alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RODNEY KING, 

 Petitioner, Case No. 14-cv-14627 

v. 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

J. A. TERRIS, 

 Respondent. 

_________________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (ECF #14) 

 On December 8, 2014, Petitioner Rodney King (“Petitioner”) filed a petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). (See ECF 

#1.) In the Petition, Petitioner argued that certain prior convictions were 

improperly used to enhance his sentence for a federal firearms conviction. (See 

id.) 

 The Court dismissed the Petition on June 24, 2015 in an Opinion and Order 

(the “Opinion and Order”). (See ECF #12.) The Court held that binding Sixth 

Circuit precedent prohibited Petitioner from proceeding under § 2241, and it 

therefore dismissed the Petition without prejudice. (See id.) 

 On July 13, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Rule 7.1 (the “Motion 

2:14-cv-14627-MFL-PTM Doc # 15 Filed 07/16/15 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 242
2 

for Reconsideration”). (See ECF #14.) Under Local Rule 7.1, a party moving for 

reconsideration “must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court 

... [has] been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a 

different disposition of the case.” L.R. 7.1(h). 

 In the Motion for Reconsideration, Petitioner argues that two days after the 

Court dismissed the Petition, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision 

in United States v. Johnson, --- S.Ct. ---, 2015 WL 2473450 (June 26, 2015). 

Petitioner argues that Johnson now allows him to challenge his enhanced sentence 

under § 2241, and that the Court should therefore reconsider its earlier decision to 

dismiss the Petition. (See Mot. for Reconsideration at 1, Pg. ID 235.) 

 Johnson, however, did not involve a petition under § 2241, did not address 

any issues related to § 2241, and did not displace the currently-binding Sixth 

Circuit precedent cited in the Court’s Opinion and Order. That authority forecloses 

Petitioner’s attempt to proceed under § 2241. Unless and until this precedent 

changes, the Court has no basis to reconsider its ruling. Petitioner has therefore 

failed to show a “palpable error” that entitles him to relief. 

2:14-cv-14627-MFL-PTM Doc # 15 Filed 07/16/15 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 243
3 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for 

Reconsideration (ECF #14) is DENIED. 

 s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: July 16, 2015 

 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 

parties and/or counsel of record on July 16, 2015, by electronic means and/or 

ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5113 

2:14-cv-14627-MFL-PTM Doc # 15 Filed 07/16/15 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 244
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

BRANDON RESCH, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 4:14-cv-13432 

v. District Judge Terrence G. Berg 

 Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

BAYDOUN, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

___________________________________/ 

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MARCH 4, 2015 SHOW 

CAUSE ORDER (DE 26) 

 On March 4, 2015, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why the 

Court should not dismiss his claims against the John Doe Defendants for failure to 

effect service. (DE 24.) This matter is before the Court for consideration of 

Plaintiff Brandon Resch’s Verified Response to Order to Show Cause. (DE 26.) 

 Plaintiff filed his timely response on March 16, 2015. (DE 26.) In his 

response, Plaintiff’s counsel, Michael R. Dezsi, notes that Plaintiff filed this case 

pro se and has only recently obtained the assistance of counsel. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-2.) 

Mr. Dezsi avers that, since filing his appearance on the case on February 16, 2015, 

he and Defendants have conducted discovery to ascertain the names of the John 

Doe Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.) Mr. Dezsi indicates that he has prepared an 

4:14-cv-13432-TGB-APP Doc # 27 Filed 03/17/15 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 163
2

amended complaint naming the John Doe Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Seeking a 

stipulation, he provided the Defendants with a copy of the proposed amended 

complaint on March 16, 2015. Defendants are currently reviewing the proposed 

amended complaint. (Id.) 

 The Court concludes that Plaintiff has shown good cause for his failure to 

timely identify and serve the John Doe Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff may file 

a motion for leave to amend his Complaint or a stipulation and Amended 

Complaint ON OR BEFORE APRIL 7, 2015.

1

 Any such motion or stipulation 

should make provision for the issuance of summonses for any newly named 

Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 17, 2015 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

                                                            

1

 If needed, a motion to amend Plaintiff’s Complaint should be made in accordance 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) and Eastern District of Michigan 

Local Rule 15.1. The Court makes no findings at this time as to the potential 

success or failure of such a motion. 

4:14-cv-13432-TGB-APP Doc # 27 Filed 03/17/15 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 164
3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on March 17, 2015, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

(313) 234-5200 

4:14-cv-13432-TGB-APP Doc # 27 Filed 03/17/15 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 165
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 97-1506 DONALD J. STRABLE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ADMINI STRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Defendant - Appellee.

No. 97-1507 DONALD J. STRABLE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE COMMITTEE, Defendant - Appellee.2 No. 97-1643 DONALD J. STRABLE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Defendant - Appellee. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-97-530-6-13AK, CA-97-179-6-13AK, CA-97-530-6) Submitted: August 14, 1997 Decided: August 20, 1997 Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Donald J. Strable, Appellant Pro Se. Ronald Keith Wray II, GIBBES, GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South C arolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's orders dismissing his civil actions. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinions accepting the recommendations of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss on the reasoning of the district court. Strable v. Administrative Office of the United States Courts , No. CA-97-530-6-13AK (D.S.C. Apr. 8, 1997; Strable v. South Carolina Justice Comm. , No. CA-97-179-6-13AK (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 1997); Strable v. Administrative Office of the United States Courts , No. CA-97- 530-6 (D.S.C. Apr. 30, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented inthe materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Editorial Note on Part 154
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 154 appear part 154 appear by CGD-95-072, 60 FR 50466, Sept. 29, 1995, CGD-96-041, 61 FR 50732, Sept. 27, 1996, USCG-2009-0702, 74 FR 49235, Sept. 25, 2009, and USCG-2012-0832, 77 FR 59785, Oct. 1, 2012.

§ 154.407 Cargo tank internal pressure head. ( a ) For the calculation required under § 154.406(a)(1) and (b), the internal pressure head (heq), must be determined from the following formula: heq = 10 Po + (hgd)max where: hgd (the value of internal pressure, in meters of fresh water, resulting from the combined effects of gravity and dynamic accelerations of a full tank) = aβ Zβ Y; where: aβ = dimensionless acceleration relative to the acceleration of gravity resulting from gravitational and dynamic loads in the β direction (see figure 1); Zβ = largest liquid height (m) above the point where the pressure is to be determined in the β direction (see figure 2); Y = maximum specific weight of the cargo (t/m3) at the design temperature.
( b ) The (hgd)max is determined for the β direction, on the ellipse in Figure 1, which gives the maximum value for hgd.
( c ) When the longitudinal acceleration is considered in addition to the vertical transverse acceleration, an ellipsoid must be used in the calculations instead of the ellipse contained in Figure 1.
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Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed February 17, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-253

Lower Tribunal Nos. 19-9109; 19-283 AC

________________

Markins Junior Anilus,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Raul 

Cuervo, Judge.

Markins Junior Anilus, in proper person.

Katherine Fernandez Rundle, State Attorney, and Casey Hughes, 

Assistant State Attorney, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, SCALES and GORDO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Vega v. CSCS Int’l, N.V., 795 So. 2d 164, 166 n.1 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 2001) (“Evidence is . . . ‘[a]ny species of proof, or probative matter, 
2

legally presented at the trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and 

through the medium of witnesses, records, documents, exhibits, concrete 

objects, etc., for the purpose of inducing belief in the minds of the court or 

jury as to their contention.’” (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 287 (5th ed. 

1983))); see also Southwin, Inc. v. Verde, 806 So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 2002) (“Determinations regarding the weight of the evidence or the 

credibility of witnesses are peculiarly within the province of the finder of fact 

and will not be disturbed on appeal.” (citations omitted)); U.S. Bank, N.A. v. 

Stokes, 289 So. 3d 523, 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“Because a trial court's 

factual findings come to the appellate court with a presumption of 

correctness to which the appellate court should generally defer, because 

an appellate court should not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of 

witnesses, and because there is competent substantial evidence in the 

record to support the trial court’s factual findings, we affirm.” (citations 

omitted)).
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 31

                    Rule 13a-14(a)/15(d)-14(a) Certification

I, Michael P. Muldowney, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Nextera Enterprises,
Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosures
controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonable likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: August 16, 2004

                                  By: /s/ Michael P. Muldowney
                                  -------------------------------------
                                  President and Chief Financial Officer
                                  (Principal  Executive Officer and Principal
                                  Financial Officer)
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         297,043                  73,498
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,847,116               1,969,485
<ALLOWANCES>                                   118,586                  67,866
<INVENTORY>                                  7,276,961               4,972,064
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            12,123,819               7,799,370
<PP&E>                                       2,896,188               1,836,396
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,308,166               1,131,640
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,150,527               9,029,900
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,994,966               1,987,456
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                     4,873,319               4,678,419
<OTHER-SE>                                           0                       0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                15,150,527               9,029,900
<SALES>                                     24,076,192              18,636,604
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            24,076,192              18,636,604
<CGS>                                       19,368,877              14,351,214
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               19,368,877              14,351,214
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,520                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             193,247                  68,657
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                821,316               1,600,354
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (325,506)                  28,671
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,146,822               1,571,683
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,146,822               1,571,683
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .38                     .57
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .37                     .56
        

</TABLE>
§ 111.95-7 Wiring of boat winch components. ( a ) If the motor controller of a boat winch power unit is next to the winch, the main line emergency switch must disconnect all parts of the boat winch power unit, including the motor controller and limit switches, from all sources of potential. Other power circuit switches must be connected in series with the main line emergency switch and must be ahead of the motor controller. The main line emergency switch must be the motor and controller disconnect required by Subpart 111.70 and must have a horsepower rating of at least that of the winch motor.
( b ) If the motor controller of a boat winch power unit is remote from the winch, there must be a switch at the controller that can disconnect the entire winch electric installation from all sources of potential. The switch must be in series with and on the supply side of the main line emergency switch.
( c ) Each davit arm limit switch, whether connected in the power circuit or in the control circuit, must disconnect all ungrounded conductors of the circuit controlled.
( d ) If one motor is used with two winches, there must be a main line emergency switch, a clutch interlock switch, and a master switch for each winch, except that a single main line emergency switch located as required by paragraph (e) of this section may be used for both winches. The main line emergency switches must be connected, in series, ahead of the motor controller. The master switches must be connected in parallel and each, in series, with the corresponding clutch interlock switch for that winch. Each clutch interlock switch must open the circuit to its master switch, except when the power unit is clutched to the associated winch. There must be a means to prevent the power unit from being clutched to both winches simultaneously.
( e ) The main line emergency disconnect switch must be adjacent to the master switch, within reach of the winch operator, accessible to the person in charge of the boat stowage, and for gravity davit installations, in a position from which the movement of boat davit arms can be observed as they approach the final stowed position.
[CGD 74-125A, 47 FR 15236, Apr. 8, 1982, as amended by CGD 94-108, 61 FR 28283, June 4, 1996]
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 24
- 00165
- CR

Phillip G. Scott , Appellant

v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY NO. CR2023
- 382 , THE HONORABLE STEPHANIE BASCON , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Phillip G. Scott has been charged by indict ment with the o ffense of taking a prohibited substance in to a correctional facility

. See Tex. Penal Code § 38

. 1 1 (b)

. Appellant seeks to bring an interlocutory appeal chall en ging the trial court ’ s incompetency
O rder

. See Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. art . 46B. 005

. Additionally, Appellant has filed a

“ S upplement Appeal , ” in which he seeks to also appeal the trial court ’ s d ecision to appoint him trial counsel in a different crimi na l case tha n the one that is the subject of this appeal

. The record does not include any certification by the trial court that appellant has a right to appea l either the
in compet ency o rder or the determination to appoi nt counsel in th e separate criminal ca se
. See
Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2) (requiring trial court to enter certification of defendant’s right of appeal each time it enters j udgment of guilt or other appealable order ) ; id. R. 25 .2 (d ) ( requiring dismissal of criminal appeal in a bsence of certif ic ation )

.2 Further , neither chal lenged action by the trial court is a “ judgment or other appealable order.” Id. R. 25.2(a)(2) (a uthorizing appeals in criminal cases only when trial court
enters judgment or other appealable order )

. A rticle 46B.005 incomp eten cy Orders are specifically not subject to interlocutory appeal pursuant to statute. S ee Tex. Code of Crim. Proc.
art. 46B.011

. N o statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal of a defendant’s request for self

- representation

. S ee Bayles s v. State , 91 S .W.3 d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ( explaining that “ a defendant’s right of appeal is a statutorily created right ” ) ; c f. Blankenship

v. State , 673 S.W.2d 578, 583

– 8 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (addressing deni al of right to self

- representation in appeal fro m fi nal judgment ). Accordingly, we dismiss t he appeal for want of j urisdi ction. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).

__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne , Chi ef Jus tice Before Chief Justice Byrne , Justices Smith and Theofanis Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction Filed: May 7, 2024
Do Not Publish