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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED APRIL 24, 2002
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant


and Cross-Appellee,
 

v	 No. 117468
 

BONNIE JUNE SHERMAN-HUFFMAN,
 

Defendant-Appellee


and Cross-Appellant.
 

MEMORANDUM OPINION
 

Defendant was charged with and convicted of third-degree
 

child abuse1 after she spanked the victim, her daughter,
 

1 MCL 750.136b(5), which provides:
 

A person is guilty of child abuse in the third


degree if the person knowingly or intentionally


causes physical harm to a child. Child abuse in
 

the third degree is a misdemeanor punishable by


imprisonment for not more than 2 years.
 
twice, and pushed her in the face, causing a nosebleed and
 

bruising on the victim’s face and back. The Court of Appeals
 

affirmed defendant’s conviction, holding that third-degree
 

child abuse is a specific intent crime and that the
 

prosecution presented sufficient evidence of defendant’s
 

specific intent to harm her child. We originally granted
 

leave to consider whether third-degree child abuse is a
 

specific or general intent crime. We conclude, however, that
 

there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of thirddegree child abuse regardless of whether the statute requires
 

general or specific intent.2 Accordingly, we affirm
 

defendant’s conviction.
 

In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to
 

sustain a conviction, this Court reviews the evidence in a
 

light favorable to the prosecution. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich
 

508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). This Court must consider
 

“‘whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational
 

trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
 

Id. at 513-514, quoting People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 366;
 

285 NW2d 284 (1979). See also People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392,
 

399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
 

2 The statement by the Court of Appeals that third-degree


child abuse is a specific-intent crime is dictum, in light of


our finding that there was sufficient evidence to support


defendant’s conviction under either standard.
 

2
 
Here, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of
 

defendant’s guilt at trial. Defendant admitted striking her
 

child. The victim’s testimony corroborated defendant’s
 

admission. The testimony of school, law enforcement, and
 

medical personnel established that the victim sustained
 

physical injury in the form of extensive bruising to parts of
 

her body and a nosebleed. Further, the injuries to the
 

victim’s face were sufficiently painful that the victim asked
 

for an ice pack at school on the following day. 


Michigan’s third-degree child abuse statute states that
 

a defendant must “knowingly or intentionally” cause physical
 

harm to a child. Regardless of whether the statute requires
 

general or specific intent, the evidence is sufficient to
 

convict defendant of third-degree child abuse because she knew
 

of her daughter’s susceptibility to bruising, due to asthma
 

medication taken by the victim, yet still spanked her with
 

enough force to dislodge a blood clot from her daughter’s nose
 

and to cause bruises that raised the suspicion of several
 

school, law enforcement, and medical personnel. Thus, the
 

prosecution presented sufficient evidence that defendant had
 

the requisite mens rea to convict her of third-degree child
 

abuse.
 

Accordingly, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of
 

Appeals that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to
 

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convict defendant of third-degree child abuse.
 

Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to
 

prove that her conduct toward the victim was not a reasonable
 

disciplinary measure. She invokes MCL 750.136b(7)3

 to make
 

this argument.
 

Defendant did not formally invoke the “reasonable
 

discipline” statute at trial, but she did indicate in her
 

trial testimony that the victim (her daughter) was “getting
 

real, real lippy” with her and that she intended to punish the
 

victim by spanking her. The trial court did not expressly
 

refer to the “reasonable discipline” statutory provision in
 

its findings of fact. However, the trial court obviously
 

rejected the credibility of the pivotal testimony of defendant
 

and the victim as it refused to accept their assertions that
 

much of the victim’s bruising was due to sources other than a
 

physical assault by defendant. Further, as summarized above,
 

the evidence indicated that the victim was attacked forcefully
 

enough to dislodge a blood clot, triggering a nosebleed, and
 

3
 

This section [which defines the child abuse


crimes] shall not be construed to prohibit a parent


or guardian, or other person permitted by law or


authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking


steps to reasonably discipline a child, including


the use of reasonable force.
 

4
 
to leave visible bruising on various parts of her body.4
 

Wherever the outer limits of “reasonable discipline” are to be
 

drawn, given the injuries inflicted by the force used in this
 

matter, they were plainly exceeded. 


Accordingly, we conclude that, in rejecting defendant’s
 

version of events, the trial court implicitly concluded that
 

this case did not involve the use of reasonable discipline.
 

In this regard, we note the presumption that a trial judge in
 

a bench trial knows the applicable law. See, e.g., People v
 

Cazal, 412 Mich 680, 686-687; 316 NW2d 705 (1982) (stating
 

that “a trial judge should be aware of lesser-included
 

offenses without the need for instruction” and referring to
 

“the trial judge’s knowledge of the law”). 


Therefore, we presume that the trial court correctly
 

rejected the applicability of the “reasonable discipline”
 

provision and did not address it more specifically for the
 

simple reason that any claim of “reasonable discipline” in
 

this case was plainly unsupportable. Additionally, we affirm
 

the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
 

4 While defendant indicates that asthma medication being


taken by the victim made her more susceptible to bruising,


because this was known to defendant, rather than being


exculpatory, it provided all the more reason that defendant


should have shown restraint in her treatment of her child.
 

Moreover, defendant admitted that she hurt her hand in


connection with her “punishment” of the victim, which
 

underscores the use of an extreme degree of force against the


child.
 

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presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant of thirddegree child abuse.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and
 

MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
 

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