UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TARIE HASSAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 14-14407

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

OPINION AND ORDER (1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS;

(2) ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION;

(3) DEEMING MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

(4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND

(5) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Plaintiff Tarie Hassan appeals from Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s

denial of his application for disability insurance. Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti

issued a Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”) advising the court to deem Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgement moot (Dkt. # 14), deny Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for

Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 15), and grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

(Dkt. # 16). Plaintiff timely filed Objections to the R. & R. (Dkt. # 20), to which Defendant

responded (Dkt. # 21). After reviewing the R. & R. and the parties’ briefs, the court

concludes that a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons

stated below and in the well-reasoned R. & R., the court will overrule Plaintiff’s

objections and adopt the R. & R.

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I. STANDARD

A. Timely Objections and De Novo Review

The filing of timely objections to an R. & R. requires the court to “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations

to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz,

447 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1980); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949 (6th Cir.

1981). This de novo review requires the court to re-examine all of the relevant evidence

previously reviewed by the magistrate judge in order to determine whether the

recommendation should be accepted, rejected, or modified in whole or in part. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

“The filing of objections provides the district court with the opportunity to consider

the specific contentions of the parties and to correct any errors immediately,” Walters,

638 F.2d at 950, enabling the court “to focus attention on those issues—factual and

legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute,” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147

(1985). As a result, “‘[o]nly those specific objections to the magistrate’s report made to

the district court will be preserved for appellate review; making some objections but

failing to raise others will not preserve all the objections a party may have.’” 

McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 837 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Smith

v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987)).

B. Substantial Evidence Standard

In a social security case, the court “must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it

‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal

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standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). When, as here, the Appeals Council declines review of a plaintiff’s

claim, “the decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the [Commissioner].” 

Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993).

The court’s review of the record for substantial evidence is quite deferential to the

ALJ. “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a

preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion,” Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. Dir., Office of

Workers’ Comp. Programs, 473 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2007), “even if that evidence

could support a decision the other way,” Casey, 987 F.2d at 1233. Moreover, the court

bases its review on the entire administrative record, not just what the ALJ cited. Heston

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). “Even if supported by

substantial evidence, however, a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where

the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow its own regulations and where that

error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004)).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Objection One

Repeating the argument in his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff first

objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the ALJ properly evaluated the

medical opinion evidence offered by Dr. Younes, Mr. Hassan’s treating physician.

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Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not give good reasons for giving Dr.

Younes’ opinion limited weight. 

When affording a treating physician’s opinion limited weight, an ALJ must give

good reasons that are “sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers

the weight the adjudicator gave the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons

for that weight.” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-3889, 2010 WL 1725066, at *7

(6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). An ALJ considers the length of the

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the

treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the

record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating source. Wilson v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004).

The ALJ did give good reasons, as the Magistrate Judge found, and Plaintiff’s

objection is unfounded. First the ALJ summarized all of Dr. Younes’ recommendations

and opinion. The ALJ then clearly stated,

The undersigned gives Dr. Younes’ opinions no more than modest weight.

First, Dr. Younes has only seen the claimant three times over the last

three years. Thus, he has not enjoyed the frequency and contact of

duration with the claimant that would allow him to make an accurate

assessment of the claimant’s functional abilities. Secondly, several of his

opinions are not well supported by the objective evidence. There is no

compelling evidence showing that the claimant cannot lift more than 10

pounds or sit, stand, or walk for only five hours in an eight-hour workday. .

. . As such, the residual functional capacity . . . [includes] no limitations on

pushing or pulling (other than the weight limitations inherent in light work)

given the lack of findings of diminished strength and the limited abnormal

findings on x-ray images. 

(Dkt. # 12-2, Pg. ID 60.) Moreover, far from “essentially outright rejecting” Dr. Younes’

opinion, Pl.’s Objs. 3, the ALJ credited him and conformed the residual functional

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capacity determination to his opinion when it was supported by record evidence. The

ALJ noted that Dr. Younes’ “finding that the claimant cannot use his feet to operate leg

controls on a regular and sustained basis is reasonably consistent with his findings of

limited range of motion of the knees. As such, the residual functional capacity includes a

restriction against the usage of foot pedals.” (Dkt. # 12-2, Pg. ID 60). Thus, the ALJ

considered Dr. Younes’ opinions, articulated good reasons for giving them limited

weight, and went on to accept those that were supported by the record. It is of little

import, and certainly not reversible error, that after giving good reasons the ALJ did not

rehash each of Dr. Younes’ recommendations and individually reject them by repeating

the good reasons already explained. 

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that he has identified “other supportive findings

never properly evaluated by the ALJ, and not adequately considered by the R&R.” Pl.’s

Obj. 5. First, substantial evidence for an ALJ’s determination may exist even where

“evidence could support a decision the other way.” Casey, 987 F.2d at 1233. Thus, this

invitation to reweigh evidence is unavailing. Moreover, the record indicates that the ALJ

did consider the evidence Plaintiff now claims was overlooked. The ALJ did consider the

paraspinal muscle tenderness, (Dkt. #12-2, Pg. ID 58), the knee crepitus, (Id. at Pg. ID

59), and observations concerning Plaintiff’s ability to sit, walk, and stand, (Id.). Though

Plaintiff references a positive straight leg raising test, the record indicates that Dr.

Younes noted a negative result on that test. (Dkt. #12-7, Pg. ID 247 (“slr negative”)).

Plaintiff’s first objection is overruled. 

B. Objection Two

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Next Plaintiff reargues his claim, which the R. & R. considered and found

harmless, that the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s inability to afford medical care in

making the credibility determination. However, so long as there remains substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion on credibility and the error does not negate

the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate credibility conclusion, such is deemed harmless and

does not warrant reversal. See Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 714

(2012). (“As long as the ALJ cited substantial, legitimate evidence to support his factual

conclusions, we are not to second guess . . .”). Here, the ALJ did not rely on Plaintiff’s

limited medical history exclusively. The ALJ also considered other objective medical

evidence that, on its own, constitutes substantial evidence. The ALJ considered the

physical examinations of Dr. Wassim, the consultative psychological examiners,

Plaintiff’s psychiatrist, Dr. Khalid’s opinion, and x-rays that showed “mild,” “minimal,” or

even an absence of any abnormalities. (Dkt. # 12-2, Pg. ID 59.) The Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation is well founded, and Plaintiff’s objection is overruled. 

C. Objection Three

Generally, Plaintiff’s third objection is that the vocational expert did not include all

the limitations he should have in determining what work was available to Plaintiff. In

part, this objection is premised on the court’s agreement with Plaintiff’s first two

objections, such that the limitations Dr. Younes recommended should have been

considered by the vocational expert. To that extent, as the court overruled those

objections, this objection is overruled as well.

Plaintiff also bases this objection on his reading of the ALJ’s residual functional

capacity determination. In relevant part, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform “no

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jobs involving concentration on detailed or precision tasks or multi-tasking, reading,

computing/calculating, or problem solving.” (Dkt. # 12-2, Pg. ID 57-58.) Plaintiff argues

that this limitation precludes jobs that involve any level of reading. The Commissioner

argues that it precludes only “jobs involving concentration on detailed or precision . . .

reading.” Def.’s Resp. 11. The Magistrate Judge agreed with the Commissioner that the

ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination could not sensibly be read to mean that

Plaintiff is completely unable to perform jobs involving any reading. The Magistrate

Judge arrived at that conclusion because the ALJ had previously found that Plaintiff had

completed at least high school, (Dkt. # 12-2, Pg. ID 61), and record evidence, including

Plaintiff’s own testimony, indicated that he had completed two or three years of college.

(Dkt. # 12-2, Pg. ID 73; Dkt. # 12-7, Pg. ID 262.) Other record evidence, as well,

suggests that Plaintiff has little difficulty reading. For example, the ALJ noted that

Plaintiff “is able to pay bills and otherwise manage his financial affairs,” (Dkt. # 12-2, Pf.

ID 56), he was able to spell the word “world” correctly forward and backward during a

mental exam, (Id. at Pg. ID 57). The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge, that in the

context of the record, the residual functional capacity determination, though inartfully

drafted, should not be read to preclude all jobs that require any level of reading. 

D. Objection Four 

Plaintiff’s final objection pertains to the ALJ’s failure to place Mr. Hassan in a

higher age category. The Social Security Administration does not apply age categories

mechanically when a claimant is within a few days or months of the next category

(known as a “borderline age situation”) and instead will consider some extra factors

when determining in which category the claimant belongs. It is undisputed that Mr.

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Hassan was in a borderline age situation and that the ALJ did not expressly address

Plaintiff’s borderline age in the decision. However, an “ALJ does not have a procedural

obligation to address a claimant’s borderline age situation in his opinion or explain his

reasons for arriving at a particular age categorization.” Bowie v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

539 F.3d 395, 400-01 (6th Cir. 2008). Further, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded

that the record does not indicate any of the “additional adversities” required to justify

application of an age category other than the claimant’s chronological age category. (R.

& R. 38-39.) Plaintiff argues that his inability to perform “jobs involving concentration on

detailed or precision tasks or multi-tasking, reading, computing/calculating, or problem

solving” or jobs requiring anything more than brief or superficial contact with the public

are additional adversities. Pl.’s Obj. 11-12. These, however, are not additional

adversities, they are adversities considered and made part of Plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity determination that resulted in the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could

perform various unskilled work. Use of the chronological age category was appropriate

because, in this case, the record does not support the conclusion that Plaintiff cannot

read and write in English, his past relevant work was skilled, and the ALJ already

accounted for Plaintiff’s moderate difficulties in social functioning and concentration,

persistence, or pace.

Plaintiff’s fourth objection is overruled. 

III. CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s objections (Dkt. # 20) are

OVERRULED and the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation (Dkt. # 19) is

ADOPTED IN FULL AND INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.

# 14) is DEEMED MOOT, Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #

15) is DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 16) is

GRANTED.

 s/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 24, 2016

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record on

this date, March 24, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 s/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

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