UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

GLORIA DENISE BEASLEY, 

 Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-cv-14386 

 v. DISTRICT JUDGE MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

COMMISSIONER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

______________________________/ 

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Gloria Denise Beasley seeks judicial review of Defendant Commissioner of 

Social Security’s determination that she is not entitled to social security benefits for her physical 

and mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 12) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 14). Plaintiff has also filed a response to Defendant’s Motion. (Docket 

no. 15.) The motions have been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Docket no. 3.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, 

dispenses with a hearing pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), and 

issues this Report and Recommendation. 

I. RECOMMENDATION

 For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 12) be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket 

no. 14) be GRANTED. 

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 

supplemental security income with a protective filing date of October 5, 2011, alleging that she 

has been disabled since April 22, 2011, due to a herniated disc, degenerative disc disease, 

diabetes, nerve damage to her right leg, constant pain, high cholesterol, her right leg “giv[ing] 

out,” post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and depression. (TR 183-95, 204, 208.) The Social 

Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s claims on December 21, 2011, and Plaintiff requested 

a de novo hearing. (TR 100-21, 132-34.) On April 18, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with a 

representative and testified at the hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Timothy C. 

Scallen. (TR 33-55.) In a July 2, 2013 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to 

benefits because she was capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the regional 

economy. (TR 15-27.) The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision (TR 1-6), 

and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review. The parties then filed cross motions for 

summary judgment, which are currently before the Court. 

III. HEARING TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE

In her brief, Plaintiff set forth the procedural history of this matter and a detailed 

summary of the medical evidence and hearing testimony. (Docket no. 12 at 2-19.) The ALJ set 

out a detailed, factual recitation with regard to Plaintiff’s medical record, Plaintiff’s hearing 

testimony, and the vocational expert’s (VE’s) testimony in his decision. (TR 20-27.) Defendant 

generally concurred with Plaintiff’s summary of the procedural history but provided her own 

synopsis of the medical evidence and hearing testimony. (Docket no. 14 at 4-10.) Although 

Plaintiff and Defendant recite evidence favorable to their respective positions, there are no 

material inconsistencies among the aforementioned accounts of the record; therefore, the 

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undersigned will incorporate the factual recitations by reference. Additionally, the undersigned 

has conducted an independent review of Plaintiff’s medical record and the hearing transcript and 

will include comments and citations as necessary throughout this Report and Recommendation. 

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DETERMINATION

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

alleged onset date of April 22, 2011, and that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe 

impairments: diabetes mellitus, degenerative disc disease, and obesity. (TR 17.) The ALJ also 

found that Plaintiff’s alleged carpal tunnel syndrome and depressive disorder were non-severe 

impairments. (TR 17-19.) Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or 

medically equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1. (TR 19-20.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the following RFC: 

[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except that she requires the 

opportunity to alternate positions between sitting and standing at will, as long as 

she is not off-task more than 10% of the workday. The claimant can occasionally 

climb ramps or stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Additionally, 

she can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. However, she must avoid 

all exposure to excessive vibration and unprotected heights and use of hazardous 

machinery. Due to ongoing pain symptoms, the claimant is limited to simple, 

routine, and repetitive tasks. 

(TR 20-26.) Subsequently, in reliance on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

was capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the regional economy. (TR 26-27.) 

Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act at any 

time from April 22, 2011, through the date of the decision. (TR 15, 27.) 

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V. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r, 127 

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try 

cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Heckler, 745 

F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r, 203 F.3d 388, 

389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting 

that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which 

the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”).

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B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

 Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a fivestep sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform relevant 

past work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can 

perform.” Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding 

“supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to 

perform specific jobs.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 

1987). This “substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in 

response to a hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the 

claimant’s] individual physical and mental impairments.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

C. Analysis

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] 

(a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

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evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter 

upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the 

decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is 

reversal and a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, 10-207, 2011 

WL 2292305, at *8 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). 

 Plaintiff asserts that this matter should be reversed and/or remanded under sentence four 

because (1) the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical evidence; (2) the ALJ’s credibility 

findings were based upon false and incomplete information; and (3) the number of jobs that the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform is insufficient. (Docket no. 12 at 20-25; docket no. 15 at 

1-6.) 

1. The ALJ’s Assessment of the Medical Evidence 

First, while not explicitly stated, Plaintiff seemingly argues that the ALJ failed to give 

good reasons for discounting the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Alis D. Vidinas, M.D. 

(Docket no. 12 at 21-22.) It is well settled that the opinions of treating physicians are generally 

accorded substantial deference. In fact, the ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion 

complete deference if it is supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic evidence and it is not 

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 

416.927(c)(2). When an ALJ determines that a treating source’s medical opinion is not 

controlling, he must determine how much weight to assign that opinion in light of several 

factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) nature and 

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extent of the treatment relationship; (3) supportability of the opinion; (4) consistency of the 

opinion with the record as a whole; (5) specialization of the treating source; and (6) other factors. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). 

 There is no per se rule that requires an articulation of each of the six regulatory factors 

listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

11-CV-11974, 2012 WL 3584664, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2012) (citing Tilley v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 394 F. App’x 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2010)). An ALJ’s failure to discuss the requisite 

factors may constitute harmless error (1) if “a treating source's opinion is so patently deficient 

that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it;” (2) “if the Commissioner adopts the opinion 

of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion;” or (3) “where the 

Commissioner has met the goal of [§ 1527(c)]—the provision of the procedural safeguard of 

reasons—even though she has not complied with the terms of the regulation.” Nelson v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App’x 462, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 

F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

 The Commissioner requires its ALJs to “always give good reasons in [their] notice of 

determination or decision for the weight [they] give [a] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Those good reasons must be “supported by the evidence in 

the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the 

weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that 

weight.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996)). The 

district court should not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has failed to identify the 

weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion and provide good reasons for that weight. See 

Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 939 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This Court has made clear that ‘[w]e do not 

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hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’ for the weight given 

to a treating physician's opinion and we will continue remanding when we encounter opinions 

from ALJ's that do not comprehensively set forth the reasons for the weight assigned to a treating 

physician's opinion.”) (citing Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009)). 

 Here, the ALJ provided the following assessment of Dr. Vidinas’s opinion: 

As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned has considered the opinion provided 

by the claimant’s treating physician, Dr. Alis Vidinas (Ex. B1F/1-3). The 

undersigned gives Dr. Vidinas’ opinion little weight. While Dr. Vidinas treated 

the claimant during the period relevant to this decision, his opinion is inconsistent 

with his own treatment notes and the medical records as a whole. Dr. Vidinas 

concluded the claimant’s impairments prevented her from standing, walking or 

sitting more than one hour out of an eight-hour day and that the claimant was 

unable to work in any capacity because of her impairments (Ex. B1F/1-3). 

However, Dr. Vidinas’ treatment notes indicate that Dr. Vidinas only 

recommended exercise for the claimant’s back impairment (Ex. B1F; B3F). In 

addition, Dr. Vidinas’ treatment notes do not reflect the severe limitations 

included in hi[s] medical source statement. Dr. Vidinas’ treatment notes indicate 

the claimant had tenderness in her lumbar spine and slightly reduced strength in 

her right side, but do not indicate that the claimant had any difficulty walking 

during the appointments (Id.). In addition, despite the debilitating limitations in 

his medical source statement, Dr. Vidinas noted the claimant’s straight leg raise 

testing was negative bilaterally and she was non-compliant with his 

recommendations (Ex. B1F/4-5; B3F/3; B7F/3). Dr. Vidinas’ opinion is also 

inconsistent with the other exams in the record. Dr. Vidinas opined that the 

claimant was unable to stand or walk for more than [a] few minutes at one time in 

December 2011 (Ex. B1F/1-3). However, on July 30, 2012, Neurosurgeon, Dr. 

Ian Lee, indicated that the claimant’s exam showed normal strength and sensation 

in her legs, she walked with a normal gait and she was alert and well oriented (Ex. 

B4F/3). In addition, the claimant’s consultative exam in December 2012 

indicated there was no evidence of focal muscle atrophy in any extremity and no 

signs of muscle spasms in her lumbar spine and no tenderness in her lumbar spine 

(Ex. B5F/3). Her range of motion in her lumbar spine was normal except for a 

reduced range of flexion and extension with reports of pain (Ex. B5F/3, 6). She 

had a normal range of motion in her hips and all extremities (Ex. B5F/3, 6-7). 

Lastly, the undersigned has given more weight to the opinions provided by the 

state agency medical consultant, Dr. Robert Roschmann (Ex. B2A/7-10). Unlike 

Dr. Vidinas, as a state agency medical consultant, Dr. Roschmann’s opinion is 

consistent with the medical record. 

(TR 23-24.) 

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 Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ in the instant matter failed to provide good reasons for 

discounting her treating physician’s opinion just as the ALJ did in Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., for which that case was remanded. (Docket no. 12 at 21 (citing Gayheart, 710 F.3d 365 

(6th Cir. 2013).) In Gayheart, the ALJ discounted the treating physician’s opinions on the 

grounds that they were “not well-supported by any objective findings” and were “inconsistent 

with other credible evidence.” 710 F.3d at 376. The Sixth Circuit found that those were not 

good reasons because the ALJ’s first line of reasoning was ambiguous and because the ALJ did 

not support his second line of reasoning by identifying the evidence that was purportedly 

inconsistent with the treating physician’s opinions. Id. at 376-77. Conversely, there is nothing 

ambiguous about the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Vidinas’s opinion in the instant matter; 

notably, Plaintiff has not asserted any instances of ambiguity. Moreover, the ALJ in the instant 

matter supported his lengthy, well-reasoned assessment of Dr. Vidinas’s opinion by citing 

numerous specific examples of its inconsistency with Dr. Vidinas’s own treatment notes as well 

as the results of examinations conducted by Plaintiff’s neurosurgeon and the consultative 

examiner. (TR 23-24.) The ALJ in the instant matter did provide good reasons for discounting 

Dr. Vidinas’s opinion; his assessment of Dr. Vidinas’s opinion is supported by substantial 

evidence and should not be disturbed. 

 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred not only by “disregarding” and “ignoring” her 

treating physician’s opinion, but by assigning only some weight to the opinion of the 

consultative examiner, Dr. Jose Mari G. Jurado, M.D., and instead following the opinion of the 

state-agency non-examining physician, Dr. Robert Roschmann, M.D. (Docket no. 12 at 20; 

docket no. 15 at 2, 5.) According to Plaintiff, Gayheart “specifically prohibits giving great 

weight to evidence from a consulting or from a non-examining physician when a treating 

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physician has given an opinion.” (Docket no. 12 at 22 (citing Gayheart at 375-76).) Plaintiff is 

incorrect. The portion of Gayheart to which Plaintiff cites reads as follows: 

As a general matter, an opinion from a medical source who has examined a 

claimant is given more weight than that from a source who has not performed an 

examination (a “nonexamining source”), [20 C.F.R.] § 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(1), 

and an opinion from a medical source who regularly treats the claimant (a 

“treating source”) is afforded more weight than that from a source who has 

examined the claimant but does not have an ongoing treatment relationship (a 

“nontreating source”), id. § 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(2). In other words, “[t]he 

regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the 

ties between the source of the opinion and the individual become weaker.” Soc. 

Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996). 

The source of the opinion therefore dictates the process by which the 

Commissioner accords it weight. Treating-source opinions must be given 

“controlling weight” if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion “is well-supported 

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques”; and (2) 

the opinion “is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case 

record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the Commissioner does not give a 

treating-source opinion controlling weight, then the opinion is weighed based on 

the length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, id., as well 

as the treating source's area of specialty and the degree to which the opinion is 

consistent with the record as a whole and is supported by relevant evidence, id. § 

404.1527(c)(2)-(6). 

Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 375-76. Later, the Gayheart court acknowledged the following: 

To be sure, a properly balanced analysis might allow the Commissioner to 

ultimately defer more to the opinions of consultative doctors than to those of 

treating physicians. Soc. Sec. Rul. No. 96–6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (“In 

appropriate circumstances, opinions from ... psychological consultants ... may be 

entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources.”). 

Id. at 379-80. The Sixth Circuit later endorsed this concept: “An administrative law judge may 

give more weight to the opinions of examining or consultative sources where the treating 

physician's opinion is not well-supported by the objective medical records.” Dyer v. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 568 F. App'x 422, 428 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Gayheart at 379–80). As discussed above, 

the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion on the basis that it is 

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inconsistent with the record evidence, among other things, is supported by substantial evidence. 

Additionally, Plaintiff does not assert substantive error with regard to the ALJ’s assessment of 

the consultative examiner’s opinion, and the Court finds none. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument 

that the ALJ’s decision to credit the non-examining physician’s opinion over that of the treating 

and examining physicians violates binding case law, fails. 

 Next, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment of the opinion of the state–agency nonexamining physician, Dr. Roschmann. Plaintiff asserts that a non-examining source’s opinion 

cannot be used to support an ALJ’s decision denying benefits where it is not based on a review 

of the entire record, citing Jones v. Astrue, 808 F. Supp. 2d 993 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 21, 2011). 

(Docket no. 12 at 22.) In Jones, a non-binding opinion, the court opined that Social Security 

Ruling 96-6p suggests that when a non-examiner’s opinion is accorded more weight than that of 

a treating source, “then the non-examiner should have reviewed a complete record which 

contains the opinion of a specialist in the claimant's particular impairment who had access to 

more detailed and comprehensive information than did the treating source.” Jones, 808 F. Supp. 

2d at 998 (emphasis in original). Actually, SSR 96-6p advises that a non-examiner’s “review of 

a complete case record that includes a medical report from a specialist in the individual's 

particular impairment which provides more detailed and comprehensive information than what 

was available to the individual's treating source” is an example of an appropriate circumstance in 

which to afford a non-examiner’s opinion more weight than an examiner’s opinion. SSR 96-6p, 

1996 WL 374180, at *3 (emphasis added). Thus, there is no requirement that a non-examiner’s 

opinion be based on a review of the entire record in order to support an ALJ’s decision denying 

benefits, and Plaintiff’s argument fails. 

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 Finally, Plaintiff finds fault with a portion of the ALJ’s reasoning for crediting Dr. 

Roschmann’s opinion. In assigning Dr. Roschmann’s opinion significant weight, the ALJ 

reasoned, among other things, that “Dr. Roschmann has specialized knowledge of the Social 

Security Administration’s disability program.” (TR 24-25.) Plaintiff argues that “the Social 

Security Administration has provided utterly no evidence to show that Dr. Roschmann was an 

expert regarding Social Security’s regulations” and that it has provided no information regarding 

Dr. Roschmann’s credentials. (Docket no. 12 at 20-21; docket no. 15 at 2.) But the ALJ did not 

find Dr. Roschmann to be an “expert regarding Social Security’s regulations;” rather, he was 

commenting on Dr. Roschmann’s specialized knowledge of the disability program in accordance 

with the regulatory factors listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). Moreover, Plaintiff 

cites no authority that requires the Social Security Administration to provide the credentials of 

the state-agency physician, or any other medical source, when his opinion is relied upon by an 

ALJ. Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit in this regard. Based on the above considerations, the 

ALJ’s assessment of the medical evidence is supported by substantial evidence, and it should not 

be disturbed. 

2. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Credibility 

 Next, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he “ALJ committed reversible error by basing his 

credibility findings upon false and incomplete information.” (Docket no. 12 at 20, 23.) “[A]n 

ALJ’s findings based on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight and 

deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness’s demeanor 

and credibility.” Walters v. Comm’r, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). But credibility 

assessments are not insulated from judicial review. Despite the deference that is due, such a 

determination must nevertheless be supported by substantial evidence. Id. An ALJ’s credibility 

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determination must contain “specific reasons . . . supported by the evidence in the case record, 

and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers 

the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.” 

SSR 96–7p. “It is not sufficient to make a conclusory statement that ‘the individual’s allegations 

have been considered’ or that ‘the allegations are (or are not) credible.’” Id. “[T]he adjudicator 

may find all, only some, or none of an individual’s allegations to be credible” and may also find 

the statements credible to a certain degree. Id.

 Further, to the extent that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements are not substantiated 

by the objective medical evidence in the record, the Regulations explicitly provide that “we will 

not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or 

about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available 

objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 

416.929(c)(2). The ALJ will consider: (1) the claimant’s daily activities, (2) the location, 

duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms, (3) precipitating and 

aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken 

to alleviate pain or other symptoms, (5) treatment, other than medication, for symptom relief, (6) 

any measures used to relieve the symptoms, and (7) functional limitations and restrictions due to 

the pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); see also Felisky v. 

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying these factors). 

Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and written statements and found 

them to be less than fully credible. (TR 25.) In support of this determination, the ALJ reasoned: 

The medical record does not support the severity of the claimant’s allegations. 

While the record indicates the claimant consistently reported low back pain, it 

also indicates that the claimant’s treating physician, Dr. Vidinas, never 

recommended more than exercise and physical therapy for the claimant’s back 

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pain after the claimant’s alleged onset date (Ex. B1F/4-5; B3F; B7F). Dr. Vidinas 

also indicated that the claimant was non-compliant with his recommendations and 

there is no indication in the record that the claimant sought or received any 

physical therapy for her back impairment after her alleged onset date (Ex. 

B6F/35). The claimant testified that she could only lift three or four pounds 

because of pain and weakness in her upper extremities. However, her 

consultative exam in December 2012 indicated that she had a full range of motion 

in her upper extremities and no atrophy in the muscles in her upper extremities 

(Ex. B5F). While the claimant demonstrated zero grip strength in her right hand, 

the report indicates that she had no difficulty performing tasks that required fine 

and gross manipulation bilaterally and the record indicates that she never sought 

or received treatment for any problems with her right hand (Ex. B5F/3, 7-8). The 

claimant also testified that she was unable to stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. 

However, her consultative exam indicated that she had a full range of motion in 

her lower extremities and retained sixty degrees of flexion, fifteen degrees of 

extension and a full range of lateral extension in her lumbar spine (Ex. B5F/6). In 

addition, while Dr. Vidinas concluded the claimant could never stoop and the 

claimant said she could never stoop, she also said that she drove a car on a regular 

basis. The diagnostic imaging in the record does not support the severity of the 

claimant’s impairments. While the imaging in the record showed degenerative 

disc disease at multiple levels of the claimant’s lumbar spine, it did not show any 

nerve root compression or disc herniations (Ex. B1F/20-21; B3F/24-25). The 

claimant also alleged disability based on depression. However, when the claimant 

sought treatment for depression, her mental status exams indicated her ability to 

concentrate, her memory and her psychomotor activity was normal (Ex. B2F/3-7). 

The claimant’s activities of daily living do not support the severity of her 

impairments. While the claimant alleged disabling physical and mental 

limitations, she testified that she went outside regularly, drove a car, went to the 

store and went to band concerts at WSU and liked to bake. 

(TR 25-26). 

 Plaintiff argues that the “sheer number of errors and misstatements in the ALJ’s opinion” 

does not meet the credibility-determination standards. (Docket no. 12 at 23.) One such error 

claimed by Plaintiff is the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Vidinas’s July 13, 2011 report that Plaintiff was 

“not very compliant with recommendations.” (Id. (citing TR 25 (citing TR 389), TR 263).) 

Plaintiff claims that this was erroneous because there is no evidence of any non-compliance by 

Plaintiff anywhere else in the record. But Plaintiff’s non-compliance with her treating 

physician’s recommendations, even if there was only one reported instance, is certainly relevant 

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to her credibility, and Plaintiff cites no authority that finds reliance on one such report to be 

erroneous. Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to mention the March 22, 2012 

EMG test that demonstrated the possibility of radiculopathy but could not be completed because 

Plaintiff was unable to “tolerate the needle exam due to discomfort.” (Id. (citing TR 318).) It is 

not clear why the ALJ did not mention this test; however, his failure to do so does not constitute 

reversible error, as an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record. Kornecky v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Additionally, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s daily activities in 

relation to her credibility. (Docket no. 12 at 23.) Plaintiff interprets the ALJ’s finding that 

Plaintiff’s “activities of daily living do not support the severity of her impairments” (TR 26) as a 

conclusion that her daily activities were incompatible with disability, and she argues that such a 

conclusion is inconsistent with the holding in Gayheart that activities are not incompatible with 

disability unless there is evidence that they can be performed on a sustained basis. (Id. (citing 

Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 377).) But the court in Gayheart was analyzing the plaintiff’s daily 

activities in relation to his mental impairments, particularly social functioning, which refers to 

one’s “capacity to interact independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis 

with other individuals.” 710 F.3d at 377 (quoting 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, at 

12.00). Such is not the case here; the ALJ was fully entitled to consider Plaintiff’s activities of 

daily living in relation to her credibility. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). 

As cited above, the ALJ set forth numerous legitimate reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s 

hearing testimony and written statements in his decision, many of which apply the factors set 

forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). Moreover, the ALJ supported his finding 

that the severity of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints was not supported by the objective medical 

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evidence by explicitly discussing and citing to several examples of inconsistency between 

Plaintiff’s complaints and the medical record. Thus, the ALJ’s decision is sufficiently specific to 

make clear to Plaintiff and to the Court the weight that he gave to Plaintiff’s statements and the 

reasons for that weight. The ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility is supported by 

substantial evidence and should not be disturbed; Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied in this 

regard. 

 3. The ALJ’s Step-Five Determination 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when, in reliance on the VE’s testimony, he 

found that Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs. (Docket no. 12 at 23-25; docket 

no. 15 at 5-6.) In making this assertion, Plaintiff asserts that while the VE testified that a 

hypothetical individual of Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and functional limitations 

could perform 2,500 jobs, she did not specify how many jobs such an individual could perform 

in the local economy. (Id.) Seemingly, Plaintiff believes that the number of jobs enumerated by 

the VE pertain to the national economy, and she claims that 2,500 jobs in an economy of over 

four million jobs is “ridiculous.” (Docket no. 15 at 5.) Plaintiff, however, is mistaken. In 

response to the ALJ’s hypothetical questions, the VE testified that there would be approximately 

500 surveillance system monitor positions “in the local economy which is Southeastern 

Michigan” and approximately 2,000 various inspection positions in the local economy that the 

hypothetical individual could perform. (TR 51-52.) Then, in making his step-five 

determination, the ALJ acknowledged that the VE defined the relevant economy as Southeastern 

Michigan and relied on the VE’s testimony in finding that Plaintiff could make a successful 

adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the regional economy. (TR 26-27.) 

Plaintiff acknowledges that the Sixth Circuit has found 1,350 jobs in a region to be sufficient to 

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support an ALJ’s step-five finding. (Docket no. 12 at 24 (citing Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 

274-75 (6th Cir. 1988).) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument fails with regard to this issue. 

 4. Plaintiff’s Other Argument

 In her conclusory paragraph, Plaintiff asserts that post-hearing evidence “confirms that 

the ALJ was wrong again by finding that Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome was not a severe 

impairment.” (Docket no. 12 at 25.) Plaintiff asserts that the Court can consider this posthearing evidence because it could not have been produced until after the hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff, 

however, does not identify or describe this record evidence, and she does not offer any further 

argument or analysis with regard to this evidence in relation to Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome 

or the alleged error made by the ALJ. The Court is not obligated to develop this argument on 

Plaintiff’s behalf, and it declines to do so. See Bush v. Astrue, No. 12-11790, 2013 WL 1747807, 

at *14 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2013) (Grand, M.J.) (citation omitted). 

VI. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated herein, the Court should DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 12) and GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 

14). 

REVIEW OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but must act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as provided 

for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections 

constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 

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F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with 

specificity will not preserve all objections that a party might have to this Report and 

Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Pursuant to Rule 72.1(d)(2) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Michigan, a copy of any objection must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. 

 Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed objections, the 

opposing party may file a response. The response shall be not more than five (5) pages in length 

unless by motion and order such page limit is extended by the Court. The response shall address 

specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained within the objections. 

Dated: January 5, 2016 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served upon counsel 

of record on this date. 

 

Dated: January 5, 2016 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

 Case Manager

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