1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

TREMAIN JONES, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

LYNN PARRISH, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

Case No. 4:14-cv-13153 

Judge Linda V. Parker 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND A 

PERMANENT INJUNCTION (DE 17) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should DENY Plaintiff’s November 

24, 2014 motion for a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction. 

(DE 17.) 

II. REPORT 

 A. Background1

 Plaintiff Tremain Vernon Jones (#412981) is currently incarcerated at the 

Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) Gus Harrison Correctional Facility 

(ARF) in Adrian, Michigan. DE 31. On August 14, 2014, while incarcerated at 

                                                            

1 Plaintiff was a party to prisoner civil rights Case No. 2:12-cv-12541-SJM-PJK 

(Jones v. Robinson, et al.) and habeas corpus Case No. 2:08-cv-14126-LPZ-MJH 

(Jones v. Lafler).  

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the MDOC’s Michigan Reformatory (RMI), Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit by 

way of a certified complaint, pro se, against fifty-two (52) defendants: ten (10) 

from Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC), eight (8) from Macomb 

Correctional Facility (MRF), seventeen (17) from ARF, ten (10) from St. Louis 

Correctional Facility (SLF) and five (5) from Correctional Facilities 

Administration (CFA), as well as the MDOC itself and fellow inmate William 

Walter Haddix (#275324), who is currently incarcerated at Lakeland Correctional 

Facility (LCF). DE 1 ¶¶ 9, 10-19, 20-27, 28-45, 46-55, 56-60. 

 Plaintiff’s 91-page,2

 297 paragraph complaint is divided into twelve (12) 

separate counts, alleging various claims against different Defendants: fraud, denial 

of medical treatment, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, denial of access to the courts, 

retaliation, abuse of process, excessive use of force, cruel and unusual punishment, 

deliberate indifference to constitutional rights and RICO. See DE 1 ¶¶ 86-285.3

 

B. Instant Motion 

                                                            

2 Page numbers 28-33 (¶¶ 112-129), 35 (¶¶ 134-135), 63, 65 (¶¶ 227-228) seem to 

be missing from DE 1, which is 82 pages in length.  

3 This case was originally assigned to Judge Parker and Magistrate Judge Komives. 

DE 1. On November 7, 2014, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge 

Hluchaniuk, and Judge Parker referred the case to Magistrate Judge Hluchaniuk for 

pretrial matters. DE 14. On January 13, 2015, the case was reassigned from 

Magistrate Judge Hluchaniuk to Magistrate Judge Patti. DE 22.   

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 As an initial matter, I note that Defendants filed three motions to sever (DEs 

13, 16 and 40), which I have addressed by a separate report, recommending that 

they be granted in part and denied in part. DE 41. Specifically, I have 

recommended that the Court dismiss Counts Six, Seven, and Nine without 

prejudice, dismiss the MRF, ARF, SLF and CFA Defendants without prejudice, 

and allow the remaining claims to proceed only against the IBC defendants and the 

MDOC. Thus, the scope of this case is currently in flux, pending the Court’s 

review of my recommendations regarding the motions to sever. 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s November 24, 2014 motion for a 

temporary restraining order (TRO) and a permanent injunction. DE 17 at 1-13, 14-

16 (Brief). Among other things, Plaintiff claims he is being retaliated against for 

having filed grievances and § 1983 complaints. DE 17 at 5 ¶ 9. He seeks several 

forms of relief, asking the Court to order, inter alia: 

 A transfer to Thumb Correctional Facility (TCF) 

 Alternatively, a transfer to the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 

custody 

 Immediate examination and treatment of his eyes, teeth, lower 

back and brain by a qualified specialist 

 Defendants to cease and desist retaliatory conduct 

 Removal of the MSP criminal investigation of Plaintiff 

 Reduction of Plaintiff’s security level to a II prison 

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 A CFA hold keeping Plaintiff at a Level II prison for the 

remainder of his sentence 

 Release of Plaintiff from RMI 

 Placement of Plaintiff in the general population 

 Restoration of his rights and privileges 

 Expungment of disciplinary convictions from Plaintiff’s 

institutional record 

 Timely execution of prescribed medical treatment 

DE 17 at 11 ¶ 30. 

 On January 6, 2015, Magistrate Judge Hluchaniuk entered an order requiring 

defendants to file a response on or before February 6, 2015. A reply, if any, was to 

be filed on or before February 17, 2015. DE 21. 

 Several MDOC Defendants filed a response on January 28, 2015. DE 26. 

Along with their response, Defendants filed excerpts of Plaintiff’s medical records 

under seal. See DE 26-5, DE 27.4

 On the other hand, Plaintiff filed his reply, with 

exhibits, on March 17, 2015. DE 30 at 1-20, 21-24.5

 Thus, it is tardy and will not 

be considered. 6 

                                                            

4

  On January 29, 2015, the Court granted Defendants’ January 28, 2015 motion for 

a protective order to seal documents (DE 28). 

5 Along with his reply and exhibits, Plaintiff also filed a motion for default 

judgment as to eleven (11) defendants (DE 30 at 25-26), notice of motion for 

default judgment (DE 30 at 27-28) and declaration as to military service (DE 30 at 

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 C. Standard 

 “‘The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative 

positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.’” Certified 

Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). The 

Court considers four (4) factors when deciding whether to issue a preliminary 

injunction: 

(1) whether the movant has a “strong” likelihood of success on the 

merits; 

(2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer irreparable injury; 

(3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause 

substantial harm to others; and 

(4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a 

preliminary injunction. 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

29-31). Although this motion for default judgment was not separately docketed, 

Plaintiff is reminded that, on November 24, 2014, the Clerk of the Court denied a 

request for entry of default pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g) (“Waiver of reply”). 

(DE 18.) Moreover, the Court’s February 12, 2015 order stated that, once the 

scope of this case is defined, the Court will entertain a request by Plaintiff to 

compel defendants to answer his complaint in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 

7(a)(2). DE 29 at 5. Finally, to date, five (5) defendants (Defendants Nichols, 

McRoberts, Jones, Long and Haddix) have yet to appear. 

6 Plaintiff’s reply is dated February 23, 2015, as is the certificate of service. DE 30 

at 20, 32-33. It is post-marked March 12, 2015 (DE 30 at 34) and was filed on 

March 17, 2015. Even under the mailbox rule, Plaintiff’s reply is tardy. Houston 

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (“the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over 

petitioner's appeal because the notice of appeal was filed at the time petitioner 

delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.”). 

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Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citation 

omitted); see also Newsome v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 373 (6th Cir. 1999).7

 “These 

factors are to be balanced against one another and should not be considered 

prerequisites to the grant of a preliminary injunction.” Leary, 228 F.3d at 736.8

 

 A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 

right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. “[T]he proof required for the plaintiff to obtain a 

preliminary injunction is much more stringent than the proof required to survive a 

summary judgment motion . . . .” Leary, 228 F.3d at 739. “[T]he preliminary 

injunction is an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching 

power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly 

demand it.” Id. at 739 (quotations and citation omitted). 

 Moreover, “[A] federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically 

obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law.” Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982). “[T]he federal equity court in fashioning a 

remedy must afford relief which is ‘no broader than necessary to remedy the 

                                                            

7

 Or, as the Supreme Court has more prosaically stated it, “A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that 

he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 

8 See also, Certified Restoration Dry-Cleaning Network, L.L.C., 511 F.3d at 542 

(6th Cir. 2007) (“These four considerations are ‘factors to be balanced, not 

prerequisites that must be met.’”) (internal citations omitted). 

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constitutional violation’.” Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1984) 

(quoting Newman v. State of Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.1982)). 

 D. Analysis 

1. The attachments to Plaintiff’s motion evidence some 

administrative history from his time at ARF during 2012 

through his transfer to SLF in 2013. 

On December 17, 2012, ARF Warden Klee approved a request to have 

Plaintiff placed on Modified Access Status for 90 days. DE 17-1 at 25-26; see also

DE 17-1 at 27-28. Plaintiff received Class II misconducts for December 28, 2012 

and January 10, 2013 destruction or misuse of property. DE 17-1 at 51-52, 55, 58, 

72-73, 76, 79. 

On January 17, 2013, Plaintiff received a Class I Misconduct for Possession 

of Dangerous Contraband, for which a hearing was conducted on January 29, 2013. 

Plaintiff was found guilty and given 7 days of top lock and 20 days loss of 

privileges. DE 17-1 at 37, 41-42, 63. On January 30, 2013, while incarcerated at 

ARF, Plaintiff filed some type of civil rights violation complaint, seemingly 

against several ARF defendants. See DE 17 at 52-97. 

Plaintiff was assessed thirty (30) days of telephone restriction – from 

January 28, 2013 through February 28, 2013 – for violation of MDOC PD 

05.03.130 ¶ HH. DE 17-1 at 71. At some point, a one year phone restriction and a 

permanent phone restriction were requested to the Regional Prison Administrator 

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(RPA). DE 17-1 at 54, 56-57, 70, 74-75, 77-78. It appears the telephone 

restriction was increased to 365 days following a February 7, 2013 hearing. See

DE 17-1 at 49-50, 53. 

On May 12, 2013, ARF issued a Critical Incident Report involving Plaintiff 

Jones and Defendant Haddix, his fellow inmate. DE 26-2 at 2-3. Plaintiff claims 

he was brutally assaulted on this same date by prison staff and placed into 

segregation. See DE 17 at 3-4 ¶ 6, DE 1 at 54-55 ¶ 221-222. The following day, a 

misconduct report, alleging assault and battery and sexual assault by Jones against 

Haddix, was issued. DE 17 at 39-40. In addition, it appears that Plaintiff 

requested protective custody. See DE 26-3 at 2, 7. 

On May 22, 2013, a Class I Misconduct Hearing took place. Hearing 

Officer Jacobsen noted Plaintiff’s comment that “he was thinking about the time 

frame and he was ill during the last couple of weeks, with a lay-in, no work, etc.” 

However, the charges were dismissed for lack of proper notice. DE 17 at 35-38. 

Still, on that same date, Plaintiff was placed into administrative segregation 

pending a Michigan State Police (MSP) investigation for alleged criminal sexual 

conduct. DE 17 at 41-42, DE 26-4 at 2. 

A segregation classification hearing took place at ARF on June 3, 2013; 

Hearing Officer Jacobsen found that Plaintiff was “under investigation by an 

outside police agency for suspected felonious behavior. Due to the seriousness and 

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type of charges, placement in segregation appears reasonable.” DE 17 at 44-45. 

Approximately one week later, on June 11, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred from 

ARF to SLF Level IV administrative segregation per the Security Classification 

Committee (SCC). DE 17 at 46-47. Plaintiff’s June 13, 2013 True Security Level 

(Departure) was II, and his June 30, 2014 Actual Placement Level (Waiver) was 

IV. DE 17 at 50-51. 

2. Given his recent transfer to ARF, Plaintiff’s November 24, 

2014 motion for injunctive relief is moot as to all other 

prison facilities in which he was housed. 

It seems that Plaintiff was transferred to RMI on or about July 3, 2014. DE 

17 at 48-49. Shortly thereafter, on August 14, 2014, he filed the instant lawsuit. 

DE 1. During October 2014, Plaintiff submitted written requests to be moved to 

G-Block and to be transferred from Level IV and reduced to a Level II security 

prison. DE 17 at 25-29, 30-34. On November 10, 2014, Plaintiff’s complaint of 

false allegations on the part of MDOC employees was referred to the MDOC’s 

Internal Affairs Section for review. DE 17 at 43. 

Plaintiff filed the instant motion for injunctive relief on November 24, 2014, 

while still incarcerated at RMI. DE 17 at 13. However, “[a] prisoner’s request for 

injunctive and declaratory relief is moot upon his transfer to a different facility.” 

Parks v. Reans, 510 F.App’x 414, 415 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Kensu v. Haigh, 87 

F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (“to the extent Kensu seeks declaratory and injunctive 

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relief his claims are now moot as he is no longer confined to the institution that 

searched his mail.”). 

On or about May 5, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred back to ARF. DE 31 at 

3. Thus, only requests for injunctive relief from one of the seventeen (17) ARF 

defendants or Defendant MDOC should be entertained. In other words, to the 

extent Plaintiff’s November 24, 2014 motion for injunctive relief sought such relief 

from an RMI employee or one of the IBC, MRF or SLF Defendants, it was 

rendered moot by Plaintiff’s apparent May 5, 2015 transfer to ARF. 

Moreover, the scope of this case is currently in flux. If Judge Parker accepts 

my recommendation, the remaining claims will proceed only against the IBC 

Defendants (McKee, Schooley, Kimball, Bolton, Bradley, Franks, Parrish, 

Maynard, Ryans and Walker) and Defendant MDOC. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff 

is seeking injunctive relief against an ARF Defendant (such as ARF Warden Paul 

Klee), or against Defendant MDOC with respect to its role at ARF (DE 17 at 11 ¶ 

28), it is possible the Court’s disposition of the motions to sever will result in 

Plaintiff’s need to file his requests for injunctive relief in another case. As my 

August 12, 2015 report states, the law is clear, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, that 

unrelated claims by prisoners against different defendants belong in different 

lawsuits. (DE 41 at 10.); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

And, as the MDOC Defendants note, the Court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin 

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the actions of a non-defendant. DE 26 at 10; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 

Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969) (“It is elementary that one is not bound 

by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in which he is not designated 

as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process. The 

consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to adjudicate a 

personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the 

defendant.”) (internal citation omitted). 

3. Even if the Court permits the ARF Defendants to remain in 

this case, Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief should still 

be denied to the extent it seeks relief from an ARF 

Defendant or Defendant MDOC. 

 

a. Likelihood of success on the merits 

The MDOC Defendants argue that “Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of 

success on the merits.” DE 26 at 9-10. “Although no one factor is controlling, a 

finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal.” 

Gonzales v. National Bd. Of Medical Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000). 

The uncertain scope of this case affects the claims regarding which the Court 

must consider Plaintiff’s likelihood of success. Nonetheless, here, I will assume 

that the Court has accepted my recommendation as to the scope of this case; 

namely, only certain claims against IBC Defendants and Defendant MDOC 

regarding Plaintiff’s October 22, 2011 seizure and Defendant Parrish’s alleged 

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failure to seek medical care for Plaintiff while he was housed at IBC (see DE 41 at 

9) are currently before the Court. 

The Court need not opine as to this factor at this point. Even if there were a 

strong likelihood of success on the merits as to Plaintiff’s claims against the IBC 

Defendants and Defendant MDOC related his October 22, 2011 seizure, I am not 

convinced that the issuance of an injunction now as to Plaintiff’s medical treatment 

and transfer would “preserve the relative positions of the parties” as to Plaintiff’s 

claims from 2011. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C., 511 F.3d 

at 542. In essence, this claim is stale, the events at issue being too temporally 

remote. 

b. Irreparable injury 

The MDOC Defendants argue that “[t]here is no present threat of irreparable 

harm.” DE 26 at 10-15. At the outset, the MDOC Defendants urge the Court to 

presume that “state officials will act in good faith [and] conduct themselves in 

accordance with the requirements of the Constitution.” DE 26 at 10-11.9

 Among 

other things, Plaintiff describes current problems with his teeth, lower back, vision, 

                                                            

9 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (“courts cannot assume that state 

legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the 

Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the 

goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system: to punish justly, to deter 

future crime, and to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved change 

of being useful, law-abiding citizens.”).

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and forms of “continued physical and mental pain . . . [,]” as well as the possibility 

of an acute epileptic seizure. DE 17 at 7-9 ¶¶ 18-25. 

“The district court should grant an injunction only where the dilemma is ripe 

for judicial resolution, and a matter is considered premature for judicial review 

when the alleged injury is speculative or may never occur.” Sharpe v. Cureton, 

319 F.3d 259, 272 (6th Cir. 2003) (quotation and citation omitted). Keeping this in 

mind, the factor of whether Plaintiff would otherwise suffer irreparable injury if 

the Court did not grant the requested injunctive relief as to his medical treatment 

does not weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. 

Plaintiff claims that, once transferred to ARF, he was placed in fear, and 

Plaintiff seems to allege his January 30, 2013 civil rights violation complaint (DE 

17 at 52-97) eventually resulted in a false accusation of assault and battery and 

sexual assault, as well as a brutal beating. DE 17 at 9-10 ¶ 26, DE 17 at 20-21 ¶¶ 

8-9. According to Plaintiff, he was brutally assaulted by prison staff on May 12, 

2013 and has not been provided appropriate medical treatment, vaguely claiming 

that “there is an informal policy within, and throughout Defendant MDOC, IBC, 

ARF and SLF to giving low priority to the medical needs of inmates and of 

refusing to provide them with medical care outside the prison unless their medical 

condition is life-threatening.” DE 17 at 3 ¶ 6, DE 17 at 7 ¶ 14; see also DE 17 at 

22 ¶ 11, DE 17 at 24 ¶ 18. Plaintiff avers that, following the May 12, 2013 assault 

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at ARF, he was not taken to an emergency room or an outside hospital but was left 

on the floor in segregation in pain and suffering. DE 17 at 4-5 ¶ 8, DE 17 at 21 ¶ 

10. 

Plaintiff alleges that he has “specialized medical needs that warrant an 

evaluation by a qualified medical practitioner , and . . . a prescription for a plan of 

treatment” and specifically claims that the medical directions and requests of SLF 

medical staff, presumably from 2013-2014, are not being followed. DE 17 at 5-6 

¶¶ 10-13; see also, DE 17 at 23 ¶¶ 12, 14-17. Plaintiff “is in serious fear for his 

LIFE, health, safety and well-being,” seemingly avoiding the prison yard, which 

results in him not eating regularly. DE 17 at 22 ¶ 13. He also describes threats he 

has received, with particular reference to the aforementioned October 2014 

requests for transfer which were made while Plaintiff was still incarcerated at RMI. 

DE 17 at 4 ¶ 7, DE 17 at 25-29, 30-34. 

Plaintiff wishes to ensure that “he receive necessary medical care for his 

acute epileptic seizures, and the protection from physical harm and injury from the 

defendants and/or any of their prison-hired ‘hit men’ while confined under their 

jurisdiction, care, custody and supervision.” DE 17 at 2 ¶ 2. 

However, as noted above, it appears that Plaintiff was placed into ARF 

segregation / detention on May 12, 2013, based upon a critical incident report of 

the same date. See DE 26- at 2. The Special Housing Unit Record shows multiple 

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initials in the medical column, indicating repeated attention from medical 

personnel while in segregation. DE 26-3 at 3, 6, 10, 11. Also, Plaintiff’s plentiful 

medical records offer insight into his medical treatment. DE 26-5, DE 27. For 

example, it seems that Plaintiff offered no complaints at his May 13, 2013 initial 

segregation review. See DE 27-1 at 64. Furthermore, although Plaintiff’s dental 

summary indicates some “no shows” due to his segregation, it also shows that he 

received exams on January 28, 2014 and June 23, 2014. DE 27 at 4-6. Clinical 

Progress Notes dated October 9, 2013 state, “[i]nmate does not need to be seen by 

optometry until May 201[4]. Will recall him for then.” DE 27 at 104. Plaintiff 

received an eye exam on May 7, 2014, at which he obtained a new state 

prescription. DE 27 at 76. Plaintiff’s state eyeglasses were dispensed on June 1, 

2014. DE 27 at 65. Thus, as the MDOC Defendants’ maintain, “Jones has been 

offered medical services.” DE 26 at 13. 

Also, the factor of whether Plaintiff would otherwise suffer irreparable 

injury if the Court did not grant his other requests for injunctive relief – such as 

transfer to TCF or the FBOP, adjustment to his security level or confinement 

security level and return to the general population - does not weigh in Plaintiff’s 

favor. As the Supreme Court has counseled: 

Neither, in our view, does the Due Process Clause in and of itself 

protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution 

to another within the state prison system. Confinement in any of the 

State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody 

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which the conviction has authorized the State to impose. That life in 

one prison is much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself 

signify that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated 

when a prisoner is transferred to the institution with the more severe 

rules. 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). “[A]n inmate has no 

justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison 

within a State . . . .” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983). 

Moreover, a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be placed in a 

particular security classification. Ford v. Harvey, 106 F.App’x 397, 399 (6th

Cir. 2004) (citing Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). 

 Furthermore, even if, arguendo, Plaintiff were able to demonstrate 

irreparable harm in this case, “any such injury is outweighed by the public 

interest” and balancing of the equities factors, and “A proper consideration 

of these factors alone [may require] denial of the requested injunctive 

relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 23. In the instant matter, the balancing of the 

equities and the public interest likewise require denial of the requested 

injunctive relief. 

c. Substantial harm: Balancing of the Equities 

The MDOC defendants appear to argue that “the alleged, speculative, future 

harm” Plaintiff seeks to address is not outweighed by the “harm in granting the 

injunction.” DE 26 at 15-17. As previously noted, since the filing of his November 

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24, 2014 motion for injunctive relief, Plaintiff was transferred to ARF, where the 

aforementioned May 2013 events took place. Nonetheless, the Court should 

conclude that issuance of a preliminary injunction which requires implementation 

of his medical or transfer requests might cause substantial harm to others. 

As the MDOC Defendants argue, “[t]he state’s interest in managing its own 

prisons is substantial . . . .” DE 26 at 17. The Court has no doubt that, as the 

MDOC defendants contend, providing medical care in the prison setting is “a 

difficult undertaking.” DE 26 at 17. For example, there are ten (10) MDOC 

Policy Directives related to Health Care (03.04) and another eleven (11) under the 

umbrella of Medical and Mental Health Services (04.06). The Policy Directive 

concerning “health services” provides: “Prisoners shall be provided with a 

continuum of medically necessary health care services that are supported by 

evidence based medical research.” MDOC PD 03.04.100, effective Feb. 1, 2015. 

At this time, the Court should refrain from foraying into the process of deciding 

when and where Plaintiff should receive medical treatment, particularly where, as 

here, the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate any substantial and 

irreparable harm which would be realized by maintaining the status quo. See, i.e., 

Gaybor v. Pugh, No. 4:14-cv-00318, 2014 WL 4184372, *10 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 

2014) (Pearson, J., adopting report and recommendation of Limbert, M.J.) 

(“issuance of the preliminary injunction may cause substantial harm to others 

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because it may impact the prison medical facility’s ability to treat those requiring 

immediate medical treatment if Plaintiff is allowed to remain in a medical facility 

and take a medical placement that another inmate may need.”). Nor has he 

demonstrated that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. 

Likewise, the Court is certain that managing prisoner transfers is not a 

simple task. For example, the appropriateness of one inmate’s transfer may 

involve a ripple effect to another prisoner and/or to the involved institutions. As 

with the management of medical care, here, too, prison authorities, not the courts, 

are in the best position to determine the appropriateness of a transfer. See Dulak v. 

Corizon Inc., No. 14-10193, 2014 WL 4678085, *6 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2014) 

(report and recommendation of Hluchaiuk, M.J.) (“Decisions concerning the 

administration of prisons are vested in prison officials, in the absence of a 

constitutional violation, and any interference by the federal courts in that activity is 

necessarily disruptive. The public welfare therefore militates against the issuance 

of preliminary injunctive relief in the prison context, absent a sufficient showing of 

a violation of constitutional rights.”). The MDOC has a policy directive regarding 

the placement and transfer of prisoners. See MDOC PD 05.01.140, effective Apr. 

15, 2015. I have been shown no reason why this Court should second-guess it. 

In Plaintiff’s case, the MDOC is best-suited to determine whether Plaintiff’s 

transfer requests are justified by MDOC policy and reasonable when weighed 

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against the decisions the MDOC makes during the day-to-day management of the 

prison population. 

d. Public interest 

The MDOC Defendants assert that “public interest favors allowing state 

corrections officials to operate prisons as opposed to inmates dictating the day-today affairs of a prison.” DE 26 at 17-18. Here, issuance of the injunctive relief 

Plaintiff seeks would not serve the public interest, because it would amount to the 

Court’s unjustified operation of prison facilities where decisions related to 

Plaintiff’s medical treatment and transfer are concerned. See, i.e., Jarrett v. 

Snyder, No. 1:13cv139, 2014 WL 6893229, *5 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2014) (Quist, 

J., adopting report and recommendation of Brenneman, M.J.) (“there exists a 

strong public interest in having the MDOC, rather than this Court, operate religious 

programming in the state penal institutions and manage the state prison 

population.”); Wappler v. Brevard, No. 4:05-cv-90, 2006 WL 3298315, *1 (W.D. 

Mich. Nov. 14, 2006) (Enslen, J.) (“Nor does the public interest favor the granting 

of any equitable relief given that federal courts are required to provide state 

officials with ample freedom to operate prison facilities.”). 

In describing the deference provided to prison officials in the management 

of their institutions, the Sixth Circuit has stated that: 

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because the daily operation of a correctional facility poses difficult 

and unique management problems, prison official should be accorded 

substantial deference in the adoption and implementation of policies 

and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal 

order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. 

Brown v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). 

In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that such deference should 

not be given or that the public interest somehow weighs in his favor. 

E. Conclusion 

 In sum, the Court should conclude that evaluation of the preliminary 

injunction factors does not weigh in Plaintiff’s favor and, accordingly, DENY

Plaintiff’s November 24, 2014 motion for a TRO and a permanent injunction. (DE 

17.) 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

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party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

Dated: August 14, 2015 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on August 14, 2015, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

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