UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

LONNIE THOMAS, 

 

 Petitioner, Case No. 14-13492 

 HON. TERRENCE G. BERG 

 v. 

DUNCAN MACLAREN, 

 

 Respondent. 

_______________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER (1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS, (2) DENYNG A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND (3) 

DENYING PERMISSION TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner, 

Michigan state prisoner Lonnie Thomas, was convicted in the Wayne County Circuit 

Court of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under M.C.L §§ 

750.520b(1)(a) and (2)(b). (Dkt. 1, p. 1.) Petitioner is serving concurrent terms of 

25-to-40 years’ imprisonment for each conviction. (Dkt. 9-9, p. 11). The application 

raises three claims: (1) the trial court erroneously prevented defense counsel from 

questioning potential jurors during jury selection; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; and 

(3) insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s convictions. (Dkt. 1, pp. 5, 7, and 8). 

For the reasons stated below, the Court will DENY the petition because the 

state court adjudication of his claims did not involve an unreasonable application of 

clearly established United States Supreme Court law. The Court will also DENY 

Petitioner a certificate of appealability and permission to proceed on appeal in forma 

pauperis. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In 2011, Petitioner was convicted in Wayne County Circuit Court of three 

counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. (Dkt. 1, p. 1.) Petitioner was initially 

sentenced on April 28, 2011 to “25 years to life” on each count, to be served 

concurrently. (Dkt. 9-8, p. 7.) On May 10, 2011, Petitioner filed a writ of habeas 

corpus with the trial court. (See Dkt. 9-1, p. 5.) The trial court then amended its 

original sentence at a second hearing on May 17, 2011, sentencing Petitioner to 

concurrent prison terms of 25 to 40 years.1 (See id.) 

 On March 27, 2012, Petitioner appealed his jury-trial convictions to the 

Michigan Court of Appeals.2 (See Dkt. 1, p. 2; Dkt. 9-9, p. 10.) On appeal, Petitioner 

contended that: (1) the trial judge, in conducting voir dire himself, failed to delve into 

any true bias that might be present within the jury pool; (2) the prosecutor 

committed misconduct by making inflammatory and disparaging remarks about 

Petitioner in her closing argument and denigrating defense witnesses by 

characterizing them as untruthful; (3) Petitioner’s attorney was ineffective by not 

objecting to the prosecutor’s remarks; and (4) the evidence presented at trial was 

 

1 May 17, 2011 is the date of sentencing that appears in Petitioner’s offender profile. See Offender 

Profile, Offender Tracking Information System (“OTIS”), 

http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=802563 (last visited April 29, 

2016); see also the Amended Judgment of Sentence (Dkt. 9-9, p. 11.) 

2 Petitioner did not immediately appeal his sentence but returned to the trial court on February 17, 

2012, approximately 7 months after he was sentenced, having filed a motion to reclaim his right to 

appeal as of right. (See Dkt. 9-1; Dkt. 9-9, p. 12.) The Court granted Petitioner’s motion and issued a 

nunc pro tunc order, allowing Petitioner’s appeal to go forward. (Dkt. 9-9, p. 12.) 

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insufficient to support his convictions.3 See People v. Thomas, No. 309339, 2013 WL 

2120299 (Mich. Ct. App. May 16, 2013). 

This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan 

Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009): 

According to the victim, when she was about seven years of age and 

defendant was babysitting her, he would tell her to pull down her pants and 

underwear and lay down on the floor, and then he would “lick” her “private 

part.” She testified that he licked her “[i]n the middle” of her “private part,” 

which she normally used to go to the bathroom. This occurred more than once 

and on “most of the days” over the course of the months that he babysat her. 

Defendant told her not to tell anyone. The victim similarly told the forensic 

interviewer that the incidents occurred every time defendant babysat her and 

“more than once” but that defendant “never did anything else.” Although 

corroboration was unnecessary, the victim’s mother gave a similar account of 

the abuse as told to her by the victim, and her description of how the victim 

eventually disclosed the abuse to her was nearly identical to the victim’s 

testimony. 

Thomas, 2013 WL 2120299 at * 3. 

 On May 16, 2013, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

conviction in an unpublished opinion. Thomas, 2013 WL 2120299 at * 1. Because 

Petitioner did not object to voir dire, the jury, or the prosecutor’s remarks at trial, the 

Court reviewed these claims for plain error only. Id. With regard to the voir dire 

claim, the Court found that “the trial court adequately questioned the juror 

regarding potential bias,” generating 76 pages of transcript. Id. at * 1-2. The Court 

also dismissed the claim of prosecutorial misconduct, finding that the prosecutor’s 

 

3 In this federal habeas petition, Petitioner has raised all these claims except a claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (See Dkt. 1.) 

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language was arguably harsh, but it “did not rise to the level of prosecutorial 

misconduct warranting reversal.” Id. at * 3. 

 Petitioner’s remaining claims fared no better. Although Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim was not found to be properly before the Court because 

Petitioner “failed to raise it in his statement of the questions presented,”4 the Court, 

having found that there was no prosecutorial misconduct, noted that Petitioner’s 

“defense counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise meritless objections 

to the prosecutor’s proper arguments.” Id. at * 4. Finally, the Court held that the 

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdict, stating that “[t]he 

victim’s testimony alone was enough to establish the elements of the offenses in 

[Petitioner’s] case.” Id. at 5. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this 

motion was denied on July 2, 2013. (Dkt. 9-9, p. 107.) 

 Petitioner appealed this decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. (Dkt. 9-10.) 

On December 23, 2013, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s application 

because it was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed. 

People v. Thomas, 840 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. 2013) (unpublished table decision). 

Petitioner did not appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Instead, Petitioner 

filed this federal habeas petition on September 9, 2014. (Dkt. 1.) Petitioner twice filed 

to stay this case, and the Court denied both motions. (Dkts. 7, 13.) 

 

4 Petitioner raises this claim in his appellate brief, stating that “[t]rial counsel’s failure to object to the 

improper prejudicial remarks constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Dkt. 9-9, p. 43.) 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., sets forth the standard of review that federal 

courts must use when considering habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging 

their state court convictions. The AEDPA provides in relevant part: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 

unless the adjudication of the claim— 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sharply curtails a federal court’s review of 

constitutional claims raised by a state prisoner in a habeas corpus action if the 

claims were rejected on the merits by the state courts. Relief is barred under this 

section unless the state court adjudication was “contrary to” or resulted in an 

“unreasonable application of” clearly established law, “as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States” at the time the state court renders its decision. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)); Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court “has held on 

numerous occasions that it is not ‘an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law’ for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not 

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been squarely established by this Court”) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 

120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)) 

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies 

a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it 

‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’” 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams, 529 

U.S. at 405-06); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “[T]he ‘unreasonable 

application’ prong of the statute permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] 

Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of a petitioner’s case.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see 

also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, “[i]n order for a federal court to find a state 

court’s application of [Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s 

decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s 

application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 

(citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. The “AEDPA thus imposes a 

‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that 

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 

773 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. 

Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). 

A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit “precludes federal 

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habeas relief so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the 

state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has 

emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s 

contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 

75 (2003)). Pursuant to section 2254(d), “a habeas court must determine what 

arguments or theories supported or... could have supported, the state court’s 

decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a 

prior decision” of the Supreme Court. Id. In order to obtain habeas relief in federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s rejection of his claim “was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. Section 

2254(d) thus “reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme 

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error 

correction through appeal...” Id. 

As noted above, a state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on 

federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Accordingly, habeas review is 

“limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 

170, 181 (2011). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and 

convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). 

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III. ANALYSIS 

A. Procedural Default 

 Respondent asserts that: (1) Petitioner’s jury voir dire claim is barred from 

review because Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection; 

and (2) that Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is defaulted due to his 

counsel’s failure to place an objection. (Dkt. 8, pp. 3, 29-34, 39-40). The Court will 

nevertheless proceed directly to the merits of Petitioner’s claims without 

consideration of whether they are procedurally defaulted because the claims lack 

substantive merit and a procedural-default analysis “adds nothing but complexity to 

the case.” Babick v. Berghuis, 620 F.3d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2010). 

B. Jury Voir Dire 

 Petitioner’s first claim asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right 

to a fair and impartial jury when the trial court questioned prospective jurors on its 

own without the participation of the parties. (Dkt. 1, p. 5.) Petitioner argues that 

this questioning of the prospective jurors was cursory at best and did not delve into 

issues which might have ferreted out jurors who would be unable to impartially 

decide a child-molestation case. (Id. at 52-56.) 

 The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the claim was waived by defense 

counsel’s failure to object, but it also reviewed the record and determined that the 

trial court conducted an adequate voir dire questioning of the prospective jurors. The 

appellate court noted that the trial court excused several jurors who had connections 

to sexual assault victims. The prosecutor also excused one juror for cause on the 

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basis of his connection to a crime victim, and defense counsel exercised nine 

peremptory challenges. Thomas, 2013 WL 2120299, at * 1-2. 

 “[P]art of the guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an 

adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 

729 (1992). “[W]ithout an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove 

prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions 

and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 

U.S. 182, 188 (1981). The Supreme Court has admonished, however, that “[t]he 

adequacy of voir dire is not easily the subject of appellate review.” Morgan, 504 U.S. 

at 730. A state trial judge “retains great latitude in deciding what questions should 

be asked on voir dire.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991). A state court’s 

refusal to pose “constitutionally compelled” questions can entitle a habeas petitioner 

to relief. Id. at 424-26. But questions are “constitutionally compelled” during voir 

dire only if “the trial court’s failure to ask these questions [renders] the defendant’s 

trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 425-26. 

Here, the trial court conducted the voir dire of prospective jurors on its own 

without any participation by the attorneys except for entertaining their challenges 

for cause and peremptory strikes. The court began the selection process by informing 

the prospective jurors of the importance of the right to trial by jury, and that the 

jurors must be free from bias, prejudice or sympathy for either side. (Dkt. 9-5, pp. 

10-11). The jury pool was administered an oath to answer all questions honestly. (Id.

at 11.) The jurors were informed that they would be asked questions to find out if 

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they knew anything about the particular case and to find out if they had any 

opinions or experiences that might cause them not to be impartial. (Id. at 12.) They 

were told not to hesitate to speak freely about anything they believed the court 

should know. (Id. at 12-13.) 

The court informed the jurors of the identities of the defendant, the victim, the 

witnesses, the lawyers, and the officers involved in the case. (Id. at 13-15.) The court 

also informed them about the anticipated length of the trial and asked if it would 

present a hardship for any of them. (Id. at 16-18.) After telling the jurors about the 

legal standards governing the case, including the presumption of innocence and the 

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof, the court then read the criminal 

information to the jury, informing them that the charges involved the alleged sexual 

assault of a child. (Id. at 18-21, 66.) 

Next, the court asked each juror seated on the panel a series of general 

biographical questions about their age, level of education, profession, marital status, 

whether they had children, and their children’s ages. (Id. at 23-99.) Throughout the 

selection process, as jurors were struck and replaced, the court asked each 

replacement juror the same set of biographical questions. (See id.) The jurors were 

all asked if they would be able to keep open mind until they heard all of the evidence. 

(Id. at 49.) 

Each juror was asked whether they had previously served as a juror, and if so, 

what the nature of the case was and the verdict. (Id. at 38-40.) The jurors were asked 

whether they had personally been victims of a crime or whether any of their family 

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members or friends had been victims. (Id. at 40-44.) They were also asked whether 

they would give more weight to the testimony of police officers, (Id. at 44-47). They 

were asked whether they had been arrested or convicted of any crimes. (Id. at 48-49.) 

And they were asked if they would be able to put aside feelings of sympathy for 

either side. (Id. at 49.) 

When the Court informed the jury pool about the nature of the charges, it 

elicited responses from some jurors that they could not be fair and impartial. A 

gynecologist who examined rape victims was excused for cause. (Id. at 49-50.) 

Another three jurors were struck for cause or peremptorily because they indicated 

that they knew victims of sexual assault cases. (Id. at 56-57, 73, 76-77.) Another 

juror was excused when he indicated that he believed a defendant who was arrested 

must have done something wrong. (Id. at 74.) 

Accordingly, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the voir dire was conducted in 

a constitutionally permissible manner. Petitioner has failed to identify any omitted 

area of questioning that rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. See Mu’Min, 500 

U.S. at 425-26. Petitioner asserts that the jurors were not asked about their views on 

homosexuality (Dkt. 1, p. 54), but he fails to show how such questioning was relevant 

to his defense—as far as the record shows Petitioner identifies as male and the 

victim identifies as female. 

It is true, as Petitioner asserts, that the jurors were not asked about their 

views on the credibility of children as witnesses (Id.), but the jurors were informed 

that the case involved a child-victim and they were asked if they could put aside 

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their feelings of sympathy. (Dkt. 9-5, pp. 12-13.) The jurors were also asked whether 

they had children and were told to speak freely about anything they believed the 

court should know. (Id.) Notably, three prospective jurors were struck because of the 

nature of the charges. This indicates that the court’s questioning was probing 

enough to ferret out the type of juror Petitioner alleges the court’s inquiries were 

inadequate to reveal. 

Established Supreme Court law did not require more probing questions then 

the ones asked by the trial court. “No hard-and-fast formula dictates the necessary 

depth or breadth of voir dire.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) 

(citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-146 (1936)) (“Impartiality is not a 

technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental 

attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests 

and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula.”) 

In Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973), the Supreme Court held 

that a state trial judge was constitutionally compelled in that case to inquire into the 

possibility of racial prejudice during the voir dire of a jury. However, the Court 

further concluded that a trial judge is not required to put the question in any 

particular form, or to ask any particular number of questions on the subject, simply 

because the judge was asked by the defendant to do so. Id. Under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, “brief, general questions” about possible racial prejudices are 

“sufficient to focus the attention of prospective jurors on any racial prejudice they 

might entertain.” Id. Similarly here, the jury was made sufficiently aware of the 

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nature of this case to reveal any prejudices or biases they might hold given the 

nature of the charges against Petitioner. 

After a careful review of the record, the Court finds that the decision by the 

state appellate court that the trial court conducted a constitutionally-adequate voir 

dire was not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103 (internal quotation omitted). Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate entitlement to habeas relief under section 2254(d). 

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Petitioner’s second claim asserts that the prosecutor inflamed the passions of 

the jury by referring to him as a “monster,” “creep,” and “pervert” during closing 

arguments. (Dkt. 1, p. 58; Dkt. 9-7, p. 46.) Petitioner also asserts that the prosecutor 

improperly attacked the defense witnesses’ credibility by characterizing them as 

being untruthful. (Dkt 1, p. 61.) The Michigan Court of Appeals found that this 

unpreserved allegation of error did not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct 

warranting reversal. Thomas, 2013 WL 2120299, at * 2-3. 

The United States Supreme Court has made clear that prosecutors must 

“refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.” Berger 

v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s conduct or 

remarks “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 

denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); see also

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Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (citing Donnelly); Parker v. 

Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012) (confirming that Donnelly/Darden is the 

proper standard). “[T]he Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the state courts 

have substantial breathing room when considering prosecutorial misconduct claims 

because constitutional line drawing in prosecutorial misconduct cases is necessarily 

imprecise.” Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 516 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). Indeed, because “the Darden standard is a very 

general one,” courts have “more leeway . . . in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 

determinations.” Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Petitioner complains about the following excerpt of the prosecutor’s closing 

argument: 

What is not in dispute, Lonnie Carl Thomas was a man people 

knew and trusted, people thought was a good guy. Even [AD]’s own 

mother sat there and told you [defendant] was a good man. I loved him, 

I trusted him, I believed in him, I had faith in him. She did not paint 

him to be some kind of monster. She didn’t know he was a creep and I 

[sic] should not have let my [sic] baby with him. 

One of the things I said in opening statement is that baby sitters 

[sic] don’t come with warning labels. Lonnie Thomas didn’t come with 

a[n] I’m a creepy pervert, leave me alone with your little girl and I will 

have oral sex with her. 

We give kids medicine, toys, movies, all have warning labels. 

Lonnie Thomas didn’t. The reputation you heard he had in the 

community from play sisters and friends he has known for 20 years and 

different kids he watched, what was his reputation? Exactly what 

Raquel Poe told. He was a good man. The kind of person people trusted 

with their kids. No matter what his relationship was with other kids, 

no matter what else he did in the world, he was the kind of person these 

women felt safe leaving their children alone with. 

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(Dkt. 9-7, pp. 46-47). 

A prosecutor may not make statements for the sole purpose of inflaming the 

jury’s passions against the defendant. Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307, 333 (6th 

Cir. 2012). Prosecutors are not categorically barred, however, from using rhetorical 

devices reasonably calculated to make relevant points. United States v. Taylor, No. 

09-5517, 2016 WL 537444, at * 22 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2016) (defendant’s trial not 

rendered unfair by prosecutor comments comparing him to a “remorseless and 

relentless hunter,” a “dangerous chameleon,” and a “wolf”). In fact, in Darden itself 

the prosecutor referred to the defendant as an “animal” who “shouldn’t be out of his 

cell unless he has a leash on him,” and the Supreme Court held that these comments 

did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id., 477 U.S. at 181-83; see also United 

States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 588–90 (6th Cir. 2010) (prosecutor’s description of 

defendants as “monsters” improper but not requiring reversal); Bedford v. Collins, 

567 F.3d 225, 234 (6th Cir. 2009) (prosecutor’s description of defendant as a “demon” 

did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial); United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 

616 (6th Cir. 2008) (prosecutor calling defendant a “predator” did not require 

reversal). 

Quite simply, if the Supreme Court did not grant relief to the defendant in 

Darden, where the prosecutor compared the defendant to an “animal,” and if the 

Sixth Circuit was not compelled to grant relief where the prosecutor compared the 

defendants to “monsters” or “predators,” then so too was the Michigan Court of 

Appeals permitted to deny relief when Petitioner was compared to a “monster” or 

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“creep.” 

Similarly, the prosecutor did not denigrate defense witnesses who vouched for 

Petitioner’s character. The prosecutor asserted that the jury should question these 

witnesses’ credibility because on cross examination she showed that they did not 

know Petitioner as well as they thought they did. (Dkt. 9-7, pp. 60-61). This line of 

argument was not improper; it was properly based on the evidence presented at 

trial. 

The state court adjudication of this claim did not result in an unreasonable 

application of the clearly established Supreme Court standard. Accordingly, 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate entitlement to habeas relief under § 2254(d). 

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Petitioner’s third claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. (Dkt. 1, p. 

28.) He asserts that the only evidence linking him to the crime was the testimony of 

the young victim. (Id. at 29.) He notes that the testimony of the victim was not 

corroborated by any forensic data, medical evidence, a rape kit, or history of 

therapeutic treatment. (Id.) He also complains that the victim did not make the 

allegations against him until a year after the offenses were alleged to have been 

committed, and only after there was a dispute between the victim’s mother and 

Petitioner regarding money owed for his babysitting. (Id.) The Michigan Court of 

Appeals found that the victim’s testimony alone was legally sufficient to support the 

verdict. Thomas, 2013 WL 2120299, at * 3-4. 

“The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 

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proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 

which he is charged.” In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). But the critical 

inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is 

“whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). This inquiry, 

however, does not require a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence 

at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Instead, the relevant 

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 318-19 (internal citation and footnote 

omitted). 

More importantly, a federal habeas court may not overturn a state court 

decision that rejects a sufficiency of the evidence claim simply because the federal 

court disagrees with the state court’s resolution of that claim. Instead, a federal 

court may grant habeas relief only if the state court decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 

2, 4, 181 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2011). “Because rational people can sometimes disagree, the 

inevitable consequence of this settled law is that judges will sometimes encounter 

convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that they must nonetheless 

uphold.” Id. For a federal habeas court reviewing a state court conviction, “the only 

question under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below 

the threshold of bare rationality.” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2065, 182 L. 

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Ed. 2d 978 (2012). 

At bottom, Petitioner’s argument is more about the credibility of the victim 

than the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. The victim testified 

to all the elements of the offense. (See Dkt. 9-5, pp. 110-114). The victim testified 

that when she was between 7 and 8 years old, Petitioner babysat for her. (Id.) On 

several occasions when the victim was alone in Petitioner’s care, he would have her 

lay down on the airbed in the living room, remove her pants and panties, and he 

would “lick” her “private part.” (Id.) Petitioner argues that there were reasons not to 

believe the victim, but whether to believe the victim or not was a decision for the 

jury, not a court reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The testimony of a 

single, uncorroborated prosecuting witness, or other eyewitness, is generally 

sufficient to support a conviction. Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1144 (6th Cir. 

1985). Attacks on witness credibility are “simply challenges to the quality of the 

government’s evidence and not to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Moreland v. 

Bradshaw, 699 F.3d 908, 920 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). This claim is also 

without merit. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

In order to appeal this Court’s decision, Petitioner must obtain a certificate of 

appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability, Petitioner must make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To 

demonstrate this denial, the applicant is required to show that reasonable jurists 

could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner, 

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or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). A federal district court may 

grant or deny a certificate of appealability when the court issues a ruling on the 

habeas petition. Castro v. United States, 310 F.3d 900, 901 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, for 

the reasons stated above, jurists of reason would not debate whether the petition 

should have been resolved in a different manner. Petitioner has not made a strong 

showing that any of his claims have merit or were unreasonably adjudicated in the 

state courts. The Court will therefore deny a certificate of appealability and 

permission to appeal in forma pauperis because an appeal of this decision cannot be 

taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(a)(3). 

 

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V. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED WITH 

PREJUDICE. For the same reasons that the Court denies the petition, the Court 

discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. The Court therefore CERTIFIES that 

any appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith, and DENIES

Petitioner a certificate of appealability and leave to appeal this decision in forma 

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 

SO ORDERED. 

s/Terrence G. Berg 

 TERRENCE G. BERG 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: May 11, 2016 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on May 11, 2016 

using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party. 

s/A. Chubb 

 Case Manager 

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