Filed 8/13/14 In re D.J. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re D.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B251615 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK96620)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Appellant,

v.
BRITTANY K. et al.,
Respondents.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert Draper, Judge. Reversed. Roni Keller, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Respondent Brittany K. Kimberly A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of App eal, for Respondent
Derick J. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel for Respondent.2 INTRODUCTION Brittany K. (“mother”) is the mother of D. J., born in July of 2012. Derick J. (“father”) is the minor’s father. D.J. came to the attention of the juvenile court after he was hospitalized with severe injuries in variou s stages of healing. The injuries included traumatic brain injuries, several fractured ribs, detached retinas on both eyes, and a bruised liver and pancreas. When D.J. was admitted into the hospital on November 12, 2012, it was not known whether he would surviv e. He did survive, but he is severely disabled, with a very short projected life sp an, and never will ever be able to live an independent life. The juvenile court sustai ned a Welfare & Institutions 1 Code section 300 petition pursuant to subdivisions (a), (b ) and (e), alleging injuries consistent with inflicted trauma that would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of deliberate, unreasonable, neglectful acts of the minor’s parents, and further alleging that the parents knew or reasonably should have known that the minor was being physically abused and failed to take action to protect him. The parents have not appealed from these findings. The court also dismissed a count pled pu rsuant to subdivision (b) of section 300, alleging that the parents failed to obtain timely medical tr eatment for the child’s injuries. At the disposition hearing, the court, over the objec tions of the Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) ordered the DCFS to provide the parents with reunification
services. The DCFS appeals from the juvenile cour t’s jurisdictional finding dismissing Count b-2, and the court’s order granting the parents reunification services. We reverse the orders of the trial court (a) dismissing the allegations against parents brought under subdivision (b) of section 300; and (b) ordering reunificati on services for the parents.

1 All code references in this opinion ar e to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.3 PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY This family first came to the attention of the DCFS af ter the minor, then almost four months old, was admitted to the emergenc y room (“ER”) of a hospital, where he was found to be suffering from se vere injuries, including extensive hemorrhage of the subarachnoid and subdural part of his brain an d multiple rib fractures in different stages of healing. Upon admission, the child was pl aced in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit and placed on a ventilator. Becau se the infant had severe swelling of the brain, a rightside ventriculostomy was performed to drai n fluids. The treati ng physician suspected non-accidental trauma. The pa rents denied any past or pr esent trauma to the minor. On November 14, 20 12, the DCFS received a referra l alleging that the minor was
the victim of child abuse by an unknown perpetrator. A Children’s Social Worker (“CSW”) responded to the hospital. The attending doctor inform ed the CSW that it would be a few days before they would know if the minor would survive. Medical records documented that the minor was initially brought to the ER for shortness of breath.
An examination then determin ed that the minor had several healing rib fractures that were suspicious for non-accidental trauma. The minor also presented with an altered level of consciousness, traumatic brain injury , acute respiratory failure, traumatic cerebral edema, and subdural hemato ma. An opthalmology cons ult was ordered and it was
determined that the minor also had multiple acute hermorrhag es in both eyes consistent
with non-accidental trauma. The CSW spoke with mother on November 14, 2012. Mother reported that the minor had symptoms of a cold fo r a week. Mother said that father had been sick so she thought minor had caught his cold . Mother told the CSW she worked and went to school on November 13, 2012, and that at about 9:15 a.m. she received a ca ll from the office at her school informing her that minor was sick. Father said the minor was not feeling well
and that he wanted her to meet him so they could take the minor to the doctor. Mother
said then when she saw minor he did not se em like himself. He would at times slump
over while in his stroller. Moth er said that when she woul d push the stroller over cracks in the sidewalk, the infant cried. While th ey were on the way to the doctor, mother told4 father that she thought they should take the minor to the ER because it was closer, however, father wanted to take him to D r. Haman, his pediatrician, because she was familiar with the minor. When they arrive d at the doctor’s office the minor still seemed lethargic, but when Dr. Haman moved the mino r’s legs around, he opened his eyes and began to appear normal. She examined the minor and diagnosed him with an ear infection and the flu, and prescribed am oxicillin, a cough medication and pedialyte. Mother watched the minor all night and noticed that he was not breathing right. Mother told father at approximately 1:00 a.m. that she believed they should take the minor to the ER; however, she could not find anyone to drive th em to the hospital. Father told mother she was panicking, that everything would be fine, and that they would take the baby to the ER later if his condition did not improve. At approximately 4:00 a.m. the infant was still having difficulty breathing so the parents took the infant on th e train to the ER.
After medical staff informed mother of th e infant’s injuries, she said she did not do anything to him and denied kn owing that he was hurt. Moth er also denied that father harmed the infant, stating they loved him t oo much. Mother said that she and father sometimes permitted people they stayed with to watch the infant and that they suspected these people harmed him.
The CSW also interviewed father. He sa id he watched the infant while mother attended school. However, he stated that he started school the prior week and so they had been permitting other people to watch the infa nt. Father said a maternal uncle watched the infant for approximately 10 minutes while he went to a store ar ound the corner from their residence. He also said that Brittany M. and W.J., both of wh om lived at the house at which the parents were staying, sometim es watched the infant. Father confirmed mother’s statement about their taking the infant to the doctor and later to the ER. The CSW spoke with Detectiv es Sundquist, Gaepa and Tanaka of the Los Angeles Police Department Juvenile Di vision. The detectives repo rted that there were some discrepancies in the parents’ statements. Moth er stated that when sh e first saw the infant on November 11, 2012, he appeared lethargic, stiff, and with his eyes rolling back, which5 was consistent with his condition when he was examined by the ER doctor. However,
father said the infant was fine and only had cold symptoms. Belinda R., a “paternal extended non-re lative,” informed the CSW that both mother and father had tempers and that father once fell on the infant while he and mother were fighting. On another occasion, she he ard that the infant had been dropped. On another occasion, mother and father were fi ghting while she was in her room, and she sat
and talked with them ab out their conduct for appr oximately two hours. On November 15, 2012, th e CSW spoke with the hosp ital social worker, who stated that in addition to other injuries th e infant had a bruised liver and pancreas. Though the infant’s as sessment had not yet been comple ted, the preliminary assessment was Shaken Baby Syndrome. The next day a CT scan was performed on the infant and it revealed that the child’s lungs were bruised and he was bleeding from the spine. The bleeding of the spine was acute. Some of the fractures were as old as four weeks. It was reported by the attending physician, Dr. Murray, that the in fant would never be able to do anything on his own, including eating, and would be blind. On November 18, 2012, it wa s reported to the parents that the infant had serious brain damage. Father blamed Brittany M. and W.J. for the child abuse. He said that it must have occurred on November 9, 2012, when he went to the market and they agreed to watch the infant until he returned. He was gone for 20 minutes. He said he suspected they abused the child because they had a strained relationship with mo ther. He denied physically abusing the infant or witnessing mother doing so. The Department notes in its assessment of the case that al though the parents strongly believed that the infant was abused by Brittany M. and W.J., the infant was found to have several injuries in separate stages of healing, which indicated that the infant’s injuries pre-dated November 9, 20 12, and occurred before they moved into the
house with Belinda R. and her family. Based on the severity of the infant’s multip le injuries and the parent’s failure to provide the DCFS with a reasonable explan ation as to how they occurred and the6 conclusion by the medical staff that the infant ’s injuries were the result of deliberate/nonaccidental trauma, the DCFS recommended that the court sustain a section 300 petition, declare the child a dependent of the court an d deny the parents reunification services. The recommendation that the juvenile c ourt not offer the parents reunification services was based on mother’s admission, du ring the course of the Los Angeles Police Department’s investigation, that she (a) previo usly witnessed father move the infant back
and forth and side to side when he was tw o weeks old, that she heard a popping sound
and asked father if he was h itting or shaking the infant; (b) previously witnessed the child become stiff with his eyes ro lled back but she did not disc lose these symp toms to the pediatrician during her examination of the infa nt; and (c) reported to the detectives that the infant did not cry, while others said the in fant “cried more than he slept.” Additional evidence supported the recommendation, in cluding (d) reports by non-related “family” members that the parents fought , that the infant was primarily in father’s care, and that father became easily frustrated with the child and would fo rcefully bounce him up and down stomping and pacing with the infant; (e ) a treating doctor at the hospital reported
that the infant suffered from a bleed to the brain, left fr ontal lobe subdural hematoma, from front to back, which injury would re quire force and, comb ined with the rib fractures, was consistent with Shaken Baby Syndrome; ( f) Dr. Murray, a child abuse expert, reviewed the findings and found the ca se to be suspicious for non-accidental trauma; (g) Dr. Rosales, the hospital ophthalmol ogist, stated that the infant had bilateral hemorrhages all the way to th e “equator,” the worst she had seen in her 30 years as a doctor, which she concluded were the result of the infant being shaken. Dr. Murray reported on November 16, 2012 th at if the infant survived, he would likely be totally dependent on others, unable to see, talk, walk, or eat on his own. She
stated that the infant could live into his teen s or early twenties, but he would have to be fed via a feeding tube. Even as a teenager he would have to have his diapers changed,
and his tracheal tube cleaned. Both parents denied during their intervie ws with the police that there were any
incidents in which the infant could have been accidentally injured.7 At the conclusion of the interview, the pare nts were informed that the infant would be taken into protective custody. Mother cr ied and father became visibly upset. The detectives subsequently heard loud noises as if someone was banging against a wall. A detective went to investigate and observed father punching walls and yelling. The
detective advised father that if he did no t calm down he would be escorted out of the hospital. Father responded, “Fuck this! I’m leaving anyway!” The police noted mother’s earlier report of father’s demeanor, which stat ed father “was clearly out of control and angry. [Mother] stated to us earlier that sh e had never seen him los[]e hi[s] temper.” M.W. said mother was very protective of the infant and she did not believe she would hurt the baby. Howeve r, she said that father woul d become frustrated with the infant, and demonstrated that father woul d hold the infant while he was crying and bounce the infant up a nd down forcefully in his arms while pacing rapidly through the house stating, “Come on D[.] J[.]! Come on!” She also said that mother was afraid of father and she had witnessed them fighting. She also could hear them fighting and heard banging noises from their room , and on one occasion she saw him trying to snatch the baby from mother’s arms.
Belinda R. also stated that father lost his temper all the time. She knew that something was wrong with the baby because he cried all th e time, sometimes all night long. Belinda R. said she went to the hospital when she learned the infant was there. She talked to father, who accused M.W. and W.J. of harming the infant and then stated: “If I get arrest[ed] for this. If the guys in jail think I did this. Yo u know what they will do to me in jail.” Mother said she suspected W.J., Brittany M. , and father of hurting the infant.
Mother said to the de tectives that approximately two we eks after the infant’s birth, she woke up and saw father shaking the baby. Mo ther described the force of the shaking as a
four to five on a scale of ten. Mother ob served the baby’s head move back and forth approximately three times and also heard a “p opping sound.” Mother said she said to father, “Are you shaking my baby?” and “Did you hit my baby?” Mother said father8 responded no, and said he was only bouncing him up and down and tr ying to get him to fall back asleep. Mother said that D.J. did not look good wh en she left for school on November 12,
2012. When she met father to take the baby to the do ctor, she knew something was wrong because he was stiff and at one point his eyes rolled back. Mother said that on approximately three occasions that night, the infant’s arms and legs would become stiff.
When a detective told mother that he felt she was minimi zing the father’s shaking of the infant, mother admitted that in her sleep she kept hear ing “popping” sounds, which eventually wakened her. Dr. Haman, the pediatrician, stated that pr ior to her examinati on of the infant on November 13, 2012, the parents had informed he r that they had brough t the infant in to
see the doctor because he was congested, was scratching his right ear, and was coughing. They did not inform her that the child had experienced stiffness, a blank stare, eyes rolling back and had been nonresponsive. If they had, she would have immediately
called 911. On May 2, 2013, a supplemental report wa s filed with the juvenile court which indicated that D.J. was residing with Tanya G, who was meeting his needs. The report indicated that the infant had “[one-]sided vision loss.” [Tanya G.] thought the infant might be able to track shadows, bright lights and colors. The infant was receiving all his feedings through a G-tube. Tanya G. was closely monitoring the pare nts’ visits, which were scheduled for
three times a week for three ho urs in duration. No problems were reported, though the parents were visiting less frequently than they had been. The CSW witnessed the infant stop crying on one occasion after mother picked him up, rocked him, and kissed him. The infant would cry when the parents left. The parents visits with the infant decreased to the point that Tanya G. informed mother th at the infant needed longer visits, and that he benefited from physical and emotional contact with her. The parents indicated they had complete d a 10-week parenting program, but they had not forwarded their Certificates of Comp letion to the Department. They also said9 they had enrolled in another parenting class. Mother was attending a program presented by COACH for Kids and Cedar Sinai Medical Center addre ssing child management. On March 11, 2013, the court ordered the Depart ment to ensure that the parents received proper medical training with respect to the in fant’s needs. The record does not reflect whether they received that training. It does indicate that father reported that he and mother had identified a medical training cour se, and they would enroll in it when they were ready. The jurisdictional hearing took place on Ma y 8, 2013. Except for one sentence contained in the police report, and no other objections bei ng raised, the court admitted into evidence all of the reports and othe r documentary evidence offered by the Department. The court also ad mitted into eviden ce mother’s certificate from a therapy clinic, and parents’ certificates for attending a parenting class. No witnesses were called, and the court immediately procee ded to closing arguments. After argument was concluded, the juvenile court made its jurisdictional findings. The court struck Count b-2, the count allegi ng that the parents failed to obtain timely medical care for the child, and sustained the remainder of the petition as pled. The allegation sustained by the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (a) was as follows: “On 11/14/12, 3 month old D[.]J[.] was hospitalized as a result of a detrimental and endangering condition and diagnosed with acute and chronic subdural hemorrhages with extra-axial hemorrhages over the cerebral hemispheres, and extensive bilateral retinal hemorrhages resulting in alte red level of consciousness, traumatic brain injury, acute respiratory failu re, traumatic cerebral edema and subdural hematoma. The
child was also found to have fra ctures to the child’s left pos terior seventh and eighth ribs and fractures of the lateral fourth, fifth and sixth ribs with adjacen t pleural thickening. The child was found to have bruising to the child’s lungs, and blee ding to the child’s spine. The child’s injuries are in different stages of healing. The child also suffered seizures. [DJ’s] mother, Brittany R. K[.] and father, Derick [J.], ga ve no explanation of
the manner in which their child sustained his in juries. The child’s injuries are consistent
with inflicted trauma. The child ’s injuries are of such a nature that would ordinarily not10 be sustained except as the result of deliberate unreasonable neglectful acts of the mother and father who had care, cust ody and control of the child. The deliberate unreasonable neglectful acts of the parents endangers the child ’s physical health a nd safety and places the child at risk of physical harm, damage , danger, and death.” Substantially identical allegations were sustained unde r section 300, subdivisions (b ) and (e), the latter with the additional allegation that the parents knew or reasonably sh ould have known that the child was being physically abused and failed to take action to protect the child. While it was making the jurisdictional findin gs, the court indicated that it intended to provide both parents with reunification servic es. The court stated that it believed that it was in the infant’s best interests for the pare nts to receive reunification services. It said that the parents had “reacted heroically in visiting the child.” After minor’s counsel requested to be heard, the court stated it w ould deal with this issue during the disposition phase of the hearing. At the disposition hearing, the DCFS recommended that the court deny both parents reunification services, but also stated that if the court had another view, it could accept that there might be a reason to treat mo ther differently than father because there were statements in the report to suggest that she was a g ood mother. Minor’s counsel asked the court to deny father reunification services, but to offer them to mother. The parents’ counsel submitted on the cour t’s tentative to offer services. Over the DCFS’s objection, the court f ound by clear and convi ncing evidence that offering both parents reunifica tion services was in the child ’s best interests and would likely prevent re-abuse or neglect of the child “in part because parents both are visiting the child on a daily basis and showing th[at] kind of dedication and commitment.” The
court further stated that it did not think it was a logical argument “to say that because something bad has happened an d we have a sustained petition, we shouldn’t provide them services to help them along their way.” The DCFS then requested a c ontinuance of the disposition hearing so that it could make recommendations as to what the case pl an should include. The court agreed and11 continued the disposition hearing for the DCFS to meet with the parents to address a case plan. The case was calendared for a further disp osition hearing on July 25, 2013 to address the proposed case plan. When the ca se was called the DCFS was represented by a different Deputy County Counsel, its prior attorney being out on medical leave. The
DCFS asked that the matter be continued for a contested hearing. Mother’s counsel objected and stated that the issue of reunifica tion services had alrea dy been heard by the court, and that the present hearing was solely to address a proposed case plan to be filed by the DCFS. Father’s counsel joined. After hearing further argument, the court st ated, “I am finding be st interest of the child and finding there are services available to prevent reoccurrence of the event.” The
court also found that ther e was bonding between the child and the parents. The juvenile court ordered the DCFS to provide the parents with reunification services, to include (a) dyadic parenting for a special needs child; (b) individual counseling to address case issu es, including domestic violence and anger management; (c) conjoint counseling; (d) participation in the child’s medical appointments; and (e) medical training to meet the child’s needs.

DISCUSSION
1. Mother’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal Mother asserts that the DCFS’s challenge to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders was untimel y, and consequently maintains that the appeal should be dismissed. Specifically, she contends that the court made the findings
and orders at issue in this a ppeal on May 8, 2013, but that th e DCFS did not file its notice of appeal until September 4, 2013, after a subsequent hearing wa s held to permit the DCFS to file a case plan outlining the family re unification services to be provided by the DCFS pursuant to the court’s earlier dispositi on order. The question is thus, did the juvenile court order reunificati on services on May 8, 2013, or rather, did it simply make a finding that this was an appropriate case in which to do so and put the matter over for12 further hearing? We turn to the transcript of the May 8, 2013 hearing to answer this question. At that hearing, the juvenile court made its intent to order reunification services known, and after argument, found this was “an appropriate case to order [DCFS] to provide family reunification services to bot h mother and father.” However, the DCFS had failed to file its case plan with the co urt. Consequently, the court continued the hearing in order to permit the DCFS to pr epare a case plan, including reunification services for the parents. The court did no t order services and complete the disposition hearing until July 29, 20 13. Therefore, because the juven ile court did not order DCFS to provide the parents with reun ification services or comple te the disposition hearing until July 29, 2013, DCFS’s notice of appeal was timely filed on September 4, 2013. Respondents’ motion to dismiss th e appeal is therefore denied.

2. Was there Substantial Evidence to Suppor t the Juvenile Court’s Dismissal of Count b-2 of the section 3 00, subdivision (b) Petition? The DCFS contends the j uvenile court erred in dismissing Count b-2 of the petition alleging the parents’ failure to pr ovide medical treatmen t. Section 300, subdivision (b), provides in part: “Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the ju risdiction of the juvenile cour t which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: . . . (b )(1). The child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, . . . as a result of the negligent failure of the pare nt, to provide medical treatment.” In the present case, in Coun t b-2 of the section 300 petiti on, the DCFS alleged that the infant suffered various serious physical injuries and that “[t]he child’s mother, Brittany R. K[.] and father, Derick J[.], failed to obta in timely necessary medical treatment for the child’s inju ries. The parents’ severe medical neglect of the child endangers the child’s physical health and safe ty and places the child at risk of physical harm, damage, danger and death.”13 In determining the operative fa cts, the record on appeal is reviewed in the light
most favorable to the decision of the trial cour t. All reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court must be made and the record reviewed in the light most favorable to the order of the juvenile court. ( In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618, 624.) The appellate court is to review the entire record to de termine if there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the lower court. As long as there is substantial evidence, the reviewing court must affirm. ( Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 872-873 ; Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411 , 429-430.) With the aforesaid guidance in mind, we summarize th e evidence presented supporting the trial
court’s decision to dismiss Coun t b-2 of the petition, the allege d violation of section 300, subdivision (b), based on the parents’ medical neglect. The parents clearly failed to obtain timely and necessary medical attention for the infant’s very serious and disa bling injuries. Although the pa rents took the infant to the pediatrician the day before he was hospitalized with life threatening injuries which have left him severely disabled, they failed to di sclose key information and symptoms to the pediatrician, only reporting that the baby was suffering from an upper respiratory infection, thus, rendering her unable to effectively diagnose and treat the child. Mother and father reported to the doctor when they brought the baby in for diagnosis and treatment that the baby was sn eezing and was congested. They failed to disclose, however, that (a) the baby cried inconsolably when touched; (b) when the parents met to take the baby to the doctor, he did not “look right,” was completely limp, was not moving, and looked “blank;” (c) was s tiff; (d) his eyes rolled back; and (e) he was unresponsive. They did not inform the physician that (a) father had accidentally fallen with the baby; (b) fath er sometimes burped the baby t oo hard; (c) the baby suffered a bloody nose after he was slammed agains t father’s knee; and (d) on one occasion mother awoke to find father shaking the then two-week old baby, that she observed the baby’s head moving back and forth and sh e had heard “popping” sounds while she was “asleep.” They also chose to take the baby to the doctor’s office rather than to an14 emergency room despite the fact that his ey es were open, he was not blinking, and his legs became stiff. The doctor confirmed that the parents faile d to inform her of the child’s most significant and alarming symptoms, and that had they done so, she would have immediately called 911 and ensured that the child was taken to the ER. The failure of the parents to provide this information constitu ted, at a minimum, extreme neglect, and delayed his receipt of medical attention he desperately ne eded. Though the parents finally brought the child to th e hospital the following morning, this does not excuse their prior conduct.
Based on the evidence summari zed above, we hold that the trial court’s decision to
dismiss Count b-2 of the sec tion 300 petition was not supported by substantial evidence.

3. Did the Juvenile Court Abuse its Discre tion in Ordering Reunification Services for Both Parents? The DCFS contends the j uvenile court abused its discretion in ordering reunification services for the parents. It maintains there was no competent testimony that services were likely to prevent reabuse; no clear and convinci ng evidence that
reunification services were in D.J.’s best inte rests; and insufficient evidence that failure to reunify would be detrimental the child. While offering reunification services is the norm, “[s]ection 3 61.5, subdivision (b) symbolizes the Legislature’s recognition that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances.” ( Deborah S. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 741, 750, citing In re Rebecca H. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 825, 837.) Once
the court determines that one of the situations set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b) is applicable, “the general rule favoring reunifi cation is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering reunification services would be an unwise use of governmental resources.” ( In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.) Although these circumstances are narrow in scope and subject to an enhanc ed burden of proof, “they demonstrate a15 legislative determination that in certain situations, attempts to facilitate reunification do not serve and protect the child’s interest.” ( Id . at p. 474.) Section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (c), 2 provide that reunification services should not be provided when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was brought within the ju risdiction of the court under su bdivision (e) of section 300
because of the conduct of that parent or guardian. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(5), (c).) Indeed, when section 361.5, subdivisio n (b) applies, a juvenile cour t is prohibited from providing family reunification services “unless it finds , based on competent testimony, that those services are likely to prevent reabuse . . . or that failure to try reunification would be
detrimental to the child becau se the child is closely and positively attached to that parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c); In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1074-1075, 1077- 1078.) Section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (c) provide, in pe rtinent part, that reunification services shall not be provided when the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivisi on of section 300 as a result of severe physical harm
to the child , unless the court finds, by clear and co nvincing evidence, that reunification is
in the best interest of the child. (§ 361.5, subds . (b)(6), (c), emphasis added.) “Severe physical harm ” includes, but is not limited to, “delib erate and serious injury inflicted to or on a child’s body by an act or omission of the parent or of another individual with the consent of the parent. . . .” (§361.5, subd. (b)(6).) A finding under section 361.5, subdivision (c), that reunification would be in the
child’s best interest is review ed for substantial evidence. ( In re William B. (2008) 163

2 Section 361.5, subd. (c) states: “. . . The court shall not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in paragraph (3), (4), (6), (7), (8 ), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), or (16) of subdivision (b) un less the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best intere sts of the child. [¶] In addition, the court shall not order reunification in any situation described in paragraph (5) of subdivision (b) unless it finds that, based on competent testimony, those services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the child becau se the child is closely and positively attached to that parent.” (Emphasis added.)16 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229.) The Court of Appeal in In re William B.
, supra, also noted that “[a] juvenile court has broad discretion when determining whether further reunification
services would be in the best interests of th e child under section 361.5, subdivision (c). [Citation.] An appellate court will only reverse that determin ation if the juvenile court abuses its discretion. [Citation.]” ( Ibid .) The reviewing court should interfere only “‘ if [it] find[s] that under all of the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the tria l court’s action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that [h e or she] did.’ [Citations.]” ( In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) “‘The a ppropriate test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduc ted from the facts, the reviewing co urt has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’” [Citation.] ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) In the present case, it is undisputed that the physical injuries suffered by the child
were substantial and severe. We will discu ss the reunification issue as to mother and father separately.

a. Reunification Services for Mother. Based on the legal standard set forth ab ove, the evidence pres ented to the trial court upon which it apparently relied in maki ng its decision to offer mother reunification
services was as follows: Mother and child appeared to have bo nded to some extent. D.J. apparently recognizes mother and cries when she leaves him in the care of another person. Mother has visited the minor (both in and out of the hospital) on a regular basis. It was the opinion among those who knew moth er that she would never do anything to harm the child. She was very protective of th e child and was determined that he not end up being institutionalized. Sh e had taken steps to become a better mother including completing a parenting class, and during her m onitored visits perform ed tasks associated with the child’s ongoing medical care. At th e time of the abuse, the minor was herself a non-emancipated minor.17 However, we hold none of this eviden ce, individually or collectively, was sufficient to support a finding that (a) reuni fication services were likely to prevent reabuse; (b) the failure to try reunification woul d be detrimental to the child due to his close and positive attachment to mother; or (c) reuni fication was in the best interests of the child. (§ 361.5. subd. (c).) Furthermore, none of the afor esaid evidence introduced by
mother was in the form of testimony , let alone competent testimony , as is required by section 361.5, subd. (c).)

b. Reunification Services for Father. Unlike mother, in the case of father, there was no eviden ce that D.J. was bonded with father, or that he was a supportive pa rent to the child. Rather, the evidence suggested that father had a low threshold fo r frustration, was intolerant of the child’s crying and responded inappropriately to it by vigorously bouncing the baby up and down, and had significant difficulties controlling his anger. Father presented no evidence that the failure to provide him with reunification se rvices would in any wa y be detrimental to the child. Because no compet ent evidence (let alone comp etent testimony) was presented to support a finding by the juve nile court that providing fath er with reunification services would be likely to prevent re-abus e, or that the failure to attempt reunification with father
would be detrimental to the child, the juvenile court erre d in ordering reunification services for father. (See In re A.M. supra , 217 Cal.App.4th at pp.1077-1078.)18 DISPOSITION The dismissal of the b-2 count of the pe tition is reversed. The juvenile court’s
orders of reunification services for mo ther and father are also reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MINK, J. 

We concur:

MOSK, ACTING P.J.

KRIEGLER, J.

 Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superi or Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.