UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RAFAELI, LLC, and GREAT LAKES 

AFFORDABLE HOUSING, LLC 

Plaintiffs, 

v. Case No. 14-13958 

WAYNE COUNTY, WAYNE COUNTY HON. TERRENCE G. BERG 

TREASURER RAYMOND WOJTOWICZ, 

OAKLAND COUNTY, and OAKLAND 

COUNTY TREASURER ANDREW 

MEISNER, 

 

Defendants. 

 / 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO REOPEN CASE (DKT. 19) AND DENYING, AS MOOT, 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 21) 

This case is a putative class action, brought by Plaintiff Rafaeli, LLC and 

Great Lakes Affordable Housing, LLC (“Plaintiffs”) against Defendants Wayne and 

Oakland Counties and the Treasurers of those Counties (“Defendants”). Plaintiffs 

allege, generally, that the notices required by the Michigan General Property Tax 

Act (“GPTA”) – Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.1 – regarding delinquent real estate taxes, 

judicial tax foreclosure proceedings and the subsequent judicial foreclosure 

proceedings violate the constitutional guarantees of Due Process and Equal 

Protection. In addition, Plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation of the takings 

clause of the Fifth Amendment on the ground that when real property is foreclosed 

upon for failure to pay property taxes, the entire equity is being taken even when its 

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value far exceeds the amount of taxes owed, and such a taking is without just 

compensation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek an award of “just compensation,” as 

well as a declaration from this Court that Michigan’s GPTA is unconstitutional. 

By way of procedural background, this Court previously entered an order 

(Dkt. 17)1 granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, on the grounds that this Court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this matter by operation of the Tax 

Injunction Act – 28 U.S.C. § 1341 – and that principles of comity required that this 

case be dismissed because a remedy was available in state court. In a nutshell, this 

Court found that Plaintiffs’ claims could not be brought in Federal Court, but rather 

must be brought in a state court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the Court 

dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice to them being refiled in state court. 

Both Plaintiffs (Rafaeli & Great Lakes) refiled their claims in state court – 

Plaintiff Rafaeli in the Oakland County Circuit Court (Case No. 2015-147429-CZ, 

Langford-Morris, J.) and Plaintiff Great Lakes in the Wayne County Circuit Court 

(Case No. 15-007482-CZ, Colombo, C.J.). Both state courts granted summary 

disposition to Defendants, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiff Rafaeli 

appealed Judge Langford-Morris’s dismissal of its claims to the Michigan Court of 

Appeals (COA Case No. 330696). That appeal is pending. Plaintiff Great Lakes 

chose not to appeal Judge Colombo’s decision, but rather filed a motion (Dkt. 19) in 

this Court to reopen the case that this Court previously dismissed. 

                                                            

1 Rafaeli, LLC v. Wayne Cty., No. 14-13958, 2015 WL 3522546 (E.D. Mich. June 4, 2015). The Court 

will not recite all of the background facts and analysis contained in its previous order in this order, 

but rather incorporates that discussion by reference herein. 

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Defendant Wayne County responded to Great Lakes’ motion to reopen (Dkt. 

20), arguing that res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Great Lakes 

from re-litigating the claims that Judge Colombo dismissed. Defendant Wayne 

County also filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 21), in which it also argued 

that Great Lakes’ claims were barred by res judicata. This Court heard argument 

on both motions on March 7, 2016. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that res judicata bars 

Plaintiff Great Lakes from relitigating the claims that Judge Colombo dismissed on 

the merits. Therefore, Plaintiff Great Lakes’ motion to reopen this case (Dkt. 19) is 

DENIED and Defendant Wayne County’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 21) 

is DENIED AS MOOT. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Motion for Relief from Judgment Standard 

Plaintiff Great Lakes moves to reopen this case under Rule 60(b). Relief 

under Rule 60(b) is “circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments 

and termination of litigation,” Waifersong Ltd. Inc. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 

F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992), the Court will only grant Rule 60 relief under one of 

the circumstances enumerated in Rule 60(b), where the situation merits reopening 

the underlying case. See Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 268 (6th 

Cir.1998). Rule 60(b)(1) provides that “the court may relieve a party or its legal 

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Courts 

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consider three factors assessing a Rule 60(b) motion: (1) culpability for the adverse 

judgment, (2) prejudice to the opposing party, and (3) whether the underlying claim 

or defense is meritorious. See Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 628 (6th Cir. 2012). 

B. Res Judicata Bars Plaintiff Great Lakes’ Claims 

“Federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to a state-court 

judgment as that judgment receives in the rendering state.” Abbott v. Michigan, 474 

F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). The “Full Faith and Credit statute,” 28 U.S.C. § 1738 

requires federal courts in a § 1983 action to give state court judgments the same 

preclusive effect those judgments would have in the rendering state’s courts. See 

Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80–82, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 

L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). 

Federal courts look to the forum state’s law to determine the preclusive effect 

that attaches to the forum state’s judgments. See Ohio ex rel. Boggs v. City of 

Cleveland, 655 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff Great Lakes’ prior litigation 

took place in a Michigan state court, which employs a “broad view of res judicata,” 

In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich. 396, 431, 596 N.W.2d 164, 183 

(1999), that “bars a second, subsequent action when (1) the prior action was decided 

on the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties or their privies, and (3) the 

matter in the second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first,” Abbott, 474 

F.3d at 331 (quoting Adair v. State, 470 Mich. 105, 121, 680 N.W.2d 386, 396 (Mich. 

2004)). 

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Res judicata “bars not only claims already litigated, but also every claim 

arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, 

could have raised but did not.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a 

factual grouping constitutes a transaction for purposes of res judicata is to be 

determined pragmatically, by considering whether the facts are related in time, 

space, origin or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient trial unit.” Adair, 

470 Mich. at 125, 680 N.W.2d at 398 (internal quotations omitted; emphasis and 

alteration in original). The burden of proving res judicata is on the party asserting 

it. See Abbott, 474 F.3d at 331. 

In this case, Plaintiff asserted both federal and state constitutional claims in 

the Wayne County Circuit Court. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted the same due 

process, equal protection and takings clause (or just compensation) claims (Dkt. 8, 

Ex. B, State Court Compl.) that it now seeks to revive before this Court. These 

claims were litigated on the merits, and ultimately dismissed by Judge Colombo, 

who explained his ruling as follows: 

The first issue this Court will address is Plaintiffs claim there is a due 

process violation on both United States and Michigan Constitutions when the 

Defendants learn that Plaintiff did not receive notice .... [recitation of 

background facts] This satisfies the requirements of due process under both 

United States and the Michigan Constitutions. [Plaintiffs claim the] General 

Property Tax Act is unconstitutional because it deprives tax payers of their 

right to just compensation when the government takes their entire property 

and sells it for amounts in excess of the tax delinquency. They claim this 

violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution and the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the ... illegal taking of property 

under the Michigan Constitution. There was no violation of U.S. and 

Michigan Constitution for keeping the equity in the property in excess of the 

taxes. This Court will also grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) 

as to the Equal Protection claim because Plaintiff never responded to 

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Defendants’ arguments and brief on this issue. This Court agrees with 

Defendants’ analysis of the Equal Protection argument (Dkt. 20, Ex. D at 10, 

13-15). 

It is clear that Judge Colombo considered the same claims that Plaintiff wishes to 

relitigate in this forum, and dismissed them on the merits. 

In an attempt to overcome the bar of res judicata, Plaintiff argues that its 

takings clause claims did not become ripe until the Michigan courts finally ruled 

that no compensation would be made for the alleged taking, relying on Williamson 

County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 

Plaintiff claims that Michigan did not fail to provide “compensation” until after 

Judge Colombo dismissed Plaintiff Great Lakes’ claims. However, the Supreme 

Court has rejected this argument, holding “[i]t is hardly a radical notion to 

recognize that, as a practical matter, a significant number of plaintiffs will 

necessarily litigate their federal takings claims in state courts.” San Remo Hotel, 

L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323, 346, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2506, 

162 L. Ed. 2d 315 (2005). In San Remo, the plaintiff litigated a takings claim in 

California state courts. When it was unsuccessful in state court, it filed suit in 

federal court. The district court dismissed the complaint and the dismissal was 

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the Supreme Court, the plaintiff 

claimed it was required to litigate the takings claim in state court because it was 

not ripe under Williamson. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, because it was 

forced to litigate in state court, the full faith and credit statute should not be 

applied since it would deprive petitioner of a federal forum for its federal 

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constitutional claims. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, applied the full 

faith and credit statute, and dismissed the case: 

At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than the concern that it is 

unfair to give preclusive effect to state-court proceedings that are not chosen, 

but are instead required in order to ripen federal takings claims. Whatever 

the merits of that concern may be, we are not free to disregard the full faith 

and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a federal forum. 

San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347 (emphasis in original); see also Trafalgar Corp. v. Miami 

Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 519 F.3d 285, 288 (6th Cir. 2008) (“because [the plaintiff] 

asserted federal issues in its complaint at the state court level, it cannot now claim 

to have reserved its federal causes of action for subsequent litigation in federal 

court”). 

 Plaintiff Great Lakes’ claims are barred by res judicata. Consequently, this 

case will not be reopened. Because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata, the 

Court need not reach the question of whether Plaintiff’s claims are also barred by 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

 

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CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to reopen this case (Dkt. 

19) is DENIED, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 21) is 

DENIED AS MOOT. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 10, 2016 s/Terrence G. Berg 

TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on June 10, 

2016, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to all parties. 

 s/A. Chubb 

Case Manager 

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