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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

S. PRT. 

2011

112–25 

ENHANCING NON-PROLIFERATION 

PARTNERSHIPS IN THE 

BLACK SEA REGION 

A MINORITY STAFF REPORT 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 27, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: www.fdsys.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ........................................................................................... v 

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 

Background ........................................................................................................... 3 

Ukraine .............................................................................................................. 3 

Moldova ............................................................................................................. 5 

Recommendations ................................................................................................ 7 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, September 27, 2011. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: In July 2011, I directed my Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee professional staff for European affairs to 

travel to the Black Sea region to assess the recent seizure of weapons grade highly-enriched uranium-235 (HEU) in Moldova and U.S. 

assistance programs to counter the threat of loose nuclear material. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency Project Officer for Ukraine 

joined the delegation. 

The Government of Moldova should be commended for interrupting an extremely troubling illicit sale of fissile material. The 9 

kg of HEU on offer would have fetched $30 million on the black 

market and contributed significantly to the 25 kg of HEU necessary to fashion a small nuclear weapon. The sellers also claimed 

to possess plutonium, an even more disturbing proliferation material. The interrupted sale was the 19th publicly known interdiction 

of fissile material since 1993. Destined for criminal or terrorist elements in North Africa, this interdiction demonstrates that the 

threat of loose nuclear material remains a central U.S. national security challenge and that the creation of layered U.S. defenses 

overseas against nuclear threats through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and other U.S. assistance programs 

remains unfinished. Several apparent links to the Russian Federation suggest that continued cooperation to strengthen its nuclear 

security, law enforcement, and export control policies, laws, and 

culture remains an urgent priority. 

The United States should intensify Nunn-Lugar WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (WMD-PPP) work with Moldova in light 

of two attempted sales over the last year of material purported by 

the sellers to be HEU. Our partners in Ukraine should be encouraged to also eliminate the bureaucratic delays that may hinder new 

phases of highly successful WMD-PPP programs, as well as the 

prompt removal of all HEU from Ukraine. Even as our non-proliferation work continues with these partners, the United States 

must also continue to highlight troubling developments in the 

realm of civil rights, political prosecutions, and the rule of law. 

This staff report examines current non-proliferation programs in 

the northern Black Sea region and offers tangible recommendations 

to the United States and our partners for enhancing this cooperation. I welcome any comments you may have. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Ranking Member. 

(V)

(1) 

1This report does not reflect the views of the Department of Defense and was prepared solely 

by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff. 2See, e.g., Lawrence Scott Sheets, ‘‘A Smuggler’s Story,’’ The Atlantic, April 2008. 

ENHANCING NON-PROLIFERATION 

PARTNERSHIPS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION 

At the direction of Senator Richard G. Lugar, Ranking Republican Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), 

a delegation of minority SFRC professional staff and Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) personnel1 traveled to the Black 

Sea region to assess non-proliferation cooperation in light of several 

recent interdictions of uranium on the black market. The delegation visited Ukraine (Kyiv, the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, and 

Odessa) and Chisinau, Moldova. The purpose of the trip was to: 

• Examine two recent seizures of uranium in Moldova, one of 

which was highly-enriched and usable in a nuclear weapon; 

• Assess ongoing efforts to combat and interdict illicit WMD materials and components; 

• Discuss prospects for enhancing non-proliferation partnerships 

in a region still plagued by porous borders and large amounts 

of fissile material. 

INTRODUCTION

On June 27, 2011, Moldovan officials arrested six persons in 

Chisinau purporting to possess 9 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium-235 (HEU), material for a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb, in 

an attempted sale for ÷23 million ($30 million). Plutonium, an even 

more troubling proliferation material, was also on offer. During the 

arrest, a vial containing 4.4 grams of highly-enriched uranium-235 

(HEU) oxide was purchased in a fake sale for ÷420,000 ($600,000) 

in a sting operation organized by officers from the Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs, some of whom had coincidentally received 

routine counterproliferation training in the United States only 

weeks earlier. The sellers sought ‘‘non-Western’’ buyers; one potential buyer, currently being sought, has been identified as a resident 

of a country of North Africa. Should the existence of a legitimate 

buyer (or middleman) from a region with a history of terror cells 

be confirmed, then the case would be substantially more alarming 

than other recent fissile material interdictions, where official 

agents were the sole potential buyers.2

Outside experts believe that the HEU oxide may have been enriched at certain sites in Russia. The HEU transited through 

Transnistria, the Russian-backed breakaway enclave of Moldova 

with weak law enforcement and border security controls, and several persons central to the sale were Transnistrian residents. One 

2 

3 In August 2010, sellers purporting to be in possession of highly-enriched uranium were also 

arrested by Moldovan law enforcement, but the resulting seizure turned out to be 7 kg of uranium-238 worth approximately $11 million, which, though not fissile itself, can be used to create 

fissile plutonium and has other weapons applications. 4 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘‘Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) Fact Sheet.’’ Some 

documents also cite 21 known cases of weapons grade plutonium or uranium trafficking. Former 

Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations have been the location of 10 of these unclassified HEU and 

plutonium seizures. 5 Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, & Institute for U.S. 

and Canadian Studies ‘‘The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism,’’ May 

2011. 6See, e.g., Freedom House, ‘‘Sounding the Alarm: Protecting Democracy in Ukraine,’’ April 

2011. 

theory is that the HEU arrived there by air from Russia and was 

transported across the porous administrative boundary line into 

Moldova proper. In addition to the North African, Moldovan authorities are seeking one Russian national, who was the alleged 

ringleader and fled from Transnistria to Russia, where he and 

other cohorts are suspected by officials to currently reside. Russian 

authorities have received official notification of the arrests. 

This operation is the second interdiction in Moldova of uranium 

purported to be highly-enriched in the past year3 and the 19th unclassified seizure of weapons grade plutonium or uranium worldwide since 1993.4 Most experts agree that HEU would be a terrorist organization’s preferred bomb-making material due to its 

widespread availability in more than 30 countries. The United 

States, Russia, and Kazakhstan each reportedly possess more than 

10,000 kg of HEU, whereas an HEU bomb requires only 25 kg of 

HEU. A recent joint U.S.-Russia Nuclear Terrorism Threat Assessment concluded that the most plausible scenario for a terrorist-acquired nuclear weapon is through ‘‘theft or black-market purchase 

of previously stolen nuclear material.’’5

These developments underscore that the threat posed to the 

United States of America by loose nuclear material endures to this 

day. U.S. efforts to create layered defenses, including at known 

fissile material storage sites overseas, at foreign customs and border inspection posts, and within the U.S. homeland, should continue. As one Moldovan law enforcement official noted, ‘‘Because 

the United States is often the end target of such illicit sales, we 

are happy to work with the United States on these issues.’’ 

But too often, bureaucratic delays in both the United States and 

partner nations have hampered this cooperation. In Ukraine, despite generous U.S. commitments to pay for the removal of HEU 

fuel, replace the fuel with low enriched uranium fuel, and pay for 

the construction of a neutron source facility in Kharkiv, some in 

Ukraine’s leadership have allowed tortuous bureaucratic processes 

to dely implementation, including a last-minute failure of the 

Ukrainian delegation to sign the final bilateral HEU agreement in 

Vilnius with the U.S. Secretary of State in July 2011. With respect 

to Moldova, delays within the U.S. Department of Defense have inhibited instructions to the Nunn-Lugar Program and DTRA implementers to begin border security analysis. 

Cooperation on non-proliferation should not constitute a substitute for high-level engagement in public institution-building and 

support for civil society, which remain acute challenges in many 

countries in Eurasia, particularly Russia and Ukraine.6 Still, nonproliferation cooperation that advances the security of both the 

3 

7Some Russian officials still insist that Ukraine remains merely a frontier of greater Russia. 

United States and our partners and allies continues to create important stability in our bilateral and regional relationships, particularly in nations of the former Soviet Union where significant 

quantities of WMD materials exist near porous borders. 

This report assesses current non-proliferation cooperation in the 

northern Black Sea region and recommends avenues for enhancing 

these partnerships. 

BACKGROUND

UKRAINE

In light of its 2,800 mile border, including a vast Black Sea coastline, Ukraine faces significant border security challenges. These 

challenges are exacerbated by its lengthy border with Russia, 

which dedicates few resources to controlling this border.7 Much of 

Ukraine’s border with Russia and Belarus has also not yet been 

demarcated. Ukraine’s border concerns are further complicated on 

its western edge, where Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria provides weak border controls and limited law enforcement, 

allowing for increased ease of trade in illicit materials. In 2010, 

Ukrainian border security officials reported a 10 percent increase 

in interdictions of illicit drugs, radioactive materials, and weapons 

compared to 2009 levels. 

The United States has dedicated significant resources to non-proliferation and border security priorities in Ukraine since its independence. In 1992, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Program began work to dismantle Ukraine’s entire nuclear weapons arsenal, allowing it to enter the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. Subsequently, Nunn-Lugar 

has established deep relationships with many Ukrainian ministries 

in the areas of biothreat reduction, strategic delivery system disassembly, border security, and others. 

One continuous threat of WMD material diversion has been 

stocks of HEU still held at many military and civilian sites in the 

former Soviet Union. In Ukraine, the U.S. Department of Energy 

has been implementing a preliminary agreement to pay for the removal of all Ukrainian stocks of HEU and replace the fuel with low 

enriched uranium. Ukraine has begun removal of HEU stocks from 

the Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research, the Sevastopol National 

University for Nuclear Energy and Industry, and the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technologies. Separately, the United States 

has committed $20 million for the construction of a neutron source 

facility near Kharkiv, Ukraine to be completed in 2014, which has 

medical, scientific research, and energy applications. A memorandum of understanding on the project was scheduled for signature in Vilnius in July 2011 between the U.S. Secretary of State 

and her Ukrainian counterpart. According to officials familiar with 

the situation, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister was unable to sign 

the MOU because its language did not reflect a previous decision 

of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), which called 

for the removal of the HEU upon the completion of the neutron 

source facility in 2014. However, the original agreement called for 

4 

8 Notably, the son of Transnistria’s ‘‘president’’ Igor Smirnov heads the enclave’s customs service. 

final HEU removal in time for the spring 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, and the Government of Ukraine is seeking to modify 

the previous NSDC decision, as well as a U.S. guarantee that the 

neutron source facility will subsequently be completed. 

Today, several U.S. border security and WMD material interdiction programs are active in Ukraine. The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program has an approximately $1 

million budget for Ukraine that focuses on building human capital 

through training and imparting best practices expertise to the 

Ukrainian border security and customs services, as well as modest 

equipment procurements such as x-ray scanners, spectrometers, 

and dosimeters. EXBS has also assisted Ukrainian agencies to investigate and prosecute trade in illegal WMD-related and dual-use 

items. The Department of Energy’s Second Line of Defense program has provided portal monitors at key points of entry to detect 

radioactive material (including items contaminated by the 

Chernobyl nuclear disaster), one ton of which was interdicted in 

2010. 

With by far the largest budget for border security, the NunnLugar WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (WMD-PPP) provides equipment for the Ukrainian border service, focusing on four 

geographical zones: the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ), major 

ports on the Black Sea coast, the Russian Federation border, and 

the vulnerable border with Moldova. 

Staff visited the CEZ boundary area, which forms an approximately 14 mile ring around the stricken reactor at Pripyat and 

abuts the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. In light of the heavily restricted access to the CEZ itself, the Ukrainian border guard service patrols the boundary as if it were an international boundary 

and must contend with elevated radiation levels. With U.S. assistance, the Ukrainian border guard service interdicts smugglers of 

radioactive material, such as scrap metal, and serves as a line of 

defense against illicit trafficking of other toxic elements. In particular, the Nunn-Lugar WMD-PPP program has provided personal 

radiation detection equipment, all-terrain vehicles, shelters, patrol 

boats, and mobile infrared cameras to build night and all-season 

patrol capability. 

At the major maritime ports of Odessa and at the Kerch Strait 

where the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea adjoin, the WMD-PPP 

program has provided training and equipment to customs units, as 

well as maritime radars and ship refurbishment to assist with detection and vessel boarding. 

In light of the recent seizures of uranium in Moldova, the 

Ukrainian-Moldovan border has been identified as an acute proliferation challenge, particularly in the border regions controlled by 

de facto separatist authorities in Moldova’s region of Transnistria, 

who heavily profit from illicit trade and kickbacks.8 Nunn-Lugar efforts have augmented the Ukrainian border service capacity in 

command and control, communications and surveillance at the 

most heavily trafficked point of entry as a test bed that can be expanded to other border areas. Assistance has included radars, 

5 

9 Arms Control Today, ‘‘U.S. Buys Moldovan Aircraft to Prevent Acquisition by Iran,′′ October 

1997. 

ground sensors, and an infrared camera package to cover the 

‘‘green’’ border between official points of entry, as well as Department of Energy portal radioactivity detectors. Since 2005, 10 interdictions of radioactive material have occurred and 587 illicit weapons shipments have been interrupted at the Ukrainian-Moldovan 

border. Although several border disputes between Moldova and 

Ukraine have hampered cooperation for a number of years, the 

most serious dispute over the Palanca border crossing was recently 

solved; two additional disputes will require diplomatic attention to 

enhance future Moldovan-Ukrainian cooperation. 

MOLDOVA

The U.S.-Moldovan non-proliferation relationship dates back to 

the mid-1990s, when Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 

funds were used to purchase 21 Moldovan MiG fighter jets, 14 of 

which were nuclear capable MiG-29Cs, reportedly in order to preempt a sale of the jets to Iran,9 which was seeking an air-based 

WMD delivery system. The agreement also led to the purchase of 

500 air-to-air missiles. 

For much of the past decade, U.S. cooperation on border security 

with Moldova has been limited due to its relatively small size and 

competing budget priorities. The U.S. EXBS program had no budget for Moldova in 2008 and 2009 but reengaged in 2010 to focus 

on export control and investigation training. In fact, three 

Moldovan law enforcement officials who participated in the June 

2011 HEU interdiction received U.S. counter-proliferation training 

in the United States in April 2011. 

In light of the recent HEU seizure, as well as other WMD material seizures over the past decade having transited Moldova, this 

limited U.S. assistance does not appear to have matched the 

threat. The chief vulnerability remains the breakaway enclave of 

Transnistria, which is renowned as an organizing base for smuggling illicit materials, including the June 2011 HEU sale that included several residents of the enclave. International assistance to 

Moldovan authorities has been centered on the European Union 

Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), which provides EU best practices training and limited equipment to Ukrainian border officials 

to control goods exiting and entering Transnistria. Nonetheless, as 

explained further below, this assistance package inevitably leaves 

major border control gaps given that flights into Transnistria cannot be monitored (one theory behind the June 2011 HEU interdiction is that it arrived in Transnistria by air) and that Moldovan authorities, for conflict resolution purposes, are constrained in controlling for persons and goods entering Moldova proper from the 

breakaway region. 

However, the United States is poised to increase non-proliferation assistance to Moldova following the July 2011 signature of the 

Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI), which serves as the 

umbrella agreement for enhanced non-proliferation cooperation and 

will result in a full assessment of Moldovan border security and 

6 

10The United States has NSOI agreements with 30 countries worldwide based on nuclear 

smuggling threat assessments established through interagency processes. 

customs needs.10 The Department of Energy has also signed a Second Line of Defense agreement, which may lead to radioactivityrelated equipment and training. 

A principal challenge will be developing controls for Moldova’s internal boundary line with Transnistria. Moldova is unlikely to be 

granted an EU visa-free regime without such controls over the flow 

of goods and persons from the Transnistrian enclave. On the other 

hand, establishment of more permanent controls for persons and 

goods creates greater political separation between Transnistria and 

Moldova proper, advancing the separatists’ aims and hindering reintegration. In light of the recent HEU seizure, creative solutions 

may have to be explored. 

The separatist issue has also complicated Moldova’s control over 

much of its easternmost international border with Ukraine, which 

coincides with the Transnistrian-controlled boundary. Early last 

decade, a joint Ukrainian-Moldovan border post arrangement was 

devised on the Ukrainian side of the border so that Moldovan border guards and customs could control goods and persons entering 

and exiting sovereign Moldovan territory without being present on 

Transnistrian-administered territory. However, this arrangement 

faltered reportedly due to Ukrainian sovereignty concerns and, instead, EUBAM was initiated to ensure an international, as opposed 

to Moldovan, presence co-located with Ukrainian border guards 

(even though EUBAM plays an advisory role and does not participate in any monitoring itself). In light of the recent UkrainianMoldovan agreement over the most tense border dispute at 

Palanca, a co-located Moldovan presence with Ukrainian border 

and customs officials could be revisited. 

In expanding U.S. non-proliferation assistance with Moldova, 

many lessons can be learned from similar programs that have been 

underway in Ukraine for several years. First, initial assistance 

should be focused on assessing human capital in the customs and 

border security services to ensure that local officials have the absorptive capacity to operate and sustain higher technology assistance. Second, once baseline training and absorptive capacity is determined, modest technological solutions, including mobile surveillance assets at test bed locations, could be pursued at high vulnerability areas. Third, training capacity built by EXBS and NunnLugar programs in Ukraine at Cherkasy, Khmelnitsky, and 

Kharkiv could become regional centers used to train Moldovan officials and avoid duplicating assistance. 

7 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States should: 

• Work with the Russian Federation in apprehending those persons reportedly involved in the recent HEU sale in Moldova 

who are suspected of having fled to Russia; and to redouble 

efforts in identifying security shortfalls at Russian nuclear 

facilities. • Immediately provide tasking to the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency to utilize the Nunn-Lugar WMD Proliferation Prevention Program to conduct a border walk in Moldova to identify 

customs and border security needs and vulnerabilities while 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense simultaneously pursues 

the necessary assistance agreements. • Apply lessons learned from non-proliferation cooperation in 

Ukraine over the past years to Moldova, including focus on test 

bed projects and provision of technology only to the extent that 

it can be absorbed and maintained by local officials. • Ensure sufficient funding for the U.S. International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) and EXBS training programs, the 

latter of which several Moldovan officials involved in the June 

2011 HEU interdiction attended in April 2011. 

Ukraine should: 

• Arrange for the memorandum of understanding on HEU removal to be promptly signed with the United States on the 

margins of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in 

September 2011 so that removal of the HEU can promptly 

occur. • Continue to dedicate resources towards sustainment and maintenance of the technology provided through Nunn-Lugar WMDPPP border security programs. • Revisit the arrangement attempted a decade ago to allow 

Moldovan customs and border officials to co-locate with 

Ukrainian officials at Ukrainian border posts near 

Transnistrian-administered territory to foster Moldovan sovereignty over its international borders. 

• Reject an agreement sought by de facto Transnistrian officials 

that would allow rail traffic to enter Ukraine without being 

checked by Moldovan customs officials, as currently required. 

• Offer to Moldova the possibility of turning Ukrainian border 

security training centers at Cherkasy, Khmelnitsky, and 

Kharkiv into regional training centers, where Moldovan officials can receive training. 

• Dedicate attention to solving the two outstanding border disputes with Moldova to ensure that border security cooperation 

is not hampered. 

8 

Moldova should: 

• Prioritize the creation of a counter-smuggling team with international assistance, similar to those created in other nations 

such as Georgia. 

• Consider creative solutions for the Ministry of Internal Affairs 

to patrol high vulnerability zones, such as use of mobile surveillance assets and checkpoints. This system can be augmented with all terrain vehicles, watercraft, and night vision. 

• Dedicate attention to solving the two outstanding border disputes with Ukraine to ensure that border security cooperation 

is not hampered. 

• Pursue high-level criminal cases against corruption given that 

not a single corruption prosecution has recently taken place in 

Moldova. 

Æ