UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THE ESTATE OF COREY HILL BY

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE RUDOLPH HILL, 

Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-cv-10079

Honorable Gershwin A. Drain 

v. 

CHRISTOPHER MIRACLE, 

Defendant. 

____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#34] 

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 9, 2015, decedent Corey Hill filed the instant action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Defendant, Christopher Miracle, violated the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition against excessive force when he tasered him while he was

suffering from a diabetic episode. The Complaint also asserts state law claims of

assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On October 29,

2015, this Court entered an Order Substituting the Estate of Corey Hill by Personal

Representative Rudolph Hill as the named Plaintiff. 

-1-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 1 of 20 Pg ID 468
Presently before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

filed on March 25, 2016. Defendant argues he is entitled to qualified immunity

because Plaintiff cannot establish a Fourth Amendment violation nor that the right

Defendant is alleged to have infringed was clearly established. This matter is fully

briefed and a hearing was held on May 19, 2016. For the reasons that follow, the

Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Decedent Hill was a diabetic. On June 23, 2013, he was suffering a diabetic

episode due to low blood sugar. His condition continued to deteriorate and his

girlfriend, Melanie Worrall, called an ambulance for assistance. At 3:20 p.m., Star

Emergency Medical Service was dispatched to Mr. Hill’s home. Luke Streeter was

one of the four paramedics to respond. 

Mr. Hill was disoriented and confused when the paramedics first arrived. The

paramedics introduced themselves to Mr. Hill and explained that they needed to check

his sugar levels. However, Mr. Hill was not listening to the paramedics. He pulled

away from them as they attempted to draw blood from his finger. He became

increasingly uncooperative as they tried to help him. Eventually, Mr. Streeter was

able to take Mr. Hill’s blood sugar level and discovered that it was very low at 38. A

normal blood sugar level is anywhere from 60 to 110. The doctor who later treated

-2-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 2 of 20 Pg ID 469
Mr. Hill explained that if his blood sugar level “was not treated, it could continue to

decrease and become fatal.” See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B at 14, ln. 23-24. 

Defendant Oakland County Sheriff Deputy Christopher Miracle arrived to assist

on the medical call at some time after Mr. Streeter was able to obtain blood from Mr.

Hill’s finger for testing. In his capacity as a law enforcement officer, Defendant

Miracle had at least a dozen prior experiences with individuals suffering diabetic

episodes. He understood that individuals suffering from such episodes “don’t act in

a normal capacity.” He was also aware that such individuals are insensate, and not

“focused to their surroundings.” 

At the time Defendant Miracle arrived on the scene, the paramedics were

attempting to establish an IV on Mr. Hill so that 25 milligrams of dextrose could be

administered to level out his blood sugar. All four paramedics were struggling to hold

Mr. Hill down on his bed in order to establish the IV, however Mr. Hill was becoming

increasingly combative. 

At one point, Mr. Streeter was able to insert a catheter into Mr. Hill’s arm, but

Mr. Hill was able to rip the catheter from his arm. Thus, his vein was open and blood

was spraying from his arm. Mr. Hill kicked, swung, and swore at the paramedics as

they attempted to establish the IV. While Mr. Streeter recalls that Mr. Hill also kicked

at Defendant Miracle, Defendant Miracle did not testify to this. Rather, Defendant

-3-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 3 of 20 Pg ID 470
admits that he never attempted to restrain Mr. Hill. Id., Ex. C at 17-18. The only time

he was near Mr. Hill was when he deployed his taser. Id. 

Plaintiff claims in his Response that Defendant was quite loud and belligerent 

and Ms. Worrall became agitated and upset and walked out of the bedroom. She told

the Defendant multiple times that Mr. Hill had experienced diabetic episodes on prior

occasions, that he was successfully contained each time, and the use of a taser was

unnecessary. 

Defendant Miracle described the use of his taser as “dry-stunning” where he

held it directly against Mr. Hill’s flesh for a few seconds, as opposed to shooting it

from a distance. Defendant explained that he rarely deployed his taser in this manner

because it was not recommended. Defendant touched Mr. Hill’s thigh for only a

moment. Defendant testified that he used the taser because he believed that Mr. Hill

posed a threat to himself and paramedics. He further explained that: 

So in my estimation I thought the dry stun would be better than any type

of, you know hands-on stuff and all the other–you know, because I

didn’t really know everything that was going on medically. 

See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C at 42. 

After Defendant administered the taser, the paramedics were able to

successfully establish a second IV in Mr. Hill’s arm. This allowed the paramedics to

provide Mr. Hill with a dose of dextrose which changed Mr. Hill’s demeanor

-4-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 4 of 20 Pg ID 471
immediately. Mr. Streeter described him as “an angel.” Mr. Hill apologized when the

paramedics explained that he had been aggressive with them. Mr. Streeter re-checked

Mr. Hill’s sugar level and obtained an EKG. Both tests were normal. Mr. Streeter did

not recall observing the area on Mr. Hill’s body where his taser made contact, but he

does remember that Mr. Hill denied being in any pain at the time. 

Mr. Hill was transported to McLaren Oakland Hospital in Pontiac for evaluation

and treatment. Medical records from McLaren reveal that Mr. Hill had a “taser

puncture wound” on his right thigh. However, no medical treatment was required in

relation to this puncture wound. After this incident, Plaintiff claims Mr. Hill suffered

burns on his legs and his diabetes worsened. 

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) empowers the court to render summary

judgment forthwith “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” See Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001). The

Supreme Court has affirmed the court's use of summary judgment as an integral part

of the fair and efficient administration of justice. The procedure is not a disfavored

-5-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 5 of 20 Pg ID 472
procedural shortcut. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see also Cox

v. Kentucky Dept. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1995).

The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is

“‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a

jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”

Amway Distributors Benefits Ass’n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir.

2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The

evidence and all reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Redding, 241 F.3d at 532 (6th Cir. 2001). “[T]he mere

existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that

there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original); see also National Satellite Sports, Inc. v.

Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).

If the movant establishes by use of the material specified in Rule 56(c) that

there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law, the opposing party must come forward with “specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270

-6-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 6 of 20 Pg ID 473
(1968); see also McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). 

Mere allegations or denials in the non-movant's pleadings will not meet this burden,

nor will a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248, 252. Rather, there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably

find for the non-movant. McLean, 224 F.3d at 800 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

B. Qualified Immunity 

Qualified immunity “shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.’” Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 457 (6th

Cir. 2016)(quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)). In determining

whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive

force claim, two questions must be evaluated. Kent v. Oakland Cty., 810 F.3d 384,

390 (6th Cir. 2016). The first inquiry in the qualified immunity analysis is whether,

based on the facts alleged and considered “in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury,” the official’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights

under the Fourth Amendment.1

 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the

1

 In Dunfee v. Finchum, No. 3:13-cv-378, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126052, * 16 (E.D.

Tenn. Sept. 21, 2015), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held

that “when a responder to an emergency is acting to provide medical care, any force used in the

process is analyzed under the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process

clause, rather than the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” Id. However, Dunfee cites to Peete v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.,

486 F.3d 217, 221 (6th Cir. 2007), which does not state this rule of law. Moreover, the Sixth

-7-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 7 of 20 Pg ID 474
district court finds a Fourth Amendment violation, the next step is to determine

whether the right was clearly established at the time of the incident. Id. at 202. The

district court may address the qualified immunity analysis in any order. Kent, 810

F.3d at 390. The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof, Garretson v. City of

Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted), and if the

plaintiff fails to carry his burden as to either element of the qualified immunity

analysis, then the official is immune from suit. Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F.

App’x 491, 494 (6th Cir. 2012). 

 1. Fourth Amendment violation 

To answer the question of whether Defendant Miracle’s use of force violated

the Fourth Amendment “turns on whether [his] actions are objectively reasonable in

light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, without regard to his underlying

intent or motivation.” Kent, 810 F.3d at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The

reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Factors to consider are: (1) the severity

of the crime, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

Circuit has employed the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard to evaluate claims of

excessive force when a government official responds to a request for medical aid. See Caie v.

West Bloomfield Twp., 485 F. App’x 92 (6th Cir. Jun. 18, 2012). As such, the Court will analyze

Plaintiff’s claim under the Fourth Amendment, rather than the substantive due process clause. 

-8-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 8 of 20 Pg ID 475
officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting

to flee. Id. “The ultimate question, however, is whether the totality of the

circumstances justifies a particular sort of seizure.” Kent, 810 F.3d at 390 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The district court “must take into account the fact that

police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving–about the amount of force that is necessary

in a particular situation.” Id. 

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that “absent some compelling

justification-such as the potential escape of a dangerous criminal or the threat of

immediate harm–the use of [a stun gun] on a non-resistant person is unreasonable.” 

Caie v. West Bloomfield Twp., 485 F. App’x 92, 96 (6th Cir. Jun. 18, 2012); Cockrell

v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F. App’x 491, 496 (6th Cir. Feb. 23, 2012); Kijowski v. 

City of Niles, 372 F. App’x 595, 601 (6th Cir. 2010). Conversely, the Sixth Circuit

has also stated that “[w]e have often found that the reasonableness of an officer’s use

of a taser turns on active resistance: When a suspect actively resists arrest, the police

can use a taser to subdue him . . . .” Kent, 810 F.3d at 392 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “Active resistance includes physically struggling with, threatening, or

disobeying officers[,]” as well as “refusing to move your hands for the police to

handcuff you, or fleeing from police.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

-9-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 9 of 20 Pg ID 476
As to the first Graham factor, the severity of the crime, Defendant was not

dispatched to Hill’s house because a suspected crime had been committed. Rather, he

was there due to a diabetic episode. Therefore, Defendant’s use of a taser under this

circumstance weighs against a finding that he acted objectively reasonable under the

circumstances. Id. at 390 (concluding that because the plaintiff was never arrested nor

even warned that he could be detained was “one important consideration in the

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.”); see also Brown, 814 F.3d at 459 (finding that

the commission of misdemeanors would not be “severe enough to warrant the use of

a taser.”)

In support of his argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity, Defendant

relies on Caie, supra. In Caie, police officers were dispatched to assist an intoxicated,

depressed and suicidal nineteen year old. Id. at 93. When the police arrived, the

plaintiff was chest-deep in a lake near his home. Id. at 94. The plaintiff was initially

uncooperative with one of the officer’s requests to get out of the water. Id. The

plaintiff repeatedly told the officers that he wanted to die and asked what he could do

that would lead them to shoot him. Id. He made comments about fighting the officers

so they would have to kill him. Id. When the plaintiff finally exited the lake, he

continued to behave erratically and repeated his statement about fighting the officers.

Id. Plaintiff would not comply with the officers when they attempted to transport him

-10-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 10 of 20 Pg ID 477
for medical care. Id. The officers eventually took the plaintiff to the ground in order

to gain control of him and transport him to the hospital. Id. When he failed to move

his hands behind his back so the officers could handcuff him, one of the officer’s

applied a taser once in the drive-stun mode to the left side of the plaintiff’s back. Id. 

The Caie court concluded that the officer’s “single use of the taser in drive-stun

mode did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 96. The Caie court

rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the officer’s use of force was unreasonable

because he was not being arrested for a crime. Id. Specifically, the Caie court

reasoned in relevant part that:

While it is true that Plaintiff was not being arrested for a crime, his

consumption of a large quantity of alcohol and drugs, his erratic

behavior, and his self-proclaimed desire to provoke the officers into

using deadly force could lead reasonable officers to conclude that he was

a threat to officer safety. Plaintiff admits that he was suicidal, meaning

that, at a minimum, he was a threat to his own safety. 

** *

Although Plaintiff insists that he no longer posed a risk of harm or flight

after being taken to the ground, there is no dispute that Plaintiff

continued to be uncooperative by actively resisting the officers’ attempts

to secure his arms behind his back. In light of this resistance, we find

that [the officer]’s single use of the taser in drive-stun mode was not

gratuitous. Rather, it served the purpose of gaining control over a highly

intoxicated, volatile, and uncooperative subject and neutralizing what a

reasonable officer could perceive as a dangerous situation. 

Id. at 97. 

-11-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 11 of 20 Pg ID 478
Caie is distinguishable from the circumstances of this case. While both Hill and

the Caie plaintiff were not charged with a crime, the officers in Caie were confronted

with an extremely intoxicated, suicidal individual who had made repeated statements

about fighting the officers and was actively resisting the officers attempts to transport

him to the hospital. Caie, 485 F. App’x at 94. Under those circumstances, the Sixth

Circuit determined that the officers use of a taser was reasonable because the Caie

plaintiff was a risk to the officers and himself. Id. at 96-97. 

In the present case, Defendant was not faced with the same risks to his safety 

as the officers in Caie. Moreover, Defendant was aware that Hill was a diabetic and

had previous experiences with individuals suffering from a diabetic episode. 

Therefore, he knew that Hill was insensate and not focused to his surroundings. See

Champion v. Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 904 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The diminished

capacity of an unarmed detainee must be taken into account when assessing the

amount of force exerted.”). Defendant also knew that the manner in which he used the

taser–drive stun mode–was not recommended. Thus, he used a taser in a manner that

was not recommended on an individual suffering from a diabetic episode even though

he “didn’t really know everything that was going on medically.” 

Additionally, Defendant was in Hill’s home, “one of the most sacred of spaces

under the Fourth Amendment’s protections.” Kent, 810 F.3d at 394. While officers

-12-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 12 of 20 Pg ID 479
can use reasonable force in such a setting, an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others must be present. Id. Here, Hill posed absolutely no threat to

Defendant’s safety. Defendant admits that he was nowhere near Hill until he

deployed his taser. 

At all times, Hill was on his bed with four paramedics surrounding him. 

Therefore, Hill was in a confined space and any danger could have been eliminated

by simply stepping away from him. Hill’s actions do not fit within the definition of

active resistance, which is required to be present for the use of a taser to be considered

reasonable. “Active resistance includes physically struggling with, threatening, or

disobeying officers[,]” as well as “refusing to move your hands for the police to

handcuff you, or fleeing from police.” Id. at 392 (emphasis supplied). Nor was Hill

attempting to flee during the incident. 

Therefore, the second and third Graham factors also favor a finding that

Defendant acted objectively unreasonable when he tasered Plaintiff. Under the

totality of the circumstances, a jury could conclude that Defendant’s use of a taser was

objectively unreasonable. 

 2. Clearly Established 

The next question this Court must resolve is whether “the right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.” Campbell v. City of Springboro, 700

-13-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 13 of 20 Pg ID 480
F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 2012). “For a right to be clearly established, the contours of

the rights must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that right.” Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.

2003). “The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. “Although it need not

be the case that the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, . . . in

light of the pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Russo v. City of

Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1043 (6th Cir. 1992). 

Here, the Court must determine whether, in June of 2013, it would be clear to

a reasonable officer that it was excessive force to use a taser on an individual who was

not under arrest and not resisting arrest and posed no risk to the officers safety. The

pre-existing law makes it sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer in Defendant’s

position would know that such conduct was unlawful under the circumstances. 

“[S]ince mid-2005, the general consensus among our cases is that officers cannot use

force . . . on a detainee who has been subdued, is not told he is under arrest, and is not

resisting arrest.” Kent, 810 F.3d at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also,

Thomas v. Plummer, 489 F. App’x 116, 126-29 (6th Cir. 2012)(finding that as of

2009, an officer’s use of a taser on a once-disobedient suspect who had stopped

-14-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 14 of 20 Pg ID 481
resisting violated clearly established law); Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372 F. App’x at

600-01 (use of taser on an unresisting suspect violated his clearly established rights). 

Defendant relies on Dunfee v. Finchum, No. 3:13-cv-378, 2015 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 126052 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 2015) to support his qualified immunity defense. 

In Dunfee, officers were dispatched when the plaintiff, who was traveling in the

backseat of a car, began foaming at the mouth and seizing. Id. at *2. When the first

officer arrived on the scene, the plaintiff was acting delirious, became combative and

began yelling. Id. at *2-3. While the officer was attempting to subdue the plaintiff,

the plaintiff headbutted and kicked the officer in the groin. Id. at *3. During the

struggle, other officers arrived on the scene. Id. at *4. The officers were able to pull

the plaintiff from the vehicle. Id. However, he struggled with the officers and bit one

of them while they were attempting to get him on a medical cot. Id. During the

struggle, one of the officers deployed his taser in the stun mode on two occasions. Id. 

The Dunfee court ultimately concluded that “the contours of the right [the

officer] is alleged to have violated were not so clear in June of 2012 that every

reasonable officer” would have understood “that a person suffering from a medical

condition, who became combative toward police officers” had a right to not be tasered. 

-15-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 15 of 20 Pg ID 482
Id. at *21-22 (emphasis supplied).

Dunfee is distinguishable from the circumstances here. Hill was not combative

with Defendant. Defendant did not approach Hill and attempt to assist the paramedics. 

Based on the state of the law in 2013, Defendant violated Plaintiff’s clearly

established right when he tasered him. Defendant is not entitled to qualified

immunity. 

C. State Law Claims

 1. Assault and Battery 

“An assault is defined as any intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to

another person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another,

under circumstances which create a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact,

coupled with the apparent present ability to accomplish the contact.” Espinoza v.

Thomas, 189 Mich. App. 110, 119 (1991). A battery is defined as “the willful and

harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended

to cause such a contact.” Id. 

A government employee is not immune from liability for intentional torts,

including the tort of assault and battery. However, a governmental officer’s actions

that would normally constitute intentional torts are shielded from liability if those

actions are justified because they were objectively reasonable under the

-16-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 16 of 20 Pg ID 483
circumstances. Brewer v. Perrin, 132 Mich. App. 520, 528 (1984). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish Mr. Hill suffered from a wellfounded apprehension of imminent contact from Defendant since Plaintiff admits that

Mr. Hill “was literally not in his right mind” and “was not oriented to time and place,

and was not cognizant of his surroundings.” See Plf.’s Resp. at 15. Defendant further

asserts that he is entitled to governmental immunity. Specifically, he asserts his

actions in administering a taser in stun mode to subdue a combative citizen whose

medical condition was swiftly deteriorating to his potential peril was objectively

reasonable under the circumstances. As such, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s

assault and battery claim must fail as a matter of law. 

Plaintiff counters that the Defendant is not entitled to governmental immunity

because he deployed his taser without attempting any other means of restraining Mr.

Hill. Plaintiff asserts that he was in a confined space and any danger could be

eliminated by simply stepping away from him. Therefore, the force used was

unreasonable. 

The Court concludes a jury could find that Defendant’s actions were

unreasonable under the circumstances. Defendant knew Mr. Hill was suffering from

a diabetic episode, that he was in his bedroom and not attempting to flee. There was

no threat of immediate harm to Defendant or the paramedics, who could have stepped

-17-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 17 of 20 Pg ID 484
away from Mr. Hill at any time. Defendant is not entitled to governmental immunity

on Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim. 

 2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

To establish a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,

the plaintiff must present evidence of (1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous

conduct, (2) the defendant’s intent or recklessness, (3) causation and (4) the severe

emotional distress of the plaintiff. Lucas v. Awaad, 299 Mich. App. 345, 359 (Mich.

Ct. App. 2013). Liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has been

found only where the conduct complained of has been so outrageous in character, and

so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish his actions were so outrageous

in character as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Additionally, Plaintiff

cannot show Defendant’s intent or recklessness. Nor has Plaintiff shown that Mr. Hill

experienced severe emotional distress as a result of Defendant’s actions. The only

resulting injuries that Plaintiff has identified are “burns on legs and diabetes got

worse.” Such injuries do not support Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress. 

Plaintiff counters that Defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous

-18-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 18 of 20 Pg ID 485
because he decided to administer a taser to Mr. Hill in the presence of his girlfriend

and children. While a jury might conclude that Defendant’s conduct was extreme and

outrageous, it still could not find in favor of Plaintiff on his intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim. Defendant is correct in arguing that Plaintiff will be unable

to establish the elements of this claim. Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any

evidence demonstrating Mr. Hill experienced severe emotional distress. Plaintiff

indicates that Mr. Hill suffered burns on his legs and that his diabetes got worse after

the incident on June 23, 2013. Such injuries do not support Plaintiff’s assertion that

Mr. Hill experienced severe emotional distress. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish

the third element of his claim and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment in his

favor on Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [#34]

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Count III–Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress–is DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 3, 2016 /s/ Gershwin A. Drain 

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

-19-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 19 of 20 Pg ID 486
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

June 3, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

/s/ Tanya Bankston 

Case Manager 

-20-

2:15-cv-10079-GAD-MKM Doc # 39 Filed 06/03/16 Pg 20 of 20 Pg ID 487