Combat Studies Institute Press

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From El Billar to Operations 

Fenix and Jaque: 

The Colombian Security Force Experience, 

1998–2008

Robert D. Ramsey III

Occasional Paper 34
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Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Robert D. Ramsey III

Occasional Paper 34

From El Billar to Operations 

Fenix and Jaque: 

The Colombian Security Force Experience, 

1998–2008
CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. 

The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army 

or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at: 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/RandPTeam.asp.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ramsey, Robert D., 1946-

 From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque : the Colombian security force 

experience, 1998-2008 / by Robert D. Ramsey III.

 p. cm. -- (Occasional paper ; 34)

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. National security--Colombia. 2. Internal security--Colombia. 3. Insurgency-

-Colombia. 4. Colombia--Armed Forces. 5. Colombia. Ejército. 6. Military 

assistance, American--Colombia. 7. Pastrana Arango, Andrés. 8. Uribe Vélez, 

Álvaro, 1952- 9. Colombia--Military policy. 10. Colombia--Politics and 

government--1974- I. Title. II. Series.

 UA625.R36 2009

 986.106’35--dc22

 2009032483

First printing: December 2009
iii

Foreword

Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have given the US military 

an appreciation of both the importance and the challenges of working with 

and through host nation security forces in the aftermath of major combat 

operations. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has indicated that these 

types of efforts will be an ongoing military requirement for the foreseeable future. The US military effort in support of Colombian security forces 

offers a different and a lesser known experience from which to learn: one 

that has been long-term, low-key, and seemingly successful. Between 

1998 and 2008, Colombian security forces dramatically improved as they 

moved from what many considered the brink of disaster to being on the 

verge of victory.

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to publish its 34th 

Occasional Paper, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The 

Colombian Security Force Experience, 1998–2008. Written at the request 

of US Southern Command, this study begins with an overview of the general security situation prior to 1998, then traces Colombian and US efforts 

during the Pastrana presidency and Plan Colombia, and concludes with 

the subsequent actions of the Uribe administration. In the final section, the 

author offers observations from the Colombian experience for those in the 

US military who will be called on to work with and through host nation 

security forces in the future.

Although the Colombian experience offers no simple model to be replicated mindlessly elsewhere, it does offer observations and analysis that 

may be useful to the military professional struggling to address similar 

situations. Robert Ramsey’s Occasional Paper not only provides a useful 

reminder of the inherent challenges for both host nation and US military 

personnel in those situations, but also shows that, given the right people, 

the right programs, and sufficient time, those challenges can be met successfully. Perhaps that is the best insight of all to be drawn from a reading 

of this work. CSI—The Past Is Prologue!

Douglas M. Fraser

General, US Air Force

Commanding General

US Southern Command
v

Acknowledgments

No one completes a study such as this by oneself. Among those 

deserving special thanks are the Combat Studies Institute Director Dr. 

William G. Robertson for assigning me this project; the United States (US) 

Southern Command historian Dr. Bradley Coleman for his assistance in 

gaining access to Colombian and United States personnel; the US Special 

Operations Command South historian Mr. Edward J. Dillenschneider 

for his assessment and for providing me interviews with personnel with 

Colombian experience; the US Army South G2 Colonel Mark A. Costello 

for arranging meetings with personnel with Colombian service; the 

Commandant of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 

Colonel Felix L. Santiago and his senior Colombian officer, Lieutenant 

Colonel Jorge I. Monsalve, for the opportunity to interview Colombian 

students; the US Military Group-Colombia commander Colonel Kevin D. 

Saderup and Lieutenant Colonel Barbara R. Fick and US Navy Lieutenant 

Harry Watkins for scheduling and supporting meetings with senior 

Colombian civilian, military, and police officials; the Colombian Ministry 

of Defense for permitting research in Colombia from 1 to 7 February 2009 

and attendance at its “Contemporary Counter-Terrorism and CounterInsurgency Conference: the Colombian Experience” in Bogotá 29 March 

to 3 April 2009; the first two Colombian Army officers attending the 

School for Advance Military Studies, Lieutenant Colonel Juan M. Padilla 

and Lieutenant Colonel Juan C. Correa, for responding to my questions; 

the Combined Arms Research Library archivist John Dubuisson for his 

assistance in gathering materials; Robin Kern for the graphics; and Betty 

Weigand for her careful editing that improved the manuscript. Without the 

support and effort of those above, as well as many others, I could not have 

completed this work in the time permitted. Responsibility for errors in fact 

or judgment rests with me alone.
vii

Contents

Page

Foreword .................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgments .................................................................................... v

List of Tables .........................................................................................viii

List of Figures .......................................................................................viii

Chapter 1. The Colombian Security Situation ......................................... 1

Colombia: The Setting ............................................................ 2

Multiple Sources of Violence: Drugs, Guerrillas, and 

Autodefensas ..................................................................... 4

	 	 Drug Traffickers ............................................................. 5

 Guerrillas: FARC and ELN ............................................ 6

 Autodefensas or Paramilitaries ...................................... 9

Colombian Security Forces ...................................................11

 Colombian Military (COLMIL) Forces ....................... 12

 Colombian National Police (CNP) .............................. 17

Colombian–United States Relations ..................................... 18

 Country Team and the Counterdrug Policy ................. 19

 USSOUTHCOM .......................................................... 24

Road to the Brink of Disaster ............................................... 26

Chapter 2. “Change Begins Today”—The Pastrana Presidency: 

Negotiations with the Guerrillas and Plan Colombia 

(1998–2002) ................................................................... 43

President Pastrana Begins Negotiations: 1998 ..................... 43

Laying a Foundation: 1999 ................................................... 48

Plan Colombia: 1999–2000 .................................................. 55

COLMIL Reorganization and “Plan Colombia”: 2000 ........ 61

Strengthening COLMIL: Plan 2001 and the Brigada 

Contra el Narcotrafico (BRCNA) .................................. 70

Collapse of the Peace Process: 2002 .................................... 76

Chapter 3. “Restoring Order and Security”—The Uribe 

Presidency: Democratic Security and 

Consolidation (2002–2008) ............................................ 95

Uribe Takes Charge: 2002 .................................................... 96

Democratic Security and Defense Policy and Plan 

Patriota: 2003 .............................................................. 100

Plan Patriota and Joint Commands: 2004–2006 ................ 108
viii

Democratic Security Consolidation Policy and Plan 

Consolidacion: 2006–2008 ........................................... 122

Chapter 4. Observations from the Colombian Security Force 

Experience .................................................................... 151

Reasons for Improvements in Colombian Security ............ 152

Insights on Working Together ............................................. 155

Glossary ................................................................................................ 163

Bibliography ........................................................................................ 167

About the Author .................................................................................. 193

Tables

1. Noncombatant deaths and forced disappearances ........................... 10

2. US assistance to Colombia, 1995–1998 .......................................... 23

3. US assistance to Colombia, 1999–2002 .......................................... 80

4. Growth of Colombian Army units, 2002–2006 ............................. 125

5. US assistance to Colombia, 2003–2008 ........................................ 134

Figures

1. Colombian physical geography ......................................................... 3

2. Areas of guerrilla and autodefensa activity ....................................... 6

3. Ministry of National Defense .......................................................... 13

4. Colombian Army brigade ................................................................ 15

5. Mobile infantry brigade (BRIM) ..................................................... 16

6. USSOUTHCOM ............................................................................. 25

7. Zona de despeje ............................................................................... 46

8. Joint Task Force–South (JTF-S) area of operations ........................ 73

9. The COLMIL areas of operations ..................................................117

10. Colombian Army infantry battalion ...............................................119

11. Virtuous circle of security ............................................................. 126

Page


Chapter 1

The Colombian Security Situation

This [defeat at El Billar in March 1998] is without a doubt 

the biggest defeat in the 35-year history of confrontation 

against insurgency. Public opinion is extremely upset, 

devastated and demoralized by what happened.

Colombian Security Analyst, Alfredo Rangel Suarez1

What we know is that the offensive was a complete 

disaster from the military point of view. The army got its 

butt kicked again. It [Miraflores in August 1998] is the 

worst in a long string of defeats, and the guerrillas just 

seem to be getting stronger and stronger while the army 

just does not seem to be able to turn it around.

United States (US) Official2

Beginning in 1996, Colombian security forces faced a series of unanticipated nationwide attacks and suffered increasingly serious defeats.3

About that same time, the United States had cut most of its security assistance to Colombia because of drug-related and human rights issues. By 

the summer of 1998—with a new President elected on a peace platform 

about to assume office and security forces incapable of defeating the leftwing guerrillas—most observers in Colombia and the United States considered the Colombian situation grave. Yet, 10 years later the situation 

had been reversed and some talked of a possible Colombian Government 

victory. By 2008, the security forces that had been “not up to the task of 

confronting and defeating the insurgents” in 1998 dominated the countryside; attacked an enemy reduced in strength by combat actions, desertions, 

and government programs; and conducted successful hostage rescues and 

high-value target attacks that demonstrated skillful, professional planning 

and execution based on actionable intelligence, capable units, and rapid 

reaction.4

 How this transformation occurred in the midst of fighting is the 

topic of this study.

What follows is an overview of how the Colombian security forces—

at times with and at times without US assistance and advice—grew in size 

and capability under difficult conditions. The story is shaped, among other 

things, by conditions in Colombia, by Colombian and US policies, by the 
actions of the security threats, and by key people. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the situation in Colombia prior to the administration of President Andres Pastrana. The second chapter addresses the 

interaction between Pastrana’s pursuit of peace, the Colombian security 

forces’ adjustment to security and political realities, the actions of multiple 

threats, the US military reengagement, and the US counterdrug policy from 

1998 to 2002. Plan Colombia, with US assistance, became the Colombian 

approach to address its problems during this period. Chapter 3 covers 

President Alvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy from 2002 to 2006 

and its followup 2007 Democratic Security Consolidation Policy. During 

the Uribe period, Colombian security forces built on the changes begun 

during the Pastrana era, expanded in size and capability, and became part 

of a whole-of-government effort to address Colombia’s security and governance challenges. The last chapter provides observations on host nation–

US interaction based on the Colombian experience that may prove useful 

to US military personnel performing similar assist-and-support missions 

in the future.

Colombia: The Setting

Situated at the northwest corner of South America, the Republic of 

Colombia borders five countries—Panama to its northwest, Venezuela 

to its east, Brazil to its southeast, Peru to its south, and Ecuador to its 

southwest. It is the only South American country with coastlines on both 

the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. As the fourth largest country on 

the continent with 1,141,748 square kilometers, Colombia is roughly the 

size of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico combined and is divided into 

five geographic regions.5

 (See Figure 1, Colombian physical geography.) 

Three parallel north-south mountain ranges—the Cordillera Occidental 

in the west, the snow-capped Cordillera Central in the middle, and the 

Cordillera Oriental in the east—make up the Andean region where most 

Colombians live. The Caribbean coastal region in the north has the major 

seaports. The underdeveloped lowlands of the Pacific region lie to the west 

of the Cordillera Occidental. To the east of the Cordillera Oriental are the 

least developed and least populated areas: the Orinoquia region known for 

its plains and the Amazon region with its jungles.

The Andean region formed the demographic, economic, and political 

heart of the country. In 1998, most of the approximately 38 million 

Colombians—the second highest population in South America—not only 

lived in the Andean and Caribbean regions, but over 70 percent resided 

in urban areas. Bogotá, the capital, served as the political center while 

Medellín acted as an economic center. Infrastructure and government 
presence focused on the populated areas. The transportation infrastructure 

consisted of 145,000 kilometers of roads of which no more than 15 percent 

were paved; over 18,000 kilometers of waterways where riverboats 

provided the only means of transport in 40 percent of the country; and 

3,300 kilometers of unused railroads because of poor security. In addition 

to traditional agricultural products like coffee, bananas, and cut flowers, 

Caribbean

Region

Pacific

Region

Andean

Region

Orinoquia

Region

Amazon

Region

45% Land Area

95% Population

96% Government

97% Roads

55% Land Area

5% Population

4% Government

3% Roads

2

3

Andean Mountains

1 – Cordillera Occidental

2 – Cordillera Central

3 – Cordillera Oriental

Figure 1. Colombian physical geography.
the economy depended on industry, services, mining, and oil and gas 

sectors. Economically, Colombian society divided into an upper class of 

5 percent, a middle class of 20 percent, and a lower class of 75 percent.6

The United Nations (UN) reported that 54 percent of the rural population 

lived in poverty—almost half of whom lived in extreme poverty—and 

that 39 percent of the urban inhabitants lived in poverty—15 percent 

in extreme poverty.7

 Land ownership in the late 1990s reflected this 

economic disparity—57 percent of land owners held only 3 percent of 

the productive land while less than 0.5 percent owned 60 percent of the 

productive land.8

Latin America’s oldest democracy, described as “procedural” and a 

“low intensity democracy,” focused more on the regular election of officials than on governance of the country.9

 Although the 1991 Constitution, 

which replaced the 1886 Constitution, and election laws made Colombia 

more democratic, established judicial and political reforms, strengthened 

civilian control over security forces, protected individual freedoms, and 

decentralized governance, Colombia remained a weak state in which 

“accountability, transparency, corruption, and the ability to extract and 

distribute resources for national development and protection of human 

rights and liberties” proved difficult.10

 Acknowledged as “one of the 

most responsible, accountable, and participatory charters in the region,” 

the 1991 Constitution suffered from being seldom or sparingly applied.11

Below the national level, 32 departments and a capital district provided 

regional governance with local affairs handled by elected officials in over 

1,000 municipalities.12 The central government had appointed municipality 

mayors before 1998 and departmental governors before 1991; afterwards 

they were elected for 4-year terms. The mayors served a staggered term: 2 

years before and 2 years after each 4-year Presidential election.13

 By 1998, 

over half of Colombia—the large, undeveloped, and unpopulated area east 

of the Cordillera Oriental where 8 of the 10 departments in the Orinoquia 

and Amazon regions had not been established until 1991 and where less 

than 5 percent of the municipalities existed—lacked any permanent government presence and could be reached only by river or air. These ungoverned and uncontrolled areas, along with similar isolated regions in other 

parts of Colombia, attracted lawless elements and guerrillas.

Multiple Sources of Violence: Drugs, Guerrillas, and 

Autodefensas

Colombia’s long history of violence included armed revolts, local 

violence, banditry, and personal vendettas. Two major civil wars, the 
Thousand-Day War of 1899–1902 with over 100,000 dead and La Violencia

of 1948–58 with over 200,000 killed, failed to resolve the tensions between 

those political elites who supported a strong central government and those 

who supported strong regional governments. In the 1960s, Communist 

and left-wing insurgent groups threatened the state. In the 1980s and early 

1990s, drug traffickers became a catalyst for violence and criminal activity. 

In the absence of Colombian security forces to provide local protection in 

parts of the country, autodefensas—self-defense or paramilitary forces—

rose to counter the lawlessness (see figure 2). With over 30,000 homicides 

a year, of which no more than 10 percent were related to insurgency or 

armed conflict, Colombia had the highest homicide rate in the world along 

with the highest kidnapping rate.14

 Demonstrating little concern for life or 

death, a culture of violence created by historical and current factors—“by 

the lack of a state monopoly of violence, by the ineffectiveness of the laws 

. . . by the rules of the narcotics trade . . . and by the class structure of 

Colombian society”— appeared in many parts of Colombia.15

 By the late 

1990s, violence from drug trafficking, insurgency, and autodefensas—

“Colombia’s Three Wars”—threatened the existence of the state from an 

“unholy trinity of non-state actors . . . perpetrating a level of corruption, 

criminality, human horror, and internal instability.”16

Drug Traffickers

For years, Colombia had been the number one producer of coca and 

of refined cocaine in the world. Heroin and marijuana rounded off the 

list of homegrown illegal drugs. Crime, violence, and money—lots of 

money—came with drugs. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, cartels—first 

in Medellín and then in Cali—dominated the drug business. When the 

Colombian Government, with US assistance, attempted to destroy the 

Medellín cartel of Pablo Escobar, the state found itself counterattacked 

for the first time by drug traffickers. The old “live and let live” or “turn a 

blind eye” policy died. Assassinations, bombings, threats, and briberies of 

government civil and security force officials—the “silver or lead” choice 

between taking bribe money or a bullet—became common. In December 

1993, a unit of the Colombian National Police (CNP) killed Escobar and 

in 1995 the Cali cartel was dismantled.17 But the demise of the cartels did 

not end the drug problem; it did not even make it better. In fact, it became 

more difficult for the CNP to address as smaller, flatter, dispersed, and 

diverse illegal drug organizations with ties to criminals, insurgents, and 

paramilitaries replaced the cartels.18

 As long as illicit drugs flourished in 

Colombia, they would attract, corrupt, and undercut government policies 

and institutions.
Guerrillas: FARC and ELN

In the early 1960s, numerous insurgent or guerrilla groups inspired 

by Communist revolutionary movements throughout the world developed in Colombia. While some organizations took their ideological lead 

from Moscow, others looked to China or Cuba. Although external support 

remained limited, most groups survived through funds raised from extortions or “taxes” and from kidnappings. In the mid-1960s, the Colombian 

P eru

Braz il

E cuador

V enezue la P anam a

P ac ific

O cean

C aribbean Sea

M itú

0 50 100 150 m iles

C a rtagena

M edellín

B o g otá

C ali

AR AU C A

M E T A

C AQ U E T A

G U A V IAR E

PU TUM A YO T res E sq uinas

FAR C

E LN

A uto defe nsas

La ran dia

FAR C /

E LN

Figure 2. Areas of guerrilla and autodefensa activity.19
security forces launched Plan LAZO against Marquetalia and eight other 

“independent republics”—attacking, reducing, and dispersing the guerrillas into remote areas where they remained a nuisance for almost 20 years. 

During the 1980s, most of these groups participated in a cease-fire with the 

Colombian Government in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement. 

The 1991 Constitution addressed many of their grievances. Several groups 

demobilized and entered the political process. However, two organizations 

that failed to reach an agreement—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—grew into 

significant threats by the mid-1990s. By 1995, guerrillas had established 

a presence in over 600 municipalities throughout Colombia with their 

strength concentrated in the newly settled areas of “internal colonization” 

west of the Cordillera Oriental and of “border colonization” east of those 

mountains.20 In 1997, the US State Department designated both the FARC 

and the ELN as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).21

In the mountains of southeast Colombia in 1966, the rural-based, 

Moscow-leaning Colombian Communist Party organized the FARC as its 

military force from survivors of the “independent republics.” A guerrilla 

since 1949 and a veteran of Marquetalia, Manuel Marulanda—known as 

Tirofijo or “sure shot”—became the FARC’s first chief of staff and its eventual commander. In its early years, the FARC’s primary effort remained 

defensive, focusing on survival and gradual expansion—a unit or front in 

1969, another in 1971, and a general staff in 1974. Lack of support among 

the populace made kidnapping the FARC’s primary source of funds in 

1971. By 1982, the FARC had grown to 17 fronts with about 1,000 armed 

members.22

The FARC leadership held its Seventh Guerrilla Conference from 

4 to 14 May 1982. At that meeting, the FARC adopted an 8-year plan 

to permit a shift from a defensive posture to an offensive strategy that 

attacked Colombian Military (COLMIL) forces and expanded FARC 

control throughout the country. The plan included offensive, government, 

and defense-of-the-revolution phases. To accomplish these tasks, the 

FARC planned to expand to 28,000 armed members in 48 fronts by 1990. 

To emphasize this change in direction, it added People’s Army (EP) to its 

name, FARC-EP. The operational concept planned to dominate the eastern 

slopes of the Cordillera Oriental from its headquarters at La Casa Verde to 

separate half of the country from the government in Bogotá by employing 

a “new method of operating”—heavily-armed, mobile guerrilla units in 

coordinated attacks against isolated military units. To create capable units, 

the FARC planned to establish training schools and regional training 

facilities. Previously, fronts had been military units consisting of 50 men 
in 2 platoons, or guerrillas, divided into squads of 7 or 8. When two or 

more fronts combined, they became columns. After this conference, fronts 

assumed regional responsibilities and the task of building additional 

fronts. The FARC reemphasized its reorientation from conducting minor 

skirmishes and ambushes to guerrilla warfare at a December 1987 

meeting. To finance this effort, specific economic areas were targeted for 

exploitation: livestock, commercial agriculture, oil, gold, and drugs. The 

primary sources of funding became extortion and kidnapping. By 1989, 

the FARC had grown to 7,000 personnel in 27 fronts—a 700 percent 

increase in 7 years—even though the military portion of its plan had been 

postponed before implementation because of peace negotiations with 

President Belisario Betancur’s government.23

Once it became apparent that the Colombian Government would not 

agree to its terms, the FARC used the cease-fire to prepare for hostilities. 

In May 1989, the FARC decided that it would renew its efforts in January 

1990. Its 8-year Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia, an updated 

version of its 1982 strategy, envisioned four phases:

(1) 1990–92: Acquire weapons, communications, and aircraft as 

the FARC grew to 18,000 guerrillas in 60 fronts.

(2) 1992–94: Increase funding for expansion to 32,000 in 80 

fronts.

(3) 1994–96: Conduct guerrilla operations with 16,000 and fight 

the “new method of operating” with 16,000 to overrun military, civilian, 

and other objectives.

(4) 1996–98: If phase 3 failed, regroup, conduct attacks against 

infrastructure—roads, electrical systems, communications sites—and plan 

a second offensive.

To augment its combat forces, the FARC created a local civilian militia. 

But no plan survives contact with the enemy. After the FARC’s refusal to 

disarm to participate in the Constitutional Assembly election, the COLMIL 

attacked the FARC headquarters at Casa Verde—Operation Centauro—on 

9 December 1990, the day of the election. The FARC leadership escaped 

and 3 weeks later launched OPERATION WASP, the largest series of 

attacks in Colombia that continued into February 1991. At its Eighth 

Guerrilla Conference in April 1993, the FARC opted for a war of movement 

and created a system of seven regional commands or blocs in response to 

the attack on Casa Verde. Thereafter, the FARC would be decentralized, 

dispersed, and a more difficult target for the Colombian security forces 

to attack. Each bloc assumed regional responsibility, consisted of at least 
five fronts, and raised funds by exploiting local resources. Senior FARC 

leadership resided in a seven-member Secretariat. The FARC decided 

to push into southeast Colombia to gain control of the coca-growing 

area and the borders with neighboring countries. In addition, the FARC 

conducted information operations to garner support within Colombia, the 

international community, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 

operating in Colombia. By 1998, the FARC had grown to well over 10,000 

members operating in 61 fronts, 4 mobile columns, 15 mobile companies, 

and 5 urban fronts. Lacking popular support, what had become the bestorganized, equipped, and trained guerrilla force in Latin America relied 

on kidnapping, extortion, and drugs for funding and on intimidation for 

recruiting.24

The ELN represented a smaller but significant rural-based guerrilla 

threat in northeastern Colombia. Created in 1964 by university students, 

liberation-theology-inspired Catholic priests, and oil workers, the ELN 

looked to Fidel Castro for support and inspiration. It primarily attacked 

infrastructure—roads, bridges, oil lines, power lines, and dams—and 

received its financial support from extortion, kidnappings, and aircraft 

hijackings. Unlike the FARC, the ELN focused on developing a political 

base before fielding guerrilla units. Like most guerrilla groups, it suffered 

from internal strife, negotiated with the government at times, clashed with 

the FARC at times, and aligned with the FARC at other times. Although 

Colombian security forces had reduced the ELN to 17 members in 1973, 

by 1998 it had recovered to almost 5,000 members. Right-wing paramilitaries constituted its principal threat.25

Autodefensas or Paramilitaries

Armed civilian militias had a long legal and illegal history in Colombia—

a result of its record of conflicts between federalism and regionalism and 

of the absence of security forces in parts of the country. As security threats 

increased from insurgents and then drug traffickers, the arming of ad hoc, 

self-defense groups by local leaders became a normal and traditional 

response. Plan LAZO—developed with US military input—recognized 

a need for local security forces to remain in areas cleared of guerrillas 

by military units that moved to other areas. In May 1965, Presidential 

Decree 3398 authorized the arming of rural civilian self-defense forces 

under COLMIL supervision. In 1968, this decree became law and served 

as the legal foundation for organizing and arming paramilitary support for 

counterguerrilla operations for over 20 years. Local paramilitary groups, 

working in conjunction with the CNP, had played an important role in the 

destruction of the Medellín and Cali drug cartels. In response to concerns 
10

about ties to drugs and atrocities, a Presidential decree in 1989 made all 

paramilitary groups, even those that operated under military supervision, 

illegal.26 Unfortunately, “making the militias illegal did not uncreate 

them . . . [but] merely encouraged the creation of multiple groups outside 

the control of the state” to fill the vacuum created by too few Colombian 

security forces.27

In many rural areas with little or no government presence, paramilitary units with known drug ties and that conducted atrocities garnered 

more support than did the guerrillas. Why? With no one to turn to for security, one observer noted that the “atrocities of the paramilitaries are not 

actions of abnormal men, but rather the acts of normal men subjected to 

and victimized by unremitted violence, who see the disappearance of the 

guerrillas as the only sure solution to their plight.”28 Because they targeted 

civilians suspected of supporting the guerrillas, many viewed the paramilitaries as antiguerrilla—not as antistate. They were not officially recognized 

as a security threat until 1993. Others, particularly human rights organizations and the US State Department, alleged continued COLMIL ties with 

the paramilitaries from 1993 to 1998 despite Colombian Government 

denials. Paramilitary activity grew during peace negotiations as government security operations decreased. From 1993 to 1997, the number of 

these illegal groups increased from about 270 to over 400 with 3,000 to 

6,000 members and resulted in increased civilian killings by paramilitaries. (See Table 1, Noncombatant deaths and forced disappearances.) In 

1997, Carlos Castano, a paramilitary leader with known long-time drug 

ties, established the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) to 

coordinate regional groups in a campaign against guerrilla strongholds. 

A multiday attack on the population of the municipality of Mapiripan in 

southern Colombia became just one such notorious event. Despite its illegal status and deserved reputation for atrocity and massacre, paramilitary 

strength continued to grow as massacres and assassinations targeted guerrilla supporters and displaced populations from parts of Colombia.29

Acknowledging the lack of security in parts of the country, in February 

1994 Presidential Decree 356 authorized “special private security and 

vigilante services” in which anyone with Ministry of National Defense 

1993 1995 1996 1997 1998

Guerrillas 28% 38% 36% 23.5% 21.3%

Security Forces 54% 16% 18% 7.5% 2.7%

Paramilitaries 18% 46% 46% 69% 78%

Table 1. Noncombatant deaths and forced disappearances30
11

(MOD) approval could provide for their own security armed with combat 

weapons. In September, President Ernesto Samper used this decree to 

create the Community Associations of Rural Vigilance (CONVIVIR), 

which focused on intelligence reporting for security forces and selfdefense by these groups. Within a year, with over 500 units created, almost 

10,000 armed men, and acknowledged lack of government oversight, 

Samper suspended the creation of additional CONVIVIRs. The existing 

organizations remained legal until abolished by his successor in 1999.31

The mix-mash of legal and illegal self-defense forces exceeded the capacity 

of the government to control and failed to provide an effective alternative 

to the lack of security forces.

Each of the principal nonstate generators of violence—drug 

traffickers, guerrillas, and autodefensas—created formidable difficulties 

for the Colombian Government and its security forces. In 1998, the 

government reported that the paramilitaries had committed 70 percent of 

the human rights violations, the guerrillas 25 percent, and the Colombian 

security forces 5 percent. In addition to the monies flowing to drug 

traffickers, funding for the guerrillas and paramilitaries that year totaled 

$551 million from drugs, $311 million from extortion, and $236 million 

from kidnappings—almost $1.1 billion.32 Despite these multiple security 

threats, for years “various Colombian Governments dealt with the 

problems on a completely ad hoc basis—without a plan; without adequate 

or timely intelligence; without a consensus among the political, economic, 

and military elites about how to deal with the armed opposition; and 

importantly, within an environment of mutual enmity between the civil 

government and the Armed Forces.”33

Colombian Security Forces

The 1991 Constitution defined the Colombian security forces—the 

Public Force—as the “Armed Forces and the national police exclusively.” 

The military organizations—the army (COLAR), navy (COLNAV), and 

air force (COLAF)—defended “the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the national territory and of the constitutional order.” The CNP—“a 

permanent armed body of a civilian nature”—maintained “the conditions 

necessary for the exercise of public rights and freedoms and to ensure that 

the inhabitants of Colombia may live together in peace.” The specifics 

of administering, raising, training, equipping, and employing each force 

were established by law. To ensure an apolitical, nondeliberative security force, members could not vote nor take part in any political activities. Constitutional protection for ranks, awards, and pensions prevented 

their removal except by legal action. Further protection covered crimes 
12

committed “while in active service” and “in connection with their service” 

that would be tried under the Penal Military Code by security force personnel and not by civilian judges under civil law. Finally, the government of 

Colombia claimed the sole right to have weapons, munitions, and explosives and to give permission to bear arms. Only the permanent armed security forces, operating under government control, had that permission.34

Colombian law placed the security forces under the MOD, which had 

replaced the War Ministry in 1965.35 (See Figure 3, Ministry of National 

Defense.) From 1953 to 1991, no civilian served as the Minister of 

Defense; however, since 1991, all have been civilians. Although civilianled, the MOD remained a military-staffed organization with few civilian 

members. The minister had one vice-minister of defense (VMOD). 

Although adhering to a long tradition of civilian control of the military 

and the police, security force commanders tended to view civilian control 

to mean control by the President with whom they often worked directly on 

security matters rather than control by the Minister of Defense.36 Within the 

MOD during peacetime, the military forces focused on territorial defense 

and the CNP addressed internal security. During internal emergencies, 

military forces secured infrastructure and conducted operations against 

the guerrilla bands in the countryside, while the CNP controlled urban 

areas and municipalities. The capabilities of the security forces to address 

the internal threats rested on the support or, more accurately, the lack of 

support of a government and a populace that sought to negotiate, appease, 

or ignore the sporadic security problem rather than to destroy it. From 

1995 to 1998, a US military official saw four Ministers of Defense, 

four COLMIL commanders, three Colombian Army commanders, six 

Colombian Army intelligence directors, and noted “in some of the other 

cabinet ministries it’s even worse.”37 The 4-year Presidency, coupled 

with the frequent turnover of key officials, created a lack of leadership 

continuity that ensured short-term approaches to long-term problems.

Colombian Military (COLMIL) Forces

In 1951, Colombia created the position of Armed Forces or COLMIL 

commander, normally filled by a Colombian Army general.38 More a 

coordinator than a commander, Colombia had not created a common or joint 

capability in security matters by 1998. Each military service commander—

equal in rank to the COLMIL commander—held both administrative and 

operational responsibilities for his service.39 Given the unique history 

of each service, their different missions, and the scarcity of resources, 

competition among the armed services was normal and with the national 

police even more pronounced. COLMIL had roughly 120,000 personnel 
13

in late 1997.40 That December, the COLMIL commander, General Manuel 

Jose Bonett, responded to the deteriorating security situation created by 

what he called collectively the “generators of violence” when he published 

a military strategy for securing the population and critical resources. 

However, without a national strategy supported by the government and 

by a budget, this document proved “nothing more than a statement of 

principle, a general guideline for action, or an expression of intent.”41

The on-the-ground, limited-resource strategy evolved to protecting the 

populated areas by establishing a military presence throughout the country 

by garrisons of small units and by reacting, whenever possible, to guerrilla 

attacks. This proved “politically sound but militarily disastrous.”42

In early 1998, the Colombian Army considered itself a professional 

army generally structured along US lines based on its Korean war 

service. As in most peacetime armies, its training and education system—

considered better “in the garrison and the classroom than in the field” 

A ir F orce

(C OLA F)

A rm y

(C OLA R)

N a vy

(C OLN AV)

M ilitary

Forces

(C OLM IL)

M in is try o f

N a tio n a l D e fe nse

(M O D)

N ation a l P o lice

(C N P)

Figure 3. Ministry of National Defense.
14

because it lacked “much unit training out in the field”—focused on external, 

more conventional threats rather than the distraction of counterguerrilla 

operations.43 A former US ambassador described the 104,000-man 

Colombian Army as “basically a barracks military, not . . . organized to 

go after the guerrillas . . . . [having] some brave and capable people, but 

. . . strictly a reaction force, and not a very mobile one at that.”44 The 

soldiers came from two sources: regulars who were conscripts or draftees 

and professionals who were volunteers. The regulars—80 percent of the 

Colombian Army—received a basic military training and they formed two 

types: those with high school diplomas who served 12 months and were 

exempt from combat duties and those without degrees who served for 

18 months. The professionals had completed initial service, volunteered 

for a 2-year term, and received additional training. They constituted a 

small, trained combat force. About 20 percent of the army, the 19,900 

professionals formed the fighting core of the army while 45 percent—

regulars without high school degrees—secured critical infrastructure such 

as roads, bridges, dams, power systems, and oil pipelines. The remaining 

35 percent—those with high school degrees—could not, by law, be sent 

to combat areas.45 The officers—all graduates of the military academy—

received commissions in infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer, intelligence, 

communications, or logistics. Noncommissioned officers—volunteer 

candidates with a 9th grade education or higher—graduated from a 11⁄2-

year noncommissioned officer school. Military occupational specialties 

for regular soldiers did not exist.46 As a conscript-based, conventionallyfocused force, the Colombian Army dealt with the guerrillas only when the 

CNP failed to do so by using its small professional units.

Reorganized in 1996, the Colombian Army consisted of five divisions 

with territorial responsibilities. Each division—commanded by a major 

general—consisted of two to four territorial brigades and two to three 

counterguerrilla battalions. The Fifth Division, authorized in 1995, remained 

a work in progress that included administrative and school responsibilities 

in Bogotá. Each brigade, commanded by a brigadier general or a senior 

colonel with a small staff, had a standard organization reminiscent of a 

US infantry brigade; however, few had all their authorized battalions that 

lieutenant colonels commanded. (See Figure 4, Colombian Army brigade.) 

Each of the 16 brigades was authorized 3 infantry battalions—many had 

2 infantry battalions assigned and one had 4; a cavalry squadron—7 

existed; an artillery battalion—7 existed; an engineer battalion—10 

existed; counterguerrilla battalions—1 to 6 assigned to each; a military 

police battalion—1 or 2 each in 4 brigades; and all had support battalions. 

The standard infantry battalion consisted of three infantry companies of 
15

four platoons filled with regular soldiers and one or more companies of 

four platoons manned by professional soldiers. Each infantry company—

commanded by a captain—was authorized 165 men and the infantry 

battalion had about 500 men. All battalions had small staffs. Although each 

battalion in a brigade, regardless of type, had security responsibilities, little 

institutional motivation existed to engage the guerrillas because any loss of 

personnel or equipment meant an investigation with probable disciplinary 

action and any dead guerrilla resulted in a police criminal investigation 

with possible criminal charges.47

To address the guerrilla nuisance—“the traditional enemy of the 

military,”48 the Colombian Army created special units of professional 

soldiers that grew in size and number as the guerrilla threat increased—

first with counterguerrilla companies during the 1960s and then with 

counterguerrilla battalions (BCG) and a mobile infantry brigade (BRIM) 

in 1990. (See Figure 5, Mobile infantry brigade [BRIM].) In December 

1990, 1 BRIM attacked the FARC leadership at Casa Verde. Special taxes 

X

I I

I

I I

F A

I I

I

I I

E N G R

I I

M P

I I

C G

I I

S P T

Regular Professional

Figure 4. Colombian Army brigade.
16

raised after the FARC attacks in 1991 permitted the Colombian Army to 

increase the number of professional soldiers from 2,000 in 1990 to about 

15,000 by 1993. In 1991, 2 BRIM was organized and 3 BRIM in 1997. Not 

truly mobile, a BRIM lacked organic transportation. Mobile merely meant 

that it had no fixed territorial responsibility; it could move, as required, 

to threatened areas. Commanded by a colonel, a BRIM consisted of four 

360-man counterguerrilla battalions commanded by majors. A battalion 

had four 84-man companies each with two 41-man platoons. Each 

counterguerrilla company had half the strength of an infantry company. 

After 1992, a Counterguerrilla Special Operations Command administered 

the nondivisional counterguerrilla units. By 1998, the Colombian Army 

had three BRIMs and a four-battalion Special Forces Brigade created in 

1996 with which to respond to countrywide threats. A small army aviation 

brigade had a limited number of UH-60, UH-1H, and MI-17 helicopters 

to provide support.49

As the second largest armed service and less than 15 percent the size 

of the Colombian Army, the Colombian Navy faced multiple challenges—

blue-water operations both in the Pacific Ocean and in the Caribbean 

I

S P T

C G

I I

C G

81 M ort

I I

C G

X

BRIM

I I

C G

I I

C G

I I

C G

Figure 5. Mobile infantry brigade (BRIM).
17

Sea where an island governmental department existed, coastal operations against drug traffickers in both areas, and brown-water or riverine 

operations along 12,600 kilometers of navigable rivers. Similar to the 

Colombian Army, the Colombian Navy favored a traditional or professional blue-water approach and resisted involvement in counternarcotics and internal security matters. Its major commands were the Pacific 

Naval Forces Command and the Caribbean Naval Forces Command. The 

Colombian Navy consisted of a navy with frigates, submarines, support 

ships, patrol boats, and fixed and rotary-wing aircraft; a naval infantry 

organized in 1937—a brigade and its largest component by 1998; a coast 

guard corps organized in 1979 and equipped with patrol boats; and a riverine force organized in 1956 and equipped with river craft. A naval infantry brigade commanded the naval infantry battalions and riverine units.50

The Colombian Navy—like most navies of the world—emphasized bluewater, high-technology matters and not counterdrug or internal security 

issues, which were CNP and Colombian Army concerns.51

The smallest armed service with less than 7 percent the manpower 

of the Colombian Army, the Colombian Air Force possessed a mixture of 

fixed and rotary wing aircraft to support air supremacy, attack or close air 

support, air transport, and aerial reconnaissance missions. As with many 

similar air forces, it had a limited number of aircraft, most not state-ofthe-art, from various countries. Air superiority aircraft included French 

Mirage and Israeli Kfir fighters. Close air support came from Brazilian 

AT-27 Tucanos and US A-37 Dragonflies, OV-10 Broncos, and AC-47 

Spooky aircraft and armed UH-1H Huey and UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. Spanish CASA aircraft with a mixture of aircraft from other countries provided air transport. Reconnaissance came from helicopter and 

light aircraft. Organized into numbered regional Air Combat Commands 

(CACOM), the Colombian Air Force responded to the Colombian Army 

and CNP internal security requirements when possible if asked. Like many 

air forces with limited means, the Colombian Air Force was a fair-weather 

daytime air force.52

Colombian National Police (CNP)

As the second largest security force in Colombia in 1998, the CNP 

numbered about 90,000 members commanded by Major General Rosso 

Jose Serrano. A long history of mistrust, dislike, and misunderstandings 

with the COLMIL and the bureaucratic battles over limited resources made 

cooperation difficult. Responsible for law enforcement throughout the 

country, the CNP had diverse responsibilities requiring urban, rural, antinarcotics, criminal investigation, antikidnapping, customs, highway patrol, 
18

intelligence, and special operations units. With US counterdrug assistance 

provided in the mid-1990s, the CNP became heavily armed for a national 

police force and its antinarcotics police aviation assets—56 helicopters 

and 17 fixed-winged aircraft along with 15 US-provided spray aircraft and 

12 helicopters—provided a mobility envied by the COLMIL. Although 

counterdrug efforts made the CNP targets for guerrillas and criminals, US 

counterdrug assistance intensified the tensions between the COLMIL and 

the CNP. A senior COLMIL officer complained to an American, “We now 

have two armies and you are responsible—you always support them—you 

treat them better than us!” Yet, in many isolated municipalities, a 40-man 

police unit provided law and order. Increasingly, guerrilla attacks targeted 

these isolated small units.53

Involvement in the internal security of the nation proved difficult for 

the COLMIL, as it does for most militaries. First, not being at war or 

under a constitutionally sanctioned “state of internal commotion” legally 

declared by the President, normal laws applied. In peacetime, only the 

CNP could arrest or detain a suspect. When anyone died during a smallunit military operation, operations ceased, the “crime scene” secured, and 

a police investigation conducted to confirm or to deny criminal activity. 

Seldom did a judicial technical police investigator accompany a military 

unit on counterguerrilla operations. Often it took hours, and sometimes 

days—depending on the remoteness of the location—for the investigator 

to arrive. Under these conditions, only limited tactical successes proved 

possible. A senior military officer noted that the laws seemed more suited 

to Denmark than to the conditions in Colombia. Second, the normal 

actions of combat operations—detentions, killings, and other actions in 

a confusing, stressful environment—meant possible liability, potential 

criminal charges, and accusations of human rights violations. For these 

reasons, COLMIL officers strongly defended their Constitutional Article 

221 protection of being judged by the military for accused crimes committed during an act of service. What many in the security forces considered 

an essential legal protection, many in the human rights community viewed 

as impunity from prosecution.54

Colombian–United States Relations

From just prior to World War II, Colombia and the United States 

maintained close diplomatic and military relations. In 1939 the United 

States established a military mission in Bogotá.55 The only Latin American 

country to send military forces to the Korean war, Colombia provided an 

infantry battalion and a frigate shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. 

These United States-trained-and-equipped Colombian units served with 
19

US divisions and naval forces.56 In 1956, US ranger-qualified personnel 

assisted in the establishment of a Lancero school, the first such course in 

South America.57 From a Special Survey Team in 1959 to the Yarborough 

Team visit in 1962 through the execution of Plan LAZO in the mid-

1960s, close cooperation and consultation between Colombia and the 

United States continued.58 Colombia participated in the United Nations 

Emergency Force I in Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis and in the United 

States-sponsored Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai where it 

provided a battalion along the Israeli–Egyptian border since 1981.

59 After 

President George H.W. Bush declared “war on drugs” in 1989, Colombian 

and United States activities became increasingly intertwined.

Country Team and the Counterdrug Policy

In 1994, Myles R.R. Frechette arrived in Colombia as the ambassador 

for the largest US Embassy overseas. Principal members of his country 

team included the Department of State’s (DOS) Narcotics Affairs Section 

(NAS), the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Military Group–Colombia 

(MILGP), US Agency for International Development (USAID), and law 

enforcement agencies that included the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 

Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), US 

Coast Guard (USCG), and US Customs Service. US policy concentrated 

on what was called the four Ds: democracy, development, drugs, and derechos humanos (human rights).60 After the election of President Samper 

in 1994, allegations of a $6 million payment from the Cali drug cartel 

brought an immediate and harsh US reaction in what would become a 

4-year adversarial relationship over corruption and the democratic process, ineffective alternate crop development and drug eradication efforts, 

resistance to the US-financed counterdrug program, and an atrocious 

human rights record. For Americans, illegal drugs—the principal reason 

for engagement in Colombia—generated the violence and corruption that 

made Colombia a potential quagmire.

Two ghosts from the recent past influenced United States policy in 

Colombia—Vietnam and El Salvador. From Vietnam came the imperative 

not to become involved in a counterinsurgency and from El Salvador came 

the necessity of emphasizing human rights. This meant maintaining a strict 

policy distinction between counterdrug and counterinsurgency efforts—

no matter how irrelevant to the actual situation or how beneficial to the 

institutions involved—as well as a spotless human rights record. In early 

1992, Colombia and the United States agreed that the CNP would lead 

the counterdrug effort—the NAS working with the antinarcotics police 

directorate (DIRAN). Counterdrug funding for the COLMIL ceased. 
20

This suited both countries. For the Americans, the CNP had proven a 

more cooperative partner and its DIRAN focused on counternarcotics. 

The COLMIL, on the other hand, had a poor human rights record and 

had been uncooperative—unable, if not unwilling, to maintain a strict 

distinction between counterdrug and counterinsurgency operations that 

the Americans required for counterdrug assistance. For the Colombians, 

the DIRAN became the focal point for the US-supported counterdrug 

effort freeing the Colombian security forces—COLMIL and CNP—to 

address the spreading violence generated by criminals, guerrillas, and 

autodefensas. This decision reinforced the COLMIL perspective that drug 

trafficking was a crime, thus a police task, while guerrillas were a military 

threat, thus a military task.61

 The COLMIL resisted what it considered an 

artificial distinction between counterguerrilla and counterdrug operations 

as it confronted what a COLMIL commander called the “narco-guerrilla” 

threat.62 Many Americans viewed the Colombian emphasis on fighting 

guerrillas rather than counterdrug operations as “not the best way to resolve 

its security problems, not the least because of opposition in Washington 

to counterinsurgency.”63 These different views of the security problem 

created miscommunication, misunderstanding, confusion, and frustration 

for Colombians and Americans.

The US counterdrug strategy in Colombia had three goals: (1) to 

take down the drug trafficking leadership, (2) to reduce the amount of 

drugs through eradication, and (3) to strengthen legal institutions. The 

first became the focus of the CNP and DEA; the second the CNP and 

NAS; and the third the government of Colombia and several US agencies—DOS, DOJ, FBI, and USAID. The key programs focused on eradication of coca plants and destruction of drug laboratories, aerial and 

maritime interdiction, judicial reform, prevention of money laundering, 

drug awareness education, and, because nothing could be done instantly, 

development of infrastructure to support these programs.64 An Air Bridge 

Denial Program, consisting of several radar sites in Colombia, identified 

suspect aircraft that the Colombian Air Force attempted to intercept in its 

airspace. The Colombian Navy—in coordination with the USCG, DEA, 

DOD, and US Customs Service—participated in interdiction efforts in its 

territorial waters. Aerial spraying, initially resisted by the Colombians, 

began in parts of Colombia in the early 1990s. The counterdrug program suffered from high expectations and poor outcomes. The American 

focus on results created short-term programs that took time to develop, 

effort to coordinate, capacity to execute, and experience to make effective. Some believed the “US has been and is still today trying to fight 

the drug war ‘on the cheap.’”65 Others claimed the counterdrug program 
21

had become the guerrillas’ “best friend” because eradication success in 

the neighboring countries of Peru and Ecuador had pushed coca production into southern Colombia and because their major competition—the 

drug cartels—had been dismantled.66 From 1990 to 1998, the over $500 

million spent on antinarcotics eradication brought no reduction in coca 

production—in fact, it rose by 50 percent.67

In 1998, Colombia reportedly had the “worst human rights record in the 

hemisphere.” The indexes—political killings, disappearances, massacres, 

forced displacements—reflected a country struggling with multiple sources 

of violence.68 Although the autodefensas and the guerrillas committed the 

majority of the violations and the security forces’ violations had declined 

over time, the COLMIL—particularly the Colombian Army—struggled to 

counter the negative image created by FARC information operations, the 

critical reports of NGOs, and DOS human rights reports. Responsible for 

security throughout the country, the security forces received criticism not 

only for committing violations, but also for failing to prevent abuses. In 

1997, when the guerrillas killed over 200 candidates for elected office and 

intimidated over 2,000 to withdraw and when the paramilitaries committed 

the majority of the massacres and political killings—to include their brutal 

attack on Mapiripan—the security forces and the judicial system continued to receive harsh criticism.69 Almost 75 percent of all crimes were not 

reported and less than 3 percent of all crimes were punished—the indicators of a broken legal system. A DOS report addressed concerns about 

military impunity, about operating under emergency or “state of internal 

commotion” decrees in parts of the country for 36 of the past 44 years, and 

about the “persistent, unofficial, emphasis . . . on body count as a means of 

assessing field performance . . . [that makes it] a main contributing cause 

of violations.”70 Past ties to self-defense groups, the inability or unwillingness to attack the growing paramilitaries, the repeated reports of security 

force personnel collusion, the inverse relationship of paramilitary violence 

increasing as security force abuse dropped (see figure 2), and the continued, although reduced, violations, made it impossible for the Colombian 

Army to overcome its poor human right reputation.

Colombian–US relations deteriorated during the Samper presidency. 

Corruption, counternarcotics, human rights, different priorities, and personalities all played a part as both countries pushed the limits of what the 

other proved willing or able to do. In an attempt to energize Colombian 

counterdrug efforts in 1995, President William Clinton granted Colombia 

a vital national interest certification waiver that placed restrictions on 

counterdrug funding and requirements for future certification—a strong 

indication of US dissatisfaction. Colombian failure to respond to these 
22

concerns resulted in decertification in 1996—a first for a counternarcotics 

partner and aid recipient—and again in 1997. Colombia received a vital 

national interest waiver in 1998. The specific factors cited for decertification included governmental corruption undermining law enforcement and 

the judiciary, poor prison security, failure to safeguard US investigative 

information, failure to implement an extradition treaty signed in 1979, and 

inability to reach agreement on herbicides for eradication. Decertification 

brought Congressionally mandated termination of most foreign assistance 

programs.71

 Ironically, the CNP counterdrug funding and humanitarian aid 

continued while the COLMIL and other funding ended. In 1996, Congress 

passed the Leahy amendment that mandated a human rights certification 

by the Secretary of State for any foreign military unit receiving US counterdrug assistance. If any “credible evidence that . . . [a] unit has committed gross violations of human rights” existed, then funding was prohibited. 

Since “unit” was not defined by law, an elaborate, rigorous, time-consuming vetting process for all members of a military unit arose that frustrated 

many in the COLMIL, particularly because it did not apply equally to the 

CNP.72

Limited US assistance to Colombia during this decertification 

period reflected the US counterdrug policy, not—from the Colombian 

perspective—the realities. (See Table 2, US assistance to Colombia, 1995–

1998.) Although the MOD received conditional counterdrug funding for 

CNP antinarcotics units, the COLMIL received none. Not only had US aid 

been reduced, the utility of much of what was provided for counterdrug 

programs from the DOD drawdown program suffered from poor planning, 

lack of coordination, and misunderstandings within US Government 

agencies and with Colombia. Excess DOD nonlethal assistance for 

counterdrug programs included protective and utility personal equipment, 

such as uniforms and helmets; night vision systems; communications, 

navigation, radar, and photo equipment; spare parts—components, 

attachments, accessories, hardware, and software—for aircraft and patrol 

boats; and river boats.73 A special 1997 drawdown program included five 

10-passenger C-26 aircraft added by the National Security Council—two 

for CNP and three for COLMIL, 12 UH-1H helicopters for CNP, and a 

landing craft and 6 river patrol crafts for the Colombian Navy. Each of these 

packages raised Colombian and United States expectations for increased 

counterdrug capacity. However, Embassy and Colombian officials noted 

the aircraft had not been configured for CNP and COLMIL surveillance 

needs, which would require modifications costing at least $3 million each. 

The DOS agreed to provide $1 million to upgrade the two CNP aircraft, but 

nothing for the COLMIL aircraft. The 12 helicopters delivered to the CNP 
23

in May 1997 had, on average, less than 10 hours of flight time remaining 

before requiring major maintenance. In July with only two helicopters 

operational, the CNP announced its intention to use these helicopters for 

spare parts to maintain its 38-helicopter fleet. In August, the DOS agreed 

to assist in making the helicopters operational. When a promised excess 

$1.5 million landing craft could not be found, the COLMIL rejected a 

smaller vessel as failing to meet its needs. To become operational, the 

six river patrol craft—decommissioned in 1993—required $600,000 

in maintenance just to be of marginal utility and when delivered, many 

lacked radios and other critical equipment. Embassy and DOS personnel 

had learned the pitfalls of using DOD drawdown assistance—excess, 

obsolescent, or obsolete equipment—for the counterdrug program.74

The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported not only that this 

package failed to include “sufficient information on specific Colombian 

requirements, the ability of the host country to operate and maintain the 

equipment, or the funding necessary . . . to support it”; that items “did 

not meet the priority needs of the Colombian police and military”; and 

that “much of the equipment was not operationally ready for use,” but 

that it had been delayed over 10 months because of delays by DOS in 

providing the Embassy guidance on human rights vetting procedures and 

by negotiations with the Colombian Government.75 US assistance did not 

always assist. In fact, hastily conceived, uncoordinated, or poorly executed 

programs made the situation worse, strained tenuous relationships, and 

encouraged distrust.

Dollars in millions 1995 1996 1997 1998 TOTAL

Economic 1.3 .6 .5 3.4

USAID .5 .5

Food Aid Grants

Other 1.3 .6 2.9

Counternarcotics 18.5 22.6 56.5 99.1 196.7

DOS International Narcotics Control 16 16 33.5 46.3 101.8

DOS Air Wing 2.5 6.6 10.9 37.8 57.8

DOD Sec 1004—CD/Police 10.3 11.8 22.1

DOD Sec 1033—Nonlethal Riverine 2.2 2.2

Administration of Justice 1.8 2 3.8

Military 10.6 .2 10.8

IMET .6 .2 .8

FMF Grants 10 10

Drawdowns 14.5 9.4 18.8 42.7

DOD Sec 506—Nonlethal Excess 14.5 9.4 18.8 42.7

TOTAL 30.4 37.7 66.6 119.6 256.3

Table 2. US assistance to Colombia, 1995–199876
24

USSOUTHCOM

By 1998, US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)—the lowest 

priority and smallest American military combatant command—had moved 

its 1,100-person headquarters from Panama into temporary facilities in 

Miami, Florida. (See Figure 6, USSOUTHCOM.) General Charles E. 

Wilhelm, commander since 1997, oversaw an area of responsibility that 

included 32 countries—19 in South and Central America and 13 in the 

Caribbean and the contiguous waters. With 7,500 military personnel 

assigned, USSOUTHCOM had five component commands—in Panama: 

1,500 soldiers in US Army South (USARSO) at Fort Clayton and US Air 

Force South (AFSOUTH) at Howard Air Force Base; in Puerto Rico: US 

Navy South (USNAVSO), US Marine Force South (USMARFORSOUTH), 

and US Special Operations Command South (USSOCSOUTH) at Roosevelt 

Roads; and two joint task forces: a 1,000-person Joint Task Force Bravo

(JTF Bravo) at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and a Joint Interagency 

Task Force–South (JIATF-S) formed from a dozen government agencies 

and departments at Key West, Florida.77 USSOUTHCOM pursued a 

“strategy of cooperative regional peacetime engagement.” Wilhelm 

understood that each country in his area of responsibility was unique in its 

“level of prosperity, stability and history” and that the region ran more on 

“handshakes and personal relationships” rather than on formal agreements. 

As its responsibilities had increased, USSOUTHCOM resources had 

decreased—a personnel reduction of 50 percent from 1994 to 1997 and 

a foreign military financing (FMF) reduction from $221 million to $2 

million from 1991 to 1997. As a result of these reductions, National Guard 

and Reserve units grew in importance—completing over 40 percent of 

USSOUTHCOM deployments in 1997. USSOUTHCOM focused on 

security assistance—particularly FMF and International Military Education 

and Training (IMET) Programs, humanitarian assistance, civic assistance, 

human rights, and counterdrug programs.78 Relocated from Panama to Fort 

Benning, Georgia, in 1984, the US Army School of the Americas provided 

most Spanish-language IMET courses.79

In Colombia, MILGP–Colombia—commanded by an Army colonel 

with regional experience, special operations or foreign area background, 

and Spanish-language skills—constituted a security assistance organization staffed by joint personnel, many serving on temporary duty. As a 

component of the country team, the MILGP worked for the ambassador.80

DOD support to counterdrug operations created an “unprecedented mixing of law enforcement and military missions” that had unintended consequences.81

 Lacking a national police and a military involved in internal 

security, the United States not only had no police organization to align 
25

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Figure 6. USSOUTHCOM.
26

with the CNP, but it had limited experience with, and little understanding of, the national police-internal security military structure common 

to most countries in the USSOUTHCOM area.82 US support of the CNP 

counterdrug program created a distortion or “institutional imbalance and 

exacerbated rivalry” between the CNP and the COLMIL. In addition to 

militarizing the CNP, it reinforced COLMIL attention on counterguerrilla 

and infrastructure protection—rather than counterdrugs—as the “core of 

their institutional mission.”83

Just as the Samper administration resisted American pressures, 

“Colombian strategies, military institutions and practices with roots deep 

in a national political, social, and military culture” resisted “alteration 

despite MILGP-suggested changes.”84 Constrained by decertification 

restrictions and human rights concerns, the MILGP had little to offer the 

COLMIL, even if it had been inclined to listen, other than pressure to 

improve its human rights record. The Joint Combined Exchange Training 

(JCET) Program constituted about the only training opportunity available for the COLMIL. Created in 1991 to provide training for US Special 

Operations personnel to gain “proficiently in their mission-essential 

tasks . . . language training, cultural immersion, and knowledge of the local 

terrain and weather,” JCET permitted training with host nation units without the funding or other constraints of assistance programs because this 

program trained US personnel by working with a host nation unit.85 JCET 

training involved a small group of Americans training with a Colombian 

company or personnel from a battalion for a limited period. The number 

of Colombians trained in basic skills by JCET missions remained insignificant. When the press alleged that JCET missions violated US policy in 

Colombia, the Embassy responded, “the few JCETs . . . were consistent 

with foreign policy objectives” and “because only one or two took place 

each year, they did not have a major impact of the achievement on US 

goals.”86

Road to the Brink of Disaster

In 1996, the FARC transitioned from isolated guerrilla attacks to phase 

3, mobile warfare, which concentrated trained, well-armed units for massed 

attacks against not just isolated CNP stations, but COLMIL units. In April 

1996, a force composed of three fronts ambushed a 49-man 6-vehicle 

military convoy patrolling the Trans-Andean oil pipeline in southern 

Colombia near the border with Ecuador. Outnumbered, the convoy lost 31

killed and 18 wounded. The Colombian Army credited the attack to “bandits 

from the cartel of the FARC.”87 At the end of August, the FARC launched 

an offensive with 22 simultaneous attacks—many multifront—against 
27

isolated police and military targets in 12 departments. A Colombian Army 

officer noted that the assaults “were carried out in different directions, 

each with great initial intensity that caused disorientation among the unit 

commanders, who, seeing their troops in imminent danger, caused even 

greater confusion in army headquarters as it tried to respond across the 

length and breadth of the country.”88 At Las Delicias, a small, remote river 

post and counterdrug base in the department of Putumayo near the Ecuador 

border, an 800-man FARC unit brutally attacked and overran a regular 

infantry company base for the first time. Overwhelmed by numbers and 

over 350 mortar rounds and gas-cylinder bombs, the post was destroyed 

and the garrison killed, wounded, or captured.89

The FARC attacks employing massed, well-armed units presented 

a major threat to small, isolated CNP and COLMIL garrisons. The CNP 

director noted that the “civil war which we had hoped was a thing of the 

past is rapidly reviving.”90 Many Colombians saw the August attacks, 

which coincided with peasant protests against coca eradication, as a reprisal for the US-sponsored counterdrug program. One analyst offered, “We 

are seeing a military escalation in the war against drugs. We are mixing 

the guerrilla conflict . . . with the antidrug conflict with the worst possible consequences.”91

 In the aftermath of Las Delicias, President Samper 

considered setting up a FARC-demanded demilitarized area, but the discussions stalled. By the end of the year, CNP counterdrug aircraft had 

been attacked at an unprecedented rate and FARC attacks and peasant 

anticoca eradication demonstrations had occurred in 15 departments. 

When kidnappings reached a rate of one every 6.5 minutes, the security 

forces created special police and military antikidnapping and antiextortion 

units—Groups of Action Unified for the Liberation of Persons (GAULA). 

Facing a deteriorating security situation, Colombian frustration with the 

United States separation of counterdrug and counterinsurgency assistance 

led a former senior official to declare what many Colombians believed: 

“We can’t accept such a stupid dichotomy that the two have nothing to 

do with each other. It is absurd.”92 While American officials believed that 

the COLMIL did not have the capability to defeat the FARC, they thought 

that the FARC lacked both the political support and the military power to 

threaten the Colombian Government. Besides, US policy and legislation 

forbade support for Colombian counterinsurgency operations.

Conditions in Colombia continued to deteriorate in 1997 as the government struggled to address the guerrilla threat while at the same time 

facing US counterdrug pressure. In February, the US decertified Colombia 

for a second year—American counterdrug programs taking precedence 

over any security concerns. Having withdrawn its security forces from 
28

remote parts of the country, the Colombian Government saw in April 

the establishment of the AUC—an umbrella organization for the growing paramilitary forces. Fundamental disagreements between President 

Samper, who pursued negotiations with the FARC, and his COLMIL commander, who opposed negotiations, refused to provide the FARC a demilitarized area, and defended the CONVIVIR paramilitaries, led Samper to 

replace his COLMIL commander with General Bonett in June.93 In the 

fall, the FARC sought to disrupt the municipality and department elections 

through a campaign of assassination and intimidation. Over 200 candidates died and almost 2,000 withdrew from the election. Despite these 

efforts, the elections occurred without major incident showing a public 

rejection of the FARC. At the end of the year, the FARC launched a widespread “Black December” offensive in which a force of up to 200 guerrillas from two fronts overran a 32-man Colombian Army platoon occupying 

a remote mountaintop communications relay site at Cerro de Patascoy near 

Ecuador. The outnumbered teenage conscripts quickly fell to the combat 

experienced and more heavily armed guerrillas.94

The Americans continued to work their counternarcotics efforts. In 

late 1996 and early 1997, the United States pushed for increased counterdrug operations in southern Colombia by offering the nonlethal, excess 

DOD package discussed earlier. The CNP, agreeing early, received its helicopters in May 1997. The COLMIL, however, failed to reach an agreement with the Embassy on human rights vetting requirements until August 

1997, after which both the Colombian Air Force and Colombian Navy 

quickly complied. The Colombian Army—bitter about decertification, 

human rights vetting, and counterguerrilla restrictions—rejected the assistance.95 Adverse publicity for this nonlethal package raised a so-called 

“difficult question of arming a military well known for abusing human 

rights, especially when the material might be used to put down insurgency 

among the military’s enemies rather than to fight drugs.” Although during a visit former USSOUTHCOM commander and “drug czar” Barry 

McCaffrey often used the COLMIL expression “narco-guerrillas”—a 

term that Ambassador Frechette repeatedly attacked as inaccurate and a 

COLMIL funding ploy, McCaffrey stated clearly: “Let there be no doubt: 

We are not taking part in counterguerrilla operations.”96 In October, the 

DOS issued its first FTO list that included both the FARC and the ELN 

among the 30 groups so designated, but it acknowledged no connection 

between terrorism and illegal drugs.97

In November, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concluded 

that within 5 years the COLMIL faced defeat by drug-financed Marxist 

guerrillas unless the government regained political legitimacy and the 
29

COLMIL was “drastically restructured.” The DIA estimated guerrilla 

strength at more than 20,000—15,000 in FARC and 5,000 in ELN. 

About two-thirds of the FARC units and one-half of the ELN units had 

ties to illegal drugs that provided tens of millions of dollars each year. 

These funds permitted the acquisition of armaments, which included 

heavy weapons, a few surface-to-air missiles, and small airplanes to 

move personnel and munitions within Colombia. Most Colombian and 

American officials acknowledged that the guerrillas controlled over 40 

percent of Colombia. In 10 years, the number of municipalities in which 

the guerrillas maintained a presence had risen from 173 to almost 700. 

To combat the guerrillas, the COLMIL—described as “inept, ill-trained, 

and poorly equipped”—had roughly 120,000 personnel, of which only 

20,000 professionals were equipped for combat duty.98 Although this 

report emphasized the guerrilla threat and its connections to narcotics, 

most US officials—particularly those in Congress—continued to view the 

problem in Colombia as counterdrug and not counterguerrilla rather than 

counterdrug and counterguerrilla. Colombian security officials leaned 

toward a counterdrug and counterguerrilla interpretation to gain access to 

US funding, but they saw counterdrug as a CNP task and counterguerrilla 

as a Colombian Army function.

From 1996 to early 1998, FARC tactical successes came from carefully planned simultaneous massed attacks throughout the country by specially trained units against weak and isolated CNP or COLMIL outposts. 

This changed the first days of March near El Billar on the Caguan River 

in the southern department of Caqueta when 52 BCG—a battalion in the 

newly raised 3 BRIM—moved to disperse a large FARC concentration 

in a remote area. On 1 March, 153 men from parts of three counterguerrilla companies moved into a U-shaped ambush established by over 450 

guerrillas from two FARC fronts and an elite special column. The FARC 

units surrounded this force and attacked it for 3 days—killing 62, capturing 43, and dispersing the remainder. Overcast skies limited air support 

and reinforcement. For the first time, an elite counterguerrilla unit had 

been defeated by FARC guerrillas in open warfare.99 Colombian defense 

analyst Alfredo Rangel declared, “This is without a doubt the biggest 

defeat in the 35-year history of confrontation against insurgency.”100 The 

COLMIL provided an 80-page response to legislative inquires after this 

disaster blaming the defeat on intelligence failure and noting the limitations of the Colombian Army: the professional 20 percent fighting, another 

45 percent providing infrastructure security, and the remaining 35 percent 

excluded from fighting by law. It proposed an increase to 60,000 professionals, which would cost $1.6 billion compared to the current budget of 
30

$1.05 billion. The report stated, “In view of the territories involved, the 

population and subversive force that we confront, it is clear our forces 

are insufficient.”101

 Whether the government would provide additional 

resources or would seek a political settlement depended on the results of 

the Presidential election in progress.

That same month, General Wilhelm told a Congressional committee he was encouraged Colombia had received a national interest waiver 

and acknowledged that a new US Ambassador, Curtis Kamman, had been 

appointed. Wilhelm described Colombia as “ill-prepared to effectively 

counter these threats, due in part to weak national leadership and an overloaded, often corrupt, judicial system, and in part, due to the ineffectiveness of its security forces.” He expressed “little cause for optimism” that 

the COLMIL could “reverse the erosion of government control over the 

outlying departments.” USSOUTHCOM analysis of Colombia focused 

on countering what he called an “alliance of convenience between the 

narcotraffickers and insurgents.” Wilhelm considered the primary weakness of the COLMIL as their “inability to see threats, followed closely by 

their lack of competence in assessing and engaging them.” To improve the 

COLMIL capacity and professionalism, the MILGRP identified seven areas 

for improvement: mobility, direct attack capabilities, intelligence systems, 

night operations, communications systems, sustainment, and operating on 

rivers and in coastal regions. Wilhelm then noted the lack of a “national 

strategy that states that it is an objective of the government of Colombia to 

defeat the insurgency or narcotrafficking.”102 Testifying at the same hearing, CNP Director Major General Serrano noted the nexus of the guerrillas 

and the narcotraffickers—saying “this is true war”—and promised to “fight 

shoulder-to-shoulder with DEA, with CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], 

with FBI and, of course the State Department.” He made no reference to 

COLMIL.103 Wilhelm followed with a letter to General Bonett in which he 

said, “at this time the Colombian Armed Forces are not up to the task of 

confronting and defeating the insurgents” and that as the most threatened 

country in his area of responsibility, the COLMIL was “in urgent need 

of our support.”104 Despite the dire military need, Ambassador Kamman 

emphasized, “We are not in a position to hand out important military aid 

[to the military]. We want to strengthen . . . [COLMIL] in any areas where 

we have got the resources and the legal basis to do so.” Decertification 

had limited resources and US law prohibited military aid to “those units 

reputed to have committed human rights abuses.”105

After El Billar, the Colombians began to work more closely with 

the Americans. In response to the El Billar disaster and to continued US 

pressure for counterdrug operations in southern Colombia, the COLMIL 
31

established Joint Task Force–South (JTF-S) organized around 2 BRIM at 

Tres Esquinas Air Base in the department of Caqueta to keep the FARC 

from establishing a base of operations to control the drug trade and from 

establishing an “independent republic.”106 Under strong US pressure, in May 

COLMIL disbanded its 20th Intelligence Brigade—notorious for human 

rights abuses and ties to the autodefensas—and separated its intelligence 

gathering function from its operations function. A new Army Military 

Intelligence Center (CIME) centralized army intelligence gathering and 

worked through Army Military Intelligence Regions (RIME) collocated at 

each division. Time would determine the effectiveness and consequences 

of these actions.107

Following the hostile relationship of the Samper presidency, many 

hoped for a closer relationship between Colombia and the United States 

after the 1998 election. Conservative Andres Pastrana, son of a former 

President, ran on a platform calling for peace negotiations with the guerrillas. Winning a runoff election that had an unprecedented 60 percent turnout by the closest margin ever in Colombia, Pastrana began talks with the 

FARC before becoming President. Among the guerrilla demands was a 

FARC-controlled area free from Colombian security force presence from 

which to negotiate.108 Despite high hopes for peace, expectations remained 

low. No one knew if after 7 August Pastrana could negotiate a peace settlement, if the guerrillas would participate in good faith, or if the security 

forces would maintain their own. The guerrillas provided a hint in the first 

week of August, when the FARC and ELN launched a coordinated offensive by making 42 attacks in 14 departments. They used mortars and devastating gas-cylinder bombs in the larger attacks. The largest attack took 

place against a key antinarcotics police base for refueling aircraft for coca 

eradication spraying operations and against a Colombian Army company 

garrisoned at Miraflores in Guaviare department. Five FARC units formed 

a 1,200-guerrilla assault force. Expecting an attack, the 120-man infantry 

company dispersed to platoon positions that the guerrillas quickly overwhelmed. The 80-man police unit resisted until it ran out of ammunition 

and then surrendered. Total security force losses at Miraflores included 30 

dead, 50 wounded, and 100 captured.109 During this offensive, Colombian 

security forces fought well—often under adverse conditions. But, the 

guerrillas had the initiative and the demonstrated ability to destroy isolated 

security force outposts. The guerrillas sent a clear message to Pastrana of 

their military strength and of the Colombian security force vulnerability.
32

Notes

1. Laura Brooks, “Colombian Military Is Called To Account: Rebels 

Outwitted Forces, Critics Say,” Washington Post, 8 March 1998, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did=27000487&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3

&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1241191

019&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 2008).

2. Laura Brooks, “Debacle in Colombia Shows Rebel Strength,” 

Washington Post, 6 August 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=18

&did=32661376&SrchMode=2&sid=17&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQ

D&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1236966447&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 

November 2008).

3. For this study, the term “security forces” refers to the Armed Forces and 

the national police. The term “military forces” means the three Armed Forces—

Army, Navy, and Air Force.

4. USSOUTHCOM commander quoted in 6 April 1998 letter to COLMIL 

commander, Douglas Farah, “Colombian Rebels Seen Winning War; US Study 

Finds Army Inept, Ill-Equipped,” Washington Post, 10 April 1998, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=9&did=28551847&SrchMode=2&sid=2&F

mt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1237824

894&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 2008).

5. Land area data taken from briefing slide, Republic of Colombia, 

“Colombia: Building A Path Toward A New Horizon,” 2008. Other comparisons 

can be made to the size of France, Spain, and Portugal or of Texas, Oklahoma, 

Arkansas, and Louisiana or of all the US states east of the Appalachian Mountains 

from Maine to Florida (minus West Virginia). The point is Colombia is not small.

6. For general information, see various sections in Jane’s Sentinel Country 

Risk Assessment, http://sentinel.janes.com/docs/sentinel/SAMS_country.jsp? 

Prod_Name=SAMS&Sent_Country=Colombia& (accessed 20 November 2008), 

or Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html (accessed 7 August 2008).

7. Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: Conditions and US Policy Options,” 

Congressional Research Service Report, updated 12 February 2001 (Washington, 

DC: Library of Congress), 5.

8. William Aviles, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity 

Democracy,” Journal of Latin American Studies 38 (2006): 391.

9. Aviles, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy,” 

380.

10. Max G. Manwaring, Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State 

and to the Hemisphere (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 

2002), 76–77.

11. James L. Zackrison, “Executive Summary: Workshop on Security Issues 

in Colombia,” in Crisis? What Crisis? Security Issues in Colombia, ed. and trans. 

James L. Zackrison (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
33

National Defense University, 1999), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-

%201999/Crisis%20What%20Crisis%20Eng%20Oct%2099/cris3.html (accessed 

11 February 2009).

12. The number of municipalities grew between 1998 and 2008 to almost 

1,100. Municipalities may have several towns. They are similar to counties in the 

United States.

13. Nazih Richani, “Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian 

State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War System and the Privatisation of 

Counterinsurgency in Colombia,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 407. 

Information on department governors came from a presentation by a Colombian 

official.

14. Colombia’s homicides were twice the number of the United States, 

which had a population seven times larger. For the United States to have had 

the same rate as Colombia would have meant well over 210,000 homicides. 

Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and 

Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 

2001) 17; Dan D. Darrach, “Workshop Session,” in Zackrison, ed., Crisis? What 

Crisis?

15. Peter Waldmann, “Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia?” 

Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007): 604–606.

16. Manwaring, Non-State Actors in Colombia, 69.

17. For an insight into the challenges posed by Escobar, the corrupting 

influences of drugs on people and institutions, and the difficulties faced by 

Colombian National Police when “orders might begin with great purpose and 

enthusiasm, but by the time they made their way down the chain of command, 

with everyone backing away from responsibility, pushing it off on someone else, 

the great machine of state always wound up confused, impotent, mired,” see Mark 

Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York, 

NY: Penguin Books, 2002), 122.

18. Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 12–14.

19. Serafino, “Colombia: Conditions and US Policy Options,” 40.

20. Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 46–47. 

21. Audrey K. Cronin, “The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning 

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Congressional Research Service 

Report, 21 October 2003.

22. Paul E. Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—

People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” 

(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, December 2005), 9; Rabasa 

and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 23–24. 

23. Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” 16–26, 

32–35; Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 24–25.

24. Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” 27–54; 

Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 28–29, 37; Jane’s, “Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),” http://www8.janes.com/Search/
34

documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwit0265.htm@curr

ent&pageSelected=allJanes&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_

Name=JWIT&keyword (accessed 20 November 2008).

25. Andreas E. Feldmann and Victor J. Hinojosa, “Terrorism in Colombia: 

Logic and Sources of a Multidimensional and Ubiquitous Phenomenon,” 

Terrorism and Political Violence 21 (2009): 49–50; Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian 

Labyrinth, 30–34, 45; Jane’s, “Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN),” http://

www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/

jwit/jwit0266.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&backPath=http://search.

janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JWIT&keyword (accessed 20 April 2009).

26. Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer Networks: The MilitaryParamilitary Partnership and the United States (New York, NY: Human Rights 

Watch, 1 November 1996), 1–8, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1996/11/01/

colombia-s-killer-networks?print (accessed 22 January 2009); Richani, “Caudillos 

and the Crisis of the Colombian State,” 405–409; Aviles, “Paramilitarism and 

Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy,” 385–386; Bowden, Killing Pablo, 165–

200.

27. David Spencer, Colombia’s Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political 

Force? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2001), 20.

28. Spencer, Colombia’s Paramilitaries, 2.

29. Aviles, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy,” 

394–399, 403–407; Spencer, Colombia’s Paramilitaries, 6–17.

30. Information collected by the Colombian Commission of Jurists in 

Aviles, 403.

31. Aviles, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy,” 395–

399; United Nations, “Report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 

Rights,” United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 9 March 1998, http://

www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/fb00da486703f751c12565a90059a227/ 

e84a158767e2e9ecc12566180049cd3e?OpenDocument (accessed 21 April 2009). 

32. Spencer, Colombian Paramilitaries, 17–18; Rabasa and Chalk, 

Colombian Labyrinth, 32–33.

33. Manwaring, Non-State Actors in Colombia, 75.

34. See Chapter 7, “Concerning the Public Force,” Articles 216–223 in 

Republic of Colombia, “Text of the Constitution of Colombia (1991),” http://

confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/colombia_const2.pdf (accessed 13 April 

2009).

35. Richard L. Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas and Politics in Colombia

(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, December 1971), 63.

36. Thomas C. Bruneau, “Restructuring Colombia’s Defense Establishment 

to Improve Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness” (Monterey, CA: Center 

for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 1, http://www.

resdal.org/experiencias/main-lasa-04.html (accessed 11 March 2009); Notes from 

discussions with Colombian and American military and civilian officials.

37. William C. Spracher, “The Colombian Armed Forces and National 

Security,” in Zackrison, ed., Crisis? What Crisis?
35

38. Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, ed. Colombia: A Country 

Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 

December 1988), 267.

39. Each service chief had the duties of a US military service chief and of 

an operational commander—transforming his service at the same time as fighting 

and running it. The ranks of Colombian general officers are brigadier general, 

major general, and general. The COLMIL commander and the service chiefs hold 

the rank of general.

40. Farah, “Colombian Rebels Seen Winning War.”

41. Manuel Jose Bonett Locarno, Estrategia General De Las Fuerzas 

Militares” “Por la seguirdad de la poblacion y sus recurrsos,” Fuerzas Militares 

De Colombia Comando General, December 1997; Quotes from Spracher, in 

Zackrison, Crisis? What Crisis?

42. Notes from discussion with a senior Colombian official.

43. Quotes from Spracher, in Zackrison, Crisis? What Crisis?, 3.

44. Quote from Myles Frechette, US Ambassador to Colombia from 1994–

97, in Larry Rohter, “Armed Forces in Colombia Hoping to Get Fighting Fit,” 

New York Times, 5 December 1999, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&d

id=46865681&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQ

T=309&VName=PQD&TS=1240516114&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 

2008).

45. “Colombia’s Brass Admit Army Cannot Compete with Guerrilla,” 

Houston Chronicle, 25 March 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=

1&did=27791616&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQ

D&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1240519282&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 

November 2008).

46. Notes from discussions with Colombian Military officials.

47. Colombia Army, “Disposicion Numero 000011 Por medio de la cual se 

reorganiza el Ejercito Nacional,” 23 August 1996. Document signed by Colombian 

Army Commanding General Harold Bedoya reorganizing the Colombian Army 

in accordance with Article 25 of Law 2335 of 1971; comment on US brigade 

structure, Bruneau, “Restructuring Colombia’s Defense Establishment, 2; 

Information about organizations and incentives below brigade level came from 

notes from discussions with Colombian and American military officials.

48. Michael Evans, ed., Document 3, US Embassy Cable, 24 May 1988, 

Part I, “War in Colombia: Guerrillas, Drugs and Human Rights in US-Colombia 

Policy, 1988–2002,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 

69, Colombia Documentation Project, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB69/ (accessed 4 August 2008).

49. Evans, Document 3, US Embassy Cable, 24 May 1988, Part I; 

Human Rights Watch, State of War: Political Violence and Counterinsurgency 

in Colombia (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, December 1993), 5, http://

www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/colombia/statetoc.htm (accessed 26 January 

2009); Colombian Army, Colombian Army Military History (Bogotá: E3 Section, 

Army Historical Studies Center, 2007) 284, 389–390.
36

50. Hanratty and Meditz, A Country Study, 283; Colombian Navy, 

Closing the Gap: “Towards the Future”—The Naval Strategy, a Cornerstone 

in the Fight against Narco-terrorism (Bogotá: Colombian Navy, 2003), 8–27; 

Ricardo A. Flores, “Improving the US Navy Riverine Capability: Lessons from 

the Colombian Experience” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, 

December 2007), 29–42; Notes from discussions with Colombian Military and 

civilian officials.

51. US Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report, 1997,” in Colombia Report, section III, http://www.state.gov/www/global/

narcotics_law/1997_narc_report/samer97.html (accessed 1 October 2008).

52. Hanratty and Meditz, A Country Study, 264; Notes from discussions 

with Colombian and American military and civilian officials.

53. US Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report, 1997”; Notes from discussions with Colombian and American military 

and civilian officials.

54. See Articles 213 and 221 in Republic of Colombia, “Text of the 

Constitution of Colombia (1991)”; Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer 

Networks, Chapter V, “Impunity”; Notes from discussions with Colombian and 

American military officials.

55. For an overview, see Bradley Coleman, Colombia and the United States: 

The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939–1960 (Kent, OH: Kent State 

University Press, 2008); Kenneth Finlayson, “Colombia: A Special Relationship,” 

Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 5–7.

56. For an overview, see Bradley Coleman, “The Colombian Army in Korea, 

1950–1954,” Journal of Military History (January 2005): 1137–1177; Charles H. 

Briscoe, “Barbula and Old Baldy, March 1953: Colombia Heaviest Combat in 

Korea,” Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 

15–23, 24–29; Charles H. Briscoe, “Across the Pacific to War: The Colombian 

Navy in Korea, 1951–1955,” Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations History 

2, no. 4 (2006): 24–29.

57. Charles H. Briscoe, “Colombian Lancero School Roots,” Veritas, 

Journal of Army Special Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 30–37.

58. Dennis M. Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: 

US Counter-insurgency Efforts in Colombia, 1959–1965,” Small Wars and 

Insurgencies (Winter 1995): 304–327; Dennis M. Rempe, The Past as Prologue? 

A History of US Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958–1966 (Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2002); Dennis M. Rempe, “The 

Origin of Internal Security in Colombia: Part I-A CIA Special Team Surveys 

la violencia, 1959–1960,” Small Wars and Insurgencies (Winter 1999): 24–61; 

Charles H. Briscoe, “Plan Lazo: Evaluation and Execution,” Veritas, Journal of 

Army Special Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 38–46.

59. Charles H. Briscoe, “Blue Helmets to Maroon Berets: Batallon Colombia

in the Suez and Sinai, 1956–1958, 1982–2006,” Veritas, Journal of Army Special 

Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 103–106.
37

60. David C. Wolfe, “The View from Washington,” in Zackrison, Crisis? 

What Crisis?

61. Evans, “War in Colombia,” Part II, “Counterdrug Operations.”

62. Tom Brown, “Colombia Official Reveals Shake-Up in Military’s 

Echelon,” Houston Chronicle, 1 November 1996, http://proquest.umi.com/pq

dweb?index=0&did=23117318&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD

&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1240931257&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

63. James L. Zackrison, “Executive Summary: Workshop on Security Issues 

in Colombia,” in Zackrison, Crisis? What Crisis?

64. US General Accounting Office, Drug Control: US Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, February 1998), 15.

65. Robert Noriega, “United States Priorities in Colombia,” in Zackrison, 

Crisis? What Crisis?

66. Mark Peceny and Michael Durnan, “The FARC’s Best Friend: US 

Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia’s Civil War in the 1990’s,” 

Latin American Politics and Society (Summer 2006): 95–116.

67. Patricia Bibes, “Colombia: The Military and the Narco-Conflict,” Low 

Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (Spring 2000): 33.

68. Coletta Youngers, “US Entanglements in Colombia Continue,” NACLA 

Report on the Americas, March/April 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb

?did=28811023&sid=4&Fmt=3&clientid=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD 

(accessed 5 November 2008).

69. See US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human 

Rights Practices for 1997” (Washington, DC: US DOS), http://www.state.gov/

www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/colombia.html (accessed 16 March 

2009).

70. See US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human 

Rights Practices for 1996” (Washington, DC: US DOS), http://www.state.gov/

www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/colombia.html (accessed 16 March 

2009).

71. Since 1986, section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act required 

the President to certify by 1 March each year that countries receiving US 

counternarcotics assistance were cooperating in meeting US counterdrug 

objectives. A partial certification for vital national interest for uncooperative 

countries provided a middle ground of limited support between full support and no 

support. GAO, Drug Control: US Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Facing 

Continuing Challenges, 18–21.

72. Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: The Problem of Illegal Narcotics and 

US–Colombian Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report, updated 11

May 1998, 8–10.

73. Serafino, “Colombia: The Problem of Illegal Narcotics and US–

Colombian Relations,” 10.
38

74. GAO, Drug Control: US Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Facing 

Continuing Challenges, 35–41.

75. GAO, Drug Control: US Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Facing 

Continuing Challenges, 9–10.

76. Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: Summary and Tables on US Assistance, 

FY1989–FY2003,” Congressional Research Service Report, 3 May 2002, 6; 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are government-to-government sales of US defense 

equipment, training, or services. DOS, not DOD, funds the Foreign Military 

Assistance Program (FMAP), which includes foreign military financing (FMF) of 

DOD equipment, training, and services through grants or loans and International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) for training of personnel in the United 

States. DOS funds anticrime and antidrug programs. DOD provides Section 1004 

counterdrug training support (CDTS) when requested by law enforcement for 

host nation police and military forces involved in counterdrug operations and 

Section 1033 riverine support when requested for units involved in counterdrug 

operations. See US Department of State, “Foreign Military Training and DOD 

Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report, Volume 1” (Washington, DC: US 

DOS, March 2002), “II. Description of Programs,” http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/

rpt/fmtrpt/2002/10607.htm (accessed 1 October 2008).

77. Dean A. Cook, “U.S. Southern Command: General Charles E. Wilhelm 

and the Shaping of U.S. Military Engagement in Colombia, 1997–2000,” in 

America’s Viceroys: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Derek S. Reveron 

(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 136–142. In 1999, USARSO moved 

to Fort Buchanan, PR, and then to Fort Sam Houston, TX, in 2002. In 1999, 

AFSOUTH or 12th Air Force moved to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AR. 

When USNAVSO moved to Mayport, FL, in 2004, USMARFORSOUTH moved 

to Miami and USSOCSOUTH moved to Homestead, FL. Marine assets came 

from Camp Lejeune, NC, and Army Special Forces (SF) teams from 7th SF Group 

at Fort Bragg, NC.

78. Charles E. Wilhelm, “Statement before the 105th Congress Committee 

on Armed Services, United States Senate,” 5 March 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/

congress/1998_hr/s980305w.htm (accessed 15 October 2008).

79. US General Accounting Office, School of the Americas: US Military 

Training for Latin American Countries (Washington, DC: GAO, August 1996). 

The school reopened in January 2001 at Fort Benning, GA, as the Western 

Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC).

80. Christopher W. Muller, “USMILGP Colombia: Transforming Security 

Cooperation in the Global War On Terrorism” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 

School Thesis, December 2006), 13, 42. Each security assistance organization has 

similar missions, but an organization and a name or title unique to that country. 

Muller noted 16 different titles when writing his paper. After September 2001, 

temporary duty (TDY) personnel increased in number and they served 3-to6-month TDY tours. The turbulence of constantly rotating personnel created 

continuity and program challenges for the MILGP.

81. Bowden, Killing Pablo, 54.
39

82. Geoffrey B. Demarest, “The Overlap of Military and Police in Latin 

America,” April 1995, http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Lessons 

Learned/LatinAm/milpolre.htm (accessed 29 August 2008).

83. Cook, “General Charles E. Wilhelm and the Shaping of U.S. Military 

Engagement in Colombia,” in Reveron, America’s Viceroys, 133.

84. Douglas Porch and Christopher W. Muller. “‘Imperial Grunts’ Revisited: 

The US Advisory Mission in Colombia,” in Military Advising and Assistance: 

From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007, ed. Donald Stoker (London: 

Routledge, 2008), 170.

85. US General Accounting Office, Military Training: Management and 

Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange Training (Washington, DC: GAO, July 

1999), 7.

86. GAO, Military Training, 47–48; Dana Priest, “US Force Training Troops 

in Colombia; Exercise Anti-Drug Efforts,” Washington Post, 25 May 1998, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did= 29679864&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fm

t=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1241189705

&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 2008).

87. “Colombian Guerrillas Ambush Army Convoy, Kill 31 Soldiers,” San 

Antonio Express–News, 17 April 1996, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index

=8&did=15244774&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQ

D&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1241197937&clientId=5904 (accessed 17 

November 2008); Colombian Army, Colombian Army Military History, 333.

88. Quoted in Thomas A. Marks, “Colombian Army Counterinsurgency,” 

Crime, Law & Social Change (July 2003): 84–85.

89. Colombian Army, Colombian Army Military History, 333; Christopher 

Torchia, “Weakness of Army Prolongs Colombian War,” Colombian, 2 September 

1996, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=6&did=15312706&SrchMode=

2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&

TS=1241202373&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 2008); David Spencer, 

“Latin America, A Lesson for Colombia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 October 

1997, http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/

janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir97/jir00125.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&

keyword=david%20spencer&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_

Name=JIR& (accessed 4 March 2009).

90. Gabriella Gamini, “Colombia Fights Back as Guerrilla Launch Fiercest 

Raids in Decades,” Times, 3 September 1996, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdwe

b?did=34285574&sid=5&Fmt=3&clientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD 

(accessed 5 November 2008).

91. Jose de Cordoba, “Guerrilla Attacks Kill 100 in Colombia in Possible 

Link to Nation’s Drug War,” Wall Street Journal, 3 September 1996, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=10&did=23868034&SrchMode=2&sid=2&

Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124120

4004&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 2008).

92. Georgie Geyer, “For Colombia, 1996 Nothing But Trouble,” Tulsa 

World, 31 January 1997, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=192&did=168
40

24144&SrchMode=1&sid=7&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309

&VName=PQD&TS=1239811252&clientld=5904 (accessed 5 November 2008).

93. Yadira Ferrer, “Change of Commander in Chief a Boost to Peace,” Inter 

Press Service, 25 July 1997, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=13182995&s

id=4&Fmt=3&clientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 5 November 

2008).

94. “Another Beating,” The Economist, 10 January 1998, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?did=25330049&sid=4&Fmt=3&clientid=5094&RQT=309

&VName=PQD (accessed 5 November 2008); David Spencer, “Focus—Latin 

America, Bogotá Continues to Bleed as FARC Find Their Military Feet,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, 1 November 1998, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc_

view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir98/jir00815.htm@

current&Prod_Name=JIR&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3COR%3E%28%2

8%5B80%5D%28+colombia+%3CAND%3E+david+%3CAND%3E+spencer%

29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%2C+%28%5B100%5D+%28%5B100%5D%28+co

lombia+%3CAND%3E+david+%3CAND%3E+spencer%29+%3CIN%3E+title

%29+%3CAND%3E+%28%5B100%5D%28+colombia+%3CAND%3E+david

+%3CAND%3E+spencer%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%29%29%29 (accessed 4 

March 2009).

95. Spencer, “Latin America, A Lesson for Colombia.”

96. Diana Schemo, “US Is to Help Army in Colombia Fight Drugs but 

Skeptics Abound,” New York Times, 25 October 1997, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=23&did=20044995&SrchMode=2&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1239807437&clientId=5904 

(accessed 5 November 2008).

97. Cronin, “The ‘FTO List’ and Congress.”

98. Farah, “Colombian Rebels Seen Winning War.”

99. Spencer, “Focus—Latin America, Bogotá Continues to Bleed as FARC 

Find Their Military Feet”; Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 42.

100. Brooks, “Colombian Military Is Called To Account: Rebels Outwitted 

Forces, Critics Say.”

101. “Colombia’s Brass Admit Army Cannot Compete with Guerrilla”; 

Notes from discussions with Colombian and American military officials confirm 

a detailed Colombian Army investigation later revealed a major institutional and 

situational weakness at El Billar.

102. Charles E. Wilhelm testimony in US House of Representatives. 

Transcript, Hearing of the House Committee on International Relations on US AntiDrug Policy Towards Colombia, 31 March 1998, http://www.colombiasupport.

net/199803/hr033198.html (accessed 15 October 2008).

103. Rosso José Serrano testimony in US House of Representatives. 

Transcript, Hearing of the House Committee on International Relations on US AntiDrug Policy Towards Colombia, 31 March 1998. http://www.colombiasupport.

net/199803/hr033198.html (accessed 15 October 2008).

104. Farah, “Colombian Rebels Seen Winning War.”
41

105. Ben Barber, “Colombia Needs Elections, Arms Aid, Ex-Army Chief 

Says,” Washington Times, 22 March 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?ind

ex=209&did=27643577&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=

PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1239818287&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 

November 2008).

106. Notes from discussions with American military officials; “Colombia 

Targets Rebel Stronghold: 5,000-Strong Unit Will Patrol Southern Jungle,” 

Rocky Mountain News, 13 March 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=2

8564227&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 5 

November 2008).

107. Laura Brooks. “Colombia Disbands Controversial Army Brigade,” 

Washington Post, 21 May 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=119&d

id=29617803&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQ

T=309&VName=PQD&TS=1239820613&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 

2008).

108. Kristian D. Skinner, “An Historical Analysis of the Colombian 

Dilemma” (Washington, DC: National Defense University Student Paper, April 

2001), 28–29.

109. Spencer, “Focus—Latin America, Bogotá Continues to Bleed as FARC 

Find Their Military Feet”; Colombian Army, Colombian Army Military History,

334, 341–342.

43

Chapter 2

“Change Begins Today”1

The Pastrana Presidency: Negotiations with the 

Guerrillas and Plan Colombia (1998–2002)

From the times of General Fernando Tapias the Military 

Forces were restructured and its mentality changed, and 

we undertook a plan in which every day we are performing 

in an increasingly more professional and technical manner 

and in keeping with the Constitution and the law.

General Freddy Padilla, COLMIL Commander2

We are committed to maintaining the line between 

counterinsurgency and counterdrugs, because we are not 

in the counterinsurgency business.

US Official3

Forty-three-year-old Andres Pastrana became Colombia’s 60th 

President on 7 August 1998 following a week of widespread Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) 

attacks that caused, among other things, the destruction of an important Colombian National Police (CNP) antinarcotics base at Miraflores. 

Elected on a peace platform and promising to pursue a settlement with the 

guerrillas, Pastrana had initiated talks with the FARC before his inauguration. The son of a former president, as well as a former senator and mayor 

of Bogotá, Pastrana promised Colombians “change begins today” to indicate a break with the corruption-ridden Samper administration. However, 

Pastrana inherited serious problems that complicated his job: deteriorating 

security situation, serious economic crisis, and lack of a legislative majority to support his peace platform. In addition, after the recent attacks questions remained about the willingness of the guerrillas to negotiate in good 

faith, the capabilities of the security forces to maintain the status quo, and 

the potential changes in the relationship with the United States.4

President Pastrana Begins Negotiations: 1998

In creating his new security team, Pastrana appointed Rodrigo Lloreda 

as Minister of Defense and kept only one incumbent—Major General 

Rosso Jose Serrano, the US-supported, counterdrug-supporting commander of the CNP. Although some in the American press referred to these 
44

changes as a purge given the guerrilla attacks, but at the beginning of each 

presidency and 2 years afterward, this change normally occurred. Pastrana 

chose General Fernando Tapias—the Colombian Army deputy, a former 

Army inspector general, and a former mobile infantry brigade (BRIM) 

commander—to be his Armed Forces commander. General Jorge Enrique 

Mora, commander of the Fifth Division near Bogotá and a former BRIM 

commander became the Army commander. The deputies of the Colombian 

Navy and the Air Force—Admiral Sergio Edilberto Garcia and General 

Jose Manuel Sandoval—each rose to become service chiefs. These commanders would attempt to revitalize the security forces while dealing, in 

Minister Lloreda’s words, “with a delicate security situation and the reconciliation process that are government priorities.”5

 This proved difficult. 

In mid-August, a 600-man FARC unit mauled a counterguerrilla battalion 

and a regular infantry battalion from the 17th Brigade in a bitter 3-day 

fight in northwest Colombia—a violent drug and arms smuggling area just 

south of Panama. Reports of over 40 killed and 130 missing brought both 

Tapias and Mora to the scene.6

 Making improvements while fighting with 

inadequate and dispersed forces presented a serious military challenge. 

Unlike other presidents who had negotiated with the guerrillas, Pastrana 

did not reduce the Ministry of National Defense (MOD) budget. Although 

the military opposed the Pastrana approach, it had to assess its weaknesses 

and identify requirements within its limited resources. Overcoming a 

defensive, defeatist mindset—one that made the guerrillas appear stronger 

than they really were—proved the initial challenge. Although the defeats at 

El Billar and Miraflores had served as a “catalyst to learn” for the military 

forces, relations with the CNP remained strained. Other than reacting to 

guerrilla attacks and withdrawing isolated security forces from threatened 

areas, little had been done after the August attacks and the destruction of 

the Miraflores base, which would not be permanently occupied by security 

forces for another 5 years.7

 This would change on 1 November.

Before agreeing to negotiations with the Pastrana government, the 

FARC made five demands: 

(1) The government would give the FARC control of five 

municipalities—four in Meta and one in Caqueta departments.

(2) The government security forces would fight the autodefensas.

(3) The government would permit social protests and public 

demonstrations.

(4) The government would develop an alternate crop substitution 

and economic development plan.
45

(5) The government would stop its wanted poster and financial 

incentives program directed against the FARC leadership.8

Each demand undercut government programs, dispersed scarce government resources, and worked to establish the FARC as a legitimate political 

organization with legal or belligerent status. Coming to the negotiations 

with a position of increasing strength—political, psychological, and military, the FARC intended to increase its power by extending the negotiations 

over time by pursuing a make-war-and-talk-peace policy. In mid-October, 

Pastrana agreed to withdraw Colombian security forces from the municipalities of Mesetas, La Uribe, Vista Hermosa, San Vincente de Caguan, and 

La Macarena by 7 November for a period of 90 days. This provided the 

FARC temporary control over a 42,000 square kilometer zona de despeje, 

or cleared zone, with over 90,000 inhabitants. Established in southeastern 

Colombia in a region long under FARC influence, the zona had a land 

area equal to Switzerland or two El Salvadors or Maryland and Delaware 

combined. (See Figure 7, Zona de despeje.) The government of Colombia 

and the FARC agreed to meet on 7 January 1999 to begin negotiations. 

At the time, no one expected the zona would be extended 11 times in the 

following 38 months.9

 The result would be a sanctuary in which the FARC 

would establish control, increase its military strength and prepare military 

attacks, hold and ransom hostages, grow and process illegal drugs, smuggle illegal drugs and arms, and establish ties with such diverse groups as 

Latin American and European Union politicians, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarian organizations, drug traffickers, and other 

guerrilla and terrorist groups. During the whole time, the guerrillas continued to conduct military operations throughout the country.

On the eve of the establishment of the zona, the FARC attacked 

Mitú—an isolated town of 15,000 inhabitants similar in size to Miraflores 

but the capital of Vaupes department in southeastern Colombian near the 

Brazilian border. Supported by almost 400 propane gas cylinder bombs, 

over 1,000 FARC guerrillas flattened the police station, destroyed the 

communications tower, and captured the local airstrip as they overran the 

125-man police garrison after 12 hours of fighting. They took about 45 

prisoners—adding to the almost 250 police and military captives held by 

the FARC. To some it appeared the FARC had captured its first department 

capital. The Colombia Military (COLMIL) reacted immediately. 

Reachable only by air or river and with no airstrip in the jungle near 

Mitú, the Colombian Air Force secured an airstrip inside Brazil from 

which to refuel the transport aircraft delivering combat troops and the 

helicopters to ferry them into battle. After a 3-day battle, a force of over 
46

400 Colombian Army soldiers—including 52 Counterguerrilla Battalion 

(BCG) rebuilt after El Billar and soldiers from the 7th Brigade—and CNP 

personnel ejected the FARC from Mitú.10 The COLMIL acted quickly 

and effectively, but concerns arose about a lack of preparedness against 

a known impending attack. A failure to share information meant that the 

CNP had reinforced its garrison before the attack and the Colombian Army 

had failed to act until after the attack. Other problems arose about the 

same time. In mid-November, General Hector Fabio Velasco became Air 

P eru

B ra zil

E c u a d or

Ve n e zu ela

C o lom b ia

North

Pacific

Ocean

Caribbean Sea

M itú

0 5 0 1 0 0 1 50 mi le s

C artagena

M edellín

B ogotá

C ali

A R A U C A

M E TA

Tres E squinas

FARC

Zona

Figure 7. Zona de despeje.
47

Force commander when his predecessor resigned “as a point of honor,” 

according to a Department of State (DOS) report, “setting a laudable 

precedent for acceptance of responsibility” after a C-130 aircraft carrying 

illegal drugs landed in Miami.11 Publically accepting full responsibility 

for the performance of the Armed Forces, General Tapias promised:

. . . to fulfill my responsibilities as commander and 

deliver a trained and motivated unit, a unit with defense 

capabilities, within 90 days at the latest. . . . This 

commitment means that I will accept responsibility for, in 

advance, the consequences of the actions or omissions and 

accept with character, frankness and moral courage any 

responsibility for failures or setback that are blameworthy 

and result from carelessness, neglect or abandonment of 

duties, or the undue execution of orders received or the 

missions assigned.12

Although each of the services required reorientation, Tapias stated that 

the Army would be reorganized starting “with the institution’s own professional core to face the challenge posed by the subversive groups.”13

Reorganization and reform would take time, additional resources, hard 

work, and dedicated leadership, but after Mitú the Army, under General 

Mora, had committed itself to addressing its deficiencies. How long this 

would take and how well it would be done remained unknown.

After the inauguration of President Pastrana, the United States sought 

a closer, more cooperative relationship with Colombia. Ambassador Curtis 

Kamman supported the peace process, which included talks with the ELN 

in October, continued judicial reform, and improvements in counterdrug 

efforts. In its annual human rights report, the DOS noted some human rights 

improvements—the inactivation of the notorious 20th Intelligence Brigade 

in May, the decision to disband most Community Associations of Rural 

Vigilance (CONVIVIR) units in July, the repeated statements of Pastrana 

and Tapias that ties between military personnel and the autodefensas would 

not be tolerated—but overall the Colombian Government record remained 

poor.14 At the same time, the commander of the United States Southern 

Command (USSOUTHCOM) continued his military-to-military visits. In 

1998, 12 US Special Forces (SF) mobile training teams (MTT) from the 

7th SF Group conducted short, counterdrug training courses for a small 

number of COLMIL and CNP personnel. A similar number of Navy special 

operations and Marine MTTs worked with the Colombian Navy riverine 

units. Total US military personnel in Colombia had remained below 200.15 In 

fiscal year 1998, the CNP received about 90 percent of the US counterdrug 
48

assistance, while the COLMIL—basically the Air Force and Navy given 

the Army’s resistance to human rights vetting—received the remainder 

to maintain radar sites for the Air Bridge Denial Program and to expand 

riverine units. At a 2 December meeting in Colombia between the Minister 

of Defense and the US Secretary of Defense, the United States decided to 

“cautiously reengage” the COLMIL. An American official reemphasized 

the US commitment “to maintain the line between counterinsurgency and 

counterdrugs, because we are not in the counterinsurgency business.” 

After the meeting, Minister Lloreda stated that a Colombian–US military 

task force would address “the modernization of the Colombian Military 

to restructure [and] . . . to focus on its mobility, its sustainability, its 

intelligence capabilities, its command and control.” In addition, the United 

States would assist in strengthening the skeletal Joint Task Force–South 

(JTF-S) at Tres Esquinas in southern Colombia by training and partially 

equipping by mid-1999 a 1,000-man Army counterdrug brigade to work 

with the Antinarcotics Police Directorate (DIRAN), setting up a joint 

police-military intelligence center to support those counterdrug operations, 

and establishing an electronic listening post to gather intelligence.16 By the 

end of 1998, the COLMIL, particularly the Army, had committed itself to 

reorganizing to fight the guerrillas; the United States had committed itself 

to supporting counterdrug efforts through the Narcotics Affairs Section 

(NAS) and the Military Group (MILGP); and President Pastrana had 

committed himself to negotiations.

Laying a Foundation: 1999

During the first half of 1999, the MOD took the initial steps in what 

would be a multiyear trial-and-error process to transform the Armed 

Forces through institutional changes, new technologies, and new doctrine 

to address the internal security threats. The prognosis was uncertain, 

the results unknown. Many believed this would require “at least a 

generation to really turn the Armed Forces around.” An analysis of its 

1997–98 experiences and the brutally frank report on El Billar provided 

the COLMIL leadership insights into its shortcomings and deficiencies 

that would require immediate action, fundamental change, and long-term 

programs to address. First, Tapias told the Armed Forces, “We are at 

war, and all our resources must be dedicated to operations.”17 Then, the 

Colombian Army leadership reinforced these words by actions as units 

moved from garrison into the field. Second, to increase the number of 

troops available for combat, the Army began replacing conscripts exempt 

from combat with professionals. By 2001, this professionalization provided 

an additional 30,000 combat troops without increasing the Army end 
49

strength. Third, the Colombian Army retrained its units on counterguerrilla 

skills and night operations. In 1998, 90 percent of the Colombian Army 

training had been conventional and 10 percent counterguerrilla; in 1999, 

these percentages began to reverse. Furthermore, the Colombian Air Force 

began to focus more on close air support for military and police units 

in combat and on night operations. Through this process—coupled with 

military successes—morale improved as an offensive, aggressive mindset 

replaced a defensive, defeatist one. In addition to moving from a regular 

to a professional force and to training for counterguerrilla war, other 

important long-term transformation areas included developing a military 

strategy, joint operations, mobility—helicopters and aircraft, intelligence 

capabilities, training and education systems, reorganized headquarters, new 

types of units, riverine capabilities, and human rights training.18 Although 

informed by US military concepts and suggestions, this transformation 

was Colombian-initiated, Colombian-led, and counterguerrilla-focused.

At the same time, the COLMIL pursued another trial-and-error effort 

to reengage the US military through a limited counterdrug effort. Gaining 

access to US counterdrug funds, training, helicopters, and support motivated this effort. First, the COLMIL addressed its Plan Condor, which 

focused on reducing overall violence. Second, it worked to increase the 

capabilities of JTF-S by providing new and better-trained units. Third, it 

began to organize a military counterdrug joint intelligence center (JICS) at JTF-S. In March, the United States agreed to increase the sharing 

of counter­drug intelligence with JIC-S. However, the CNP—not the 

COLMIL—led the counterdrug effort focused on coca eradication in the 

Guaviare department. For the COLMIL, this counterdrug program required 

not only US assistance, but also a closer working relationship with the 

CNP. Nevertheless, for some Americans “the most important change” 

proved to be the “introduction of mandatory human rights courses for 

most military personnel”—not the COLMIL reform effort or its willingness to participate in the counterdrug program. Although understanding the 

need to improve its human rights record, few in the COLMIL at that time 

would have equated mandatory classes as “the most important change” to 

deal with their primary concern—the guerrillas, or to address a secondary 

effort—the drug problem, or to improve its human rights record.19

In March, President William Clinton certified Colombia for counterdrug 

funding, which lifted previous military assistance restrictions. However, 

Congress attached the Leahy amendment to the defense budget, which made 

human rights vetting by DOS a requirement for any military assistance 

for Colombia, not just counterdrug assistance.20 That same month, in 
50

Congressional testimony General Charles E. Wilhelm praised the Pastrana 

civil-military team’s cooperation and commonsense approach. He stated 

that for “the first time in years . . . [he was] confident that Colombia’s 

military leadership is equal to the task at hand.” Acknowledging human 

rights as “Colombia’s international Achilles heel,” he added, “I am 

personally convinced that there are no institutional linkages between the 

paramilitaries and the Army, but I cannot rule out local collusion.” In his 

review of ongoing USSOUTHCOM programs for Colombia, Wilhelm 

mentioned assisting in the reform and restructure of the COLMIL, training 

a Colombian Army counterdrug battalion to work with the CNP, and 

conducting a 5-year riverine program in Colombia and Peru.21

Putting together a counterdrug package for JTF-S at Tres Esquinas 

proved challenging. With no programmed funding, Wilhelm obtained $7 

million from the Department of Defense (DOD) counterdrug funds to 

train and equip a counterdrug battalion and to establish a joint intelligence 

center–south (JIC-S) and a joint operations center–south (JOC-S) and 

another $5 million for infrastructure. He considered the 1,000-man 

counterdrug battalion—modeled on a US Ranger battalion and larger than 

three Colombian BRIMs—to be a pilot program for working with the 

Colombian Army.22 When a DOS counterdrug official offered 14 UH-1N 

helicopters for shipping costs to the COLMIL, the Air Force declined for 

maintenance and cost reasons. The Army accepted the UN-1N helicopters 

and its aviation battalion—four or five MI-17 helicopters—grew in size 

by 300 percent.23 In April, the first of several US SF training teams rotated 

into Colombia to begin training human rights vetted personnel from which 

the counterdrug battalion would be formed. Despite efforts to improve 

Colombian–US military relations, things became “more conditional and 

tenuous” in April when President Pastrana, under heavy American pressure, 

relieved three general officers—the Colombian Army director of operations, 

a division commander, and the war college director—for alleged past ties 

to the illegal autodefensas. After that, for the COLMIL—and particularly 

the Army—“the United States went from the cavalry riding to the rescue 

to just another element in the ongoing crisis, a generally positive force but 

one which would have to be assessed critically and watched.”24

Although the initial January talks with the FARC had stalled almost 

immediately, President Pastrana continued to work to find common 

ground for negotiations with the guerrillas. When the 90-day limit for 

the zona de despeje expired in February, he extended it for another 90 

days despite continued FARC attacks, kidnappings, and vows never to 

lay down its arms. In late May, the announcement that the zona—or 
51

what some called Farclandia—would be extended indefinitely as long 

as peace talks continued brought an immediate reaction from the MOD. 

Minister Lloreda resigned, followed by many military officers, stating, 

“Too many concessions have been made by the government, and that’s the 

perception of the overwhelming majority of Colombians.” In fact, almost 

80 percent of Colombians opposed the zona. The FARC, he added, “are 

preparing more for war than for peace.” Lloreda stressed that to make 

such strategic decisions about the zona without consulting both the MOD 

and the COLMIL beforehand—in this case, neither had been consulted—

was “incalculably dangerous.” In response to the unprecedented mass 

resignation of general officers and hundreds of military officers, Pastrana 

met with his military commanders.25 The resignations indicated that the 

COLMIL “senior leadership did not believe they were wrong, or that 

their methods unsuccessful; they believed the President was reckless in 

making concessions to the armed left.”26 Accepting only the resignation 

of the Minister of Defense, Pastrana replaced him with Luis Fernando 

Ramirez. Thereafter, coordination of peace negotiations and security 

issues improved somewhat.

Early in 1999, the FARC warned of a “first great offensive” if peace 

negotiations failed to progress. Although the government made numerous 

concessions, the FARC made none and refused to accept a ceasefire. Public 

support fell to where 75 percent of Colombians polled considered the FARC 

a terrorist group with no ideology except kidnapping and drug trafficking. 

On the eve of the talks scheduled for 7 July, the FARC postponed them 

for 2 weeks. Then within days, the FARC launched its largest offensive 

in 40 years. Striking primarily in multiple directions from the zona de 

despeje, FARC forces from its Bloque Oriental—most supported by 

propane gas-cylinder bombs and some by homemade armored tractors—

attacked military and police installations in 10 departments—primarily in 

eastern and southern Colombia. One group attempted to isolate Bogotá by 

blocking the roads to the capital. Unlike previous offensives, Colombian 

Army forces held their own and within a week or so of serious fighting, 

the Fourth Division—commanded by Brigadier General Carlos A. Ospina, 

a former BRIM commander—blunted the attacks and forced the FARC 

back into its safe haven in the zona. “This offensive,” according to General 

Tapias, intended “to show an image of strength before the opening of peace 

negotiations with the national Government.” Unlike previous attacks, 

the FARC strength met effective Army strength reinforced by Air Force 

support, but neither side dominated the other. A conference of Catholic 

bishops issued a pastoral letter that forecast “a dark panorama that has 
52

no limits” in which “clear possibilities of success cannot be seen, and the 

civilian population is less and less secure in a country buffeted by the 

winds of war and death.”27

Like the guerrillas, the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia 

(AUC)—another active player in this “dark panorama”—grew in strength 

during the year from 5,000 to 7,000 combatants organized in seven major 

groups. The DOS reported that many autodefensa members had security 

force or guerrilla backgrounds and that these illegal groups varied from 

those arising from the legitimate desire of rural Colombians to defend 

themselves against the guerrillas to paid private armies working for 

prominent landowners or drug traffickers. Their campaign of terror and 

intimidation focused on guerrilla supporters rather than the armed groups. 

This increased internal displacements as Colombians migrated from 

violence-prone areas to the cities. The number of civilian massacres—

defined as the killing of three or more persons at the same place—reached 

almost 400 with over 1,800 dead.28 The autodefensas committed the 

majority of the killings, and the guerrillas had the next highest number. 

Human Rights Watch reported that half of the 18 Army brigades had links 

to paramilitary activity. It charged that the brigade in Cali had created the 

paramilitary Calima Front to attack the ELN after the May kidnapping 

of 140 worshipers from a church. Observing that “training alone, even 

when it includes human rights instruction, does not prevent human rights 

abuses,” the Human Rights Watch called on the Colombian Government 

to take action.29 Several years before, the COLMIL had initiated human 

rights training that included role-playing exercises, classroom instruction, 

and written examinations. By 1999, about 90 percent of the military and 

all of the CNP had received training. Even though allegations of human 

rights abuses by the military dropped from 2,000 in 1996 to just over 300 

in 1998 to only 40 by August 1999, human rights groups continued to 

attack the COLMIL for alleged links to the paramilitaries.30 Earlier in the 

year, Pastrana had relieved three general officers being investigated for 

ties to the autodefensas. On 12 August, he signed a revised Military Penal 

Code with stronger measures and approved the creation of an independent 

military lawyer or Judge Advocate General Corps. Despite repeating that 

collusion between military personnel and the paramilitaries would not be 

tolerated and that the Colombian Army would combat the autodefensas, 

“security force actions in the field were not always consistent with the 

leadership’s positions.” Meeting the FARC and ELN guerrilla threat 

stretched an overextended Army. A senior Army officer suggested that 

the CNP should lead the effort against the autodefensas.

31 Viewed by 
53

many Colombians as antiguerrilla rather than antigovernment, the illegal 

paramilitaries—regardless of origin—would not become a security force 

priority for years.

After the July attacks, the COLMIL continued its primary focus on 

making the military forces more effective against the guerrillas by better 

training, intelligence, air support, and leadership. At the same time, the 

MILGP concentrated on counterdrug programs. In late July, a US Army 

RC-7 surveillance aircraft gathering counterdrug intelligence crashed, 

killing the five Americans and two Colombians on board. At that time, 

160 military personnel—including a 12-man SF MTT training Colombian 

Army counterdrug battalion personnel—and 30 DOD civilians served in 

Colombia.32 On 4 August, the Colombian Navy established an 8,000-man, 

5-battalion riverine brigade—under the command of its marine infantry 

brigade—to control almost 8,000 kilometers of rivers throughout the country. Two battalions operated in eastern Colombia, two on rivers flowing to 

the Caribbean in the north, and one in the southern Pacific region. Each 

battalion operated in four-boat riverine combat elements (RCE). Each 

RCE had three 22-foot boats equipped with a .50-caliber machinegun, 

four M-60 machineguns, and a grenade launcher, and a 26-foot command 

boat equipped with a .50-caliber machinegun, two M-60 machineguns, 

an MK-19 grenade launcher, and a 60-mm mortar. Each boat carried 1 

officer, 5 noncommissioned officers, and 17 marine infantry professionals. In addition, a counterguerrilla group of 1 officer, 3 noncommissioned 

officers, and 18 marine infantry served as a strike force. The commander, 

Admiral Sergio Garcia, said, “If the army and the air force are controlling guerrilla actions, we cannot do less. For this reason we created this 

brigade . . . to contribute to military actions and to control trafficking in 

the drugs and chemical precursors that move along Colombia’s rivers.”33

This newly established 8,000-man brigade constituted a major component 

of the Colombian Navy.

Training of counterdrug battalion personnel continued at the Colombian 

Army’s major training base at Tolemaida. Minister of Defense Ramirez 

commented, “This is the army of the future in Colombia. . . . This is the 

army we want, and we are going to continue training battalions like this all 

over Colombia until we have what we need.”34 Given that the Colombian 

Army had no battalions with 900+ soldiers, Ramirez meant that he wanted 

training like this—not battalions like this. The counterdrug battalion would 

support the CNP attack on FARC finances through its coca eradication 

program. Additional training followed formal activation of the battalion 

in September. In December, the battalion joined JTF-S—supported by the 
54

newly activated JIC-S but not by the helicopters that had been delayed—

at Tres Esquinas. The improved mobility sought by the Colombians—

primarily through helicopters, but also trucks—failed to arrive as scheduled. 

The case of 18 Vietnam-era 2.5-ton trucks offered insight into Colombian–

US interaction. After waiting for months, the trucks (part of a 30-truck 

package) arrived in such a dilapidated condition—rusted bodies, batteries 

and engines so old that the COLMIL had ceased using them a decade 

earlier, heaters and ignition systems suitable for subzero conditions—that 

the Colombians, who estimated it would cost roughly $53,000 to make 

each truck serviceable versus just over $67,000 to buy a new one, refused 

to accept them. A COLMIL official said, “The only thing they have in 

common with what was asked for is the tires. What they sent causes more 

problems than they solve.” The United States refused to take the trucks 

back and left them in Colombia for spare parts. An American official called 

the Colombian complaints exaggerated, noting that while not meeting all 

their requirements, the trucks had some useful life—at least useful for the 

Colombians. A Colombian official offered a different perspective when 

he said that while officials in Washington took pride in sending aid, “in 

reality they are sending us millions of dollars in junk.”35 Looking back 

years later, a senior COLMIL officer observed, “US support was very 

important for morale,” given the isolation and professional embarrassment 

of decertification, “and not so much for military assistance.” Counterdrug 

assistance, even when serviceable, provided marginal utility in the 

counterguerrilla struggle.36

In November and again in December, the FARC launched multiple 

attacks from the zona de despeje and in northern Colombia. Both times 

the Colombian Army responded effectively—many units fighting under 

difficult conditions. However, FARC successes remained few and short 

lived. When General Tapias announced he had evidence that at least five 

FARC fronts and mobile columns staged attacks from the zona, the government peace commissioner downplayed these charges. On 19 November, 

the COLMIL commander and his Army commander, General Mora, presented their resignations to President Pastrana. Rejecting the resignations, 

Pastrana publically defended the military, opposed the exchange of jailed 

guerrillas for soldier and police hostages, attacked the guerrillas, and 

served notice that he would not allow the zona to turn into a sanctuary 

from which attacks against the military and the police could be launched. 

In response, Raul Reyes, a FARC spokesman, threatened to dissolve the 

zona and abandon the peace process.37 The give and take of negotiations 

continued, but the FARC and Pastrana both suffered from their failure to 

reach some agreement. Despite its increasing military strength, the FARC 
55

began to lose support for the negotiation process and Pastrana’s approval 

rating dropped to 22 percent by the end of 1999.38

Through the COLMIL transformation process, each military service—

the 120,000-soldier Army, the 15,000-man Navy, and the 7,500-airman Air 

Force—ended the year somewhat better prepared to address the immediate 

counterguerrilla threat and planning to make additional improvements in 

2000. Better training, intelligence, and service cooperation had enhanced 

combat performance, but the military forces remained too small to fight 

the guerrillas and to secure critical infrastructure throughout the country.39

A Colombian Army officer captured the frustration of fighting a war 

under peacetime constraints when he said: “Yet the crucial question 

is how to control the ground. In our system everything is prohibited. If 

you even attempt to uncover the infrastructure, much less dominate 

areas, you are violating something. We are in a position of fighting 

for a system unwilling to defend itself.”40 Despite these challenges, on 

23 November the Colombian Army published its reorganization plan for 

2000. Each of its five divisions—two with four brigades and three with 

three brigades—now had nonstandardized brigades that reflected both 

the limits of force structure and the task organization for specific areas. 

The Colombian Army divisions totaled 45 infantry battalions, 9 cavalry 

squadrons, 7 artillery battalions, 11 engineer battalions, 5 military police 

battalions, 45 counterguerrilla battalions, 17 support battalions, and 16 

new antikidnapping units (for example, GAULA). The reorganization 

included a three-battalion counterdrug brigade and a rapid reaction force 

(Fuerza de Desplique Rapido or FUDRA) composed of the three BRIM, 

the four-battalion SF brigade—more ranger battalions than US SF units—

and the Colombian Army aviation brigade.41 Security force helicopters—a 

scarce and critical mobility asset—numbered a handful for the Colombian 

Navy, 17 for the Colombian Army, 50 for the Colombian Air Force, and 

almost 100 for the CNP—half of which were restricted by US assistance 

to counterdrug operations.42 Activated in early December, the 5,000-man 

FUDRA—a small division-equivalent combining the mass of large elite 

units with the mobility of helicopters—provided the Army a stronger and 

more flexible response force for countering FARC and ELN attacks. As 

it looked into 2000, the COLMIL expected additional resources from 

President Pastrana’s initiative known as Plan Colombia.

Plan Colombia: 1999–2000

Many believe that Plan Colombia evolved from the reengagement 

of the COLMIL by the US military. Some would have it begin with the 

disbandment of the 20th Intelligence Brigade, the creation of the Army 
56

Military Intelligence Center (CIME), and the establishment of JTF-S in 

1998. Others would tie it to the process that birthed the counterdrug battalion, 

the planning for a counterdrug brigade, and the working relationship 

between Wilhelm and Tapias. From the beginning, Americans—and later 

the COLMIL—stressed the need for an overall, comprehensive national 

plan. A senior Pastrana advisor, Dr. Jamie Ruiz, developed a Colombian 

concept that included US input. In May 1999, the government issued a 

white paper titled “Plan Colombia” to address its problems. Colombian–

US discussions followed as Wilhelm encouraged Embassy involvement 

and support.43 In September, President Pastrana announced his 6-year Plan 

Colombia. Shortly thereafter, the Colombians and the Americans refined 

its details. The Colombian Government planned to fund $4 billion of the 

$7.5 billion cost for the first 3 years and sought international contributions 

for the remaining $3.5 billion. The United States agreed to fund $1.3 

billion, almost 75 percent to address the counterdrug problem, with other 

contributors providing the remaining $2.2 billion. Because of difficulties 

raising funds within Colombia and lukewarm international support, 

only the United States met its funding goal in the first 3 years—creating 

unintended consequences.44

“Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of 

the State” proved more a concept than a detailed plan. After stating its 

fundamental goal: “to strengthen the State in order to regain the citizens’ 

confidence and recuperate the basic norms of peaceful coexistence,” 

the plan acknowledged that it would take years to consolidate control 

throughout the country and to build peace. It briefly described 10 elements 

or strategies in the following order: economic, fiscal and financial, military, 

judicial and human rights, counternarcotics, alternate development, social 

participation, human development, peace, and international. The plan 

ended by addressing five topics in some detail: economy, counterdrug 

strategy, justice reform, democratization and social development, and 

peace process. The only reference to a military strategy—other than 

discussion in the section on counterdrugs—focused on restructuring and 

modernizing the security forces “to reestablish the rule of law and provide 

security throughout the country, and in combating organized crime and 

armed groups.”45 With Plan Colombia, Pastrana tried to build a peace 

effort on three components: peace talks with the guerrillas; strengthened 

security forces; and international assistance in funding economic, political, 

social, and military programs.46 Written to address multiple audiences 

with different goals, Plan Colombia became a nation-strengthening plan 

in Colombia, a peace plan in Europe, and a counterdrug plan in the United 

States.
57

Written with the Americans in mind, the counterdrug strategy section 

contained the most details and mixed counterdrug with counterguerrilla 

issues. Acknowledging counterdrug as “one of its top strategic priorities,” 

four “violence-generating agents” were identified: narcotraffickers, 

guerrillas or subversives, illegal autodefensas or paramilitaries, and 

common criminals. The “National Mission” was “to ensure order, stability, 

and the rule of law; guarantee sovereignty over national territory; protect 

the State and the civilian population from threats posed by illegal armed 

groups and criminal organizations; break the links between the illegal armed 

groups and the criminal drug industry that supports them.” Reduction of 

cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal drugs by 50 percent in 6 

years became a measurable goal. To reach this goal, six objectives—each 

with areas of focus—followed: 

(1) Strengthening the counterdrug fight through an integrated 

effort by the Armed Forces to establish military control of areas.

(2) Strengthening the judicial system and fighting corruption.

(3) Neutralizing the drug financial system and seizing its 

resources.

(4) Neutralizing and fighting agents of violence allied with the 

drugs.

(5) Integrating national initiatives with regional and international 

efforts.

(6) Strengthening and expanding alternate development in drug 

growing areas.

A three-phased plan to reach the 50 percent reduction goal integrated the 

COLMIL and the CNP efforts to destroy the armed, logistical, and financial 

drug trade organizations. Phase I—the first year (2000)—focused military, 

police, and judicial efforts on Putumayo department and the south. Phase 

II—the second and third years (2001–2002)—concentrated military, 

police, judicial, and social efforts in the southeastern and the central parts 

of Colombia. Phase III—the last 3 years (2003–2005)—expanded the 

“integrated effort” to the whole country.47

During the execution of the three-phased counterdrug plan, protection of human rights was identified as the first priority. Under roles and 

missions, each counterdrug force had its priorities assigned: COLMIL—

insurgents or guerrillas, illegal self-defense or autodefensas, drug traffickers, and organized crime; CNP—drug traffickers, organized crime, petty 

crime; and Department of Administrative Security (DAS)—economic and 

financial crime, illegal gained wealth by individual or guerrilla groups. 
58

Although counterdrug remained a CNP function, the COLMIL became 

involved because of the drug ties to the guerrillas and the autodefensas. The “basic elements” for the COLMIL–CNP counterdrug efforts 

were human rights, air interdiction, interdiction of precursor chemicals, 

COLMIL support of CNP counterdrug operations, destruction of drug processing laboratories and stockpiles, and coca eradication. The counterdrug 

strategy sought to bring “all elements of the Police and Armed Forces” to 

bear on the problem “to eliminate large-scale drug production, end largescale violence and lawlessness by organized groups, promote respect for 

human rights, and break the link between armed groups and their narcotics 

industry support.”48 Plan Colombia acknowledged the linkage between the 

guerrillas and the autodefensas with the drug traffickers. This suggested 

that to combat one it needed to fight the other.

For the United States, Pastrana’s plan meant a new, improved, and bigger counterdrug effort—one that provided the CNP with critical military 

support to increase its coca eradication operations in southern Colombia. 

The heart of the US “Plan Colombia” centered on a “Push to the South” 

into coca-growing Putumayo department led by a US-trained and equipped 

three-battalion Colombian Army counterdrug brigade with its own UH60 helicopters. Funding of this program shifted the bulk of US counterdrug assistance from the small DIRAN in the CNP to a new counterdrug 

brigade—an equally small part of the Army—that would be tied to US 

counterdrug requirements and in support of CNP eradication operations. 

Between 7 February 2000, when the Clinton administration requested funding for its “Plan Colombia,” and 13 July when the President signed the law 

authorizing $768.5 million in addition to the $163.7 million previously 

approved for counterdrug programs, the legislative process modified the 

“Plan Colombia” package. Congress reduced funding requests for groundbased radars, the riverine program, voluntary eradication, alternative crop 

development, governance, and environmental programs, but tripled funding for human rights. For a third of the cost, 30 UH-60 helicopters were 

replaced by 60 UH-II helicopters—twice as many with less lift and less 

capacity. In addition to the human rights vetting requirement by DOS, 

Congress placed a limit on personnel—500 DOD personnel and 300 civilian contractors—in Colombia at any time in support of “Plan Colombia.” 

After the legislation passed, officials renegotiated the helicopter package, 

which became 33 UH-1N, 30 UH-II, and 16 UH-60 aircraft.49

In Congressional testimony during the period that the “Plan Colombia” 

legislation developed, a senior DOD official described the US efforts in 

Colombia as a “threat based, intelligence driven, counterdrug inter­diction 

strategy.” DOD programs included detection and monitoring, riverine 
59

operations, ground-based radars, and training of human rights vetted 

personnel such as the counterdrug battalion. He expressed concern that 

the COLMIL—“heavy on ‘tail’ and short on ‘tooth’”—was “not optimally 

structured and organized to execute sustained counterdrug operations.”50

That same month, about a third of Wilhelm’s annual Congressional 

testimony concentrated on USSOUTHCOM’s counterdrug campaign 

and on Colombia. Short-term tactical analysis teams and joint planning 

and assistance teams provided host nation forces in his area training 

and assessments annually. In Colombia, the counterdrug battalion—

three maneuver companies and a headquarters company—had become 

operational 15 December 1999 at a cost of $3.9 million for training and 

$3.5 million for equipment. This battalion would be the nucleus of a 

counterdrug brigade of three battalions that would be part of a 6-year, 

three-phased “Push into Southern Colombia”: (1) 2 years in Putumayo 

and Caqueta departments, (2) 2 years in Meta and Guaviare departments, 

and (3) 2 years in Santander and northern departments. Wilhelm noted 

that the UH-60 would become the standard Colombian helicopter because 

of its range, survivability, payload, and versatility. He emphasized 

improvements made in aerial interdiction—the Colombian Air Force 

received a few upgraded aircraft—and in the riverine program—the 

Colombian Navy fielded 25 of an anticipated 45 riverine combat units.51

The USSOUTHCOM’s counterdrug and interdiction programs reflected 

US policy and the American “Plan Colombia.”

In March, former ambassador to El Salvador David Passage offered 

a critique of, and an alternative to, the US counterdrug and human rights 

policy in Colombia. Calling it “almost irrational to expect that a country 

fighting for national survival . . . should be able to quickly or easily achieve 

the truly prodigious transformation necessary to live up to accepted norms 

of human rights and civil liberties,” he noted the Colombian security force 

improvements in human rights and, based on his experience in El Salvador, 

questioned the wisdom of denying assistance for alleged human rights 

violations rather than requiring additional training and prosecutions. Passage 

noted the major disconnect between Colombian and US goals and the 

frustrations and misunderstandings caused by a narrow counterdrug focus. 

“Colombia’s overarching national priority is to reestablish sovereignty, 

regain control over its national territory, end its domestic violence, and 

resource economic growth for all its people—but the professed US 

objective is simply to end illicit drug trafficking to American customers.” 

Passage believed that US policy failed to address four Colombian realities: 

increased control in rural areas and pressure on urban areas by FARC and 

ELN guerrillas, increased potential for human rights violations as security 
60

force personnel “lash out” at civilians, increased reliance of armed and 

trained paramilitaries for local security, and increased linkages between 

drugs and the guerrillas and paramilitaries. He observed that over time, the 

counterdrug effort had evolved from just supporting DIRAN to CNP training 

to training drug case prosecutors to training and equipping COLMIL units 

“exclusively devoted to counternarcotics programs.” Despite these changes 

and increased counterdrug funding for 6 straight years in Colombia, the 

“simple fact” remained that there had been no reduction in illegal drugs. 

Passage declared that the United States’ $250 billion, 20-year counterdrug 

effort had “no impact at all—absolutely none” on reducing illegal drug 

supplies. He concluded, “It will not, repeat not, be possible to constrict the 

production or trafficking in narcotics so long as Colombia’s Government 

cannot enforce Colombia’s law over the whole of its national territory.”52

Passage not only critiqued US counterdrug and human rights policy, 

he offered suggestions for the Colombian Army—many applicable to 

the COLMIL—and lessons for US officials based on his El Salvadorian 

experiences. After praising Pastrana for selecting capable military leaders, 

Passage acknowledged the long-term challenges of moving beyond the 

“professional critiques” of the Army that indicated “examples of incompetence and corruption at virtually every level of leadership . . . [that] go 

all the way down to ignorance and fear among ill-trained, inadequatelyequipped, and poorly-led conscripts at the bottom.” First, he suggested 

that the Army needed to develop a strategy for defeating the guerrillas and 

the paramilitaries. Second, it needed training and doctrine that addressed 

small unit operations, joint operations with the other military services and 

the CNP, and “virtually unheard of” night operations. Third, it needed 

drastic improvement to its “primitive” intelligence system. Fourth, operationally the Army needed a rapid response force, an aerial delivered special force to attack high-value targets (HVT), increased ground and aerial 

transport assets, and improved aerial medical evacuation—what President 

Jose Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador equated to another division in terms 

of enhanced morale and lives saved. Last, but not least, the Army needed 

to improve its logistics system and the anticipation of maintenance requirements such as services and repair parts. Passage added that the COLMIL 

should not spend money on things not needed—fighters instead of close 

air support and transport aircraft for the Air Force and “blue water” instead 

of riverine and coastal craft for the Navy. Passage offered three lessons 

from El Salvador to guide the United States in Colombia. First, the United 

States made it clear that the war was the host nation’s war to win or lose, 

not a US war to win or lose. Second, the United States helped retrain 

and support the host nation security forces “despite an appalling human 
61

rights record,” but it did not engage in combat operations and limited its 

military presence to 55 trainers—“not, note, ‘advisors.’” Third, the United 

States “used all the means at its disposal to compel . . . significant internal reforms.”53 After years of limited governmental support and the leaner 

years of decertification, many in the Colombian Army might have agreed 

with Passage’s bleak assessment—particularly before 1999—and many 

would support some of his suggestions that had been identified in the 

Army transformation process that began in 1999. Other ideas—such as 

small unit operations—may not have seemed appropriate for fighting the 

larger, well-trained, and heavily-armed guerrillas. However, the COLMIL 

transformation process remained largely a self-help program with limited 

governmental resources and minimal US assistance beyond counterdrug 

programs. In 2000, the COLMIL understood—even if the United States 

did not—that the war it had to win or lose was against the guerrillas: 

FARC and ELN.

COLMIL Reorganization and “Plan Colombia”: 2000

The highly publicized fielding of the first counterdrug battalion raised 

expectations, exposed disagreements, and led to misunderstandings. First, 

the 18 UH-1N helicopters had not arrived as scheduled—delaying an 

initial JTF-S foray into Putumayo. Second, human rights vetting remained 

a bone of contention with the Colombian Army. Third, although American 

officials and the press expressed high hopes for the battalion, the FARC 

considered it a threat to its coca cultivation in southern Colombia, and the 

Colombian Army saw it as a means to gain further access to US assistance. 

A former COLMIL commander observed, “I don’t think the United States 

understands the problem. . . . It’s absurd to think that 18 helicopters and 

900 troops will win this war.” During the give-and-take in late 1999 over a 

COLMIL proposal to organize two additional US-funded, US-trained, and 

US-equipped counterdrug battalions and a brigade staff, disagreements 

and misunderstandings surfaced. USSOUTHCOM proposed what one 

observer described as the “Schwarzenegger” battalion—a large, oneof-a-kind, it-exists-no-where-else, high-tech organization based on a 

US Ranger battalion. Two other options considered were a modified 

Colombian Army battalion—similar in structure to the US Korean-era 

battalions—and the smaller Colombian Army counterguerrilla battalion. 

Larger battalions required more Army personnel and increased the human 

rights vetting requirements. A dispute over the design and responsibilities 

of the two battalions led Wilhelm to threaten withdrawal of US support. 

Tapias reacted in kind by threatening to withdraw his request. In the end, 

both sides agreed on a military mission—raiding drug laboratories—and 
62

to an organization with smaller 780-man battalions. After its fielding in 

2001, the counterdrug brigade’s primary mission became the provision 

of ground security for the NAS-supported CNP eradication operations, 

followed by raiding. What an American military official described as a 

“clash of egos”—actually more a clash of different military cultures 

and priorities—ended with a US official stating, “This is their program, 

their initiative. We are supporting them.” United States “cradle to grave” 

funding of CNP counterdrug programs appealed to a resource-constrained 

COLMIL while access to US military training met the Colombian Army’s 

needs.54 However, the Army counterdrug brigade program remained 

secondary to fighting the guerrillas.

Within its limited resources, the COLMIL continued its long-term 

adjustments to the growing guerrilla threat. In the first months of 2000, the 

Colombian Army reorganized its headquarters in Bogotá. It replaced its 

traditional E1—personnel, E2—intelligence, E3—operations and training, 

and E4—logistics staff organization with four directorates: operations, 

personnel, logistics, and training. This permitted the Army to perform its 

routine administrative, logistical, and training functions and to become a 

combat command. The director of operations, a major general, oversaw 

the Colombian Army combat operations. The operations directorate had 

three branches: operations headed by a colonel, intelligence headed by 

a brigadier general, and psychological operations headed by a colonel. 

The training directorate oversaw education, training, doctrine, and lessons 

learned. The national education-training center remained responsible 

for the normal schools and a new national training center trained the 

professionals—formerly re-enlisted conscripts, but expanded to include 

civilian volunteers and prior service personnel.55 The creation of the Army 

Tactical Retraining Center (CERTE) proved a critical training initiative by 

providing standardized, reoccurring training for all Army combat units. 

Eventually units would rotate through a cycle of 3 months of operations, 

leave time, and a month of training by CERTE cadre at a training facility. 

Training focused on critical tasks and lessons learned—first week: 3 days 

of human rights, followed by psychological operations and specialty 

training; second week: soldier skills and marksmanship; third week: 

squad, platoon, and company training; and fourth week: a field training 

exercise incorporating the previous 3 weeks of training. The Fifth Division, 

released from administrative and training responsibilities, evolved into a 

combat division with the transfer of brigades from other divisions already 

stationed in its area of responsibility. The Fourth Division, in whose 

area the zona de despeje and JTF-S resided, completed its transition to 

professionals that spring.56
63

The guerrillas adjusted their operations in response to Army actions. 

Guerrilla multicolumn attacks declined during the first half of 2000, but 

attacks on isolated security force outposts continued throughout the year. 

On 28 March, for example, almost 300 FARC guerrillas supported by the 

ubiquitous gas cylinder bombs destroyed Vigia del Fuerte in Antioquia 

department, the second poorest village in Colombia, leaving behind 36 

dead, 10 wounded, and 9 missing. Among the dead—some killed by 

machetes and others burned and decapitated—numbered 21 policemen, 

the mayor, 7 civilians, and 2 children.57 Massacres by the paramilitaries 

of alleged guerrilla supporters increased during the year. In February, over 

300 autodefensas occupied the town of El Salado in northern Colombia 

and settled in for a 3-day session of rape, torture, and killing that ended 

with over 36 dead and nearly 3,000 displaced. Security force—in this case 

the Colombian Navy marine infantry—failure to respond led to charges 

of collusion with the paramilitaries.58 Reportedly, over 200 massacres—

guerrilla and autodefensas—occurred during the first half of 2000. 

The FARC and ELN continued their off-and-on negotiations with the 

government. In March, the FARC declared “Law 002,” which required 

taxes from anyone with over $1 million in assets or they risked kidnapping. 

It became common for families of kidnapped victims to travel to the zona

to pay ransoms. In an attempt to broaden its base in the urban areas, the 

FARC established a clandestine political movement, the “Bolivarian 

Movement for a New Colombia,” in April. During previous local elections, 

the guerrillas had attempted to disrupt them through threats and killings. In 

2000, they shifted to supporting candidates who through intimidation or 

political belief could be convinced to share government-provided funding 

with the guerrillas. Given the lack of permanent government security 

in many municipalities, mayors had to reach an understanding with the 

guerrillas, leave their posts, or face death. This FARC effort undercut 

civil-military trust as security force commanders came to view many 

mayors as FARC supporters. By the end of the year, almost 90 percent of 

the municipalities had a permanent guerrilla presence or had suffered from 

an attack.59

Combat operations intensified in July. At the beginning of the month, 

Brigadier General Mario Montoya began Operation JAGUAR—a JTF-S 

counterdrug operation in 10 municipalities in southern Caqueta and in 

northern Putumayo—with roughly a 2,500-man Army force consisting of 

the counterdrug battalion and five counterguerrilla battalions supported by 

Air Force helicopters. In what was reported as an “unprecedented operation against drug traffickers” and a test of the counterdrug battalion in 

its “baptism of fire” some 6 months after its activation, the failure to use 
64

the 18 US-provided helicopters reportedly because of a lack of funds for 

fuel became the story. In fact, the long-anticipated counterdrug battalion 

operations had been delayed first due to a late delivery of the helicopters 

and then to a disagreement about funding.60 This caused a problem in May 

when most of the DOS-funded third-nation contract pilots lost their funding. After President Clinton signed “Plan Colombia” in late July and the 

United States assumed “cradle to grave” funding for a counterdrug brigade 

and its helicopters, the DOS agreed in August to fix the problem and in 

October the DOS estimated that it would take another 3 months to field 

the contract pilots—almost a full year after the first counterdrug battalion 

became operational.61 In mid-July, the FARC launched another series of 

multicolumn attacks against police stations near the zona highlighting the 

Army need for greater mobility and better intelligence. Once again, the 

Colombian Army blunted the offensive and forced the FARC back into 

their base areas after local successes.62 By mid-2000, the Colombian Army 

had developed a better understanding of the guerrillas and began to think 

about controlling the mobility corridors used by the guerrillas to move 

forces and illegal drugs between their base areas from which attacks were 

launched throughout the country and between their rear area in southeastern Colombia from which the guerrillas supported and financed their 

operations.

In late summer, both the Colombians and the Americans made changes 

in key personnel. Routinely, Colombian security force commanders served 

2-year terms. Despite his early relationship with the COLMIL, in August 

Pastrana retained his COLMIL, Army, and Air Force commanders—

Tapias, Mora, and Velasco. He appointed Admiral Mauricio Soto as Navy 

commander and Major General Luis Ernesto Gilbert as CNP commander. 

That month, Ambassador Anne W. Patterson arrived in Colombia to 

replace Kamman. On the military side, in September General Peter 

Pace—a fellow Marine—replaced Wilhelm who had completed a 3-

year tour as USSOUTHCOM commander. Working with the Colombian 

leadership, Patterson and Pace would manage the beginnings of the US 

“Plan Colombia.”

Colombian legislation reinforced on-going military reform efforts. 

On 12 August, a new military penal code required human rights cases to 

be tried by civilian courts and the removal of the military legal system 

from the chain of command to professional military judges. At the same 

time, the COLMIL began its efforts to create a Judge Advocate General 

Corps. On 14 September, a reformed military personnel law permitted 

the dismissal of officers who had less than 15 years’ service—previously 
65

forbidden by law without legal confirmation. This allowed the COLMIL to 

release military personnel credibly accused of gross human rights abuses 

or with known ties to the autodefensas.

63 In October, with unanimous 

COLMIL approval, Minister Ramirez used this law for the first time to 

dismiss 388 Armed Forces members—including 89 officers from the 

military services—to improve the efficiency of the security forces. Despite 

these legal improvements, manpower and resource constraints continued 

to limit the COLMIL capabilities. Although a record 48 percent of 

COLMIL personnel participated in combat operations, 13 percent guarded 

infrastructure, 6 percent secured the borders, and 33 percent remained in 

training or in military installations.64

Rejecting charges of an abusive military, Tapias acknowledged that 

some officers might have failed to respond to calls for assistance and that 

ex-soldiers had joined the autodefensas for the pay because of record 

unemployment in Colombia. However, Tapias maintained the fundamental problem remained “we don’t have the capacity to act.” For a mountainous and jungle country over six times the size of South Vietnam, the 

Colombian Army had 17 helicopters and about 55,000 combat soldiers to 

confront half as many guerrillas and autodefensas dispersed throughout 

the countryside—a challenge for the best soldiers in the world even with 

perfect intelligence and access to additional helicopters. Restrictions on 

United States-supplied counterdrug assets in Colombia complicated the 

problem and increased frustrations. For example, in July a 14-man CNP 

post held off 300 guerrillas for 27 hours with 3 counterdrug UH-60 helicopters supporting the DIRAN only 20 minutes away. After the policemen 

ran out of ammunition, they surrendered and were executed. The situation, 

and others like it, had not been considered by the US approving authorities 

as an emergency mission.65

In the fall, the US Government released its “Plan Colombia.” The 

CNP remained the lead agency under the DOS with a Colombian Army 

counter­drug brigade providing support. Increased US support focused on 

the “common counterdrug objective” and would “not support Colombia 

counterinsurgency efforts.” Training, equipping, and supporting a counterdrug brigade—composed of the operational counterdrug battalion, a second counterdrug battalion that began training in August and would become 

operational in December, a 12-man brigade staff that would become operational in early 2001, and a third counterdrug battalion being formed from 

vetted Army personnel that was scheduled to begin training in January 

and become operational in April—with a helicopter package of 13 to 16 

UH-60, 33 UH-1N (18 previously delivered), and up to 30 UH-II formed 
66

the core of the US counterdrug package. The plan provided some funding 

for CNP operations; counterdrug intelligence enhancements; interdiction 

efforts; and judicial reform, human rights, alternative development, and 

governance programs.66

Given the increased military involvement in “Plan Colombia,” a 

civilian DOD official provided Congress an overview of its plan. Noting 

over 10 years of DOD support for counterdrug efforts in Colombia, he 

declared the program would build on past programs that had proven 

successful in Peru and Bolivia. The program had two parts: (1) support for 

the push into southern Colombia, and (2) support for interdiction efforts. 

To support the first part, the key tasks became training and equipping the 

additional counterdrug battalions; establishing an operational brigade staff 

in February 2001 to conduct counterdrug operations in “the world’s largest 

coca cultivation center” in the departments of Caqueta and Putumayo; 

building an army aviation support infrastructure for the mix and number 

of DOS-supplied helicopters; enhancing the counterdrug intelligence 

collection capability beginning in April 2001; and managing a contractorled effort to support organizational military reform at the MOD and military 

service-level that addressed military planning, air and ground logistics 

support, counterdrug military doctrine, counterdrug military strategy, 

manning the military, intelligence integration, and command, control, and 

computers. For the second part, DOD support included modifying two 

C-26 aircraft with air-to-air radars, forward looking infrared radars (FLIRs) 

for night operations, and communications equipment by the summer 2001; 

installing FLIRs in two AC-47 aircraft by the summer 2001; establishing 

a ground-based radar at Tres Esquinas by October 2001; providing a 

modern, operationally effective nationwide radar command and control 

system in Bogotá by fall 2001; continuing the multiple country Andean 

Ridge intelligence collection program; and initial planning for a ground 

interdiction—road control—program. Acknowledging that there was 

“nothing new here for DOD” and that it would “not be easy” to attack 

the cocaine center in southern Colombia, the official offered three DOD 

concerns. First, the COLMIL—limited by resources, training procedures, 

and lack of joint planning and operations—needed to be restructured for 

success against the drug threat for which DOD had provided a “small 

portion” of the funding. Second, human rights improvements—from US 

legislative-mandated requirements, personal example of US trainers, and 

the reforms of Pastrana—had reduced allegations against the military 

by 95 percent in 5 years to less than 2 percent of the violations in 

1999, but violations by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries provided a 
67

“call to action” requiring resources and training for Colombia to which 

“Plan Colombia” provided a US contribution. Finally, addressing the 

counterdrug and counterinsurgency issue, the targets of this program, 

individuals and organizations engaged in narcotrafficking and those 

armed elements that resisted counterdrug operations, would be engaged—

whether “narcotraffickers, insurgent organizations, or illegal self-defense 

forces.” He ended by stressing “numerous restrictions, constraints, and 

reviews” from the Embassy and USSOUTHCOM to the Joint Staff and 

DOD minimized the risk to US military personnel and included on “each 

and every deployment order . . . in no uncertain terms, that DOD personnel 

are not to accompany host nation personnel on operational missions.”67

Two General Accounting Office (GAO) reports released that October 

addressed the implementation challenges—for both the US and Colombia—

presented by “Plan Colombia” and one concluded that it would “take years 

to produce results.” On the planning side, no one—DOS, DOD, US Agency 

for International Development (USAID), or Colombia—had developed 

detailed implementation plans. However, initial estimates indicated a need 

for increased Embassy staff—24 in NAS and 40 for USAID—for whom 

modular offices on the Embassy grounds would be unavailable for at least 

a year. Economic and social programs would build on pilot projects not 

yet developed—much less implemented—and requiring years to evaluate. 

In addition, initial planning had been hasty and uncoordinated—between 

agencies and between governments. Take DOD for example. For years, 

the MILGP had assisted specific counterdrug programs such as the riverine and aerial interdiction programs, had little reason to expect major 

changes, and had focused on the day-to-day management of its on-going 

counterdrug programs and human rights vetting. The COLMIL had no 

counterdrug military plan. The USSOUTHCOM lacked a detailed assessment of COLMIL requirements. This caused USSOUTHCOM to base its 

initial input of COLMIL requirements on incomplete information and on 

“intuitive assessments of the Colombian Military’s basic needs.” To remedy this shortcoming, DOD had initiated two studies—one for an aviation 

support package and another to look into modernizing and restructuring 

the COLMIL—to identify “operational doctrine, structure, and systems” 

to make the counterdrug assistance effective.68 Sharing these planning and 

coordinating shortcomings with DOD, Colombian and US agencies continued to develop the details of their programs.

Even if the planning had been perfect, there remained significant 

management and coordination challenges among US agencies, within 

the Colombian Government, and between the two governments that 
68

threatened the prompt execution of programs—thus producing confusion, 

misunderstanding, frustration, and mistrust. First, the United States had 

“not always provided the necessary support to operate and maintain the USprovided equipment to the extent possible [needed] to help.” Longstanding 

problems—many encountered in the 1998 assistance package—included 

inadequate DOS understanding and funding for helicopter support, a lack 

of helicopter spare parts, a shortage of trained Colombian helicopter pilots 

and mechanics, DOD inability to provide all the equipment requested, DOS 

inability to get CNP to assume responsibility for aerial spray eradication, 

and lack of program oversight—in May 2000, the CNP had its first audit 

in 15 years.69 Second, concerns about the ability of Colombia to finance 

and execute Plan Colombia arose. Not only had international funding 

fallen below expectations, Colombian attempts to float $1 billion in bonds 

had raised only $325 million by August with another $325 hoped for by 

December 2001. Its detailed action plan for Plan Colombia, finally issued in 

September, had required assistance from a special US interagency task force 

created in July. Third, governmental policies, bureaucratic procedures, and 

delayed decisions coupled with long lead times all added to the friction. 

Training could be accomplished easier than equipment could be acquired. 

As an example, take the helicopter package for the counterdrug brigade 

scheduled to be operational in April 2001. In September 2000, DOS 

estimated it would take over 2 years to complete the delivery of the UH-II 

helicopters, and that they would be delivered in increments beginning in 

mid-2001. If an agreement on the specifications for the UH-60 helicopters 

permitted a contract by December, DOS estimated initial delivery in mid2001 with final delivery in December. If the contract was not signed then, 

the final delivery estimate became October 2002—3 years into the 6-year 

Plan Colombia. Human rights vetting remained another thorny issue that 

threatened Plan Colombia as the United States maintained the “strictest 

human rights standards.” Training for the second counterdrug battalion 

had been delayed by the Embassy until the Colombian Army removed 

a captain accused of a human rights violation even after the Colombian 

Government had investigated and cleared him of any wrongdoing. Some 

in the Colombian Army viewed the DOS insistence in removing this 

officer as an act of personal injustice and a professional—if not national—

affront.70 Expectations for quick and dramatic counterdrug results faded as 

timelines lengthened and disagreements increased.

Although the FARC had attempted “bait and ambush” operations in 

1999 and 2000, the Fourth Division had recognized the gambit and turned 

the tables on the guerrillas with good results. However, in mid-October in 

a series of FARC and ELN coordinated attacks, a 500-man FARC force 
69

attacked the town of Dabeida in Antioquia department north of Medellín 

astride a mobility corridor used for arms and drug smuggling. After 

driving the police from the town, scattering the population, and opening 

up the corridor, the guerrillas held the town as bait and ambushed a 4th 

Brigade reaction force. The resulting 3-day battle with 5 FARC fronts 

left 54 soldiers and 2 policemen dead and a crashed Colombian Air Force 

UH-60, which had tried to land in the daylight.71 The guerrillas retained 

the capability—under the right conditions—to damage Colombian Army 

units. However, under normal conditions the Colombian Army had proven 

capable of handling larger guerrilla units. In mid-November, the 5th 

Brigade in northeastern Colombia intercepted the elite FARC 360-man 

Arturo Ruiz column—making a 700-mile, 10-department journey by foot, 

canoe, and truck from southern Colombia to the central Magdalena River 

valley—on the barren, frigid Berlin plateau about 12,000 feet up in the 

mountains. In a month-long series of engagements known as Operation 

BERLIN, Brigadier General Martin Carreno’s 1,500-man Colombian 

Army force suffered 1 killed as it scattered the FARC column—killing 

46 and capturing 77—in what was called “the army’s shining moment for 

the year.” During this operation, the Army documented FARC use of child 

soldiers—32 of the prisoners were from 14 to 17 years old and 20 of the 

killed were children. When the operation finally ended in early 2001, the 

FARC had lost 71 killed and 132 captured.72

After 2 years of negotiations, peace appeared no closer than at the 

beginning. On the positive side, Plan Colombia provided some international support—particularly in the counternarcotics arena—and an 

improving COLMIL continued to oppose guerrilla violence. However, 

during that same 2-year period, conservative estimates indicated that the 

guerrillas had increased in record numbers: the armed FARC from 11,300 

to 16,500, the ELN from 3,500 to 4,500, and the autodefensas from 4,500 

to 8,100.73 Violence and lawlessness reigned in large parts of the country displacing 2 million internally and causing over 800,000 to leave the 

country. An American analyst compared the contrast between urban and 

rural Colombia to “a sophisticated South American Milan attached to a 

brutal South American Congo.” Despite years of experience and increasing US involvement, Americans had retained “an appalling ignorance 

of Colombia’s hellishly complicated realities” and of its “endemic violence [that] bewilders and dismays many Colombians.” Noting that most 

Colombians viewed the drug war as “America’s war” in which they were 

victims, the lack of financial support for Pastrana’s counterdrug-focused 

Plan Colombia made some sense. The principal complaint of COLMIL 

officers was the lack of national support to fight the guerrillas. Other 
70

criticisms spoke to “outmoded US counterinsurgency doctrine, unreasonable human rights constraints, and weak-kneed politicians.” Addressing 

concerns about the United States being dragged into a quagmire, the 

analyst observed, “Unless we were to replace the country’s nationalistic 

officers with English-speaking toadies, dependent on US assistance and 

approval, the Colombian Armed Forces will continue to fight their own 

wars and resist US military interference. This will be no Vietnam.” He 

concluded that the increased US counterdrug assistance would do little 

to reduce illegal drugs and would not reduce the amount of violence in 

Colombia.74

Strengthening COLMIL: Plan 2001 and the Brigada Contra el 

Narcotrafico (BRCNA)

At the beginning of the year, COLMIL began a process that led to the 

development of Plan 2001—the Colombian Army’s first campaign plan. 

On 17 January, the COLMIL held a conference to review the security 

status, evaluate counterguerrilla and antiparamilitary plans, and consider 

the “Plan Colombia” guidelines for Army counternarcotics units. Before 

the meeting, the five new division commanders each met with their brigade commanders to analyze the public order situation in their areas of 

responsibility, determine regions at risk, and decide on missions for the 

year. Senior COLMIL commanders then met with the new Army director of operations, Major General Carlos A. Ospina, and the division commanders to discuss topics that included Operation BERLIN, paramilitary 

actions, car bomb attacks, infrastructure security, and the recently activated 

Brigada Contra el Narcotrafico (BRCNA)—the US-supported counterdrug brigade. The Armed Forces commander briefed the division commanders on the antiparamilitary committee.75 At a second session later that 

month, the COLMIL decided to concentrate in 2001 on improving combat 

capabilities and accomplishing strategic goals; improving security in five 

departments—Cundinamarca, Antioquia, and Valle where the three largest 

cities (Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali) were located, Putumayo where JTFS conducted counterdrug missions, and Arauca where a critical oil pipeline existed; continuing reorganization and modernization of the Armed 

Forces; meeting the division and brigade objectives in their areas of operation; and creating new elite units. To maintain the proficiency of combat units, the COLMIL leaders committed themselves to maintaining the 

retraining program between combat operations. To expand the Colombian 

Army offensive capability, four divisions—First through Fourth—would 

each activate a BRIM and the Fifth Division would activate a new high 

mountain battalion from over 10,000 professionals beginning that spring. 
71

An official summarized, “We spent last year reorganizing and modernizing the troops. This year we shall strengthen them.”76

By 2001, the Army had developed a strategy to counter the guerrillas. 

First, the Army secured key areas, resources, and infrastructure critical 

to maintaining the nation. Capitalizing on the lack of popular support for 

the guerrillas, the Army then focused on the armed guerrilla units and 

the areas that supported them. In 2000, the Army began concentrating on 

mobility corridors—areas with limited to no government presence through 

which the guerrillas moved units, illegal drugs, and weapons between 

guerrilla base areas or, in Army terms, “generators of direct action,” 

and between guerrilla rear or support areas—the Army’s “generators of 

actions.” In 2001, the divisions assumed responsibility for contesting 

the mobility corridors. The three-BRIM FUDRA and the now separate 

SF Brigade, the Colombian Army’s reaction forces, began to pressure 

base areas from which the guerrillas launched attacks and JTF-S, with 

the newly operational BRCNA, attacked FARC support in Putumayo 

and Caqueta.77 To implement the strategy, the Army published its first 

strategic plan, Plan 2001. Within the strategic design, other plans or 

programs developed the necessary tools. Plan 10,000, a 3-year effort, 

replaced 10,000 regulars with high school diplomas (noncombat soldiers) 

each year with 10,000 professionals. By 31 December, the Colombian 

Army would have over 53,000 professionals—44 percent of its strength. 

These professionals supplied personnel for the high mountain battalion, 

additional counterguerrilla battalions, and new urban counterterrorism 

units (AFEUR). Plan Fortaleza or Strength Plan provided 10,000 regulars 

to replace 10,000 professionals securing critical installations identified in 

the infrastructure security plan, Plan Especial Energetico Vial (PEEV). 

These professionals provided the personnel for the four divisional 

BRIMs.78 In the absence of a national strategy beyond negotiating peace 

and the vision offered in Plan Colombia, the 2001 military strategy became 

a guiding concept for a resource-constrained military in its efforts against 

the guerrillas.79 No matter how much the COLMIL improved, it lacked the 

mobility required to react promptly to attacks and it remained too small to 

secure areas cleared of the “generators of violence.”

On paper, the 2,300-man BRCNA, the US-supported counterdrug 

brigade, with its 77-helicopter support package appeared to be a great asset 

for the Army. Its three large counterdrug battalions had roughly the strength 

of the FUDRA, the Colombian Army’s three BRIM strategic reserve, and 

its helicopter package equaled the combined assets of both the Colombian 

Army and Air Force.80 In reality, things were not that straightforward. First, 

US human rights vetting requirements of regular and professional soldiers 
72

caused delays and frustrations for both sides. Second, when a two-battalion 

BRCNA and its 12-man joint staff—comprised of members from each 

military service and the CNP—became operational in early 2001, only the 

least capable helicopters had arrived—33 UH-1N. Given the conditions in 

Colombia, each UH-1N could carry about half a dozen soldiers compared 

to over twenty for the UH-60. By the time the third counterdrug battalion 

completed its 18-week training program in late May, the 3-battalion 

BRCNA had received no additional lift assets—the 14 UH-60 package 

arrived between July and December and the 30 UH-II package arrived 

between December and May 2002. The helicopter package completed 

delivery a full year after the 3-battalion BRCNA became operational.81

Third, BRCNA counterdrug operations were tied to supporting CNP coca 

eradication operations. Fourth, counterdrug restrictions combined with 

the human rights vetting requirements for Army units working with the 

BRCNA in effect created a long-term, US-interagency-involved “military 

within the military, a special ‘drug fighting’ component.” Assigned the 

BRCNA, several Army brigades, and some riverine units in the area, 

JTF-S (still commanded by Montoya) assumed control of a specially 

created counternarcotics area in Putumayo and Caqueta departments—

an area about the size of Pennsylvania. There, JTF-S supported the USsponsored, CNP-led “push into southern Colombia” that concentrated on 

coca eradication. (See Figure 8, Joint Task Force–South (JTF-S) area of 

operations.) This arrangement permitted the Colombian security forces in 

the remaining 30 departments to address Colombian security issues with 

minimum US involvement.82

In 2000, as one of two studies to better define COLMIL requirements, 

the DOD contracted a 14-member team headed by a retired US Army 

general officer to provide advice to the MOD for COLMIL and CNP 

reforms in planning, operations, intelligence, training, logistics, and 

personnel areas. DOD hired the team “not because it has any special 

expertise,” but because USSOUTHCOM “cannot spare 14 men to send 

to Colombia.” For whom the contractors worked—the United States or 

Colombia—became an issue when their task to recommend “legislation, 

statues, and decrees” became public knowledge. The DOS indicated that 

the United States was not trying to “ram military reform down the throats of 

the Colombians” who could accept or reject any recommendations. In fact, 

Colombian security sector reform had been ongoing since early 1999.83 In 

response to Colombian pressure, in February 2001 DOD decided not to 

renew its contract. Why? Hired by DOD to come up with ways to “fix a 

defective soldier” and a broken MOD, the contract team spoke no Spanish, 

had little to no Latin American experience, and had subject matter experts 
73

mostly with Pentagon and European experience. Colombian officials 

found the final products of little use and not suited to their needs. Manuals 

contained generic, commonplace observations based on past US military 

operations rather than specific advice tailored to the current Colombian 

situation. In the midst of a war, combat-experienced COLMIL general 

officers had little time for retired US officers who did not understand or 

failed to address their problems. In fact, the biggest Colombian frustration 

was that the contractors focused on the drug war and not their war against 

Figure 8. Joint Task Force–South (JTF-S) area of operations.

P eru

B ra zil

E c u a d or

Ve n e zu ela

C o lom b ia

North

Pacific

Ocean

Caribbean Sea

M itú

0 5 0 1 0 0 1 50 mi le s

C artagena

M edellín

B ogotá

C ali

A R A U C A

M E TA

Tres E squinas

JTF South

FARC

Zona
74

the guerrillas. In an effort to downplay the situation, the MOD noted, “In 

a country at war, there is not a lot of time to go to committees” and that 

the contractor-provided products would serve as “an element of analysis 

and discussion.” An expert on Colombia observed that some US officials 

tend to “lord it over the Colombians, they don’t know the language, or the 

culture or the geography, and they certainly don’t know the interservice 

rivalries that have been impediments to reform.” DOD had no plans to 

replace the contract team as MOD officials indicated they would continue 

to reform “a la Colombiana”—Colombian-style.84

 Peace negotiations continued in what one called a “dialogue without a 

road map.” The European trip in 2000 with FARC representatives brought 

no consensus and increased FARC political prestige in parts of the world. 

In November, the FARC walked out of the talks accusing the government 

of failing to combat the autodefensas. During the same time, talks with 

the ELN about a zona continued. In February 2001, residents in Santander 

protested a proposed government zona for the ELN as the AUC attacked 

ELN areas. On 8 February, Pastrana met with Marulanda in the zona and 

agreed to extend it for another 7 months, to denounce the paramilitaries 

as a common enemy of the FARC and of the government, and to permit 

foreign diplomats to observe the next talks. On 8 March, observers from 

22 countries attended the talks in the zona.

85 Some Colombians saw the 

FARC release of 242 police and military captives in June as a sign of 

progress in the peace process.86 However, as the talks continued throughout 

the year, both the FARC and the ELN conducted attacks on small, isolated 

government forces and on critical infrastructure—particularly power lines 

and oil pipelines, but no major offensives as in 1999 and 2000. In addition, 

both continued their kidnappings, summary executions, and killings of 

civilians.87

In the absence of Colombian security forces, autodefensa military 

strength continued to grow. Armed paramilitary presence in the 

municipalities reached over 40 percent by the end of 2001. Human Rights 

Watch referred to the paramilitaries as the “Sixth Division” in the fivedivision Colombian Army.88 The Armed Forces commander predicted in 

February that the paramilitaries would outnumber the guerrillas in 3 years 

because “they have more support from civil society.”89 Despite its illegal 

status, the AUC had a 15-percent favorable rating—five times greater 

than the FARC. In an interview, Carlos Castano—the AUC leader—

noted the autodefensas did not “represent the best solution to Colombia’s 

problems.” But they were “one, perhaps the only one, and one that the 

Colombian people see at this moment.” He added the Armed Forces “are 

like brothers. Our enemy is the guerrillas and that has not changed.” In 
75

defense of AUC killings and atrocities, Castano said, “This is an irregular 

conflict. You have to understand that the guerrillas, not us, determined 

the conflict’s characteristics.”90 From January through April, the AUC 

conducted a successful offensive to displace the ELN in northeastern 

Santander department where, in the words of an observer, “The AUC, and 

not the Colombian Armed Forces, is the main reason the ELN is on the 

ropes militarily.” During this fighting, over 180 civilians died and about 

4,000 departed the area.91 A farmer simply explained, “The army comes, 

the army goes. The [armed] groups remain to tell us what to do.”92 This 

absence of government—a defining attribute of the war—created the void 

in which armed irregular groups operated.

Despite increases in the number of professionals, in training 

improvements, and in combat operations, the Colombian Army end 

strength remained too small to counter the growing guerrilla threat, much 

less defeat it. Fifty times the size of El Salvador, Colombia had an Army 

roughly twice the size of that in El Salvador during its civil war. Minister 

of Defense Gustavo Bell, the vice president and government human rights 

advocate who replaced Ramirez in May, noted that military operations 

had retaken some critical mobility corridors. However, commanders 

acknowledged their inability to establish a permanent government 

presence meant that the guerrillas returned after they withdrew from an 

area. This increased the likelihood that the security forces would, in the 

words of a villager, “see the whole population as guerrillas.” Because 

negotiations remained the government priority, the MOD received about 

7.5 percent of the budget—below its 1990 level—but funding rose from 

$1.5 billion in 1995 to over $1.9 billion in 2001.93 Generating additional 

combat power through helicopter mobility proved difficult because of 

inadequate numbers, counter­drug restrictions, and five separate helicopter 

fleets listed in decreasing size—CNP, JTF-S, Air Force, Army, and 

Navy.94 To strengthen the military forces, in August President Pastrana 

signed the MOD-recommended National Defense and Security Law—the 

first substantial reform to the national security law since 1965. In areas 

declared by the President to be “theaters of operations,” the military could 

establish martial law and replace civilian rule. The military received the 

authority to arrest and investigate if the fiscalia—criminal investigators—

were not available. The automatic release of prisoners not delivered to the 

fiscalia after 36 hours no longer applied, but delays in processing required 

justification. The law, modified by the legislative process, reduced the time 

allowed for the military to investigate human rights violations from 12 to 2 

months.95 Without major political changes, the military forces continued to 

be bound by their legal and resource-constrained straightjacket.
76

At the beginning of the George W. Bush administration, US policy 

toward Colombia remained basically unchanged. Counterdrug and human 

rights drove the relationship. The administration changed the limits on 

DOD Plan Colombia personnel from 500 DOD personnel and 300 US 

contractors to 400 each—a total of 800.96 In September, the DOS had designated the AUC a foreign terrorist organization as United States pressure for action against the autodefensas continued. Human Rights Watch 

reported that all CNP, DIRAN, Air Force, and Navy units had been vetted 

for US aid compared to only 11 Army units—all related to JTF-S, SF, 

or the aviation brigade.97 What many viewed as the Army’s inability to 

meet human rights standards in fact reflected an Army efforts to minimize 

its interface with the US counterdrug effort. Simply put, why vet units 

that received no US assistance? During this period, human rights training continued to receive Army emphasis. Many Colombians had come to 

view the “human rights cartel”—as they called it—as just another guerrilla 

weapon for attacking COLMIL leaders.98 By year end, the counterdrug 

program appeared to get underway. The CNP, supported by JTF-S, began 

phase 1 of the counterdrug program almost 2 years later than planned. 

Aerial spraying in Putumayo almost doubled all spraying in Colombia in 

2000. JTF-S supported these eradication missions and conducted over 200 

operations against drug labs and infrastructure. Other than the Air Bridge 

Denial Program, which had been suspended after the shoot down of a missionary airplane in Peru in April, counterdrug programs grew. The DIRAN 

increased its airmobile interdiction units—its elite Junglas—from one to 

three companies, the Colombian Army began talks about a second counterdrug brigade, and Navy riverine forces reorganized with a 5-year goal 

of 25,000 personnel in two brigades.99 After years of effort and innumerous delays, the counter­drug program in the south had begun.

Collapse of the Peace Process: 2002

By the beginning of 2002, the years of peace efforts had run their 

course. Pastrana, unable to force a settlement on the guerrillas, had lost 

support for negotiations; the guerrillas had missed an opportunity for a 

settlement but had used the time to improve their capacity to continue the 

military struggle; and the zona de despeje had come close to disestablishment in late 2001. On 10 January, President Pastrana announced the end 

of peace talks and gave the FARC 48 hours to evacuate the zona. He failed 

to indicate when the time limit began or what he intended to do if they did 

not evacuate. Immediately, the COLMIL increased its readiness and began 

to move forces toward the zona, in the words of a military official, “to be 

ready for whatever decision the President makes, whether he says go back 
77

home or go in.”100 The COLMIL concentrated almost 13,000 personnel, to 

include non-BRCNA units from JTF-S.101 By this time, full-time guerrilla 

strength had grown to almost 22,000 with a presence in over 90 percent 

of the 1,097 municipalities. The two largest groups—the FARC and the 

ELN—fielded over 17,000 and over 4,000 respectively. Along with the 

guerrillas in 2001, the AUC had grown almost 25 percent to 10,500.102

Despite these increases, the COLMIL end strength had remained basically 

static, even with the reforms and an Army reorganization that incorporated 

the units raised in 2001—four divisional BRIMs, additional divisional 

counterguerrilla battalions, a mountain battalion, eight infrastructure 

security or PEEV battalions, and the BRCNA.103 As Pastrana considered 

his next action, FARC and ELN attacks on civilians and infrastructure 

increased throughout the country. To meet these multiple threats, the 

COLMIL commander called his division and brigade commanders together 

in early February for the second time in weeks to review operations to 

counter narco­terrorists—a term increasingly used after 11 September 2001 

for guerrillas and autodefensas—operations countrywide.104 The hijacking 

of an airplane and taking hostage of a prominent senator proved the final 

straw. That night, in a nationwide address, Pastrana ordered the reoccupation of the zona. Referring to the FARC as terrorists for the first time in his 

presidency, he warned, “Hard times are coming, without a doubt.”105

At midnight on 20 February, the Colombian Air Force, acting on its 

technical intelligence confirmed by human intelligence, bombed FARC 

camps and airstrips to begin Operation THANATOS—what would 

become more than a 3-month operation in the former zona de despeje. The 

task of reoccupying an area the size of Switzerland with 13,000 military 

personnel fell to Major General Gabriel E. Contreras. Air Force aircraft 

and Navy riverine units supported the Army units involved—brigades 

from the Fourth Division, four counterguerrilla battalions, and the Army 

reaction forces—the FUDRA and the SF Brigade. Anticipating the 

attack, the FARC had dispersed into the countryside and offered minimal 

resistance in the former zona. On short notice, the Army executed its plan 

without major difficulties. Conducting over 300 military operations in the 

first month to reoccupy the former zona—in addition to counterguerrilla 

operations elsewhere—drained COLMIL funding and exhausted the Air 

Force’s stockpile of 500-pound bombs.106 Not only were funds stretched, 

General Tapias warned, “It is important that everyone understand that we 

do not have troops available or reserves to confront emergencies” and the 

public “cannot expect . . . total control of areas larger than El Salvador . . . 

when . . . the FARC has been present in [some parts] . . . for more than 30 

years.”107 Years of government failure to anticipate—and thus prepare to 
78

combat the guerrillas—would have to be made up by continued COLMIL 

adaptation.

As guerrilla attacks—now small-unit hit-and-run affairs, car bombings, 

terrorist incidents, and kidnappings—increased countrywide after the 

closure of the zona, Pastrana took several actions. First, he established a 

“theater of operations”—the former zona and areas to its north just south 

of Bogotá that included 19 municipalities in six departments—to prevent 

guerrilla attacks on infrastructure supporting Bogotá similar to attacks that 

left over 60 urban areas without electricity, water, or phone services or 

isolated by guerrilla roadblocks or damaged bridges. In this designated 

region, the military could establish curfews, create roadblocks, register 

civilians, and set business hours. If disputes arose, the mayors could 

appeal to Pastrana for a decision.108 Second, Pastrana publicized FARC 

narcotrafficking activities. Satellite and aerial photography indicated and 

the CNP confirmed after reoccupation of the zona that coca cultivation 

there had increased 2.5 times and poppy cultivation had started. In 2002, 

12 percent of the illegal narcotics cultivation in Colombia existed inside the 

former zona—the result of FARC drug ties, exemption from counterdrug 

operations, and CNP eradication efforts in Putumayo, which pushed 

growers into other parts of the country.109 Third, Pastrana strengthened 

the COLMIL by providing $110 million for continued military operations 

and by increasing the Colombian Army by 10,000 regulars a year for 3 

consecutive years.110 Fourth, with the collapse of the peace process, Pastrana 

appealed to the United States for increased military assistance beginning 

with improved intelligence sharing, a request approved almost immediately, 

and the lifting of the legislative-mandated counterdrug restrictions on the 

BRCNA. At the time, a former MOD official warned, “Intelligence is only 

as good as your ability to act on it. What the Americans will do is not the 

key to success here. There are many other things that need to be done first. 

It’s going to cost a lot of money and it’s going to cost a lot of lives.” US 

estimates suggested the need for doubling the Colombian Army strength 

just to slow the guerrilla growth. Tapias believed he needed a quadrupling 

of the Army to “restore . . . normalcy”—to secure all the major towns, to 

control the roads, and to eradicate 50,000 acres of coca that assisted in 

financing FARC.111 The collapse of the peace process, the reoccupation of 

the zona de despeje, and the appeal for American assistance occurred at 

a time when US policy on counterdrugs in Colombia had begun to shift 

toward counterterrorism.

Before the collapse of the peace process in mid-February, the Bush 

administration had expressed concern about Colombian infrastructure 
79

security—specifically the protection of the Cano Limon-Covenas oil 

pipeline in the northeast. Then on 21 March, responding to the Colombian 

appeal for assistance, the administration requested a counterterrorism 

supplemental bill, which included “new authorities” that permitted 

the United States “to address the problem of terrorism in Colombia as 

vigorously as [it] currently address[ed] narcotics” and to assist Colombia 

to “address the heightened terrorist risk that has resulted” with the closure 

of the zona de despeje. Accepting linkage between the narcotraffickers and 

terrorists in Colombia, the bill sought to remove the counterdrug restrictions 

in the fight against narcoterrorists by permitting the units trained with and 

the equipment provided by the $1.7 billion US counterdrug assistance 

since July 2000 to be used to attack the narcoterrorists, which were USdesignated foreign terrorist organizations (FTO): FARC, ELN, and AUC. 

The DOS human rights vetting requirements to qualify for US assistance 

and the DOD 800-personnel cap remained unchanged. The $35 million 

counterterrorism legislation, signed into law in late summer, included 

$25 million in Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related 

Programs (NADR) for CNP and COLMIL equipment and antikidnapping 

training; $6 million in foreign military financing (FMF) to begin training 

for a Colombian Army infrastructure security brigade for the Cano 

Limon-Covenas pipeline—the first substantial noncounterdrug funding 

for the COLMIL; and $4 million in International Narcotics Control Law 

Enforcement (INCLE) funding for CNP programs to reestablish a presence 

in abandoned municipalities. (See Table 3, US assistance to Colombia, 

1999–2002, for funding during the Pastrana presidency that includes the 

supplemental funding for Plan Colombia and fiscal year 2002 in bold 

italics.) This proposed legislation “to mount an effective campaign against 

terror” rather than counterdrugs marked a major shift in US policy toward 

Colombia.112

Having replaced General Pace on 1 October 2001 as acting 

USSOUTHCOM commander, Major General Gary Speer provided the 

annual update to Congress on 5 March. In Colombia, he noted the closure of 

the zona and highlighted the fact that the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline 

had not been operational for over 266 days in 2001—almost 9 months—

at a cost of $40 million per month. He noted a “steady improvement in 

the professionalism and respect for human rights” by the COLMIL and 

increased counterdrug operations. Speer addressed legal assistance projects 

to develop a Judge Advocate General (JAG) school and to improve human 

rights and added that “in a short period of time” the COLMIL had “emerged 

as one of the most respected and trusted organizations” in Colombia with 
80

less than 3 percent of the human rights complaints—compared to 60 percent 

a few years before—against the security forces. He called the counterdrug 

brigade “the best trained unit” in the Colombian Army, noted delivery of 

the “Plan Colombia” UH-60 package, and projected the final delivery of 

the 30 UH-II package in August—almost 14 months after activation of the 

3-battalion counterdrug brigade. The counterdrug brigade success had led 

to support for a Colombian request to create a second counterdrug brigade 

in fiscal year 2003. Major engineer projects continued to develop a support 

infrastructure for riverine, counterdrug brigade, and aviation units. Speer 

stressed the importance of military education programs such as those 

offered at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 

(WHINSEC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. He concluded with his scarcity of 

resources—although the USSOUTHCOM FMF program had increased to 

$8.7 million, it remained less than 0.1 percent of the worldwide program.114

Colombia remained just one—although an important one—of the many 

USSOUTHCOM programs that now included detainee operations at 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

For the remainder of his presidency, Pastrana struggled against an 

increasingly critical situation. A multiday fight in May at Bellavista in 

northwest Colombia between 1,400 heavily-armed, well-financed, and 

unconstrained autodefensas and FARC guerrillas to control a critical 

smuggling corridor caused heavy casualties, “the largest single massacre 

of civilians recorded,” after a FARC propane gas cylinder bomb hit the 

church killing 117 civilians—about one-third children. Despite warnings, 

Dollars in millions

FY

1999

FY 2000/

Plan Colombia

Supplemental

FY

2001

FY 2002/

Supplemental TOTAL

Economic—USAID 13 4 4 21

Developmental Aid 3 3

Economic Support Funds 4 4 8

Disaster Assistance 10 10

Counternarcotics 287.2 954.2 259.9 518.5 2,019.8

DOS International Narcotics Control 205.9 50 / 768.5* 48 380.5 / 4 1,456.9

DOS Air Wing 30 31.3 / *in above 35 41.8 138.1

DOD Sec 1004: Nonlethal CD/Police 35.9 90.6 150 83.2 359.7

DOD Overlapping Sections 1004/124 6.6 4.6 5 16.2

DOD Sec 1033: Nonlethal Riverine 13.6 7.2 22.3 4 47.1

Administration of Justice 1.8 1.8

Antiterrorism—NADR /25 25

Military .9 .9 1 7.2 10

IMET .9 .9 1 1.2 4

FMF Grants / 6 6

Drawdowns 72.6 72.6

DOD Sec 506: Nonlethal Excess 58.1 58.1

Other US Departments Sec 506 14.5 14.5

TOTAL 373.7 190.6 / 768.5 264.9 515.7 / 35 2,148.4

Table 3. US assistance to Colombia, 1999–2002113
81

many of which often proved false, this isolated town received no assistance from the thinly stretched security forces.115 Throughout the country, 

the demand for security forces continued to exceed the supply. In early 

May, Pastrana tried another peace initiative, “The Road towards Peace 

and the Counterterrorism Strategy,” that foundered on the heavy fighting 

between the guerrillas and the autodefensas in areas of the country; on the 

decision of the European Union not to designate the FARC or the ELN as 

terrorist organizations while designating the AUC as one; and on a bleak 

DOS assessment of the political and military circumstances. Military officers reacted to a suggestion to create a joint command by calling it a threat 

to “what is functioning by constitutional mandate.”116 Despite his continued efforts, Pastrana could not accomplish in his last 3 months what he had 

failed to accomplish in the previous 4 years.

In a 29 June speech to the nation, Pastrana called for national unity in 

resisting the terrorists who—in his words—had failed to defeat the Army, 

failed to paralyze the country through attacks on infrastructure, and failed 

to disrupt the legislative and Presidential elections. Declaring to have 

strengthened the security forces “like never before in history” by referring to his recent increase in MOD funding and the addition of 10,000 

personnel, he noted the FARC had changed to terrorist attacks because of 

its inability to defeat the Colombian Army. In an effort to attack the FARC 

leadership, Pastrana announced two programs: first, a rewards program for 

information leading to the capture of FARC leaders—$2 million for members of the Secretariat and $1 million for bloc commanders; and second, 

the creation of a “special unit” in the military, in the police, and in the DAS 

“tasked with finding and capturing the members of the FARC Secretariat.” 

In meeting the current situation, Pastrana and his advisors rejected calls 

for “a state of internal commotion” as inappropriate, but warned the media 

not to become “a mouthpiece for the terrorists’ threats.”117

At the 20 July Independence Day military parade, Pastrana reviewed 

the improvements in security made during his administration—what he 

called an “unprecedented strengthening of the Armed Forces.” To support 

this claim, he noted the 75 percent increase in fighting soldiers—from 

75,000 to almost 140,000; the 150 percent increase in professionals—

from 22,000 to over 55,000; the Strength Plan which permitted a 10,000 

increase in soldiers each year through 2004; the 400 percent increase in 

UH-60 gunships—from 4 to 16; the increase in transport helicopters from 

75 to 176; and the creation of new units—the FUDRA, four BRIMs, the 

BRCNA, 24 riverine combat elements, and the JIC. He referred to the 

improvements in respect for human rights and to the legislative reforms 
82

that defined professional careers, health and welfare benefits, promotions, 

and the military justice system. The CNP improved in similar ways—

increased manpower, new programs, and reactivations of rural police 

stations. Pastrana mentioned pending US legislation that would remove 

counterdrug restrictions and provide additional funds as a way “to collect 

resources and tools for our Armed Forces.” He concluded by thanking 

General Tapias, his Ministers of Defense—Ramirez for modernization and 

strengthening and Bell for human rights improvements, the COLMIL and 

CNP commanders, and the members of the Armed Forces for their work.118

In fact, most of the security force improvements during the Pastrana 

administration had been COLMIL and MOD initiatives. From before the 

establishment of the zona de despeje to Plan Colombia to the collapse of 

negotiations, Pastrana had focused on the pursuit of peace through talks, 

not through military strength. As a result, the illegal armed groups—

particularly the FARC and the AUC—had increased to record numbers.

Before the end of negotiations in February, peace candidates had 

dominated the field for the national elections—legislative on 11 March 

and Presidential on 26 May. Liberal Party leader Horacio Serpa had 

dominated the 11-person Presidential field for almost a year. With the 

collapse of the peace process, the Colombian people rejected “peace” 

candidates. Serpa slipped from leading the polls in January to less than 30 

percent support by the end of February. That month, the FARC kidnapped 

one of the Presidential candidates—Ingrid Betancourt. Another candidate 

running as an independent, Alvaro Uribe—a hard-line, former governor 

of Colombia’s most populous department, Antioquia—had almost singlehandedly called for taking the fight to the guerrillas through firmer action, 

law and order, a larger military, and arming the population. Attracting 

little support in 2001, by January 2002 his message had garnered him a 

39 percent approval rate. Although the FARC and ELN had attempted to 

disrupt both elections—to include three assassination attempts on Uribe—

over 11 million Colombians turned out on 26 May to give Uribe an unheard 

of first-round victory with 53 percent of the vote.119 On becoming President 

in August, Uribe would face a severe security situation caused in large part 

by the failure of the Pastrana peace effort. On the other hand, without that 

failure and the rejection of negotiations by the Colombian people, Uribe 

would not have been elected.
83

Notes

1. Diana J. Schemo, “Colombia Installs New President Who Plans to Talk 

to Rebels,” New York Times, 8 August 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?i

ndex=4&did=32695228&SrchMode=2&sid=19&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType

=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1236966804&clientId=5904 (accessed 

5 November 2008).

2. “Commander Defends Colombian Armed Forces in Interview,” BBC 

Monitoring Americas—Political, 10 November 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pq

dweb?index=0&did=1159878151&SrchMode=2&sid=21&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1236966958&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

3. Douglas Farah, “US to Aid Colombian Military: Drug-Dealing Rebels 

Take Toll on Army,” Washington Post, 27 December 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=5&did=37803016&SrchMode=2&sid=22&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1236967126&clientId=5904 

(accessed 5 November 2008).

4. Schemo, “Colombia Installs New President Who Plans to Talk to 

Rebels.”

5. Frank Bajak, “Colombia’s New President Purges Military Leadership,” 

San Antonio Express–News, 10 August 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?i

ndex=7&did=1206820531&SrchMode=2&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTyp

e=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242063078&clientId=5904 (accessed 

11 May 2009).

6. “Colombian Army Says 40 Killed in Clash With Rebels,” Washington 

Post, 17 August 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=3316573

2&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&V

Name=PQD&TS=1242064952&clientId=5904 (accessed 11 May 2009); Notes 

from discussion with Colombian officer present at this fight.

7. Notes from discussions with senior Colombian Military officers.

8. Paul E. Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—

People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” 

(Monterey: CA: Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, December 2005), 75–78.

9. Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: Conditions and US Policy Options,” 

Congressional Research Service Report, updated 12 February 2001 (Washington, 

DC: Library of Congress), 18; Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani, and Philip McLean, 

Back from the Brink: Evaluating Colombia, 1999–2007 (Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007), 8; Myles R.R. Frechette, 

Colombia and the United States—The Partnership: But What is the Endgame? 

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2007), 12–13.

10. “Colombian Soldiers Re-enter Disputed City/Rebels’ Attack Raise 

Doubts About Peace Bid,” Houston Chronicle, 5 November 1998, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=8&did=35718239&SrchMode=2&sid=1&F

mt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242141

204&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 May 2009); Jared Kotler, “At Least 70 Dead 
84

in Colombia Rebel Attack: Assault on the Police Station was Waged Even as 

Peace Talks Approach,” Fresno Bee, 3 November 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=2&did=35684454&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242147398&clientId=5904 

(accessed 11 May 2009); David Spencer, “Latin America, FARC’s Innovative 

Artillery,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 December 1999, http://search.janes.

com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir99/

jir00594.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=david%20spencer&b

ackPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JIR& (accessed 4 March 

2009); Notes from discussions with senior Colombian Military officials; Brigadier 

General Freddy Padilla commanded the 7th Brigade at Mitú.

11. US Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report for 1998,” Colombia Section (Washington, DC: US DOS, February 1999), 

http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/samer98.

html (accessed 1 October 2008).

12. “Colombia: Commander Accepts Responsibility for Errors, Army’s 

Reorganization,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 15 November 1998, 

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=35964886&SrchMode=2&sid=

2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242

143016&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 2008).

13. “Colombia: Commander Accepts Responsibility for Errors, Army’s 

Reorganization.”

14. US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices for 1998,” 26 February 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_

rights/1998_hrp_report/colombia.html (accessed 22 October 2008).

15. Frank Bajak, “US Trains Colombian Military to Resist Rebels,” Austin 

American Statesman, 6 December 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?inde

x=0&did=36560244&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=P

QD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242153130&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 

November 2008).

16. Farah, “US to Aid Colombian Military; Drug-Dealing Rebels Take Toll 

on Army.”

17. Quoted in Douglas Farah, “Colombian Army Fighting Legacy of 

Abuses,” Washington Post, 18 February 1999, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb

?index=2&did=39087527&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTyp

e=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242237748&clientId=590 (accessed 

5 November 2008).

18. Alfred Rangel Suarez, Fuerzas Militares para la guerra: La agenda 

pendiente de la reforma militar (Bogotá: Ensayos de Seguridad Y Democracia, 

November 2003), 43–69; Notes from discussions with senior Colombian Military 

officials.

19. Patricia Bibes, “Colombia: The Military and the Narco-Conflict,” Low 

Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (Spring 2000): 39–44.

20. Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: US Assistance and Current Legislation,” 

Congressional Research Service Report, updated 15 May 2001, 19.
85

21. Charles E. Wilhelm, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee,” 13 March 1999, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/

1999/990413cw.pdf (accessed 1 October 2008).

22. Dean A. Cook, “U.S. Southern Command: General Charles E. Wilhelm 

and the Shaping of U.S. Military Engagement in Colombia, 1997–2000,” in 

America’s Viceroys: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Derek S. Reveron 

(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 148–149.

23. Notes from discussion with American civilian and military officials; 

Jimmy Burns and Adam Thomson, “Shades of Vietnam in Anti-drugs Fights: 

US Army Officers are Joining Colombia’s Action Against Narcotics—But 

It Will Involve Them in Conflict with Rebel Groups Too,” Financial Times, 

26 October 1999, http://lumen.cgsccarl.com/login?url=http://proquest.umi/com/

pqdweb?did= 45794559&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=P

QD (accessed 5 November 2009).

24. Thomas A. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency 

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2002) 24; Serge F. 

Kovaleski, “Colombian Army Drill: Respect for Rights: Training Course Tests 

Empathy, Discipline,” Washington Post, 29 August 1999, http://proquest.umi.com/ 

pqdweb?index=9&did=44275664&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242403982&clientId=5904 

(accessed 5 November 2008).

25. “Colombia’s Defense Minister Quits Over Concession to Rebels,” New 

York Times, 27 May 1999, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=13&did=4191

2447&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&

VName=PQD&TS=1242327099&clientId=5904 (accessed 14 May 2009); “The 

Warning from Colombia’s Generals,” Washington Times, 30 May 1999, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=9&did=41983631&SrchMode=2&sid=3&F

mt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242327

099&clientId=5904 (accessed 14 May 2009).

26. Cynthia Watson, “Civil Military Relations in Colombia: Solving or 

Delaying Problems?” Journal of Political and Military Sociology (Summer 2005): 

102.

27. Quoted in Larry Rohter, “As Colombia Declares an Alert, Rebel 

Offensive Rages On,” New York Times, 12 July 1999, http://proquest.umi.

com/pqdweb?index=3&did=43068777&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst= 

PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242335255&clientId

=5904 (accessed 14 May 2009); Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC 

Insurgency, 11.

28. US Department of State, “Colombia: Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices—1999” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 23 February 2000), http://www.

state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/380.htm (accessed 22 October 2008).

29. Human Rights Watch, The Ties That Bind: Colombia and MilitaryParamilitary Links (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1 February 2000), 

http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2000/02/01/ties-bind?print (accessed 23 January 

2009).
86

30. Kovaleski, “Colombian Army Drill: Respect for Rights.”

31. US Department of State, “Colombia: Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices—1999.”

32. Juanita Darling and Ruth Morris, “Crash Points to Military Role of 

US in Colombia,” Los Angeles Times, 28 July 1999, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=17&did=43516995&SrchMode=2&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242413974&clientId=5904 

(accessed 5 November 2008).

33. “Colombia: River Brigade Forces Begin Operations on 4th August,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 1 August 1999, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?did=43586599&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=P

QD (accessed 5 November 2008); Ricardo A. Flores, “Improving the US Navy 

Riverine Capability: Lessons from the Colombian Experience” (Monterey, CA: 

Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, December 2007).

34. Larry Rohter, “With US Training, Colombia Melds War on Rebels 

and Drugs,” New York Times, 29 July 1999, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?i

ndex=6&did=43483369&SrchMode=2&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType

=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242413974&clientId=5904 (accessed 

5 November 2008).

35. Sibylla Brodzinsky, “Colombia Turns down Dilapidated US Trucks: 

Repairs Too Costly Despite ‘Donation,’” Washington Times, 2 December 1999, 

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=46807467&SrchMode=2&sid=

1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242

421733&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 1999).

36. Notes from discussion with senior Colombian Military officer.

37. “Colombia: President Pastrana’s Handling of Military Crisis 

Assessed,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 14 December 1999, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&did=47218556&SrchMode=2&sid=1&F

mt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242419

601&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 2008).

38. DeShazo, Primiani, and McLean, Back from the Brink, 9.

39. Serafino, “Colombia: Conditions and US Policy Options,” 21–22.

40. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 11.

41. Colombian Army, “Disposicion Numero 000010 Por medio de la cual 

se reorganiza el Ejercito Nacional,” 23 November 1999. Document signed by 

Colombian Army Commanding General Jorge Enrique Mora. This document 

reorganized the Army in accordance with Article 23 of Law 1932 of 1999.

42. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 13.

43. Cook, “General Charles E. Wilhelm and the Shaping of U.S. Military 

Engagement in Colombia,” in Reveron, America’s Viceroys, 149–152; Darren D. 

Sprunk, “Transformation in the Developing World: An Analysis of Colombia’s 

Security Transformation” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, 

September 2004), 41; Notes from discussions with Colombian and American 

civilian and military officials.

44. Serafino, “Colombia: Conditions and US Policy Options,” 22–23.
87

45. Republic of Colombia, “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, 

and the Strengthening of the State,” October 1999, http://www/ciponline.org/

colombia/plancolombia.htm (accessed 4 August 2008); a later version updated for 

the US audience added “and to protect and promote human rights and international 

humanitarian law” at the end of the military strategy section and the peace process 

section to earlier in the document, see “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, 

and the Strengthening of the State,” US Institute of Peace, posted 15 May 2000, 

http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plan_colombia_101999.html 

(accessed 18 May 2009).

46. Serafino, “Colombia: Conditions and US Policy Options,” 18.

47. Republic of Colombia, “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and 

the Strengthening of the State.” A later version updated for the US audience did 

not list the specific priorities for security forces in a roles and missions section. 

See US Institute of Peace version.

48. Republic of Colombia, “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and 

the Strengthening of the State.”

49. I use “Plan Colombia” to represent the US counterdrug package that 

served as the US component of Colombia’s broader Plan Colombia. For a review 

of this process, see Serafino, “Colombia: US Assistance and Current Legislation.” 

With the passage of “Plan Colombia” funding, Colombia moved from a distant 

third-largest recipient of US aid to a close third behind Israel and Egypt.

50. Brian E. Sheridan, “Statement before House Armed Services 

Committee,” 23 March 2000, http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/testimony/

106thcongress/00-03-23sheridan.htm (accessed 15 October 2008).

51. Charles E. Wilhelm, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee,” 7 March 2000, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/

2000/000307cw.pdf (accessed 1 October 2008).

52. David Passage, The United States and Colombia: Untying the Gordian 

Knot (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2000), 7–11, 27, 

29.

53. Passage, The United States and Colombia: Untying the Gordian Knot,

13–19.

54. Tod Robberson, “Colombia Plans Offensive,” Salt Lake Tribune, 

4 December 1999, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did=46862077&

SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VNam

e=PQD&TS=1242675227&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 2008); Notes 

from discussions with American military officials.

55. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 13–15; Notes 

from discussions with Colombian and American military officials.

56. Robert W. Jones Jr., “Special Forces in Larandia: ODA 753 and the 

CERTE,” Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 

85–90.

57. “Colombia: Further Details of FARC Attacks on Vigia del Fuerte 

and Elsewhere,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 28 March 2000, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=403&TS=1237824812&clientId=5904&D
88

BId=G5&xsq=Colombia&xFO=CITABS&xsq1=military&xFO1=CITABS

&xOP1=AND&saved=1 (accessed 19 May 2009).

58. Larry Rohter, “Massacre in Colombia Village Reverberates: Paramilitary 

Terrorism Raises Questions on US Aid for Drug War,” Pittsburg Post—Gazette, 

16 July 2000, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=56460309&Srch

Mode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=P

QD&TS=1242767033&clientId=5904 (accessed 19 May 2009).

59. US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices—2000” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 23 February 2001), http://www.

state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/741.htm (accessed 16 March 2009).

60. Notes from discussions with American military officials; “Colombia: 

Armed Forces Carry Out ‘Unprecedented’ Anti-Drug Operation in South,” BBC 

Monitoring Americas—Political, 13 July 2000, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb

?index=1&did=56418519&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTyp

e=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242830120&clientId=5904 (accessed 

4 November 2008).

61. US General Accounting Office, Drug Control: US Assistance to 

Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results (Washington, DC: GAO, October 

2000), 16.

62. Clifford Krauss, “Attacks by Colombian Rebels Appear a Response to 

US Plan,” New York Times, 20 July 2000, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?ind

ex=0&did=56669258&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=

PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242831399&clientId=5904 (accessed 

19 May 2009).

63. White House, “Report on US Policy and Strategy Regarding Counterdrug 

Assistance to Colombia and Neighboring Countries,” 26 October 2000, Center for 

International Policy’s Colombia Program, http://ciponline.org/colombia/102601.

htm (accessed 1 October 2008).

64. “Colombia: Government Dismisses 388 Officers, NCOs,” BBC 

Monitoring Americas—Political, 17 October 2000, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=1&did=62614800&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242839474&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

65. Linda Robinson and Ruth Morris, “Colombia’s Messy, Complicated 

War,” US News and World Report, 4 September 2000, http://web.ebscohost.com/

ehost/detail?vid=7&hid=104&sid=77ac7b0e-8678-4d6b-8bb2-49ddfb6f1153%4

0sessionmgr109&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN

=3483857 (accessed 20 May 2009).

66. White House, “Report on US Policy and Strategy Regarding Counterdrug 

Assistance to Colombia.”

67. Brian E. Sheridan, “Statement before House Committee on International 

Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,” 21 September 2000.

68. GAO, Drug Control: US Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to 

Produce Results, 19–22, 26.
89

69. US General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Challenges in 

Implementing Plan Colombia (Washington, DC: GAO, 12 October 2000), 4–8.

70. GAO, Drug Control: Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia, 10–

12; GAO, Drug Control: US Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce 

Results, 22–25. For more on helicopter deliveries, see Serafino, “Colombia: 

US Assistance and Current Legislation,” 21. Serafino provided the following 

counterdrug brigade helicopter deliveries: 33 UH-1N—18 in October 2000 and 

15 on 2 February 2001; 14 UH-60—3 in July 2001 and remainder by end of 2001; 

and 30 UH-II—3 scheduled in December 2001 and remainder by May 2002; 

Notes from discussions with American military officials. The captain became a 

member of the escort team for US visitors to the counterdrug battalions and the 

Colombian Army commander would refer to him in their presence as his very best 

captain who had not been good enough for the Americans.

71. Juan Forero, “Colombia Says Rebels Have Killed 56 Troops,” New 

York Times, 21 October 2000, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=39&did=

62797057&SrchMode=1&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT

=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242938270&clientId=5904 (accessed 5 November 

2008); Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 16–17; Angel 

Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and 

Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 

2001), 44–45.

72. Juan Forero, “Colombian Army Goes High Up to Fight Rebels,” New 

York Times, 19 December 2000, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did

=65287103&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT

=309&VName=PQD&TS=1242942108&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 

2008); Colombian Army, Colombian Army Military History (Bogotá: E3 Section, 

Army Historical Studies Center, 2007) 342.

73. Mario Montoya, “Ejercito Nacional: Informacion del Comandante,” Montoya, “Ejercito Nacional: Informacion del Comandante,” 

Briefing, May 2006.

74. Brian M. Jenkins, “Colombia: Crossing a Dangerous Threshold,” The 

National Interest (Winter 2000/2001): 48, 51–52, 54–55.

75. “Colombia: New Commanders of Divisions Attend Military ‘Summit,’” 

BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 18 January 2001, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=2&did=66907118&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243026063&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

76. “Colombia: Military ‘Summit’ Analyses Tasks; Four Mobile Brigades 

Being Set Up,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 27 January 2001, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=67351439&SrchMode= 2&sid=2&Fm

t=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124302727

1&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

77. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 15–21; 

Thomas A. Marks, “Colombian Army Counterinsurgency,” Crime, Law & Social 

Change (July 2003): 100.
90

78. Jorge Enrique Mora, Guia de Planeamiento Estrategico, 2001. Fuerzas 

Militares de Colombia Ejercito Nacional, 2001.

79. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 31–32.

80. Marks, “Colombian Army Counterinsurgency,” 99.

81. US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices—2000” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 23 February 2001), http://www.

state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/741.htm (accessed 16 March 2009); Peter 

Pace, “Statement before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee,” 

4 April 2001, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2001/011025pace.

pdf (accessed 8 March 2009); Serafino, “Colombia: US Assistance and Current 

Legislation,” 21.

82. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 25.

83. Paul de la Garza and David Adams, “Military Aid . . . From the Public 

Sector,” St. Petersburg Times, 3 December 2000, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb

?index=3&did=64917780&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTyp

e=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243349412&clientId=5904 (accessed 

4 March 2009).

84. David Adams and Paul de la Garza, “Contract’s End Hints of 

Colombia Trouble,” St. Petersburg Times, 13 May 2001, http://www.sptimes.

com/News/051301/news_pf/Worldandnation/Contract_s_end_hints_.shtml 

(accessed 4 March 2009); Jason Vauters and Michael L.R. Smith. “A Question 

of Escalation—From Counternarcotics to Counterterrorism: Analyzing US 

Strategy in Colombia,” Small Wars and Insurgencies (June 2006): 181; Notes 

from discussions with Colombian and American military officials.

85. Stephen Johnson, “Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug 

Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 

No. 1435, 26 April 2001, 8, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/

bg1887.cfm (accessed 15 September 2008).

86. Juan Forero, “Rebel Force in Colombia Repatriates 242 More P.O.W.’s,” 

New York Times, 29 June 2001, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=

74837004&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT

=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243371882&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 

2008).

87. US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices—2001” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 4 March 2002), http://www.state.

gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8326.htm (accessed 16 March 2009).

88. Max G. Manwaring, Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State 

and to the Hemisphere (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 

2002), 6; Human Rights Watch, The “Sixth Division”: Military-paramilitary Ties 

and US Policy in Colombia (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, September 

2001), http://www.colombianatverket.se/files/thesixthdivision_hrw.pdf (accessed 

8 March 2009).

89. Scott Wilson, “Colombian General Convicted in Killings; Collaboration 

with Paramilitaries Seen,” Washington Post, 14 February 2001, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?index=12&did=68578862&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=
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3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124336

4549&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

90. Scott Wilson, “Colombia’s Other Army; Growing Paramilitary 

Force Wields Power With Brutality,” Washington Post, 12 March 2001, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=6&did=69550386&SrchMode=2&sid=2&F

mt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243365

516&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

91. US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices—2001” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 4 March 2002), http://www.state.

gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8326.htm (accessed 16 March 2009); Michael Radu, 

“E-Notes Colombia: A Trip Report,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1 June 

2001, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20010601.radu.colombiatrip.html (accessed 

6 August 2008).

92. Scott Wilson, “War With an Absent Army; In Contested Region, 

Colombian Government Finds Some Towns Too Dangerous to Protect,” 

Washington Post, 3 August 2001, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&di

d=76989264&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQ

T=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243367018&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 

2008).

93. Juan Forero, “Colombia’s Army Rebuilds and Challenges Rebels,” New 

York Times, 2 September 2001, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=

79411237&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT

=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243439417&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 

2008).

94. John A. Cope, “Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy” (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic 

Forum 194 (October 2002)), 5.

95. US DOS, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights Practices—

2001”; Scott Wilson, “Colombia Increases Military’s Powers; Law Could 

Threaten US Aid Disbursement,” Washington Post, 17 August 2001, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=15&did=77942545&SrchMode=2&sid=1&

Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124344

5918&clientId=5904 (accessed 27 May 2009).

96. K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino. “Andean Regional Initiative 

(ARI): FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors,” Congressional Research 

Service Report, updated 21 December 2001, 13.

97. Human Rights Watch, The “Sixth Division”: Military-paramilitary Ties 

and US Policy in Colombia, 96.

98. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 26.

99. US Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report for 2001,” Colombia Section (Washington, DC: US DOS, 1 March 2002), 

http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/8477.htm (accessed 1 October 

2008).

100. Juan Forero, “Colombian Troops Move on Rebel Zone as Talks Fail,” 

New York Times, 11 January 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&d
92

id=99067316&SrchMode=2&sid=6&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQ

T=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243525371&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 

2008).

101. “Colombia: Army Commander Says 13,000 Troops Advancing Toward 

Demilitarized Zone,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 14 January 2002, 

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=99540960&SrchMode=2&sid=

1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243

527326&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

102. Montoya, “Ejercito Nacional: Informacion del Comandante,” Briefing; 

US DOS, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2001.”

103. Colombian Army, “Disposicion Numero 000002 Por medio de la 

cual se reorganiza el Ejercito Nacional,” 4 February 2002. Document signed by 

Colombian Army Commanding General Jorge Enrique Mora. This document 

reorganized the Army in accordance with Article 29 of Law 1512 of 2000.

104. “Colombian Military Hold Emergency Meeting to Debate 

Counterterrorism Strategy,” BBB Monitoring Americas—Political, 13 February 

2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=107302002&SrchMode= 

2&sid=5&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&T

S=1243525103&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

105. Scott Wilson, “Colombian Army Ordered Into Haven As Rebel Talks 

End,” Washington Post, 21 February 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?in

dex=5&did=109434508&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType

=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243529560&clientId=5904 (accessed 

4 November 2008).

106. Notes from discussions with senior Colombian Military officials; for air 

operations, see “Colombian Air Force Chief: “Several Guerrilla Leaders Targeted,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 4 March 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=1&did=110023051&SrchMode=2&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243540735&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008); for units, see Colombian Army, Colombian Army 

Military History, 346–350, which refers to the operation as Operation Tierra 

de Honor (TH); Scott Wilson, “Colombians Ill-Prepared for Prolonged War on 

Rebels,” Washington Post, 3 March 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?ind

ex=7&did=110002917&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=

PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243536257&clientId=5904 (accessed 

4 November 2008).

107. “Colombia: Commander Says Military to Ask for More Money,” BBC 

Monitoring Americas—Political, 26 March 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqd

web?index=0&did=111527883&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD

&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243536700&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

108. Andrew Selsky, “Colombia Leader Gives His Military More Power,” 

San Antonio Express—News, 1 March 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?i

ndex=3&did=1171854151&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTyp
93

e=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243540085&clientId=5904 (accessed 

28 May 2009).

109. “Colombia: Investigations Show FARC Controlled Drug Crops, 

Trafficking in ex-DMZ,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 15 March 2002, 

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=110486053&SrchMode=2&sid=

8&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243

542032&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

110. Rodman, Peter. “Testimony before House International Relations 

Committee Subcommittee for Western Hemisphere,” 11 April 2002, http://

ciponline.org/colombia/02041104.htm (accessed 15 October 2008).

111. Wilson, “Colombians Ill-Prepared for Prolonged War on Rebels.”

112. Marc Grossman, “Testimony of Ambassador Marc Grossman, Under 

Secretary of State for Political Affairs before the House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Operations on US Assistance to Colombia and the 

Andean Region,” 10 April 2002, http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02041001.

htm (accessed 29 May 2009).

113. Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: Summary and Tables on US Assistance, 

FY1989–FY2003,” Congressional Research Service Report, 3 May 2002, 4.

114. Gary D. Speer, “Posture Statement of Major General Gary D. Speer, 

United States Army Acting Commander in Chief United States Southern Command before 107th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee,” 5 March 2002, 

http://www.ciponoline.org/colombia/02030501.htm (accessed 1 October 2008).

115. Scott Wilson, “No Sanctuary from Colombian War; Army Was Absent 

During Massacre at Village Church,” Washington Post, 9 May 2002, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did=118615149&SrchMode=2&sid=1&

Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124362

5034&clientId=5904 (accessed 28 May 2009).

116. “Colombian Military: Pastrana Counterterrorism Bid Bound to Fail,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 6 May 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=0&did=117885474&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1243626112&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

117. “Colombia’s Pastrana Beefs Up Military, Offers Reward for Rebel 

Leaders’ Arrest,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 29 June 2002, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=130362711&SrchMode=2&sid=1&

Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124369

3667&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

118. “Colombia: Pastrana Praises Armed Forces, Police for Their AntiRebel Efforts,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 22 July 2002, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=140519251&SrchMode=2&sid=1&

Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124369

7101&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

119. Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: The Uribe Administration and 

Congressional Concerns,” Congressional Research Service Report, 14 June 2002.

95

Chapter 3

“Restoring Order and Security”1

The Uribe Presidency: Democratic Security and 

Consolidation (2002–2008)

Security is not achieved simply through the efforts of the 

Armed Forces and the National Police. This is an effort 

of the entire State and all Colombians. A strong state 

structure, supported by citizen solidarity, guarantees the 

rule of law and the respect of rights and civil liberties.

President Alvaro Uribe2

. . . Congress gave us Expanded Authority to use counterdrug funds for counter-terrorism missions in Colombia 

because it concluded that there is no useful distinction 

between a narcotrafficker and his terrorist activity, hence 

the term narcoterrorist. This link between narcotics 

trafficking and terrorism in Colombia was . . . recognized 

in National Security Presidential Directive 18 (NSPD18) concerning support to Colombia. Operations today 

are more efficient and effective because our expanded 

authorities allow the same assets to be used to confront 

the common enemy found at the nexus between drugs and 

terror. Expanded Authority permits greater intelligence 

sharing and allows Colombia to use US counterdrug 

funded equipment for counterterrorism missions. 

Expanded Authority from Congress is essential to this 

command’s ability to deal with narcoterrorists.

General James T. Hill, USSOUTHCOM Commander3

On 7 August 2002, in the midst of an attempted Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia (FARC) mortar attack on the Presidential palace that 

reportedly killed and wounded over a hundred in Bogotá, 50-year old 

Alvaro Uribe became President of Colombia. Having served in numerous appointed and elected positions—including mayor of Medellín, governor of Antioquia, and a national senator for two 4-year terms—Uribe’s 

“Firm Hand, Big Heart” campaign captured his reputation as a law-andorder advocate and a social reformer. His 100-point campaign program 

included security measures—increasing the Ministry of National Defense 
96

(MOD) budget, doubling the size of the military, and creating a millionman militia to assist the security forces—as well as political, social, and 

economic proposals. Uribe had established a reputation as an honest, charismatic, and fiscally skillful politician with ties as governor to Community 

Associates of Rural Vigilance (CONVIVIR) forces.4

 He would prove to 

be a hard-working, tireless micromanager who refused to accept substandard performance.5

 Given the nationwide guerrilla attacks in early August 

and the lack of an adequate police presence in almost 50 percent of the 

municipalities—no presence in 184 and a presence “so weak as to be virtually nonexistent” in another 370—questions existed about Uribe’s ability 

to turn promises into actions as an independent without the support of a 

political party, how he would interact with his security forces, and the 

capability of the security forces to turn increased resources into improved 

performance against the ongoing, widespread guerrilla attacks.6

Uribe Takes Charge: 2002

Within days, Uribe responded to the security situation. First, he established his security team. The first female Minister of Defense, Marta Lucia 

Ramirez, led the MOD with the Army commander, General Jorge Enrique 

Mora replacing General Fernando Tapias as the Colombian Military 

(COLMIL) commander, with General Carlos A. Ospina assigned as the 

Army commander, and with Major General Teodoro Campo Gomez promoted to Colombian National Police (CNP) director. The Navy and Air 

Force commanders remained unchanged. Then, to open the roads to traffic, on 8 August in the department of Cesar, Uribe called on Colombians 

to support their security forces and launched his “one-million-member” 

Citizen Security Plan by creating an initial group of 600 unarmed volunteers equipped with radios to provide information to the security forces.7

Finally, after over 100 Colombians had been killed in 4 days, on 12 August 

Uribe declared a state of emergency that established a one-time 1.2 percent emergency tax for individuals and companies with $60,000 in assets.8

This raised $800 million in taxes to finance 6,000 Army professionals for 

two additional mobile infantry brigades (BRIMs), 10,000 additional police 

officers—primarily rural police or Carabineros, administration of the 

civilian information or informant network, and reduce the military budget 

deficit.9

 In September, Uribe used his state-of-emergency decree to establish two “Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones.” In each zone, military 

commanders controlled all security forces and could conduct searches, 

question civilians, impose curfews, and restrict travel.10 The zone in the 

northeast included parts of the departments of Arauca and Sucre. The former zona de despeje constituted the second zone.11
97

In addition to national support, additional resources, and new powers, 

Uribe brought a sense of urgency and greater civilian involvement in security matters. An experienced government administrator, Minister Ramirez 

stated in late August, “As we are in the process of defining what type of 

ministry we need we shall also have to make decisions about what kind 

of officials have the best characteristics for this ministry.”12 In late August 

after Uribe publically criticized Army officers in one department for their 

slow response to guerrilla activities, the brigade commander responded: 

“At times we do not have enough soldiers” but his forces were “working 

hard throughout the region. This situation is not new. It is many years 

old.” Ramirez characterized Uribe’s comments as not a reprimand but as 

a call for the security forces to become more proactive, more responsive, 

and less defensive—“a recommendation for all of us to be on the alert. . . 

We must anticipate events, act wisely but quickly and not be simply on 

the defensive. If we already know that there are places where there are 

guerrillas, we need the security forces to be present there to prevent regrettable incidents.”13 To make this possible, Uribe supported the COLMIL 

and CNP expansion plans—professionals, BRIMs, mountain battalions, 

a commando battalion, rural police squadrons, intelligence fusion, infrastructure security battalions—but not their timelines. Uribe wanted more, 

he wanted it faster, and in the case of road security and local security forces, 

he wanted something new. The CNP’s proposed 4- to 5-year timeline to 

reoccupy municipalities with no police presence became 18 months.14 In 

addition to its counterdrug support of the Antinarcotics Police Directorate 

(DIRAN)—Air Service and three 166-man Junglas companies—the 

Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) agreed to assist the CNP by training and 

equipping over 60 150-man Carabinero or rural police squadrons armed 

similar to Army units and by training and equipping policemen for the 

unoccupied municipalities.15 In October, Ramirez announced MOD goals 

for the police to reoccupy 120 major municipalities in 6 months and for the 

security forces to expand by 100,000 personnel—55,000 in 6 months and 

another 45,000 by December 2003.16 Once raised, these forces became the 

first installment of a multiyear program known as Plan Choque or Shock 

Plan. Uribe’s work ethic and his demand for results, in the words of a former Military Group (MILGP) commander, “cascaded down to every rank 

in the Police and Military.”17

American officials seemed inclined to support Uribe’s efforts, but 

they sought evidence of greater Colombian commitment to addressing its 

security problems. Meeting with 800 Colombian business leaders in late 

July, Ambassador Anne W. Patterson echoed many of Uribe’s proposals—

additional security forces, tax increases, legal reform—and stressed, 
98

“Priority must be to restore security.” She added, “This means that the 

United States is ready to invest more if the Colombians invest more in 

their own security.”18 On 2 August, President George W. Bush signed 

the supplemental funding law that provided for the initial training of 18 

Brigade responsible for infrastructure or oil pipeline security in the Arauca 

department—the first major US noncounterdrug-related program. In 

addition, the law provided expanded authorities that authorized “a unified 

campaign against narcotics trafficking, against activities by organizations 

designated as terrorist organizations and . . . actions to protect human health 

and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue 

operations.” With this change from a strictly counternarcotics focus, the 

United States and Colombian views of the Colombian security challenges 

began to align. In late November, the Fiscal Year 2003 Intelligence 

Authorization Act permitted intelligence sharing and provided intelligencerelated funds to support the unified campaign in Colombia.19 Earlier that 

month, Bush issued NSPD-18, Supporting Democracy in Colombia, which 

provided guidance for the new US policy in Colombia.20

As American policy changed, USSOUTHCOM and the MILGP broadened their former counterdrug approach with the MOD and the COLMIL. 

Problems immediately identifiable by the Americans—some the result 

of previous US efforts—included no strategic plan, poor unity of effort, 

limited sharing of only counterdrug intelligence, Joint Task Force–South 

(JTF-S) and BRCNA deployment restrictions, priority for support and 

repair parts, and five separate helicopter fleets. Rebuilding the confidence 

of senior COLMIL leaders became an important task—particularly given 

the need for increased Colombian resources, for long-term US support, 

and for continued human rights vetting.21 In the last months of the Pastrana 

administration, the MILGP had continued its counterdrug training and had 

worked with COLMIL on planning for a second counternarcotics brigade, 

the reorganization of the four-battalion Special Forces (SF) Brigade to a 

three-battalion brigade to provide for a commando battalion to attack highvalue targets (HVTs), the reorganization of the BRCNA, and the training for an infrastructure security unit—18 Brigade. An eight-man Joint 

Planning and Assistance Team (JPAT) working much of this effort included 

five reservists or National Guardsmen on temporary duty. In August, the 

MILGP reviewed the new authorities with the COLMIL and stressed the 

importance of human rights vetting of Army units to gain access to US 

assistance. In a September briefing on the counterdrug brigade reorganization and infrastructure security, Ambassador Patterson and General Mora 

agreed that a smaller, reorganized, 2,100-man, all-professional BRCNA 

would be placed under Army control for use where needed. Near the end 
99

of the year, General James T. Hill, USSOUTHCOM commander since 

July, and Mora met to discuss a US concept to place American military 

personnel, a Planning Assistance Training Team (PATT), in selected Army 

units.22 In this give-and-take process after the US policy change, neither side accepted all the suggestions made and those that were accepted 

required planning, time, and resources to become a reality. For example, 

the training for 18 Brigade and the commando battalion, discussed for 

months, did not begin until October and continued into 2003.

Uribe sought to reform the MOD at the same time as he expanded 

and improved his security forces. A USSOUTHCOM official emphasized 

the Colombian need for a “good national military strategy—a game plan 

to go on—to prosecute.”23 At the end of August, a retired US Air Force 

major general arrived to assist the MOD in the development of a national 

military strategy. Working with senior MOD civilian and military personnel, he played an advisory role in the MOD reorganization and in the 

creation of a national military strategy. Opening an October strategy seminar, the COLMIL commander emphasized his support of civilian control 

of the military, jointness, and better cooperation and planning within the 

MOD—all concepts emphasized by the Americans.24 What he may have 

actually meant was control by the President, jointness in effect but not in 

structure given the absence of a Colombian Goldwater-Nichols Act, and 

better cooperation and planning in support of the major combatant—the 

Colombian Army. By December, the MOD had reorganized with two viceministers: one for Budget and one for Policies and Foreign Affairs. Uribe 

provided clear guidance: change the MOD by taking things that work and 

improving them without asking for new legislation, additional funding, 

or new organizations. All his initial priorities—the security of the roads, 

reduction of kidnappings, and expansion of the civilian cooperative (informant) program—required working within each military service, between 

the military services, and between governmental agencies.25 All of these 

actions, and those in other governmental ministries, generated the programs for what would become Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense 

Policy (DSDP).

The FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) continued guerrilla attacks throughout the country attempting to discredit and paralyze 

the government by damaging critical infrastructure—particularly electrical grids, communications systems, and oil pipelines; disrupting road 

traffic and commerce between urban areas; and terrorizing the population 

through bombings, killings, and forced displacements. Narcoterrorist or 

illegal armed group strength at the end of 2002 totaled over 36,000—17,000 

FARC, less than 4,000 ELN, and over 12,000 United Self-Defense Groups 
100

of Colombia (AUC).26 As in 2001, AUC strength continued to grow faster 

in 2002 than either the FARC or the ELN. In December, the AUC agreed to 

a unilateral ceasefire as a precondition to negotiate conditions for demobilization with the government. To confront these threats, the security forces 

had grown to 313,000 personnel by the end of the year—203,000 military 

with over 166,000 soldiers and 110,000 police—but the narcoterrorists 

maintained the initiative.27

Democratic Security and Defense Policy and Plan Patriota: 2003

In early 2003, COLMIL published its first national military strategy—

a document developed in parallel with and in support of the government’s 

Democratic Security Policy that would be published in June. The strategic 

objectives called for improving the operational capability of each service, 

destroying the will of the narcoterrorists by rapid and decisive operational 

successes and protecting the population, strengthening legitimacy through 

transparency and respect for human rights, maintaining deterrence against 

external threats, and improving the proficiency of military personnel. 

The new operational concept called for rapid reaction based on improved 

collection and sharing of intelligence, integrated communications, and 

responsive air support for ground operations. To execute this concept, the 

strategy addressed six lines of action. First, the 4-year, phased expansion 

plan—Plan Choque—called for additional units: mobile brigades, mountain battalions, antiterrorism units (AFEUR), anti­kidnapping and extortion 

units (GAULA), naval riverine forces, and 40-man platoons of soldados 

campesinos for local security in towns. Other lines of action included 

increasing the size and capabilities of each service; improving technical, 

human, and strategic intelligence; increasing antiterrorism units; improving joint air support capabilities; and strengthening integrated action.28 The 

Colombian Army issued operational guidance supporting the COLMIL 

strategy.29 These documents provided a long-term framework that underlay day-to-day decisions and improved military capabilities as the security 

forces struggled with the narcoterrorists.

The COLMIL Infrastructure Security (ISS) Plan had three phases: 

I—security of the first 110 miles of the Cano Limon-Covenas Oil Pipeline 

in the department of Arauca; II—security of the remaining 367 miles of 

the pipeline between Arauca and the Caribbean coast; and, III—security of 

338 critical economic infrastructure sites. United States support for phase 

I provided the Colombian Army its largest and its first noncounterdrug 

assistance package. This 2-year, $99 million program—scheduled to begin 

in January 2003 and end in December 2004—provided $71 million for 

10 helicopters to be delivered by May 2004, $15.4 million for training, 
101

and $12.7 million for equipping 18 Brigade.30 In January, US 7 SF Group 

soldiers arrived to conduct their training missions—70 Americans worked 

with 18 Brigade in Arauca, 25 with the BRCNA at Larandia, and 15 with 

the commando battalion at the Tolemaida Training Center.31 Designated 

part of a “Rehabilitation and Consolidation” zone, Arauca—roughly the 

size of New Hampshire—had three generations of inhabitants who knew 

only the ELN and recently the autodefensas. An American described the 

situation there as trying to train-the-trainer in the middle of a gunfight.32

Reflecting the view of many Colombians, another American observed, 

“The paramilitaries are bad guys, but they’re good bad guys.” Still, what 

the Americans found impossible to comprehend was “the designation of a 

war zone as a civilian ‘crime scene.’” What appeared to be a “legal fiction” 

to them remained a legal reality for the Colombian security forces who 

operated under peacetime law.33 Problems with the American timelines 

proved another Colombian reality. As with the previous US priority program—training and equipping the counterdrug BRCNA—the ISS training 

had to be adjusted to accommodate equipment delays caused by late decisions, by the US procurement system, and now by the competing demands 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. The helicopter delivery date shifted from May 

2004 to April 2005 to June and had not been completed by September, over 

a year later than planned. Much of the programmed equipment—weapons, 

ammunition, night vision goggles, helmets, medical supplies—arrived late 

as delivery lead times approached 2 years. A partial shipment of night 

vision goggles ordered in late 2003 arrived in June 2005. Despite these 

delays, the security situation improved as attacks on the pipeline dropped 

from 170 in 2001 to 41 in 2002 to 34 in 2003 and arrests soared from 3 

between 1986 to 2001 to almost 600 in 3 years.34 As usual, the narcoterrorists adjusted by shifting their attacks further down the pipeline away from 

Arauca and by changing their attacks from the pipeline to the electrical 

system that pumped the oil. Through these delays, Colombian security 

officials continued to find American bureaucratic procedures cumbersome, 

unresponsive to their needs, and frustrating.

Despite the expanded authorities of the American officials and the 

efforts of the Uribe administration and its security forces, neither the US 

emphasis on human rights nor the level of violence diminished. In January, 

Embassy officials decertified 1 Air Combat Command (CACOM)—the 

first time a Colombian Air Force unit lost US assistance. Disagreement 

between the Embassy and Air Force over the details of the bombing of 

the town of Santo Domingo in 1998 that caused civilian casualties continued and eventually led to the resignation of the Air Force commander in 

August.35 In February, as it had shortly after the approval of the expanded 
102

authorities the previous year, the MILGP again asked the Army to initiate vetting for additional military units.36 The 7 February FARC carbomb attack on the El Nogal nightclub in Bogotá that left 35 dead and 

173 injured served as a wake-up call to many of the Colombian elite 

about their vulnerability to narcoterrorism. A week later, the crash of an 

American surveillance aircraft that left two dead, an American contractor 

and a Colombian soldier, and three Americans as FARC hostages served as 

a wake-up call to many Americans about the dangers of increased involvement. Describing the security situation, the USSOUTHCOM commander 

testified, “Colombians suffer daily from a level of violence and terror practicality unimaginable to us.” Citing 2002 figures, General Hill noted that 

Colombia had 1.5 million internally displaced persons; had the highest 

number of terrorist attacks in the world—an average of four a day, more 

than all the attacks in all of the other nations of the world; had the highest 

homicide rate—13 times that of the United States, which made homicide 

the most likely cause of death in Colombia; had the highest kidnapping 

rate in the world with 2,900 abductions; and had remained the number one 

producer of cocaine in the world. Ongoing US military efforts to reduce 

this violence included supporting the BRCNA and the commando battalion, training the infrastructure security brigade in Arauca, and sharing 

intelligence with the Colombians. Because the expanded authorities for 

2003 made this possible, he requested expanded authorities for 2004 for 

his entire area of responsibility. Despite the dismal statistics, Hill ended 

his comments noting Uribe’s 70-percent approval rating with Colombians 

and the positive changes underway.37 In a different forum, Hill emphasized 

that US military support continued to be training and assistance—not 

operational—conducted by a limited number of military personnel working with Colombian security forces who had improved their combat performance and their human rights record. Alleged human rights violations 

by the security forces had dropped to 2 percent.38 During that same period, 

45 percent of the FARC attacks had been against civilian, not military, 

targets, and the ELN and the AUC had attacked civilians in 90 percent of 

their actions.39 Colombia remained a violent country.

In addition to increasing security force presence throughout the country, COLMIL pursued a “decapitation” strategy aimed at the narcoterrorist leadership. To have the capability to strike HVTs—an attempt against 

narcoterrorist leaders or to rescue hostages—both Pastrana and Uribe 

supported the establishment of a special unit and better sharing of intelligence. With input from the MILGP commander and training from US 

Special Operations Command South (USSOCSOUTH), the Colombian 

Army created a Ranger-type commando battalion and established an Army 
103

Special Operations Command (COESE) on 17 March. The COESE had 

two small battalions of specially trained personnel—a commando battalion and a Lancero group.40 On 5 May, 75-men from the commando battalion conducted a hostage rescue operation as part of a joint team that started 

with Brigadier General Mario Montoya’s 4th Brigade and involved the 

FUDRA and the Colombian Air Force—photo reconnaissance and helicopter support. On hearing the helicopters, the FARC commander ordered 

the hostages killed and his unit to disperse. The rescue force landed in three 

groups and moved to the site making no contact with the narcoterrorists. 

On arrival 20 minutes or so after landing, the rescuers found nine hostages 

murdered, three wounded—one who later died, and one unharmed. The 

dead included the governor of Antioquia, a former Minister of Defense, 

and eight members of the Armed Forces. Even with good intelligence and 

specially trained forces, hostage rescue proved a high-risk operation. In a 

televised address to the nation, President Uribe took full responsibility for 

the failed rescue.41 But not all HVT operations failed. On 18 May in an 

operation planned over 4 weeks and supported by signals intelligence, 650 

men from the SF Brigade, accompanied by Department of Administrative 

Security (DAS) officials and civilian prosecutors, simultaneously arrived 

by helicopter in four municipalities in Caqueta that served as the base for 

one of the FARC’s most capable units and the one that had captured the 

American hostages—the Teofilo Forero mobile column. This operation led 

to the capture of 52 FARC members, to include several senior members.42

However, US signals monitoring had indicated the American hostages 

remained deep in the jungle surrounded by multiple rings of security and 

scattered minefields that made rescue difficult. The FARC military chief, 

Mono Jojoy, told his subordinates, “We will never allow the gringos to be 

rescued. Split them up.” American officials asked that no rescue attempt 

be made without their prior approval.43

With the publication of the DSDP in June, Uribe established his longterm whole-of-government approach to address Colombia’s problems. 

The policy rested on three concepts: a lack of personal security caused 

Colombia’s political, social, and economic troubles; the absence of government in large areas of the country caused this lack of personal security; 

and all elements of the government had to end this absence by integrating 

the nation into a whole.44 The DSDP strategic objectives were: consolidating government control throughout the country; protecting the populace; eliminating the illegal drug trade; protecting Colombia’s borders; 

and achieving transparent and efficient resource management. To achieve 

these objectives, the government pursued six policies: 
104

(1) Coordination of actions through a National Defense and 

Security Council, a Joint Intelligence Committee, a reformed MOD, and 

interagency support teams.

(2) Strengthened state institutions—judicial, armed forces, 

national police, intelligence, and finances.

(3) Consolidated control of the countryside through recovery, maintenance, and consolidation of territory; a border security plan; 

improved urban security; elimination of illegal drug trafficking; and dismantlement of narcoterrorist and drug finances.

(4) Protection of the rights of Colombians—for persons at risk, 

the internally displaced, the demobilized, child combatants; and against 

terrorism, kidnapping and extortion, and recruiting of children; and protection of critical infrastructure—economic and roads.

(5) Cooperation for the security of all Colombians through solidarity, cooperative networks, rewards programs, and international support.

(6) Communication of state policy and actions to the populace 

and the international community.45

No one knew how well the policy would be executed, but Uribe placed 

high demands on his government officials, often directly calling them or 

their subordinates at any time of the day or night.

The DSDP strengthened the security forces and highlighted several 

tasks—some more traditional than others. First, it directed the COLMIL to 

improve mobility through increased, reorganized, and trained manpower; 

to improve the quality of its members and the readiness of its equipment; 

to improve the gathering, processing, analysis, and coordination of intelligence; to continue its human rights and international humanitarian law 

training; and to use its resources to deter external threats. To impede the 

flow of illegal drugs out of Colombia and of illegal weapons into the 

country, border security became a priority. Another priority became the 

Government Road Security Program. In addition, the policy sought to 

reform military service by making all members liable for combat duty 

regardless of educational level and it called for an increase in the role for 

the recently created soldados campesino. Second, the DSDP directed the 

police to reoccupy municipalities that had no police presence, to create 

62 mobile field police or Carabinero squadrons, to build fortified rural 

police stations, to strengthen the highway police, to coordinate city security plans, to increase its strength by 10,000 new policemen and by 10,000 

auxiliary policemen, and to build civilian cooperation networks.46
105

In addition to fighting the narcoterrorists and to executing its expansion 

program, the DSDP specified COLMIL requirements for infrastructure 

security, local security, and road security. First, the three-phased 

infrastructure security program—Plan Especial Energetico Vial (PEEV)—

demanded attention. Special PEEV units were created to address phase II 

and III requirements as the United States continued to support phase I 

with training in Arauca. Second, understanding the need for permanent 

local security, Uribe had pledged during his campaign to arm civilians—

an idea not supported by many American officials given the CONVIVIR 

and autodefensas experience. However, the discovery of a 1940’s law that 

allowed conscript soldiers to serve a portion of their military time at home 

permitted the creation of 40-man soldados campesinos—peasant soldier—

platoons. Trained as regulars, led by a professional noncommissioned 

officer (NCO), and serving for 2 years, many of the soldiers referred to 

themselves as soldados de mi pueblo—soldiers of my town. These soldados

campesino platoons formed a company in the local territorial battalion. In 

2003, the COLMIL planned to train 15,000 to serve in 450 municipalities in 

priority areas.47 This permanent security force, composed of trained armed 

locals under military control, had an immediate effect. As a mayor under a 

FARC death threat said, “It has bettered the peace” because “[t]hey know 

the land. They know the people.” And most important, but not stated, they 

are always present.48 Third, Uribe understood the actual and psychological 

importance to the populace of opening the roads to traffic. However, the 

police proved too weak for the task and the military resisted it. In early 

February, Uribe met with the Minister of Defense, the two vice ministers, 

and his general officers. After asking the generals their views and listening 

to comments about road security being police work—not a military job—

and a distracter from more important tasks, Uribe told them they were 

correct about the roads being police work. Nevertheless, if they viewed the 

roads as supply routes or lines of communication, then it appeared he had 

a military that could not, or would not, protect its lines of communication. 

He then described the road as a plaza where the military and the people 

could interact. Uribe said that convincing the people that the roads were 

safe was the first task; transitioning the roads to the police would be 

the second. He noted that when he became President every Colombian 

problem had become his problem and that he needed their assistance with 

the roads. Instead of ordering the military to do the task, he explained the 

problem, showed them their role, and gained their support.49 Plan Meteoro

or Meteor Plan was the COLMIL program to open the roads. In addition 

to the security provided by territorial units and the information provided 

by the cooperative networks, special joint Army–highway police Meteoro
106

companies patrolled the major roads—establishing security and providing 

a show of force. After the primary roads became secure, these units shifted 

to the secondary roads.50

The COLMIL developed a multiyear campaign plan, Plan Patriota or 

Patriot Plan, to regain control of priority areas in the country. It had three 

phases: (1) securing Bogotá and Cundinamarca department, (2) securing the 

FARC rear area in Caqueta department, and (3) securing Antioquia department. The 5 Division commander, Major General Reinaldo Castellanos, 

conducted phase I, Operation Liberty I, between 1 June and 31 December 

2003. Reinforced by the FUDRA, the SF Brigade, and Air Force assets, 5 

Division destroyed multiple FARC fronts and ended the threat to Bogotá 

in the largest, most complex, and most successful operation conducted 

by Colombian forces. These operations—that eliminated seven front leaders, six deputy leaders, and seven heads of finance—handed the FARC 

an estimated 4 to 5 year setback.51 With the expansion and specialization 

of units under Plan Choque, security forces began to dominate priority 

areas using what some referred to as a grid system. First, military forces 

cleared the area of narcoterrorists. Then local security forces reoccupied 

the area—police units and platoons of soldados campesenos in the towns 

and better armed, more mobile Carabinero squadrons in the municipalities around the towns. With a permanent security presence, government 

activities could rebuild. This became the operational concept implemented 

by security force commanders.52 In September, a Colombian Army reorganization recognized the creation of 6 Division that had replaced JTF-S 

in late 2002, of the Army Special Operations Command created in March, 

and of other specialized units. Each division had two to four brigades, 

urban antiterrorism SF units (AFEUR), and most had mobile brigades, 

extra counterguerrilla battalions, and Meteoro companies. In addition to 

the FUDRA, SF Brigade, BRCNA, and Aviation Brigade, the authorizations for the six divisions totaled 6 mobile brigades, 46 infantry battalions, 

38 counterguerrilla battalions, 18 support battalions, 11 engineer battalions, 11 PEEV battalions, 9 cavalry squadrons, 9 artillery battalions, 6 

mountain battalions, 15 GAULA units, 14 AFEUR units, and 7 Meteoro

companies.53 As the Army grew larger, it became more tailored to meet 

specific security tasks.

Just as support for “Plan Colombia” had required time for the US 

Country Team to reorganize, increase manning, and develop appropriate 

programs, the expanded authorities created similar challenges—particularly 

for the MILGP in 2002 and 2003. In addition to coordinating training for 

Colombian units by 7 SF Group personnel, the MILGP organized liaison 

sections to work with the COLMIL on information operations, psychological 
107

operations, medical, intelligence, civil affairs, and engineer issues. Because 

temporary duty personnel—primarily reservists and guardsmen from all 

services serving short tours—filled many of the positions, turbulence 

created continuity problems. An American joint planning assistance team 

manned the operations planning group that worked with COLMIL and 

scheduled mobile training teams—staff training, military decision making, 

civil affairs, casualty evacuation—for the limited number of human rights 

vetted units.54 Given the small divisional staffs and the even smaller brigade 

staffs, the appropriateness of US staff and decision making training that 

relied on trained and sizable staff sections might be questioned. As an 

American trainer noted:

They don’t plan like we do. The division commander will 

brainstorm with his brigade commander and the staffs, 

then give a verbal order. The brigade commander will 

write an order which is more like our FRAGO [fragmentary order] so that the general knows the brigade commander understands his concept. Then they go with it.55

As a US initiative in early 2003, a four-man Planning and Assistance 

Training Team (PATT) joined the BRCNA. Created to assist in the planning for operations, the team contained operations, intelligence, logistics, 

and civil affairs personnel that served 1-year tours. Many Spanish-speaking US military personnel from the Active and Reserve Components filled 

the teams. The functions, locations, and size of the teams changed over 

time, but the maximum PATT strength seldom exceeded 50.56 Sometimes 

the Americans asked what Colombians needed; but just as often, they provided them with what they thought was needed.

Despite increased support by Uribe, progress of ongoing operations, 

and US assistance, fundamental problems remained. In August, General 

Edgar Alfonso Lesmes became the Colombian Air Force commander 

after repeated US pressure concerning a 1998 bombing incident led to 

the resignation of his predecessor.57 Although security force human 

rights complaints had dropped, past incidents continued to affect 

Colombian–US relations. A more serious issue arose in November when 

Minister Ramirez resigned after struggling with the COLMIL leadership. 

Unlike under Pastrana, the Uribe team sought MOD reform and greater 

civilian involvement in security matters—primarily nonoperational—

that previously had been considered military issues. Summarizing the 

problem, Ramirez said, “There is a civilian minister of defense but not a 

civilian ministry of defense.”58 Determining what a civilian MOD would 

look like, how it would work, and clarifying basic civil-military issues 
108

had proven a challenge. Some in COLMIL equated civil control of the 

military as control by the President, not by a civilian minister. Uribe’s style 

of personally dealing directly with commanders reinforced this tendency. 

Uribe responded to this resignation by retiring the COLMIL commander. 

Understanding that internal disputes would not be tolerated, the new MOD 

team—Minister of Defense Jorge Alberto Uribe and COLMIL General 

Ospina—worked together with less conflict.59 General Martin Orlando 

Carreno replaced Ospina as the Colombian Army commander.60 Like 

many of the problems with which Colombians wrestled, MOD reform and 

changing institutional culture had no quick—much less easy—solution. 

Change required a sustained trial-and-error effort to determine what 

worked best in Colombia.

By the end of 2003, things had begun to change. Security forces 

gained the initiative in parts of Colombia. Operation Liberty I had ended 

the FARC threat to isolate Bogotá. Road security improved. Following the 

lead of President Uribe, Ospina called on his generals to make hostage rescue a major priority.61 The new commander promised to resign if the Army 

failed to kill or capture a member of the FARC Secretariat within a year.62

The AUC began demobilization negotiations with the government and one 

organization demobilized that fall. The FARC had failed to disrupt the 

local elections in October and narcoterrorist desertions increased 80 percent. In August, the Department of State (DOS) reinstated the counterdrug 

Air Bridge Denial Program. Drug eradication proceeded at a record pace, 

and the CNP established a presence in all but 18 municipalities. Those 18 

were occupied by February 2004.63 Despite these improvements, Uribe 

continued to pressure his security forces for results.

Plan Patriota and Joint Commands: 2004–2006

Phase II of Plan Patriota began on 4 January 2004 with a 17,000-man 

assault into long-held FARC base areas in Caqueta department where the 

“state [had] abandoned these people years ago.”64 The area of operations 

later expanded to include the parts of the departments of Guaviare and 

Meta—or roughly an area near the former zona de despeje. During these 

operations, Major General Castellanos commanded COLMIL’s first joint 

command: Joint Task Force (JTF) Omega—a division equivalent comprised of Army, Navy, and Air Force units. Formed in late December 2003, 

JTF Omega consisted of the three-BRIM FUDRA, the three-battalion SF 

Brigade, six additional BRIMs, Military Intelligence Region 8 (RIME 8), 

Army aviation, one counterdrug battalion, a logistics company, a medical 

evacuation company, seven Navy riverine combat elements, and an Air 

Force air component. These operations—coordinated with the 4 Division 

to the north and 6 Division to the south—disrupted the FARC strategic 
109

plan by attacking the narcoterrorist support infrastructure and by engaging forces from the Eastern and Southern blocs. During 2004 and 2005, 

the BRIMs assigned to JTF Omega had US PATT personnel assigned. US 

logistical support proved crucial for sustaining these combat operations. 

Improved medical support procedures and contract flights for rotating 

troops into and out of the area of operations helped sustain troop morale.65

US military assistance, which continued to remain less than counterdrug 

assistance, provided JTF Omega the capability to conduct sustained operations in an isolated region dominated by the FARC for decades. As the operations unfolded, Minister of Defense Uribe cautioned, “Plan Patriot[a] is 

not a great military operation, it is a jigsaw puzzle . . . [that] is going to last 

a long time. There is not going to be one great battle.” Eventual success 

would come from the accumulation of small accomplishments—seizure 

of weapons, disruption of units, defection of narcoterrorists, destruction 

of drug facilities, capture of leaders, establishment of local governance—

over a period of years.66

In his annual USSOUTHCOM assessment to Congress, General 

Hill acknowledged the progress he had witnessed during his 23 visits to 

Colombia. He stressed the critical role played by President Uribe and the 

importance of building capable government organizations that would continue after his presidency.

President Uribe is a unique leader who has galvanized 

the will of the people and motivated his Armed Forces. 

He has personally demonstrated that one individual can 

change the course of events. Without his personal leadership, energy, and dedication, I don’t think the Colombians 

would have achieved the remarkable progress we have 

seen. Yet his personal charisma and drive only go so 

far, and he well knows it. That is why he is building the 

structures to sustain momentum and institutionalize success beyond that of his term and beyond that of Plan 

Colombia.67

To improve COLMIL capabilities, USSOUTHCOM and the MILGP 

worked closely with the MOD and the COESE, assisted in the operational 

and logistical support of JTF Omega operations, focused on establishing 

Navy riverine combat elements, supported the reestablishment of the DOS 

Air Bridge Denial Program, assisted in infrastructure security planning, 

provided PATTs for selected human rights vetted units, worked to develop 

intelligence-driven operations, improved civil affairs capacities, supported 

creation of a Military Penal Justice Corps, assisted in establishing a 

Command Sergeant Major school “to develop a robust noncommissioned 
110

officer corps,” and continued to train COLMIL units. Hill described 

military training for human rights vetted units as “a key enabler in their 

fight.”68 However, the majority of the Colombian security forces never saw 

an American trainer. During this period, about seven SF A Teams (ODA) 

provided training to Colombian Army and police personnel. The number 

of security force units training with these teams—usually small classes to 

address specific skills and none larger than a battalion—remained limited 

and focused on the BRCNA and its helicopter unit, the COESE with its 

commando battalion and lancero group, urban antiterrorism (AFEUR) units, 

phase I infrastructure security units—18 Brigade and 5 BRIM, personnel 

from the FUDRA and the SF Brigade, Navy riverine units, Army aviation, 

CNP Carabineros, and DIRAN Junglas.

69 To meet the requirements 

generated by the increased tempo and scale of operations undertaken after 

the expanded authorities, Hill requested that the cap on in-country military 

personnel permitted to support “Plan Colombia” be increased from 400 

Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and 400 contractors to 800 DOD 

personnel and 600 contractors.70 This cap, signed into law in October, did 

not include DOD personnel assigned to the MILGP or those involved in 

search and rescue activities for the three American hostages.71

With expanded authorities and increased combat operations, some in 

the US Armed Forces saw the need for a greater American military role in 

Colombia—something neither requested by, nor probably acceptable to, 

the Colombians. In addition to a number of student papers written at the 

Army War College and the National Defense University calling for a more 

direct US involvement, the US Army South (USARSO) commander—

drawing on a version of the El Salvador experience—called for a US 

military advisory effort, primarily Army, with “boots on the ground” as a 

“concrete manifestation of US resolve.” Defining victory as the destruction 

of the FARC, the dismantling of its narcotics network, and ending the war 

on drugs in the United States, he believed that this “job is simply too large 

for the Colombian Military alone.” The advisory structure recommended a 

two-man, Spanish-speaking advisory team at each Colombian division and 

brigade—a combat arms or SF major or captain and a military intelligence 

major or captain—supported by US colonel and lieutenant colonel advisors 

in the COLMIL and Army staff sections. To avoid the impression of a 

“less-than-firm US commitment to the war against drug trafficking and 

terrorism,” US unit advisors were to accompany their counterparts during 

operations. The article concluded:

A robust US military advisory program might not bring 

the Colombian war to a negotiated settlement . . . nor will 

it ensure an ultimate military victory for the Colombian 
111

Military; however, it can buy time to achieve victory 

by preventing the destruction of Colombia’s political, 

economic, and social infrastructure by an armed, wellorganized criminal group.72

Instead of this more aggressive advisory model, the US maintained its 

assist and support approach, which was proving adequate for Uribe and 

his security forces to reduce the narcoterrorist threat.

President’s Uribe’s whole-of-government DSDP constituted 

another jigsaw puzzle with complex social, economic, political, and 

legal components. Although the establishment of security and control 

throughout the country remained the focus of the MOD and served as the 

prerequisite for implementing governmental programs, other ministries 

had responsibility for the reestablishment of local governance and 

social programs. To oversee this effort, and with MILGP support, Uribe 

established and led the interministerial Coordination Center for Integrated 

Action (CCAI). Permanently manned by personnel from the ministries, 

the CCAI coordinated civil affairs in newly secured areas. Initially the 

CCAI focused on 11 areas that encompassed 58 municipalities.73 The 

CCAI worked to develop ways to maintain control by reducing crime 

and drug-related activities, to strengthen the justice system, to establish 

humanitarian and social programs, to encourage economic activity, and 

to reintegrate the populace into Colombia. MILGP, NAS, and the US 

Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel worked with 

the CCAI in support of consolidation efforts.74 At the same time, US 

agencies continued to work their nonmilitary and counterdrug programs 

in support of “Plan Colombia.” After a multiyear effort by the Embassy 

supporting judicial reform and the establishment of an accusatorial system 

similar to that in the United States to reduce the backlog and to speed up 

cases, Colombia reformed its judicial system in 2004 and began a phased 

implementation that would take effect for the whole country in January 

2008. During the 4-year transition, the United States provided training for 

judges, prosecutors, and criminal investigators in the new system.75 As 

US assistance continued to fund counterdrug, military, and nonmilitary 

programs, the Colombian government—just as its security forces—

developed and refined its programs.

Despite a sharp decline in violence, some wondered about the focus 

and conduct of Uribe’s program. Questions arose about the sustainability of 

military operations “for months or years on the zones that have historically 

been controlled by the guerrillas [and] where they have great popular 

support.” Some attributed government progress to a “tactical retreat” by 

the FARC, noted the lack of success in capturing or killing key leaders, and 
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repeated human rights concerns voiced by nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs).76 By declining to attack the security forces, dispersing into small 

units, and moving deeper into remote areas, the FARC maintained its forces 

while protecting its leadership. In February, HVT operations captured the 

finance officer from 14 Front and gained valuable information from her 

computer about FARC drugs and weapons trafficking. Earlier, Simon 

Trinidad, a senior FARC negotiator involved in narco­trafficking, had been 

arrested in Ecuador and extradited to Colombia.77 However, no member of 

the FARC Secretariat had been killed or captured. Human rights groups 

continued their complaints, but the DOS annual human rights report 

acknowledged that different standards—one applying legal compliance 

and one using other criteria—led to “drastically divergent understandings 

. . . [that] deepened already profound mutual suspicions” and to underreporting by the government and over-reporting by the human rights 

groups.78 After the December 2003 AUC ceasefire, negotiations continued 

that produced results the following summer when the AUC signed an 

agreement to demobilize by the end of 2005.79 Demobilization of the 

organization responsible for the majority of the human rights violations 

and a significant amount of violence would eliminate a serious threat 

during a time that the ELN—reduced in numbers—expressed interest in 

renewed negotiations. How the demobilized paramilitary members would 

be reintegrated into society and held accountable for their deeds remained 

to be resolved, but most saw the AUC demobilization agreement as another 

Uribe success that improved security.

Joint commands that integrated each of the military services under a 

single commander for a particular mission or a particular area of operations, 

normally overseas, had become a dominant US military concept after 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 replaced jointness as a function with 

jointness as a structure. In theory, joint commands reduced redundancy and 

waste, fostered interoperability, eliminated service rivalry, and improved 

combat performance. For this to happen in the United States, it had required 

institutional reform driven by a legal mandate from Congress. Even then, it 

took years, if not decades, to develop a joint mindset, create joint doctrine, 

and establish joint procedures. What appeared normal to many Americans 

in 2004 remained a difficult, alien concept for COLMIL—just as it had been 

for the US military before 1986—because of history, institutional cultures, 

limited resources, constitutional mandates, and governmental procedures. 

USSOUTHCOM and the Embassy emphasized joint and interagency 

organizations to the MOD and the COLMIL. In the late 1990s, a US 

Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) had been established to share counterdrug 

intelligence and to model joint capabilities. The US-sponsored counterdrug 
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JTF-S—largely an Army and a CNP organization—had a joint staff and a 

naval officer had served briefly as its second commander. In December 

2003, JTF Omega became a COLMIL joint command. Predominantly an 

Army organization, JTF Omega served as a small, long-term laboratory 

for evaluating joint concepts. In 2004, the COLMIL began work on the 

establishment of a Joint Special Operations Command (CCOPE) that would 

include the COESE with its commando battalion and Lancero group, joint 

urban antiterrorist units (AFEAU), an Air Force SF Group (ACOEA) with 

airborne snipers, and a 253-man, 3-company Navy SF marine infantry 

battalion.80 In the summer of 2004, to the disappointment of American 

officials, the COLMIL ceased work on joint territorial commands. That 

October, Ambassador William B. Wood told Colombian officers that “the 

cooperation and coordination between US and Colombian forces could 

be better, and within the COLMIL, rivalries between forces jeopardize 

efforts to coordinate operations and share resources.”81 In December, 

Uribe intervened and directed the establishment of Joint Command 

No. 1—Caribbean (CCC).82

By the end of 2004, the security situation had continued to improve. 

JTF Omega had seized numerous FARC stockpiles, destroyed over 650 

camps, and killed or captured almost 800 narcoterrorists.83 The COLMIL 

and CNP strength continued to grow as units improved through continued 

training and combat experience. The Navy had doubled its riverine forces 

and established 2 Riverine Brigade—giving the Navy a marine infantry brigade and two riverine brigades.84 The CNP continued to improve 

its presence in every municipality in Colombia. The AUC had begun to 

demobilize its estimated 15,800 armed members. For the first time, FARC 

strength had dropped significantly—from estimates of over 16,000 to 

12,600 armed members. During the same time, the ELN remained a minor 

problem with about 3,500 members.85 All the indexes of violence continued to drop and prospects for further improvements in 2005 seemed good. 

In fact, some talked of victory.

In the early months of 2005, the FARC responded with a series of 

attacks against isolated military and government targets—the greatest 

number since Uribe took office—in an effort to create casualties to undermine governmental efforts. In February, the FARC announced its “Plan 

Resistencia”—a strategy that ended its tactical withdrawal and initiated 

attacks against government targets.86 To reduce its vulnerability, the FARC 

had reorganized into companies of 54 with squads of 12 personnel and 

focused on the use of snipers, landmines, and improvised explosive devices 

(IED) to create security force casualties.87 In conjunction with increased 

attacks, the FARC sought to redirect its foreign affairs commission from 
114

lobbying abroad to working with nongovernmental agencies, to establish 

a nonmilitary presence in urban areas to infiltrate state organizations, to 

rebuild a military presence in areas cleared by the security forces, and 

to expand the political actions like the clandestine Bolivarian Movement 

for a New Colombia.88 General Castellanos, the former JTF Omega commander who replaced Carreno as Army commander in November 2004, 

confronted the attacks that continued into 2006 and left more than 300 

military dead in 2005 alone. According to a COLMIL analyst, the FARC 

in 2004 “were in a planned retreat. They were playing for time and waiting 

for the government to tire out. The military has not been able to neutralize 

the FARC, and now the rebels are trying to weaken Uribe and influence the 

next election.” As with President Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” banner, 

a Colombian Military analyst warned that the government had “prematurely declared victory.”89

General Bantz J. Craddock, USSOUTHCOM commander since 

November 2004, provided Congress an overview of his area of operations 

in March. In Colombia, not only had crimes decreased in 2004—homicides 

by 16 percent—the lowest number since 1986, robberies by 25 percent, 

and kidnappings by 46 percent, terrorist attacks nationwide had dropped 

from 209 in 2003 to only 80, the lowest number since 1998. At the same 

time, military operations and demobilizations had reduced the strength of 

the narcoterrorist organizations. Craddock highlighted several other areas 

of improvement: support of civil affairs in reclaimed areas by Colombia’s 

13-ministry CCAI, increase in narcotics eradiation, improvement 

in counternarcotics interdiction programs, improvement in judicial 

cooperation, and increase in Colombian defense spending from 3.5 percent 

of gross domestic product (GDP) to 5 percent in 2004.90 Military programs 

receiving US military assistance included the counterdrug BRCNA that 

was involved in both the US-led eradication program and the COLMILled Plan Patriota; a helicopter support program to train pilots, crew chiefs, 

and aviation mechanics; the infrastructure security program’s 18 Brigade 

that had reduced pipeline attacks from 170 in 2001 to 17 in 2004; and the 

PATT Program that included 40 military personnel with plans to expand 

to 59 to assist selected Colombian regional joint commands, divisions, 

and brigades. Just over a third of DOD counterdrug funding requested 

for fiscal year 2006 was programmed for USSOUTHCOM and less than 

a third of that—$112 million—was for Colombia.91 In 2004–2005, 7 SF 

Group deployed to Afghanistan and training support for USSOUTHCOM 

and Colombia declined. Generally, three ODAs provided training in 

Colombia—one with CCOPE units, one with CNP units—the Junglas

and the Carabineros, and one with the Army Tactical Retraining Center 
115

(CERTE)—supporting the 1-month retraining of Colombian Army combat 

units at three sites each supported by teams of 18 Colombian CERTE 

instructors.92 US trainers introduced the after action review (AAR) process 

in 2005–2006, and the last CERTE rotations occurred in 2006.93 In 2005–

2006, the PATTs had been moved to work with the Army operations staff 

in Bogotá; with the 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 Divisions; and with 18 Brigade and the 

Navy 2 Riverine Brigade.94

As with the adoption of other US military concepts, joint military 

commands remained a thorny issue within the COLMIL. Major General 

Montoya became the first commander of the Joint Carribean Command 

(CCC)—COLMIL’s first regional joint command that consisted of his 1 

Division, the Navy’s riverine units in his area, and the Air Force’s Combat 

Air Command No. 3. With minimal guidance and no transition plan, he 

assumed responsibility for air, land, and riverine operations in support of 

ongoing counterdrug programs and counter-narcoterrorist operations. As 

a functional joint command, CCC would remain a work-in-progress for 

years to come.95 In April, Uribe ordered the creation of five joint territorial 

commands—Caribbean in the north along the border with Panama, Omega 

in the southeast along the border with Peru and Brazil, Central for the 

Andean region, Pacific for the southwest along the border with Ecuador, 

and Eastern along the border with Venezuela.96 When four senior general 

officers raised questions to the Colombian Army commander about the 

utility of US-style joint commands and the wisdom of such a radical 

change in the midst of executing Plan Patriota, they were immediately 

retired.97 In the controversy that followed, retired COLMIL officers voiced 

the concerns of many military officers. One of the four generals retired 

raised institutional issues: “no analysis of . . . political, constitutional, and 

military significance” of joint commands, lack of operational command 

“left [service chiefs] only with the responsibility of supplying troops and 

recruiting men,” and “institutional fragmentation” similar to when a naval 

officer—“What can he do to lead . . . men from the army?”—had served as 

the second commander of the US-sponsored counterdrug JTF-S. A former 

COLMIL commander added the national issue: “Joint commands are a 

bad imitation of the American experience and the Colombian conflicts 

bears no comparison with that of the United States. . . . We cannot allow 

ourselves to apply an American organizational chart.” General Tapias, the 

COLMIL commander under Pastrana, acknowledged, “Joint commands 

are necessary,” but “the trouble lies in the strategy for implementing them. 

Quite often, what is beneficial for other countries is not beneficial for 

Colombia, because the conflict we have is unique to us.” He added, “Let 

us hope that . . . [this decision is] backed by a thorough study of the threats 
116

from terrorism in the country because this is really a drastic venture.”98

Although the requirement for additional joint regional commands 

remained in place, during the remainder of Uribe’s first term and into his 

second, the COLMIL joint commands remained JTF Omega, CCOPE, and 

CCC. In July, the Army established 7 Division and divided 1 Division area 

of responsibility in the north between these divisions and both became 

part of the CCC. (See Figure 9, The COLMIL areas of operations.) After 

mid-2005, the COLMIL oversaw the operations of CCC in the north, of 

JTF Omega in the southeast, and of CCOPE against national HVTs. The 

Army directed operations in 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 Division areas and provided 

forces for COLMIL joint commands. The Navy had responsibility for the 

Caribbean Naval Forces Command, the Pacific Naval Forces Command, 

and those riverine forces not provided to CCC and JTF Omega. The Air 

Force provided air support to each of the joint commands and to the 

divisions.

After a couple of years of working together under expanded authorities, 

the Colombian–US relationship had evolved. It took years to overcome 

many of the misunderstandings, frustrations, and mistrust that had arisen in 

the pre-expanded authorities’ period. As one senior Colombian official put 

it, “Arrogance ran both ways.” Proud, under-resourced Colombian security force professionals struggling in a harsh internal war under Colombian 

conditions and constraints clashed with mission-oriented, we-are-here-tohelp-you-in-our-own-way Americans. Both thought they knew best. Both 

tended to acknowledge the importance of human rights, strategic planning, MOD reform, jointness, intelligence-sharing, special operations, and 

procurement of critical assets. However, each tended to disagree on the 

form and content of these programs, on evaluation criteria, and on the 

time needed to produce results. American assistance helped, but to many 

it “distorted” the security force effort—reinforcing security force rivalries 

and dispersing critical assists such as helicopters—by pushing things not 

always needed, by insisting on things not always wanted, and by not always 

supporting things considered critical by the Colombians.99 For example, 

for years the COLMIL had emphasized human rights training. Violations 

had dropped as the security forces increased in size and number of combat operations conducted. Yet, in spring 2005, the MILGP again had to 

encourage the Army to vet additional units. Units vetted by the DOS to US 

standards, not a drop in human rights violations, tended to be the US metric, and, for institutional and professional reasons, the Colombian Army 

had continued to resent and resist.100 Afterward, Army resistance subsided 

and additional units were vetted. Over the years, many in the MOD concluded that the United States would not sell Colombia what it wanted. 
117

Particularly prior to the expanded authorities, they believed the United 

States tended to push obsolete equipment—airplanes, helicopters, vehicles, and personal equipment considered good enough for Colombians—

and failed to deliver items as programmed—“Plan Colombia” and ISS 

support packages. Considering the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program 

bureaucratic and unresponsive, the MOD procurement officials preferred, 

when permitted, to deal directly with the manufacturer to purchase critical items. Initially, American officials failed to see the importance of the 

P e ru

B ra zil

E c u a d or

Ve n e zu ela

C o lom b ia

North

Pacific

Ocean

Caribbean Sea

M itú

0 5 0 1 0 0 1 50 mile s

A R A U C A

M E TA

C ali B ogotá

M edellín

C artagena

Tres E squinas

Larandia

D iv -2

D iv -5 D iv -3 D iv -4

D iv -6

JTF Omega

C C C

Figure 9. The COLMIL areas of operations.
118

soldados campesino program for providing local security. They encouraged the Colombian Air Force to acquire C-130 transport aircraft when it 

wanted to acquire Brazilian Super Tucano close air support aircraft, which 

it finally ordered in late 2005. Interestingly, while Colombian officials 

acknowledged the important role of US military assistance in sustaining 

combat operations, they stressed the critical importance of the interaction 

with US military personnel in developing and improving programs.101 A 

former vice-minister of defense (VMOD) described the US military support as a “very light touch,” one “never . . . involved in operational decisions.” He concluded that US assistance “brings a rigor of training, focus, 

organization that we Colombians lacked. It has sped up what may have 

been a much slower process. US assistance brings decisiveness and helps 

us to make decisions.”102

The growing security forces—COLMIL and CNP—continued to 

improve through individual and unit training, retraining, and combat 

operations. The professionals serving in the Colombian-developed mobile 

brigades and counterguerrilla battalions remained the fighting core of the 

Colombian Army. However, Army infantry battalions had grown in combat potential. The infantry battalion had increased to seven infantry and a 

support company. (See Figure 10, Colombian Army infantry battalion.) Six 

infantry companies had four platoons each. Each platoon was authorized 

3 NCOs and 36 soldiers. Three companies had regular soldiers without 

high school degrees and three companies had professional soldiers. These 

six companies of trained combat soldiers, 24 platoons, had a strength 

equivalent to three counterguerrilla battalions. The seventh infantry company had soldados campesino platoons assigned based on the number of 

municipalities in the battalion area of operations that had one or more 

of these locally raised platoons. For example, a battalion commander in 

northern Colombia had nine municipalities in his sector—three with one 

platoon, three with two platoons, and three with no platoons. His seventh 

infantry company had nine platoons. The support company had an 81-mm 

mortar platoon, a security platoon, and a support platoon.103 However, the 

expansion in manpower had not included larger or additional classes at 

the 4-year military academy or the 1.5-year NCO school. A severe shortfall of leaders, officers and NCOs, resulted with almost half of the Army 

units missing officers and with the Navy’s riverine and naval infantry having a 1,200-officer shortage. Instead of a major, often a captain or senior 

lieutenant commanded counterguerrilla battalions. Sergeants or corporals 

ran most platoons. “Ten year soldiers are the ones making things happen,” observed a PATT member, “but they can’t be promoted.”104 Under 

the personnel system, NCOs could not become officers and professional 
119

soldiers could not become NCOs. Despite these problems, the military 

forces continued to improve their performance against the narcoterrorists 

and human rights violations did not increase proportionally—in fact they 

dropped—as combat operations had more than doubled.105

Plan Patriota not only included combat operations by JTF Omega

and improved performance by jurisdictional military units, but after 2004 

it had an increasingly capable HVT component. Early in his presidency, 

Uribe established a Colombian Joint Intelligence Council to consolidate 

analyses from his seven intelligence agencies—DAS, COLMIL, Army, 

Navy, Air Force, CNP, and Treasury.106 Although far from perfect, it 

provided Uribe a means to focus agencies on specific HVTs. The creation 

of the CCOPE provided a national-level special operations force to attack 

HVTs. Through trial and error, both the intelligence—technical and 

human—and the capabil­ity to conduct intelligence-driven HVT operations 

improved. However, success against HVTs remained difficult to achieve. 

In September, after months of preparation to understand how and where a 

particular FARC front involved in narcotrafficking operated and training 

for a direct action force, local Army units established a grid around the 

targeted FARC unit. When the narcoterrorists tried to cover the escape 

I I

I I I

R egu lars Profess iona ls

S o ldados

C am pes inos

I

S P T

S P T

M o rt S E C

Figure 10. Colombian Army infantry battalion.
120

of their leader, a pre‐positioned CCOPE force captured him and five 

men. After talking with the captives, they released three to return to their 

comrades to encourage surrender. Leaderless, surrounded, and provided 

an option to surrender, every member of the FARC unit gave up without a 

fight.107 The success of this operation proved an exception. Few operations 

made contact with their targets and fewer were as successful, but the 

pursuit of HVTs continued as intelligence, procedures, and capabilities 

improved.

At the end of 2005, the US counternarcotics “Plan Colombia” ended. 

After 6 years; $4.9 billion spent primarily on counterdrug programs that 

included 72 helicopters, a counterdrug brigade, the Air Bridge Denial 

Program, infrastructure security, the riverine program, CNP units, and 

aerial eradication; $1.3 billion spent on nonmilitary programs; and record 

eradication statistics with improved security, coca cultivation in Colombia 

had increased 15 percent since 2000 when the goal had been a 50-percent 

reduction.108 Nevertheless, the US Congress agreed to support a threestage Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase (PCCP). Under this program, no 

change in the level of US assistance would occur through fiscal year 2008. 

During the Uribe period, US assistance to the military and the police—

both counterdrug and counterterror programs—had comprised 10 to 11 

percent of the MOD budget. After fiscal year 2008, the programs would be 

consolidated, US funding reduced, and transferred to Colombia. In the last 

stage, nationalization or Colombianization, Colombia had ownership of the 

programs.109 Despite the day-to-day problems and setbacks that sometimes 

obscured progress, the trends in Colombia continued to be positive. Security 

and local governance improved. Crime statistics continued to fall. From 

2002 to 2005, homicides dropped 37 percent, kidnappings 72 percent, 

kidnappings with extortion 76 percent, and massacre victims 63 percent; 

terrorist acts declined from 1,645 to 611; and road mobility improved 45 

percent.110 The counterdrug programs—eradication, interdictions, and 

extraditions—all reached new highs. Transition continued to the new 

judicial system. Attempts throughout the year by the FARC to discredit 

Uribe and turn back security force gains failed. Uribe, as popular as ever, 

received legal approval to run for an unprecedented second term. The 

passage in July of a Peace and Justice Law facilitated the demobilization 

of the remainder of the paramilitaries. By the end of the year, the AUC 

demobilized 13,000 of an estimated 20,000 members. In mid-December, 

the ELN, reduced in strength to about 2,000, began talks in Cuba. FARC 

strength remained about 12,000.111 If Uribe won the election in May, he 

would have another 4 years to build on the gains brought about by the 
121

DSDP. Instead of being a year of impending change and new policies, 

2006 could become one of continuity.

President Uribe provided unprecedented support to his security forces, 

but he demanded results and held commanders accountable for their organizations. Almost a dozen Army generals had lost their jobs by 2006 for 

reasons ranging from misusing funds to inadequate results against the 

narco­terrorists to disagreements over joint commands. Dismissals came 

suddenly and often publicly. In February, President Uribe dismissed 

General Castellanos—his Army commander and the highly-respected and 

successful commander of Operation Liberty I around Bogotá in 2003 and 

the first commander of JTF Omega from 2004 to 2005—after a serious 

hazing incident at an Army training facility. At the ceremony for General 

Mario Montoya, Castellanos’ replacement as Army commander, President 

Uribe informed his audience, “It’s difficult to defend the idea that we 

respect human rights . . . when we are accused of violating human rights 

inside the Armed Forces.”112 Dismissals for corruption and human rights 

reasons also occurred within the CNP. Perhaps the inability or unwillingness of security force senior leadership to fix responsibility and take 

prompt disciplinary action encouraged such Presidential action. Between 

dismissals and resignations during his first term as President, Uribe had 

three Ministers of Defense, two COLMIL commanders, and four Army 

commanders. Although many in the security forces questioned the wisdom and timing of some of these dismissals, few doubted the right of the 

President to take such action.

In March, General Craddock informed Congress that the “top priority” 

of USSOUTHCOM in Colombia had become the “safe return of the three 

American hostages” held by the FARC since early 2003. He praised the 

progress of the DSDP in strengthening Colombian democratic institutions 

and security—homicides had reached an 18-year low and attacks on 

towns had dropped 84 percent. Plan Patriota had disrupted the FARC 

support infrastructure, isolated its units, reduced its overall strength, and 

removed a score of mid-level commanders. In 2005, FARC losses totaled 

400 killed and 445 captured. Ongoing demobilization and reintegration 

of narcoterrorists—particularly AUC organizations—had included over 

16,000 autodefensas in 2005 and over 8,000 individual defectors from 

all 3 illegal armed groups—FARC, ELN, and AUC—since Uribe took 

office. Craddock highlighted the $4.5 billion MOD budget for 2006 and 

the interagency efforts of the CCAI. He stressed the continued importance 

of the expanded authorities to support Colombia’s “unified campaign” 

against narcotrafficking and terrorists and of the personnel cap of 800 
122

military and 600 civilians. He noted that the highest number of military 

personnel in country at any one time in support of “Plan Colombia” had 

been about 520.113 At the end of September 2005, there had been 359 DOD 

personnel and 365 civilian contractors in Colombia.114

The May Presidential election dominated events in the first 5 months 

of 2006. The FARC tried but failed to disrupt the elections. The security 

forces provided protection for the population and continued to push FARC 

elements into the remote jungles along the borders of Ecuador, Venezuela, 

and Panama. Over a 3-year period, the largest source of violence and 

human rights violations—the AUC—completed its collective demobilization on 18 April. During that time, 30,150 autodefensa members—a 

higher total than government estimates—surrendered over 17,000 weapons, 117 vehicles, and 3 helicopters along with urban and rural properties. 

Under the Justice and Peace Law—a controversial law that did not provide 

amnesty but did provide for reduced sentences—over 600 faced accountability for their crimes before a Justice and Peace Tribunal. In addition 

to these procedures, Colombia extradited some of the notorious AUC 

drug traffickers to the United States for prosecution.115 After 18 April, nondemobilized autodefensas became classified as criminals subject to apprehension and trial. In August, after further negotiations, a final AUC unit 

disbanded bringing the total demobilized in 38 actions to over 31,670 with 

over 18,000 weapons surrendered.116 How well the reintegration program 

would work remained a concern. Although some former AUC-controlled 

areas came under FARC, ELN, or criminal influence, most Colombians 

saw AUC demobilization as another step toward better security and governance. Running as an independent candidate for an unprecedented second 

term as President, Uribe received 62 percent of the votes on 28 May for his 

second straight first-round victory in the least violent Colombian election 

in two decades.117

Democratic Security Consolidation Policy and Plan 

Consolidacion: 2006–2008

On 19 July, Uribe began establishing his second-term security team 

when he named Juan Manuel Santos as Minister of Defense. A former 

Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Trade, and naval officer, Santos 

became the first civilian Minister of Defense to have had military service 

in addition to extensive government experience. He promised to carry on 

with the DSDP by “correcting what needs correcting, strengthening what 

needs strengthening and continuing what needs continuing” and by making “life more difficult for . . . [the narcoterrorists] every day.” Santos 

said his naval service allowed him to understand the Armed Forces and 
123

“demand more from them” since he knew “their foibles, their fears, their 

strengths, and their weaknesses.” Disliking “making clean sweeps,” he 

anticipated gradual changes in commanders.118 Then, in mid-August, Uribe 

announced his security force appointments. The head of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, General Freddy Padilla—an engineer officer who had commanded 7 

Brigade at Mitu, 5 Division at Bogotá in 2002, and served as Army inspector general—replaced Ospina as COLMIL commander. Admiral Guillermo 

Barrera assumed command of the Navy after Soto transformed it through 

his “Closing the Gap” strategy and the building of two riverine brigades 

during his 6-year tenure. General Jorge Ballesteros replaced Lesmes as Air 

Force commander. The recently appointed Army commander, Montoya, 

and the CNP commander, Major General Jorge Daniel Castro, retained 

their positions.119 Describing Padilla as “a capable man in strategic command, an expert in intelligence . . . [who] has a sense of well-founded 

planning . . . [and] who could reconcile military know-how with strategic command,” former Armed Forces commander General Tapias added, 

“Under his command the Armed Forces will be more united.”120

In the fall, a series of incidents involving security force activities 

undercut public confidence and again tied military intelligence—as had 

been noted in 1997—to “secret behavior . . . linked to the violation of 

human rights . . . not under the control of any government office.” Whether 

systemic or the result of pressure for positive results, poor coordination, or 

inadequate oversight, these concerns arose after a “friendly fire” incident 

between an Army unit and the police, faked terrorist attacks by Army antiterrorism officers in Bogotá, “false positives” that presented civilian dead 

as dead narcoterrorists, leaked classified information to the media, and 

abuses in the payment of rewards to informants who provided unreliable 

information. In the resulting confusion, it became difficult to sort out the 

real from the false. In spite of efforts over the years to improve intelligence 

analyses and sharing, the problem remained that the lack of an intelligence 

system meant “the organization that has the information is the one that 

handles the problem . . . [which] leads to non-sharing of information.” 

Minister Santos responded with a legislative proposal for intelligence sector reform, even though Colombia’s Congress had failed to act on a similar 

proposal earlier.121 After the dramatic security improvements during the 

first Uribe administration, the continued push for results created opportunities for abuse and a necessity for better supervision.

During this same period, increased narcoterrorist attacks added to 

the strains on the security forces. Through a series of attacks aimed at 

discrediting the security forces—bombings that included the Nueva 

Granada Military University in Bogotá and an assault against the isolated 
124

municipality of Tierradentro—the FARC reminded Colombians that it 

remained a threat. To attack Tierradentro, the FARC moved roughly 450 

guerrillas from three fronts into an area formerly under AUC control. The 

less than 60-man police garrison suffered 17 killed, but prevented the 

FARC from occupying the town.122 Immediately, the CNP reinforced the 

garrison and the Army moved forces that engaged the FARC elements. 

Putting these attacks into perspective, the COLMIL commander reminded 

the public of the security improvements over the previous 4 years—

FARC strength dropped almost a third to roughly 11,000, terrorist 

attacks occurred less frequently with less result, completion of the “most 

successful demobilization process” in Colombian history, and a steep 

decline in crime statistics. Addressing the “false positives,” he emphasized 

the care given to the orders issued and to the training provided military 

personnel to meet the goal that all “actions . . . correspond, day after day, 

to the guidelines of the Constitution and the Law” which, he noted, “is the 

only way to ensure that the Colombian people will continue to walk by 

our side.” Padilla acknowledged two failures—not capturing a member of 

the FARC Secretariat and not rescuing the political hostages. “This does 

not mean . . . that we are not trying,” he added because in 360 rescue 

operations over 480 captives had been released without a single hostage 

injury or death. Padilla’s message noted that “every day we are performing 

in an increasingly more professional and technical manner and in keeping 

with the Constitution and the law” while the narcoterrorists, despite the 

recent attacks, were being worn down and dispersed.123

By the end of 2006, the Colombian security forces had grown in size, 

complexity, and capability. During Uribe’s first 4 years (2002 to 2006), 

security force strength had grown 30 percent from 313,000 personnel in 

2002—203,000 COLMIL and 110,000 CNP—to 406,000 (+30 percent)—

276,000 COLMIL (+32 percent) and 139,000 CNP (+26 percent). The Army 

grew 35 percent from roughly 148,000—89,000 regulars without degrees, 

59,000 professionals, and no soldados campesinos—to over 200,000 with 

96,000 regulars (+8 percent), 79,000 professionals (+34 percent), and 

25,000 soldados campesinos. As in the preceding years, in 2006 the Army 

continued to increase the number and types of units it needed to counter 

the narcoterrorist threat. (For an overview of some of the Colombian Army 

expansion, see Table 4, Growth of Colombian Army units, 2002–2006.) 

Among the units created, three provided new capabilities. To counter the 

FARC snipers, the Army created sniper detachments. To provide each 

division commander a Reserve, the Army established a counterguerrilla 

battalion-size division reaction force (FURED) commanded by a major. 

In November, the Army organized a 3-BRIM, light division-equivalent 
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Fuerza de Accion Decisiva or Decisive Action Force (FURAD)—in effect 

a second FUDRA—to provide the COLMIL a strategic reaction force.124 In 

December—after a process than began in 2001 to replace 24 combat aircraft and a year after placing its order—the Air Force received its first 5 of 

25 Brazilian-made, day-and-night capable EMB-314 Super Tucano close 

air support aircraft equipped with Israeli avionics. This aircraft provided 

greater loiter time, quicker responsiveness, and more accurate engagement 

of ground targets.125 In an effort to improve performance, all HVT security 

force units came under a single office in the MOD. During operations in 

2006, at least six senior FARC leaders, including a General Staff member, died.126 With the demobilization of the AUC and almost 2,000 narcoterrorist desertions in 2006, the security forces could concentrate in 2007 

on a FARC that had less than 12,000 members, on the ELN with a strength 

of about 2,000, and on criminals and drug-traffickers.127

Building on the successes of the DSDP from 2002 to 2006 and 

supporting Uribe’s National Development Plan 2006–2010, “Community 

State: Development for Everyone,” Minister Santos published a new 

national defense policy, Democratic Security Consolidation Policy 

(DSCP), in early 2007. The DSCP moved beyond the focus on regaining 

Colombian Army 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 TOTAL

Divisions 1 1 2

Decisive Action Force (FUCAD) 1 1

Territorial Brigades 1 1 1 3 6

Mobile Brigades (BRIM) 2 1 3 3 3 12

Division Reaction Forces (FURED) 7 7

Urban Antiterrorism Special Forces Units

(AFEUR)

10 1 11

Special Operations Command (COESE) 1 1

Lancero Group 1 1

Counterguerrilla Battalions (BCG) 10 4 8 12 14 48

Mountain Battalions 2 2 1 1 6

Intelligence/Counterintelligence Regions 4 1 5

Technical Intelligence Units 2 2

Plan Meteoro Companies 7 2 9

Instruction/Training Centers 20 20

Sniper Detachments 41 41

Table 4. Growth of Colombian Army units, 2002–2006128
126

territorial control by the security forces to “social recovery of that territory 

through integrated state action”—a whole-of-government effort to establish 

security, governance, rule of law, and social programs. The “virtuous 

circle of security” concept explained the relationship between security 

improvements and economic and social development. (See Figure 11, 

Virtuous circle of security.) A three-phased territorial consolidation strategy 

and an Integrated Action Doctrine—in which the security forces worked 

with the CCAI where it was present and with local civilian officials where 

it was not—provided the foundation of the DSCP. The DSCP implementing 

principles stated that the security force would work to establish security 

and peace, act within the law, maintain a continuous presence, provide 

security to permit the rule of law, maintain flexibility and adapt to the 

1

2

3

4

6

5

In v e s tm en t

in S e c urity

C o n fid enc e

& S ta b ility

P riv a te

In v e s tm en t

E c o n om ic

G ro w th

Ta x e s = S o c ia l

In v e s tm en t

S o c ia l W e ll

B e in g – B a s ic

N e e d s S a tis factio n

Figure 11. Virtuous circle of security.
127

security threats, and coordinate with other security forces—“Each one of 

the Armed Forces will intensify its process to adapt to the joint operations 

doctrine,” and coordinate with other state agencies. The DSCP established 

five strategic objectives: consolidate territorial control and strengthen 

the rule of law throughout the national territory; protect the population 

and maintain the strategic initiative against all threats to citizen security; 

drastically raise the cost of trafficking in drugs; maintain modern, efficient, 

and legitimate security forces with earned public support and confidence; 

and sustain the downward trend in all urban crimes. To implement the 

DSCP, 28 plans, programs, and initiatives had been developed.129 How the 

security force commanders embraced the nonsecurity aspects of the DSCP 

remained to be determined.

To implement the DSCP, the COLMIL replaced Plan Patriota with Plan 

Consolidacion or Consolidation—initially called Plan Victoria or Victory. 

The general military strategic concept—“execute simultaneous joint operations across the entire country”—included consolidating governance to 

support legal economies, social investment, and a functional justice system; working with social investment and development agencies; working 

jointly with the CNP on all security and counterdrug efforts; and continuing 

the transformation and strengthening of the COLMIL. The three-phased 

consolidation strategy—clear, hold, and state buildup—sought to align the 

security, social, and counternarcotics efforts. In the first phase, clear, “red” 

areas with active illegal armed groups underwent a military-intensive 

effort to drive out these armed groups and to establish territorial control. 

Hold, the second phase, focused on police and military efforts to sustain 

security in “yellow” areas to attract government agencies for the establishment of governance and social programs. In the third phase, state buildup, 

stabilized or “green” areas received intensive political and social efforts 

to consolidate state authority and to establish all state agencies and public services. The COLMIL mission stressed weakening the narco­terrorist 

will to fight, forcing narcoterrorist demobilization and disarmament, protecting the population, securing the national economic infrastructure, and 

consolidating the rule of law. Breaking the will of the narcoterrorists and 

reducing their offensive capacity implied a change in the metrics of success—from killed guerrillas to surrendered or captured. Four principles 

governed joint operations: unity of effort through the rational use of integrated and coordinated forces; synchronization from matching operations 

in time, space, and purpose; synergy from teamwork; and flexibility from 

an ability to adapt to the operational environment. According to the plan, 

military joint commands increased capability, decentralized employment, 

improved synergy through integration, improved employment and control, 
128

improved counterdrug interdiction operations, and reduced the offensive 

capacity of the narcoterrorists.130 Just as it took time to build the forces 

necessary and experience to refine the operations that made Plan Patriota

successful, Plan Consolidacion would require a multiyear, trial-and-error 

effort to approach its goals.

Confirming his predecessor’s focus, Admiral James Stavridis, the 

USSOUTHCOM commander in October 2006, stated that freeing the 

American hostages was his “first and foremost” priority. In addition, the 

security situation in Colombia remained an area of focus and of great 

success—the result of Colombian interagency efforts and US resources 

and support—given that 10 years before “beheadings, kidnappings, torture, 

and bombings occurred essentially daily.” “Since 2000,” Stavridis noted, 

“Colombia stands out as a true reflection of what steady partnership with 

the US can achieve.” He saw this reflected by sustained combat operations, 

the development of actionable intelligence, the protection of critical 

infrastructure, and improved civil-military cooperation—all performed 

within the “norms of international human rights and the rule of law.” 

Stavridis emphasized the importance of training, particularly human rights 

training, that the Western Hemisphere Institute of Security Cooperation 

(WHINSEC) provided. He promised to “continue to bring innovative and 

experimental capabilities under development into Colombia”—unmanned 

systems, detecting objects under dense foliage, data fusion, biometrics—

and “near real time support” from such “cutting edge technologies.” He 

highlighted several programs—logistic support to JTF Omega and Plan 

Consolidacion, logistics support for helicopter aircrew and maintenance 

personnel, fielding of “Midnight Express” boats to the Navy for interdiction, 

and working with 2 Riverine Brigade. Stavridis asked for Congressional 

support for a proposed Center for Excellence in Human Rights noting 

that USSOUTHCOM was the only combatant command with a dedicated 

human rights program.131 In 2006—after resisting US vetting procedures 

for years—the new MOD team, and the Colombian Army in particular, 

embraced human rights vetting. In time, instead of a short list of vetted 

units, the MILGP maintained a shorter list of nonvetted units.132 The MILGP 

continued to provide logistics, technical, and training support for a variety 

of programs that addressed ground operations, helicopter operations, 

maritime interdiction, riverine operations, air support, intelligence, joint, 

and civil-military issues. In 2007, most PATTs—now part of the MILGP 

Field Liaison Groups—moved to support units in JTF Omega where they 

coordinated US support and provided information on ongoing operations.133

Discussions began on the multiyear transition of US military assistance 

and counterdrug programs to Colombian ownership scheduled for after 
129

fiscal year 2008. Ambassador William R. Brownfield arrived in August to 

oversee that process.

The past continued to influence the present. As governor of Antioquia, 

President Uribe had established CONVIVIR self-defense units to address 

the security situation in his department. Allegations of ties to the autodefensas by Uribe and by some of his supporters, to include members of 

Congress, created a scandal that exposed a relationship between the paramilitaries and elements in the political and economic elite. Confirmation 

of these charges against some resulted in convictions and prison. Security 

force personnel faced similar charges. The Army commander faced allegations that his brigade had worked with the autodefensas in reestablishing government control of a neighborhood in Medellín known as Comuna 

13 during Operation Orion in October 2002.134 During the annual DOS 

human rights certification process, the Colombian Attorney General’s 

Office reported that since 1 January 2002 it had initiated disciplinary proceedings against 54 military personnel for presenting 94 dead civilians, 

killed accidentally or intentionally, as dead guerrillas. Half of these cases 

remained under investigation, but half had been recommended for disciplinary action. In addition, six cases had been filed against Army personnel in five different departments alleging their “participation in the deaths 

of individuals whom they later presented to the public as guerrillas and 

on whom they reportedly planted firearms to confirm the accusation that 

they were subversives.”135 Given the importance of results, the shortage 

of officers and NCOs, the increase in combat operations, and the belief 

that successful combat operations meant dead guerrillas, the fact that these 

“false positives” occurred should have been no surprise.

Despite the problems addressed above, security force operations 

continued against the illegal armed groups throughout the country. JTF 

Omega focused on clearing and holding the municipalities in its area of 

operations in the heart of what had been a FARC-dominated region. With 

improvements in targeting (human intelligence, technical intelligence, 

and intelligence sharing) and in attack capabilities (CCOPE, Air Force 

Super Tucanos, helicopter-borne Army units), successes against leadership targets complemented the successes of local operations. By the end 

of the summer, a senior FARC commander—El Negro Acacio—had been 

killed, a major drug trafficker—Don Diego—had been captured, and the 

camp of another FARC leader destroyed. “Nowadays there is no safe place 

for the FARC leaders,” noted the COLMIL commander because it had 

“acquired technological capacity that they did not have previously, and 

their organization and equipment, with the support of friendly countries, 

is giving fruit. Day or night, there is no place where the Armed Forces 
130

cannot venture” without surprise and decisiveness.136 Under this pressure 

of sustained and increasingly successful combat operations by the security forces, FARC units diminished in strength, became isolated from one 

another, and moved to the border areas for safety. In June, a FARC front 

holding 12 legislators from the Valle Del Cauca department hostage since 

their capture in Cali in 2002 killed 11 of them. To justify the action, the 

FARC blamed a botched hostage rescue when no operation had occurred. 

It appeared that the FARC commander either feared such an attempt or no 

longer possessed the means or the will to hold these important hostages.137

The security force operations continued to stress a weakened FARC organization and to disrupt narcotrafficking activities.

Plan Consolidacion placed greater focus on the integrated action of the 

security forces and civilian government organizations. Before 2007, the 

CCAI had attempted to coordinate pilot programs in 11 priority regions that 

encompassed 58 municipalities. Some of the programs worked well, others 

failed to produce useful results. The CCAI’s number one priority region—

the Zona Sur or south zone included JTF Omega’s area of operations—

had proved a difficult area in which to make progress.138 Under the DSCP, 

Santos explained, “We have to go to the more remote areas, where we have 

drug trafficking and illegal groups and we have poverty” and the military 

had to work with civilian agencies to provide healthcare, schools, and 

infrastructure improvements—something that had not happened in that area 

before.139 In August, the MOD sponsored the CCAI Plan de Consolidacion 

Integral de la Macarena (PCIM), a project for six municipalities in Meta 

department. In addition to security and drug eradication, the PCIM focused 

on five areas: governability, institutional development, and citizenship; 

territorial order and property rights; infrastructure and connectivity; 

access to public goods and social services; and business and economic 

development. Although JTF Omega had operated in this area since 2004, 

progress against 27 and 43 FARC Fronts—among the largest and best 

armed—improved in 2007 after the focus shifted from clearing or killing 

guerrillas to holding the areas cleared. During the next year in the PCIM 

areas, FARC morale dropped, desertions rose, and its drug-based economic 

support declined.140 As with many security and development programs in 

Colombia, sustainability and the role of the security forces in nonsecurity 

functions remained a question.

By the end of 2007, the narcoterrorist threat had continued to 

decline—FARC strength had dropped to 9,500 and a 2,000-member ELN 

still talked negotiations. However, new illegal groups with ties to narcotrafficking arose in areas. The local department and municipality elections 

in October proceeded without interference with only 25 candidates killed 
131

nationwide.141 Crime statistics dropped and narcoterrorist desertions 

increased. During the year, narcoterrorist units had not attacked a town.142

The MOD reported 67 percent of the population in “green” or state building 

areas, 19 percent in “yellow” or hold areas, and only 14 percent in “red” 

or clear areas.143 Counternarcotics operations increased in number and in 

results. Manual eradication—now the preferred Colombian eradication 

method—increased 50 percent. Extraditions to the United States reached 

a record 164. To create additional units to support holding operations, the 

CNP reorganized its 150-man Carabinero squadrons into 120-man units.144

Despite these improvements and operational successes by the security 

forces, the FARC remained undefeated.

Nevertheless, an undefeated FARC did not mean a capable FARC. 

Not only had FARC strength declined to almost half its peak strength—the 

result of increased deaths and desertions that included mid-level leaders—

but at least 20 fronts, to include the elite Teofilo Forero mobile column, 

had become ineffective or ceased to exist. Among these units, the Teofilo 

Forero column had been reduced to 54 of 200 members, 52 Front near 

Bogotá disbanded when its last three members moved to other fronts, the 

200-man 40 Front in Meta disbanded, 26 and 31 Fronts had fewer than 50 

of 220 members, and 19 and 35 Fronts in the north disappeared from deaths 

and desertions. Security force operations forced most fronts to disperse 

into small groups. Improved sharing of real-time, actionable intelligence 

between the military services and the increased bombing accuracy of the 

Super Tucano aircraft permitted the operations that killed two important 

FARC commanders—El Negro Acacio in September and Martin Caballero 

in October. With its advanced firing systems and accurate bombing, the 

Super Tucano permitted ground forces to arrive at the target almost immediately after engagement. A Colombian Army general said, “The use of 

what are known as intelligent weapons improve the effectiveness of the 

operations and eliminated the use of wide area bombing that made more 

noise than caused deaths.”145 Capabilities had improved to the point that if 

a HVT could be located by human or signals intelligence, it could be targeted. If it could be targeted, it could be attacked promptly and accurately 

from the air. Ground forces could be pre-positioned so that immediately 

after the air attack, these units exploited the site to assess the damage and 

to gather intelligence about other potential targets. To counter this threat, 

FARC units dispersed in small groups and minimized their use of electronic communications equipment, which further hampered its command 

and control.

In January 2008, a Colombian analyst acknowledged that the military 

consolidation strategy—based on a larger budget, increased personnel, 
132

and the payment of rewards to informants—had “won a level of initiative . . . managed to get the guerrillas to retreat, and . . . managed to get 

the government to somewhat regain territorial control” while seeking to 

demobilize the illegal armed groups, capture their members, and maintain 

a presence in every municipality. Despite some success against mid-level 

leaders, he noted the security force failure to strike members of its principal HVT—the FARC Secretariat.146 That changed with Operation Fenix or 

Phoenix on 1 March. In a carefully planned, professionally executed joint 

operation involving CNP, Army, and Air Force units, the COLMIL struck 

the camp of Raul Reyes—the FARC number two and chief spokesman—

just inside the border of Ecuador. After a bombing attack, ground forces 

assaulted the site and found the body of Reyes and a laptop computer with 

valuable intelligence about the FARC and its supporters. Military analyst 

Alfredo Rangel commented: 

His death comes after a lot of defeats at the hand of the 

army, the capture of leaders, the killings of leaders, the 

loss of territory, the reduction in finances, the reduction 

in military capability. So this could be very significant, 

in the perception of the guerrillas may have about the 

possibility of military success in the future. This shows 

that its military project has no possibility of triumphing 

in Colombia.147

Within days, a second Secretariat member and the principal FARC peace 

negotiator, Ivan Rios, died in northwest Colombia at the hand of his bodyguard who presented Rios’ right hand—along with a laptop computer—as 

proof of death when he claimed a reward of over $2.5 million.148 Although 

it would be 2 months before the news broke, the long-time FARC leader, 

Manuel Marulanda, died of a heart attack on 26 March making Alfonso 

Cano the FARC commander.149 Within less than a month, three of the 

seven-member Secretariat had died from military attack, treachery, or natural causes. Despite these successes, the FARC was able to fill the three 

vacancies on the Secretariat.

Citing the progress in security, judicial matters, and political transparency, in March Admiral Stavridis described Colombia as “on the 

brink of winning its peace and making its successful gains against terrorism and social disorder irreversible.” During the 3-year transition to 

Colombian-owned programs, US support of the Armed Forces and the 

interagency efforts in former FARC-controlled regions would focus on 

training, mobility, and sustaining “key infrastructure programs” that provided “long-term self-sufficiency” supported by a 12-percent increase in 
133

the Colombian defense budget that would provide $3.7 billion between 

2007 and 2010.150 During the Uribe period, over 55 percent of the US 

funding—CNP and COLMIL counterdrug—continued to support counterdrug programs. The remaining 45 percent was divided almost evenly 

between nonmilitary and Army programs. (See Table 5, US assistance to 

Colombia, 2003–2008.) The majority of the CNP assistance supported the 

DIRAN’s counterdrug operations, its elite Junglas, and the Carabineros—

about 15,000 personnel or 10 percent of the national police. The majority 

of the COLMIL training and assistance focused on counterdrug units—

BRCNA, aviation, and riverine; on infrastructure security; and on elite 

units like the CCOPE and JTF Omega—likewise a small percentage of the 

COLMIL manpower.151 The majority of the funding—military and nonmilitary—came from the Colombian Government. To support the transfer 

of programs to Colombia and to make the security gains irreversible, the 

MILGP identified 20 programs grouped into 8 program areas that it listed 

by funding priority: rotary-wing operations, ground operations, riverine 

operations, fixed-wing operations, joint initiatives, naval interdiction, 

governability, and intelligence and communications.152 A Government 

Accounting Office (GAO) report on the US transition efforts concluded—

as with earlier programs in Colombia—that efforts were “not guided by an 

integrated plan that fully addresses the complex mix of agency programs, 

differing agency goals, and varying timetables for nationalization.”153

In March, the issue of “false positives” arose again as a debate surfaced within the MOD between generals who supported aggressive operations that focused on killing narcoterrorists or guerrillas and those who 

favored metrics other than body counts. The chronic but isolated problem 

of military personnel killing civilians—extrajudicial killings—and passing them off as guerrilla dead had grown as the pressure for results clashed 

with improved security that made results more difficult. Most victims had 

been peasant farmers, but the number of kidnapped urban poor killed had 

grown. Over 650 cases between mid-2003 and mid-2007 that involved 

over 1,000 dead were under investigation. Minister Santos acknowledged the problem: “I’ve told all my soldiers and policemen that I prefer 

a demobilized guerrilla, or a captured guerrilla, to a dead guerrilla.” He 

added, “I have said this very clearly: the soldier who commits a crime 

becomes a criminal, and he will be treated as a criminal.” In addition, 

Plan Consolidacion had emphasized the demobilization or surrender of 

narcoterrorists. This implied a metric of success that gave priority first to 

surrendered, second to captured, and last to killed guerrillas. However, 

many in the military supported aggressive, decentralized operations and 

shared the view espoused by the Army commander: “What’s the result 
134

of offensives? Combat. And if there’s combat, there are dead in combat.” 

Successful combat meant dead guerrillas. In fact, soldiers received extra 

pay or time off for kills in combat, but for those captured or who surrendered no such rewards accrued—just the burden of securing and feeding 

them until they could be transferred to the police. A former soldier said, 

“The army gives prizes for kills, not for control of territory.”155 Although 

the COLMIL plan emphasized demobilization of the narcoterrorists, many 

Army operations continued to stress its core function and its metric of success for the past 44 years—dead guerrillas.

After the military successes against Secretariat members in March, 

Alfonso Cano struggled to gain control of the FARC. First, the constant 

pressure of security force operations wore the FARC down. A FARC 

commander wrote that the Army “doesn’t let up. The number of troops 

is enormous. Sometimes we eat once a day.” This stress led to despair, 

increased desertions, and fear of betrayal. Second, security force capabilities 

and successes disrupted FARC command and control. Afraid of detection 

Dollars in millions FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08

(Est.) TOTAL

Promote Social and Economic

Justice

$125.7 $126.4 $124.7 $130.4 $139.8 $194.4 $841.4

Alternate Development $60.2 $59.8 $70.7 $72 $68.2 $119.7 $450.6

Internally Displaced Persons $41.5 $42.6 $32 $30.7 $31.1 $35.3 $213.2

Demobilization/Reintegration $8.9 $15.7 $18.3 $42.9

Democracy and Human Rights $24 $24 $22 $18.8 $24.8 $21.1 $134.7

Promote Rule of Law-Judicial

Reform and Capacity Building

$27 $9 $7.3 $10.5 $7.8 $39.4 $101

CNP $164.5 $172.2 $190.9 $204.5 $217.7 $155 $1104.8

Eradication $63.7 $44.2 $82.5 $81.7 $82 $66.5 $420.6

Air Service $62.3 $71.2 $70 $70.5 $69 $52.5 $395.5

Interdiction $21 $41 $16.9 $16.5 $16.5 $16.5 $128.4

Police Presence—Conflict Zones $15.5 $13.8 $20.1 $19.4 $18.7 $87.5

Other $2 $2 $1.4 $16.4 $31.5 $19.5 $72.8

COLMIL Counterdrug $203.3 $268.1 $249.9 $213.4 $222.4 $182.2 $1339.3

Air Interdiction $8 $7.1 $4.6 $18.8 $10 $48.5

Coastal/River Interdiction $26.2 $11.8 $19.1 $19.2 $13 $89.3

Counterdrug Funding $195.3 $234.8 $238.1 $189.7 $184.4 $159.2 $1201.5

Colombian Army $240.1 $177.3 $144.9 $169.4 $151.3 $86.1 $969.1

Aviation $140.8 $155.2 $127.5 $143.2 $129.6 $69.7 $766

Ground Forces $6.3 $18.1 $13.4 $22.2 $17.7 $16.4 $94.1

Infrastructure Security $93 $4 $4 $4 $4 $109

TOTAL $760.6 $753 $717.7 $728.2 $739 $657.1 $4355.6

Table 5. US assistance to Colombia, 2003–2008154
135

from the use of mobile phones, the FARC reverted to foot messengers. In 

May, Karina—a one-eyed, 24-year veteran and Front female commander—

surrendered. She announced that she had not communicated with her 

commanders for over 2 years and added, “Everywhere we went, the army 

was there. We couldn’t sleep in one place for more than one night.” Third, 

the government used some of those who surrendered as guides to locate 

their former units and used others to make radio and television appeals 

to their comrades. A FARC commander complained that defectors “are 

constantly on the air” and that in his unit 10 members deserted and 4 of 

them surrendered to government forces. Fourth, Mono Jojoy—the FARC 

military and the Southern bloc commander—had became a rival for FARC 

leadership. And, as if he had no other problems, the improving security 

force intelligence net—using a nationwide network of civilian informants, 

aerial intelligence systems, and improved intelligence sharing between the 

Armed Forces and the police—increased the vulnerability of all HVTs.156

On 2 July the Colombian Army launched one of the boldest, most 

masterful hostage rescue operations ever conducted—Operation Jaque

or Check. After months of tracking a group of FARC political hostages 

that included former Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt captured in 

2002, three American contractors—Keith Stansell, Thomas Howes, and 

Marc Gonsalves—taken in 2003, and 11 long-held security force personnel, Colombian intelligence personnel proposed an unusual scheme using 

informants and simulated communications between senior FARC leaders 

and the 1 Front commander—Cesar—who held the prisoners. Convinced 

that Cano wanted to move the hostages, Cesar brought them together, met a 

civilian helicopter that included aid workers, press personnel, and a FARC 

member he knew, loaded the hostages on the helicopter, and agreed to fly 

to the rendezvous. He had no idea that the white MI-17 was an Army helicopter or that the unarmed civilians onboard were security force personnel executing a carefully planned, thoroughly rehearsed rescue. Without a 

shot fired, Operation Jaque dealt the FARC another crippling blow—loss 

of its political hostages and capture of its 1 Front commander.157 Taking 

pride in the success gained and personally aware of the risks run, a senior 

Colombian officer remarked, “People will always say it’s impossible 

that Colombians did this on their own. Of course the gringos have to be 

present.”158 Ambassador Brownfield acknowledged, “This mission was a 

Colombian concept, a Colombian plan, a Colombian training operation, 

then a Colombian operation.” Then he added the United States “had been 

working with them more than five years on every single element that came 

to pass that pulled off this operation, as well as the small bits that we did on 
136

this operation.”159 Few denied the critical support role played by American 

assistance over the years or the intense US military focus on rescuing the 

American hostages, but few militaries would have considered, much less 

executed, this Colombian operation.

Changing an institutional culture is difficult; it takes time, often 

decades, to go from saying something to having that something accepted 

to having that something done routinely within a military organization. 

The process may begin with training or directions from the top, but it 

takes much more—things like constant emphasis, widespread supervision, 

strict accountability, rewards for success, and punishments for failure—to 

change the way a military thinks about its roles, and thus what it does. On 

3 October, the MOD convened a special military commission to investigate the deaths of 11 urban poor who were killed as guerrillas in northeast 

Colombia. Before the end of the month, President Uribe fired 20 Army 

officers—3 generals that included 2 division commanders, 4 colonels, 7 

lieutenant colonels, and 6 others—along with 7 soldiers. In the largest 

human-rights related dismissals during his presidency, Uribe said, “In 

some instance, there has been negligence in the army, and that has permitted some people to involve themselves in crimes, which in some regions 

end in the killings of innocents to show success against the criminals.” 

Santos declared that the 27 were “administratively responsible” through 

acts of commission or omission and repeated for his commanders, “The 

measurement of success cannot be body count. Our men have to be commended for controlling territory, for the number of demobilizations that 

are registered. I have said it many times. I prefer a demobilized guerrilla 

to a combat kill.”160 Not consulted about the firings, the Colombian Army 

commander resigned to be replaced by General Oscar Gonzalez.161 By 

2008, most observers agreed that the security forces had made tremendous 

progress in the human rights area. A Colombian analyst described their 

“theoretical emphasis the best in the world, better than Switzerland,” but 

acknowledged, as in many places, it was not always done well in practice.162

What some saw as a chronic problem still uncontrolled, others viewed as a 

regrettable but isolated incident that received prompt, decisive action.

Improved performance against the narcoterrorist groups—and 

increased security—came from larger security forces, better training, 

sustained combat operations, and the consolidation strategy. By the end of 

2008, Colombia appeared to be on the brink of success in its struggle against 

these groups. The FARC numbered less than 9,000 members and the ELN 

remained at about 2,000.163 Building on the Pastrana increases, under Uribe 

the security forces had grown from 313,000 in 2002—203,000 COLMIL 
137

and 110,000 CNP—to almost 432,000 in 2008—286,000 COLMIL and 

146,000 CNP. The 212,000-member Army had roughly 101,000 regulars, 

86,000 professionals, and 25,000 soldados campesinos.

164 In addition, the 

whole-of-government consolidation effort moved forward under Uribe’s 

DSCP. Although the immediate threat of defeat no longer existed as it 

had in 1998, questions remained about the ability to further reduce crime, 

about the sustainability of the consolidation programs, about the MOD 

reform effort and joint commands, about the roles and missions of the 

security forces, about the ability of the military to do integrated action 

or civil-military projects, and about the road Colombia might take after 

President Uribe. Many of these questions may be answered by the end of 

the second Uribe presidency in 2010 and after the transition of US-funded 

programs. Then one can better evaluate if the security gains and increased 

governance can be considered irreversible.
138

Notes

1. Republic of Colombia, Democratic Security and Defense Policy, 

Republic of Colombia, 16 June 2003, 7.

2. “Colombian Minister Stresses Importance of Role of State in Security 

Issues,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 21 October 2002, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?index=19&did=217198381&SrchMode=2&sid=15&Fmt= 

3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1236966153&

clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

3. James T. Hill, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee 

on the State of Special Operations Forces,” 12 March 2003, http://armedservices.

house.gov/comdocs/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-03-

12hill.html (accessed 18 March 2009).

4. Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: The Uribe Administration and 

Congressional Concerns,” Congressional Research Service Report, 14 June 

2002. Serafino concluded that from a US Congressional perspective, Uribe’s 

three major challenges were (1) counternarcotics, (2) economic, and (3) security. 

Uribe probably would have agreed with security and economic; Yadira Ferrer, 

“Colombia: Uribe Launches Controversial Network of Informers,” Global 

Information Network, 9 August 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=32

1047661&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 

4 November 2008).

5. Myles R.R. Frechette, Colombia and the United States—The 

Partnership: But What is the Endgame? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, February 2007), 17.

6. “Colombian Minister Stresses Importance of Role of State in Security 

Issues.”

7. Ferrer, “Colombia: Uribe Launches Controversial Network of 

Informers.”

8. David Adams, “President Declares Emergency as 100 Die in Colombia,” 

Times, 13 August 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=13&did=14874

8841&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&

VName=PQD&TS=1245765801&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

9. Juan Forero, “Burdened Colombians Back Tax to Fight Rebels,” New 

York Times, 8 September 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=

163053271&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT

=309&VName=PQD&TS=1245780557&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 

2008).

10. Rachel Van Dongen, “‘Zones’ Suspend Colombian Rights; Military 

Put in Charge of Security, Given Authority Over Civilians,” Washington Times, 

3 December 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&did=250009071

&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&V 

Name=PQD&TS=1245781832&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

11. United Nations, “Report of the United Nations High Com­mis­sioner 

for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia,” United Nations 
139

Commission on Human Rights, 24 February 2003, 43, http://www.unhchr.ch/

Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/1304674285b7eb3bc1256cf5003906fb?Opendocument 

(accessed 19 March 2009).

12. “Defense Minister Says Security Forces Must Be Present Throughout 

Colombia,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 26 August 2002, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=155320491&SrchMode=2&sid=1&

Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124577

5397&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

13. “Colombia: General Reacts to Public Reprimand of Armed Forces by 

President Uribe,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 29 August 2002, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=156290021&SrchMode=2&sid=1&

Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124577

9069&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

14. Darren D. Sprunk, “Transformation in the Developing World: An 

Analysis of Colombia’s Security Transformation” (Monterey, CA: Naval 

Postgraduate School Thesis, September 2004), 46 and 57.

15. US Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report for 2002” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 1 March 2003), http://www.state.

gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/index.htm (accessed 1 October 2008).

16. “Colombian Minister Stresses Importance of Role of State in Security 

Issues.”

17. Sprunk, “Transformation in the Developing World,” 72.

18. Scott Wilson, “Colombia Poised to Install Leader as Rebels Attack; 

Dozens Dead in Wide-Ranging Offensive on Eve of Hard-Liner’s Inauguration,” 

Washington Post, 7 August 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&did= 

146818411&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT

=309&VName=PQD&TS=1245852022&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 

2008).

19. K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino, “Andean Regional Initiative 

(ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and 

Neighbors,” Congressional Research Service Report, updated 22 January 2003, 

31 and 42.

20. This replaced the Clinton administration’s Presidential Decision 

Directive 73, which established a strict distinction between counterdrugs and 

counterinsurgency.

21. John A. Cope, “Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy” (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic 

Forum 194), October 2002, 5–7.

22. Notes from a review of MILGP weekly reports and discussions with 

American military personnel.

23. Galen Jackman, “Media Roundtable with US Southern Command J‐3 

(Operations Chief),” 4 October 2002, http://ciponline.org/colombia/02100401.

htm (accessed 3 June 2009).

24. Notes from a review of MILGP weekly reports.

25. Notes from discussion with Colombian civilian officials.
140

26. Republic of Colombia, “Colombia: Building a Path toward a New 

Horizon,” Briefing, 2008.

27. Colombian Ministry of National Defense, “Logros de la Politicia de 

Consolidacion de La Seguridad Democratica—PCSD,” Briefing, February 2009, 

http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/ (accessed 19 March 2009).

28. Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, Direccionamiento Estrategico, 2003. 

Comando General Fuerzas Militares, 2003; William F. Perez, “An Effective 

Strategy for Colombia: A Potential End to the Current Crisis,” US Army War 

College Student Paper, 3 May 2004, 10–11.

29. Carlos A. Ospina Ovalle, Politicas de Commando: Guia Operacional 

2003 (Bogotá: Fuerzas Militares de Colombia Ejercito Nacional, 2003).

30. US General Accounting Office, Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure 

Colombia’s Cano Limon-Covenas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but 

Challenges Remain (Washington, DC: GAO, September 2005), 1–13.

31. Scott Wilson, “US Moves Closer to Colombia’s War; Involvement of 

Special Forces Could Trigger New Wave of Guerrilla Violence,” Washington 

Post, 7 February 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&did=2840683

41&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&V

Name=PQD&TS=1246038232&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

32. Notes from discussion with American military official.

33. Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the 

Ground (New York, NY: Random House, 2005), 64 and 77.

34. US GAO, Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia’s Cano 

Limon-Covenas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, 3 and 15–18.

35. “1998 Bombing Cited as US Decertifies Unit in Colombia,” New York 

Times, 15 January 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=27716

7311&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&

VName=PQD&TS=1246045418&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008); 

T. Christian Miller, “THE WORLD; Colombian Air Force Chief Quits; General 

Resigns Amid US Pressure and New Evidence Suggesting that Pilots Knowingly 

Fired on Civilians during a 1998 Bombing Raid,” Los Angeles Times, 26 August 

2003, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=388820971&SrchMode=2

&sid=5&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS

=1246045550&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

36. Notes from a review of MILGP weekly reports.

37. Hill, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on the 

State of Special Operations Forces,” 12 March 2003.

38. James T. Hill, “Colombia: Key to Security in the Western Hemisphere,” 

The Heritage Foundation Lecture 790, 16 April 2003, http://www.heritage.org/

Research/LatinAmerica/HL790.cfm (accessed 15 September 2008).

39. Gabriel Marcella, The United States and Colombia: The Journey from 

Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

May 2003), 21.

40. Notes from a review of MILGP weekly reports and discussions with 

American military officials.
141

41. “Colombian Government Issues Official Report on ‘FARC Genocide,’” 

BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 6 May 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index

=0&did=332739061&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType= 

PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246114047&clientId=5904 (accessed 

4 November 2008); Margarita Martinez, “Colombian Chief Takes Blame in Rescue 

Fiasco, Sound of Helicopters Set Off an Orgy of Death in the Jungle,” San Antonio 

Express–News, 7 May 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&did=780

326551&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309

&VName=PQD&TS=1246114784&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

42. “Colombia: Joint Operation Against FARC’s Teofilo Forero Unit Bags 

52 Guerillas,” BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 3 June 2003, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=343349231&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3& 

VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246115960& 

clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

43. “Colombia: US Insists on Approval of Any Action to Free US Hostages,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 20 May 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=0&did=338532281&SrchMode=2&sid=5&Fmt= 3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246116365&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

44. Thomas A. Marks, “Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic 

Security,’” Small Wars and Insurgencies (June 2006): 203.

45. Republic of Colombia, Democratic Security and Defense Policy, 31–61.

46. Republic of Colombia, Democratic Security and Defense Policy, 37–

39.

47. Notes from discussion with Colombian civilian official; Thomas A. 

Marks, Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for “Democratic 

Security” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2005), 11–12; 

“Colombia: Peasant Soldiers Return Home after Completing Military Training,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas—Political, 6 March 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=0&did=301760851&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246135556&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

48. Rachel Van Dongen, “Colombia’s Newest Troops Don’t Have to Leave 

Home, Some 5,000 Troops Eagerly Enlist in a Program that Lets Them Serve in 

Own Villages,” Christian Science Monitor, 9 April 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=0&did=322434131&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246136585&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

49. Notes from discussions with Colombian and American civilian 

officials.

50. Marks, “Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security,’” 209; 

Notes from discussions with Colombian Army military officials.

51. Colombian Army, Colombian Army Military History (Bogotá: E3 

Section, Army Historical Studies Center, 2007), 356–357; Notes from discussions 

with Colombian Military officials.
142

52. Marks, Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for 

“Democratic Security,” 10–13.

53. Colombian Army, “Disposicion Numero 000021 Por medio de la cual 

se reorganiza el Ejercito Nacional,” 29 September 2003. Document signed by 

Colombian Army Commanding General Carlos Alberto Ospina. This document 

reorganized the Colombian Army in accordance with Article 29 of Law 1512 of 

11 August 2000.

54. Douglas Porch and Christopher W. Muller, “‘Imperial Grunts’ Revisited: 

The US Advisory Mission in Colombia,” in Military Advising and Assistance: 

From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007, ed. Donald Stoker (London: 

Routledge, 2008), 175–176; Notes from review of MILGP weekly reports and 

discussions with American military officials.

55. Kenneth Finlayson, “OPATT to PATT: El Salvador to Colombian and 

the Formation of Planning and Assistance Training Teams,” Veritas, Journal of 

Army Special Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 93.

56. Notes from discussions with American military officials. One official 

noted that the COLMIL commander did not request or formally approve the PATT 

concept. As he put it, the COLMIL commander did not say yes, but he did not say 

no.

57. Miller, “THE WORLD; Colombian Air Force Chief Quits.”

58. Thomas C. Bruneau, “Restructuring Colombia’s Defense Establishment 

to Improve Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness” (Monterey, CA: Center 

for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School (2004)), 4, http://www.

resdal.org/experiencias/main-lasa-04.html (accessed 11 March 2009).

59. Andrew Selsky, “Colombian Military Commander Resigns,” Washington 

Post, 13 November 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=7&did=44481

0391&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&

VName=PQD&TS=1246371401&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008); 

“Colombia Names New Armed Forces Leader,” New York Times, 19 November 

2003, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=453199511&SrchMode=2

&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS

=1246371594&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

60. “Army Chief Resolves to Get a Rebel Leader/Colombian General to Quit 

if He Fails,” Houston Chronicle, 20 December 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=0&did=504360601&SrchMode=2&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246371940&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

61. “Colombia: Military Forces Chief Asks Generals to Locate, Rescue 

All Hostages,” BBC Monitoring Americas, 27 November 2003, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=465970841&SrchMode=2&sid=5&Fmt=

3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124637

2576&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

62. “Army Chief Resolves to Get a Rebel Leader/Colombian General to 

Quit if He Fails.”
143

63. US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices 2003” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 25 February 2004), http://www.

state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27891.htm (accessed 16 March 2009); US DOS, 

“International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2002.”

64. Scott Wilson, “Colombia Targeting Rebel Strongholds; More Aggressive 

US-Backed Strategy Expected to Be More Challenging, Brutal,” Washington Post, 

25 January 2004, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=4&did=530444221&Sr

chMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=P

QD&TS=1246389072&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008); In discussions 

with senior Colombian Military officials, several expressed a similar sentiment 

about the plight of the population in areas controlled by the narcoterrorists.

65. Notes from discussions with senior Colombian and American military 

officials.

66. Rachel Van Dongen, “Plan Puts Colombia on Offensive; Top US 

Officials Asked Congress Last Week to Increase the Cap on Troops Allowed in 

Colombia,” Christian Science Monitor, 22 June 2004, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=0&did=653680301&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246456382&clientId=5904 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

67. James T. Hill, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee,” 

24 March 2004, http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/openingstatements 

andpressreleases/108thcongress/04-03-24hill.html (accessed 18 March 2009).

68. Hill, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee.”

69. Hill, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee”; 

Benjamin Mixon, “Written Statement of Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon, 

United States Army, Director of Operations, United States Southern Command 

before the 108th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 

Merging Threats and Capabilities,” 2 April 2004, http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/

docs/test04-04-02Mixon.doc (accessed 23 June 2009); Notes from a review of the 

weekly MILGP reports.

70. Hill, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee.”

71. Connie Veillette, “Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related 

Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance,” Congressional Research Service Report, 

updated 9 December 2004.

72. Alfred A. Valenzuela and Victor M. Rosello, “Expanding Roles and 

Missions in the War on Drugs and Terrorism: El Salvador and Colombia,” Military 

Review (March–April 2004), 28–35.

73. US General Accounting Office, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals 

Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; US Agencies Need More Detailed 

Plans for Reducing Assistance (Washington, DC: GAO, October 2008).

74. Republic of Colombia, “CCAI: Centro de Coordinacion de Accion 

Integral,” Briefing, 2007; Hill, “Statement before the House Armed Services 

Committee”; Notes from discussions with Colombian and American civilian and 

military officials.
144

75. US Department of State, Colombia Section, “International Narcotics 

Control Strategy Report for 2004” (Washington, DC: US DOS, March 2005), 

http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol1/html/42363.htm (accessed 1 

October 2008).

76. “Colombia: Two Analysts See Serious Problems with Government’s 

Security Policy,” BBC Monitoring Americas, 20 April 2004, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=621176981&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=

3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124655

3296&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

77. Van Dongen, “Plan Puts Colombia on Offensive”; Edmund Turner, 

“Written Statement before the 109th Congress House Government Reform 

Committee Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources,” 10 May 2005, 6, http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test05-05-

10Turner.doc (accessed 19 March 2009).

78. US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices 2004” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 28 February 2005), http://www.state.

gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41754.htm (accessed 16 March 2009).

79. Garry Leech, “US/COLOMBIA: Demobilizing the AUC?” NACLA 

Report on the Americas, September/October 2004, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdw

eb?did=693199551&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD 

(accessed 4 November 2008).

80. Kenneth Finlayson, “Colombian Special Operations Forces,” Veritas, 

Journal of Army Special Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 56–59.

81. Manuel A. Orellana, “How to Train An Army of Intelligence Analysts” 

(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, September 2005), 56.

82. Marks, Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for 

“Democratic Security,” 13.

83. Michelle L. Farrell, “Sequencing: Targeting Insurgents and Drugs in 

Colombia” (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School Thesis, March 2007), 74.

84. Ricardo A. Flores, “Improving the US Navy Riverine Capability: 

Lessons from the Colombian Experience” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 

School Thesis, December 2007), 54.

85. Colombian MOD, “Logros de la Politicia de Consolidacion de La 

Seguridad Democratica—PCSD”; US DOS, “Colombia Country Report on 

Human Rights Practices 2004.”

86. “FARC Offensive Signals Change in Tactics, Colombian Weekly Says,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas, 14 February 2005, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?

index=0&did=792945081&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTyp

e=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246639601&clientId=5904 (accessed 

4 November 2008); Farrell, “Sequencing: Targeting Insurgents and Drugs in 

Colombia,” 77–78.

87. Andrew Feickert, “US Military Operations in the Global War on 

Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia,” Congressional 

Research Service Report, 26 August 2005, 18.
145

88. “FARC Attacks Seek to Discredit President, Colombian Weekly Says,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas, 4 July 2005, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index 

=0&did=862530111&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType= 

PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246639073&clientId=5904 (accessed 

4 November 2008).

89. Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, “Rebels Reassert Deadly Agenda in 

Colombia,” Boston Globe, 26 May 2005, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?ind

ex=2&did=844886731&SrchMode=2&sid=5&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType

=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246640478&clientId=5904 (accessed 

4 November 2008).

90. Brantz J. Craddock, “Posture Statement before the 109th Congress 

House Armed Services Committee,” 9 March 2005, http://ciponline.org/colombia/

050309crad.pdf (accessed 1 October 2008).

91. Turner, “Written Statement before the 109th Congress House 

Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources.”

92. Notes from discussions with American military officials; Kenneth 

Finlayson, “‘Conducting the Orchestra:’ AOB 740 in Colombia,” Veritas, Journal 

of Army Special Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 69–73; Robert W. Jones Jr., 

“‘Who Taught Those Guys to Shoot Like Chuck Norris?’ ODA 746 in Tolemaida,” 

Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations History 2, no. 4 (2006): 73–78; 

Kenneth Finlayson, “‘There Is a Word I Need to Learn:’ ODA 741 and Colombian 

National Police Training at Espinal,” Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations 

History 2, no. 4 (2006): 79–84; Robert W. Jones Jr., “Special Forces in Larandia: 

ODA 753 and the CERTE,” Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations History 

2, no. 4 (2006): 85–90.

93. Notes from discussions with American military officials.

94. Finlayson, “OPATT to PATT,” 92–93.

95. Notes from review of MILGP weekly reports and discussions with 

American and Colombian Military officials.

96. “Colombia: Armed Forces Restructured,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, 

5 May 2005, http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/63192/colombia_armed_

forces_restructured (accessed 2 July 2009).

97. Douglas Porch, “Uribe’s Second Mandate, the War, and the Implications 

for Civil-Military Relations in Colombia,” Naval Postgraduate School, Center for 

Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insights 2 (February 2006), http://www.ccc.nps.

navy.mil/si/2006/Feb/porchFeb06.asp (accessed 19 March 2009).

98. “Retired Generals Fear Consequences of Military Restructuring—

Colombian Daily,” BBC Monitoring Americas, 2 May 2005, http://proquest.umi.

com/pqdweb?index=1&did=830857351&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst= 

PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1246652143&clientId=

5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

99. Notes from discussions with senior Colombian and American civilian 

and military officials.
146

100. Notes from review of MILGP weekly reports and discussions with 

senior Colombian and American civilian and military officials.

101. Notes from discussions with senior Colombian and American civilian 

and military officials.

102. Porch and Muller, “‘Imperial Grunts’ Revisited: The US Advisory 

Mission in Colombia,” 180–181.

103. Notes from discussions with former Colombian Army battalion 

commanders.

104. Notes from discussions with Colombian and American military officials; 

Porch and Muller, “‘Imperial Grunts’ Revisited: The US Advisory Mission in 

Colombia,” 184–185.

105. Republic of Colombia, “Colombia: Building a Path toward A New 

Horizon,” Briefing.

106. Steven C. Boraz, “Intelligence Reform in Colombia: Transparency and 

Effectiveness against Internal Threats,” Strategic Insights (May 2007).

107. Notes from discussion with Colombian Military official.

108. US General Accounting Office, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals 

Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved, 4–6.

109. US Department of State, “Report to Congress: US Assistance Program 

in Colombia and Plans to Transfer Responsibilities to Colombia,” March 2006, 

http://ciponline.org/colombia/0603stat.pdf (accessed 1 October 2008).

110. Farrell, “Sequencing: Targeting Insurgents and Drugs in Colombia,” 81.

111. US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices 2005” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 8 March 2006), http://www.state.

gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61721.htm (accessed 16 March 2009); US Department 

of State, Colombia Section, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 

2005” (Washington, DC: US DOS, March 2006), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/

nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62106.htm (accessed 1 October 2008).

112. Notes from discussions with Colombian and American military and 

civilian officials; Steven Dudley, “Colombian President Alienates Military 

Leaders,” McClatchey Tribune News Service, 21 March 2006, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=1007298581&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt

=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=12469

99653&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

113. Brantz J. Craddock, “Posture Statement before the 109th Congress 

House Armed Services Committee,” 16 March 2006, http://ciponline.org/

colombia/06031crad.pdf (accessed 1 October 2008).

114. Connie Veillette, “Colombia: Issues for Congress,” Congressional 

Research Service Report, updated 4 January 2006, 10.

115. “Colombia Says Paramilitary Demobilization Complete,” BBC 

Monitoring Newsfile, 18 April 2008, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=

0&did=1022593911&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=P

QD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1247072929&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 

November 2008).
147

116. Jose R. Perdomo, “Colombia’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy 

in the Demobilization of the Paramilitaries,” US Army War College Student Paper, 

29 March 2007, 15.

117. Farrell, “Sequencing: Targeting Insurgents and Drugs in Colombia,” 99; 

Frechette, Colombia and the United States—The Partnership, 19.

118. “Democratic Security Policy to Continue, Says Colombia’s New Defence 

Minister,” BBC Monitoring Americas, 26 July 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pq

dweb?index=0&did=1083390701&SrchMode=2&sid=7&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1247081947&clientId=5904 

(assessed 8 July 2009).

119. “Colombia Appoints New Head of Armed Forces,” Xinhua News 

Agency, 16 August 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=109

5412221&SrchMode=2&sid=9&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=

309&VName=PQD&TS=1247083356&clientId=5904 (accessed 8 July 2009); 

Colombian Navy, Closing the Gap: “Towards the Future”—The Naval Strategy, 

a Cornerstone in the Fight Against Narco-terrorism (Bogotá: Colombian Navy, 

2003).

120. “Colombia’s New Armed Forces Chief ‘Strategic’ Intelligence Expert,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas, 22 August 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?i

ndex=0&did=1102991381&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTyp

e=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1247680055&clientId=5904 (accessed 

4 November 2008).

121. “Colombian Public Losing Confidence in Military Intelligence, Daily 

Reports,” BBC Monitoring Americas, 27 September 2006, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1136001071&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt

=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=12471

55165&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 November 2008).

122. US Department of State, “Colombia Country Report on Human Rights 

Practices 2006” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 7 March 2007), http://www.state.

gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78885.htm (accessed 16 March 2009).

123. “Commander Defends Colombia Armed Forces in Interview,” BBC 

Monitoring Americas, 10 November 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?ind

ex=0&did=1159878151&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=

PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1247155196&clientId=5904 (accessed 4 

November 2008).

124. Colombian MOD, “Logros de la Politicia de Consolidacion de 

La Seguridad Democratica—PCSD”; Discussions with Colombian Military 

officials.

125. Paul Richfield, “Colombia Takes Its First Five Super Tucanos,” C4ISR 

Journal (7 December 2006), http://www.c4isrjournal.com/story.php?F=2408477 

(accessed 11 March 2009); “Colombia Buys 25 Super Tucanos,” Defesa@

Net, 8 December 2005, http://www.defesanet.com.br/embraer/super_tucano_

colombia7_e.htm (accessed 11 March 2009); Notes from discussions with 

Colombian Military officials.
148

126. US Department of State, Colombia Section, “International Narcotics 

Control Strategy Report for 2006” (Washington, DC: US DOS, March 2007), 

http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/vol1/html/80855.htm (accessed 1 

October 2008).

127. US DOS, “Colombia Report on Human Rights Practices 2006.”

128. Colombian MOD, “Logros de la Politicia de Consolidacion de La 

Seguridad Democratica—PCSD.”

129. Colombian Ministry of National Defense, Politica de Consolidacion 

de La Seguridad Democratica (PCSD) (Bogotá: Ministry of National Defense, 

2007), http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/ (accessed 19 March 2009).

130. Colombian Ministry of National Defense, “Democratic Security 

Consolidation Policy,” Briefing, 2008.

131. James Stavridis, “Posture Statement before the 110th Congress House 

Armed Services Committee,” 21 March 2007, http://armedservices.house.gov/

comdocs/schedules/2007.shtml (accessed 10 July 2009).

132. Notes from discussions with American civilian and military officials.

133. Notes from discussions with American and Colombian Military 

officials.

134. Constanza Vieira, “Colombia: Uribe Uses Military to Monitor 

Opposition Lawmakers,” Global Information Network, 23 April 2007, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1259095951&sid=4&Fmt=3&clientld= 

5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 3 November 2008).

135. “Colombian Military Links to Executions Could Hinder Human Rights 

Certification,” BBC Monitoring Americas, 25 June 2007, http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=0&did=1294313041&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO

D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1247325082&clientId=5904 

(accessed 3 November 2008).

136. “Colombian Military Chief Says Armed Forces Close to Defeating 

Guerrillas,” BBC Monitoring Americas, 17 September 2007, http://proquest.

umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1337048011&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt

=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=12473

30956&clientId=5904 (accessed 3 November 2008).

137. Juan Forero, “Colombian Leader Says Rebels Killed 11 Civilian 

Hostages,” Washington Post, 29 June 2007, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?in

dex=7&did=1296614111&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType

=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1247327973&clientId=5904 (accessed 

3 November 2008).

138. Republic of Colombia, “CCAI: Centro de Coordinacion de Accion 

Integral,” Briefing.

139. Juan Forero, “Colombia Tries Social Reform Programs as New Weapons 

Against Rebels; Aim Is to Establish a State Presence in Long-Neglected Areas,” 

Washington Post, 10 July 2007, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=

1301875571&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQ

T=309&VName=PQD&TS=1247333209&clientId=5904 (accessed 3 November 

2008).
149

140. Peter DeShazo, et. al., Colombia’s Plan de Consolidacion Integral de la 

Macarena: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, June 2009), 1–2, 7.

141. US Department of State, “Colombia Report on Human Rights Practices 

2007” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 11 March 2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/

rls/hrrpt/2007/100633.htm (accessed 16 March 2009); Notes from discussion 

with American military officials.

142. Republic of Colombia, “Colombia: Building a Path toward a New 

Horizon,” Briefing.

143. Colombian Ministry of National Defense, “Consolidating Achievements,” Briefing, July 2008, http://www.colombiaemb.org/docs/BRIEFING_

COLOMBIA_SECURITY_JULY_2008.PPT (accessed 10 July 2009).

144. US Department of State, Colombia Section, “International Narcotics 

Control Strategy Report for 2007” (Washington, DC: US DOS, March 2008), 

http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol1/html/100776.htm (accessed 1 

October 2008).

145. “Colombia’s FARC Seen as Considerably Weakened But Not Defeated,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas, 4 December 2007, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?

index=1&did=1392730681&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTyp

e=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1247343082&clientId=5904 (accessed 

3 November 2008).

146. “Colombian Military Plan Yet to Defeat FARC—Political Analyst,” 

BBC Monitoring Americas, 20 January 2008, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb

?did=1415609471&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD 

(accessed 3 November 2008).

147. Juan Forero, “Colombian Rebel Commander Killed; Strike by 

Government Forces Called Major Setback for FARC Guerrillas,” Washington 

Post, 2 March 2008, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=17&did=14381930

01&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&V

Name=PQD&TS=1247497351&clientId=5904 (accessed 3 November 2008).

148. Hugh Bronstein, Joshua Goodman, and Bill Faries, “Top Rebel 

Commander Killed by His Own Bodyguard, Colombia Says; Second FARC 

Leader Killed as Countries Agree to Ease Tensions,” Ottawa Citizen, 8 March 

2008, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=7&did=1443445081&SrchMode=

2&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&T

S=1247498664&clientId=5904 (accessed 3 November 2008).

149. Anonymous, “Manuel Marulanda,” Times, 27 May 2008, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1484996861&SrchMode=2&sid=5&

Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=12474

99810&clientId=5904 (accessed 3 November 2008).

150. James Stavridis, “US Southern Command 2008 Posture Statement,” 

13 March 2008, 15–16, http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=43 

(accessed 19 March 2009).

151. Notes from discussions with Colombian and American civilian and 

military officials.
150

152. US GAO, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, 

but Security Has Improved, 67.

153. US GAO, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, 

but Security Has Improved, 71.

154. US GAO, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, 

but Security Has Improved; 28, 47. Corrected addition errors in original.

155. Juan Forero, “Colombian Troops Kill Farmers, Pass Off Bodies as 

Rebels’,” Washington Post, 30 March 2008, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?i

ndex=2&did=1453809271&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTyp

e=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1247514403&clientId=5904 (accessed 

3 November 2008); Discussions with Colombian Military officers.

156. Jose de Cordoba, “Southern Front: Rebels Flail in Colombia after Death 

of Leader,” Wall Street Journal, 28 May 2008, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdwe

b?did=1485594701&sid=1&Fmt=4&clientld5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD 

(accessed 3 November 2008).

157. John Otis, “How Colombian Army Hoodwinked the Rebels,” Houston 

Chronicle, 4 July 2008, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=4&did=150542

0341&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&

VName=PQD&TS=1247584749&clientId=5904 (accessed 3 November 2008); 

Frank Bajak, “‘Can This Truly Work?’: Rebel Disarray, Acting Lessons, Payback 

All Part of Colombian Rescue,” North Adams Transcript, 4 July 2008, http://

proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1505423661&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientld=5094&R

QT= 309&VName=PQD (accessed 3 November 2008).

158. Tony Allen-Mills, “Daring Sting Freed Jungle Hostages,” Sunday Times, 

6 July 2008, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1505859291&sid=6&Fmt=3

&clientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 3 November 2008).

159. Juan Forero, “In Colombia Jungle Ruse, US Played a Quite Role; 

Ambassador Spotlights Years of Aid, Training,” Washington Post, 9 July 2008, 

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=3&did=1507416311&SrchMode=2&sid

=3&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=124

7586488&clientId=5904 (accessed 3 November 2008).

160. Juan Ferero, “Colombia Fires 27 From Army Over Killings; Youths’ 

Deaths Attributed to Stress on Body Counts,” Washington Post, 30 October 2008, 

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=7&did=1585149411&sod=6&Fmt=3&c

lientld=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 3 November 2008).

161. “General Montoya’s Replacement,” Semana.com, 10 November 

2008, http://www.semana.com/wf_ImprimirArticuloIngles.aspx?IdArt=117595 

(accessed 15 January 2009).

162. Notes from discussion with Colombian and American civilian and 

military officials.

163. US Department of State, “Colombia Report on Human Rights Practices 

2008” (Washington, DC: US DOS, 25 February 2009), http://www.state.gov/g/

drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119153.htm (accessed 16 March 2009).

164. Colombian MOD, “Logros de la Politicia de Consolidacion de La 

Seguridad Democratica—PCSD,” Briefing.
151

Chapter 4

Observations from the Colombian Security Force Experience

Repeating an Afghanistan or an Iraq—forced regime 

change followed by nation-building under fire—probably 

is unlikely in the foreseeable future. What is likely though, 

even a certainty, is the need to work with and through 

local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue 

the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian 

disaster.

Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking of the 

United States Armed Forces has shifted—away from 

solely focusing on direct American military action, and 

towards new capabilities to shape the security environment 

in ways that obviate the need for military intervention in 

the future.

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates1

For many Americans the Colombian experience from 1998 to 

2008 provides a successful example of working with and through local 

governments. In fact, some in government talk of a “Colombian model” 

that might have applicability—given the similar problems of illegal 

armed groups, ungoverned spaces, and drug trafficking—in places like 

Afghanistan or Mexico.2

 Although, when pressed, most have little 

idea—beyond generalities like long-term support, counternarcotics, and 

human rights—what that model might be. Then the United States “Plan 

Colombia” becomes a potential candidate.3

 However, with the passage 

of “expanded authorities” by Congress in 2002, “Plan Colombia,” 

primarily the counterdrug component of President Andres Pastrana’s 

nation-strengthening Plan Colombia, became the term for a modified US 

counterdrug program that permitted assistance to Colombia in its internal 

struggle against illegal armed groups with ties to narcotrafficking. In 

America’s support of Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy 

(DSDP), Colombian guerrillas became narcoterrorists. In truth, there was 

no great model or elaborate plan. Rather, a long-term trial-and-error process 

that included major policy changes, misunderstandings, frustrations, 

and mistakes by Americans and Colombians alike eventually produced 

the improvements in Colombian security that have led to progress in 

governance and counternarcotics efforts.
152

Reasons for Improvements in Colombian Security

Without a doubt, the leadership of President Alvaro Uribe constitutes the principal reason for the improvements in Colombia. First, unlike 

his predecessors, Uribe tackled the security problem as his number one 

priority. From the beginning, he intended to fight and defeat the illegal 

armed groups. He expanded the security forces and relentlessly pushed 

them to engage the narcoterrorists and to regain control of the countryside. 

Second, understanding that improved security was not an end in itself, 

but a prerequisite for pursuing other programs to address Colombia’s ills, 

Uribe’s DSDP and its follow-on Democratic Security Consolidation Policy 

(DSCP) established a multiyear, whole-of-government effort to establish 

governance and social programs throughout the country. Third, no one 

worked harder at pushing for results in multiple governmental areas than 

Uribe. He personally monitored and supervised the execution of his policies. After providing guidance and resources for various governmental 

programs, Uribe expected results. Fourth, as a strong, forceful leader who 

obtained positive results, Uribe retained the support of the Colombian 

people and the respect of the security forces. Willing—as necessary—to 

replace those who failed to meet his expectations, Uribe held his government officials accountable for their actions and for those of their subordinates. Last, despite the ups and downs of his presidency, the Colombians 

elected Uribe to a second term, which permitted a continuation of his 

policies for another 4 years. Without Uribe, the security and governance 

improvements in Colombia would not be what they are today.

The performance and leadership of the Colombian Military (COLMIL) 

constitutes the second major reason for the improvements in security. At 

the beginning of the Pastrana presidency, the COLMIL—particularly the 

Colombian Army—confronted the difficult task of combating large guerrilla units with minimal support from the government and with no US assistance. Even under Plan Colombia and after recertification, US assistance 

remained restricted to counterdrug programs. Under these trying conditions, the COLMIL leadership—primarily Tapias, Mora, and Ospina—

developed an understanding of their threat, assessed the capabilities of 

their forces, and began a multiyear program for improvements within existing resources. Through professionalization, reorganization, better training, 

day-to-day improvements, and combat operations, the COLMIL blunted 

the guerrilla threat and developed an experience-based doctrine. Unlike 

other militaries that falter when provided additional resources and new 

missions, under President Uribe the COLMIL continued to build on its 

previous experience and reduced the areas under narcoterrorist control. In 
153

fact, under commanders like Ospina and Padilla, the COLMIL developed 

a military strategy, expanded its forces, increased its operations, refined its 

procedures, established specialized units—mountain battalions, antiterrorist, highway security, special operations, and soldados campesinos—and 

improved its human rights record while reducing the narcoterrorist capability. Despite its challenges, the COLMIL developed the capabilities that 

allowed it to seize and maintain the initiative against the narcoterrorists. 

To have come from the jaws of defeat in 1998 to the successes and capabilities of 2008 is a tribute to the vision, professionalism, and persistence 

of the senior COLMIL leadership and to the skills, dedication, and performance of security force personnel.

What about the role of US assistance? Many Americans immediately 

focus on the $6.5 billion spent—$2.1 billion from 1999 to 2002 and $4.4 

billion from 2003 to 2008. (See Table 3, US assistance to Colombia, 1999–

2002, and Table 5, US assistance to Colombia, 2003–2008.4

) During the 4-

year Pastrana period, the COLMIL received in noncounterdrug assistance 

no more than $10 million in training and equipment of which $6 million 

supported infrastructure security training for 18 Brigade in Arauca, $25 

million for new antiterrorist units, and $73 million in nonlethal excess 

equipment—$108 million. Even with $47 million added for the counterdrugfunded riverine units, the COLMIL received only $155 million of the $2.1 

billion. Basically, the COLMIL received no military assistance useful in 

its fight against the guerrillas. Things changed dramatically during the 6-

year Uribe period with “expanded authorities,” even though counterdrug 

funding totaled $2.4 of the $4.4 billion—more than half. The COLMIL 

received $1.3 billion for counterdrug activities—$48 million for Air Bridge 

Denial, $90 million for riverine units, and $1.2 billion for counterdrug 

operations that continued to include funding for the counterdrug brigade 

and its helicopter fleet and some Colombian Army operations against the 

narcoterrorists; and $970 million for the Colombian Army—$770 million 

for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) helicopters, $109 million for infrastructure 

security, and $88 million for training and equipping Army units. During 

this 6-year Uribe period, the COLMIL received over half of the assistance 

funds, but counterdrug funded programs did not always directly support 

its operations against the narcoterrorists. With US assistance, Uribe and 

his armed forces produced dramatic security improvements in Colombia. 

In contrast, the counterdrug programs—totaling over $4.4 billion during 

the 10 years—did not reduce coca cultivation.

With this funding, the US military provided assistance and support. 

This included suggestions, and at times requirements, for the security 

forces—human rights improvements, integrated national and military 
154

strategy, improved intelligence sharing, Ministry of National Defense 

(MOD) reform, improved jointness, intelligence-driven operations, 

special operations capability, and civil-military cooperation. Training for 

the security forces took many forms—individual, group, and unit—and 

addressed numerous topics: infantry skills, special operations, helicopter 

pilots and mechanics, combat life-saving, riverine operations, military 

decision making, intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations, 

military law, and human rights to name a few. Human rights received the 

greatest emphasis. Human rights training and a focus on human rights 

programs improved the relations between the security forces and the 

populace. Training ranged from mobile training teams, planning assistance 

and training teams, specialists, and seminars in Colombia to individual 

training courses in the United States. Over time different priority units 

received instruction from US trainers—Antinarcotics Police Directorate 

(DIRAN), Junglas, riverine, counterdrug brigade, special operations, 

infrastructure security, Joint Task Force (JTF) Omega, Carabineros. 

Although the majority of security force personnel never worked with an 

American trainer, Colombian training and programs increasingly became 

US-influenced. In addition to training, US-funded equipment provided 

important capabilities—mobility from helicopters, riverine operations, 

antiterrorist units, and special operations. But perhaps most important, 

toward the end of this period US assistance programs made possible the 

sustainment of the COLMIL operations and of security force counterdrug 

programs that permitted the clearing, holding, and building of governance 

and social services throughout Colombia.

In contrast, while senior Colombian Military leaders and MOD 

officials acknowledged the importance of US assistance, several focused 

not on the amount of money or training or equipment—all of which they 

said were useful. Instead, they cited two things: the importance of being 

treated with professional respect and the value of interacting with US 

military personnel. The loss of its longstanding ties with the US military 

during decertification hit the COLMIL—particularly the Army—hard. A 

former COLMIL commander stated that the renewal and continuation of 

US assistance was very important for morale, but not as important for the 

military support provided. Another senior officer mentioned the importance 

of COLMIL being treated with dignity and respect.5

 Abandoned by its 

government and by the United States during decertification, renewed US 

ties provided the COLMIL an opportunity to regain public confidence and 

to demonstrate its professional competence. Being a partner with the US 

military raised morale and provided opportunities to work on problems 

together. Over the years, the COLMIL had been exposed to numerous US 
155

military personnel and to various US military concepts and suggestions—

some considered useful, others not so. A former MOD official stated 

that US military assistance was critical—not, as he put it, for the little 

money—but for the “lots of knowledge” shared by American personnel 

when addressing Colombian problems.6

 Although not all the ideas worked 

or were accepted, the rigor and problem-solving approach of the Americans 

and their insistence on integrated planning, which helped in organizing 

and coordinating, improved Colombian security efforts. The impact of US 

assistance to the Colombian security forces cannot be measured just by the 

amount of money, training, equipment, or logistical support provided.

Insights on Working Together

The lack of a great model or an elaborate plan—things that rarely work 

if they really exist—does not mean that there are not important things to 

learn from the Colombian experience. In fact, the give-and-take nature 

of the process over 10 years offers valuable insights into the challenges 

that the US military faces when working, in the words of Secretary Gates, 

“with and through local governments.” Much of what follows may seem 

basic or obvious; however, sometimes in the press of events and in the 

interactions with others it becomes difficult to understand or to accept the 

obvious.

●	 It all begins with policy. US policy and Congressional actions 

provide the resources, constraints, and framework for what the United 

States will and will not attempt in a host nation, just as host nation policies, 

resources, constraints, and institutions determine what can and cannot be 

done. The fundamental reason for the 30-year intensified involvement of the 

United States in Colombia is illegal drugs. In the beginning, US policy and 

funding focused on counterdrugs, on human rights, and on not being drawn 

into a counterinsurgency. The United States was in Colombia primarily to 

fight narcotrafficking, not to assist Colombia in other endeavors. After the 

terrorist attack on 9/11 and the collapse of Pastrana’s peace negotiations 

in 2002, the United States agreed to support Colombia’s fight against 

its long-term internal security threat—narcoterrorists. During this same 

period, the fundamental problem in Colombia had been security—not 

narcotics. Colombians elected Pastrana to negotiate a settlement with the 

guerrillas—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 

the National Liberation Army (ELN). The COLMIL undertook a modest, 

resource-constrained reorganization and modernization program. After 

the failure of Pastrana’s peace efforts, Colombia elected Uribe to defeat 

the guerrillas. Uribe inherited a small but improved security force and 

resources from Plan Colombia just when the United States agreed to 
156

partner in fighting the narcoterrorists. What the United States was willing 

to support and what Colombia was willing and able to do changed over 

time, but the security challenge remained the fundamental problem.

● Host nation leadership matters. Uribe provided a strong, 

energetic, and capable leadership to execute his DSDP and DSCP. The 

right man at the right time can make a difference, even in a government 

with weak institutions, in a society known for corruption, and in a country 

with ungoverned spaces. In addition, the leadership of his Armed Forces 

proved proactive, professional, loyal, and adaptable in addressing security 

requirements.

● It is not easy. Tensions, misunderstandings, frustrations, and an 

adversarial relationship are normal when two nations work together. 

Different interests, priorities, languages, cultures, systems, and procedures, 

among other things, mean that frustrations will always result from 

miscommunication, misunderstanding, confusion, distrust, and differing 

goals. As an agent of change and the controller of resources, the US role 

will tend to be seen as having—as often it does—“a heavy adversarial 

quotient.”7

 Rather than accepting this situation as normal and working 

to mitigate the problem, often attitudes hardened to the point that both 

sides believed they knew best. A former US Ambassador to Colombia 

acknowledged that a major US error had been the failure to “understand 

the cultural differences” between Colombia and the United States.8

 Over 

time, both sides came to better understand the ways of the other.

● The problem matters. Working with a host nation is more effective 

and less frustrating for all when its identification of the problem is similar

to the US identification of the problem. Before “expanded authorities” 

and Uribe, most Colombians defined their problem as security—

guerrillas and narcotraffickers, and the United States defined its problem 

as narcotrafficking—illegal drugs. During the Pastrana presidency, 

the COLMIL focused on its security mission, defeating guerrillas, and 

resisted US pressure to being drawn into what the COLMIL considered 

the wrong effort, counterdrugs. To divert limited assets during a period of 

crisis from the critical task of combating the guerrillas made little sense 

to most in the COLMIL. During this period, Colombian–US military 

relations tended to be adversarial. After 2002, Colombia and the United 

States focused on combating the narcoterrorists—a security problem with 

links to narcotrafficking. Even so, the United States funded and conducted 

record numbers of counterdrug operations—extractions, interdictions, 

and extraditions. During this period, Colombian–US military relations 

improved, but could still be adversarial on certain issues.
157

● Teamwork requires a team. Working with and through a host 

nation—listening to its concerns and understanding its perspective, its 

constraints, and its capabilities—is more effective and less frustrating for 

all than working on a host nation. This is particularly important in a support 

and assist role. Working with and through a host nation—trying to make 

improvements to host nation forces, institutions, and procedures—is not 

the same as working on a host nation—trying to make fundamental changes 

in the host nation and its institutions. One way involves a partnership in 

which the host nation has the lead and the United States is in support. 

The US role is to make the host nation forces better than their opponents’ 

forces. There will be disagreements over the best ways to accomplish this 

at times. Not only is working with and through more effective and less 

frustrating, it is more likely to produce sustainable host-nation solutions 

that will last. In fact, the best approach may be to improve, modify, or 

expand things that already work, rather than to create something new that 

no matter how perfect may not be feasible, acceptable, or sustainable by 

the host nation. The other way—working on a host nation by imposing 

unwanted solutions—is heavily adversarial, makes a long-term process 

longer, and often proves counterproductive. Before “expanded authorities,” 

many in the COLMIL probably considered that they were being worked 

on given the US focus on counterdrugs, human rights vetting, and no other 

security support, rather than being worked with in addressing their number 

one priority—the security challenge.

● Change is not simple. Modifying host nation institutions, 

organizations, procedures, and doctrine requires knowledge and 

understanding and is more effective and lessfrustrating—but more difficult

and less common—that mirror-imaging or overlaying US organizations, 

procedures, and doctrine. Individual and small-unit training is relatively 

easy and straightforward. Changing military institutions and organizations 

can be extremely difficult. Mirror imaging—making them look like us—is 

often the quick, easy, and common approach taken. It requires no special 

knowledge of the host nation military or its problems and it reinforces 

what some see as a “we-know-better, fix-it-quick” American approach. 

Unfortunately, to try to make the host nation like us even though its culture, 

society, government, and military are not like ours is a common thing to 

attempt, but a difficult thing to accomplish. To find ways to make the host 

nation military better at joint operations, intelligence sharing, military 

decision making, special operations, or noncommissioned leadership 

by building on its ways is often more productive than copying a foreign 

military organization. It is easy to overlook that the minimum standard for 

host nation forces is to be better than their opponent, not to become small 
158

versions of a world-class, high-tech military that the host nation cannot 

afford. Interestingly, the Colombian Army improved the training for its 

counterguerrilla battalions and mobile brigades—Colombian-developed 

units much smaller than their US counterparts—but made few other 

major organizational modifications to the fighting core of its forces. The 

COLMIL developed its strategic concepts, operational plans, and military 

units and conducted its operations—first securing its critical areas, then 

increasing its territorial control, and finally targeting specific high-value 

targets (HVTs)—with US support and assistance, but with Colombian 

forces and in a Colombian manner.

● This is different. An understanding of the situations and the 

constraints faced by most host nation security forces—composed of 

military and national police organizations—in dealing with an internal 

threat should inform US counterinsurgency and stability operations 

doctrine. Most countries facing internal threats have military and police 

forces engaged in this effort—something alien to US military experience, 

doctrine, and organization. As a result, many Americans did not know and 

had trouble understanding—much less accepting—the restrictions placed 

on the security forces by Colombian law. Operating under peacetime law 

and treating a combat site as a crime scene became a concept difficult for 

many to grasp, much less understand its implications for military operations. 

In many countries, the internal roles and missions of the Armed Forces and 

the national police are not well defined and the relationship between the 

two competitive at best, adversarial at worse. A basic question exists: Just 

how well suited can a modern, world-class military be to provide advice 

and support on internal conflicts for countries with an internally focused 

military and a national police force? Since the United States plans to work 

with and through host nation security forces in the near future, a better 

understanding of these forces and the environment in which they work 

becomes important.

● Do not make things worse. US support to a limited portion of host 

nation security forces, such as military units with only counternarcotics 

missions and counternarcotics police, can distort security force roles and 

missions. This clearly happened in Colombia. US emphasis on counterdrug 

programs—on the national police, on riverine units during decertification, 

and on a Colombian Army counterdrug brigade with its own helicopter 

fleet during “Plan Colombia”—exacerbated the rivalries between the police 

and the Armed Forces and between the military services. Critically limited 

resources, helicopters for example, ended up dispersed into five different 

organizations. Commenting on US support to the national police during 
159

the Pastrana period, a Colombian Army general told an American officer, 

“We now have two armies and you are responsible—you always support 

them—you treat them better than us!”9

 As a result, jointness and cooperation became more difficult when roles and missions became blurred.

● Take the long view. Persistence—both by the host nation and 

by the United States—over a long time is required to deal with internal 

security problems. Easily said, this proves difficult to do. For one reason, 

election cycles bring new leaders and new policies. For another, many 

problems require sustained policies and programs for multiple election 

cycles. Looking back in 2007 on Plan Colombia, Ambassador Myles R.R. 

Frechette identified another reason when he said, “The key US analytical 

error was not recognizing that Colombia’s various problems took decades 

to develop and . . . [would] take at least a decade more of intense attention 

to approach resolution.”10 A 6-year timeline for accomplishing the nationstrengthening goals of Plan Colombia—even if it had been better focused, 

fully funded, and executed more effectively—proved unrealistic.

● Smaller is better. A small footprint, limited resources, low 

profile, and some successes increase the likelihood for a long-term US

involvement. In addition, a small footprint—limited military personnel—

ensures the United States remains in a support role. A veteran from El 

Salvador concluded, “Contrary to the US Defense Department’s usual way 

of doing things, smaller is better.” Staying small reinforced the facts: “It 

is their war and they must win it. . . . We probably cannot deliver victory 

from outside and if we can, it probably is transitory.”11 This observation 

remained valid in Colombia. Restrictions on Department of Defense 

(DOD) personnel may have made it difficult to execute support programs 

at times and the rotation of part-time personnel kept the workload heavy, 

but it helped ensure that the war remained a Colombian war, which is what 

the Colombians wanted. Looking back, one wonders if the effort would 

have been kept small if it had been in the area of responsibility of any other 

combatant command—one with a higher priority and greater resources than 

the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)—or if it had not 

been constrained by ongoing operations in other parts of the world. With 

higher priority and greater resources, one wonders if the effort would have 

stayed one-of-those-most-difficult missions for the US military—being in 

support of someone else. This may be one of the greatest challenges we 

face when working with host nations—resisting the temptation to do too 

much with too many. Better too few than too many.

This overview of the improvements in the Colombian security condition 

between 1998 and 2008 demonstrates that Colombians developed the key 
160

policies and did the heavy lifting. From 1998 to 2002, the COLMIL—with 

limited to no US assistance—developed a military strategy for dealing with 

its critical guerrilla situation and began a multiyear internal reorganization 

and professionalization project to execute that strategy. From 2002 to 2006, 

under Uribe’s DSDP—which mobilized the government and most of the 

population—the security forces continued to grow in size, specialization, 

and effectiveness. COLMIL secured Bogotá and the key cities, attacked 

the FARC base-areas in southeast Colombia, and regained territorial 

control of much of Colombia. After 2006, the DSCP shifted the focus to 

a more whole-of-government effort to reestablish governance and social 

services in former narcoterrorist areas. Beginning in 2002, US support and 

assistance—logistics, aviation, intelligence, civil affairs, civil-military, 

special operations—permitted the COLMIL to execute its military strategy 

by supporting and sustaining operations throughout the countryside on a 

larger scale and for a longer time than possible without that assistance. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, captured a 

key to the success in Colombia—and to doing it well with and through 

host nations in the future—when he emphasized the long-term United 

States support “to your approach, your execution, and obviously your

results (emphasis added).”12
161

Notes

1. Robert M. Gates, “US Global Leadership Campaign,” Speech delivered 

15 July 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://

www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262 (accessed 15 July 

2009). Gates’ quotation is used as the introduction to the second chapter, “Stability 

in Full Spectrum Operations,” of FM 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, 

DC: Department of the Army, 6 October 2008), 2–1.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Press Conference with Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Colombian Minister 

of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, and Colombian Military Forces Commander 

General Freddy Padilla,” 5 March 2009, http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1139 

(accessed 20 July 2009); Scott Wilson, “Which Way in Afghanistan? Ask Colombia 

for Directions,” Washington Post, 5 April 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/03/AR2009040302135_pf.html (accessed 6 April 

2009).

3. As throughout this study, “Plan Colombia” refers to the US program 

created initially to support a part of President Pastrana’s Plan Colombia and which 

was modified by “expanded authorities” in 2002.

4. Nina M. Serafino, “Colombia: Summary and Tables on US Assistance, 

FY1989–FY2003,” Congressional Research Service Report, 3 May 2002, 4; US 

General Accounting Office, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not 

Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; US Agencies Need More Detailed Plans 

for Reducing Assistance (Washington, DC: GAO, October 2008), 28, 47.

5. Notes from discussions with senior Colombian Military officials.

6. Notes from discussion with senior Colombian civilian official.

7. John D. Waghelstein, “Military-to-Military Contacts: Personal 

Observations—The El Salvador Case,” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement

(Summer 200): 39.

8. Myles R.R. Frechette, Colombia and the United States—The Partnership: 

But What is the Endgame? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

February 2007), 28.

9. Notes from discussion with American military official.

10. Frechette, Colombia and the United States—The Partnership, 27.

11. Waghelstein, “Military-to-Military Contacts: Personal Observations—

The El Salvador Case.” 39.

12. Chairman of the JCS, “Press Conference with Mullen, Santos, and 

Padilla.” Emphasis added.

163

Glossary

AAR	 after action review

ACI	 Andean Counterdrug Initiative

ACOEA	 Air Force Special Forces Group

AFEAU	 Agrupación de Fuerzas Especiales Antiterroristas 

Urbanas (Joint Urban Special Antiterrorist Forces

Group)

AFEUR	 Agrupación de Fuerzas Especiales Urbanas (Army

Urban Special Forces Group)

AFSOUTH	 US Southern Air Force

ARI	 Andean Regional Initiative

AUC	 United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia

BCG	 counterguerrilla battalions

BRCNA	 Brigada Contra el Narcotrafico (Counterdrug

Brigade)

BRIM	 mobile infantry brigade

CACOM	 Air Combat Command

CCAI	 Coordination Center for Integrated Action

CCC	 Joint Command No. 1—Caribbean

CCOPE	 Joint Special Operations Command

CD	 counterdrug

CDTS	 counterdrug training support

CERTE	 Army Tactical Retraining Center

CIA	 Central Intelligence Agency

CIME	 Army Military Intelligence Center

CNP	 Colombian National Police

COESE	 Army Special Operations Command

COLAF	 Colombian Air Force

COLAR	 Colombian Army

COLMIL	 Colombian Military (Armed Forces)

COLNAV	 Colombian Navy

CONVIVIR	 Community Associations of Rural Vigilance

DAS	 Department of Administrative Security

DEA	 Drug Enforcement Agency

DIA	 Defense Intelligence Agency

DIRAN	 Antinarcotics Police Directorate

DMZ	 demilitarized zone

DOD	 Department of Defense

DOJ	 Department of Justice

DOS	 Department of State

DSCP	 Democratic Security Consolidation Policy

DSDP	 Democratic Security and Defense Policy

ELN	 National Liberation Army
164

EP	 People’s Army

FARC	 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FARC-EP	 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s

Army

FBI	 Federal Bureau of Investigation

FL	 Florida

FLIR	 forward looking infrared radar

FMAP	 Foreign Military Assistance Program

FMF	 Foreign Military Financing

FMS	 Foreign Military Sales

FRAGO	 fragmentary order

FTO	 Foreign Terrorist Organization

FUDRA	 Fuerza de Desplique Rapido (Rapid Reaction Force)

FURAD	 Fuerza de Accion Decisiva (Decisive Action Force)

FURED	 division reaction force

FY	 fiscal year

GA	 Georgia

GAO	 General Accounting Office (effective 7 July 2004 the

legal name became Government Accountability

Office)

GAULA	 Groups of Action Unified for the Liberation of

Persons

GDP	 gross domestic product

HVT	 high-value target

IED	 improvised explosive device

IMET	 International Military Education and Training

INCLE	 International Narcotics Control Law Enforcement

ISS	 COLMIL Infrastructure Security

JAG	 Judge Advocate General

JCET	 Joint Combined Exchange Training

JIATF-S	 Joint Interagency Task Force–South

JIC	 joint intelligence center

JOC	 joint operations center

JOC-S	 joint operations center–south

JPAT	 Joint Planning and Assistance Team

JTF	 joint task force

JTF-S	 Joint Task Force–South

MARFORSOUTH	 Marine Force South

MILGP	 Military Group

MOD	 Ministry of National Defense

MTT	 mobile training team

NADR	 Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and

Related Programs

NAS	 Narcotics Affairs Section

NC	 North Carolina
165

NCO	 noncommissioned officer

NGO	 nongovernmental organization

NSPD	 National Security Presidential Directive

ODA	 Operational Detachment Alpha

OPATT	 Operational Planning Assistance and Training Team

PATT	 Planning and Assistance Training Team

PCCP	 Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase

PCIM	 Plan de Consolidacion Integral de la Macarena

PEEV	 Plan Especial Energetico Vial

POW	 prisoner of war

RCE	 riverine combat elements

RIME	 Army Military Intelligence Regions

SF	 Special Forces

TDY	 temporary duty

UN	 United Nations

US	 United States

USAID	 US Agency for International Development

USARSO	 US Army South

USCG	 US Coast Guard

USNAVSO	 US Navy South

USSOCSOUTH	 US Special Operations Command South

USSOUTHCOM	 United States Southern Command

VMOD	 vice-minister of defense

WHINSEC	 Western Hemisphere Institute for Security

Cooperation

167

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About the Author

Robert D. Ramsey III retired from the US Army in 1993 after 24 years

of service as an Infantry officer that included tours in Vietnam, Korea, and

the Sinai. He earned an M.A. in history from Rice University. Mr. Ramsey

taught military history for 3 years at the United States Military Academy

and 6 years at the US Army Command and General Staff College. Mr.

Ramsey is the author of Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18,

Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and 

El Salvador; Occasional Paper 19, Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and 

Observations from Lawrence to the Present; Occasional Paper 24, Savage 

Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902; 

and Occasional Paper 25, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG 

J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901–1902.


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