UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 14-14450

SCOTTY’S INC., et al., 

Defendants.

/

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the court is Plaintiff United State’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. # 22), seeking injunctive relief pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 332 for violations of the

federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“the Act”), 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and (k). The

matter is fully briefed, and the court finds that a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. LR

7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated below, the court will grant the government’s Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

For fifty-five years, the Bruce family has owned and operated Defendant Scotty’s,

Inc., a small, Detroit-based company that manufactures, sells, and distributes ready-toeat sandwiches to gas stations and convenience stores located throughout Michigan

and Ohio. (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 588; Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 641, 653.) On five separate

occasions over the last decade, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) inspected

Defendants’ headquarters located at 3426 Junction Street: first in August 2006, then

subsequently in August 2008, August 2009, October 2010, and January-February 2014. 

(Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 590-605.) On each of these occasions, inspectors discovered

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 1 of 16 Pg ID 696
multiple violations of the Seafood Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (“HACCP”),

21 C.F.R § 123.6, and Current Good Manufacturing Practice (“CGMP”), Id. at § 110.5,

regulations. (Id.) The HACCP regulations govern all establishments that “process fish

and fishery products” and apply to Defendants because they manufacture and sell tuna

salad sandwiches. Id. at § 123.6. Similarly, the CGMP is applicable to all food

processors, except those harvesting, storing, or distributing raw agricultural

commodities. Id. at § 110.19.

Among others, Defendant Scotty’s was cited for the following violations: 

(1) failing “to have a written HACCP plan to control the food safety hazards reasonably

likely to occur during the processing of tuna salad sandwiches,” (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 590;

Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 643); (2) storing tuna salad sandwiches in reduced oxygen packages,

(Id.); (3) failing to maintain the requisite sanitation control record, (Id. at Pg. ID 591; Dkt.

# 26, Pg. ID 643); (4) maintaining the plant in state of disrepair, as evidenced by the

moldy ceiling tiles in the walk-in cooler where Defendants store sandwiches, (Dkt. # 22,

Pg. ID 592; Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 643); (5) failing to “properly identify toxic cleaning

compounds and sanitizing agents in a manner that protects against contamination of

food,” (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 593; Dkt # 26, Pg. ID 644); (6) allowing personnel to process

food with bare hands without removing jewelry, (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 593); (7) lacking

“adequate hand-washing facilities,” (Id. at Pg. ID 594); (8) storing production materials

such as bread buns in plastic trays and plastic wrap directly on the floor, (Dkt. # 19-5,

Pg. ID 398-99); and (9) failing to “remove litter and waste that serves as an attractant,

breeding place, or harborage area for pests, within the immediate vicinity of the plant

building,” (Id. at Pg. ID 595). 

2

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 2 of 16 Pg ID 697
After each inspection, FDA investigators issued Forms FDA 483 to Defendant

Sandra J. Jackson, Scotty’s co-owner and manager, and discussed each of the

observed violations with her. (Id. at Pg. ID 605.) Each time, Jackson “promised to

make the necessary corrections.” (Id.) Additionally, at the conclusion of the 2008, 2009,

2010, and 2014 inspections, “Defendant Jackson promised that Defendants would stop

processing tuna salad sandwiches, so as to avoid the obligation to comply with the

seafood HACCP regulations.” (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 605; Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 651). 

Nevertheless, few of the promised improvements were made year-to-year between

inspections, and Defendants continue to make tuna salad sandwiches. (Dkt. # 22, Pg.

ID 605-06; Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 651.) 

In addition, the FDA has sent Defendants three follow-up letters. First, in a

December 5, 2006 letter, agency officials “detail[ed] Defendants seafood HACCP

violations[,] . . . discuss[ing] in detail what the seafood HACCP regulations require and

referr[ing] Defendants to additional resources on the FDA’s website.” (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID

607; Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 653.) Defendants did not respond. (Id.) Then, on November 19,

2009, the FDA sent Defendants a warning letter which elaborated on many of the

regulatory violations and reminded Jackson “that she told FDA investigators during the

August 2009 inspection that she would stop processing tuna salad sandwiches as of

August 27, 2009.” (Dkt. # 22, pg. ID 606.) Jackson responded in kind with a letter ten

days later, “promising corrective actions,” but suggesting “that she was continuing to

process tuna salad sandwiches.” (Id.), The agency responded with a follow-up letter

two months later, stating that “Defendants’ response was inadequate because

Defendants failed to address the issues in the Warning Letter in sufficient detail.” (Dkt.

3

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 3 of 16 Pg ID 698
# 22, Pg. ID 607.). Defendants, once again, did not respond. (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 607;

Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 653.)

After Defendants failed their fifth inspection in 2014, Plaintiff United States

commenced the present action for injunctive relief pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 332.

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 497

(6th Cir. 2003). The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine

dispute as to a material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

“[T]hat burden may be discharged by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810,

817 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must put forth enough evidence to

show that there exists “a genuine issue for trial.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909

(6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is not appropriate when “the

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 243 (1986). In evaluating a summary judgment

motion, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the

truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial . . .

4

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 4 of 16 Pg ID 699
credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.” Moran v. Al Basit

LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

The government now seeks injunctive relief under section 332(a) of the Federal

Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which authorizes district courts “to restrain violations of

section 331" of the Act “for cause shown.” 21 U.S.C. § 332(a). When, as here, “a court

is called upon to enforce a federal statutory injunction, its reliance upon the traditional

practices of equity must be ‘conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which

Congress has sought to protect.’” United States v. City of Painesville, 644 F.2d 1186,

1194 (6th Cir. 1981). Therefore, unlike with a standard injunction determination, courts

do “not need to consider whether there is an adequate legal remedy or irreparable

injury.” United States v. S. Serra Cheese, No. 14-13077, 2015 WL 6156961, at *6 (E.D.

Mich. Oct. 20, 2015) (Cohn, J.). Instead, “the Government only needs to establish that

[Defendants] violated the statute and there is some cognizable danger of recurrent

violation.” Id.; see also United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 246 F. Supp. 2d 744, 753

(E.D. Mich. 2003) (“[P]laintiff need only show that there has been a violation of the SEC

and that future violations are reasonably likely to occur.”). Each factor will be discussed

in turn.

A. Violation of the Act

The government argues that Defendants have violated the Federal Food, Drug,

and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) and (k). The court agrees. Section 331(a) of the 

Act prohibits the “introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any

food . . . that is adulterated or misbranded.” 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). Subsection (k)

5

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 5 of 16 Pg ID 700
similarly restricts “doing any other act with respect to, a food . . . if such act is done

while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment in

interstate commerce and results in such article being adulterated.” Id. at § 331(k). 

Thus, to prove the alleged violations, the government must show that (1) Defendants’

products constitute “food” within the meaning of the legislation; (2) Defendants either

introduced said food into interstate commerce, 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), or held it for sale

after shipment in interstate commerce, 21 U.S.C. § 331(k); and (3) said food is

adulterated. S. Serra Cheese Company, 2015 WL 6156961, at *4. 

The government claims that “[n]o genuine issue as to any material fact exists in

this case.” (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 618). Indeed, Defendants have not attempted to argue

prongs one and two, admitting that their sandwiches are “food” within the meaning of

the Act and that they have introduced those sandwiches into interstate commerce. (Dkt.

# 26, Pg. ID 641.) Instead, Defendants rely on the unexplained assertion that “[t]here

are genuine issues of fact as to some of the alleged violations.” (Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 656

(emphasis added).) Rather than providing evidence to support this claim, however,

Defendants rely on the non-sequitur that “the company has never received a complaint

of having sold an un-wholesome sandwich.” (Id. at Pg. ID 654.) 

Food is adulterated within the meaning of the Act “if it has been prepared,

packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have be contaminated with

filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health.” 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4). 

“This provision of the Act pertains solely to the conditions under which food is prepared,

packaged, or held; it is not necessary to prove that the food itself actually contains filth

or is injurious to health.” S. Serra Cheese, 2015 WL 6156961, at *4. On the contrary,

6

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 6 of 16 Pg ID 701
“the government need only show a reasonable probability that, because of the

insanitary conditions under which food is prepared, packed, or held, food may have

been rendered filthy or injurious to health.” Id. (citing United States v. Wiesenfeld

Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1964); Berger v. United States, 200 F.2d 818, 821

(8th Cir. 1952); United States v. Gel Spice Co., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (E.D.N.Y.

1984)). “The question of insanitary conditions is to be determined from the totality of the

circumstances.” United States v. Am. Mercantile Corp., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1075-76

(W.D. Tenn. 2012). 

1. The HACCP Violations

Federal regulations interpreting this Act require “every processor” of “fish or

fishery products” to “conduct, or have conducted for it, a hazard analysis to determine

whether there are food safety hazards that are reasonably likely to occur for each kind

of fish and fishery product processed by the processor and to identify the preventative

measures that the processor can apply to control those hazards.” 21 C.F.R. § 123.6(a). 

Whenever said “hazard analysis reveals one or more food safety hazards that are likely

to occur,” a processor is required to “have and implement a written HACCP plan”

detailing 

(1) the safety hazards which are likely to occur; 

(2) the “critical control points for each of the identified food safety hazards;” 

(3) “the critical limits that must be met at each of the critical control points;”

(4) a list of procedures that “will be used to monitor each of the critical control

points to ensure compliance;”

(5) any corrective action plans developed by the processor to correct deviations;

(6) the processor’s verification procedures; and

7

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 7 of 16 Pg ID 702
(7) a “recordkeeping system that documents the monitoring of the critical control

points.”

Id. at § 123.6(b). “Failure of a processor to have and implement a HACCP plan that

complies with this section whenever a HACCP plan is necessary . . . shall render the

fish or fishery products of that processor adulterated” as a matter of law. Id. at §

123.6(g). 

The government argues that Defendants’ tuna salad sandwiches are adulterated

within the meaning of the Act because “Defendants have repeatedly failed to establish

and implement a HACCP plan that addresses food safety hazards that are likely to

occur when processing tuna salad sadwiches,” including “the formation of scombrotoxin,

the growth of pathogens and the formation of additional toxins, and the presence of

allergens.” (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 591, 624.) Defendants do not dispute that the

manufacture and distribution of their tuna salad sandwiches pose significant health risks

to the public, and “admit that at the time alleged they did not have a written HACCP

plan in place.” (Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 643.) Nevertheless, they argue that “based on advice

received from FDA inspector Rasha Bamieh in 2008, they believe[d] Scotty’s production

of a limited amount of tuna sandwiches, pursuant to a special order, and both produced

and delivered to a customer within 6 hours, exempted Scotty’s from any required

compliance with the HACCP regulations.” (Id. at Pg. ID 642 (emphasis added).) No

such exemption exists within the regulations or the Act. Even if it did, the government

has provided evidence that shows “tuna salad sandwiches produced by Defendants for

customers . . . were stored in the firm’s walk-in cooler . . . until being stored in the firm’s

delivery trucks overnight.” (Dkt. # 29, Pg. ID 677; see also Dkt. # 20-2, Pg. ID 434.) 

Defendants have proffered nothing to rebut this evidence. As such, the tuna salad

8

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 8 of 16 Pg ID 703
sandwiches in question were not “produced and delivered to a customer within 6 hours.” 

Defendants’ operation is not exempted from the HACCP regulations. 

Defendants are essentially arguing good faith, but as the Ninth Circuit has noted

“if it is shown that the product proceeded against is adulterated or misbranded, then

good faith or lawful intent will not constitute a defense.” Research Labs., Inc. v. United

States, 167 F.2d 410, 420 (9th Cir. 1948); see also 13 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 35:500

(“Violations [of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] may be punished as misdemeanors

regardless of a lack of knowledge, willfulness, or personal participation by the

defendnat.”). Having admitted that they did not have an HACCP plan in place,

Defendants must also admit that the tuna salad sandwiches are adulterated as a matter

of law.

2. CGMP Regulations

Violations of CGMP regulations are also independently indicative of a food being

adulterated within the meaning of the Act. 21 C.F.R. § 110.5(a). These regulations

require the “grounds about a food plant under the control of the operator [to be] kept in a

condition that will protect against the contamination of food.” Id. at § 110.20(a). It also

mandates that “plant management shall take all reasonable measures and precaution to

ensure” disease control, cleanliness, and the education, training, and supervision of

personnel with respect to proper sanitation when handling food products. Id. at §

110.10. Among other things, the regulations require employees to wash their “hands

thoroughly . . . in an adequate hand-washing facility before starting work, after each

absence from the work station, and at any other time when the hands may have

become soiled or contaminated,” Id. at § 110.10(3); “remov[e] hand jewelry that cannot

9

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 9 of 16 Pg ID 704
be adequately sanitized during periods in which food is manipulated by hands,” Id. at §

110.10(4); and “tak[e] any other necessary precautions to protect against contamination

of food, food-contact surfaces, or food-packaging materials with microorganisms or

foreign substances,” Id. at § 110.10(9). 

The government has shown that during their inspections of Defendants’ facilities,

FDA agents documented multiple CGMP violations including: (1) mold-covered ceiling

tiles in the walk-in cooler where Defendants stored sandwiches (Dkt. # 19-5, Pg. ID

399); (2) employees touching non-food contact surfaces, including plastic bakery racks

stored outside near the trash, before handling food products without washing their

hands, (Id.); (3) an employee handling food without first removing a large gemstone

ring, (Id. at Pg. ID 400); (4) “[p]lastic wrap used to wrap various [ready-to-eat]

sandwiches . . . stored directly on the floor in front of a processing table during the

manufacturing of . . . sandwiches,” (Id. at Pg. ID 398); (5) plastic bakery racks holding

bread buns stored directly on the floor and in the ally near the trash which were later

placed directly on the production table without first being sanitized, (Id. at Pg. ID 398,

399); (6) a “[l]ack of effective hand cleaning preparations,” specifically noting a “hand

wash sink located in the meat slicing/dishwashing room” that did “not have readily

available hand soap,” (Id. at Pg. ID 400); and (7) a “[f]aliure to remove litter and waste

that may constitute an attractant, breeding place, or harborage area for pests, within the

immediate vicinity of the plant buildings,” (Id.). 

Defendants even admit that some of these violations occurred, including the

moldy ceiling tiles and employees placing the bread bun racks directly on the floor, but

insist that following the inspection, “they promptly took steps to prevent a reoccurence

10

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 10 of 16 Pg ID 705
of any errors of such nature as were reported by the inspector,” and “arranged to have

the missing or discolored ceiling tiles replaced.” (Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 644.) To support

these assertions, Defendants have provided the court with only two bare-bone

affidavits, one by Defendant Jackson and the other by her father, David Bruce. For her

part, Jackson claims that “[e]xtensive physical improvements have been made to our

food production facility, and these improvements are continuing.” (Dkt. # 26-3, Pg. ID

662.) Similarly, Bruce states that “[i]mprovements in Scotty’s, Incorporated’s physical

facilities and its sandwich-making practices have taken place during this litigation, and it

expects to finish the planned improvements by the end of November, 2015, if given the

opportunity to do so.” (Dkt. # 26-5, Pg. ID 666.) Neither affidavit refute any of the

specific violations shown by the government. To the extent these affidavits address

such violations, they discuss only future corrective plans, and are thus insufficient to

create a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (a non-movant “must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts . . . [and] come forward with specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”).

Defendants have provided even less evidence to support its denials of the

government’s other allegations, including employees not washing their hands before

handling Defendants’ products after touching non-food contact surfaces, an employee

handling food without first removing hand jewelry, the lack of soap at the hand washing

station, and the failure to remove trash. In each case, Defendants either deny the

allegations out right, (See, e.g. Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 644), or state that if such violations

occurred, they were in contradistinction to Defendants’ “standard rules.” (Id.) The only

11

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 11 of 16 Pg ID 706
piece of evidence Defendants cite to support any of these denials is paragraph fourteen

of Defendant Jackson’s affidavit, which states “I have read the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment and the response by Scotty’s and myself. The facts stated therein

are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.” (Dkt. # 26-3,

Pg. ID 662.) This sort of circular reasoning is certainly not “more than a scintilla” of

evidence. S. Serra Cheese, 2015 WL 6156961, at *5 (stating that argument fails

because “aside from the assertions in its brief, Serra has not established proof of the

assertions”). As such, Defendants have not raised a genuine issue of material fact with

respect to its CGMP violations. In light of these violations, the court finds that there is a

“reasonable probability that, because of the insanitary conditions under which

[Defendants’ sandwiches are] prepared, packed, or held, [they] may have been

rendered filthy or injurious to health.” S. Serra Cheese, 2015 WL 6156961, at *4. 

Defendants’ sandwiches are adulterated as a matter of law.

 B. Likelihood of Future Violations

Having already determined that Defendants violated the Act, the court turns to

the second factor: the likelihood of Defendants violating the Act in the future. When

making this determination, courts consider a number of factors, including:

(1) the egregiousness of the violations;

(2) the isolated or repeated nature of the violations;

(3) the degree of scienter involved; and

(4) the sincerity of the defendant’s assurances, if any, against future violations.

Edward Rose & Sons, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 753-53. While this is not an exhaustive list

and no single factor is dispositive, Id., all of the relevant factors suggest that an

injunction is warranted to prevent future violations of the Act.

12

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 12 of 16 Pg ID 707
First, as noted above, Defendants’ past violations were particularly egregious,

present in nearly every aspect of their sandwich-making operation. This factor weighs in

favor of granting injunctive relief.

Second, many of Defendants’ regulatory violations date back to at least August

2006, when the FDA inspectors first noted Scotty’s lack of a written HACCP plan, failure

to maintain sanitation control records, and practice of placing bread buns in plastic trays

directly on the floor. (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 604; Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 651.) Despite Defendants’

unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, Defendants did not take the “necessary action to

correct [these] conditions.” (Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 651.) These and other violations of the

HACCP and CGMP regulations continuted, and were documented in each of the FDA’s

four subsequent inspections. (Dkt. ## 20-3, 20-5, 20-6, 20-7, 20-8, 20-9.) As the Sixth

Circuit has noted, such a “pattern of repetitive violations . . . weigh[s] heavily in favor of

granting a prospective injunction.” Martin v. Funtime, Inc., 963 F.2d 110, 114 (6th Cir.

1992). 

Third, in light of the FDA’s repeated warnings, (Dkt. ## 20-3, 20-4, 20-5, 20-6,

20-7, 20-8, 20-9, 20-10, 21, 21-2), there is no question that Defendants have knowingly

violated the Act since August 2006. Thus, this factor cuts in favor of the government as

well.

Fourth, Defendants admit that after each inspection, Defendant Jackson

“promised corrections to many of the CGMP violations,” (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 595, 601,

603, 605; Dkt. # 26, Pg ID 646, 648, 649, 650, 651). Yet, the violations persisted. 

Furthermore, Defendants admit that following the 2008, 2009, and 2010 inspections,

Defendant Jackson also promised “that Defendants would stop processing tuna salad

13

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 13 of 16 Pg ID 708
sandwiches.” (Dkt. # 22, Pg. ID 605; Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 649, 650, 652.) Yet, production

continued. Given the emptiness of their past promises, Defendants’ present contrition

and promises of reform are dubious at best. 

Nevertheless, Defendants essentially argue that this time around they really

mean it, as evidenced by the fact that Scotty’s “has made a substantial financial

commitment by obtaining well-trained and competent advisors from Wayne State

University to assist it in meeting FDA’s requirements.” (Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 655.) 

Defendants anticipated that their renovations would be completed by December 2015. If

this is true, an injunction will have no negative impact—Defendants will be in full

compliance with the Act. However, that does not change the court’s suspicions:

Defendants’ past unreliability cause this factor to weigh in favor of granting the

government’s motion.

The court, therefore, finds that absent an injunction, there is a substantial

likelihood that Defendant will violate the Act in the future.

C. Equitable Factors

Defendants request that the court refrain from issuing the injunction sought for a

number of additional reasons. First, Defendants ask the court to “appropriately take

notice of the economic problems facing the City of Detroit,” noting that “Detroit definitely

needs all the jobs it can retain.” (Dkt. # 26, Pg. ID 654.) “Although the jobs available at

Scotty’s are small compared to the total employment available in the City, they still have

importance to the City’s economic needs, given the ongoing financial crisis.” (Id. at Pg.

ID 655.) Be that as it may, Congress has already balanced the policy considerations

here and determined that ensuring the public health is worth whatever negative impact

enforcement of the statute might have on local economies. The Act contains no

14

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 14 of 16 Pg ID 709
exception for a business laboring in a struggling economy or a city with a particularly

high unemployment rate, but places a premium on public health concerns. As such,

Defendants’ argument is inconsequential.

Second, Defendants argue that an injunction would be inappropriate because

there is no “immediate and dire threat to the public health.” (Id. at Pg. ID 656.) 

However, the Act requires only that the government show that Defendants have violated

the Act in the past and that there is cognizable danger of future violations. See United

States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Having found that Defendants

have not raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to either factor, the court

will grant the government’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 22) and issue an

injunction.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS SO ORDERED that the government’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.

# 22) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the government shall SUBMIT to the court the

form of injunction it believes appropriate no later than April 1, 2016. Defendants shall

then RESPOND by no later than April 8, 2016. The court will hold a telephone

conference with counsel on April 15, 2016 at 9:30 a.m. If the language of the

injunction is not resolved at the conference, the court will hold a formal hearing with

party representatives on the matter on April 26 , 2016 at 9:00 a.m.

 s/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 28, 2016

15

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 15 of 16 Pg ID 710
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record

on this date, March 28, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 s/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

3/28/16:S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C1 ORDERS\14-14450.SCOTTY.summaryjudgment.wpd

16

2:14-cv-14450-RHC-RSW Doc # 31 Filed 03/28/16 Pg 16 of 16 Pg ID 711