J-A16006-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RONALD AND ALICIA BENTON, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HUSBAND 

AND WIFE 

Appellants

v.

POLLINA SHULL, LINA I. EYDLIN, 

ALEX EYDLIN AND VON M. 

SCHWANDT

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1938 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered November 6, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Civil Division at No(s): 18-2469

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 04, 2020

Alicia and Ronald Benton appeal from the order granting summary 

judgment in favor of Pollina Shull and her parents, Linda and Alex Eydlin, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County. On appeal, the Bentons contend 

the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing their claims 

under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 75 Pa. C.S.A. 

§§ 1701 et. seq. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

This case arises from a three-car accident in which a vehicle driven by 

Alicia Benton was struck from behind on Route 422 in Berks County. Shull, 

who was driving a car owned by her parents, rear-ended a car driven by Von 

Schwandt. Schwandt’s car, in turn, then struck Alicia Benton’s rear bumper. 

Although the Benton car sustained only minor damage, Ronald, Alicia’s 
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husband and the passenger in the front seat, claimed he suffered neck and 

back injuries due to the accident. 

The Bentons filed a tort action against Shull, Shull’s parents, and 

Schwandt to recover damages for personal injury and loss of consortium. In 

their complaint, the Bentons alleged that, as a result of Shull and Schwandt’s 

negligence, Ronald sustained severe injuries to his neck and back. These 

injuries, in turn, resulted in mental anguish, lost income, and medical 

expenses. Accordingly, the Bentons sought economic as well as non-economic 

damages. 

Thereafter, Schwandt filed a motion for summary judgment alleging 

Shull and her parents were solely liable to the Bentons. The trial court granted 

the motion and dismissed Schwandt from the case.

Shull and her parents filed their Answer and New Matter, averring that 

the Bentons were precluded from recovering damages for non-economic loss 

because they had elected limited-tort coverage under the MVFRL. Shull and 

her parents alleged that the MVFRL only allows a limited-tort plaintiff to 

recover non-economic damages for “serious injuries,” and that Ronald was not 

able to prove that his injuries were “serious” under the MVFRL. 

At his deposition, Ronald testified that the injuries he suffered in the 

accident have had a severe impact on his physical condition. In the years 

following the accident, he underwent multiple surgical procedures to alleviate 

pain in his neck and back. These procedures included a cervical discectomy in 

his neck and lumbar decompression and fusion surgery on his back. He has 
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also undergone physical therapy for his condition. However, despite receiving 

various medical treatments, Ronald opined that his neck and back pain has 

worsened in the years since the accident. 

He also explained that his injuries have had an adverse effect on his 

social life and marriage. Ronald is no longer able to drive – even though he 

drove very little before the accident – and spends most of his time at home. 

Moreover, he stated that he stopped having sex with his wife, Alicia, due to 

the pain in his neck and back.

In addition, Ronald testified that his injuries prevented him from being 

able to work at the janitorial services business he owns. Ronald maintained 

that after the accident he was forced to hire employees to perform his 

responsibilities. He claims he is no longer able to work as a result of the 

accident. 

The evidence adduced at the deposition also showed that Ronald had a 

history of neck and back injuries predating the accident at issue. Ronald 

admitted that he suffered neck and back injuries on several occasions prior to 

the accident and that he experienced chronic neck and back pain for nearly 

two decades. Throughout the years, Ronald has undergone various treatments 

and surgical procedures on his neck and back in an attempt to alleviate his 

pain. In fact, several hours before the accident, Ronald was seen at the 

Rothman Institute and was given a prescription for oxycodone to treat the 

pain in his neck and back.
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Following Ronald’s deposition, Shull and her parents filed a motion for 

partial summary judgment on the Bentons’ claim for non-economic damages 

under the MVFRL. In their motion, they argued that, since there was no expert 

medical report showing that Ronald sustained a serious injury, the Bentons 

were barred from recovering non-economic damages. The trial court held a 

hearing and granted the motion. Accordingly, the Bentons were precluded 

from presenting any testimony or evidence related to any non-economic 

damages at trial.

Shortly thereafter, Shull and her parents filed a motion for summary 

judgment on the Bentons’ remaining claim for economic damages. They 

argued that the economic damages claim should be dismissed as it was 

entirely dependent upon the claim for non-economic damages, which had 

already been disposed of by the trial court. The trial court agreed, and entered 

an order granting the summary judgment motion and dismissing the Bentons’ 

civil action with prejudice. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, the Bentons raise the following issues for our review:

1. [Whether] the lower court erred in granting partial summary 

judgment where the evidence introduced showed there was a 

genuine issue of material fact as the medical evidence uniformly 

stated the accident exacerbated [Ronald Benton’s] pre-existing 

condition, there was a marked increase in pain as a result of the 

accident . . . and there was medical evidence that opined that 

[Ronald’s] current condition was caused by the motor vehicle 

accident?

2. [Whether] the lower court err[ed] in granting summary 

judgment and dismissing the complaint with prejudice when the 

court incorrectly held the preclusion of the claim for non-economic 
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damages did not preclude plaintiff from asserting a claim for 

economic damages as pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A § 1705 (d), a 

person who elects the limited tort alternative remains eligible to 

seek compensation for economic loss?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

In their first issue, the Bentons argue the trial court erred in granting

partial summary judgment on their claim for non-economic damages. We 

disagree.

We review a challenge to the entry of summary judgment as follows:

[We] may disturb the order of the trial court only where it is 

established that the court committed an error of law or abused its 

discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary 

judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the 

summary judgment rule. See Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1035.2. The rule 

states that where there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary 

judgment may be entered. Where the nonmoving party bears the 

burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his 

pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment. 

Failure of a nonmoving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an 

issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of 

proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment 

as a matter of law. Lastly, we review the record in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved 

against the moving party.

In re Risperdal Litigation, 175 A.3d 1023, 1028-1029 (Pa. Super. 

2017).

In Pennsylvania, when purchasing automobile insurance, drivers are 

presented with the option of choosing either full or limited-tort coverage under 

the MVFRL. See 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1705. A driver who has selected full-tort 
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coverage under their insurance policy and who is injured by a negligent driver 

can recover all medical and out-of-pocket expenses, and receive financial 

compensation for pain and suffering and other non-economic damages. See 

Verner-Mort v. Kapfhammer, 109 A.3d 244, 248 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing 

75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1705(a)(1)(B)). “A limited-tort plaintiff also can recover all 

medical and out-of-pocket expenses; however, such a plaintiff cannot recover 

for pain and suffering or other non-economic damages unless the plaintiff’s 

injuries fall within the definition of ‘serious injury’.” Id. (citing 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 

1705(a)(1)(A)). A “serious injury” is defined as “[a] personal injury resulting 

in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious 

disfigurement.” 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1702.

Here, there is no dispute that the Bentons elected limited-tort coverage 

under their policy and therefore must establish that Ronald suffered a “serious 

injury” as defined by the MVFRL in order to recover non-economic damages. 

There is also no dispute that, under the circumstances of this case, Ronald 

was required to show he sustained an injury resulting in “serious impairment 

of body function.” The Bentons, however, contest the trial court’s conclusion 

that they failed to present evidence capable of establishing that Ronald 

sustained such an injury. They assert that this question should have been 

determined by a jury, not the court. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17. 

Our Supreme Court in Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 740 (Pa. 

1998), held that the threshold determination of whether a “serious injury” has 
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been sustained was to be “left to a jury unless reasonable minds could not 

differ on the issue of whether a serious injury had been sustained.” However,

the Court went on to find that the trial court in that case had properly granted 

summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to establish that 

he had suffered a “serious injury.” See id. 

In reaching this conclusion, the Washington Court explained that the 

inquiry is not whether the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to show 

that he has suffered any injury. Rather, the Court emphasized that the 

question is whether the plaintiff has shown that he has suffered a serious 

injury such that a body function has been seriously impaired. See id., at 741. 

To help lower courts answer that question, the Court directed them to consider 

the following factors: (1) the extent of the impairment, (2) the length of time 

the impairment existed, (3) the treatment required to correct the impairment, 

and (4) any other relevant factors. See id., at 740. Further, the Court stated 

that medical testimony will generally be needed to establish the existence and 

extent of an impairment. See id.

Therefore, Ronald was required to establish that the accident caused a 

serious injury in order to get non-economic damages. In applying 

Washington, this Court has found that a limited-tort elector seeking noneconomic damages did not establish that he had suffered a “serious injury” 

when he did not provide any objective medical evidence regarding the degree 

of an impairment and the extent of any pain suffered. See McGee v. 
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Muldowney, 750 A.2d 912, 915 (Pa. Super. 2000). We held that subjective 

allegations alone, in the absence of objective medical evidence, are not 

sufficient to establish that a serious injury has occurred. See id. 

Here, Ronald presented evidence – most notably, the opinion of Dr. 

Alexander Ricciuti, M.D. – that he suffered some injuries due to the accident. 

Dr. Ricciuti opined that, as a direct result of the accident, Ronald suffered a 

lumbar sprain, a cervical sprain, a myofascial spasm of the trapezius, and a 

thoracic sprain. See Exhibit E, at 3. However, given his pre-existing injuries, 

Ronald failed to establish that any of those injuries were serious.

As discussed above, Ronald suffered various injuries to his neck and 

back in the years leading up to the instant car accident. He sustained a lumbar 

disc herniation and other injuries to his neck and back in a series of car 

accidents predating the one at issue. See N.T., Deposition, 09/26/2018, at 

45-46 and 118-119. He also suffered neck and back injuries due to a workrelated accident and a medical mishap. See id., at 17-20. These episodes, in 

particular, required Ronald to undergo a cervical spinal fusion on his neck and 

a lumbar spinal fusion on his back. See id., at 21-22. Also, in that period, 

Ronald was diagnosed with Guillain-Barre syndrome and experienced a degree 

of weakness and paralysis in his back.1 See id., at 14-15.

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1 “Guillain-Barre syndrome is rare disorder in which your body’s immune 

system attacks your nerves.” Mayo Clinic, 

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/guillain-barre-
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As a result of these injuries, Ronald registered complaints of chronic 

neck and back pain for well over a decade. His extensive medical history 

reveals that his discomfort reached its apex on the day of the accident when 

he presented for an examination at the Rothman Institute. There, Ronald 

described to his treating physician, Dr. Saloni Sharma, M.D., that his neck and 

back pain was an “8” on a scale of 10. See Exhibit A, at 1. He also reported 

that he felt sharp and stabbing pain in his neck. See id. Dr. Sharma’s 

examination noted “suspicious” changes in Ronald’s cervical myelomalcia, as 

compared to previous years, and multiple levels of degenerative disc disease. 

See id., at 1.2 The examination also showed a deterioration in Ronald’s 

physical condition. This led Dr. Sharma to conclude that Ronald needed to 

continue seeking treatment for his chronic neck and back pain. See id., at 1-

2.

Following the instant accident, we note that Ronald continued to 

complain of neck and back pain, but not on the level he did before the 

accident. He described his neck and back pain as between a “5” and “10” on 

____________________________________________

syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20362793. The exact cause of GuillainBarre syndrome remains unknown. See id.

2 “Cervical myelopathy is a form of myelopathy that involves compression of 

the spinal cord in the cervical spine (neck).” Johns Hopkins Medicine, 

https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/cervicalmyelopathy. “Degenerative disk disease is when normal changes that take 

place in the disks of your spine cause pain.” Johns Hopkins Medicine, 

https://www.webmd.com/back-pain/degenerative-disk-disease-overview#1. 
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the pain scale after the accident. See Exhibit C, at 2. This is a notable variation 

as Ronald stated before the accident that his pain was unequivocally an “8” 

on the pain scale. See Exhibit A, at 1. Further, the post-accident medical 

evidence shows that Ronald’s cervical myelomalcia remains a noted concern 

as does his degenerative disc disease. See Exhibit C, at 1; see also Exhibit 

E, at 3-4. Hence, there is no objective evidence that would allow us to discern 

any significant dissimilarity between Ronald’s physical condition prior to the 

accident and in the immediate aftermath.

Accordingly, none of the post-accident medical evidence established 

that Ronald suffered serious injuries to his neck and back. The medical 

evidence merely showed that Ronald suffered some injuries as a result of the 

accident. However, Ronald’s evidence was insufficient to establish that any of 

the injuries he suffered from this accident were serious, given the serious 

injuries he was suffering from before the accident. Therefore, under the 

circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in finding the evidence 

insufficient to establish that Ronald suffered a serious injury due to the 

accident. 

Next, the Bentons challenge the trial court’s decision to grant summary 

judgment on their economic damages claim and dismiss their complaint with 

prejudice. They argue that the court erred in preventing them from asserting 

a claim for economic damages pursuant to 75 C.S.A. § 1705(d). See 
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Appellant’s Brief, at 19. The Bentons contend that they retain the right to seek 

economic damages as authorized by the limited-tort option. See id.

Under the limited-tort option, a policy holder and other household 

members covered under the policy may seek to recover economic damages 

for all medical and out-of-pocket expenses. See 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 

1705(a)(1)(A). Notably, a claim for economic damages is an entirely separate 

and distinct inquiry under the limited-tort option. See Long v. Mejia, 896 

A.2d 596, 600 (Pa. Super. 2006). Therefore, even if the policy holder is 

precluded from seeking non-economic damages, he or she is entitled to 

present evidence of economic loss as a result of an accident. See 75 Pa. C.S.A. 

§ 1705(a)(1)(A).

Here, the Bentons sought to present evidence of economic loss as a 

result of the accident. Even though their claim for non-economic damages was 

foreclosed by the trial court, the Bentons remained steadfast, as they do now, 

that the limited-tort option entitled them to seek economic damages to 

recover all medical and out-of-pocket expenses. But the trial court, having 

found that the Bentons failed to overcome the limited-tort threshold on noneconomic damages, granted summary judgment on the issue of economic 

damages. See Trial Court Opinion, 01/24/2020, at 12. 

In reaching this conclusion, the trial court misread the MVFRL. Under 

the statute, a claim for economic damages is entirely separate from a claim 

for non-economic damages. See Long, 896 A.2d at 600. As such, a claim for 
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economic loss under the limited-tort option is available regardless of whether 

or not the claimant succeeds on his or her non-economic claim for pain and 

suffering. See id.

Moreover, the Bentons presented evidence capable of establishing that 

Ronald suffered an injury due to the accident. Unlike a claim for non-economic 

damages, the Bentons did not need to establish that Ronald sustained a 

serious injury in the accident. Rather, they needed only to present medical 

evidence that showed Ronald suffered some injury, which they did. For that 

reason, the Bentons should have been permitted to present evidence of 

economic loss to a jury, particularly with regard to unpaid medical bills and 

any lost wages. It was for the jury to decide whether those losses were caused 

by the accident or were the result of Ronald’s pre-existing injuries. 

As a result, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment on the Bentons’ claim for economic damages under the limited-tort 

option. The limited-tort option does not prevent claimants from seeking 

recovery for economic damages merely because the claim for non-economic 

damages fails. Thus, the Bentons are entitled to present evidence of economic 

loss incurred as a result of the accident.
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Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings on the issue of 

economic damages.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/4/2020