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THE SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE: 

SBINET THREE YEARS LATER 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, 

MARITIME, AND GLOBAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 

Serial No. 111–35 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIE J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Mississippi 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNER, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARTIME, AND GLOBAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex 

Officio) 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michichgan 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

ALISON NORTHOP, Staff Director 

NIKKI HADDER, Clerk 

MANDY BOWERS Minority Subcommittee Lead 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and 

Global Counterterrorism ..................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and 

Global Counterterrorism ..................................................................................... 2 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 4 

WITNESSES 

Chief David Aguilar, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 8 

Mr. Mark Borkowski, Executive Director, Secure Border Initiative, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection: 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 8 

Mr. Timothy E. Peters, Vice President and General Manager, Global Security 

Systems, The Boeing Company: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

APPENDIX 

Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez .................................................... 53 

(1) 

THE SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE: 

SBINET THREE YEARS LATER 

Thursday, September 17, 2009 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sanchez, Thompson, Jackson Lee, 

Cuellar, Kirkpatrick, Pascrell, Green, Souder, McCaul, Bilirakis, 

Rogers, and Miller. 

Also present: Representative Carney. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. [Presiding.] Good morning. The subcommittee will 

come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on the Secure Border Initiative, SBInet, 3 years later. I 

would like to at this point ask unanimous consent that Mr. Carney, 

a member of the full committee be permitted to sit and question 

the witnesses at today’s hearing. Hearing no objection. 

Good morning. Today’s—hello, Chief—today’s hearing will further examine the Department of Homeland Security’s Secure Border Initiative, physical infrastructure fencing as well as the virtual 

fence known as SBInet. 

Thank you to our witnesses for being here today, many of you 

have been before us before and, in particular, Mr. Stana, thank you 

for your continued frank and honest assessment of what is happening out there on this initiative. 

The witnesses’ testimony and responses to our questions are critical parts of the oversight this subcommittee continues to conduct 

on the Secure Border Initiative and SBInet. In fact, many of the 

members of this committee have had an opportunity once or twice 

now to go over and take a look not only at the physical fence in 

different portions, but also at the virtual fence and what is going 

on with SBInet. 

Given that the Boeing SBInet contract is expiring soon, I think 

that this is a good opportunity for us to catch our breath and see 

what is going on and see whether we have any movement on this 

program or if there is a lack of progress in the program. 

And I am particular concerned by SBInet program’s ongoing 

struggle with transparency and what I see as a pattern of delayed 

planned development. For instance, in May of 2008, I had the opportunity, along with many members of the subcommittee, to travel 
2 

to the Tucson sector and to review SBInet’s Project 28 and to hear 

about the beginning stages of AJO–1 and TUCSON–1. I think the 

chief accompanied us on that. 

I was assured that these new projects could be fully operational 

and able to be accepted by the Department of Homeland Security 

by the end of 2008, and I am extremely disappointed that the new 

deadlines estimate that TUCSON–1 will be December 2009 and 

that AJO–1 will be ready in June of 2010. 

Based on my past experience with the missing of deadlines on 

this project, I have a real hesitancy to believe that these deadlines 

are even going to be met, these new ones. 

In the last series of hearings on this topic the subcommittee was 

given hard dates and assurances that deadlines for specific SBInet 

projects would be met by Boeing, and yet weeks later, they were 

pushed back. SBI’s full deployment along the southwest border, 

now estimated by Boeing and CBP to occur in 2016, will be 7 years 

after the original contract end date of 2009. 

This situation is incredibly troubling since in the meantime, our 

Border Patrol agents continue to use older and less capable technology. We have maintenance issues, and more importantly, there 

is more danger to our Border Patrol as time moves on. 

Further, as a member of the Congress who is very concerned 

about fiscal responsibility, it is hard for me to believe that DHS 

would award a contract of $1.1 billion over 3 years, and continue 

to award task orders without viable results. 

Moving to the other half of the Secure Border Initiative, the 

physical border fence, it has also risen in cost. What used to cost 

us $3.5 million a mile is now at $6.5 million a mile, and vehicle 

fencing has gone from $1 million to $1.8 million per mile. 

And that is sort of unbelievable, considering that construction 

costs because, you know, we haven’t been building—construction 

has been in the dumps—how we could really justify that the cost 

of fencing, the vehicle and the pedestrian fencing, is going up so 

much. 

According to program dates there have been about 3,300 

breaches in the fence and it costs us about $1,300 every time that 

we have to repair them. And that being said we have yet to see 

whether or not this fencing has increased border security and has 

justified its cost. I mean, I am still waiting to really see that, and 

I know that about a year or two ago, Chief, you and I had a discussion about what is it really going to take to do this. 

And we were trying to figure out what the metrics would be, so 

I am interested to see what you think the metrics are and how you 

can justify whether these systems are working for us. So I look forward to your testimony and to the responses to the many questions 

that I have. And I know that you can see from the interest here 

that we all have so many questions. 

I will now let my ranking member, Mr. Souder from Indiana, for 

his opening statement, who is also, I know, very concerned about 

this issue. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Securing our borders, 

closing vulnerabilities and gaining operational control: this is what 

was promised to Congress and to the American people when 

SBInet was announced 4 years and 9–1/2 months ago. 
3 

It is hard to be optimistic when we sit here today and have partial technology deployed along just 23 miles of the southwest border and a few northern border pilot sites set to begin in the next 

month or two. 

Over $1 billion has been allocated for SBInet, but it seems that 

very little progress has been made. It has been very slow. I think 

it is important to note for the past 3 years we have been asking 

for a timeline for SBInet deployment and lifecycle costs, but they 

have yet to be provided. 

Similarly, there is no picture of the performance metrics and parameters used to judge the success of this program. It is hard to 

have Congress accurately review and conduct oversight over this 

initiative without these key pieces of data. 

Do not take this criticism as a lack of my support for the project 

and the larger goal of securing our borders. I think it needs to be 

a top priority for DHS and the administration. Now is not the time 

to waver in this commitment. To that end, I need to raise a concern 

that I have with the number of miles considered to be under operational or effective control. 

According to the CBP documentation, as of October 2008 there 

are 625 miles of the southwest border considered to be under effective control. According to the fiscal year 2010 budget justification, 

by the end of 2009 there should be 815 miles under effective control. 

If these estimates are correct we will have gained 190 miles in 

a little over a year. This is good news, and I think it can be attributed to the additional staffing and the construction of 630 miles of 

tactical infrastructure, fencing and vehicle barriers. 

The budget justification goes on to say that zero additional miles 

outside of the 815 are expected to be under effective control in 

2010. How is it possible that the Border Patrol could come to this 

conclusion? What is expected to happen with SBInet in the next 

year? Are more personnel or fencing or the National Guard necessary? CBP needs to address these concerns at today’s hearing. 

On Monday, U.S. law enforcement conducted an anti-terror operation in New York City. According to intelligence officials, all indications pointed to the need to intervene and prevent further plotting and coordination. 

While few details are known at this time as the investigation is 

ongoing, I think it is a poignant reminder that 8 years after September 11 terrorist attack, we are still a country at risk. We must 

remain vigilant and aggressive in securing our country from attacks. 

Securing our borders, closing vulnerabilities and gaining operational control are essential for bolstering the security of our nation. The SBInet program should be a cornerstone building block 

of this effort. 

I would like to add on a personal note that I was down on the 

southwest border for about a week, just short of a week, traveling 

from San Ysidro over to Nogales. I visited the TUCSON–1 area 

again, saw the towers working and on every side of me different 

people were being intercepted. I also saw the physical fencing; we 

went to about probably six different stops along the border. 
4 

We have breaches in the old fencing. We do not have breaches 

in the new fencing. Also the soil in different areas have changed 

cost estimates and difficulty. They are continuing to adjust even in 

the areas where we have had the breaches. 

For example, one of the debates is can you put barbed wire on? 

The one kind of fencing in California that they are cutting through, 

where it is very expensive, which is what has been in the news 

media, can be addressed by trying to block them from getting to 

the fence, which is what they are now experimenting with. 

The physical fence does not secure the border. The physical fence 

stops vehicles. It stops larger groups. It slows people down so that 

as we move the technology behind it we can move people in behind 

if it is in a mountainous area, they can catch them as they move 

to the road. 

If it is in a flat area the rate of speed that they are coming across 

is slowed significantly down, and it is the combination, then, with 

enough agents, and we have been plussing up the Border Patrol 

with which to go get the different groups then to get them to different places. 

And we have to see how we are going to increase this because, 

quite frankly, I doubt if an immigration bill is going to be able to 

move through this Congress until we have increased the number 

of miles that are currently projected, secured under effective control, because any kind of major immigration reform will lead to additional pressures on the border unless we have a higher percent 

under effective control. I yield back. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the ranking member, and the Chair now 

recognizes the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from 

Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I welcome 

our witnesses to this hearing today. Today’s hearing on the Secure 

Border Initiative comes at a very important time as next week 

marks an anniversary of sorts for the Department of Homeland Security. 

On September 21st, 2006, DHS awarded a contract to Boeing to 

help secure our nation’s borders. At that time we were told that 

Boeing would be integrating existing off-the-shelf technology to create a virtual fence along the borders known as SBInet. It was supposed to be a relatively easy project. 

Instead, the Government Accountability Office has repeatedly 

raised concern about SBInet, including poor planning, insufficient 

testing, inadequate government oversight and a failure to set and 

achieve project goals. Today, after spending nearly a billion dollars 

on the program we are still waiting for an effective technological 

tool to secure America’s borders. 

DHS and Boeing have had 3 years to show they can secure the 

borders with technology. It is my understanding that they have at 

least one more year to do so if the department renews Boeing’s 

SBInet contract for an additional year as expected, which I understand has already been executed. 

It is time to deliver some tangible results to the American people 

and to Congress. I would like to know how DHS is going to ensure 

that when Boeing delivers the next phase of SBInet to the government early next year, taxpayers get their money’s worth. 
5 

Clearly, this administration has inherited a serious challenge 

and has some difficult choices ahead. DHS either needs to get 

SBInet right or find an alternative technology solution that will do 

the job. Along with technology, DHS has committed significant resources in recent years to constructing physical fencing along the 

southwest border. 

While there are currently over 600 miles of fence and barriers, 

according to GAO the department has not systematically evaluated 

the effectiveness of these barriers. At a price tag of roughly $2.4 

billion and a potential lifecycle cost of $6.5 billion, GAO’s finding 

is extremely troubling. 

Looking ahead, both DHS and Boeing have considerable ground 

to cover when it comes to deploying effective, efficient border security technology and infrastructure, I am hopeful this administration can address many of the problems that have plagued this program and previous border security technology efforts. 

The witnesses can be assured that this committee will continue 

to monitor the Secure Border Initiative closely. I would like to 

thank Chairwoman Sanchez for all her work continuing her oversight on this important topic. I would also like to thank the witnesses for being here today, and I also look forward to their testimony. I yield back. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the Chairman of the full committee. Other 

members of the subcommittee are reminded that under committee 

rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

And so now I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses. I will 

give the backgrounds of our witnesses and then we will start down 

the row and ask for your 5-minute or less summary of your written 

testimony. 

Our first witness will be Chief David Aguilar. He was named 

Chief of the United States Border Patrol in May 2004. As the nation’s highest ranking Border Patrol agent, Chief Aguilar directs 

the enforcement efforts of more than 16,500 Border Patrol agents 

nationwide, and I commend you for that because I know we have 

grown our Border Patrol quite quickly, and you have been at the 

helm of that. 

So you have the expertise gained from 30 years of service. We 

look forward to your testimony, Chief, and welcome. 

Our second witness, Mr. Mark Borkowski, was named Executive 

Director of the Secure Border Initiative Program Executive Office 

in October of 2008. He oversees the SBI implementation at Customs and Border Protection, and he will oversee SBI’s continued efforts to provide front line personnel with the enhanced situational 

awareness along the U.S. borders. 

Before joining CBP he was a program executive for the Robotic 

Lunar Exploration program in the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate at NASA headquarters. Welcome. 

Our third witness, Mr. Timothy Peters, is a Vice President of 

Global Security Systems, a business of Boeing Integrated Defense 

Systems. He is responsible for the execution of SBInet and other 

GSS programs. Since joining Boeing in 1985, Mr. Peters has held 

a number of key engineering and leadership positions on surveillance and command and control programs. We welcome you this 

morning. 
6 

And our final witness, Mr. Richard Stana, is the Director of 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government Accountability Office. During his 33-year career with the GAO, Mr. Stana 

has directed reviews on a wide variety of complex military and domestic issues and most recently he has directed GAO’s work in immigration and border security issues. He has been frequently before us. We welcome you back. 

So without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted into the record, and I will ask the witnesses to summarize 

their statements in 5 minutes or less. And we will begin with Chief 

Aguilar, who will give a statement on behalf of both himself and 

Mr. Borkowski for CBP. 

STATEMENT OF CHIEF DAVID AGUILAR, U.S. BORDER PATROL, 

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 

Chief Aguilar. Good morning. Chairwoman Sanchez, Chairman 

Thompson and Ranking Member Souder, I want to begin by expressing my appreciation for this subcommittee’s and the full committee’s interest in not only our mission, but especially the interest 

and the well-being, safety, of our men and women. 

It is good to be here this morning, and it is absolutely a privilege 

and an honor to appear before you to testify and discuss the Secure 

Border Initiative. As you stated, I am accompanied by Mr. Mark 

Borkowski, who is our executive director for the Secure Border Initiative. 

The primary goal of our strategy between the ports of entry is 

to gain effective control of our nation’s border. Effective control is 

achieved when a chief patrol agent in the field determines that in 

a given area of operation the Border Patrol has the ability to consistently detect, identify, classify, respond to any illegal incursion 

that occurs between the ports of entry, and very importantly, has 

the ability to bring that illegal incursion to an appropriate law enforcement resolution. 

In our view, control of our borders between the ports of entry 

comes from an appropriate combination of personnel, technology 

and tactical infrastructure, which includes border fencing. We often 

refer to this requirement as a three-legged stool. These components 

are interdependent and provide for maximum effectiveness when 

appropriately applied. 

The mix of these three elements will vary depending on the challenges posed by the area on which we are focusing. Within that 

construct, the Secure Border Initiative plays an important role. It 

is but one part of our integrated approach, but it is a very critical 

and significant piece. 

The current focus of the Secure Border Initiative is to support 

border control efforts by providing tactical infrastructure and technology. Before discussing the details of SBInet, it might be useful 

to provide a short update on our progress with respect to construction of tactical infrastructure along the southwest border. 

As of the end of August we have approximately 632 miles of 

fence constructed. Of that, approximately 334 miles are pedestrian 

fence and the remaining 298 miles are vehicle fence. Our target, 

based on our chiefs’ assessments, has been approximately 670 

miles throughout the southwest border. 
7 

The exact total mileage is imprecise at this point because it will 

depend on the actual measurement of completed fence as opposed 

to pre-construction estimates. We are actually in the process of 

modifying this figure as we speak. 

Fence provides what we refer to as ‘‘persistent impedance’’ which 

contributes to our ability to control the border by providing additional time for agents to respond to incursions, illegal incursions. 

As we have testified before, fence alone will not secure the border. However, we believe some areas of the border must have persistent impedance in order to establish control. It is in those areas 

where we have emphasized the construction of fence. 

Let me now turn to some specifics about SBInet, the technology 

part of SBI and the focus of this hearing. The SBInet program is 

focused on developing and deploying a system that can provide surveillance and situational awareness over stretches of the border. 

Project 28 was our initial effort to prototype this type of system. 

While Project 28 suffered from many deficiencies, it has actually 

evolved to the point where it is now operational and provides effective support of our operations. For example, it has been instrumental in enabling the apprehension of over 5,000 illegal entrants 

and over 14,000 pounds of narcotics. 

More importantly, we were able to use the lessons learned from 

Project 28 to design the first generation of the operational SBInet 

system. We call this first generation SBInet Block 1. We have completed most of the engineering design of SBInet Block 1 and have 

performed extensive engineering testing now. 

We are in the process of installing our first deployment into an 

operational area known as TUCSON–1. TUCSON–1 will actually 

replace Project 28 prototype system with a new Block 1 first generation production system to cover 23 miles of border around 

Sasabe, Arizona. 

The Border Patrol will receive the system, probably in early January, to conduct a formal process known as Operational Test and 

Evaluation, OT&E. In OT&E the Border Patrol will conduct disciplined assessments in the real world environment to determine 

whether the SBInet Block 1 system is effective and suitable for use. 

Based on these assessments, the Border Patrol will effectively deliver literally a report card to SBI indicating whether it has met 

our operational requirements. In parallel with these test activities, 

we expect to begin the deployment of our second area of operation 

known as AJO–1. 

It will cover approximately 30 miles of border near Ajo, Arizona. 

Together TUCSON–1 and AJO–1 represent the initial deployment 

of Block 1. Through its structured review process, the Department 

of Homeland Security has authorized initial deployment but not 

full deployment. 

After the initial deployment and results of the Border Patrol’s 

test of Block 1, CBP will be in a better position to decide on the 

pace and magnitude of future deployments. The last 3 years of 

SBInet had been frustrating and at times very discouraging. 

We believe we are on a reasonable improvement path. We understand that the Congress and this committee are less interested in 

hearing about our improvement plans and, as we, more interested 

in results. 
8 

We share that interest and commit our best efforts to produce 

those results in a prudent and effective manner. We appreciate this 

committee’s continued support of CBP’s efforts to better secure our 

borders, and we look forward to any questions that you might have 

of us. Thank you. 

[The joint statement of Chief Aguilar and Mr. Borkowski follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID AGUILAR AND MARK BORKOWSKI

Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished Members of 

the Subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss ‘‘The Secure Border Initiative: Three Years Later.’’ At U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), we are confident that we are making significant strides in our integrated efforts to increase the security of our borders. 

I would like to start by emphasizing an important point: our border security efforts are integrated efforts, and while the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is an important element of our overall strategy, it does not represent a panacea or a standalone capability for border security. It is one part of a much larger effort, which includes many stakeholders and partners across the federal government, as well as 

state, local, tribal, and international partners. The National Southwest Border 

Counternarcotics Strategy, released jointly this past June by Office of National Drug 

Control Policy Director Kerlikowske, Attorney General Holder, and Secretary 

Napolitano is one example of this broad, integrated effort. 

The primary goal of our strategy between the ports of entry is to secure our Nation’s borders. This means consistently detecting illegal entries into the United 

States, assessing and classifying any threats associated with the illegal entries, responding to the area, and bringing the situation to a successful law enforcement resolution. Put a bit more simply, the ability to secure the border requires two basic 

conditions. First, we must have an accurate awareness of what is going on in the 

area around the border. Secondly, we must have the ability to respond to that 

awareness how, where, and when we deem it appropriate to respond. The ability 

to secure of the border, therefore, comes from a combination of both the knowledge 

and the ability to act on that knowledge. 

In our view, control of our borders—particularly between the legal ports of entry— 

comes from an appropriate combination of personnel, technology, and tactical infrastructure. We often refer to this strategy as a ‘‘three-legged stool.‘‘ One of these legs 

alone cannot provide control of the border. The mix of these three elements will vary 

depending on the challenges of the focus area. Technology alone cannot control the 

borders, but it can provide a significant capability that augments and improves the 

effectiveness of an integrated approach. Similarly, tactical infrastructure, such as 

fencing, does not control the border independently of other elements. 

How can we measure the effectiveness of each contribution (personnel, technology, 

and tactical infrastructure) to the overall control of the border? That is a difficult 

question to answer. No one of the elements that contribute to border control can do 

the job without contributions from the other elements. For example, we cannot say 

that fencing prevented a discrete number of people from crossing the border illegally, and that technology prevented some others, and personnel prevented still others. In fact, even to ask the question perpetuates the misperception that any single 

one of these elements can control the border. 

We do believe, however, that we can evaluate and characterize the effectiveness 

of our integrated efforts to secure the border. And we can characterize the contribution of each of the three legs of the stool even if we cannot precisely quantify the 

individual contribution of each component. Technology allows us to detect the entries and to assess and classify the threat. Personnel provide the response to confront the criminal element. Tactical infrastructure supports the response by either 

providing access or extending the time needed for the response by deterring or slowing the criminal element’s ability to easily cross the border and escape. 

Personnel are the most flexible and robust of the elements, since they can provide 

both knowledge (through observation) and response. However, use of personnel 

alone is not the most efficient way to achieve border control. Deploying enough personnel to provide coverage of large areas of the border would be cost prohibitive as 

well as a nonsensical use of funds. Technology can be used to ‘‘watch’’ large areas 

of the border, thus helping with the ‘‘knowledge’’ part of the equation. By using 

technology in this role, we can relieve personnel of the requirement to stand and 

observe, and redeploy them to serve where current technology cannot -in the area 
9 

of response. Finally, we can use tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, as a fixed 

resource to deter and delay illicit border incursions. It is important to recognize that 

tactical infrastructure and technology are not interchangeable. Infrastructure (including fencing) provides a constant and continuous effect, and more options for response. I wish to be very clear-fence alone does not and cannot provide effective control of the border. It does, however, provide a continuous and constant ability to 

deter or delay, which we refer to as ‘‘persistent impedance.’’ That delay provides 

more time for personnel to respond to the incursion, but it cannot altogether stop 

an incursion. 

The current focus of SBI is to support border control efforts by providing tactical 

infrastructure and technology. SBInet, which is the primary focus of this hearing, 

represents the technology contribution of SBI. Before discussing the details of 

SBInet, it might be useful to provide a short update on our progress with respect 

to construction of the fence along the southwest border. As of the end of August, 

we have approximately 632 miles of fence constructed. Of that, approximately 334 

miles are pedestrian fence and the remaining 298 miles are vehicle fence. Our target, based on Border Patrol’s operational assessments of fencing needs, has been approximately 670 miles. The exact total mileage is imprecise at this point because 

it will depend on the actual measurement of completed fence as opposed to pre-construction estimates. The fence that is not yet complete is still planned but has been 

delayed primarily due to legal proceedings related to the condemnation and transfer 

of real estate required for the fence. 

As already noted, fence provides persistent impedance, which contributes to our 

ability to secure the border by providing additional time for agents to respond to 

incursions. There are locations where the Border Patrol has concluded that persistent impedance is absolutely necessary in order to gain control of the border. 

There are other areas where persistent impedance would be a useful contribution 

but it is not an absolute necessity. It is important to emphasize the fact that we 

have constructed and planned fencing in areas where the Border Patrol has concluded that persistent impedance is a necessity; we have not built fence in areas 

where we think we might be able to achieve control through other means—that is, 

through different combinations of personnel, technology, and tactical infrastructure—or where we have encountered engineering or other challenges in moving with 

construction. Before any consideration is given to building fencing in other locations, 

we want to ensure that CBP has determined the operational requirements for effective control in those areas, and has the opportunity to compare any other options 

we can identify. An accurate assessment requires more experience and observation, 

both in areas where we have fencing and in areas where we do not, so that we have 

a good basis for the comparison. 

Furthermore, we have built fence where we have concluded it is the most costeffective way to provide persistent impedance. As a practical matter, the only other, 

albeit unrealistic, way to provide persistent impedance is to deploy personnel fairly 

densely along the border, in fixed locations, twenty-four hours a day and seven days 

a week. We reviewed these options in a set of detailed ‘‘Analyses of Alternatives,’’ 

we have provided to the Congress as part of our annual expenditure plan. 

Let me now turn to some specifics about SBInet, the technology part of SBI, 

which is the focus of this hearing. The SBInet program is focused on developing and 

deploying a system of networked sensor towers that can provide surveillance and 

situational awareness over stretches of the border. The SBInet system will be deployed in discrete Areas of Responsibility (AoRs) each of which covers a length of 

border ranging between approximately 20 and 40 miles. The basic concept involves 

constructing towers in locations that are selected based on knowledge of terrain, 

vegetation, and typical routes used by illegal entrants, as well as by sensitivity to 

and impact on the environment. Each of the sensor towers in an AoR includes a 

ground surveillance radar, a day camera, and a night camera. Each also includes 

a receiver for signals from unattended ground sensors (UGSs), which are hidden 

within the AoR and can detect nearby movement. There are also communications 

relay towers, which receive the signals from the sensor towers and transmit them 

back to a Border Patrol station. One key element of SBInet that distinguishes it 

from other technology at the border is the networking of the towers and sensors. 

Information from the various cameras, radars, and sensors is combined within a 

computer system called the Common Operating Picture (COP). The COP provides 

a display on computer monitors that includes an integrated picture of the radar and 

sensor detections from all of the towers within an AoR. It also provides the feeds 

from the day and night cameras, and software that can point the cameras in order 

to look at what the radars and sensors have detected. 

Project 28 was our initial effort to prototype this type of SBInet system. As a prototype, we did not intend Project 28 to be the actual system we would put in produc-
10 

tion. We did, however, anticipate that, even as a prototype, Project 28 would provide 

us with improved capability, and we advertised that it would be a relatively simple 

and low risk effort. Unfortunately, it did not work as well as we anticipated and 

took longer than it should have to complete. But we learned from the experience 

and we are in the process of making significant improvements. 

Since the initial experience, we have improved Project 28 to the point that it is 

currently operational and effective in supporting the Border Patrol in the area 

around Sasabe, Arizona. Border Patrol agents credit Project 28 with providing them 

with enhanced situation awareness that has assisted in the detection and subsequent apprehension of over 5,000 illegal entrants and the interdiction of over 14,000 

pounds of marijuana. Without Project 28-and absent some other increase in capability, such as more agents—the success rate of these apprehensions and interdictions may have been lower. 

Our SBInet contractor, Boeing, has taken a great deal of criticism for its past performance on SBInet. In truth, SBI has not been fully satisfied with performance to 

date. It is worth noting, however, that Boeing delivered Project 28 on a firm fixed 

price task order basis and absorbed tens of millions of dollars in losses in order to 

correct the initial deficiencies, demonstrating a significant commitment to deliver a 

useful capability. 

We were able to use the lessons we learned from Project 28 to design the first 

generation of the operational SBInet system. We call this first generation SBInet 

Block 1. We have completed most of the engineering design of SBInet Block 1 and 

have performed extensive engineering testing. Although the engineering tests increased our overall confidence in the system, they did identify some areas for improvement. We do not believe those areas represent ‘‘show stoppers,’’ but we have 

taken steps to enforce a deliberative and disciplined process to address them, including opting to delay some program activities while we await the results of further 

testing and analysis. 

At this point, we are in the process of doing our first deployment into an operational known as Tucson-1, will replace Project 28 (the prototype system) with the 

new Block 1 (first generation production system) to cover 23 miles of border around 

Sasabe, Arizona. Tus-1 includes nine sensor towers and eight communications relay 

towers, all of which are now constructed. We are now starting basic system and 

component checkout of the Tus-1 systems and awaiting results of some remaining 

corrective actions before authorizing Boeing to begin more comprehensive system 

testing. SBI anticipates being prepared to provide that authorization within the 

next few weeks, at which point we will conduct extensive engineering tests on the 

system. Those tests are designed to demonstrate that the system meets its engineering requirements. If it passes, SBI will accept the system from Boeing. 

Provided SBI accepts it, the Border Patrol will receive the system, probably in 

early January, to conduct a formal process known as Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). In OT&E,the Border Patrol will conduct disciplined assessments in a 

real world environment to determine whether the SBInet Block 1 system is effective 

and suitable for use. Based on these assessments, the Border Patrol will effectively 

deliver a report card to SBI, indicating whether or not it has met their operational 

requirements. The Border Patrol is still designing the test regimen, but we anticipate OT&E will continue at least into March of next year. 

While testing is underway, we expect to begin the deployment of our second AoR, 

known as ‘‘Ajo–1,’’ Ajo–1 will cover about 30 miles of border near Ajo, Arizona. Our 

experience with Ajo–1 will build on Tus–1 and Ajo–1 and ensure we can move from 

one deployment activity to another in a smooth and effective manner. Ajo–1 should 

be completed and tested by late spring or early summer of next year. 

Taken together, Tus-1 and Ajo-1 represent the initial deployment of Block 1. 

Through its structured review process, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

has authorized initial deployment—but not full deployment. This is a normal sequence of events. Before authorizing full deployment, we need to have the results 

of the Border Patrol’s OT&E and demonstrate that we can effectively and efficiently 

complete the deployment process. As currently planned, full deployment of Block 1 

means deployment along the Arizona border. The exact schedule for that deployment will depend on the successful completion of initial deployment activities, as 

well as other decisions that will be advised by the initial deployments. For example, 

based on results from the initial deployments, CBP will gain experience and knowledge about how well SBInet contributes to the technology element of border control. 

With that knowledge, we can make better decisions about where it is most cost-effective to use SBInet Block 1. CBP will also have better information about the desired pace of deployments going forward and can reflect those decisions in future 

budget submissions. 
11 

In short, we believe we are making appropriate progress towards the deployment 

of SBInet Block 1. Based on the testing that has been performed to date, we have 

a sound level of engineering confidence that the system will meet its requirements. 

In order to increase our confidence, we are proceeding with the initial deployments 

and the formal OT&E process. 

We have set requirements for our program that are modest but effective. Remembering that technology does not, in and of itself, control the border, we require 

SBInet Block 1 to detect at least 70 percent of incursions within each AoR and provide accurate identification at least 70 percent of the time. The Subcommittee may 

recall that early goals for SBInet were at 95 percent, rather than the 70 percent 

we have currently established. This threshold does not indicate that we will allow 

failure to detect or identify incursions 30 percent of the time. Rather, we recognize 

that the SBInet system is one contribution among several resources we have available, such as air assets, tactical infrastructure, additional technology, and personnel. Based on experience, cost, and a better understanding that the role of technology is to contribute, SBInet’s contribution may well be adequate to provide an 

overall, integrated capability of 95 percent or more, when all of the other elements 

of border control are taken into account. 

In designing the Block 1, we have selected modest components which we believe 

are cost-effective and anticipate will do the job. While there are other cameras and 

radars that are higher performing, by starting with the currently-designed Block 1, 

we: avoid the risk of over-designing; we reduce the risk of excessive cost, schedule, 

and technical problems; we provide an operational capability sooner; and we provide 

the quickest possible opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the system in an 

operational environment. With some real-world experience, we can make future decisions about how and if we should enhance the system. Our block approach to 

SBInet, which represents an acquisition strategy known as spiral development, provides us an opportunity to deliver cost-effective enhancements in the future, as 

needed or desired. 

While we are deploying the SBInet Block system and tightening up our requirements discipline, we are also taking steps to improve our competence in the management of complex acquisition programs. We have redesigned our SBI organization 

to develop and retain skilled government personnel in the disciplines that are key 

to successful program management. We are also strengthening our oversight and 

management of our contractors’ activities to ensure we are able to communicate our 

requirements clearly and consistently. 

We are strengthening the role and influence of the end users of our systems— 

in this case, the Border Patrol—in the development and acquisition process. The 

structured we described, which is a normal process in the Department of Defense 

but relatively new to us, is one example. Beyond that, operational end users participate in overseeing program activities, setting priorities, and deciding on acquisition 

courses of action. End users also now have a more structured process and conduit 

to request consideration of program changes, and to participate in trade-offs between capabilities and costs. 

We are eager to establish better ways to predict and evaluate the effectiveness 

of our systems. We are confident that increased enforcement efforts have had a positive effect on our ability to control our borders. Since 2006, we have increased the 

size of the Border Patrol from approximately 12,350 agents to nearly 20,000 today. 

We now have almost 650 miles of fence deployed to areas along the border where 

we need it most. And we have begun to deploy effective technology to critical areas. 

There is no question, based on the measures we have available, that these enforcement activities have reduced illegal activity between the ports of entry. 

Going forward, we acknowledge we need to find a better way to characterize and 

measure the effects of increased enforcement. The third party indicators we currently use, like trends in apprehensions or drug seizures, taken with our subject 

matter expert assessment about relative levels of border control, are useful and 

valid. But we still need to develop tools that will allow us to assess different mixes 

of personnel, tactical infrastructure, and technology; to compare their effectiveness; 

and to compare their costs. In this way, we can make better decisions about the 

most cost-effective investments. In order to develop the appropriate tools, we need 

to gain experience and measure results of our ongoing efforts. We believe we are 

headed in that direction with our current activities. 

In closing, although we know that the last three years of SBInet have been frustrating and at times discouraging for all involved, we believe we are on a path towards improvement. We thank Congress and this Subcommittee for your interest 

in this issue and share your desire for the achievement of results. We appreciate 

the Subcommittee’s continued support of CBP’s efforts to better secure our borders 

and look forward to responding to your questions. 
12 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chief. 

And I will now recognize Mr. Peters to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes or less. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY E. PETERS, VICE PRESIDENT AND 

GENERAL MANAGER, GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, THE 

BOEING COMPANY 

Mr. PETERS. Good morning, Chairwoman Sanchez, Chairman 

Thompson, Ranking Member Souder and committee members. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss SBInet progress with you today. 

I will update you today on development and deployment status 

of the SBInet Block 1 system. This capability is a substantially improved version of the prototype we delivered to Customs and Border Protection in early 2008. I will also say a few words about our 

deployments on the northern border. 

P28, which has been operational for 18 months now, has proven 

to be a valuable enforcement tool for the Border Patrol. P28 also 

serves as a valuable engineering tool for the development of Block 

1 in future SBInet systems. 

Over the past 2 years many important lessons have been learned 

from the P28 prototype and incorporated into the SBInet Block 1 

system. The first deployment known as TUCSON–1 or TUCS–1 has 

been constructed in the area of P28 and covers 23 miles of the border at the Sasabe port of entry. 

A second deployment called AJO–1 has been initiated to the west 

of TUCS–1 and will cover 30 miles of border at the Loopville port 

of entry. The TUCS–1 deployment consists of nine sensor towers, 

eight communication towers and a command and control facility. 

The Block 1 system includes a fixed tower design an upgraded 

sensor package and improved communication system and a new 

common operational picture or COP. BOEING engineers work sideby-side with Border Patrol agents in the design of the look, feel and 

function of the Block 1 common operational picture. 

During this development, we have encountered technological 

challenges common to the integration of commercial off-the-shelf 

components. Two recent issues have proven to be especially problematic. The first, control of the radar during azimuth scanning 

and the second, human machine interface freezes. 

After a detailed root cause corrective action effort, I am pleased 

to report that we have implemented solutions that address each of 

these problems and subsequently have undergone several weeks of 

successful testing without recurrence. 

The Block 1 system is scheduled to complete system qualification 

tests in the next month at facilities in Playas, New Mexico. Then 

in the deployed TUCS–1 system will undergo system acceptance 

testing during the fourth quarter of this year. 

When completed we will deliver the system to the government for 

operational test and evaluation, which will be overseen by the Border Patrol. Results of these tests will assist the customer in determining future deployments and system enhancements. 

The Ajo deployment is also progressing. The system design is 

complete and construction of the Border Patrol command and control facility has been initiated. However, site specific work and in-
13 

stallation of the system are awaiting environmental approval from 

the Department of the Interior. 

In summary, the SBInet Block 1 system, pending successful completion of the testing that I outlined, will be ready for deployment 

across the southwest border. 

Boeing has also been working on the northern border deployments in the Detroit and Buffalo sectors. In these deployments 

Boeing is installing remote video surveillance systems to enhance 

agent surveillance capabilities in a temperate river environment. 

The RVSS’ are comprised of two sets of day and night cameras 

mounted atop monopoles and/or existing structures. 

These systems feed video images back to Border Patrol sector 

headquarters. Installation began in the Buffalo sector in early May 

of this year and in the Detroit sector in early September. Both deployments are planned to be delivered to the government by early 

2010. 

In conclusion, I would like to say that SBInet has been both an 

important and challenging program to the Boeing Company. The 

P28 prototype and Block 1 system represent approximately half of 

the government-funded effort that Boeing has received to date. 

Additionally, Boeing has made a number of significant capital 

and research and development investments to ensure the success 

of the SBInet program. The Block 1 system remains the core of our 

effort. 

As I mentioned earlier, I believe we have a system that is robust 

and soon will be ready for a widespread deployment. Our goal remains to provide the technology and tools to support enhanced border security and increased agent safety as the best value of the taxpayers. 

With the Tucson sector deployment underway, SBInet now has 

a solid foundation for future deployments. Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony this morning, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Peters follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY E. PETERS

I’m Tim Peters, Vice President of Boeing’s Global Security Systems, which includes the SBInet program. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss progress on 

SBInet before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism. 

Today, I’ll address our progress in designing and developing the overall SBInet 

solution. I’ll also update you on the deployment status of Block 1, which is based 

on the same concept of integrated, commercial technology, but includes improvements from P–28. I’ll also say a few words about activities on the Northern Border. 

P–28 Lessons Learned 

P–28 has proven to be a valuable operational tool for the Border Patrol, as well 

as a framework for development of Block 1 and future SBInet systems. Operational 

for eighteen months, P–28 has been instrumental in apprehension of thousands of 

illegal border crossers and interception of thousands of pounds of narcotics, according to recent Customs and Border Protection reports. Many important lessons 

learned from the prototype P–28 system have been incorporated into the development of Block 1, including: 

—Active involvement of the entire user community in the system design and 

function; 

—Laboratory testing of components, systems and subsystems, and the creation 

of an operationally representative test-bed for field testing; and 

A substantially improved Common Operating Picture. 

Block 1 
14 

The Block 1 system has been in development for the past two years. The first deployment is known as Tucson 1—or TUS–1—is now well along in the P–28 area of 

operations and will cover 23 miles of the border around the Sasabe Port of Entry. 

A second deployment, called AJO–1, has been initiated west of the TUS–1 area of 

operations and will cover 30 miles of border at the Lukeville Port of Entry. AJO– 

1 construction will follow TUS–1 by several months while we await the Department 

of the Interior’s environmental approval. 

TUS–1 consists of nine sensor towers and eight communications towers. Of the 

17 total towers, Boeing built 13 new towers and modified four existing government 

towers. As of today, all tower construction is complete, and all sensors have been 

installed. For those of you familiar with the system, it has a distinctly different look 

to complement its improved capabilities. We are using a fixed tower, an upgraded 

sensor package, a different support equipment package, and most importantly, 

greatly improved communication technology. Specifically, TUS–1 and all future deployments will send data back to sector headquarters via a line-of-sight microwave 

link or fiber-optic link where it is available or not cost-prohibitive to do so. Gone 

are the satellite dishes used in the P–28 system, as well as the system lags they 

produced. The TUS–1 system is much more responsive, providing information to 

agents more quickly. The new Common Operating Picture (or COP) software is also 

responsible for significant improvements in responsiveness and usability. Boeing engineers sat side-by-side with Border Patrol agents who served as the primary designers of the look, feel and function of the Block 1 COP. 

While we’ve encountered some technological challenges—not uncommon when integrating off-the-shelf components – we’re working diligently within our team 

and the customer to resolve issues quickly and thoroughly, so the operational system will be robust and reliable. There have been two recent issues that have been 

particularly problematic – radar control, and human-machine interface malfunctions. I’m happy to report that we have implemented solutions to address each 

of those problems. We’ve been testing these solutions for several weeks, and the 

problems have not recurred. 

Once these solutions are fully implemented over the coming weeks, the Block 1 

system will complete System Qualification Test (SQT) at test facilities in Playas, 

New Mexico, then the deployed TUS–1 system will undergo Systems Acceptance 

Testing (SAT) during the fourth quarter this year. When completed, we’ll hand the 

system over to the government for Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E), 

which will be overseen by the Border Patrol. Results of these tests will assist the 

customer in determining future deployments, system enhancements and designs for 

other border geographies. 

Our goal has been to provide a complete system, technology and tools to bolster 

security for the nation, increase agent safety and add value for taxpayers. With the 

Tucson deployment underway, SBInet now has a baseline to be replicated in future 

deployments, such as AJO–1. We have a frame of reference from an operational deployment, not just the prototype of Project 28. The Block 1 system remains the core 

of our effort, and I believe our work over the last few years has lowered risk and 

increased system integrity. I also believe our work has produced a capability that 

will give the Border Patrol agents a highly effective tool to enhance border security 

and improve agent safety. We have now had the opportunity to work in the field 

with the Border Patrol Agents and have a more thorough understanding of the challenges they are facing. We believe that the Block 1 system architecture we are providing, once deployed, is readily scalable and upgradeable to incorporate new and 

improved sensors to meet changes in the Border Patrol Agent’s mission. 

AJO–1 

The AJO–1 deployment is also progressing well. System design is complete, and 

the command-and-control facility is already under construction. The majority of the 

hardware has been purchased, and site work and installation are awaiting environmental approval from the Department of the Interior, expected in mid-October. The 

AJO deployment consists of six sensor towers and five communications towers, 

spanning about 30 miles of border. 

Northern Border 

The Boeing team has also been active on the Northern Border with projects in 

the Detroit and Buffalo Sectors. Boeing is installing Remote Video Surveillance Systems, or RVSS, to enhance surveillance capabilities in a cold-weather, river environment. The RVSS are comprised of two sets of day and night cameras atop monopoles 

or existing structures. These systems feed video images back to sector headquarters 

using the same microwave communications design as being deployed in TUS–1 on 

the southwest border. However, in this deployment we aren’t including radar for additional detection or a Common Operational Picture for multi-sensor correlation and 
15 

tracking. Eleven RVSS are slated to be installed in the Detroit Sector to monitor 

activities along the St. Clair River and five in the Buffalo Sector to monitor activities along the Upper Niagara River. Installation began in the Buffalo Sector in May, 

and efforts recently started in the Detroit Sector. We expect both projects to be fully 

operational by early 2010. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, let me say that SBInet has been both a challenging and also an 

important program to The Boeing Company. The Project 28 prototype and Block 1 

system, which have received a majority of the attention, represent approximately 

half of the government-funded effort to date. Boeing has invested its own funds in 

SBInet: we built a systems integration lab in Huntsville, Alabama; we established 

the Rapid Application Development / Joint Application Development lab in Arlington, Virginia; and we created modeling and simulation tools to support development. 

These have been significant factors in the program’s success to date. Boeing has also 

leveraged existing capabilities to support SBInet. For example, the entire TUS–1 

network was replicated in our existing Network Systems Integration Laboratory 

(NSIL) in El Segundo, California, to ensure it was operationally robust prior to deployment. 

Boeing’s support to Customs and Border Protection has extended beyond SBInet. 

Last year, we supported tactical infrastructure efforts through the Supply and Supply Chain Management task order. Using our supply chain expertise, we procured 

more than $440 million or 140,000 tons of steel for use in 290 miles of fence construction. That’s the equivalent of three modern-day aircraft carriers. According to 

September 2008 testimony by then–U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner W. Ralph Basham, between $63 million and $100 million was saved. 

Our goal has been to provide a complete system, technology and tools to bolster 

security for the nation, increase agent safety and add value for taxpayers. With the 

Tucson deployment underway, SBInet now has a baseline to be replicated in future 

deployments, such as AJO–1. We have a frame of reference from an operational deployment, not just the prototype of Project 28. The Block 1 system remains the core 

of our effort, and I believe our work over the last few years has lowered risk and 

increased system integrity. I also believe our work has produced a capability that 

will give the Border Patrol agents a highly effective tool to enhance border security 

and improve agent safety. We have now had the opportunity to work in the field 

with the Border Patrol Agents and have a more thorough understanding of the challenges they are facing. We believe that the Block 1 system architecture we are providing, once deployed, is readily scalable and upgradeable to incorporate new and 

improved sensors to meet changes in the Border Patrol Agent’s mission. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Peters, and thank you for coming 

under time. 

Mr. Stana, for 5 minutes or less on your testimony? 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE 

Mr. STANA. Thank you, Chairwoman Sanchez, Chairman Thompson, Mr. Souder, members of the subcommittee. Shortly after the 

launch of the secure border initiative, this committee asked us to 

review the SBI program and to provide periodic updates on the status of our efforts and interim findings. 

My testimony and our report provide our fourth formal update. 

As you know, SBI is a multi-year multi-billion dollar program 

aimed at stemming illegal entry into the country. Since fiscal year 

2005, SBI has received funding amounting to over $3.7 billion and 

DHS has requested over $779 million for next fiscal year. 

I would now like to highlight our observations on program status 

and challenges. With respect to technology deployment, the SBInet 

program continues to experience delays. When the SBI contract 

was let in September 2006, the initial SBInet technology deployment for the entire southwest border was planned to be completed 
16 

by early fiscal year 2009, but by February 2009 the completion date 

had slipped to 2016. 

Similarly, in February 2008 the SBI program office reported that 

TUCSON–1 and AJO–1 in Block 1 would be complete by the end 

of calendar year 2008. TUCSON–1 is now scheduled for final acceptance by January 2010 and AJO–1 in June 2010. 

The cost of the SBInet projects from fiscal years 2007 through 2014 was estimated at $6.7 billion, but the cost could change due 

to program adjustments. A lifecycle cost has not been estimated. 

Along with environmental issues and funding reallocations, the 

results of testing activities contributed to these delays. SBI program office officials emphasized, and we agree, that testing is a 

necessary step of deployment in that it ensures that technology capabilities perform as required. 

By February 2009 testing results revealed problems including 

the instability of camera under adverse weather conditions, mechanical problems with the radar at the tower, and issues with the 

sensitivity of the radar. The SBI program office is still working 

with Boeing to address some of these issues. 

In a 1-week user evaluation last spring that was not part of formal testing, Border Patrol agents had an opportunity to address 

the suitability and effectiveness of Block 1 technology compared to 

Project 28 and mobile surveillance system technology. 

The Border Patrol found that on windy days the Block 1 radar 

had issues that resulted in an excessive number of false detection, 

and that the capability was not adequate for optimal operational 

effectiveness. 

They also found that the features of the Block 1 camera were insufficient in comparison to features of the Project 28 and MSS cameras. Once all SBInet capabilities are deployed in TUCSON–1, the 

Border Patrol is to perform a complete operational testing. Provided there are no additional schedule changes, this testing of 

TUCSON–1 is scheduled to begin in January. 

Until SBInet is deployed, CBP cannot determine what operational changes it will need to take full advantage of the new technology. In the meantime, the Border Patrol relies on existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers that have intermittent 

problems including signal loss. 

During our site visit to Tucson last March, Border Patrol agents 

told us, as they had during our previous visits, that Project 28 system had improved their operational capabilities but they must continue to work around ongoing problems, such as finding good signal 

strength for the wireless network, remotely controlling cameras 

and modifying radar sensitivity. 

To fill gaps or augment legacy equipment, SBI program office 

procured and delivered 40 MSS units, but these units sometimes 

are not operational because of the need for repairs. 

Turning to tactical infrastructure, the deployment of 661 miles of 

fencing and vehicle barriers along the southwest border is nearing 

completion. But delays persist due mainly to property acquisition 

issues. 

About 633 miles had been completed and CBP was scheduled to 

complete the remaining 28 miles by November. Yesterday CBP provided an update of miles completed and remaining and these totals 
17 

1 At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of people and cargo into and out 

of the country, while facilitating legitimate travel and trade. 2The SBI Program Executive Office, referred to in this testimony as the SBI program office, 

has overall responsibility for overseeing all SBI activities for acquisition and implementation, 

including establishing and meeting program goals, objectives, and schedules for overseeing contractor performance,and for coordinating among DHS agencies. However, as of March 2009, the 

Continued 

decreased slightly. About $2.4 billion has been allocated from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2009 to complete fencing projects. 

CBP estimates the lifecycle cost for the fencing and related 

roads, lighting and so on, assuming a 20-year lifespan, to be about 

$6.5 billion. According to CBP data, as of May 2009, there had been 

3,363 breaches in the fence with each breach costing an average of 

about $1,300 to repair. 

Despite the $2.4 billion investment in tactical infrastructure, 

CBP has not systematically evaluated the impact of tactical infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of effective border control. 

Such an evaluation is important to help demonstrate its contribution to effective control of the border and to help CBP to determine whether more tactical infrastructure would be appropriate 

given other alternatives and constraints. 

In our report, we recommended that DHS evaluate the impact of 

tactical infrastructure on effective control and DHS concurred with 

our recommendation and describes actions recently completed, underway or planned to address it. 

In closing, the SBInet program continues to face uncertainties 

and expectation gaps. Three years ago at the time the Boeing contract was signed, DHS was to have SBInet capabilities across the 

northern and southern borders as of today. 

While this was likely an overambitious goal and lessons have 

since been learned, schedules have continued to slip. In the meantime, the border control continues to rely mostly on Legacy technology and we remain uncertain about whether the new system 

will meet the Border Patrol’s needs and expectations. 

These uncertainties underscore Congress’ need to stay closely attuned to DHS’ progress to ensure that SBInet deployments work as 

planned, the schedule stabilizes and that the investments made in 

the program yield an efficient and effective system that addresses 

our nation’s border security needs. 

I would be happy to answer any questions that members may 

have. 

[The statement of Mr. Stana follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA

Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the implementation of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program— 

a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Securing the nation’s borders from illegal entry of aliens 

and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to 

be a major challenge. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of SBI to help 

address this challenge. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) supports this 

initiative by providing agents and officers to patrol the borders, secure the ports of 

entry, and enforce immigration laws.1 In addition, CBP’s SBI program is responsible 

for developing a comprehensive border protection system using technology, known 

as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure— fencing, roads, and lighting—along the 

southwest border to deter smugglers and aliens attempting illegal entry.2 Since fis-
18 

tactical infrastructure program office was realigned and is now managed on a day-to-day basis 

by CBP’s Office of Finance Facilities Management and Engineering division. 3 Remaining funds were allocated to program management and environmental requirements. 

4The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors in which it is responsible for detecting, interdicting, 

and apprehending those who engage in illegal activity across U.S. borders between official ports 

of entry. 5See appendix II of our September 2009 report—GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology 

Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO–09– 

896 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9. 2009)—for a summary of the task orders awarded to Boeing for 

SBI projects. 6GAO–09–896. 

7GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation, GAO–08–131T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2007); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects, GAO–08–508T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2008); and Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges, GAO–08–1141T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008); GAO–09–896. 8Project 28 was an effort to provide a technology system with the capabilities to control 28 

miles of the border in Arizona. 

cal year 2005, SBI has received funding amounting to over $3.7 billion. Approximately $1.1 billion has been allocated to SBInet and $2.4 billion to tactical infrastructure.3

SBInet surveillance technologies are to include sensors, cameras, and radars. The 

command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) technologies are to include software and hardware to produce a Common Operating Picture (COP)—a 

uniform presentation of activities within specific areas along the border. SBInet 

technology is to be initially deployed in two geographic areas —designated as Tucson-1 and Ajo–1— within the Tucson sector.4 In September 2006, CBP awarded a 

prime contract for SBInet development to the Boeing Company for 3 years, with 

three additional 1-year options. As of July 8, 2009, CBP had awarded 13 task orders 

to Boeing for a total amount of approximately $1.1 billion.5

In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, DHS planned to 

deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing and 300 miles of vehicle fencing 

by December 31, 2008. Pedestrian fencing is designed to prevent people on foot from 

crossing the border and vehicle fencing consists of physical barriers meant to stop 

the entry of vehicles. In September 2008, DHS revised its goal, committing instead 

to having 661 miles either built, under construction, or under contract by December 

31, 2008, but did not set a goal for the number of miles it planned to build by December 31, 2008. Although some tactical infrastructure exists in all the southwest 

border sectors, most of what has been built through the SBI program is located in 

the San Diego, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley sectors. 

My testimony is based on a report we are publicly releasing today 6 that is the 

fourth in a series of interim reports on SBI implementation.7 My testimony will discuss the following key issues in our report: (1) the extent to which CBP has implemented the SBInet technology program and the impact of any delays that have occurred, and (2) the extent to which CBP has deployed the SBI tactical infrastructure 

program and assessed its results. Our full report also provides a status of SBI program office staffing and the progress the office reports in achieving its human capital goals. I will conclude with some observations regarding our recommendation 

and DHS’s response. 

For our report, we reviewed program schedules, status reports, and previous GAO 

work and interviewed DHS and CBP officials, including representatives of the SBI 

program office and the tactical infrastructure program office; the Border Patrol (a 

component of CBP); and the Department of Interior (DOI). We visited three SBI 

sites where SBInet technology (Project 28) and/or fencing had been deployed at the 

time of our review.8 We determined that funding, staffing, and fencing mileage data 

provided by CBP were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. More detailed information on our scope and methodology appears in our September 2009 report. Our work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

SBINET CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE DELAYS, AND BORDER PATROL CONTINUES TO RELY

ON EXISTING TECHNOLOGY THAT HAS LIMITATIONS THAT NEWER TECHNOLOGY IS

PLANNED TO OVERCOME

SBInet technology capabilities have not yet been deployed and delays require the 

Border Patrol to rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than 

using newer technology planned to overcome the existing technology’s limitations. 

As of September 2006, SBInet technology deployment for the southwest border was 

planned to be complete in fiscal year 2009. When last reported in February 2009, 
19 

9The SBI program office defines final acceptance as the SBI program office taking ownership 

of the SBInet technology system from the contractor and comes before handing the technology 

over to Border Patrol. 

the completion date had slipped to 2016. In addition, by February 2009, the schedule for Tucson-1 and Ajo–1 had slipped from the end of calendar year 2008, and 

final acceptance of Tucson-1 was expected in November 2009 and Ajo–1 in March 

2010. As of April 2009, Tuscon-1 was scheduled for final acceptance by December 

2009 and Ajo–1 had slipped to June 2010.9 (See fig. 1 for schedule changes over 

time). 

Flaws found in testing and concerns about the impact of placing towers and access 

roads in environmentally sensitive locations caused delays. By February 2009, preliminary results of testing revealed problems that may limit the usefulness of the 

system for Border Patrol agents, including the instability of the camera under adverse weather conditions, mechanical problems with the radar at the tower, and 

issues with the sensitivity of the radar. As of May 2009, the SBI program office reported that they were still working with Boeing to address some issues such as difficulties aligning the radar. 

As a result of the delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology 

that has limitations, such as performance shortfalls and maintenance issues. For example, on the southwest border, the Border Patrol relies on existing equipment such 

as cameras mounted on towers that have intermittent problems, including signal 

loss. The Border Patrol has procured and delivered some new technology to fill gaps 

or augment existing equipment. However, incorporating SBInet technology as soon 

as it is operationally available should better position CBP to identify and implement 

operational changes needed for securing the border. 

Tactical Infrastructure Deployments Are Almost Complete, but Their Impact on 

Border Security Has Not Been Measured 

Tactical infrastructure deployments are almost complete, but their impact on border security has not been measured. As of June 2009, CBP had completed 633 of 
20 

10 In program evaluation, scientific research methods are used to establish a causal connection 

between program activities and outcomes and to isolate the program’s contributions to them. 

GAO, Program Evaluation: Studies Helped Agencies Measure or Explain Program Performance, 

GAO/GGD–00–204 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2000). 

the 661 miles of fencing it committed to deploy along the southwest border (see 

table 1). However, delays continue mainly because of challenges in acquiring the 

necessary property rights from landowners. While fencing costs increased over the 

course of construction, because all construction contracts have been awarded, costs 

are less likely to change. CBP plans to use $110 million in fiscal year 2009 funds 

to build 10 more miles of fencing, and fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funds for supporting infrastructure. The life-cycle cost study prepared by a contractor for CBP 

shows that total 20-year life-cycle costs are estimated at about $6.5 billion for all 

tactical infrastructure—including pre–SBI infrastructure as well as that planned for 

fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011—and consisting of deployment and operations and 

future maintenance costs for the fence, roads, and lighting, among other things. 

Table 1: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of June 26, 2009 

Infrastructure 

type 

Miles in 

place 

before SBI* 

Miles deployed 

through SBI as 

of 6/26/09 

Total miles 

in place as 

of 6/26/09 

Target 

Miles 

remaining 

to meet 

target 

Pedestrian fencing 67 264 331 358 27 

Vehicle fencing 76 226 302 303 1 

Total fencing 143 490 633 661 28 

Source: GAO analysis of SBI data. 

* Seventy-eight miles of pedestrian fencing and 57 miles of vehicle fencing were in place before the SBI 

program began. However, since SBI began construction, some miles of fencing have been removed, replaced 

or retrofitted resulting in mileage totals that are different from those we have reported in earlier reports. 

CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, 

had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.4 

billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. CBP measures miles of tactical infrastructure constructed and has completed 

analyses intended to show where fencing is more appropriate than other alternatives, such as more personnel, but these analyses were based primarily on the 

judgment of senior Border Patrol agents. Leading practices suggest that a program 

evaluation would complement those efforts.10 Until CBP determines the contribution 

of tactical infrastructure to border security, it is not positioned to address the impact of this investment. In our report, we recommended that to improve the quality 

of information available to allocate resources and determine tactical infrastructure’s 

contribution to effective control of the border, the Commissioner of CBP conduct a 

cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure on effective control 

of the border. 

DHS concurred with our recommendation and described actions recently completed, under way, and planned that the agency said will address our recommendation. For example, DHS commented that it is considering using independent researchers to conduct evaluations and considering using modeling and simulation 

technology to gauge the effects of resource deployments. We believe that such efforts 

would be consistent with our recommendation, further complement performance 

management initiatives, and be useful to inform resource decision making. 

This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that members of the subcommittee may have. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Stana, and I thank the witnesses 

for all of their testimony. I will remind each of the members that 

he or she will have 5 minutes to question the witnesses, and I will 

now recognize myself for some questions. 

Mr. Peters, in your testimony I think it was you who said that 

Project 28 has become a valuable enforcement tool for the last 18 

months. That was part of your testimony, correct? 
21 

Mr. PETERS. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Because I am having a little problem really trying 

to understand what is going on out there, and I haven’t been out 

there for a while, as you know, Chief. Originally, we all thought, 

a majority of us that Project 28 was actually going to be an operational system that was going to be able to be used by the CBP. 

And later we learned that no, now you all thought it was going 

to be a prototype where you would test different things, and that 

is about the point, at least the last time that I was out on the Tucson sector looking at it, Chief. 

And TUCSON–1 and AJO–1 actually overlapped Project 28. Am 

I correct? I mean, we spent the money to do Project 28. We thought 

it was going to be operational. It was just a prototype to test out 

different things. 

Now, you are telling me that it is operational and that it has 

been useful, but at the same time we are turning that same equipment out, and we are putting in new equipment across AJO–1 and 

TUCSON–1, which have a big overlap with the original Project 28. 

So I guess my question is, if that is the case, why is Mr. Stana 

telling me that we have less capability or worse equipment on 

there? Was it cameras or radar that you were talking about, Mr. 

Stana? 

Why is it that it seems to me, not only were you falling behind 

in time, but were falling behind, and we are spending much more 

money, but now we have actually got technology that is worse? 

Somebody? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. How about I take that? I think what Mr. Stana 

was referring to in the old technology is the pre-SBInet technology. 

There is on the border things called remove video surveillance system cameras, those kinds of things. Those are technologies that 

have been placed, in fact, since before 2000. 

So the way I understood the report, and I think Mr. Stana actually did highlight the difference between that technology and 

Project 28, those are the technologies that the Border Patrol is essentially laboring with awaiting SBI, and I think that was the 

point of his testimony. 

Now against that backdrop, SBInet Project 28 is an improvement 

compared to those old systems but it is not the production system. 

So I think that is the context in which we are talking about the 

old technology. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Stana, can you clarify that for me? 

Mr. STANA. Yes, a couple of different points here just for clarification. Project 28 was supposed to have a leave behind capability 

for 28 miles of the border. So your observation about why are we 

overlaying Block 1 stuff on Project 28 is a valid question. 

And the answer to that is, is Project 28, while useful to the Border Patrol in its current iteration, is not really what the Border Patrol needs most. I mean, they appreciate the help, and they appreciate the 5,000 apprehensions and the drug seizures and all, but 

it is really not the end game here. 

With respect to—in the meantime, until a better capability comes 

on board, the Border Patrol will need to use Project 28 assets. We 

will have to use the RVSS’ on the poles, as Mark mentioned, and 

other technologies, sensors that may not be tied to any kind of a 
22 

COP. But until Block 1 comes on and its predecessors and the final 

design of SBInet is settled on, they are pretty much stuck with 

what they have got. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Stana, let me ask you. Your report says that 

‘‘as of September 2006 SBInet technology development of the southwest border was planned to be complete in fiscal year 2009. When 

last reported in February 2009,’’ just this past February, ‘‘the completion date has slipped to 2016.’’ What were the reasons given for 

this? 

Mr. STANA. Well, I think that the contract that was signed by 

Boeing and DHS way back in September 2006, almost 3 years to 

the day, was very ambitious and probably overly ambitious. 

It called for a completion of the project on off-the-shelf technology 

largely, to integrate it and have Project 28 be the first iteration, 

and go forward and actually duplicate it with some modification up 

and down the border. It would be finished in 3 years. 

When they got into it they realized for a number of reasons that 

was overly ambitious and they didn’t consult with the Border Patrol on design. There were some features there; didn’t realize how 

tough it was; many lessons to be learned from Project 28. 

As the project has matured, they have realized other issues have 

cropped up. You know camera distance is a persistent problem. 

Radar clutter on windy or rainy days a persistent problem. And 

these are issues that they are still trying to get on top of. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So from a technology standpoint, how close are we 

on TUCSON–1 and AJO–1 to actually be able to use something 

that is operational, that is at the capability we had imagined in the 

beginning after getting through Project 28? 

We would have for the Border Patrol to actually be able to see 

people moving, decide where to go and apprehend them, et cetera, 

because you tell me you have looked at it on a day or two when 

they didn’t know you were coming in and on a windy day it all fell 

apart. 

Mr. STANA. Well, I am not really sure where we are right now. 

I think it is good that testing is being done. There is retest plans, 

re-planning, lots of testing and that is good. The thing that, I 

guess, is of concern is that the testing is finding two things. One 

is that the testing is finding the same general kinds of problems 

with the hardware and the interface and the software. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The same ones as Project 28 had? 

Mr. STANA. Well, I mean, if you look at camera distance, which 

was a problem with 28, radar clutter was a problem with 28. Some 

of these issues are being addressed. 

But I am not so sure, and we won’t know until it is ultimately 

deployed in January and the Border Patrol takes over for operational testing exactly whether this is going to yield the product 

that the Border Patrol finds operationally effective. We just won’t 

know until that kind of testing is done. 

The other concern we have is with the way testing was designed 

and executed, and we have another team in GAO, our information 

technology team that is looking at those issues. They have surfaced 

some concerns. Their work will be completed in the next few 

months. 
23 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Stana. I mean, this is important. 

I also want to come back at some point to talk about the measure 

and whether we are really going to measure what resources ultimately we are going to have to put towards this if we ever get 

SBInet to work enough for you to be able to use it confidently, if 

you will, Chief Aguilar. 

But in the interest of time, I know there is so many members 

who have questions, I will now recognize for 5 minutes my ranking 

member, Mr. Souder of Indiana. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. First for the record, Congressman Miller and I on June 8, 2009 asked for a copy of the 

northern border action strategy, and we would appreciate an answer. 

Also, on July 31, 2009, a month-and-a-half ago, three ranking 

members from Government Reform and Oversight, Natural Resources and this committee plus two subcommittee ranking members, myself and Congressman Bishop asked for the Fish and Wildlife and the Department of Interior overlap with DHS and would 

appreciate answers to those letters. 

Let me plunge directly in where Chairman Sanchez was headed. 

I think that Mr. Stana’s point about ‘‘overambitious’’ is an incredible understatement that some of us raised concerns in the beginning, not about the partners, but about the concept. 

You have hilly areas of the border, particularly in that area from 

Nogales over to where it flattens out by Organ Pipe in the Ajo area. 

In my district when I am going back and forth between Warsaw 

and Fort Wayne any little bump, yet alone the hills like in California, will cause me to lose my cell phone service. 

It wasn’t too hard to figure out that when you have relay towers, 

particularly when this subcommittee group visited it as a group 

and we saw the tall towers to try to address that, that the wind 

was going to blow that. 

We already knew that from the military. This would have been 

transferable information, and I don’t believe there was adequate 

advanced planning before plunging into this contract about the realism of it. 

Now what—in TUCSON–1 they have addressed challenges with 

some smaller towers some taller towers. They are trying to overcome some of the conceptual flaws of how you do this transmission 

of technology in a mountainous area, how that is different in the 

flat areas. 

There aren’t continual flat areas anywhere along that border. 

Chief Aguilar did some of this over by Douglas in the early primitive forms that kind of identified how do you tell? 

In fact, the first time I was at the—I just blanked on the airbase 

in Saudi Arabia after Khobar Towers before 9/11, they couldn’t tell 

even with far more expensive military technology the difference between a tumbleweed and terrorists coming up on Prince Sultan Air 

Force Base. 

One of my questions has been repeatedly how do we get military 

technology, which we have already paid for in the government, 

transferred into border technology? 

I have IGT Aerospace, Raytheon, General Dynamics, USSI, DAE 

all in my district, all who do electronics warfare and so on. I have 
24 

been talking to them. SBInet is incredibly cheap compared to anything we do in the military. 

And we are trying to do what they are doing in tracking terrorists and what they are doing in military on the cheap, and it has 

been a struggle. As we get into some of the particulars, let me ask 

Mr. Peters a question, in your contract, because early on we saw 

that there wasn’t pre-testing prior to coming to the border, you 

built a testing center, is that correct? 

Mr. PETERS. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. SOUDER. Did the government fund that, or how much of that 

was funded by government versus private? 

Mr. PETERS. Government-funded, and Boeing has also made 

some contributions to that capital. 

Mr. SOUDER. Significant? 

Mr. PETERS. I don’t know the number off the top of my head, and 

I will get that for you. 

Mr. SOUDER. And was your contract on Project 28 a fixed cost, 

and then you absorbed anything that ran over that cost. Is that 

true? 

Mr. PETERS. Yes, sir. The deployment of the P28 prototype was 

a fixed cost, and then the Boeing Company brought its resources 

to complete the project. 

Mr. SOUDER. Would you say that you have contributed double 

what the government did? 

Mr. PETERS. Yes, sir, approximately two-times. 

Mr. SOUDER. And in TUCSON–1 how is that working? 

Mr. PETERS. TUCSON–1 is a different contract, and so we are, 

you know, we are working to deploy that. We are currently partway through our SQT, our system qualification test, and we will 

move into our system acceptance test later this fall. 

Mr. SOUDER. The government challenge now is, is that when we 

invest in something that we basically had too optimistic and ambitious goals and now have this kind of investment. If we switch the 

partnership group that we have, we lose the testing center and we 

lose a lot of what you have invested in your private funds, or do 

we have to pay you for that? 

Mr. PETERS. You will certainly lose the non-recurring engineering that, you know, has spent over the past 2 years on TUCSON– 

1. And then we would have to look at specifically what portions of 

the Playas site were, you know, Boeing-funded and which were 

government-funded. 

Mr. SOUDER. And we need to understand it because we run into 

this in military contracting, that this type of contact that we have 

here where they had to do the cost overruns puts us in a different 

situation as we develop future alternatives. 

Mr. Borkowski, one of the overly ambitious, to use Mr. Stana’s 

words, was that this was going to be able to be communicated to 

the vehicles. Does that appear realistic, and is that in the future 

proposals because that would be a great advance? But I know what 

these systems cost when we transfer them to Humvees, and it is 

nothing like the cost of what you are proposing to do. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Correct, sir. The SBInet Block 1 does not include the mobile data terminals, and for several reasons. One is the 

cost of creating the capability. The other is the operational experi-
25 

ence and the ConOps that we gained. It is a question of do we really get benefit from that. So SBInet Block 1 does not include mobile 

data terminals to deal with those kinds of questions. 

Mr. SOUDER. And Tucson won’t either, TUCSON–1? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Correct. TUCSON–1 is the first deployment of 

the so-called SBInet Block 1. So the plan for the system will not 

include it. 

Mr. SOUDER. I see. Then so the goal is to go to a center, and then 

the center communicates it to the vehicle. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Correct. 

Mr. SOUDER. Which is a difference from our original conception 

of the program? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Correct. 

Mr. SOUDER. But there was no way to cost effectively do the 

other? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Correct. Now we are still looking at options if 

they are required downstream, but they are not in the baseline at 

this point. 

Mr. SOUDER. Because to some degree in the mountainous areas 

it is easier to get in behind and send the people there than to try 

to figure out how to transmit this data into a vehicle when the terrain is going up and down. Is that not correct? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Correct. That is absolutely correct. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Yield back. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the ranking member. 

I will now recognize the chairman of the full Committee of Homeland Security in the House, Mr. Thompson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Continuing somewhat 

along the line of your questioning and the ranking member’s, earlier this year the Border Patrol agents had an opportunity to operate the newest SBInet technology at the Boeing test facility. 

We have already heard that according to GAO the agents indicated that on windy days the radar had an excessive number of 

false detections, which is one of the same problems that plagued 

Project 28. 

But the agents also compared the new camera technology to the 

existing Project 28 and mobile unit cameras and said that the new 

cameras did not even measure up to the existing ones. Now, is this 

true? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. It is true that that was the conclusion of the 

agents, yes. Those are true statements. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So the agents don’t know what they were talking 

about? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. No, that is what the agents experienced. But 

one of the reasons for doing the operational assessment, which was 

informal, was to test some other things like how well did we explain the operation of the system. 

How well did we train the operators to use the system? They are 

familiar with, for example, Project 28, and a lot of these operators 

are familiar with the mobile surveillance system. 

So one of the reasons for doing that operational assessment was 

to collect that information, figure out what the problem was, what 

was the cause of that, and then if in the actual deployment that 
26 

really is an issue. So that was the purpose of that was to collect 

that information. 

Now, in many cases we don’t think that that problem persists 

into SBInet Block 1 as deployed in TUCSON–1, but again, that is 

with the formal operational test and evaluation. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So if your testimony to the committee is that it 

happened, but there were some reasons for it happening, and it has 

been corrected. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We believe so. And again, we will see for sure 

in the operational test and evaluation but we believe so. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Stana, would you want to comment? 

Mr. STANA. Well, first that is why you have testing is to get the 

bugs out of a system. In this case the Border Patrol agents who 

tested the system found the bugs that you described, among others, 

and there was a cause for concern. 

The concerns they raised were some on the COP, all the components were integrated, but some was with the hardware itself. If 

the camera range issue and the radar flutter issues are corrected, 

I guess I would have to see that in testing before I would buy that, 

you know, just right away. But that is why we have testing and 

that is why the operational testing by the Border Patrol in January 

is going to be very telling. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam Chairwoman, I have a diagram I want 

to put on the screen. Well, so much for technology. We have had 

the information distributed to our witnesses, and what you have 

before you is the original concept behind SBInet. And what I really 

want to do is to have you to explain to the committee what specific 

steps Boeing has taken toward making this technology depicted in 

this diagram a reality. 

[The information follows:] 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Are you asking that question—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I guess both Mr. Peters and yourself. 
27 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Okay. The Project 28 which was a prototype, although to be fair not properly advertised as such, attempted to test 

this concept of operations and to learn from it. So it did have 

things like satellite communications. It did have things like the 

mobile data terminals. It did have the kinds of things that are depicted here. 

Based on that experience, SBInet Block 1 is a different concept. 

It is a concept that uses microwave communications and relay towers to send the information from the sensors back to the station 

and then at the station for agents to dispatch others to respond. 

So this concept is not the concept of SBInet Block 1 based on the 

lessons learned from Project 28 and the current estimate of the 

operational needs of the Border Patrol. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So it was changed? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes, it was. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Did that reflect the change in pricing or just the 

change in technology? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. The Project 28, which as we discussed was a 

firm fixed price, did overrun, but Boeing had to absorb those costs. 

As we have designed the new system, that new system is put on 

by new task orders which are like new contracts. I mean they are 

all on this basic contract. And they are priced based on what we 

know or anticipate we want to do next. 

And the go-forward is priced—and by the way, that is a cost reimbursable contract, that means the government will pay what it 

costs—so those are estimated based on the current concept. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Stana, based on what you just heard, is that 

a generally accepted procurement procedure? 

Mr. STANA. Well, I think it is a generally accepted approach to 

begin with a project and build on what you can actually make 

work. That is fine. What is missing here and I don’t know if it is 

fair to as the Congress to consider a $6.7 billion investment, if we 

really don’t know what the end-game is going to look like. 

And I know there is some development that goes on here, but 

what this seems to articulate to me is this is someone’s vision of 

the end-game where you will have maybe satellites, UAVs, sensors, 

mobile units and so on, and I don’t know how much of that is still 

on the table in the out years. So there is just a lot of uncertainties. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I think the whole issue of the procurement 

is what kind of has us in the weeds most of the time, when we are 

trying to figure out exactly where we are, and perhaps we can get 

some further direction. Chief, you might be able to help us at some 

point in trying to clear this up. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the Chairman. 

And I will now recognize Mr. McCaul, of Texas for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank the witnesses for 

being here. Recently I went down to the El Paso Intelligence Center, EPIC, and at that point in time, Juarez was and still is in a 

state of crisis. It is probably the most violent city in the American 

continent. 

President Calderon has said he is in a war with drug cartels and 

I mention this only to frame the issue. That is really why we are 
28 

here today. That is the threat. That is why getting operational control of the border is so important. 

They showed me the fence that had been—the physical fence 

that had been built in El Paso which has allowed Border Patrol to 

gain more operational control. But while the physical fence is nearly completed, progress along the lines of a virtual fence using technology, in my view, has barely begun. 

And I wanted to reference to a—it is an unclassified notation in 

a DHS intelligence report saying that ‘‘drug trafficking organizations operating in Chihuahua, Mexico use some 300 identified 

makeshift crossings at low points along the Rio Grande between El 

Paso and Presidio.’’ This is according to a Mexican government 

study cited in a Juarez daily newspaper. 

And this unclassified map from the DHS intelligence report 

shows Chihuahua and the main drug trafficking locations. Despite 

the evidence that this Mexican state is a source of significant drug 

trafficking and violence, it is alarming to me that the SBInet 

project does not anticipate deploying surveillance technology to this 

section of the Texas—Mexico border, including the Marfa and Del 

Rio Border Patrol sectors, until after the year 2014 at the earliest—2014. 

We have completed the physical fence. Virtually, to the point, 

why in the world does this take so long to do? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. What we have tried to do is come up with what 

we think is a reasonable and prudent and acceptable budget, an 

ambitious but acceptable budget. So essentially the plan that you 

are describing is a plan that we put forward as how much could 

we do with the most budget that we could reasonably expect to ask 

for? 

Now, that is not necessarily, by the way, the budget we will get 

but that was the plan we laid out. The idea I think is to get 

through this SBInet Block 1 to a point where we can then start 

stamping these out, essentially, as production. 

And then the pace of that depends on funding, one, and then two, 

any desire to build off of SBInet Block 1, is there anything I want 

to change in it, as I go into other areas? But that is fundamental 

where that pace came from. It was the most that we thought we 

could reasonably ask for in funding, which is not necessarily what 

we will get, okay, so that all has to be focused in on this, too. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well again this is—we are spending a great deal 

of money up here in Washington, and yet we still can’t get this border situation under control. And it seems to me we ought to be investing more in this technology to get this thing done more rapidly 

than the year 2014. 

You know, my constituents and the American people want this 

done, and they don’t want to wait 5 years to see this thing completed. My governor, Texas Governor Rick Perry, in the mean time 

because of the crisis down there, has requested 1,000 National 

Guard troops be deployed and has asked for that from the federal 

government. 

He has not received any response as I am aware to date. Can you 

tell—can anyone on this panel speak to that request? 

Chief Aguilar. The request that Governor Perry has made is still 

be worked out, being looked at between DHS and DOD. At this 
29 

point I cannot give you an update. I will get you what we have as 

soon as we can, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I would hope the secretary would respond to 

the letter. I think it is important, particularly if we can’t get this 

technology done by the year 2014. It seems to me it is a good idea 

to get more human manpower and resources down there on the 

border. Chief Aguilar, would you agree with that comment? 

Chief Aguilar. Absolutely. Any kind of capability that we can get 

down to the border as fast as possible is going to help us secure 

our border. Just in fairness to Mr. Borkowski out here as to the 

question that was asked, the lay-down plan, given the capability 

requirements that we have identified from a technology systems 

base is what gets us to Texas in 2014. 

That is not necessarily saying that is when we want to get there. 

We would like to get there yesterday, but of course what we are— 

what we have identified is the capability requirements package 

that they are working to create, and given the budget that we 

think we are going to get, that is that lay-down plan timeline for 

Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chief. 

And Madam Chair, I hope we can, on this committee and Mr. 

Chairman, the full committee, work to speed up this process, make 

it more efficient, more functional so we can finally get operational 

control of this border. And with that, I yield back. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I think there is nobody in disagreement with you 

on this committee. As you know, Mr. McCaul, we have been working on this for a while. 

I would like now to recognize one of our members who actually 

represents a border area with some of the most crossings. I believe 

that would be Mr. Cuellar at this point. Are you ready to go, Mr. 

Cuellar? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, Madam Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much for your leadership in having this meeting. First of all, I want to thank the witnesses for 

being here, and one of the questions I have, GAO and the other 

committee I sit in, in Government Oversight Reform, just came out 

with a report just a couple of days ago criticizing Homeland and 

the billions of dollars that they have invested in technology. 

And saying that it is—I guess you are one of the at risk agencies 

that we have subject to fraud, abuse, et cetera on that, so start off 

with that background. And again I appreciate everything that you 

all do, but I guess it gets us a little frustrated. Being on the border, 

I have lived near the border and, Chief, you are from the area and 

you know what it is. 

I mean billions of dollars have been invested but, you know, if 

we don’t do our work correctly you are going to have governors saying we have got take things in our hands. For example, Governor 

Perry came up with saying that he was going to send this, ‘‘elite 

Texas Rangers,’’ which I know because I used to do the budgets for 

the Texas Rangers. 

Do you know—did they coordinate with you in any way or form? 

Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. In fact the Texas Rangers were actually 

trained by our national tactical team, BORTAC. 
30 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Knowing their budget, do you know how 

many are coming down to the border? 

Chief Aguilar. I don’t know how many are coming down. I can 

tell you that I believe there was about 15, give or take a few, that 

were actually trained by our tactical unit. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay, so what Governor Perry is talking about, 

just 15 Texas Rangers that will come in and supplement the work 

that you are doing? 

Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. I will additionally state that the Rangers, 

DPS and the county sheriffs have always worked very closely with 

us in the past. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Well, I am talking about this new elite Texas 

Rangers. 

Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. So 15 for the record, 1,200 miles for the Texas border? 

Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir, 1,200 miles, 15 that we trained. Yes. 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. The other thing is is the—and I appreciate the work that Boeing has done. I know there have been questions about the work, but the Defense Department has been working on pilot programs. And I don’t know if they have done a pilot 

program close to Wilmot, Texas in my district there. I think they 

just finished one in the northwest. 

And in sitting down with them, and—is they are saying that, you 

know, instead of millions of dollars for a, let us say, five-mile radius, they are saying that they can do this in the tens of thousands. And Mr. Borkowski, I think you and I, Borkowski, we spoke 

a little bit before, you said it is not really what they are, you know, 

they are—it is not up to par. 

But you know, I still go back and I have seen some of the work, 

but if it is military—and I think, Mr. Souder, I think you might 

have mentioned this before I got in—but if it is military tested and 

they have done this in the heat—that was one of the reasons why 

we had trouble on the SBI at the very beginning. 

They have done this before. It is proven, and it is in the tens of 

thousands of dollars, why the heck are we paying millions of dollars when we can do this in the tens of thousands for the same 

length that we have? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Certainly, if we can do what we need to do for 

tens of thousands, we would like to see that and look at it. We 

would be happy to look at that. 

We are actually and have talked to parts of the DOD. It turns 

out the applications they are talking about compared to our needs 

don’t always match quite the way they might think. However, I do 

spend 3 to 6 hours on an average week, talking with Department 

of Defense people on their proposals, talking with various vendors 

and contractors because we actually are trying to collect a reservoir 

of other technologies. 

So that we can start, as we gain experience with the SBInet and 

we are able to measure its effectiveness and we gain experience 

with some of these other systems, we can start picking and choosing what we put where. So we would be very interested in looking 

at those. 
31 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I have sat down with these 

folks several times, and I will ask both, Madam Chair, I would love 

for you all if we could sit down and do a briefing, Mr. Souder, because with all due respect, if we could have maybe Boeing and the 

departments sit down with the Defense. 

I have seen this presentation and unless if I am missing something I would like for somebody to tell me that I am missing something on this, but if we can do the same range for tens of millions, 

military tested equipment, it has been proven. It is cheaper to the 

taxpayers’ dollars. It is quicker to implement. Why can we not do 

that? Mr. Chairman or Madam Chair, if you want to set that up? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Cuellar, actually, as you know, I sit on the 

Armed Services Committee so we have been talking to the Department of Defense and we have set up a briefing next week to take 

a look at some of the applications that they have. 

I think DHS is correct in saying that they don’t exactly match 

up, but we will have the briefing and an informational meeting so 

that we can take a look at it and then we can decide, since we set 

the policy, the Congress does, as to whether what the Department 

of Defense has done in other areas like Iraq and all and looking 

at the borders. 

For example, whether that technology, because it tends to be less 

expensive than what we are experiencing here, whether that is applicable and that whether that really, you know, blankets or allows 

us to feel the confidence level we need at our border. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Well and again I—yes. I would like to talk to, you 

know, sit down because again I have seen this and being on the 

border, having this type of technology is better than waiting for 

years and years and years for something. And if we can do this at 

tens of thousands of dollars, I would like to see this sit down so, 

I want—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Unless it gets the job done, I think all of us would 

like to see it. Thank you, Mr. Cuellar, for your questions. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I will now recognize my good friend from Florida, 

Mr. Bilirakis, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very 

much. Mr. Peters, share with us your perspective on lessons 

learned from previous SBInet deployments and areas that the department and Boeing can improve upon to ensure future deployments are completed in as timely and cost effectively as possible. 

Mr. PETERS. Yes, sir, be happy to do that. Probably the biggest 

lesson learned we took away or one of the major ones was the establishment of a test facility in an environment similar to what you 

are going to be deploying in, and that would be Playas, New Mexico 

test bed that we established. 

Another one was the early user involvement. We talked about 

P28 being a prototype system developed predominately by engineers. We got very valuable, useful feedback from the users, when 

they looked at that P28 prototype system, in terms of the humanmachine interface. We were able to incorporate that back into the 

actual Block 1 system design. 

We also learned lessons, going back to Mr. Thompson’s diagram, 

learned lessons about latencies that were in the system, the P28 
32 

prototype used a Ku band satellite communication system and it 

introduced latencies into the system. So we knew we had to take 

those out and we went to a microwave line-of-sight-type communication system in the Block 1 design. 

We learned, as we talked earlier, about the wind moving the 

radar around and introducing clutter into the system, so we had 

to introduce clutter rejection algorithms into the design. So those 

things—P28 was a very valuable, and that is why I had it in my 

opening statement, P28 was a very valuable engineering tool. 

In addition to being an enforcement tool for the Chief and the 

Border Patrol, it was a very valuable engineering tool for us to take 

those lessons learned and introduce them into the Block 1 design, 

which is what we will take out to the field, at both Tucson and Ajo. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Sorry about that. Is the department satisfied with 

the contracting vehicle for SBInet? Does it provide sufficient protections for taxpayers, if the system doesn’t work? Does it prevent 

large cost overruns, and for example, are there disincentives or 

penalties for contractor or missed deadlines or program errors that 

cause delays? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. In general, I would say that the contract we 

have is awkward. It is not the contract, in hindsight, that probably 

we should have. It does have the capability to do incentives and 

disincentives. 

Ultimately, the responsibility though for holding the costs and— 

it is basically the government program management. The contract 

is a standard contract. It is a standard type of acquisition. It gives 

us the tools that we do need. 

It includes elements like award fee and incentive fee, which adjusts profit based on performance of the contractor. And as we put 

additional tasks on, we are in the position where we put disincentives. 

For example, on the northern border, there are schedule incentives, and if schedules are missed there are penalties for missing 

them. There are also other kinds of tools that we have outside of 

the contract. 

But I would say that the contract as it is structured is awkward, 

and as we get to the point where we have this kind of production 

system that we can start stamping out, we are going to need to 

look at how do we get out from under the structure of this contract. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Stana, in your testimony you noted the concerns about the 

impact of placing towers and access roads in environmentally sensitive locations have caused SBInet deployment delays. Has GAO 

quantified the impact these environmental concerns have had on 

technology deployments relative to the other factors that may be 

slowing this project up? 

Mr. STANA. Well, there were three factors that really tugged at 

the pace at which the SBI Block 1 was being fielded. The environmental concern was one. There was some confusion whether the 

provisions of the Secure Fence Act applied to the SBI program. 

Turns out it didn’t, so they had to go through some environmental 

procedures to place the towers and roads. 

The other two were the fencing, you know, getting money reallocated to complete the fencing as much as they could by the end of 
33 

2008. And the third is is the SBI program just wasn’t ready for full 

fielding. They had to re-plan and retest. 

So even if the environmental concerns weren’t there, it is not to 

say that, you know, they would have met the 2008 date that they 

originally put out there because there were retest and re-plan 

issues out there. 

We couldn’t tell exactly how much each one of those factors 

tugged, but the fact is that the delays persist and it is not only due 

to environmental issues. There were other testing issues and the 

appropriateness and the readiness of technology to be fielded issues 

that were still there. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. All right, thank you very much. 

Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The Chair recognizes Mr. Thompson for a comment. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Borkowski, you said the contract was awkward. For the committee’s information, who developed the contract? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Ultimately we are responsible for that contract 

so we developed it, and we are responsible for its nature. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So I would assume that because we now know 

it was an awkward contract, we won’t enter into any more awkward contracts? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I can’t promise that. I hope that we learn our 

lessons from these kinds of experiences. I have the contract I have, 

and I have to make the most of it until I am in a position, a reasonable time position to fix it, but—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Maybe I need to ask the Chief. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The Chief, I don’t think, had anything to do with 

the contract because he wasn’t—weren’t you not allowed to even 

suggest deployment or—— 

Chief Aguilar. At the beginning we were not involved in the contract, and it would actually be a CBP responsibility over all as to 

how the contract is actually designed, sir. And I would agree with 

Mr. Borkowski that at the most opportune time we will look for a 

realignment, if you will, where it can be done because I agree with 

Mr. Borkowski. It is an awkward way of doing business. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So let me ask you something because I am told 

that it is a possibility you may be doing add-on or you may be extending in the very near future. Does that mean the extension or 

the add-ons are going to be all awkward also? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. The extension of the contract is done and the 

contract itself has what are called task orders, which are essentially subcontracts. And that is what makes it awkward because 

the elements of each of these task orders are really connected, but 

they look like they are independent contracts and that is the awkward part. 

Now, the way that we are managing that now is we have imposed requirements on the contractor to connect those so we can 

work around it. And certainly, though, in the future to the degree 

that I am in control of the design of the contract, we would not do 

this in the future, but it is what we have. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I believe, Mr. Souder, I will recognize you. You 

had a comment also. 
34 

Mr. SOUDER. Yes, and I think it is important that Mr. Peters also 

acknowledge that it was a tad awkward on your side, and that generally speaking Boeing does not have the principle of entering into 

contracts that cost you more than two times what you get? 

Mr. PETERS. Yes, sir, it is an awkward arrangement particularly 

in a development contract where, as Mr. Borkowski said, you have 

multiple task orders and they are linked together but contractually 

they are treated as separate. 

That is what makes it awkward. That is what makes it slow and 

inefficient for the contractor and customer relationship. 

Mr. SOUDER. And it is fairly safe to say that, if this project ended 

now, it would have been an experience you would have rather not 

been in. The assumption here is that if Boeing can continue it 

maybe you can recoup back to even. 

But one thing that needs to be pointed out here is there was not 

an enrichment of the private sector in this contract. This was just 

basically way over-promised and everybody has lost their shirt, so 

to speak on it, so far. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, but I think the record needs to reflect that 

this was a competitive process. It was not a sole source. So Boeing 

knew they had risk going in and that risk is—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Supposed to be borne by the private sector. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Absolutely. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Ms. Kirkpatrick, you have been very vigilant over there waiting for your turn, so I will recognize you, also 

from a border state, from Arizona, Ms. Kirkpatrick for 5 minutes. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Madam Chairman, it is an honor 

to yield to the esteemed colleague from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, so I 

don’t mind waiting. Thank you, panel, for being here. 

The security of our nation depends on maintaining operational 

control of our borders, there is no question about it. And if the 

SBInet is able to meet our ambitions, it will be a valuable tool in 

achieving this control. 

However, time-after-time, officials from DHS and Boeing have 

come in and told Congress that the program is back on track, that 

past problems have been resolved and everyone is ready to move 

forward. And time-after-time we later find out the old problems 

have not been fixed and there continue to be delays. 

Today we are hearing again the same story. After months of 

being told SBInet is back on track and ready for deployment, the 

GAO is reporting that the technology has many of the same flaws 

it has had for years. This program is too important to keep messing 

up and needs to get back on track. 

Mr. Stana, how much closer are we now than we were 2 years 

ago to having an operational system that works the way we have 

envisioned without the operational shortfalls that have been evident in the past? 

Mr. STANA. That is a good question, and I don’t have a complete 

answer for you. What I do know is that the testing regimes that 

have been designed for Block 1 are more rigorous than they were 

for Project 28 and there were some lessons learned from Project 28 

that have been incorporated in the design of the Block 1. 

On the other hand, we are seeing the same kinds of issues that 

we have seen in camera projects dating back into the 1990s, you 
35 

know, about camera range and reliability and flutter and these 

kinds of things. So I guess we will find out when it goes to operational testing. 

I share your concern about the optimism. I think Mr. Peters is 

the third Boeing Vice President that I recall here at the witness 

table, and each time there has been an optimistic assessment, and 

I can understand coming from the contractor why that would be. 

But I think we have to wait and see exactly what is delivered 

and is it operationally efficient and effective for the use of the Border Patrol. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. The second part of my question is why are we 

not testing until January of next year? Why don’t we start testing 

now, the operational test? 

Maybe, Mr. Peters, you can answer that. 

Mr. PETERS. We actually are testing but there are phases of 

tests. There is the test that, you know, the contractor has to sell 

this off to me as the engineering geek, okay. And so we are going 

to do that and that is going to start here shortly. In fact, some of 

it has already started in Tucson. 

At that point, I am going to make a conclusion about whether 

Boeing gave me what I thought they were supposed to give me. 

When that happens—now, my customer is the Chief of the Border 

Patrol. 

Now, I am going to turn that over to the Chief of the Border Patrol and he is going to make whatever conclusions he chooses to 

make. That is the testing we are talking about starting in January, 

so there are steps to get to that. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Can that be accelerated? 

Mr. PETERS. We hope it can but again the schedule that we have 

given you is the schedule that we think is reasonable. Again, you 

know, there are risks, as Mr. Stana says, and I don’t want to overpromise. I want to tell you think we have done the best we can at 

this point to give us the most confidence in that. 

We will try to accelerate if we can. We are already working with 

Boeing on that, but we are not confident that we will succeed. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. All right. I appreciate your desire not to overpromise. We do not need that now, but we do need a system that 

is operational. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Ms. Kirkpatrick. 

I will now recognize Mr. Rogers for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank the witnesses 

for being here. You know, a little over 4 years ago when I was 

chairing the MIO subcommittee we did an investigation into ISIS 

and just thought surely that could never happen again. And it 

seems like this is eerily similar to the outcome that we saw from 

that debacle but with a lot bigger numbers. 

I would ask Mr. Borkowski and Mr. Stana, could you tell me why 

you think we have let it happen again? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I can’t tell you why we think we have—— 

Mr. ROGERS. But with much bigger numbers. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Right. The only thing I can tell you, sir, is that 

I think that we have had to build our own competence in managing 

a program like this and then learning what you have to put in 

place. 
36 

And some of the things that we put in place at the start of this 

program, in hindsight, were not effective. And so now we are in a 

position where we can either stop and start over or we can fix as 

much as we think we need to fix to make the risk going forward 

prudent, and that is exactly what we are doing, and there are risks 

in that approach. 

So we are trying to fix what should have probably been fixed before this program, but we are doing it in the process of delivering 

it, and I can’t explain how we got here. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I just don’t understand, just from a technical 

standpoint, why it is so difficult. I mean, they are basically cameras on a pole, and we have got folks monitoring multiple cameras 

in a dispatcher format. 

I have been out there and I have seen them, and I just don’t understand why we are having problems. This is not the most sophisticated technology that our country has. As you just heard the 

Chairwoman, what we are doing in Iraq is much more sophisticated. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. In some ways it is and in some ways it isn’t. 

And one of the keys things here—well, first of all, there are two 

things going on here and I will use a little bit of an analogy because what we bet on—and it was probably not a good bet—but 

what we bet on was that this was like buying a new printer for 

your computer, and you are supposed to be able to plug it in, when 

you go home and, you know, the printer is supposed to work. 

When I do that half the time the printer doesn’t work. It is supposed to, but it doesn’t, and I have to go get the CD–ROM and 

cram it into place and I will eventually get it to work. That is one 

factor. 

The other is I think we miss the point sometimes that this is a 

network system, okay. That is very important. This is a network 

system. All of these towers are connected and what that means is 

that you have got, in the case of TUCSON–1, nine radars, nine infrared cameras, nine electrical optical cameras, all coming together 

into one pipeline, one communication pipeline. 

So there is the process you have to go to manipulate the data 

from those things to get them all to fit in that pipeline. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I understand that, but my point is that is basic 

technology. We do it here. We have all sorts of information systems 

here that if we move around just in this one building, just in this 

one hearing in the televising of it. This is not rocket science. And 

I don’t understand why we can’t do that networking along that border in a more effective way. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We can, and if we had started with the assumption of let us look at the requirement, let us look at what bandwidth we have and so forth and designed systems, we probably 

would have been okay, but we didn’t. 

We started with the assumption that we can plug these things 

together and it will fit. And once we did that we were in trouble 

because when it didn’t fit, we hadn’t started from that normal, natural beginning and now we had to make it fit. And so we started 

the wrong way in my opinion. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is true. 
37 

Mr. Stana, you used a figure of $6.7 billion a little while ago. 

What was that figure about? 

Mr. STANA. That is the total estimated cost of SBInet from fiscal 

years 2007 through 2014. And it is not a lifecycle. 

Mr. ROGERS. So that is what I was going to get at. Nobody knows 

how much this is going to cost. 

Mr. STANA. Well, nobody knows what it is going to look like, so 

how would they know what it costs? 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. And I am just amazed that we have spent over $3 billion already and we don’t have a system that works. It 

is just phenomenal to me. But last, I want to go to Chief and ask 

about something that I am interested in, blimps. 

You know, we use blimps for weather purposes. We use them in 

the military for aerial surveillance because they loiter. They can 

stay up for a very extended period of time. Do you currently use 

blimps along the border for aerial surveillance? And if so, how 

many and what kind of platforms do you use them for? 

Chief Aguilar. We do not currently use blimps. We have tested 

them in the past out in the field in Arizona specifically. We don’t 

have any now. We do fly some radar aerostats along the southwest 

border, but they are not surveillance blimps. 

One of the things that we are asking Mr. Borkowski, SBInet is 

specifically to capability. If he believes that a blimp is a proper 

platform, he will take a look at that. But our—and this is the good 

thing about the way that the relationship works between the border patrol, the SBInet program and whoever the contractor is going 

to be. 

We articulate requirements. This is what the Border Patrol 

needs from an operational perspective. They start doing the research and assessing what it is that can bring us that capability 

in the most efficient, effective and, of course, reasonable manner 

from a funding perspective. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I know that you all like the drone, but it is 

so expensive and the blimps are being used by the military now, 

by weather services. I would like to see you all look at that. One 

of my concerns all along about the video cameras on poles is they 

can be shot out, and it is just a fact, by the bad guys, and you don’t 

get the real high surveillance that allows you to look over into 

Mexico. 

So, but I will try to get a meeting with you, Mr. Borkowski, and 

talk about more about that later. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You are quite welcome, Mr. Rogers. 

I will now recognize Ms. Jackson Lee for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the chairwoman and ranking 

member for the hearing. The background of a number of my questions will be simply the conditions at the border that I think are 

well-known and have accelerated over the last year. 

The gun running, the explosive violence on the Mexican side of 

the border spilling over to the U.S. border and the interest of the 

American people about whether or not this violence can be contained and what elements we are using. 

Certainly, SBInet deals specifically with the issues of securing 

the border in ways that might capture the less endowed criminal 
38 

because there are other ways to promulgate the violence that is 

going on. Mr. Stana, if you would give me what you think is the 

major Achilles heel of this program, the major indictment of this 

program, if you would do that? 

And Chief Aguilar, would you give me a status of the lawsuits 

and the negotiations dealing with the fence? This is part fence, 

part virtual that is at the Texas border? And I would also like to 

understand why there was an extension of the Boeing contract and 

what is expected to be accomplished out of that extension. 

Mr. Stana, first of all? 

Mr. STANA. Okay, thank you. With a broad stroke, I would say 

getting something that works to spec has been the most difficult 

part of this program and Project 28 was accepted. It didn’t meet 

all the specifications, but it is within the right of the secretary to 

accept it and he did back in March 2008. It has been helpful but 

it has not worked to spec, and now we are seeing the same thing. 

I also would note that the spec for acceptance of Block 1 is now 

a 70 percent identification rate, so that means when you are talking about drug runners or bad criminals, it can be accepted if they 

can find seven out of 10 of them. And I hope that would come—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Three can really be explosive. 

Mr. STANA. I hope that that metric would come up because, you 

know figuring that three out of 10 are going to get by and you can 

still accept the program, as I understand that metric, seems to me 

a lower bar than maybe we want. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What about the training of the Border Patrol 

agents, their understanding, comprehension, comfort level with it? 

Mr. STANA. You know, they have been trained to use Project 28. 

They were trained on the mobile units and then there was delay 

getting the mobile units fielded and deployed. You know, I think 

the Border Patrol is doing what it can to train, but until this thing 

gets deployed, you really won’t have the—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But as Mr. Thompson asked the question 

about the agents who said they were uncomfortable or couldn’t get 

their hands around it. 

Mr. STANA. As we understand the Border Patrol agents were 

thoroughly familiar with MMS’ and Project 28 and the folks that 

our people talk with sort of dismissed that counterargument. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Aguilar, Chief Aguilar, if you want to 

comment and then add on the lawsuits, please? 

Chief Aguilar. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And then you might be able to—someone 

jump in on the contract being extended. 

Chief Aguilar. Right. I will ask Mr. Borkowski to speak to the 

contract extension, ma’am, and I will also ask him to fill in some 

of the gaps with—relative to the land condemnation, the lawsuits 

that are ongoing currently. 

As we speak, we have built about 92 miles of fence just in Texas, 

and I mention Texas because that is where most of the lawsuits are 

happening at. We intend to build 115 miles in total. So we have 

about 23 miles that are caught up in some kind of litigation or concerns having to do with IBWC and things of this nature. 

We are working through those lawsuits, through those condemnations, and we fully expect to either build a fence by the end 
39 

of this year or articulate a means by which to get the persistent 

impedance that we are looking to get in those areas where we cannot build a fence because of the ongoing lawsuit. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would like to pursue that with you, but if 

I could get the answer on the Boeing question and what results are 

we looking for at the end of this year? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, the Boeing contractor—obviously Boeing is 

in the process of building these things and testing them, so we 

needed to extend the contract to allow them to do that. And in fact, 

part of what is awkward about this contract is it has these independent task orders, and those task orders have periods that are 

not the same as the master contract. 

So we extended the contract to allow Boeing to continue the work 

that was contracted on the task orders because it is a task order 

contract extension, just provides us the flexibility to continue having Boeing continue the work that was already contracted and, if 

appropriate, do follow-on work. So that is the reason we have extended the contract. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. On my last seconds, I just think that we need 

to have a steadfast monitoring of the progress here. This is an ongoing saga of 10 years plus and our borders are screaming for the 

right kind of security, and America is screaming for the right kind 

of security. 

I look forward to some in-office briefings, and I thank you all 

very much and I yield back. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

And now I will recognize Ms. Miller, from Michigan for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MILLER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I certainly want to thank you for calling this hearing, and I want to 

thank the witnesses as well for their testimony and to the Chief 

and the Director. Certainly appreciate your service to our country, 

all of you, and what you are doing, which is not an easy job. 

And I am very interested in SBInet, and I actually want to talk 

a little about what my experience in my region in our sector has 

been on the northern border. And as always seems to happen, we 

always talk about the southern border, and believe me, I am not 

minimizing. I am very cognizant of all the problems we have on the 

southern border. 

But the northern border of our nation is twice as large, as long, 

and has some similar challenges as well as some unique dynamics 

as well. And a principal advocacy of mine of course is the northern 

border. 

And it was mentioned a little bit about some of what is happening in the Detroit Sector and the Buffalo Sector with SBInet. 

But let me just say that our experience is happening very quickly 

and generally quite positively in regards to SBInet. 

And I want to personally thank, if it is not inappropriate, Chief 

Gallegos, who is the Detroit Sector chief, and I know you guys 

move around in your business, but I hope you don’t—we don’t want 

to lose him. We really like him and he is doing a great job. 

And I will tell you, as we have rolled out SBInet in the northern 

sector—actually, principally in my district, of course we always 

have—in Michigan you have the map of your state on the end of 
40 

your hand here and we are having 11 surveillance cameras put up 

on the monopoles along this sector, as well as we have a mobile 

unit at Selfridge Air National Guard Base which is in the immediate geographic area, and it houses all different facets of the military, but the CBP has a large presence there. 

And the SBInet is complementing, under the CBP umbrella the 

Great Lakes Northern Border Wing for CBP which has air assets 

and water assets, additional personnel is there for a number of reasons, some of the unique dynamics. 

Not only do we have sort of an asymmetrical theater going on 

there with the Great Lakes, the long liquid border that we share 

with Canada, we have the two busiest border crossings on the 

northern tier are there. 

The busiest rail entry in the northern, the entire country actually, is there. And all of this is happening, and so we have a lot 

of the same kinds of things that are happening on the southern 

border. 

We are anticipating that we have the ground mission for UAV 

next year, 2010, there as well, again under the DHS CBP. And the 

interesting thing for me that has, and I just want to speak to this 

as a positive experience, is the rollout of all of these surveillance 

cameras. 

You can imagine how we were all very concerned about how the 

public would say, my gosh, big brother. All of a sudden you are putting these huge surveillance cameras in one of the busiest boating 

sectors, for example, in the entire world really. 

People are out there saying, what do you—you know I am out 

there having a beer. Are you going to be looking—or women be— 

whatever. There was a lot of public consternation about the rollout 

of this. 

And I will tell you, our Detroit Sector chief and CBP, how they 

rolled it out, they brought in all the affected stakeholders, our local 

law enforcement officers, the county, the sheriff, obviously the 

Coast Guard which is one of your critical partners, our Canadian 

counterpart, everybody, and most importantly, the public. 

And how the public has accepted this now as not an intrusion 

into their privacy but something that they are looking forward to, 

and I think the first thing with SBInet, the very first big bust that 

we have as a result of these cameras, will dissipate any public hesitation about it and how—what an important critical tool it is, an 

element for border security going forward. 

And I know I should ask a question, but I just want to make the 

committee aware of what is happening here and speak to this. And 

I was noticing that the chairman put up here—actually as we look 

at this, one of the other things that is happening, Mr. Chairman 

and members of the committee, as well, in our area is something 

called an Operation Integration Center along the northern border. 

Because we have, although in our case we have all the water and 

everything shown on here, all of these various cameras and various 

types of things, all of this data, you know you have to collect the 

data, right? Collect all the data, analyze the data, and then get it 

back out into the hands of the Border Patrol agents, the brave men 

and women who are tasked with protecting our border. 
41 

And CBP is putting an Operation Integration Center as well at 

the Great Lakes Northern Border Wing which will be a pilot program for the northern border of analyzing all of this data and utilizing it in an efficient manner. 

And I think that is one of the things that we learned from 9/11. 

That was one of their big recommendations. The ability—you have 

to move from the need to know to the need to share information 

amongst all of the agencies. 

And I know my time is running out here, but I just wanted to 

mention that—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Your time has actually run out. 

Ms. MILLER. My time has run out. I would invite the committee 

to come and take a look firsthand of what is happening on the 

northern border. And again, our experience is very positive. We are 

much looking forward to this in our area. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Ms. Miller, I would just like to acknowledge your 

continued efforts to talk about the northern border. I know from a 

political standpoint and what America worries about, they are always talking about the southern border, but the reality is we have 

three real borders. 

We have the southern border. We have the northern border, 

which is quite open as we still all know, and the resources and all 

don’t seem to get there, and we also have the maritime border. And 

in particular we were very worried about the Caribbean situation, 

drugs coming in and people smuggling, et cetera, which also doesn’t 

get as big a play. 

And we are hoping on this committee at some point this year or 

early next year to address both the Caribbean region and as well 

as the northern border, and I was just talking to our ranking member and we will try at some point, I hope, to make a trip up to the 

northern border. 

We did a few years ago when we went to Niagara, the Niagara— 

Buffalo area, but it definitely is overdue and as we know, the 

stronger we become on one side and some of the links we make 

them stronger then people go to the place where we are not paying 

as much attention or it is weak or—so we definitely have it on our 

list, and I thank you for that. 

Ms. MILLER. Thank you very much, Ms. Chairwoman. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Our next person will be Mr. Pascrell, of New Jersey for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, the fact 

is that our inability to find a border security solution that actually 

works makes it impossible for the Congress to enact real comprehensive immigration reform. That is the bottom line. 

And with all due respect, and I thank them for their service, 

Chief Aguilar, Mr. Borkowski and Mr. Stana and to many respects 

our friend from Boeing here, not the technology that is the problem. See, I don’t think the technology is the problem. It is our inability to articulate a coherent policy for practicing and protecting 

our borders. That is the problem. 

I don’t think they are the problem. We are the problem, and the 

administration is the problem before and now. So you can put more 

personnel—I mean we just discovered we had a northern border in 

the last 2 years. I thought that had disappeared, dematerialized. 
42 

But you can have more personnel, more walls and fences and more 

electronics and we are good at that stuff, you know, like to work 

with that. 

But we are not good at accomplishing what we set out to do and 

that is to have an overall plan and have a clear budget. This budget is certainly not clear to me. Maybe it is clear to all of you. 

So Chief Aguilar and Mr. Borkowski, I have a simple question 

on the actual results we have seen from the Secure Border Initiative. Since fiscal year 2005, SBI’s funding has amounted to over 

$3.7 billion. This year the Department of Homeland Security has 

requested $779 million in SBI funding for the fiscal year 2010. 

My question is what are the actual results on the border before 

and after we had put all this funding into technology on the border? And my second question, and I will have a third one, but my 

second question, just to be clear, how many more illegal crossings 

have we stopped in the years since we started SBI as compared to 

the years before? How many more drug seizures have we made? 

How many weapons have we stopped from going across the border because remember, Madam Chair, we weren’t even concerned 

about all the weapons that were going from the United States 

down into Mexico which are now killing our guys and gals—our 

guys and gals. We certainly don’t want to stop industry do we? So 

we want those weapons to continue to go over from all kinds of 

sources. Let us start with those two questions. 

Chief Aguilar. Let me begin with the statistics that you asked 

for, Congressman. The peak year for activity levels was fiscal year 

2000, the year of 9/11, 1.6 million apprehensions of illegal entries 

between the ports of entry. In addition to that, close to a million 

pounds of narcotics. As we speak we are going to end up this year 

with about 5–1/2 or 550,000 apprehensions, a decline of over 62 

percent. 

One of the reasons we have been able to do that—oh, and by the 

way, the narcotics apprehensions is about 2.5 million pounds, a tremendous increase. One of the reasons for that ability to increase 

the narcotics apprehensions, we could because our ability to focus 

on other threats such as narcotics. 

When we mitigate the illegal alien incursions we are able to 

focus our efforts on other threats. One of the reasons we have been 

able to do that is because of some of these expenditures of funds, 

some of these expenditures of funds. 

Within these $3.7 billion that you spoke about, we got capabilities to us such as the MSS that was spoken to earlier, mobile surveillance system, which gives us a standalone capability. It is a 

system standalone capability. It is not networked, but it gives us 

a tremendous amount of enhancement to our agents. 

Mr. PASCRELL. What about the interdictions of weapons going 

from the United States to Mexico? 

Chief Aguilar. We have actually increased our efforts as a department, CBP. Border Patrol is assisting—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. How many weapons have you confiscated? 

Chief Aguilar. I don’t have that number for you right now, sir, 

but I can get it for you. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Do you have any idea? 
43 

Chief Aguilar. I wouldn’t guess at this point, sir. I would rather 

not. I will get you the number. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Is that a priority? 

Chief Aguilar. It is a DHS and a CBP priority in which Border 

Patrol specifically assists, and this Congress has actually given the 

Border Patrol 44 specific positions for next year in order for us to 

continue assisting. But the main focus on southbound weapons is 

by our OFO counterparts at the ports of entry checking traffic 

southbound. But I—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. Could you get back to me and let the committee 

know how many weapons have been confiscated—— 

Chief Aguilar. Absolutely. 

Mr. PASCRELL. ——that are going from the United States into 

Mexico? 

Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. I would also take the opportunity, Congressman, to address something that I think is important because 

of the level of support that Congress has given to CBP, Border Patrol and DHS, but specifically CBP. Madam Chair, unfortunately I 

think we may have provided you with some wrong stats. 

The number of Border Patrol agents, and I am very pleased to 

put this forth, as of the 29th of August, was actually 20,000 agents, 

20,000 Border Patrol agents. We have grown tremendously. 

That along with the capability being given to us right now by 

Project 28, its evolution, its morphing, its development, its continued enhancements, is helping us tremendously. We still have a lot 

further to go and we are working very hard because of the recognition that we do need to secure this border as America has demanded. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Having a second round? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We will see. Thank you to the gentleman from 

New Jersey. 

When I began this hearing I spoke about metrics and trying to 

understand whether putting up a physical fence or putting up a 

virtual fence is really going to allow us to, if you will, take scarce 

resources and deploy them and use them better so that, in fact, we 

can bring down the apprehension, bring down the number of people 

coming across illegally, get the number of drugs that we need to. 

And Mr. Pascrell, I completely share your view that until we fix 

the immigration issue we will continue to have excess people, people trying to get into this country. That really clutters up what we 

are really trying to do which is to get really bad guys, get the drug 

dealers, get people who would harm this country. 

So unfortunately this is just one piece of that. This is the, you 

know, the piece of security, and I think it is fair to say that the 

people in the United States don’t believe that we have been doing 

a good job of securing our borders. And that is why this SBInet, 

that is why the resources that we are giving to Chief Aguilar and 

others, that is why the physical fence in places where it does work 

is so important for this cause. 

We need to have a level of confidence in the American public that 

in fact we can keep people out and we can also catch the bad guys. 

So I appreciate you bringing up the issue of how important the reform of immigration is. 
44 

I would like to at this point recognize a member who we gave 

unanimous consent to sit on this committee today, who sits on the 

full committee, actually is the chair of our oversight committee, 

and he and I have chaired many hearings together, in particular 

looking at the issues of border security, and that would be Mr. Carney for 5 minutes. 

Thanks for waiting around to get a chance to ask your questions. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, thank you for the gracious invitation to attend, Madam Chair, and I have several questions, probably more 

than 5 minutes worth, but we will not do—this is not the last time 

we will gather, I am sure, on the subject. 

Chief Aguilar, you mentioned earlier in your comments that you 

have sort of a three-legged stool, that—and it is all interdependent. 

You know, I think one of the legs, the technology leg, is a fairly 

wobbly leg. How are you compensating for that? 

Chief Aguilar. We are compensating for that wobbly leg by continuing to develop our capabilities within the technology realm. 

Going from standalone technology, for example, to a integrated system or a network of systems for technology is where we need to get 

to. 

In addition to that—— 

Mr. CARNEY. But I know what we need to get to but what are 

you doing now? 

Chief Aguilar. Well, as I said, that is part of the actual development that we are going through that Mr. Borkowski is doing on our 

behalf. Our responsibility as agents is to identify and articulate the 

requirements that we have. 

His responsibility is then to search out a means by which to fill 

that gap, that void that we have articulated as a need. We have 

technology. We have standalone technology. We are putting pieces 

together in a rudimentary fashion, but what we are working towards is that integrated network system that we are—that is what 

we are requiring. So it is a work in progress basically. 

Mr. CARNEY. Putting pieces together in a rudimentary fashion. 

Okay. Okay. 

Mr. Borkowski, I have got to compliment you on a comment you 

made sort of offhand, but it wasn’t lost on me, that P28 was not 

sold as advertised. I don’t know anybody on this committee who 

thought it was a prototype when they agreed to it, but now it is 

being sold as a prototype, as to somehow, you know, it is just somehow a bit of a slight of hand. And it just rankles me to hear that 

as a prototype. 

In any event, you said something that was interesting, that you 

purchased several printers over the course of your time and sometimes, you know, they work half of the time they work as advertised, half the time they don’t. You continued to buy those printer 

products that don’t work as advertised? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. You know it is interesting because we had this 

discussion at the department, and when I had this with senior 

leaders at the department they said, ‘‘Well, you know, that is why 

you buy a Mac.’’ 

But the issue that you have and the question that we always 

have is if you go to, you know, as an individual when I go to buy, 

a Mac costs about three times a P.C., and so I am going to make 
45 

a conscious decision about do I want to buy—pay the one-third and 

pay the pain of always cramming in the printer, or am I going to 

pay three times and have the high confidence in the thing, and 

that is exactly the situation we are in. 

And typically in the government we go with the one-third cost. 

And I am not saying that was necessarily a bad decision. You 

know, I am not—you could make that argument either way, but 

that is essentially what happened to us. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Peters, I think you are probably in maybe a 

better position than your two predecessors, but we asked the question a year-and-a-half ago, maybe 2 years ago now, of one of your 

predecessors of what happened? 

And they said, ‘‘Well, we didn’t have the A team in the contract.’’ 

I mean, that was their answer. ‘‘We didn’t have the A team on 

there.’’ I am not sure how far down the alphabet they were, but I 

want to believe that you are the A team and that you are going 

to do this well. 

We want to be able to believe you, but you have to understand, 

in the context of what has happened in the past, it is tough for this 

committee and certainly my subcommittee to believe your words 

until we see results. And results are going to be absolutely essential and, you know, the trials coming up here in the next couple 

of months we are going to be paying very close attention. 

In fact, it wouldn’t surprise me if we get a request from this committee and my subcommittee to observe them, to be on the ground, 

you know, when they are going on because we are paying that close 

attention. 

Mr. Stana, the last question is for you and it is a yes or no answer actually. I know it is hard in government, but has the American taxpayer so far gotten what they paid for? 

Mr. STANA. No. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. No further questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Pennsylvania? Pennsylvania. Okay, I want to go back to the original, one of the original things I said, metrics. So one of the discussions, Chief Aguilar, you and I have had over time is we have now 

given you 20,000 positions. 

You have done a great job in finding people, trying to train them, 

bringing them along and building a culture that is really about getting the bad guys but, you know, most of the people who cross the 

border really have a reason to be crossing and making sure that 

people feel confident about that. 

My question to you is because we had this discussion, if we get 

SBInet working and if we put up the physical fence in places as 

we have, is that going to create more work in a sense for your 

workforce where you will need more people? 

Or is that going to make it a necessity not to have the 20,000 

agents that you currently have because the last time we discussed 

this I believe you said something to the effect, ‘‘I don’t really know 

if my workforce will decline or whether we will just be catching so 

many more people that I am actually going to need more people to 

get them, more people to detain them, more people to put them 

through the process.’’ 
46 

So what is the magic—do you think now and what is the metric? 

How are we going to judge whether we are just making so much 

busywork in a sense for us and really not using the scarce resources of the American people to still go after the bad guys? 

The terrorists, the person who means to, you know, bring in 

chemical weapons, which is really, I think, when we look at homeland security, our biggest desire is to really get the bad guys before 

something happens on our soil. 

Chief Aguilar. Yes, ma’am, and we have spoken about this before 

and thank you for asking the question because I think it is important that at every opportunity we speak to this. First of all, I think 

it is important that we recognize that the efforts that are ongoing 

are to secure our borders. Each one of our borders—you articulated 

three of them and I agree there are three versions of our borders— 

requires a different enforcement model. 

The purpose of the application of the enforcement model is to basically, on the southern border for example, is to mitigate the high 

level of cross border illegal traffic that is occurring because of the 

potential for exploitation of that high traffic by not only narcotics 

traffickers, illegal aliens, but especially the terrorists that are still 

looking to come into this country. 

So applying the right enforcement model comprised of the right 

type of technology, the right level of technology, the right numbers 

of personnel, and the tactical infrastructure is critical. The metrics 

that correlate to that is how do we measure that mitigation of cross 

border activity? 

There are several ways that we use. Third party indicators, what 

happens to activity that is associated with a high level of cross border activity? We see in San Diego, for example, we use to see a lot 

of stolen vehicles, people getting run over on the major highways. 

We used to see a lot of rapes, murders on the immediate border. 

We used to see stash houses. We used to see staging on the Mexican side, social costs because of hospitals and things of this nature 

having to basically cater to this illegal traffic that was occurring. 

We measure all of those to gauge what is happening overall from 

a global perspective as it relates to a specific area of the border. 

So we take all of those things into account. Some of the things we 

take into account—assaults against our officers. 

We know for a fact that when we are going into an area of operation to gain control, assaults against our officers are going to escalate. They are going to go up. We fully expect that. We train, organize and equip our officers in order to be responsive to that. 

So we take a look at all these metrics looking for the outcome 

of securing our border. On our northern border, I won’t go into a 

lot of detail, but on the northern border we have an absolute need 

to increase our situational awareness of just what is happening, as 

Ms. Miller said. 

That we at this point, frankly, there are some points on the 

northern border where we just don’t know what we don’t know because we are not out there to the degree that we need to be. 

So what are the metrics? It is intelligence. It is working with 

CBSA. It is working with RCMP, working with our IBIS units, our 

ICE partners, FBI, DEA, interlocking all the intelligence that we 
47 

have, getting greater fidelity on that northern border. So those are 

the metrics that we are looking at. 

Now, as we move forward one of the complexities that we are 

faced with is that we are dealing with the obvious—human criminal aspect. For everything, for every action that we take they are 

going to react. 

Whether it is because they are wanting to come into this country 

to make a better life or to destroy our way of life, or whether they 

are looking to come into this country to bring in their narcotics 

loads. There are certain draws into this country. So that human aspect we have to take into account. We actually play for that displacement. 

It is going to move until we are at a point where we have secured 

our entire southwest border. As we speak, in California on the Pacific side yet—2 days ago we had two loads of aliens that went out 

20 miles into the Pacific and then went north 39 miles and then 

landed. The reason for that is they can’t get past us along the land 

borders in San Diego. That is actually a measure of success. 

Coast Guard is involved with us right now so that we take that 

avenue away from them also. So those are the things that we are 

tracking. Those are the metrics and that is the way that we preplan where it is that we are going. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chief. 

Mr. Souder, do you have a couple more questions for, sir? 

Mr. SOUDER. Yes. I wanted to make a couple of comments and 

a fundamental question. Mr. Pascrell and others have talked some 

about the north border. As somebody who worked narcotics issues 

for many issues, as well as that evolved into terrorism and did a 

border report after a series of hearings prior to 9/11, and have 

worked with Chief Aguilar for many years, let me say that I have 

visited every state on the north border, have held joint hearings 

with the Canadians on the north border when I was chair over in 

the Government Reform and Oversight and before the creation of 

this committee. 

And the problems that we have are common. It is people and 

contraband. The contraband can be narcotics. The contraband can 

be chemical weapons. It can be nuclear and it is a constant challenge. The people can be coming for work. They can be coming for 

terrorism. They can be coming for a variety of reasons, and the 

problem is that if any can get through, which is almost impossible 

to stop, then any could be the one carrying the nuclear weapon. 

And the challenge is how you get zero tolerance when you have 

these huge borders and that obviously requires intel, which is critical, and then it requires every strategy. Part of the job of Mr. 

Stana and your whole agency is to be a pain in the neck and to 

try to hold the agencies accountable. That you obviously don’t have 

all the information, but it provides an independent check and we 

need to hear that constantly. 

I don’t know whether or not this program ultimately will be justified in cost. Quite frankly I was one of the early skeptics because 

I felt this was an excuse to avoid building a real fence and dealing 

with it and it was too massive of approach rather than a building 

block approach, and if you did 28 miles, when you have as long a 
48 

border as we are and put this much money in 28 miles it wasn’t 

going to be workable. 

I don’t agree with the statement that some of us didn’t raise that 

question in the very beginning. We had questions as to what the 

deal was with this. The prototype was an ideal structure that in 

the military world would have been incredibly expensive. In this 

world we didn’t have the dollars to do it. 

You can see certain advantages with the UAVs going up. You can 

see where the gun is. Our agents that have been killed in California, had they had technology to tell them that there were three 

guys there with a gun he wouldn’t have been assassinated. 

If you can see at Organ Pipe where a park ranger was killed, if 

we would have had information that would have been able to get 

down to them there they would have been able to see where his 

gun was. They would have been able to see where the drugs were. 

That is incredibly expensive, and the question is what can we do 

that is reasonable, that is workable on both borders to add technology to the people and to the other methods that we use? 

And because they are always going to change. Chief Aguilar definitely made a terrific point in that is what we deal in narcotics all 

the time. The degree you push them out more you increase their 

expense. You have reduced the numbers. You have more chances 

that they will trip up, more chances that you will see them, and 

the whole reality here is, is that we are never going to reach 100 

percent. 

But the degree we make it harder, the more likely are that you 

are going to catch them and we are much more aware than we 

were on 9/11. 

Now, my fundamental question is that there were some signs 

that you are going to look at SBInet in January and see whether 

it would proceed. And at some point if we are going to do the whole 

border, particularly if we are doing the north, too. Congress still 

hasn’t seen a—what the range of the cost of this project is. 

The only way we can do that is to take, okay, here is what we 

did for 28 miles. Now we are doing that with TUCSON–1. Are we 

going to extrapolate that? What percent of that do you extrapolate? 

Then you wind up with these huge figures that scare Congress 

off. Ultimately we need some sort of ‘‘effective control’’ of the border. Do you see yourself evolving towards another strategy? A faster strategy, a more of a building block strategy, what do you see 

Mr. Borkowski? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We see ourselves as going to a building block 

strategy. So what we have at this point is we have a plan that if 

it is appropriate that talks about covering the whole border. And 

we need to be prepared to execute that plan. But like you, we don’t 

have all the data we need to convince ourselves that that is the 

right plan. 

It may make more sense to be a little more selective about where 

we put this. So for example, one of these areas of responsibilities 

covers about 20 to 40 miles of border. That is roughly the range. 

And it costs us, loosely speaking, about $50 million to cover that, 

you know, to put it in. Now, there is the operation cost. 

So you can start to see that as we figure out what the effectiveness of this is, compared to other lower costs or other types of tech-
49 

nology, which is the reason I am having these 3 to 6 hours of meetings every week, to collect those other technologies. We will gain 

some experience here and then the department is going to be in a 

position to say, okay, we are prepared. 

We are prepared to cover the whole border, but before we do that 

let us take some of this experience and say is that really the most 

cost effective way to mix infrastructure, technology and personnel 

in all parts of the border? 

So our strategy has been be prepared to do it. Get to the point 

where you are prepared to do it as quickly as told, but also make 

sure as you do it you have incremental steps where you can check. 

And we can have this discussion about how much is the right 

amount in each part of the borders so then we are—— 

Mr. SOUDER. And then it is important for anybody who is watching this hearing or reviews the record of this hearing, to understand that while we are focused on this sector of Arizona which 

continues to have, plus Douglas, the most intense pressure, although we don’t know what we don’t know. 

The fact is that your agency isn’t just focusing on this area because we talked just beforehand about what is being done at Big 

Bend and Amistad in Texas. Congresswoman Candice Miller just 

talked about selfridge. You are working the whole border. It is just 

this is the most intense area because it is the most tense area of 

conflict and numbers. I yield back. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And I might remind my ranking member that the 

border is much more than just the land border also. There is a reason why we are called the Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee. Engages quite a bit. 

Mr. Pascrell, do you have a question or two? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

I want to ask Mr. Stana about standards. I know that Homeland 

Security keeps on changing the goal. It makes it more difficult for 

them to do, and the other folks, to do what they have to do. 

It is my understanding that at various times when it has become 

apparent that the SBInet would not be able to meet established 

performance criteria, that the department has simply lowered its 

standards rather than fixing the problems with the system. 

At one point there were nine such criteria, and we talked about 

this a few years ago. Now there are three. At one point the system 

was supposed to identify and classify 85 percent of the entries. 

Now it is only 70 percent. So Mr. Stana, what can you tell us about 

the performance criteria for both Project 28 and TUCSON–1? How 

do they compare and are we grading on a curve? 

Mr. STANA. With respect to Project 28 the criteria there was 95 

percent plus or minus 5 percent, so that was much higher. For 

Block 1 I believe the objective is 85 percent, but the threshold for 

acceptability is 70 percent. I would hope that over time that bar 

would go up a little bit. That seems a little bit low. 

I think, you know, 2010 is going to be a crucial year with these 

operational tests, and if the technology turns out to work and, you 

know, with a few tweaks or right out of the gate that is great. We 

all hope it works. 

If it doesn’t then perhaps the department needs to think about 

a plan B because this is the second prototype in essence after 
50 

Project 28 and if it this doesn’t work with appropriate metrics, then 

what? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, let me ask you this question. I mean you 

anticipate it. You have looked at this and you have overseen the 

situation for quite some time now. You have witnessed the changes 

I have talked about, the goals changing. What is the main problem 

here? Since we are not satisfied here—it is quite obvious—both 

sides of the aisle as to what is happening down there? 

And then it is not any way a reflection on the hard work that 

the chief does and the other folks have done. But we are not getting it done. And while that is not getting done we are not responding to the major problem of immigration. 

In fact, the economy of America has more to do with the immigration than any of our brilliant ideas here about how we are going 

to make sure we know who comes into this country from wherever 

they are coming, north, south or, you know, from planets. It doesn’t 

matter. What is your analysis? 

Mr. STANA. Well, I would put it this way. This is a very difficult 

thing to do. We can talk about hooking up printers and I think 

that—and I understand that he is trying to use a metaphor here, 

but it almost simplifies the task at hand, and maybe we are still 

having an expectation gap here. Is the technology really ready to 

do what we have contracted for it to do? That is one thing. 

The second this is is that I think in setting contracts that talk 

about the whole northern and southern border in 3 years and, you 

know, now we are—it seems like every time we have one of these 

hearings everything is going to be fixed and we are disappointed. 

Maybe it is just—is time to really think about whether this is the 

way to go? Are cameras really of sufficient rigor and technology to 

get the 10-mile range that maybe the Border Patrol might like? Are 

the radars really able to deal with the winds that you have to expect down in Arizona? Or is there another plan? 

I know the Border Patrol likes MSS’ as sort of a stopgap for 

small areas and they have their problems, too. But in thinking 

about this, and it is a good question, maybe the grand plan is 

something that isn’t achievable right now given the current state 

of technology, and maybe, depending on what happens in 2010, it 

might be time to think about other options. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I want to thank you for your honesty, and I ask 

this question to you because I respect your acumen in this area. 

Perhaps maybe we ought to get the immigration policy first before 

we deal with the border situation because wouldn’t—if we had a robust immigration policy that we can come together, both sides, that 

would certainly affect the traffic on any of our borders. 

And it might simply save us a lot of money, and doing what we 

are doing is not succeeding, not to the extent that we want it to. 

I am very concerned of putting our men and women in jeopardy if 

we are not clear about the policy in the first place, and I would 

suggest that we are not. I will stand corrected if I am wrong. 

And I have seen too many valleys in this thing and not enough 

peaks, and I am concerned. We have been here together, whether 

we were before when we were a select-committee before we were 

even a committee, you know, I have been here trying to do it to 

the best of my ability, to be in—to be something hopefully positive. 
51 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I think we are headed in the wrong direction. 

That is my opinion. I don’t know. I am not going to ask you whether you agree or disagree, but—— 

Mr. STANA. Well, I am not a policymaker, Mr. Pascrell. I just try 

to provide information and analysis. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The gentleman’s time has expired anyway so we 

will lose that. 

Mr. SOUDER. I want to say—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Go ahead, Mr. Souder, just a comment. 

Mr. SOUDER. I would like to say something that the other members can’t really say. The republican administration overpromised 

the ability of technology to do this, and we would appreciate that 

the new administration doesn’t overstate it. Come in with realistic 

goals, realistic budgets and that we will try and address it from 

there. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And I think overall what you are hearing from this 

committee is that we are very concerned about securing the border, 

and I think we have worked in a very bipartisan manner to attempt to do that and keep the politics out of this, although as Mr. 

Souder and I were just discussing, there are always politics involved whether it is immigration policy or the border, et cetera. 

I have one more question for you because as the chairwoman of 

this subcommittee in particular, again, one that is titled Border, 

Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, as you probably hear—and 

I hear this over and over and we talk to our membership. 

Some of us have made some trips to some of the areas. There are 

more areas to be secured. We were talking about the Colombia 

drug issue. 

Chief Aguilar, you spoke about how people are avoiding the land 

now and they are going around and coming through the ocean. We 

have a real open area as far as the Caribbean arena, and so there 

has been a lot of bantering around, especially at some of my members about the fact that they go and they travel and they take a 

look at these things. 

I want to ask both Mr. Stana and Chief Aguilar, do you think 

it has been worthwhile for the members to come out and actually 

take a look at, for example, SBInet, to go over and talk to the 

Mexican officials about border violence that is happening? 

Do you think we should be going to the northern border? Do 

you—just what is happening and talking to the Coast Guard and 

what is going on, for example, in the Pacific or the Caribbean? 

Do you think that is worthwhile or do you think we should just 

take Mr. Stana’s and your word for what is happening out there? 

Chief Aguilar. You should not take our word for it. I would absolutely recommend that you continue going out to the field. And it 

is a very complex matter that we are handling. It is in requirement 

of a comprehensive approach and the enforcement model that I 

spoke to earlier is very specific to each one of those borders and 

even within those borders within specific areas it needs to be literally designed for the area we are focusing on. 
52 

I would absolutely love to have you and the rest of the committee 

members out there. I think it is critical that you get a look at it 

firsthand. Absolutely yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Stana, how do you feel about that? 

Mr. STANA. Yes. Well, I would like you to take my word for 

things, but I think it is absolutely essential. I get down there three 

or four times a year and the Border Patrol and Air and Marine are 

good enough to take us around and, you know, up in the helicopter. 

There is no substitute for seeing it firsthand, seeing what works, 

what doesn’t work, what the challenges are. 

It sounds awfully simplistic sometimes to say well, you put this 

camera and this radar together and a COP and everything is going 

to get—it is difficult. The terrain is difficult. The challenges are 

there, and I think getting down there is one way to gather a firsthand appreciation for the difficulty of this task. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I appreciate your comments, and I just want to remind all of you and in particular Mr. Peters, you didn’t have too 

many questions—representing Boeing there. I just wanted to let 

you know this is not about a witch hunt. 

This is about trying to figure out how we make a system work 

because the American people have not only tasked with spending 

the money to do so, but we have such broad issues out there that 

affect so many people on a day-to-day basis. 

That if we can’t get this under control, if we can’t work together 

and we can’t figure it out, you know, it is very difficult to work on 

some of these and have the confidence to work on some of these 

other issues that are out there. 

So I want to thank all of you for being before us today, for your 

valuable testimony. I want to thank the members for having attended so well, and members of the subcommittee may have some 

additional questions for you. We will put them in writing. We hope 

you will get them back to us as quickly as possible. 

And hearing no further business, this subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(53) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN LORETTA SANCHEZ FOR DAVID AGUILAR AND MARK

BORKOWSKI

Question 1a. The Committee understands that recently constructed border fencing 

is already in need of repair in many places along the border. The Government and 

Accountability Office (GAO) noted that each breach in the fence costs on average 

$1,300 to repair. Moreover, GAO reports that the overall 20-year life-cycle cost for 

the fence is estimated to be $6.5 billion. 

What is the total cost of repairs for border fencing already constructed? 

Answer. Since March of 2008, CBP has expensed $7,509,688 for contracts on fence 

maintenance for the El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, Laredo and El Paso Sectors. 

Question 1b. What is the current status of procuring maintenance services for the 

border fence? 

Answer. Short term maintenance contracts are currently in place for the Yuma, 

Tucson, Laredo, and El Paso Sectors. Additional short term maintenance contracts 

for the San Diego, El Centro, Marfa, Del Rio and Rio Grande Valley Sectors are 

scheduled to be awarded during first quarter of fiscal year 2010. These contracts 

will be in place until the long term ‘‘Comprehensive TI Maintenance and Repair’’ 

(CTIMR) contracts are awarded. 

Question 1c. Please describe CBP’s long-term strategy for fence maintenance. 

Answer. The long term strategy for fence maintenance is to be provided through 

the ‘‘Comprehensive TI Maintenance and Repair’’ (CTIMR) contracts covering all 

nine Sectors. The strategy is for CBP to set aside two of the four contracts to small 

businesses and the remaining two to full and open competition. The first CTIMR 

Request for Proposal is currently under development, with contract awards scheduled for fiscal year 2010. 

Question 2. Last year, CBP reprogrammed approximately $400 million from unobligated SBInet funds, along with funding from other Department accounts, in an effort to complete construction of border fencing by the end of 2008. How did the reprogramming of funds affect the schedule and deployment of SBInet? 

Answer. The funding that was redirected from SBInet to the Tactical Infrastructure program last year effectively eliminated the potential to complete SBInet deployments in Arizona by the end of 2011. However, even with the full funding, meeting this SBInet deployment schedule would have been high risk due to technical and 

management challenges. When CBP re-planned the SBInet deployments within 

available funding, we were able to step back, make trade-offs between risk and 

schedule, and provide enhanced testing and engineering rigor before we resumed deployment. 

Question 3. According to a recent GAO Report (GAO–09–896), CBP has not systematically evaluated the impact of tactical infrastructure on the border. This finding is very troubling considering the $2.4 billion investment that American taxpayers have made in this infrastructure. 

Considering all the funding that Congress has provided for fencing and the $400 

million in reprogramming that CBP directed last year for fencing, why hasn’t CBP 

completed this type of study? 

While apprehensions have generally decreased along the southwest border, how 

do you account for the rise in apprehensions in the San Diego sector, where fencing 

has been present for some time? 

Answer. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border 

Fencing Has Not Been Assessed (GAO–09–896) recommended that Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of the tactical infrastructure’s contribution to border security. CBP concurred that this study 

would be beneficial and has since committed to completing this study by the end 

of calendar year 2011. 
54 

The Office of Border Patrol (OBP) recently met with a representative from the 

DHS Center of Excellence for Border Security and Immigration (co-located at the 

University of Arizona at Tucson and the University of Texas at El Paso) and discussed CBP’s need to analyze the impacts of tactical infrastructure on border security. The Center of Excellence, established through the DHS Science & Technology 

Directorate, has an open task order with the Department of Homeland Security. 

OBP is currently developing its Fiscal–Year (FY) 2010 spend plan for allocation of 

the necessary funding to facilitate the study and ensure its completion by the end 

of calendar year 2011. 

Border security cannot be achieved through fencing alone; rather, it requires the 

appropriate combination of tactical infrastructure, personnel, and technology. Nevertheless, immediate and continuous access to the border is a critical component to 

achieving control of the border. Tactical infrastructure provides access to the border, 

as well as additional time to respond to an illegal entry by deterring or slowing the 

criminal element’s ability to easily cross the border and escape. 

The Secure Border Initiative has deployed an additional 24.6 miles of fencing in 

the San Diego Sector (SDC) since fiscal year 2007. Most of these projects were completed at the end of calendar year 2008. 

Apprehension Data: • fiscal year 2006 Apprehensions 142,108 • fiscal year 2007 Apprehensions 152,460 • fiscal year 2008 Apprehensions 162,347 • fiscal year 2009 Apprehensions 118,705 • Apprehensions for SDC were down 27 percent when compared to fiscal year 

2009—fiscal year 2008 respectively 

Border Security: • Effective Operational Control 

• SDC currently has 50 percent of the Area of Responsibility under Operational Control (30 Miles), 10 of which have been achieved in the past three 

years • Secure and Safe Border 

• Reduced volume of activity 

• Reduction in drive throughs 

• Displacement of activity to the coastline 

• Quality of life has increased as evident by the vitality of the San Ysidro and 

Otay Mesa communities / businesses 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN LORETTA SANCHEZ FOR TIMOTHY E. PETERS

Question 1. In your testimony you referred to Project 28 as a ‘‘prototype.’’ This 

Committee went to great lengths trying to determine exactly what the Border Patrol 

was receiving with Project 28: a ‘‘prototype,‘‘a ‘‘test bed,’’ or an ‘‘operational tool.’’ 

Every term means something different and raises certain expectations. Can you 

state for the record what the Border Patrol will be receiving in Tucson 1? 

Answer. Project 28 (P28) was a prototype, requested by the department in the Request for Proposal to create a segment of the offeror’s concept of operations to ‘‘demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed overall solution’’ (Section M, Factor 7, p. 100 

of the SBInet RFP). 

Tucson 1 (TUS1) is the first deployment of an operational segment using the 

Block 1 SBInet configuration. It will cover approximately 23 miles of border and 

consist of nine sensor towers, eight communications towers (four new and four upgraded existing towers), a new common operating picture (COP) software package, 

a command and control facility, and associated warranties. 

Question 2. According to the Government Accountability Office, Project 28 technology currently in place is of limited use to Border Patrol agents because they are 

forced to work around shortcomings with the wireless network, camera controls, and 

radar. What would you tell agents in the field who are waiting for Tucson-1 to be 

deployed with the expectation that it will offer them more operational utility than 

its predecessor? 

Answer. As Chief of the Border Patrol David Aguilar testified to Congress on September 17, 2009, P28 is operational and provides effective support to our operations. 

As part of the Project 28 prototype, Boeing provided 50 Mobile Display Terminals 

(MDTs) in vehicles to demonstrate the feasibility of providing Common Operational 

Picture (COP) like capability to vehicles in the field. This capability, which utilizes 

wireless network technology, requires the vehicle to be within range of a P28 tower 

with unrestricted line of sight. The rough terrain in the P28 area created problems 

for this type of communication design and it did not provide reliable connectivity 

for the agents. As a result, the MDT was not included in the Block 1 design. In 
55 

order to understand the feasibility of the use of MDTs, a CBP chaired communications working group was created to study the future communications architecture 

options. Boeing has subsequently developed MDT software which leverages commercial infrastructure and is ready to proceed once the communications working group 

determines which wireless network architecture it wants to adopt. This capability 

will be available for use in deployments beyond Block 1. 

One of the early trades done on the Project 28 prototype was to determine the 

type of communication system used to transmit data between the towers and headquarters. The trade study recommended the use of satellite communications which 

avoided the lengthy process of getting frequency allocations needed for the microwave line of sight concept as well as cost and schedule for erecting repeater towers. 

The use of satellite communications included an inherent latency in the response 

time between command input from the user and response of the sensor in the field. 

This was particularly noticeable in the camera control. The system being deployed 

utilizes microwave line of sight and, where possible, fiber optic communication links. 

The use of microwave line of sight technology significantly reduces the response 

time of the sensor to the Border Patrol agent’s input, and therefore, significantly 

improves the camera control performance. 

The radar integration on Project 28 the default command set provided by the 

radar manufacturer for integration into the COP. During integration testing it became apparent that additional command settings for ‘‘tuning‘‘the radar would be 

needed to address different weather conditions. Block 1 has integrated the full radar 

command set to the COP, and currently, has provided four ‘‘user selectable’’ weather 

settings for the operator. 

The Boeing Team has been in active communication and collaboration with the 

Border Patrol since 2007 to provide a system that meets their needs. The Block 1 

configuration is the result of this input from the user in both formal and informal 

communications as well as a detailed, formal requirements definition process. The 

system, which will go through Systems Acceptance Test, will meet or exceed the requirements established for it in the contract and will have the look and feel determined by the Border Agents involved in its development. 

Question 3. One factor that likely contributed to the flaws with Project 28 was 

insufficient component testing prior to deploying the system into the field. The Committee understands that the Boeing testing facility in New Mexico was built to resolve many of these testing issues. In addition to the testing facility, what is Boeing 

doing differently this time to ensure that problems with Tucson-1 are identified and 

rectified in a timely manner? 

Answer. The processes used for P28 and for the SBInet Block 1 system are significantly different. The P28 concept was developed by the Boeing Team during the proposal preparation period and involved only limited interaction with the customer as 

set out in the RFP. The RFP required bidders to propose a task order to build ‘‘one 

or more modules’’ (Section L–12, Subpart A.5, p. 88 of the SBInet RFP) of their proposed concept of operations that could be constructed in eight months time for a 

fixed price of $20 million. To meet this objective the Boeing Team used a ‘‘Prototype’’ approach to develop, integrate, and test the P28 system. The competition also 

provided that the government could award this task order to the winning bidder, 

‘‘without negotiations or discussions,’’ which they exercised. Subsequent to the 

award, discussions with the Border Patrol were restricted by policy that was in 

place at the time. 

Development of the Block 1 system including the TUS1 deployment is being run 

as a standard development contract under the FAR. This includes a formal requirements definition process, trade studies, extensive testing of hardware and software 

at all levels, milestones reviews, etc. The Boeing Team has established a number 

of facilities to test system components, subsystems, and systems in a laboratory environment and in an environment representative of its deployment. Boeing built a 

Mission Analysis and Assessment Lab and a Rapid Application Development1 Joint 

Application Development (RAD/JAD) Lab, both in Arlington, Virginia. These labs 

enabled us to incorporate Border Patrol Agent inputs in both the geographic 

laydown of the system and as features in the design of the Common Operational 

Picture (COP). In addition we set up a System Integration Lab in Huntsville, Alabama, and a full system test facility in Playas, New Mexico to ensure component 

and systems tests were conducted in a controlled and geographically representative 

environment. While the situation and schedule of P28 did not accommodate component testing, the program now has the time and the facilities to thoroughly test the 

system at all levels. Likewise, the interaction with the users, which was severely 

limited in P28, is robust and healthy in the Block 1 development. All of this ensures 

that problems are identified early and addressed in a timely manner. 
56 

1GAO, Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance 

Technology Program, GAO–06–295 (Washington, D.C.: Fed. 22, 2006). 2GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key 

Technology Investment, GAO–08–1086 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2008). 3DHS–OIG, Better Oversight Needed of Support Services Contractors in Secure Border Initiative Programs, OIG–09–80 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 17, 2009). 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN LORETTA SANCHEZ FOR RICHARD STANA

Question 1a. In the past, GAO has discussed a number of reasons SBInet was at 

risk of failing to meet user needs and operational requirements or performing as intended. These reasons included ambiguous schedules, lack of clear definitions and 

baselines, ineffective testing, and poor management. Many of these same problems 

also affected earlier technology programs such as the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System and the American Shield Initiative. 

What parallels, if any, do you see between SBInet and the Department’s previous 

failed border security technology programs? 

Answer. There are some parallels between SBInet and previous border security 

technology programs. In February 2006, we reported that the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS)—a system composed of sensors, databases, and 

cameras—was subsumed into the American Shield Initiative (ASI).1 The goals of 

ASI were to address ISIS capability limitations and support the Department of 

Homeland Security’s antiterrorism mission. We reviewed the ASI program and 

found, among other things, that the program had not established the people and 

process capabilities required for effective program management. While the program 

had defined and begun implementing a plan to manage program risks, it had not 

yet defined key acquisition management processes, such as effective project planning, and contract tracking and oversight. As a result, the program risked repeating 

the inadequate contract management oversight that led to a number of problems in 

deploying, and operating and maintaining the ISIS technology. At that time, DHS 

had decided to reevaluate ASI within DHS’s broader border interior enforcement 

strategy, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). In September 2008, we reported that 

DHS needed to address significant risks in delivering SBInet, including program 

planning issues.2 For example, we reported that ineffectively defined and managed 

SBInet requirements and ineffective management of testing activities increased the 

risk of SBInet not meeting mission needs and performing as intended, as well as 

the chances of expensive and time-consuming system rework. Furthermore, in June 

2009, the DHS Inspector General reported that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had not established adequate controls and effective oversight of contract workers responsible for providing SBI program support services.3 Furthermore, 

the DHS IG reported that CBP had not provided an adequate number of contracting 

officer’s technical representatives to oversee support services contractor’s performance. As a result, contractors were performing functions that should be performed 

by government workers. 

Question 1b. Given all your findings, do you believe that the DHS-Boeing partnership will produce an effective technological solution to secure the border within the 

next year? 

Answer. At this point, it is hard to tell whether DHS and Boeing will produce an 

operational SBInet technological solution, with an initial deployment, to secure the 

border within the next year. In February 2009, preliminary results of testing revealed problems that would limit the usefulness of the system for Border Patrol 

agents, including the instability of the camera under adverse weather conditions, 

mechanical problems with the radar at the tower and issues with the sensitivity of 

the radar. The SBI program office oversaw Boeing’s efforts to rework and retest 

these issues, but as of May 2009, the SBI program office reported that they were 

still working to address some issues, such as difficulties aligning the radar. Initial 

user assessments conducted by Border Patrol officers comparing the performance capabilities of existing technology and new technology testing also showed potential 

issues with cameras and radar as compared with existing technology. Testing of the 

system has continued as DHS and Boeing move toward final acceptance, at which 

point the government takes ownership of the system. Following final acceptance, 

scheduled for January 2010 for Tuscon-91 and June 2010 for Ajo–1, the Border Patrol will conduct operational testing to determine how the system works while in 

use. Until this operational testing gets underway and its results become known, it 

will be difficult to know whether or not the SBInet solution will meet Border Patrol’s needs. 

Question 2a. We understand that Boeing and the SBInet program office have 

begun to incorporate the independent validations of the Army Test and Evaluation 

Team into their testing and product assessments. 
57 

How valuable are these independent validations for the SBInet program? 

Question 2b. Given the concerns you have raised about SBInet over the years, do 

you believe there should be a larger role for these independent assessments? 

Answer. While GAO has not conducted a review of the value of the Army Test 

and Evaluation Team’s independent validations for the SBInet program, independent validations are generally very useful, as recognized by DHS itself in its acquisition guidebook. Such validations should provide objective and unbiased conclusions regarding the system’s operational effectiveness and suitability from a source 

other than the program office, user representative, or vendor who might have an 

interest in presenting a more positive picture of the system’s capabilities. 

Question 3. In your recent report on SBI (GAO–09–896), you point out that CBP 

has procured 40 Mobile Surveillance System (MSS) units to fill the gaps or augment 

existing border security technology, until a more comprehensive system can be deployed under SBInet. It is the Committee’s understanding that while these MSS 

units aren’t without their own limitations, they have radar and camera capabilities 

that meet or exceed those offered by Project 28 or Tucson-I. Given the amount of 

time and money that has been spent trying to deploy an operational SBInet system, 

does it make sense to look at MSS units or other technologies that might be of use 

to the Border Patrol? 

Answer. Until SBInet capabilities are deployed across the southwest border, Border Patrol agents are using existing capabilities, supplemented by more recently 

procured MSS units, but these do have limitations and are not a substitute for 

newer technology. As we reported in September 2009, Border Patrol officials said 

that the MSS units represent increased operational capabilities for the Border Patrol. In addition, in a user assessment, Border Patrol agents noted that the features 

of the camera to be deployed in Tucson–1 were insufficient in comparison to features 

of the Project 28 and MSS camera. However, MSS units are not connected to a Common Operating Picture and, thus, require an officer to operate each one. In addition, 

SBI program officials and Border Patrol noted that the units were not designed to 

be used 24/7 and that at any given time, a unit may not be operational because of 

the need for repairs. For example, as of April 2009, 15 of the 23 units at Border 

Patrol’s Tucson sector were operational. These MSS limitations underscore the importance of DHS’s SBInet testing and evaluation activities in 2010. If SBInet is 

deemed not ready for deployment or if the technology does not meet Border Patrol 

needs, other options may need to be considered to assist in controlling the nation’s 

borders. 

Æ