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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 14-20780 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

CURTIS SCOTT,

 Defendant. 

_________________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CURTIS SCOTT’S 

MOTION FOR SEVERANCE (ECF #56) 

 This case arises out of an armed carjacking at Birmingham Seaholm High 

School. The Government alleges that Defendant Curtis Scott (“Scott”) participated 

in the carjacking and then falsely told federal agents that he was not in possession 

of a cellular telephone that the agents believed was used during the carjacking. 

On November 24, 2015, a grand jury returned a three-count First 

Superseding Indictment against Scott. (See ECF #45.) Count I charges Scott with 

carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; Count II charges Scott with using a 

firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c); and Count III charges Scott with making a false statement in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1001. (See id.) 

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Scott has now filed a motion for severance under Rule 14(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure (the “Motion for Severance”)1

. (See ECF # 56.) Scott 

asks the Court to sever his trial on Counts I (carjacking) and II (using a firearm) 

from the trial on Count III (making false statement). (See id.) Scott argues that 

trying all three charges together would unfairly prejudice him by allowing the 

introduction of evidence against him that would not be admissible if the charges 

were tried separately. Scott’s argument, in toto, is as follows: 

Here, joinder will prejudice Mr. Scott by allowing 

introduction of evidence pertaining to the details of the 

carjacking offense that is minimally, if at all, relevant to 

the alleged false-statement charge. Given the 

government’s proffer at Mr. Scott’s detention hearing, 

newly discovered evidence puts Mr. Scott at the scene of 

an armed carjacking and, in fact, suggests his 

involvement in planning the carjacking and providing the 

firearm used. Although highly relevant to the carjacking 

and firearm charges, the details about this alleged 

carjacking have only minimal probative value in regard 

to the alleged false statement about Mr. Scott’s 

possession of Mr. Hubbard’s phone. In a trial solely on 

the false-statement charge, the newly revealed allegations 

about the details of Mr. Scott’s role in carjacking would 

not be admissible, as the probative value of this evidence 

is substantially outweighed the danger that the jury will 

impermissibly imply Mr. Scott’s commission of the 

false-statement offense because of his other alleged 

crimes. Fed. R. Evid. 403. The jury should not hear such 

evidence in the course of determining Mr. Scott’s guilt or 

innocence on the false-statement charge. 

 

1

 Scott has not argued that the charges against him were improperly joined in 

violation of Rule 8 of the Federal Criminal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

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Additionally, evidence of the false-statement charge 

would be unfairly prejudicial if admitted in a trial for the 

carjacking and firearm offenses. The same jury that hears 

evidence casting Mr. Scott as a liar should not be 

expected to fairly assess his guilt or innocence of the 

other offenses. Thus, severance is appropriate in this case 

to ensure Mr. Scott receives a fair adjudication of the 

charges against him. 

(Id. at 3-4, Pg. ID 538-539.2

) 

 The Court disagrees with the premise of Scott’s argument – namely that a 

jury in a single trial of all of the charges against Scott would hear evidence that 

would be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (“FRE 403”) if the charges 

were tried separately. First, if Scott stood trial on the false-statement charge alone, 

FRE 403 would not bar admission of evidence concerning the carjacking as Scott 

claims. That evidence would be relevant to prove, among other things, Scott’s 

motive for making the false statement – to cover up his alleged connection to the 

carjacking. Evidence concerning the carjacking would likewise be probative of the 

materiality of Scott’s allegedly false statement – to show why the statement 

mattered to the investigating agents and how it could have influenced their 

decisions. While admission of the carjacking evidence would undoubtedly 

prejudice Scott, the Court does not believe that the prejudice would be unfair under 

 

2

 Scott has not identified any rule other than Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as the 

sole rule that would purportedly require exclusion of the evidence identified above 

if the false statement charge was tried separately from the carjacking and firearms 

charge. 

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the circumstances. And the Court is quite certain that in a trial on the falsestatement charge alone, the probative value of the carjacking evidence would not 

be substantially outweighed any unfair prejudice. Thus, even if Scott was tried on 

the false-statement charge alone, evidence concerning the carjacking would not be 

excluded under FRE 403. 

 Second, if Scott stood trial on the carjacking and firearms charges alone, 

evidence of his alleged false statements would not be excluded by FRE 403. The 

evidence that Scott allegedly attempted to conceal the location of the cellular 

phone by lying about its location is relevant to show Scott’s consciousness of guilt. 

See Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 7.14 and authorities cited in commentary 

to the instruction. And while the evidence of the allegedly-false statements by 

Scott would admittedly prejudice him, that prejudice is not unfair under the 

circumstances. And in a trial on the carjacking and firearms charges, the probative 

value of the evidence that Scott made false statements would not be substantially 

outweighed by any unfair prejudice. Accordingly, FRE 403 would not require the 

exclusion of evidence concerning the allegedly-false statements in a trial on the 

carjacking and firearms charges alone. 

 A criminal defendant is entitled to severance under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 14 “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a 

specific trial right of [the defendant], or prevent the jury from making a reliable 

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judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 39 

(1993). For all of the reasons explained above, Scott has failed to show that either 

of these serious risks exists in a single trial on all three charges in the First 

Superseding Indictment. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Severance 

(ECF #56) is DENIED. 

 s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

Dated: January 12, 2016 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 

parties and/or counsel of record on January 12, 2016, by electronic means and/or 

ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5113 

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