1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MICHAEL A. STEVENSON, 

Trustee in Bankruptcy, 

 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 14-CV-13115 

vs. HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, 

et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

_______________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER (1) STRIKING FILING (Dkt. 38) AND (2) 

OVERRULING COTTER’S OBJECTIONS (Dkts. 36, 39) 

I. INTRODUCTION

P-J Cotter filed this action, pro se, against Defendants, alleging violations of the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681 et seq., and the Michigan Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 

§§ 339.901 et seq., 445.251 et seq. See Am. Compl. (Dkt. 9). The matter was referred to the 

Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings. See Order of Referral (Dkt. 8). Shortly thereafter, 

Michael A. Stevenson entered a notice of appearance, on behalf of himself, as Chapter 7 Trustee 

(Dkt. 14), and a notice of Chapter 7 bankruptcy (Dkt. 15). In the notice of bankruptcy, 

Stevenson stated that Cotter filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and that Stevenson was 

appointed as Chapter 7 Trustee to administer Cotter’s bankruptcy estate. Notice of Chapter 7 

Bankruptcy at 1. Stevenson asserted that, as Chapter 7 Trustee, he was entitled to possession and 

control of Cotter’s assets, including claims for damages resulting from harm and any award or 

settlement resulting from those claims. Id. Accordingly, Stevenson claimed an interest in this 

litigation as the real party in interest. Id. 

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Cotter filed a motion to strike Stevenson’s appearance and the notice of bankruptcy (Dkt. 

24), which the Magistrate Judge denied (Dkt. 32). Stevenson subsequently filed a motion to 

substitute in as the plaintiff (Dkt. 33). The Magistrate Judge granted Stevenson’s motion and 

substituted Stevenson for Cotter as the plaintiff in this action, thereby terminating Cotter from 

the lawsuit (Dkt. 34). 

After his termination from the lawsuit, Cotter submitted several filings to the Court titled 

“Notice [t]o District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith.” See Dkts. 36, 38, 39. Although not explicitly 

labeled as formal objections under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, the substance of these 

filings appear to object to various aspects of the Magistrate Judge’s handling of Cotter’s case, 

and the Court will construe the notices as objections.1 For the reasons set forth fully below, the 

Court overrules all of Cotter’s objections. 

II. ANALYSIS

Before reaching the merits of Cotter’s objections, the Court must first address the 

appropriate standard of review. Magistrate judges are authorized to hear and determine any 

pretrial matter referred by a district judge, except for certain civil motions, which include, as 

relevant here, motions for injunctive relief, judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, to 

certify or decertify a class, to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and to involuntarily dismiss an 

action. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Any pretrial or other non-dispositive order to which a party 

objects must be reviewed by the district court for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Magistrate 

judges may also hear and consider matters dispositive of a party’s claim or defense — including 

the motions exempted in § 636 — but must issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 

 

1

 Cotter filed two sets of objections on December 9, 2014: Docket No. 38 and Docket No. 39. 

Docket No. 39 is titled “Amended Notice to District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith.” Thus, the Court 

understands Docket No. 39 to supersede Docket No. 38, and will review Docket No. 39 as the 

operative set of objections for this date. The Court strikes Docket No. 38, accordingly, as moot. 

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law for the district court judge’s review and disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b). Dispositive matters, to which parties submit timely and proper objections, are subject 

to de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Accordingly, the Court’s standard of review is 

dependent upon the nature of the order(s) to which the parties object. 

It is unclear from the face of the objections as to which of the Magistrate Judge’s orders 

Cotter is objecting, but there are two possibilities: (i) the order denying Cotter’s motion to strike 

Stevenson’s notice of appearance and notice of bankruptcy (Dkt. 32), and (ii) the order 

substituting Stevenson as the plaintiff in the case (Dkt. 34). Both orders address non-dispositive, 

pretrial matters. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(1)(A) (defining dispositive motion); see also 

Specialty Fin. Grp., LLC v. DOC Milwaukee, LP, No. 10-C-315, 2010 WL 5419105, at *1 (E.D. 

Wisc. Dec. 22, 2010) (characterizing a motion to substitute plaintiffs as a non-dispositive 

motion).2 Therefore, the Court will review the Magistrate Judge’s orders for clear error. 

 

2

 One court in this district has noted that there is disagreement as to whether a motion to strike 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) is a dispositive motion. See Herrerra v. Mich. 

Dep’t of Corrs., No. 5:10-CV-11215, 2011 WL 3862426, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mich. July 22, 2011), 

adopted by No. 10-11215, 2011 WL 3862386 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2011). Guided by the Sixth 

Circuit on this topic, the Court concludes that, at least under the present circumstances, the 

Magistrate Judge’s order disposing of Cotter’s motion to strike is a non-dispositive one. In 

Bennett v. General Caster Service of N. Gordon Company, Inc., 976 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1992), 

the Sixth Circuit recognized that the enumerated list of filings contained in the Federal 

Magistrates Act — listing items over which a magistrate judge may not issue a final order — is 

non-exhaustive. Id. at 997. The Bennett court explained that a magistrate judge lacks authority 

to issue a final order “in circumstances analogous to those set forth in [the] list,” i.e., those 

circumstances in which the order is the functional equivalent to an involuntary dismissal. Id. 

Often, an order under Rule 12(f) may be dispositive of a party’s claims or defenses and, thus, 

may warrant a full report and recommendation, which, if properly objected to, would be subject 

to de novo review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). However, here, Cotter’s Rule 12(f) motion to 

strike would not have been dispositive of any party’s claims or defenses. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes that the Magistrate Judge retained authority to enter an order disposing of Cotter’s 

motion to strike. Even if the Magistrate Judge did lack authority to enter a final order, the Court 

would construe the order as a report and recommendation subject to full de novo review and 

reach the same conclusion as the Magistrate Judge. 

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General objections to a magistrate judge’s report or order, without identifying or 

explaining specific issues of contention or sources of error, are insufficient to trigger this Court’s 

review. Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508-509 (6th Cir. 1991); 

Watkins v. Tribley, No. 09-cv-14990, 2011 WL 4445823, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2011) 

(“An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than disagree with a magistrate judge’s conclusion, or 

simply summarizes what has been argued before, is not considered a valid objection.”). 

Furthermore, “issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at 

developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a 

possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.” 

McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-996 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

A. 12/5/2014 Objections 

Nearly all of Cotter’s assertions/objections begin with the unsubstantiated and frivolous 

premise that the Magistrate Judge has been biased and prejudiced against Cotter in this case, and 

that the Magistrate Judge has somehow abused his position of authority on the bench. 

Furthermore, many of Cotter’s objections are vaguely stated, incoherent, or express mere 

disagreement with the Magistrate Judge’s decision, and are devoid of further factual or legal 

support, rendering them insufficient to invoke this Court’s review. As discussed below, many of 

Cotter’s objections are rejected on this basis alone; however, other objections suffer from 

additional defects, as well. 

1. Cotter’s Objections that Stevenson Lacks an Interest in this Case 

Cotter first objects by claiming that Stevenson lacks an interest in this case. Cotter’s 

objections with respect to this point appear to be premised on undeveloped and conclusory 

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assertions that the associated bankruptcy proceeding is somehow invalid. For instance, Cotter 

variously alleges that (i) the Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing was in violation of a partially-identified 

credit counseling statute, (ii) “no documents . . . [were] submitted with the classification of 

Debtor” in the associated bankruptcy case, (iii) all documents submitted in the bankruptcy case 

stated “All Rights Reserved, Void Where Prohibited By Law, Vi Coactus,” and (iv) a 

presumption of abuse arose under the means test, which requires that the Chapter 7 bankruptcy 

be converted to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2).3 12/5/2014 Obj. at 

2-3. Cotter continues to attack the bankruptcy proceeding on the grounds that a statement, 

submitted to the bankruptcy court by the United States Trustee, that rejects Cotter’s contention 

that a presumption of abuse has arisen, “has never been produced for examination and 

inspection,”4 and that there are no known creditors in the bankruptcy case. Id. at 3, 4. Cotter 

 

3

 Section 707 permits a court to dismiss a case filed under that chapter, or to convert the case into 

a bankruptcy under Chapter 11 or 13, where certain conditions are met. Section 707(b)(1) 

permits a court to either “dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose 

debts are primarily consumer debts, or, with the debtor’s consent, convert such a case to a case 

under chapter 11 or 13 of this title,” if the court determines that to grant the debtor bankruptcy 

relief would be an abuse of the bankruptcy provisions. Section 707(b)(2)(A)(i) sets forth a 

standard under which a court is to presume that granting a debtor relief under the bankruptcy 

code would be an abuse of the bankruptcy provisions. Presumably, in this objection, Cotter is 

suggesting that this standard has been met and, accordingly, his bankruptcy must be converted 

into a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 

 

4

 After reviewing the docket for the bankruptcy matter, the Court understands Cotter’s objection 

to take issue with the fact that a docket filing indicates that the United States Trustee “filed a 

statement with the court indicating that no presumption of abuse has arisen,” but the actual filing 

is comprised of a notice issued by the clerk of the bankruptcy court and not the United States 

Trustee’s actual statement. See In re Cotter, 14-51270, 8/11/2014 Docket Filing (Dkt. 19). 

Thus, it appears to be Cotter’s contention that a statement or filing by the United States Trustee 

exists somewhere, but has not been made available to Cotter. However, the docket entry 

associated with the docket filing states, “The Debtor originally declared that this case was 

presumed to be an abuse under 707(b)(2). The United States Trustee has reviewed all materials 

filed by the debtor and has determined that the debtor’s case is NOT presumed to be an abuse 

under 707(b)(2).” Id. 8/11/2014 Docket Entry (Dkt. 19). According to that entry, the docket 

entry statement itself was filed and entered by individuals from the United States Trustee’s 

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also summarily states that a show-cause hearing has been scheduled in the bankruptcy 

proceeding, ostensibly for the “production of verified and validated facts of any Creditors that 

[Trustee Stevenson is] acting to collect funds for.” Id. at 4, 12-13. 

Cotter’s concerns are more properly raised in the forum exercising jurisdiction over the 

bankruptcy matter — the bankruptcy court. If Cotter is dissatisfied with the bankruptcy court’s 

resolution of his concerns, Cotter may appeal the bankruptcy judge’s decision in accordance with 

the bankruptcy code, 28 U.S.C. § 158. If Cotter is successful before the bankruptcy judge or on 

appeal, such that a defect in the bankruptcy proceeding rendered Stevenson’s interest in the 

present case, as Chapter 7 Trustee, invalid, Cotter may then seek to be relieved from any order or 

judgment predicated upon Stevenson’s interest in this case, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60. Accordingly, Cotter’s objections as to Stevenson’s interest in the case are 

overruled. 

2. Cotter’s Objections that the Case Caption was Improperly Modified

Cotter also makes numerous objections that the case caption was improperly modified 

from “P-J:Cotter” to “P-J Cotter” or “P. J. Cotter.” 12/5/2014 Obj. at 3-6, 7, 8. At times, 

Plaintiff states that this was done in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. E.g., id. at 

5. There is no evidence on the docket that the case caption was “deliberately” changed, as 

alleged by Cotter. Furthermore, Rule 11 bears absolutely no relevance to the appearance of a 

case caption. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (governing the signing of papers, representations made to 

the court, and sanctions). Nor does Cotter explain how the purported modifications affect his 

case in any way. Accordingly, the Court overrules Cotter’s objections concerning the 

appearance of his name in the case caption. 

 

office. Id. Thus, it appears that the docket entry comprises the United States Trustee’s 

statement, which is available for viewing and inspection by Cotter through the docket. 

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3. Cotter’s Objections Regarding a Failure to File a Statement of Corporate 

Affiliations and Financial Interest

In his objections, Cotter also argues that Stevenson and his counsel of record failed to file 

a statement of disclosure regarding corporate affiliations and financial interests, in violation of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 and Local Rule 83.4. 12/5/2014 Obj. at 6. Rule 7.1 requires 

that a “nongovernmental corporate party” must file a disclosure statement indicating certain 

information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a). Local Rule 83.4 articulates a similar requirement. E.D. 

Mich. LR 83.4(a). Cotter’s objection is not well taken for the reason that Stevenson is 

proceeding as Chapter 7 Trustee in his individual capacity and not as a corporate party. See 

Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. Therefore, no such statement of disclosure is required. The 

Court overrules these objections. 

4. Cotter’s Objections that the Magistrate Judge Improperly Decided a Dispositive 

Motion

Cotter’s objections also contain three conclusory allegations that the Court believes to be 

connected, concerning a motion submitted by Cotter. First, Cotter asserts that a dispositive 

motion for injunctive relief against Stevenson was pending on the docket. 12/5/2014 Obj. at 6. 

Second, Cotter asserts that no verified response to Cotter’s motion and brief was filed by 

Stevenson or his counsel of record. Id. In connection with these statements, Cotter references 

Docket Nos. 24 and 31, which refer to Cotter’s motion to strike Stevenson’s notice of appearance 

and notice of Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and to Cotter’s reply to Stevenson’s response to the motion 

to strike, respectively. Finally, Cotter argues elsewhere in his objections that the Magistrate 

Judge issued an order not requested by Cotter or any of the defendants to the case, and that, in 

doing so, the Magistrate Judge improperly cited to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) rather 

than to Rule 72(b). Id. at 8. The Court understands this last objection to be arguing, at least in 

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part, that the Magistrate Judge improperly decided a dispositive motion, i.e., the purported 

motion for injunctive relief against Stevenson.5 

As to Cotter’s first and third objections, a motion to strike Stevenson’s notice of 

appearance and notice of bankruptcy is not dispositive of any party’s claims or defenses.6 While 

Cotter characterizes his motion as one for injunctive relief, there is nothing in the motion itself 

that supports that characterization. In support of his motion to strike, Cotter cited Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure 12(f) and 7(b), Mot. to Strike at 2 (Dkt. 24), neither of which governs a 

motion for injunctive relief. Rather, Rule 12(f) governs motions to strike defenses or other 

matters from a pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), and Rule 7(b) simply requires that all requests to 

the Court be made in the form of a motion, Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b). The relief sought in Cotter’s 

motion requested the Court to strike all entries made by Stevenson, consistent with a motion to 

strike, but did not request further, affirmative relief in the form of an injunction. See Mot. to 

Strike at 6. As such, the Magistrate Judge was well within his authorization to issue an order on 

the motion to strike. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (permitting a magistrate judge to issue an order on 

“a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense”). Furthermore, the Magistrate 

Judge’s order was issued in response to Cotter’s motion to strike; as such, the order was indeed 

requested by one of the parties to the case — by Cotter himself — and therefore was not issued 

sua sponte, as Cotter appears to allege. And finally, Cotter’s contention that the Magistrate 

Judge cited the wrong rule of civil procedure in his order is nonsensical. Cotter references 

 

5

 This argument is made clearer in Cotter’s second set of objections. See 12/9/2014 Obj. at 11-

12 (Dkt. 39). 

6

 Furthermore, as discussed supra, even if Cotter’s motion to strike was a dispositive motion 

warranting a report and recommendation as opposed to an order, the dispositive nature of the 

motion would require that the Court subject the Magistrate Judge’s decision to de novo review, 

rather than review for clear error. As stated previously, Cotter’s objections fail to persuade 

under either form of scrutiny — clear error or de novo review; therefore, the fact that the 

Magistrate Judge issued an order, as opposed to a report and recommendation, is immaterial. 

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Docket No. 32, the Magistrate Judge’s order denying Cotter’s motion to strike, in connection 

with this last statement. 12/5/2014 Obj. at 8. The Court has reviewed the order in question and 

has not found a single reference to Rule 7(a). Therefore, Cotter’s first and third objections 

concerning this issue are overruled. 

As to his second objection, Cotter provides no support for his implicit contention that any 

response to his motion to strike needed to be a verified response. Therefore this objection is also 

without merit. 

5. Cotter’s Objections that Hearsay Evidence was Introduced and Considered

Cotter’s objections also assert that the Magistrate Judge has entertained hearsay evidence 

from Stevenson and his counsel, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 12/5/2014 

Obj. at 7, 8-9. Cotter provides no explanation as to what the alleged hearsay evidence was, or 

why the evidence was hearsay. Furthermore, Cotter provides no explanation for why Rule 11 

would apply to the purported introduction of hearsay here. Accordingly, the Court overrules 

Cotter’s evidentiary objections as undeveloped and unsubstantiated. 

6. Cotter’s Objections Regarding Ocwen Financial Corporation’s Counsel 

In his objections, Cotter states that the Magistrate Judge has impermissibly allowed the 

case to move forward without the entry of counsel for Ocwen Financial Corporation and 

Defendant Ronald Ferris. 12/5/2014 Obj. at 7-8. First, Ocwen Financial Corporation is not a 

listed defendant in this matter, although Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC is a named defendant and 

does have representation listed on the docket. See Notice of Appearance (Dkt. 16). Ronald 

Ferris is also represented according to the docket. See Notice of Appearance (Dkt. 17). Thus, 

Plaintiff’s objections on this point are erroneous and overruled. 

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7. Cotter’s Objections that the Magistrate Judge Improperly Provided Legal 

Advice

Cotter argues that the Magistrate Judge, by instructing Stevenson to file a motion to 

substitute, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c), gave “concise legal advice 

to [Stevenson and his counsel] by giving them the compilation of the legal entries allowing them 

to enter into [the case] without the confirmation of any legal status to do so,” and that Stevenson 

and his counsel acted in concert with the Magistrate Judge by subsequently filing the motion. 

12/5/2014 Obj. at 9-10. Courts routinely instruct parties to submit certain filings or motions in 

court orders or opinions. The Court fails to see how the Magistrate Judge acted improperly by 

reviewing the merits of Stevenson’s interest in this case, and concluding that Stevenson’s interest 

was legitimate and thereby should be given effect. This objection is overruled. 

8. Cotter’s Objection that a Conflict of Interest Exists

Cotter asserts that a conflict of interest exists between Stevenson’s role as the Chapter 7 

Trustee, where he is responsible for distributing Cotter’s estate to creditors like Defendant 

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, and Stevenson’s role as acting plaintiff in the present matter, 

where he is against Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. 12/5/2014 Obj. at 11. There is no 

such conflict. 

It is well established that upon declaring bankruptcy a debtor loses standing to pursue any 

existing legal or equitable claims, as those claims become the property of the debtor’s estate and 

may only be pursued by the trustee. Auday v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc., 698 F.3d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 

2012). Thus, unless the trustee abandons the claim — which Cotter does not presently allege — 

only the trustee may bring Cotter’s claim. Id. As Cotter points out, this rule places Stevenson in 

the position of pursuing litigation against the same creditors that may receive distributions to the 

estate. Nonetheless, this fact does not give rise to a conflict of interest because the trustee does 

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not represent the creditors; rather, the trustee represents the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. 

§ 323(a); see also In re Cottrell, 82 B.R. 45, 46-47 (W.D. Ky. 1987), aff’d 876 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 

1989) (“As the Bankruptcy Court pointed out, the trustee represents neither the creditor nor the 

debtor. The trustee represents the estate.”). Accordingly, Cotter’s suggestion that Stevenson’s 

position as Chapter 7 Trustee, by itself, creates a conflict of interest is simply contrary to law. 

9. Cotter’s Objections Regarding “Non Authenticated Documents”

Cotter makes a number of objections concerning the entry of “non verified” or “non 

authenticated” documents into both this case and the associated bankruptcy matter. 12/5/2014 

Obj. at 11-12. Cotter does not further explain what he means by “non verified” or “non 

authenticated,” nor does he identify which documents he believes to be “non verified” or “non 

authenticated.” Although Cotter references Docket Nos. 32 and 34 in connection with one of 

these objections, id., those docket numbers correspond to orders issued by the Magistrate Judge, 

not to any filing submitted by any of the parties. Elsewhere in his objections, Cotter intimates 

that documents bearing the caption “P. J. Cotter” as opposed to “P-J:Cotter” are “unfounded,” id. 

at 5-6, but fails to elaborate further as to why the appearance of Cotter’s name would implicate 

the validity of any document. Without further information, the Court is unable to evaluate these 

objections, and, consequently, they are overruled. 

10. Cotter’s Objection Regarding Removal from the E-Filing System

Cotter also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s decision on the grounds that the allegedly 

improper substitution, and subsequent removal of Cotter from the e-filing system, prevented 

Cotter from responding to the order denying his motion to strike, Stevenson’s motion to 

substitute parties, and the order granting Stevenson’s motion to substitute parties, as was Cotter’s 

purported right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). 12/5/2014 Obj. at 10-11. 

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However, Cotter did, in fact, object to the Magistrate Judge’s orders, by mailing his objections to 

the Court. Therefore, any right to review and respond to the Magistrate Judge’s orders was not 

adversely affected by Cotter’s termination from the e-filing system. 

B. 12/9/2014 Objections

As with his earlier objections, Cotter’s second set of objections nearly all begin with the 

same frivolous and unsubstantiated allegations against the Magistrate Judge. See generally 

12/9/2014 Obj. (Dkt. 39). Moreover, it appears that these later objections merely parrot Cotter’s 

earlier-made objections, including that (i) the Magistrate Judge permitted the case to go forward 

without the entry of counsel for Ocwen Financial Corporation and Defendant Ronald Ferris, id. 

at 2; (ii) the Magistrate Judge improperly entertained a motion from Stevenson, and improperly 

entered an order substituting Stevenson as the plaintiff in this matter in place of Cotter, id. at 2-3, 

8-9; (iii) the Magistrate Judge considered hearsay evidence in substituting the parties as the 

plaintiff, id. at 4; (iv) the Magistrate Judge improperly provided legal advice to Stevenson in 

granting Stevenson leave to file a motion to substitute, id. at 4-8; (v) a conflict of interest exists 

between Stevenson acting as the plaintiff in the case against an alleged creditor and Stevenson 

acting as Chapter 7 Trustee in the distribution of funds to the same alleged creditor in the 

bankruptcy case, id. at 9-10; (vi) “non authenticated” and “non verified” documents have been 

entered into this matter, id. at 1, 11, 12-13; (vii) the legitimacy of the associated bankruptcy is at 

issue, id. at 13-14; (viii) the Magistrate Judge improperly entered an order on a motion for 

injunctive relief without recommendations of law and fact for the district court’s review and 

disposition, id. at 2-3, 11-12; and (ix) the Magistrate Judge improperly removed Cotter from the 

e-filing system, id. at 9. 7

 

7

 To this particular objection, Cotter adds that the removal violated his due process rights and 

adversely affected his right to a jury trial. 12/9/2014 Obj. at 9. The Court observes that Cotter 

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Because these later objections are merely repetitive of Cotter’s earlier objections, the 

analysis provided supra is equally applicable here. For those reasons, which need not be 

repeated, the Court overrules Cotter’s second set of objections. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Cotter’s objections (Dkts. 36, 39) are overruled. Cotter’s 

filing at Docket No. 38 is ordered stricken. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 5, 2015 s/Mark A. Goldsmith 

 Detroit, Michigan MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

 United States District Judge 

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and 

any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on May 5, 2015. 

 s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams 

 Case Manager 

 

still had the opportunity to — and did — file objections by mailing those objections to the Court. 

Therefore, Cotter’s due process rights were not impeded by his removal from the e-filing system. 

Moreover, because Cotter’s claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate, and not to Cotter 

individually, Cotter’s individual right to a jury trial is not implicated in this case. Cf. Bauer v. 

Commerce Union Bank, Clarksville, Tenn., 859 F.2d 438, 440-441 (6th Cir. 1988) (explaining 

that a statutory right to a jury trial belongs to the individual prosecuting the claim, which, in the 

case of parties undergoing bankruptcy proceedings, is the trustee as representative of the 

bankruptcy estate). 

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