ORAL ARGUMENT HELD ON OCTOBER 22, 2015 

No. 14-5249 

_______________________________________________ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

_______________________________________________ 

INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

_______________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

_______________________________________________ 

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

_______________________________________________ 

Daniel A. Petalas 

Acting General Counsel 

dpetalas@fec.gov 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Deputy General Counsel — Law 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

 

Erin Chlopak 

Acting Assistant General Counsel

echlopak@fec.gov 

Greg J. Mueller 

Attorney 

gmueller@fec.gov 

Federal Election Commission 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

January 6, 2016 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 Page

I. THE SUBSTANTIALITY STANDARD ADOPTED IN THIS 

CIRCUIT AND APPLIED IN THE DECISION BELOW IS 

CONSISTENT WITH SHAPIRO ............................................................... 3

II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO CONVENE 

A THREE-JUDGE COURT TO DECIDE INDEPENDENCE 

INSTITUTE’S INSUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL 

CHALLENGE ............................................................................................ 9 

III. THE DISTRICT COURT AWARDED JUDGMENT TO THE FEC 

AS A MEANS OF TERMINATING THIS INSUBSTANTIAL 

CASE ........................................................................................................ 11 

IV. INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE EXPRESSLY CONSENTED TO 

HAVE THE MERITS RESOLVED BY THE DISTRICT COURT 

AND BCRA, UNLIKE SECTION 2284, PERMITTED IT 

TO DO SO ................................................................................................ 13 

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 15 

 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases Page 

Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) .................................................... 5, 8, 10

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) ....................................................................... 6

Bowyer v. D.C., 793 F.3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................................................. 12 

*Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)........................................ 9, 10, 11 

Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) ..................................................... 1, 2, 6, 7 

*Feinberg v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 522 F.2d 1335 

 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ........................................................................... 2, 7, 8, 10 

*Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973) ............................................... 1, 2, 4, 6-7 

*Hannis Distilling Co. v. City of Baltimore, 

 216 U.S. 285 (1910)............................................................................... 2, 6 

Jenkins v. Washington Convention Ctr., 

 236 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ..................................................................... 12 

*McConnell v. FEC, 

 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ............................................................................... 9, 10 

*Shapiro v. McManus, 

 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015) .................................................................. 1-8, 11, 13 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 

 523 U.S. 83 (1998) ........................................................................... 6, 8, 10 

Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 

 447 U.S. 134 (1980)................................................................................ 6-7 

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Statutes 

28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1)......................................................................................... 4 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 403, 116 Stat 113 ............................... 13, 15 

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 Pursuant to the Court’s December 11, 2015 Order (Document No. 1588062), 

the Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) submits this brief to 

explain why the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shapiro v. McManus, 

136 S. Ct. 450 (2015), confirms that the decision below should be affirmed. 

Shapiro reaffirms the “familiar proposition” that a “‘substantial federal 

question’” is a jurisdictional prerequisite to obtaining a three-judge court under 

28 U.S.C. § 2284, and that a single district judge may properly decline to convene 

a three-judge court (and dismiss the case) where an asserted claim is “‘wholly 

insubstantial and frivolous.’” 136 S. Ct. at 455. Rather than re-defining those 

terms, Shapiro relies on a several earlier Supreme Court decisions that collectively 

confirm that a claim is jurisdictionally “insubstantial” and “frivolous,” and a threejudge court is not warranted, where the legal question presented has already been 

settled by the Supreme Court. Id. at 455-56 (collecting cases); see infra pp. 5-9. 

In particular, Shapiro embraces three earlier Supreme Court decisions, each of 

which explain that a legal question is insubstantial — and a three-judge court is 

unwarranted — if the “‘unsoundness’” of the claim “‘so clearly results from the 

previous decisions of [the Supreme Court] as to foreclose the subject and leave no 

room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of 

controversy.’” Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973); Ex parte Poresky, 290 

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U.S. 30, 32 (1933) (per curiam); Hannis Distilling Co. v. City of Baltimore, 

216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910); see Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 455-56 (citing Goosby, Ex 

parte Poresky, and Hannis Distilling Company). 

In Shapiro, the Supreme Court concluded that “a plea for relief based on a 

legal theory put forward by a Justice of this Court and uncontradicted by the 

majority in any of [of the Court’s] cases” is a substantial question to be decided by 

a three-judge court. Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 456 (emphasis added). The Court thus 

reversed a decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that 

28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1) permits a single district judge to evaluate a case under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and decline to convene a three-judge 

court upon finding that a complaint fails to state a claim for relief on the merits. 

Id. at 455-56. 

This Court, unlike the Fourth Circuit, determines whether a three-judge 

court must be convened pursuant to section 2284 by applying the substantiality 

standard repeatedly articulated by the Supreme Court in Goosby, Ex Parte Poresky,

and Hannis Distilling Company, see Feinberg v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 522 F.2d 

1335, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. at 32), which 

is the same standard the district court applied in the decision below. (J.A. 42.) 

And here, unlike in Shapiro, Independence Institute seeks to relitigate a 

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constitutional challenge to the statutory disclosure requirements for “electioneering 

communications” based on a legal theory that is contradicted — indeed, it is 

“squarely foreclosed” — by an eight-Justice majority of the Supreme Court in two 

separate cases. (J.A. 42, 57.) For all the reasons set forth in the FEC’s brief and at 

oral argument, the district court correctly concluded that Independence Institute’s 

constitutional claims are “‘clearly foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent,’” and 

properly declined to convene a three-judge court. (J.A. 42.) Shapiro confirms that 

the decision below should be affirmed. 

I. THE SUBSTANTIALITY STANDARD ADOPTED IN THIS CIRCUIT 

AND APPLIED IN THE DECISION BELOW IS CONSISTENT WITH 

SHAPIRO

 

In Shapiro, voters sought to challenge the constitutionality of Maryland’s 

apportionment of congressional districts and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, they 

requested a three-judge court to decide their case. 136 S. Ct. at 453. The district 

judge, however, found that the claim was “‘not one for which relief can be 

granted,’” and dismissed the case without convening a three-judge court. Id.

(quoting Benisek v. Mack, 11 F. Supp. 3d 516, 526 (D. Md. 2014)). Consistent 

with Fourth Circuit precedent permitting a district judge to deny a request for a 

three-judge court if the district judge finds that the case fails to state a claim under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court of Appeals summarily 

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affirmed. 136 S. Ct. at 454, 455. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify 

“under what circumstances, if any, a district judge is free to ‘determin[e] that three 

judges are not required’ for an action ‘challenging the constitutionality of the 

apportionment of congressional districts.’” Id. at 452 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2284(a), (b)(1)). 

Section 2284 provides: “Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the 

judge to whom the request is presented shall, unless he determines that three 

judges are not required, immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who 

shall designate two other judges.” 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

The Court in Shapiro first clarified that the italicized language “should not 

be read as a grant of discretion to the district judge” to ignore the statutory mandate 

to convene a three-judge court upon a proper request. 136 S. Ct. at 454. 

Second, and most relevant here, the Court in Shapiro reaffirmed the 

“familiar proposition” that “the filing of a ‘constitutionally insubstantial’ claim 

d[oes] not trigger the three-judge court requirement. . . .” Id. at 455 (quoting 

Goosby, 409 U.S. at 518). The Court emphasized that a “substantial federal 

question” is a threshold jurisdictional requirement; “[a]bsent a substantial federal 

question, even a single-judge district court lacks jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis 

added). Shapiro reiterates the Court’s explanation, in earlier decisions, that a claim 

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is deficient for jurisdictional purposes if it is “‘wholly insubstantial and 

frivolous.’” Id. at 455. And rather than further defining “wholly insubstantial and 

frivolous,” Shapiro invokes the Court’s “long” history of “distinguish[ing] 

between failing to raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes 

. . . and failing to state a claim for relief on the merits,” and cites several earlier 

decisions, discussed below, that collectively confirm that a claim is jurisdictionally 

“insubstantial,” and a three-judge court is not warranted, where the legal question 

presented has already been settled by the Supreme Court. Id. at 455-56 (collecting 

cases). 

Shapiro cites Bailey v. Patterson, in which the Supreme Court held that a 

three-judge court was not required to decide whether a state could require racially 

segregated transportation facilities. 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962) (per curiam); see 

Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 456 (citing Bailey). The Court in Bailey explained that the 

segregation question was a legal issue that the Supreme Court had “settled beyond 

question” and is thus “no longer open; it is foreclosed as a litigable issue” and a 

three-judge court need not be convened to decide such an issue because the claim 

is “wholly insubstantial, legally speaking nonexistent.” 369 U.S. at 33. Bailey

further held that “three judges are similarly not required when . . . prior decisions 

make frivolous any claim that a state statute on its face is not constitutional.” Id. 

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Shapiro also cites Bell v. Hood, in which the Court held that the case was not 

“insubstantial or frivolous” because it concerned an “issue of law” — whether 

monetary damages are available for federal officers’ violations of the Fourth and 

Fifth Amendments — that “ha[d] never been specifically decided by th[e Supreme] 

Court.” 327 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1946) (emphasis added); see Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 

455 (citing Bell). 

As indicated supra pp.1-2, Shapiro cites three earlier decisions in which the 

Supreme Court explained that a federal legal question is “obviously frivolous or 

plainly unsubstantial” where it is “either . . . manifestly devoid of merit, or . . . its 

unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of th[e Supreme C]ourt 

as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions 

sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.” Hannis Distilling Co., 216 

U.S. at 288; see Goosby, 409 U.S. at 518 (same); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. at 32 

(same); see Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 455 (citing Goosby, Ex parte Poresky, and 

Hannis Distilling Company). 

Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, which Shapiro also 

cites, similarly explains that dismissal for lack of a federal claim is appropriate 

where a claim is “‘foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court.’” 523 U.S. 83, 89 

(1998); see Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 456 (citing Steel Company). And in Washington 

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v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation (“Confederated Tribes”), 

also cited in Shapiro, the Court similarly held that under Goosby, prior Supreme 

Court decisions support a conclusion that certain claims are insubstantial where 

those decisions “inescapably render the claims frivolous.” 447 U.S. 134, 148 

(1980) (citation omitted); see Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 455 (citing Confederated 

Tribes). 

These earlier decisions, each cited in Shapiro, collectively confirm that the 

substantiality standard adopted by this Circuit and applied in the decision below is 

consistent with Shapiro. Indeed, there is no dispute that this Court, unlike the 

Fourth Circuit, determines whether a three-judge court must be convened pursuant 

to section 2284 by applying the same substantiality standard articulated by the 

Supreme Court in Goosby, Ex Parte Poresky, and Hannis Distilling Company. See 

Feinberg, 522 F.2d at 1338-39 (“Constitutional claims may be regarded as 

insubstantial if they are ‘obviously without merit,’ or if their ‘unsoundness so 

clearly results from the previous decisions of [the Supreme Court] as to foreclose 

the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be 

raised can be the subject of controversy.’”) (quoting Ex parte Poresky); 

Appellant’s Br. 13-14, 15, 19-20, 25 (quoting Feinberg standard); FEC Br. 53 

(same). Both parties similarly agree that the district court properly recognized that 

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the substantiality standard in Feinberg is controlling here. (Appellant’s Br. 13-14 

(acknowledging that “the district court correctly stated” the applicable standard 

here and thus evaluated whether the “‘unsoundness’” of appellant’s constitutional 

claims “so clearly results from the previous decisions (of the Supreme Court) as to 

foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought 

to be raised can be the subject of controversy’”) (quoting Mem. Op. (J.A. 42 

(quoting Feinberg, 522 F.2d at 1338-39))); FEC Br. 53 (citing parties’ agreement 

with district court on Feinberg standard); see J.A. 42 (decision below applying 

Feinberg).) Feinberg, moreover, is also consistent with the other Supreme Court 

decisions cited in Shapiro that describe the section 2284 substantiality standard. 

Compare, e.g., Bailey, 369 U.S. at 33 (legal issue that Court has “settled beyond 

question . . . is foreclosed as a litigable issue” and thus “wholly insubstantial”); 

Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (claim that is “‘foreclosed by prior [Supreme Court] 

decisions” is insubstantial). 

In Shapiro, the Supreme Court concluded that “a plea for relief based on a 

legal theory put forward by a Justice of th[e] Court and uncontradicted by the 

majority in any of [the Court’s] cases” is a substantial question to be decided by a 

three-judge court. Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 456 (emphasis added). Nothing about 

that conclusion calls into question this Court’s Feinberg standard, which the 

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district court properly applied in the decision below, see infra pp. 9-11. Indeed, 

here, unlike in Shapiro, the legal theory in question has been litigated in the 

Supreme Court on two separate occasions and, in both instances, was flatly 

rejected by eight Justices of the Court. 

II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO CONVENE A 

THREE-JUDGE COURT TO DECIDE INDEPENDENCE 

INSTITUTE’S INSUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 

 As the FEC previously explained (FEC Br. 17, 20-40, 51-56), the district 

court properly applied Feinberg’s insubstantiality standard and correctly concluded 

that Independence Institute’s constitutional challenge is “clearly” and “squarely” 

foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, namely, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 

310 (2010), and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). (J.A. 42, 57.) The court 

observed that this case “can be distilled to the application of the Supreme Court’s 

clear instructions in Citizens United,” in which “in no uncertain terms, the 

Supreme Court rejected the [same] attempt to limit [the Bipartisan Campaign 

Reform Act’s (“BCRA”)] disclosure requirements to express advocacy and its 

functional equivalent.” (J.A. 42 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369).) The 

court below properly declined to convene a three-judge court and dismissed 

Independence Institute’s claims because appellant “seeks the same relief that has 

already been foreclosed by Citizens United” and Independence Institute’s “efforts 

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to distinguish this challenge from that in Citizens United are futile.” J.A. 42-43; 

Feinberg, 522 F.2d at 1338-39 (three-judge court not required where previous 

Supreme Court decisions “foreclose the subject and leave no room for the 

inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy”); 

see also, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (dismissal is appropriate where claim is 

foreclosed by prior Supreme Court decisions); Bailey, 369 U.S. at 33 (three-judge 

court need not be convened to resolve an issue that is “settled beyond question”). 

 That the district court considered Independence Institute’s various 

arguments for why “Citizens United does not determine the outcome of this case” 

does not transform the decision below into an improper, first-hand evaluation of 

the merits of appellant’s constitutional challenge. (J.A. 43; see J.A. 44-75.) The 

district court addressed such arguments in order to support its conclusion that 

“[n]one of the[] distinctions” Independence Institute attempted to draw between its 

challenge and Citizens United “have the effect [Independence Institute] desires, 

and Citizens United still governs this matter.” (J.A. 44.)1

 

 

1

 Among other things, the district court correctly explained that the breadth of 

the Supreme Court’s holdings in McConnell and Citizens United foreclose 

Independence Institute’s attempts to distinguish its legal claims from those rejected 

by the Supreme Court based on the content of its proposed advertisement. (See 

J.A. 53 (explaining that the Court in McConnell upheld BCRA’s disclosure 

requirements for “the entire range of ‘electioneering communications’”) (quoting 

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The circumstances of this case bear no similarity to Shapiro, where “a plea 

for relief based on a legal theory put forward by a Justice of th[e] [Supreme] Court 

and uncontradicted by the majority in any of [the Court’s] cases” was found to be a 

substantial question to be decided by a three-judge court. Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 

456. Here, Independence Institute seeks to relitigate a legal question that is 

squarely foreclosed by two eight-Justice opinions of the Supreme Court. (J.A. 48-

53.) This case epitomizes a claim that is “wholly insubstantial.” 

III. THE DISTRICT COURT AWARDED JUDGMENT TO THE FEC AS 

A MEANS OF TERMINATING THIS INSUBSTANTIAL CASE 

Ultimately, having explained its reasons for concluding that Independence 

Institute’s challenge “is squarely foreclosed by Citizens United,” the district court 

concluded that such reasons were the basis for the Court’s denial of the application 

for a three-judge court. (J.A. 57-58.) Then, as a means of fully resolving the stillpending action, including Independence Institute’s pending preliminary injunction 

motion, and “[p]ursuant to the parties’ agreement to consolidate briefing on the 

 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196; emphasis added by district court); J.A. 48-52 

(rejecting Independence Institute’s attempts to distinguish its case from Citizens 

United based on the content of its proposed advertisement and explaining that 

Citizens United upheld BCRA’s disclosure requirements for electioneering 

communications “[e]ven if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction” and 

expressly refused to limit such disclosure requirements to express advocacy and its 

functional equivalent) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369).) 

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merits with the preliminary injunction briefing,” the Court entered judgment in 

favor of the FEC and dismissed the case. J.A. 58; see infra pp. 13-15. 

Importantly, the district court did not undertake any separate analysis of the merits 

to support its dismissal decision; it dismissed the insubstantial case because it is 

“squarely foreclosed” by Supreme Court precedent. (J.A. 42, 57-58.) That course 

of action was a permissible means of disposing of Independence Institute’s 

insubstantial constitutional challenge. 

Even if, under Shapiro, the district court should have more explicitly 

characterized its dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction, it correctly determined 

that Independence Institute’s claims are “squarely foreclosed” by Supreme Court 

precedent and did not apply an alternative standard as the district court in Shapiro

had. (J.A. 57.) Determining whether a claim is wholly insubstantial involves a 

heightened standard but is otherwise very similar to making a merits determination 

as a matter of law. Because the district court applied the correct standard, its 

characterization of its dismissal is of little significance. Indeed, this Court may 

affirm the decision below even on different grounds than those relied on by the 

district court. See, e.g., Bowyer v. D.C., 793 F.3d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“On de 

novo review, we may affirm the district court’s judgment on a different theory than 

used by the district court.”); Jenkins v. Washington Convention Ctr., 236 F.3d 6, 8 

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n. 3 (D.C. Cir.2001) (“The court may affirm the district court on grounds different 

from those relied upon by the district court”). 

IV. INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE EXPRESSLY CONSENTED TO 

HAVE THE MERITS RESOLVED BY THE DISTRICT COURT AND 

BCRA, UNLIKE SECTION 2284, PERMITTED IT TO DO SO 

As the FEC explained in its principal brief (FEC Br. 52), section 403 of 

BCRA sets forth special procedures for constitutional challenges to “any 

provision” of BCRA and, inter alia, required all constitutional challenges to the 

statute initiated before December 31, 2006, to be heard by a three-judge district 

court convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Such special procedures do not 

apply to challenges like this case filed after December 31, 2006, however, “unless 

the person filing such action elects such provisions to apply to the action.” 

BCRA § 403(d)(2), 116 Stat. 114; see FEC Br. 52. Shapiro, by contrast, 

concerned the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts, for 

which three-judge courts remain mandatory where the challenge presents a 

substantial federal question. Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 452-455. 

As the record in this case makes clear, although Independence Institute 

invoked BCRA’s special judicial review provision and requested a three-judge 

court (J.A. 8), it also expressly consented — before the three-judge court request 

had been ruled on — to consideration of its preliminary-injunction motion as a 

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motion for summary judgment and to consolidation of its preliminary injunction 

motion with a decision on the merits. (See J.A. 4 (Minute Order, Sept. 9, 2014) 

(“With the parties’ consent, the court will consider Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction as a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff has agreed to 

file no additional substantive briefing on the merits.”); J.A. 34-35 (reciting the 

parties’ joint stipulation and the district court’s order “in light of Plaintiff 

Independence Institute’s agreement not to supplement its motion for Preliminary 

Injunction (Docket No. 5) with supplemental substantive briefing or evidence, for 

the Court to consider Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction as a Motion for 

Summary Judgment”) (emphasis added).) Independence Institute made no 

objection to a single-judge court ruling on its motion for preliminary injunction 

and never specified that the ruling on that motion after consolidation with the 

merits should occur only after a ruling on its three-judge court request. 

The decision below both denied Independence Institute’s application for a 

three-judge court and entered judgment for the Commission, and it expressly did 

the latter “[p]ursuant to the parties’ agreement to consolidate briefing on the merits 

with the preliminary injunction briefing.” (J.A. 58 (emphasis added); see id. n.18 

(“The parties agreed that the Court would adjudicate this case on the merits 

without the submission of additional evidence. . . .” (citing the Joint Stipulation 

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(J.A. 34-35)).) Independence Institute effectively waived any objection to the 

single-judge district court ruling on the merits when it entered into that stipulation. 

Where, as here, the parties expressly agreed, in a joint stipulation, for the 

district court “to consider [Independence Institute’s] Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction as a Motion for Summary Judgment,” (J.A. 35), section 403(d)(2) of 

BCRA permitted them to do so, and the district court simply followed that agreedupon consolidation procedure, the court’s award of judgment to the FEC was 

plainly not improper and Shapiro, which does not concern section 403 of BCRA, 

does not suggest otherwise. 

CONCLUSION 

For all the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the FEC’s principal brief 

and at oral argument, the Court should affirm the decision below. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Daniel A. Petalas 

Acting General Counsel 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

Erin Chlopak 

Acting Assistant General Counsel 

/s/ Greg J. Mueller 

Greg J. Mueller 

Attorney 

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

 (202) 694-1650 

January 6, 2016 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 6th day of January 2016, I electronically filed the 

Supplemental Brief for Federal Election Commission with the Clerk of the United 

States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit by using the Court’s CM/ECF system 

and hand delivered paper copies to the Court. Service was made on the following 

through CM/ECF: 

Allen Dickerson 

Tyler Martinez 

Center for Competitive Politics 

124 S. West Street, Suite 201 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

 /s/ Greg J. Mueller 

 Greg J. Mueller 

Federal Election Commission 

 999 E Street, NW 

 Washington, DC 20463 

 (202) 694-1650 

 gmueller@fec.gov 

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