United States v. Matthews – 14-cr-20655 

Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 

Page 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 NO. 14-cr-20655 

 Plaintiff, 

 HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI 

v. United States District Judge 

DEONTA MATTHEWS, 

 Defendant. 

 

GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

 

 The United States of America, by and through its attorneys, Barbara L. 

McQuade, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, and A. Tare 

Wigod, Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, 

hereby responds to defendant’s motion to suppress evidence as follows: 

 

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United States v. Matthews – 14-cr-20655 

Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 

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BRIEF 

I. BACKGROUND 

On July 4, 2014, Trooper Adam Hartford of the Ohio State Highway Patrol 

was stationary in his police cruiser along Interstate I-75 monitoring traffic. At 

approximately 8:45 a.m., Tpr. Hartford saw a gray Chrysler Sebring travelling 

southbound on I-75 that appeared to be speeding. Tpr. Hartford activated his laser 

radar, which determined the vehicle’s speed to be 86 miles per hour, in a posted 55 

mile per hour zone. Tpr. Hartford followed the Chrysler and, after catching up to it, 

conducted a traffic stop. 

Trp. Hartford approached the vehicle on the passenger side and greeted the 

three occupants. He asked the driver, Lequale Brown, for her license, registration, 

and proof of insurance. Ms. Brown stated that she had a permit, but that her 

brother, Deonta Matthews, one of the rear passengers, had a valid license. While 

speaking to Ms. Brown, Tpr. Hartford smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana 

coming from inside the car. Tpr. Hartford asked the occupants why the car smelled 

like marijuana, and none of them knew; however, Ms. Brown stated that her 

boyfriend uses her car and smokes “weed.” At that time, Tpr. Harford requested a 

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United States v. Matthews – 14-cr-20655 

Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 

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second cruise to come to the scene to conduct a probable cause search of the 

vehicle. 

Once the second cruise arrived, the three occupants of the vehicle were 

removed from the car. After securing the occupants, the troopers conducted a 

search of the vehicle. During the search, troopers located a .40 caliber semiautomatic Smith and Wesson pistol, with a full magazine and a bullet chambered, 

in the truck compartment. The troopers located the firearm while looking through 

the armrest opening in the rear passenger compartment. The firearm was on top of 

the luggage in the trunk, within arm’s reach of the rear passengers. Also during the 

search, the troopers located a baggie of marijuana in the trunk compartment. 

After locating the firearm and marijuana, all three occupants were detained 

and taken to the Ohio State Highway Patrol post for further investigation. 

II. ARGUMENT

This Court should deny defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The 

officers conducted a valid probable cause search of the Chryler Sebring based on 

the odor of marijuana. As such, this court should deny defendant’s motion. 

Generally, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Coolidge v. New 

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United States v. Matthews – 14-cr-20655 

Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 

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Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1971). However, there is a well-recognized 

exception to this general rule: under the automobile exception, a warrantless search 

of a vehicle which has been lawfully stopped is permissible if the search is based 

on probable cause. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 

L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); United States v. Crotinger, 928 F.2d 203, 205 (6th Cir.1991). 

Probable cause to search a vehicle is established if, under the “totality of the 

circumstances” there is a “fair probability” that the car contains contraband or 

evidence. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Moreover, it is firmly 

established in the Sixth Circuit that a marijuana odor emanating from a vehicle 

supplies probable cause to law enforcement officers to search the entire vehicle—

even the trunk—and any containers within that vehicle which could be hiding 

marijuana. United States v. $118,170.00 in U.S. Currency, 69 Fed. Appx. 714, 716 

(6th Cir.2003) (“The smell of marijuana alone constitutes probable cause to 

believe that drugs are in the vehicle and will justify searching without a warrant.”) 

(emphasis added); United States v. Jackson, 63 Fed. Appx. 839, 842 (6th Cir.2003) 

(“We conclude that during a reasonable stop of the car, the two police officers 

smelled marijuana coming from the car's interior, and that this discovery provided 

probable cause to search the automobile.”); cert. denied, 540 U.S. 910, 124 S.Ct. 

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297, 157 L.Ed.2d 200 and 540 U.S. 916, 124 S.Ct. 304, 157 L.Ed.2d 209 (2003); 

United States v. Littelton, 15 F.App’x 189, 193 (6th Cir.2001) (“As a matter of law, 

the district court correctly concluded that the odor of marijuana can constitute 

probable cause for a warrantless search [of a vehicle]”); United States v. Carrera, 

966 F.2d 1454 (Table), 1992 WL 116006, *2 (6th Cir.1992) (“The smell of 

marijuana emanating from [the] vehicle gave the officer probable cause to search 

the vehicle, including the trunk.”); United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th 

Cir.1993) (“we find that Agent Perman's smelling the marijuana [in the truck] then 

constituted probable cause to believe there was marijuana in the vehicle.”) 

Moreover, it is well established that if probable cause justifies the search of 

a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of that vehicle, 

including the trunk and any containers found within it. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825; see 

also, United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 542 (6th Cir.2002) (“An officer may 

conduct a warrantless search of every part of a legitimately stopped vehicle, 

including the trunk and all containers, if there is probable cause to believe that the 

vehicle contains contraband.”), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 953, 123 S.Ct. 1643, 155 

L.Ed.2d 500 (2003); Crotinger, 928 F.2d at 205 (holding that where officers had 

probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband, officers could search 

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entire vehicle, including trunk, and any containers therein which could conceal the 

contraband); United States v. Borne, 2005 WL 2290273, *13 (E.D.Tenn.) (same). 

 In the instant case, while speaking to the occupants of the vehicle, Trooper 

Hartford smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from inside the car. 

This odor of marijuana provided Trooper Hartford probable cause to search the 

vehicle, including the trunk. Consequently, the search of the Sebring was valid, 

and the .40 caliber semi-automatic Smith and Wesson pistol found as a result of 

that search should not be suppressed. 

Defendant argues that the recent decision of the United States Supreme 

Court in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), compels 

suppression of the evidence. However, the searches of the cell phones in Riley

were justified based on the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 

requirement. “The two cases before us concern the reasonableness of a warrantless 

search incident to a lawful arrest.” Id. at 2482. Conversely, in the instant case, the 

government does not justify the search of the vehicle as a search incident to arrest; 

rather, the search was conducted pursuant to the automobile exception to the 

warrant requirement. As such Riley is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the 

present case. 

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United States v. Matthews – 14-cr-20655 

Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 

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III. CONCLUSION

 In conclusion, the government requests that the court deny defendant’s 

motion. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 BARBARA L. McQUADE 

 United States Attorney 

Dated: January 20, 2015 s/ A. TARE WIGOD 

 Assistant United States Attorney 

 211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001 

 Detroit, Michigan 48226 

 Phone: (313) 226-9191 

 tare.wigod@usdoj.gov

 P58479 

 

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United States v. Matthews – 14-cr-20655 

Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that on January 20, 2015, the foregoing document was 

electronically filed by an employee of the United States Attorney’s Office with the 

Clerk of the Court using the ECF system which will send notification of such filing 

to the following: 

 John M. McManus, Attorney for Defendant 

 I further certify that an employee of the United States Attorney’s Office 

mailed, by United States Postal Service, the foregoing document to the following 

non-ECF participants: 

 None. 

 s/ A. TARE WIGOD 

 Assistant United States Attorney 

 211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001 

 Detroit, Michigan 48226 

 Phone: (313) 226-9191 

 tare.wigod@usdoj.gov

 P58479 

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