# C_2008083EN.01000201.xml

| 2.4.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 83/2 |
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2.4.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 83/2

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its meeting on 15 June 2007 concerning a preliminary draft decision relating to Case COMP/38.784 — Wanadoo España v Telefónica

Rapporteur: United Kingdom

(2008/C 83/02)

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the relevant product markets in Spain are the retail broadband ‘mass’ market and the markets for wholesale broadband access at both national and regional level. A minority abstains. |
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1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the relevant product markets in Spain are the retail broadband ‘mass’ market and the markets for wholesale broadband access at both national and regional level. A minority abstains.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Telefónica de España is dominant in the relevant markets. |
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2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Telefónica de España is dominant in the relevant markets.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission with the methodology and data used to determine a margin squeeze by Telefónica, including the use of different data to CMT (the Spanish Regulator) in its decisions. A minority abstains. |
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3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission with the methodology and data used to determine a margin squeeze by Telefónica, including the use of different data to CMT (the Spanish Regulator) in its decisions. A minority abstains.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's calculations determining a margin squeeze. A minority abstains. |
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4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's calculations determining a margin squeeze. A minority abstains.

| 5. | As regards the Commission's conclusion on the impact of the margin squeeze on competition and harm to the consumer, the Advisory Committee agrees with (a) the Commission's assessment on likely effects; and (b) the Commission's assessment on actual effects. A minority disagrees on (b). |
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5.

As regards the Commission's conclusion on the impact of the margin squeeze on competition and harm to the consumer, the Advisory Committee agrees with (a) the Commission's assessment on likely effects; and (b) the Commission's assessment on actual effects. A minority disagrees on (b).

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission (a) that there is no objective justification for the margin squeeze; and (b) that the margin squeeze is an infringement of Article 82 of the Treaty. |
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6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission (a) that there is no objective justification for the margin squeeze; and (b) that the margin squeeze is an infringement of Article 82 of the Treaty.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Telefónica had autonomy to set prices and that CMT's decisions regarding margin squeeze do not provide Telefónica with immunity from the application of Article 82. A minority abstains. |
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7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Telefónica had autonomy to set prices and that CMT's decisions regarding margin squeeze do not provide Telefónica with immunity from the application of Article 82. A minority abstains.

| 8. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of this opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
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8.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of this opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

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