UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 14-cv-14939 

v. Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

JENNIFER L. BENTLEY and 

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 

CORPORATION, 

 Defendants. 

_______________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART EMERGENCY MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, DIRECTING SERVICE, AND SETTING 

FILING DEADLINES AND HEARING DATE 

 Plaintiff Metropolitan Life Insurance Company filed a complaint initiating this matter on 

December 30, 2014. ECF No. 1. MetLife contemporaneously filed a motion for a temporary 

restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction. ECF No. 2. MetLife alleges in both 

documents that it erroneously overpaid monies to Defendant Jennifer L. Bentley as beneficiary 

of a decedent’s life insurance benefits. It seeks both a TRO to “maintain the status quo” and a 

hearing date to consider its request for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 2 at ¶ 17. The motion 

for a TRO will be denied but a hearing will be scheduled for consideration of Plaintiff’s request 

for a preliminary injunction. 

I. 

 On July 31, 2014, Richard H. Gillette, a former employee of General Motors 

Corporation, passed away. ECF No. 2 at ¶¶ 3 & 5. As an employee of General Motors, Gillette 

participated in the General Motors Life and Disability Benefits Program (“Plan”). Id. at ¶¶ 1 & 3. 

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Upon his death, Gillette’s life insurance benefits were payable to Bentley, as the last designated 

beneficiary of Gillette. Id. at ¶ 4. Benefits in the amount of $20,613.26 were payable to Bentley 

at the time of Gillette’s death. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8. 

 “On August 4, 2014, Defendant Bentley signed an Assignment of Proceeds of Life 

Insurance . . . assigning $9,893.47 of the [life insurance benefits] to the Swartz Funeral Home, 

Inc. . . ., in Flint, Michigan.” ECF No. 2 at ¶ 6. MetLife paid the required amount to Swartz 

Funeral Home under the Assignment of Proceeds agreement. Id. at ¶ 7. An internal computation 

error was made by MetLife, however, and the amount paid by MetLife to Swartz was not 

deducted from the disbursement of monies to Bentley. Id. at ¶ 8. MetLife deposited the entire 

$20,613.26 into Bentley’s total control account (“TCA”) “established by MetLife with BNY 

Mellon[.]” Id. 

 When MetLife discovered this error on October 6, 2014 it “contacted Defendant Bentley 

by telephone to explain . . . and request that the [o]verpayment of $9,893.47 be returned[.]” Id. at 

¶ 9. On October 7, 2014 MetLife also sent a letter to Bentley reminding her that she had 

allegedly agreed to repay any overpayment from MetLife and providing her with different 

options for repayment. Id. at ¶ 10. According to Plaintiff, “[t]o date, Defendant Bentley has 

failed and refused to repay the [o]verpayment of $9,893.47 to MetLife.” Id. at ¶ 11. MetLife has 

initiated this action to recover that amount plus what it claims are reasonable attorney fees. 

II. 

 Rule 65 provides that a “court may issue a [TRO] without written or oral notice to the 

adverse party or its attorney” if two requirements are satisfied: (1) “specific facts in an affidavit 

or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 

result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition”; and (2) “the movant’s 

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attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be 

required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). 

 Four factors govern whether the Court will issue a TRO (the same four factors governing 

whether to issue a preliminary injunction): (1) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether there is a threat of irreparable harm to 

the plaintiff; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would harm others; and (4) whether the 

public interest is served by granting injunctive relief. Hamilton’s Bogarts, Inc. v. Michigan, 501 

F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless and Serv. 

Emps. Intern. Union, Local 1199 v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006). “These 

factors are not prerequisites, but are factors that are to be balanced against each other.” 

Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations 

omitted). 

III. 

 Plaintiff, in its motion for a TRO, does not engage in any analysis of the four factors 

governing the propriety of granting temporary injunctive relief. Rather, Plaintiff explains, with 

repetitious citation that the provision authorizing the relief it seeks is ERISA § 502(a)(3) and is 

equitable in nature. This provision may indeed, as the quoted authority states, be equitable in 

nature. But this does not relieve Plaintiff from demonstrating its entitlement to this specific type 

of equitable relief. The closest Plaintiff comes to an analysis of the factors favoring a TRO is in 

the text of its motion. Therein it recites multiple times that it may not be able to recover the 

overpayment amount if a TRO is not entered. Plaintiff does not, however, explain why this is so. 

Particularly because “harm is not irreparable if it is fully compensable by money damages.” 

Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 1992). Even if the purpose of 

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emphasizing authority that holds § 502(a)(3) of ERISA to be equitable in nature is to 

demonstrate that money damages are not sufficient in this case, it does not excuse Plaintiff’s lack 

of attention to any analysis of the TRO factors. 

 Plaintiff also omits consideration of the second requirement under Rule 65 for the 

issuance of a TRO. Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint or motion explains why no effort to give 

notice to Defendant Bentley should be required. Plaintiff states that “there is a strong likelihood 

that Defendant Bentley will withdraw funds from the Bentley TCA account making it difficult or 

impossible for MetLife to recover the Overpayment and be reimbursed for its attorney’s fees[.]” 

ECF No. 2 at 5. But once again, this conclusory claim, without more, will not support the 

issuance of a TRO. 

 Furthermore, even if assuming, without deciding, that § 502(a)(3) of ERISA entitles a 

plan fiduciary to immediate equitable relief, Plaintiff does not provide the requisite proofs to 

demonstrate that § 502(a)(3) applies to this specific situation. Section 502(a)(3) reads: 

A civil action may be brought . . . (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 

(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or 

the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 

redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the 

terms of the plan[.] 

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). Plaintiff does not identify anything in its initial filings demonstrating 

that a “term of the plan” requires enforcement to remedy the overpayment to Bentley. Plaintiff 

attaches to its complaint a letter it sent Bentley which states: “MetLife has a responsibility and 

the right to recover overpaid benefit amounts. . . . As set forth in the Claimant’s Statement you 

signed and submitted to MetLife, you agreed to repay MetLife in the event of an overpayment.” 

ECF No. 1 at Ex. C. Plaintiff does not explain to the Court what, presumably the plan, gives it 

“the right to recover overpaid benefit amounts[.]” Likewise, Plaintiff does not include the 

“Claimant’s Statement” showing that Bentley acknowledged a right of repayment. The omission 

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of these documents is doubly problematic because the authority on which Plaintiff relies requires 

proof of an “equitable lien by agreement” for the action being brought under § 502(a)(3) to be 

characterized as equitable. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Srvs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 363-365 

(2006). Without these documents, relief cannot be given. 

IV. 

 MetLife also moves in its motion for further relief beyond a TRO. Specifically, it asks 

that the Court schedule a hearing on its request for a Preliminary Injunction and that “this Court 

enter Judgment against Defendant Bentley[.]” ECF No. 2. The request for judgment is premature 

as Defendant has not had an opportunity to respond. The request for a preliminary injunction 

hearing, however, will be granted. 

V. 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff MetLife’s Motion for Temporary Restraining 

Order, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. A temporary restraining order 

will not be issued. 

It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff MetLife is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this 

Opinion and Order on Defendants BNY Mellon and Bentley, and then file proof of service on the 

Court’s docket. 

 It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff MetLife is DIRECTED to file a motion for a 

preliminary injunction no later than February 6, 2015. 

 It is further ORDERED that Defendants BNY Mellon and Bentley’s responses to that 

motion are due on or before February 27, 2015. 

 It is further ORDERED that any reply brief, should Plaintiff MetLife choose to file one, 

is due no later than March 6, 2015. 

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 It is further ORDERED that a hearing on Plaintiff MetLife’s motion for a preliminary 

injunction (to be filed by February 6, 2015), is set for April 8, 2015 at 2:00 p.m.

Dated: January 13, 2015 s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on January 13, 2015. 

 s/Tracy A. Jacobs 

 TRACY A. JACOBS 

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