This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. NO. 34,673 4 ADAN H., 5 Child-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DON ̃A ANA COUNTY 7 Marci E. Beyer, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Laura E. Horton, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 13 Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 FRENCH, Judge. 182 {1} Adan H. (Child) appeals the revocation of his juvenile probation by the district 1 court. Child argues that the court committe d reversible error b ecause two witnesses 2 were improperly allowed to testify at the revocation hearing and because Child’s 3 juvenile probation was revoke d without sufficient evidence. We disagree with Child 4 and affirm the order revoking Child’s juvenile probation. 5 BACKGROUND 6 {2} Child was on supervised juvenile probati on as a result of his no contest plea to 7 a charge of criminal damage to property and subsequent probation violations. The 8 State filed a petition to revoke his probation, alleging that Child was involved in an 9 altercation with another student and recei ved a long-term suspension from school for 10 possession of a pocket knife on school grounds . As a consequence, Child failed to 11 meet the following conditions of his probation: attend school without an unexcused 12 absence and maintain an acceptable behavi or record, refrain from the possession of 13 weapons, and refrain from any act forbi dden by law. The district court held an 14 adjudicatory hearing and subsequently found that Child violated his probation as 15 alleged in the State’s petition. Additional facts will be provided as necessary in our 16 discussion of the issues. 17 EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES 181 Rule 10-231 applies to petitions alle ging delinquency, not a petition to revoke 16 probation, as was filed in this case. However, NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-24(B) 17 (2009), provides that proceedings to revoke the probation of a child are governed with 18 regard to discovery by th e rules applicable to delinquency proceedings. Therefore, 19 Rule 10-231(A)(5) provides the relevant standard for the State’s witness list in this 20 probation revocation proceeding. 21 3 {3} The State’s witness list identified “[a] ny and all witnesses named in police 1 reports and/or statements” in addition to one named witness and two other categories 2 of witnesses. At the hearing, the State called the police officer, who wrote the police 3 report, and the assistant principal of Ch ild’s school, who was named in that report. 4 Neither witness was mentioned by name in the State’s witness list. Child objected to 5 the testimony of both witnesse s and argued that they shoul d be excluded because the 6 State’s witness list was vague and, therefore, legally inad equate under the applicable 7 disclosure rule. Child did not request any lesser remedy than the exclusion of the 8 witnesses. The applicable rule—Rule 10-231(A)(5) NMRA—requires the State to 9 have disclosed or made available to Child“a written list of th e names and addresses 10 of all witnesses which the court attorney intends to call at the adjudicatory hearing” 11 within ten days of the filing of the petition to revoke his probation. 1 The State 12 responded that the witnesses were properly disclosed becausethey were named in the 13 police report and the State timely provided Child with the relevant police report by 14 uploading it to the case management system(CMS). The distri ct court overruled 15 Child’s objection to the testimony of the po lice officer and the assistant principal. 164 Although the court did not offer its reasoning concerning the assistant principal, the 1 court explained that it allowed the police o fficer to testify because the witness list 2 disclosed the State’s intention to call pers ons named in the police report, the police 3 report named the police officer, and the police report was provided to Child via the 4 CMS. 5 {4} On appeal, Child argues that the distri ct court committed reversible error by 6 allowing the witnesses to testify. We revi ew “[a] trial court’s decision to admit or 7 exclude evidence for failure to comply with notice and disclosure re quirements . . . for 8 an abuse of discretion.” State v. Guerra , 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 23, 278 P.3d 1031. “A 9 court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the 10 facts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Harper , 2011-NMSC-044, ¶ 16, 150 11 N.M. 745, 266 P.3d 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 12 {5} In order to grant Child the reversal he seeks on the basis of this issue, we must 13 hold both that the State’s disclosure of the witnesses was legally inadequate, and 14 further, that the failure of the district court to exclude the State’s witnesses as sanction 15 for that alleged inadequacy was an abuse of the court’s discretion. We decline to hold 16 that the court committed reversible error. We explain. 17 {6} First, the district court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the 18 testimony of the police officer and assistant principal. The exclusion of witnesses is 195 a severe sanction not to be imposed except in extreme cases. Id . ¶ 21. Exclusion is 1 generally appropriate only wh ere, among other requirement s, “the State’s conduct is 2 especially culpable, such as where evidence is unilaterally withheld by the State in bad 3 faith, or all access to the evidence is precluded by State intransigence.” Id . ¶ 17. Child 4 has not argued that the State acted in bad faith or is especially culpable, nor do we 5 perceive any willful misconduct in the actions of the State. The State filed a witness 6 list the day it filed its petition to revoke probati on. The witness list stated that the State 7 intended to call as a witness anyone named in the police report. Child admits that the 8 case was not complicated and that “only three or four people” were involved; thus we 9 do not infer bad faith or even gamesmanship on the part of the State by its non10 specific reference to persons named in the police report. The State confirmed for the 11 district court, and the court accepted, thatthe police report naming both witnesses was 12 uploaded to the online CMS in a timely fashi on. We observe that the police report was 13 made available to Child via CMS eight days after the petition to revoke probation was 14 filed. We also observe that the hearing di d not take place until more than three months 15 later. Although non-specific witness lists are less than ideal, we do not perceive bad 16 faith on the part of the State by this form of disclosure. Cf. State v. Layne , 2008- 17 NMCA-103, ¶ 13, 144 N.M. 574, 189 P.3d 707 (holding that where the state 18 intentionally chose to ignore a discovery order of the district court, the exclusion of 196 a witness was proper). We note that Ch ild, who was under similar disclosure 1 requirements as the State, filed a similarly non-specific witness list. CompareRule 10- 2 232(A)(3) NMRA (stating that a respondent child is required to disclose or make 3 available to the state “a list of the names and addresses of the witnesses the respondent 4 child intends to call at the adjudicatory hearing”), with Rule 10-231(A)(5) (stating that 5 the state is required to disclose or make available to the respondent child “a written 6 list of the names and addresses of all w itnesses which the children’s court attorney 7 intends to call at the adjudicatory hearing”). Finally, we note that Child did not request 8 any remedy less severe than exclusion—for example, a motion for continuance and/or 9 an opportunity to interview the witnesses— and in the absence of such a request by 10 Child, we do not fault the district court for failing to craft an alternative. In sum, we 11 hold that the refusal of the district court to exclude the State’s only witnesses was not 12 an abuse of discretion. 13 {7} Moreover, the State adequately fulfille d its disclosure requirements under the 14 circumstances of this case. To the extent that Child was not prepared for testimony by 15 the assistant principal and the police o fficer, that surprise cannot reasonably be 16 ascribed to the form of the State’s witn ess disclosure. The witness list stated the 17 intention of the State to call as a witn ess any person named in the police report. The 18 police report was not withheld from Child but, instead, was disclosed timely. Child 197 concedes that reference to a police report in the witness list “may appear to be 1 reasonable in a case such as th is one[.]” We agree. Child has not cited to any authority 2 indicating that a witness list such as that provided by the State (and also Child) is 3 legally inadequate, and thus we presume there is none. See In re Adoption of Doe , 4 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (“[The appellate courts] assume 5 where arguments in briefs are unsupported by cited authority, [that] counsel . . . was 6 unable to find any supporting authority.”). Weneed not determine the precise contours 7 of the requirements of Rule 10-231(A)(5) in this memorandum opinion. Under the 8 circumstances of this case, we conclude th at the State adequately and timely, fulfilled 9 its duty to disclose its witnesses to Child. 10 {8} For the foregoing reasons, the decision by th e district court not to exclude the 11 State’s witnesses was not clearly contrary to the logic and effect of the facts and 12 circumstances of the case and, therefore, not reversible error under an abuse of 13 discretion standard. See Guerra , 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 23 (stati ng that appellate courts 14 review “[a] trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for failure to comply 15 with notice and disclosure requirements . . . for an abuse of discretion”); id. ¶ 36 16 (stating that a court abuses its discreti on when an “evidentiary ruling is clearly 17 contrary to logic and the facts and circ umstances of the case” (internal quotation 18 marks and citation omitted)). 198 SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 1 {9} Child argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding by the 2 district court that he violated the conditi on of his probation requiring that Child refrain 3

from any act prohibited by law. The revocation of a juvenile’s probation requires 4 proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Erickson K., 2002-NMCA-058, ¶ 18, 132 5 N.M. 258, 46 P.3d 1258; see § 32A-2-24(B). We review a challenge to the sufficiency 6 of the evidence by determining whether, indulging all reasonable inferences and 7 resolving all conflicts in favor of the verdict, substantial evidence of a direct or 8 circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on 9 all elements essential to the conviction. State v. Astorga , 2015-NMSC-007, ¶ 57, 343 10 P.3d 1245. 11 {10} The State concedes that insufficient evidence exists to support a finding that 12 Child violated his probation by carry ing a deadly weapon on school grounds. 13 However, the district court found that Child also violated two other conditions of his 14 probation, as alleged in the State’s petition. Child has not challenged those two 15 findings of violation. Because a single violation was sufficient for the district court 16 to find that Child violated his probationaryagreement, and Childhas not challenged 17 the sufficiency of the evidence supporting two findings of violation, we affirm the 189 decision of the district court that Child violated his probationary agreement. See § 1 32A-2-24(B) (“If a child is found to have viol ated a term of the child’s probation, the 2 court may extend the period of probation or make any other judgment or disposition 3 that would have been appropriate in the original disposition of the case.”); State v. 4 Leon , 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 37, 292 P.3d 493 (stati ng, with reference to an adult 5 probationer, that sufficient evidence to s upport even one violation supports affirmance 6 of a trial court’s revocation of probation). 7 CONCLUSION 8 {11} For the reasons stated, we affirm the order of the district court revoking Child’s 9 juvenile probation. 10 {12} IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

__________________________________ 12 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 13

WE CONCUR: 14

___________________________ 15 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 16

___________________________ 17 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 18