1The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-2287

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Patricia A. Piziali, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Grand View College; Martha Davis, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellees. *

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 Submitted: February 2, 2000

 Filed: February 11, 2000

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Grand View College (GVC) hired Patricia A. Piziali under a renewable contract

as an assistant professor of education. She later declined a second contract. Piziali

now appeals the District Court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment in her subsequent

employment discrimination action against GVC and Martha Davis, the education

department chair, under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12101-12213 (1994), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 (ICRA), Iowa Code
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§§ 216.1-216.20 (1999). For reversal, Piziali argues the grant of summary judgment

was premature, and the District Court incorrectly found that she was not a qualified

individual under the ADA and ICRA, and that her ADA and ICRA claims against her

supervisor, and her constructive-discharge and emotional-distress claims, were not

viable.

Having carefully considered the record and viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to Piziali, see Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1021 (8th Cir.

1998), we conclude that summary judgment was proper. Initially, we must reject

Piziali’s argument that summary judgment was premature, as she failed to file an

affidavit, as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), showing what

specific information additional discovery would reveal. See Stanback v. Best

Diversified Prods., Inc., 180 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir. 1999) (where party fails to carry

burden under Rule 56(f), postponement of ruling on summary judgment is unjustified).

To establish a prima facie case under the ADA and ICRA, Piziali had to show

she was disabled within the meaning of the statutes, qualified to perform the essential

functions of her job with or without accommodation, and suffered an adverse

employment action. See Young, 152 F.3d at 1021-22 (ADA); Vincent v. Four M Paper

Corp., 589 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Iowa 1999) (ICRA). Because Piziali applied for and was

granted social security disability insurance benefits (DIB), she also was required to

explain sufficiently any apparent contradiction. See Cleveland v. Policy Management

Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1603 (1999).

We find Piziali failed to rebut defendants’ evidence that she was not qualified

to perform her job with or without accommodation. Multiple entries in the record,

including Piziali’s complaints to her physicians and her representations on her DIB

application, show that she was physically unable to meet the essential functions of her

job, and although she argues that she would have been if all of her requested
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accommodations had been granted, we find some of her requested accommodations

were not reasonable, because they would have required reassigning others to perform

her duties or eliminating essential functions of her job. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of

America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (employer is not required to reallocate

or eliminate essential functions of job to accommodate disabled employee). Piziali’s

inability to perform after being granted various accommodations during the second half

of her contract further undermines her claim that she was a “qualified” individual under

the ADA and ICRA. 

Thus, we agree with the District Court that the issue of the viability of her ADA

and ICRA claims against her supervisor individually is moot, and conclude that the

District Court was correct in declining to address Piziali’s constructive-discharge claim.

See Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1998) (in

all constructive-discharge cases under ADA, plaintiff must first make out prima facie

case of discrimination).

Finally, we conclude that to the extent Piziali’s emotional-distress claims were

not precluded by the ICRA, see Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa

1993), they are meritless, because the alleged conduct was not outrageous under

applicable state law, see Taggart v. Drake Univ., 549 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Iowa 1996)

(“conduct must be extremely egregious; mere insult, bad manners, or hurt feelings are

insufficient”; factor of supervisory authority over plaintiff did not make defendant’s

conduct outrageous); Cutler v. Klass, Whicher & Mishne, 473 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Iowa

1991) (peculiar susceptibility because of physical or mental condition is factor to

consider, but major outrage is always crucial element).

Accordingly, we affirm.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.