Latin American studies. He has a master’s in 

philosophy from Oxford, and a bachelor’s from Kansas State University. Professor Weibe after law school clerked for Judge James 

Francis, a Federal magistrate judge in the Southern District of 

New York in 1999, when he joined the Center for Applied Legal 

Studies at Georgetown Law Center as an advocacy Fellow. He has 

been an active participant in the efforts to curb the use of land 

mines and cluster bombs in armed conflicts. 

Gentlemen and lady, thank you so much for being here. With 

unanimous consent, your statements will be made part of the 

record. 

I would like to begin by letting Channapha begin. We will go 

along in that sequence. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CHANNAPHA KHAMVONGSA, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, LEGACIES OF WAR 

Ms. KHAMVONGSA. I will be making a shorter statement, but I 

have a written statement we would like to submit for the record. 

So good afternoon, Chairman Faleomavaega, Congressman Honda, 

ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I would like to give my sincere 

thanks to Chairman Faleomavaega, the subcommittee, and its wonderful staff for organizing the historic hearing entitled, ‘‘Legacies of 

War: Unexploded Ordnance in Laos.’’

From what I understand, this is the first hearing on the scourge 

of unexploded ordnance, or UXO, in Laos, a legacy of the U.S. 

bombing of Laos during the Vietnam War. Tragically, more than 

29

four decades after the end of the bombing, more than 300 Lao people, one-third of them children, continue to be killed or injured by 

UXO every year. Just this February, on February 22, eight children 

from Champassak Province came upon a cluster bomb similar to 

this one. They were in the rice paddies near their home. Like many 

bombs, these deadly weapons resembled a toy, and the children 

tossed it around in play. The bomb exploded. Two children survived. One was severely injured and five were killed. Beyond this 

terrible human toll, UXO continues to hamper economic development in one of the poorest countries in the world. 

Today is also significant, as mentioned earlier, because 39 years 

ago this week, the Senate held a historic hearing on the status of 

refugees in Laos. This hearing, chaired by Senator Ted Kennedy on 

April 21 and 22 of 1971, helped to expose the secret bombing of 

Laos. The bombing had begun in 1964, and had displaced hundreds 

of thousands of civilians within Laos, but had never been disclosed 

to Congress or the American public. 

The bombing finally ended in 1973. This was the same year I 

was born in Vientiane, the capital of Laos. When I was 6 years old, 

my family left Laos due to the country’s political instability. We 

spent 1 year in a Thai refugee camp and eventually resettled here 

in Virginia. Many of the 400,000 Lao refugees who now reside in 

the United States have similar stories. We were fortunate to resettle in America, but were sad to leave behind family members and 

friends who we feared we might never see again. 

Much has changed since then. Over the past 10 years, improved 

relations between the Lao and U.S. Governments have allowed me 

to travel back to Laos numerous times. Like thousands of other 

tourists who visit Laos every year, I feel a deep affection for the 

people, culture, and land that I barely remember from my childhood. Reconnecting with my Lao heritage included discovering the 

dark history and lingering effects of the secret war in Laos. 

This discovery led me to establish Legacies of War, where I currently serve as executive director. Legacies is the only U.S.-based 

organization dedicated to raising awareness about the current devastation that has resulted from the Vietnam War-era bombing in 

Laos. Our mission is to advocate for the clearance of unexploded 

bombs and provide space for healing the wounds of war. 

Since our founding in 2004, we have worked with Lao Americans, 

bombing survivors, veterans, artists, nongovernmental organizations, and others, to establish a credible voice for reconciliation and 

justice. As we know, Laos is the most bombed country per capita 

in history. U.S. bombings left Laos contaminated with vast quantities of unexploded ordnance. At least 20,000 people have been 

killed or injured by UXO in Laos since the bombings ceased. 

I would like to share with you some other disturbing facts about 

the U.S. bombing of Laos and its tragic aftermath; 260,000 million 

cluster bombs were dropped in Laos during the Vietnam War. An 

estimated 75 million cluster bombs did not detonate, scattering 

throughout Lao villages, rice fields, school yards, pasture lands, 

and forest. During the bombing, the equivalent of a planeload of 

bombs was dropped every 8 minutes, 24 hours a day, for 9 years. 

About one-third—at least one-third of the land in Laos is littered 

with UXO. 

30

So for more than 20 years after the war ended, Lao villagers 

struggled to survive among vast quantities of unexploded ordnance 

without any organized technical assistance or clearance program. 

The relationship between Laos and the United States was strained, 

and there were no humanitarian demining programs operational in 

the Lao NGO sector. 

In the 15 years since the demining program began in 1994 with 

the help of the Mennonite Central Committee and the Mines Advisory Group, it has grown, employing Lao nationals in nine provinces. Undoubtedly, thousands of lives have been saved and injuries avoided as a result of this work. Yet fewer than 0.5 million of 

the estimated 75 million unexploded bomblets have been destroyed. 

As you mentioned, Chairman, less than 1 percent of the contaminated land has been cleared. 

Initially I was surprised by the small percentage of land that has 

been cleared. Then, during a trip to Laos in 2008 as part of a Legacies of War delegation, I observed a clearance team working in the 

field. I witnessed the slow, dangerous, tedious process of surveying, 

detecting, and detonating UXO. I was humbled by the men and 

women we met during our trip who risk their lives daily to make 

the land safe for others. 

Formal UXO clearance in Laos is now coordinated by the Lao 

Government’s National Regulatory Authority, or NRA, with several 

dozen partner organizations and international donors that support 

the UXO clearance, victim assistance, and mine-risk education. The 

UXO clearance sector has built up a well-trained and experienced 

workforce. Through new, more effective equipment and careful 

planning, clearance teams have dramatically improved their efficiency. 

An official of the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal 

and Abatement has called the National Regulatory Authority UXO 

program in Laos, ‘‘one of the best programs in the world. The gold 

standard.’’

The NRA’s newly completed strategic plan over the next 10 years 

offers clear, achievable goals, including the reduction of UXO casualties from the current 300 to less than 75 per year, and ensuring 

that the medical and rehabilitation needs of all UXO survivors are 

met in line with obligations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an international agreement signed by 106 countries to ban 

the production, transfer, and sale of cluster munitions and to destroy current stockpiles. 

So what is the funding required? According to the NRA, during 

each of the past 3 years, a total of $12–14 million was spent for 

clearance goals. Funding for clearance comes from international donors, including the U.S., but the NRA estimates that the UXO sector will need at least double the amount per year to meet its 10-

year goals. 

The problem for UXO clearance in Laos is the absence of a longterm funding commitment that matches the scale of the problem. 

In order to buy equipment and train and maintain adequate staffing, clearance organizations working in the field must have assurances of a continued, reliable stream of funding. Therefore, we recommend a U.S. commitment of $7 million to support UXO clearance in Laos in Fiscal Year 2011, a measured increase from this 

31

year’s allocation of $5 million. Thereafter, we recommend an annual U.S. commitment of $10 million over the next 10 years. This 

would strengthen and secure the UXO sector’s capacity and bring 

its already effective programs to scale. This 10-year, $100 million 

commitment to UXO removal in Laos would total less than what 

the United States spent in 1 week bombing Laos. 

I have focused primarily on UXO clearance in the statement, but 

I also want to address the related need for victim assistance. Close 

to 40 percent of UXO accidents result in death, leaving many families without the primary breadwinner or caregiver. For the 60 percent who survive, their lives will never be the same. Almost 14,000 

injuries have resulted in the loss of one limb, while close to 3,000 

victims have lost two limbs. There is a serious need for better 

emergency health care after accidents occur, as well as longer-term 

needs for prosthetics, physical rehabilitation, and vocational retraining. According to the NRA, only $2.5 million a year currently goes toward victim assistance needs in Laos. Agency staff estimates that 

at least $5 million a year will be required to adequately help victims and their families. 

So what is the current U.S. funding support? The United States has provided about $40–50 million in funding for UXO removal in 

Laos over the last 15 years. It averages about $2.7–3 million per 

year. Compare this to $7 million the United States spent each day 

for 9 years bombing Laos. In other words, the United States spent 

more in 3 days dropping bombs on Laos than it has spent in the 

last 15 years cleaning them up. In Fiscal Year 2010, Congress designated $5 million specifically 

for UXO clearance in Laos, the largest amount allocated in any 

given year to date. Unfortunately, despite a specific congressional 

mandate for $5 million for bomb removal in Laos this year and in 

subsequent years, the Department of State is only requesting $1.9 

million for next year. 

The funding levels for UXO clearance in Laos have been disproportionate to the magnitude of the problem. There seems to be 

little regard for the level of contamination in the country or the 

source of the UXO. One-third of worldwide cluster munitions casualties occur in Laos, yet the funding doesn’t reflect this stark reality. 

It has been nearly 40 years since the secret U.S. bombing campaign in Laos was finally revealed to Congress and the American 

public, yet all of these years later massive quantities of UXO remain a dangerous threat to the daily lives of the people in Laos. 

I would like to mention Mor. She is a 5-year-old girl from Thaijok 

Village in Xieng Khouang Province. Unlike hundreds of Lao children who have been killed or injured by cluster bombs each year, 

Mor is still alive and healthy. But she lives and plays among these 

deadly weapons every day. She has never known a bomb-free backyard. We must do what we can to protect children like Mor and 

clear the land so that when she walks to school or her family plows 

their fields, everyone returns home safely at the end of the day. We 

should want this for Mor and the generations that will follow her. 

The problem of UXO in Laos has been allowed to persist far too 

long. Too many innocent lives have been lost. But it is not too late 

32

to stop this senseless suffering. This is one of those rare problems, 

rare policy problems with a clear and effective solution. The United 

States has a responsibility to clean up the unexploded bombs it left 

behind in Laos and provide support for those harmed since the end 

of the war. It would require only a relatively modest increase in 

U.S. funding to dramatically improve clearance and victim assistance in Laos. 

Clearing cluster bombs and supporting those injured by them is 

an act of humanity and decency. It is the right thing to do. The 

State Department must make a sustained commitment to solving 

this problem. 

We recommend an allocation of at least $7 million next year, followed by a subsequent increase of $10 million per year over the 

next 10 years. Only with this kind of consistent support will the 

scourge of UXO in Laos finally come to an end. 

Thank you, Chairman Faleomavaega, Congressman Honda, for 

the opportunity to offer our statement today. We appreciate the attention that you have brought to this important issue. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Khamvongsa follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Keeley. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT KEELEY, PH.D., COUNTRY PROGRAM 

MANAGER FOR LAOS, THE HUMPTY DUMPTY INSTITUTE 

Mr. KEELEY. Thank you very much. Can I start by saying it is 

quite an honor to be called to testify. I am quite grateful for the 

opportunity. I would like to say as well that my testimony, which 

is in full, obviously, and I will summarize it—but Ms. 

Khamvongasa and I have never met before today, but actually 

what you will hear is that although we have worked on this from 

a completely different angle, some of our conclusions are remarkably similar, which seems to triangulate some of our findings. 

So as you mentioned, I studied life as a bomb disposal officer, so 

I have a technical perspective; but I am also an economist as well. 

So I am going to testify in both directions. There is one area, another perspective on this which you may consider helpful, which is 

when large unexploded aircraft bombs—they constitute a point 

hazard, but cluster munitions contaminate a whole area within 

their footprint. 

I did a lot of work with the people in Laos 2 years ago on this 

map. What we did was we removed all of the aircraft bombs from 

the map and we looked at the points that represent cluster munitions. Basically, there is about 0.5 million hectares covered by cluster munitions on that map which translate into 1,930 square miles. 

So that is a way of conceptualizing the problem slightly differently 

from the way we have been talking, because when we clear weapons, we tend to think in how many square meters we clear a day. 

So it is worth scoping the problem in terms of area. 

In the questions that you sent me, you asked me a question 

about the effects of these weapons on the economy. First of all, as 

has already been mentioned, most of the economy in Laos is based 

on agriculture production, and rice in particular. So it is possible 

to use the opportunity cost of the land that can’t be used as a 

measure of the impact. I will talk about that more later. 

Also, where there are infrastructure projects—road clearance, 

dams, hydroelectric power—the UXO clearance acts as a tax of 

about 30 or 40 cents per square meter. So any infrastructure 

project that is planned in Laos has to carry the cost of the UXO 

clearance as a line item, which obviously makes those projects 

more expensive. 

But in the private sector there is an unseen impact. I am not 

talking about the village level, but the small to medium enterprise 

level. These costs can act as a barrier to entry, particularly in 

projects such as forestry or agribusiness where the cost of investing 

in a project becomes significantly higher because of the cost of the 

UXO. Unfortunately, we can’t measure this because we don’t know 

how many people have chosen not to invest in projects because of 

the cost of the UXO clearance. 

For example, I was helping a Japanese agribusiness that had 

been looking at growing medicinal plants. And the startup cost was 

going to be significantly increased by the cost of the UXO clearance. I think they may have decided not to invest. At the village 

41

level, most of the poorest people, as we have heard, they can’t afford a choice. So they have to use this land as contaminated. 

It should also be emphasized from an economic point of view that 

some of these families are forced to make the otherwise incomprehensible choice of sending their children out deliberately to look for 

these bombs. These children are kept out of school. They are given 

a $15 homemade metal detector and they go and look for scrap 

metal. There is a very strong correlation between the casualty 

rates, the price of scrap metal, and the price of food. I think it is 

quite clear that we can see as people need more food, they take 

more risks and go and look for this stuff. In fact, that is one of the 

major causes of the casualties today. 

I would like to go now in the rest of my time to talk about answering the last question you gave us, which is about how much 

would it cost. As a bomb disposal officer and somebody committed 

to this subject, I would like to be clearing every last weapon there 

is in Laos, and that would take many years and cost billions of dollars. As an economist, I recognize we have scarce resources and we 

have to make some harsh choices. If we use the principle of costbenefit analysis and look at the land that is potentially of the most 

value and remove the areas which are otherwise unusable—mountainous areas, for example, in Laos—we actually get down to about 

78,000 hectares of the original 500,000, or 300 square miles. If we 

were able to use new techniques—and I will talk more about technology later—but if we were able to use new survey techniques, it 

is conceivable we could get the area down to 22,000 hectare, which 

would be 84 square miles. That is about 7.5 percent of the actual 

contamination, but it represents the most important land to be 

cleared. 

When we did the calculations on this 2 years ago, it basically worked out at about $138 million, so it is very close to the number 

that you have come up with. That is $138 million spent over 16 

years would be needed to clear the most impacted land. Now I 

know that sounds like a lot of money, but it is only 7.5 percent of 

the total contamination. I think we should remember, to put this 

into context, that the clearance of the Exxon Valdez cost $2 billion. 

So this is quite a small budget and it is quite justifiable by any criteria. 

So, to summarize, there is a sound economic argument for increasing the budget for the UXO clearance, making longer-term 

commitments. And I completely agree that one of the problems is 

that the sector out there is constantly living on a hand-to-mouth 

situation. They can’t budget properly. They don’t know where next 

year’s money is coming from. So whatever we do, it should be more 

long term and more measurable so the people can predict what 

they are going to have available next year. If we did that, we can 

actually measure the benefits to the economy as an investment. So 

this isn’t a cost; this is a benefit. We can consider this an investment in the Laos economy. 

I would like to say in support for the Office of Weapons Removal 

and Abatement, they already support a number of programs 

throughout the world. One of the things I am worried about is if 

we force them to just reallocate their existing budget from other 

countries to solve the Laos problem, we are simply robbing Peter 

42

to pay Paul. So this really would need to be new money, as opposed 

to taking money out of their existing pocket and spending it somewhere else. 

So I would just like to finish the answer to the question you 

asked about technology earlier. So I will put my bomb disposal hat 

back on. And I would like to speak on behalf of all the bomb disposal and land mine clearance organizations that can’t be here 

today. We have been promised a lot from technology over the last 

20 years or so since we have been doing this sort of work. It hasn’t 

really delivered very much. In fact, the problem in Laos is comparatively simple. We don’t need detectors from space. We really 

don’t. And I am worried if we started spending money on the research, people would take the money, but we wouldn’t actually get 

results. We can achieve the result in Laos with existing technology. 

There is room for improved techniques and improved efficiency. 

But it would be a false horizon, in my humble opinion, to start 

spending research dollars on this. We know what we need to do. 

We just need the budget. 

I know that the American Army and the Special Forces Training 

Team have already committed a lot of effort in the past to providing the training. In fact, the core training in Laos was done in 

1994, 1995, 1996 by the U.S. Army. So they have already contributed quite a lot. We probably don’t need them back for the civilian 

program. In fact, quite humbly, some of the Laos guys I have 

worked with, they could probably teach me a few things. I am not 

sure we need to give them much technical training anymore. It is 

simply about the budget. And that is what I would like to say. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keeley follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Dr. Keeley. 

Professor Weibe. 

STATEMENT OF MR. VIRGIL WIEBE, MEMBER OF THE BOARD, 

MINES ADVISORY GROUP (MAG) AMERICA 

Mr. WEIBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Honda. 

It is an honor to appear before you today, along with colleagues 

from Legacies of War and the Humpty Dumpty Institute, to discuss 

this important issue. The Mines Advisory Group, better known as 

MAG, is an international humanitarian organization that saves 

lives and builds futures by destroying weapons in conflict-affected 

countries. MAG is currently working in 35 countries across the 

globe helping communities to escape the poverty and devastation 

caused by conflict. I serve on the board of MAG’s U.S. partner, 

MAG America. 

In 1994, MAG established operations in Laos in cooperation with 

the Mennonite Central Committee and Laos National Committee. 

MAG thus became the first international NGO to begin clearing 

the country of its extensive UXO contamination. As we have heard 

from preceding testimony, Laos is one of the most heavily UXOcontaminated countries in the world. A thorough survey of the 

country has never been completed and much of the land along the 

eastern border is densely forested. The National Regulatory Authority in Laos is currently addressing this shortcoming by developing a national contamination database. And a clearer picture of 

the remaining amount of UXO will become available in the not-toodistant future. 

A point that is indisputable and most important to note is that 

serious levels of UXO contamination in Laos continue to have an 

extremely detrimental and damaging impact on the country’s people, its economy, and its future. Widespread contamination restricts economic growth by limiting the population’s ability to grow 

cash crops thereby forcing individuals and families into subsistence 

farming. Those efforts at subsistence farming are themselves hampered by the presence of UXO. 

Since the inception of MAG’s program in 1994, our approach has 

not focused solely on finding and destroying UXO and cluster munitions. Rather, MAG’s has seen its clearance activities as the first 

step in relieving the very problems I have just mentioned. Currently, MAG operates in Khammouan and Xiangkhoang provinces, 

two of the most contaminated provinces in the country, where our 

goal is to alleviate poverty through safe and effective UXO clearance. 

MAG achieves this by linking its activities and strategies to the 

Laos national growth and poverty eradication strategy. UXO clearance is one of the three poverty-related programs outlined in this 

national strategy, and MAG is committed to achieving the clearance targets and priorities set forth in the government’s plan. 

MAG also partners with and clears land in support of development agencies such as the World Food Program, World Vision, and 

the Laos Red Cross. By linking directly with development projects, 

MAG contributes to improved food security and provides access to 

basic services and infrastructure to some of the poorest, most 

marginalized communities in Laos. This integrated approach enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:07 Nov 10, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\APGE\042210\56094 HFA PsN: SHIRL
49

sures that our grassroots intervention makes an impact not only 

for our beneficiary communities, but also at the regional and national level. 

An impact assessment that MAG completed in 2009 has proven 

that MAG’s work results in much more than cleared land. Sixtythree percent of village groups interviewed in Khammouan and 83 

percent in Xiangkhoang reported increased yield and productivity 

following clearance conducted by MAG. Some households reported 

that they could now plow their land more deeply because they were 

confident they would not be injured as a result, again, increasing 

agriculture productivity. As a result of increased crop yield, approximately three out of four respondents said their household income had increased. 

In addition to eradicating poverty, MAG’s work was proven to 

improve people’s sense of security and self-respect by removing a 

sense of risk and hopelessness associated with UXO contamination. 

Ninety-seven percent of the people interviewed in Khammouan and 

94 percent in Xiangkhoang reported feeling a restored sense of 

pride and a greater feeling of safety and security for themselves 

and their families. 

MAG’s program in Laos currently employs 235 individuals; 229 

of which are national staff members. MAG also hires community 

members temporarily to cut vegetation in village-assisted clearance. For example, in the last quarter of 2009, nearly 1,000 community members were employed in such projects. By employing individuals from the local community, MAG builds a sustainable capacity and empowers them to play a key role in recovery from conflict. We recruit women and individuals who have been disabled for 

UXO accidents, as they are too often the most marginalized members of their community. 

MAG has been able to achieve these results thanks to support 

from its donors, including the U.S. Department of State’s U.S. Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, the U.K. Department for 

International Development, the European Union, OZ Aid for Australia, and World Vision. Ongoing support from the State Department has resulted in the destruction of over 30,000 items of UXO. 

In another project, over 2.6 million square meters of land was 

cleared for agricultural use, infrastructure development, access to 

water and schools, in a project funded by the Humpty Dumpty Institute and the U.S. Department of Agriculture in a space of a year, 

in 2008 and 2009. 

Unfortunately, as has been mentioned by my colleagues, the investment, or, perhaps more aptly put, the disinvestment made in 

contaminating Laos with UXO has far outweighed the investment 

made in cleaning it up. UXO clearance assets currently deployed 

by MAG and other operators are not adequate to tackle the extensive challenge presented by such widespread contamination. With 

limited resources, MAG focuses on the poorest, most threatened 

communities and clearing enough land to enable them to grow 

crops and have a sustainable food source year round. 

Additional support will enable MAG and other organizations to 

scale-up operations to address these urgent cases more quickly and 

then tackle other unmet demands, such as clearance of land for 

50

larger-scale farming, commerce and trade, thereby increasing the 

multiplier effect of clearance on poverty eradication. 

In closing, I would like to thank the U.S. Government, in particular, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, for its ongoing support to MAG’s Laos program. I would like to ask the U.S. 

Government to provide additional funding for UXO clearance in 

Laos. Without increased support, the men, women, and children 

will continued to be killed by the legacy of our secret war. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wiebe follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. All three of you have had an opportunity to 

listen to the testimony from our Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Marciel from the State Department. Would you say that there is 

consensus not necessarily where we have to reinvent the wheel or 

get more organizations involved; we have enough organizations; it 

is just the resources that they need to really get the thing moving. 

Would there be agreement in that assessment? In other words, we 

don’t have to go look for some more people to come in and help. 

We have the organizations, but they just need more resources like 

funding to increase their operations. Am I correct on this? 

Mr. KEELEY. Yes, more or less. It is certainly not about new 

training. I don’t really think it is about new technology, either. 

There is room for improvement in the planning and in the resource 

allocation processes in Laos, but the problem is, at the moment, 

management people spend most of their time running around looking for cash. It takes away their time they have got available to 

sit down and plan what they are going to do. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. In other words, I don’t need to be looking 

for 50 specialists from the Department of Defense to tell the Laotians how to demine these unexploded ordnance. Do you think we 

have the expertise now in place? Is it just a matter of getting more 

resources? 

Mr. KEELEY. I have been doing this type of work since 1981, sir, 

and the Lao people can teach me stuff about these bombs because 

they have been doing this since 1994. So there is a lot of expertise 

in country, both in the organizations that are there and amongst 

the Laos people. So it is not a technical question, and I don’t think 

we need much in the way of new technology either. It is really—

we have a phrase in England, ‘‘Let the dogs see the rabbit.’’ It is 

more about getting the money available. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Let the dogs see the rabbits. 

Mr. KEELEY. It is a sporting term from the greyhound track. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am just searching. Let’s say we come up 

with an increase in funding. We don’t need to depend on the Department of Defense for expertise to go down there and utilize the 

funds. That is what I am trying to get at. 

Ms. Khamvongsa. 

Ms. KHAMVONGSA. I would just like to add, I don’t feel like we 

got clear answers today about the reduction in the State Department funding amount. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. There are clear answers. It was very clear; 

the fact that they did reduce the funding. 

Ms. KHAMVONGSA. Right. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So there is no ambiguity about that. 

Ms. KHAMVONGSA. As to why that has happened. I think it still 

remains unclear to us, and baffling. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I will tell you why. Nobody pays any attention to the problems in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam. That is the bottom line. I hate to say this, but sometimes when we visit our 

friends in these countries, we are so taken by so many voices, interests coming from other countries in the world or regions in the 

world, that sometimes they are not on the train. 

I think Laos has been one of the classic examples, even though 

we have some 400,000 Laotians living here in America. I think this 

56

is something that maybe we need to have more active members of 

our Laotian American community. This is the only way that Washington is going to turn. I wish there was a better way, but that is 

the bottom line for members to get their attention to any problems 

affecting—whether it be Laotian Americans or Laos itself, that is 

the reality that we are faced with. 

I wish I could be kinder in saying that Laos is the very center 

of attention in our American foreign policy. I hate to say this, but 

we are not on the map yet. Why it has taken 39 years that all of 

a sudden a little subcommittee chairman thought this may be 

something we ought to look into; it is simply because this is unbelievable. But I am not surprised that things like this happen. Laos, 

Cambodia, Vietnam, just falls through the cracks. You can also talk 

about the Hmong people. We can talk about some of our Southeast 

Asian people who migrated to this country. Tremendous hardships. 

But we are not going to give up because of this. 

I wanted to raise another additional question about let’s say that 

we do get an increase in funding. I just want to get a sense from 

you. We currently have the current structure that can implement 

the program of clearing up the unexploded ordnance. Have we actually taken section by section of the country in terms of saying 

this is certified cleared? Go do the farming of whatever? Has there 

been any effort taken by the Laos Government to do this? 

Mr. KEELEY. Sir, with the help of the international community, 

the National Regulatory Authority has quite an impressive database, not only of the contamination, but increasingly they are mapping the records of the clearance work that has been done. Now 

there are some historical legacy work that was done precomputer, 

which they are having trouble now putting into that database. So 

work that is being done today is being recorded, and the perimeter 

is being measured and recorded and included in a database. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. This is something my staff will just have to 

follow up on to see where we are at right now. 

Mr. KEELEY. The Swiss Government has been supporting the 

management and creation of this. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I hate to keep saying that 1 percent of the 

contaminated lands have been cleared. I don’t want to keep saying 

this for the next 10 years. Have we done anything? I am totally not 

satisfied with the responses that I have been getting from the State 

Department, but we just have to move on. 

I am going to withhold a couple of more questions. Congressman 

Honda, please. 

Mr. HONDA. Thank you very much. Thank you for the clarification on technologies. The recommendation was 7 for 2011 and 10 

for the next 10 years. Is that the optimum pace that we can go at? 

Ms. KHAMVONGSA. I think that there is growing capacity, and I 

think the State Department, because of their doubling in funding 

from the previous year, I think is evidence that the capacity can 

be met. I would imagine that, with additional resources—I mean 

we are talking about 30 percent increase between last year and 

this year to $7 million. We hope that that will then allow for additional technicians, equipment, and more long-term planning, which 

I think is not possible at the current rate of funding. 

57

Mr. HONDA. So at that rate of funding that you would expect, 

that you are recommending, we have folks on the ground that are 

prepared to be able to move everything forward and expend the resources as it comes? Are we ready to go? 

Mr. KEELEY. More or less, yes, sir. The risk of spending more 

faster is that you would get inefficiencies, because there wouldn’t 

be a capacity big enough to absorb it. The numbers that are being 

spoken about, I think it is reasonable. There is a need for a bit of 

institutional strength. I think there is a need for perhaps some better decisions on resource allocation. At the moment, they spend all 

their management time worrying about where next month’s money 

is going to come from. And as a result, they never have the chance 

to draw a breath and step back and work out. If they had some 

consistency of funding, we would see better mechanisms so that 

they could make better resource allocation decisions. 

Mr. HONDA. With the President’s budget they allocated $5 mil- lion, and then the State Department only utilized $1.9. Is there 

anybody from the State Department here? Do you know why the 

State Department did not utilize the full 5? 

VOICE. Actually, we will use the entire $5 million. The $1.9 million is what is being requested for Fiscal Year 2011. So it is going 

to drop back down in the State Department request. But the $5 

million that Congress did put into the budget for Fiscal Year 2010 

will be spent in Laos, all $5 million. 

Mr. HONDA. The request will be put in for $7 million for 2011. 

Is there a reason why we would feel that the State Department 

would not spend the $7 million? And then it will be our plan to 

continue the increase to $10 million for the next 10 years. I guess 

if you need that sense of certainty, I think we can do it. Hopefully, 

with some sense of commitment, we will try and find the appropriate wording that will direct the spending in those areas. 

Having said that, you are telling me that there are some organizational things that need to be done so that the allocation and distribution will be done appropriately so there is some accountability 

on that. And then the mapping and the way of looking at how it 

is going to be done in a systematic way so that folks can expect 

clearance of land in ways that will anticipate utilization of land in 

that manner, is that what I hear and understand? 

Ms. KHAMVONGSA. Yes. Also, I think for our future record, it 

might be good to look into the strategic plan that the NRA has, 

which includes input from all the various donor partners as well 

as NGOs working in this sector. And that strategy then, I think, 

lays out specifically how the institutions will be strengthened; how 

they are going to build capacity over the next 10 years. 

Mr. HONDA. Mr. Chairman, through the chair, would it be inappropriate to ask the group that would be involved how that cost 

breaks down in terms of best equipment to be purchased, the cost 

of training, and the other costs that need to be done in order to be 

able to execute the plan, so that we have an idea? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If the gentleman will yield, I believe the 

Laos Government does have a national commission specifically addressing the very issues that we are talking about—unexploded 

ordnance and that of cluster bombs—and they do have a commission or committee organized in such a way that many aspects of 

58

the whole issue dealing with the unexploded ordnance and things, 

I am sure they would have the information. And I am sure they 

would be more than willing to cooperate with us if we needed more 

information. It will definitely be the intent of the chair to pursue 

this as a followup as a result of our hearing this afternoon, as well 

as with the State Department, and to see that there is absolutely 

no question. 

The fear of lack of continuity is something that is common practice here in Washington, depending on who the new President is. 

The unfortunate thing with our foreign policies here in Washington 

is that we have become very inconsistent, simply because whoever 

is the new President changes the whole landscape of whether we 

are going to do anything to help that country and whether or not 

priorities are shifted to some other area or region. Just like $150 

billion is being planned for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. That 

has been the core central issues of our foreign policies right now, 

and that is where it is at—$150 billion-plus. So that is the reality 

that we are faced with here. 

Mr. HONDA. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I understand working 

through the government. As we know it, working with the government, there is always the need for partnership with the civilian 

section and oversight, so that there is transparency and a sense of 

a higher level of confidence that it is going in the right direction. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If the gentleman will yield, I definitely 

think we both agree on that line of thought in terms of how we can 

follow up with this. 

Dr. Keeley. 

Mr. KEELEY. Sir, thank you. Mr. Honda asked earlier the question about food security. Actually, one of the things that may be 

some good news—I kept quiet out of an unusual sense of modesty—

but one of the areas where Humpty Dumpty has been able to tie 

into other funding that you haven’t mentioned is we had a very 

generous grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture over the 

last 3 to 4 years. In fact, we have received a total of $9 million for 

school feeding. I am looking at food security at 150 villages. By the 

time we are finished, we will be feeding up to 20,000 children and 

their families and their teachers. And of that, some $3 million is 

actually spent on UXO clearance. 

We have had two phases of this so far, as Mike mentioned. We 

will be studying a third phase of this in September. So there are 

two point. First, we are looking at the question of food security. I 

know other money is also spent by the USDA through the World 

Food program. So there is that significant American contribution. 

And also it is another source of money not accounted for in the 

State Department or DoD budgets for UXO clearance. 

Mr. HONDA. Mr. Chairman, if I may, this is off the subject, but 

as land becomes available, it would be of interest to me that the 

land that becomes available stays in the hands of the landowners, 

and not speculators or anything else, so that the ability to use the 

land for families or tribal clans or whatever, that that is where the 

basic control of the land should be. Not knowing Laos that well, I 

guess what I am trying to say is that it stays close to the community. 

59

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you so much for making the effort to 

come and testify this afternoon. I promise you the chair is not 

going to finish here. We will continue to pursue this issue. 

I believe my good friend, Secretary Clinton, I am sure she is not 

aware that all this has been going on in Laos. We have got to come 

up with the data and the evidence and the information to show 

that the good people of Laos need help. With your testimony and 

your expertise in this area, I do want to thank you very much for 

your coming here. 

My staff definitely will be in touch with you respectively. I sincerely hope that we will come up with better results in just having 

a hearing. I sincerely hope that we will be able to do this. 

Mr. HONDA. Mr. Chairman, before you drop the gavel, let me just 

say publicly that I really appreciate your focus on this. I remember 

you said that we have to have a public hearing when we were 

going through this in our trip to the countries. 

And so just to let folks know that there is a true champion who 

won’t tolerate double-talk and is very unabashed about how he 

feels. I just want to let you know that I appreciate that. They say 

the squeaky wheel gets the grease. I hope there is a lot of grease 

out there, because if there is not, I know you will squeak louder 

than hell. I do thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman for his comments. 

This is not to suggest that I am some do-gooder out there. I am 

just proud of being an American. When you see things that need 

to be corrected, this is one of them. Like I said, I am sure that the 

general public out there throughout America has never heard of 

these things. I am willing to believe and I have complete faith in 

the willingness of the American people to come through and to 

make sure that our leaders here in Washington will pay attention 

to the problems of this country, a least developed country. 

But we have 400,000 Laos people living in this country, so it is 

connected to America. I sincerely hope that those that get an education, that they will have an opportunity to go back to their homeland and be a contributing member of the community and to be of 

help. They are beautiful people. I just sincerely hope that part of 

the legacy of our great country here in America is that we will 

make every effort to correct our mistakes, as we have done in the 

past. Thank you very much. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(61)

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