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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH R. WATSON,

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 14-14124

HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD

v.

WILLOW ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a

PORT HURON HOSPITAL INDUSTRIAL

HEALTH, et al,

Defendants.

 /

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN 

PART REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (Doc # 39) and

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(Doc # 30)

This matter is before the Court on a Report and Recommendation (Doc # 39) 

filed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie Dawkins Davis to grant the Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc # 30) filed by Defendants Willow Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a 

Port Huron Hospital Industrial Health (“Willow”); Sarah Kading, LPN (“Kading”); 

and Brandi Schieman, LPN (“Schieman”). Plaintiff Joseph R. Watson (“Watson”)

has filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc # 41) Defendants 

have filed a Response to the Objections. (Doc # 42) Having conducted a de novo

review of the parts of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations to 

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which valid objections have been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court 

ADOPTS IN PART AND REJECTS IN PART the Report and Recommendation 

and DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

The background facts of this matter are adequately set forth in the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and the Court adopts them here

in their entirety.

The parties submitted a Joint Statement of Resolved and Unresolved Issues 

Regarding Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc # 36) In summary, 

Watson brings an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based upon 

Willow employees Nurse Kading and Nurse Schieman’s alleged failure to provide 

several of Watson’s heart medications to him for five days while he was 

incarcerated in the St. Clair County Jail. Watson claims that this caused him to 

suffer a myocardial infarction on July 28, 2012. Defendants argue that they are 

entitled to summary judgment because Watson has failed to create a genuine issue 

of material fact to establish that Kading and Schieman’s actions rose to the level of 

deliberate indifference to Watson’s serious medical needs. Watson argues that 

questions of fact remain regarding Kading and Schieman’s actions that preclude 

summary judgment. 

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review by the district court when examining a Report and 

Recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636. This Court “shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or the specified proposed findings or 

recommendations to which an objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The 

court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. In order to preserve the right 

to appeal the magistrate judge’s recommendation, a party must file objections to 

the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of service of the Report 

and Recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections 

constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 

155 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508-09 

(6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).

The summary judgment standard is adequately set forth in the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and the Court adopts it here.

B. Watson’s Objections

In her February 14, 2017 Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge 

Davis recommended that the Court grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment because Watson’s claims sound in mere negligence and do not rise to the 

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level of deliberate indifference. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Watson 

offers no evidence to support that Kading and Schieman knew or should have 

known that the failure to quickly obtain the heart medications at issue would put 

Watson at risk of suffering a heart attack. Watson has filed eleven objections to 

the Report and Recommendation. 

1. First Objection

Watson first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on a Ninth Circuit 

case arguing that, in the Sixth Circuit, actual knowledge of the particular medical 

need is not required to show an awareness of the risk of harm. The Court finds 

that, while the Report and Recommendation includes one quotation from a Ninth 

Circuit case for the proposition that a defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to 

respond to a prisoner’s medical need in order for deliberate indifference to be 

established1 (which the Court rejects), the Magistrate Judge nevertheless applied 

the correct standard in her analysis: that a defendant must be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and must also draw the inference for deliberate indifference to be established. See

Doc # 39, Pg ID 490; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Watson’s 

first objection is overruled.

 1 See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992).

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2. Second, Third, and Fourth Objections

Watson’s second, third, and fourth objections are to the portion of the Report 

and Recommendation that sets forth the Defendants’ arguments under the subheading “Parties’ Arguments.” After review of the Report and Recommendation,

Watson’s Objections, and Defendants’ Response, the Court finds that the 

Magistrate Judge accurately set forth the Defendants’ arguments, as well as 

Watson’s arguments, before setting forth her analysis. Rather than “relying” on 

the facts that Watson complains are irrelevant or misstating the issues in this 

portion of the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge was simply 

setting forth Defendants’ arguments. Watson’s second, third, and fourth objections 

are overruled.

3. Fifth Objection

In Watson’s fifth objection, he argues that the Magistrate Judge misstates the 

central issue in this case: that Kading and Schieman were deliberately indifferent 

in ignoring Watson’s repeated requests for his missing medications in combination 

with their access to his medical screening information and their knowledge that 

several of the missing medications on the list were cardiac medications. The 

Magistrate Judge stated the issue somewhat differently as follows.

There are essentially two actions (or inactions) that must be analyzed 

to determine if defendants’ conduct rose to the level of deliberate 

indifference. First, did the defendants’ apparent failure to obtain 

additional information that could have led to the verification of 

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plaintiff’s other medications constitute deliberate indifference? And, 

second did the failure to independently follow up with a physician rise 

to the level of deliberate indifference?

(Doc # 39, Pg ID 485). The Court finds that this specific language that Watson 

objects to is the same issue that he claims is the central issue in the case — whether 

Kading and Schieman were deliberately indifferent in how they responded or failed 

to respond to Watson’s requests for his missing heart medications. Watson’s fifth 

objection is overruled.

4. Sixth Objection

Watson’s sixth objection is to a portion of the Report and Recommendation 

that discusses Latona v. Pollack, No. 07-1 ERIE, 2010 WL 358526 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 

25, 2010), aff'd sub nom. Latona v. Prison Health Servs. Inc., 397 F. App'x 807 (3d 

Cir. 2010). Watson first argues that the Magistrate Judge applied a malice standard 

that is not required for a finding of deliberate indifference. In Latona, the court 

noted in passing that the defendants’ denial of medications was not malicious or 

sadistic, and in the instant case, the Magistrate Judge noted in passing that 

“[s]imilarly, there is no evidence in this record of malice.” (Doc # 39, Pg ID 486) 

After review of the Report and Recommendation, Watson’s Objections, 

Defendants’ Response, and the case, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge did 

not improperly apply a malice standard in deciding the instant case. This portion 

of Watson’s sixth objection is overruled.

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Within his sixth objection, Watson further argues that there remains a 

question of fact regarding whether Defendants contacted the last pharmacy Watson 

had used to obtain his heart medication prescriptions in order to verify them. In 

the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge stated: “In relying solely 

on information concerning plaintiff’s the [sic] last pharmacy to verify his 

prescriptions, defendants were following policy.” During depositions, Kading and 

Schieman did not testify that they verified Watson’s heart prescriptions with the

last pharmacy he used. Rather, they testified that if there was a discrepancy 

between the medications that were verified and those claimed to be current by an 

inmate, they would have asked the inmate which pharmacy he used. They could 

not recall how they responded, if at all, in Watson’s case. Watson testified that 

nobody asked him which pharmacy he used. According to Watson, his last 

pharmacy was The People’s Clinic for Better Health. Records from this pharmacy 

show that Watson was taking all of the medications on the list attached to his 

medical screening form, including the missing heart medications he was 

requesting. The Court finds that there remains a question of material fact 

regarding whether Defendants contacted Watson’s last pharmacy to verify his 

missing prescriptions. Accordingly, this portion of Watson’s sixth objection is 

sustained, and the Court rejects this portion of the Report and Recommendation.

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5. Seventh Objection

In Watson’s seventh objection, he argues that the evidence shows that 

Defendants had knowledge sufficient to conclude that the denial or delay of his 

heart medications would put him at risk for a heart attack. The Magistrate Judge 

found that Watson had offered no evidence to support that argument. Having 

conducted a de novo review, the Court sustains Watson’s seventh objection, and 

rejects the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Watson, he told 

Defendants that he had a heart condition and needed his heart medications during 

med pass on four consecutive days. On several occasions he was told by 

Defendants that they would look into the issue, and sometimes he received no 

response from Defendants at all. 

Defendants testified that they receive the inmates’ medical screening forms 

during their shifts. Watson’s medical screening form included a list of his 

medications and indicated that he has high blood pressure and heart disease. 

Defendants reviewed this list, as it is undisputed that they were somehow able to 

verify and dispense four of the medications on the list (none of which were heart 

medications). Kading testified that she knew that several of the medications on 

Watson’s list are cardiac medications. Kading further testified that if heart disease 

was circled on an inmate’s medical screening form, she would order medications 

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within the first 24 hours and would make sure that the inmate had his heart 

medications. Schieman testified that if heart disease was circled on an inmate’s 

medical screening form, she would review the information taken during booking 

and speak with the inmate. According to Defendants, if there was a discrepancy 

between the medications that were verified and those claimed to be current by the

inmate, they would ask the inmate which pharmacy the inmate used, would give 

the inmate a medical request form, and/or would review booking information with 

the inmate. According to Defendants, there were physicians available to them 

“24/7,” and they spoke to physicians daily while on duty.

Defendants cannot recall how they responded or what they did in Watson’s 

case. Watson, on the other hand, testified that he is one hundred percent sure that 

nobody spoke to him about his medical issues, told him that he could complete a 

medical request form, or asked him which pharmacy he used. Records from the 

pharmacy he was using at the time would have verified all of the heart medications 

on the list attached to his screening form. 

Drawing factual inferences in Watson’s favor, as the Court must at this 

stage, a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants were deliberately 

indifferent because they were aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm to Watson existed if he did not receive 

his missing heart medications, and that Defendants also drew that inference. 

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“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a 

question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference 

from circumstantial evidence . . . and a fact finder may conclude that a prison 

official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Viewed in the light most favorable to Watson, he 

repeatedly requested treatment for his heart problem. Defendants ignored his 

requests for his missing heart medications, and Watson received no treatment for 

his heart condition for four days. He then suffered a heart attack which the 

examining physician concluded was at least in part due to a lack of heart 

medications. Defendants were trained medical nurses who were aware or should 

have been aware that the lack of heart medications posed a serious risk to a patient 

with heart disease and high blood pressure. Indeed, Kading testified that if heart 

disease was circled on an inmate’s medical screening form, she would order 

medications within the first 24 hours and would make sure that the inmate had his

heart medications. When the need for treatment is obvious, medical care which is 

so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all can amount to deliberate 

indifference. Rouster v. Cnty. of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2014).

The Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact remain to preclude 

summary judgment as to whether Defendants asked Watson which pharmacy he 

used, looked into the reportedly missing heart medications, or informed Watson of 

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the procedure for seeing a doctor to discuss his missing heart medications after 

Watson repeatedly told Defendants that he had a heart problem and needed his 

missing heart medications. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgement, and the Court rejects the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion and 

recommendation to the contrary.

6. Eighth Objection

Watson’s eighth objection is to a portion of the Report and Recommendation 

that discusses Potvin v. City of Westland Police Dep’t, No. 05-CV-70291, 2006 

WL 3247116 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2006). The Magistrate Judge distinguished the 

case, stating: 

Potvin is factually distinguishable because not only were the 

defendants aware of the medical condition at issue, they deliberately 

discarded her medication. Moreover, after it was determined that the 

medications had been either destroyed or discarded, the officials in 

Potvin opted to release the plaintiff from jail that same day, rather 

than hold her until her previously planned release date two days later. 

Thus, there was evidence that the officials were both aware of the 

facts from which an inference of a substantial risk of harm could be 

drawn, and they in fact drew that inference. The court also noted that 

the defendants failed to offer any rebuttal to plaintiff’s versions of 

events. Yet, in the present case, there is no evidence that the 

defendants drew an inference of a substantial risk of harm.

(Doc # 39, Pg ID 487-88) (emphasis in original). Watson argues that there was no 

actual finding that the defendants in Potvin deliberately discarded her medications. 

After review of the Report and Recommendation, Watson’s Objections, 

Defendants’ Response, and the case, the Court sustains Watson’s eighth objection 

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to the extent that there was no actual finding that the defendants in Potvin

deliberately discarded the plaintiff’s medications. See Potvin, 2006 WL 3247116

at *11-12. However, the Magistrate Judge also distinguished Potvin on a second 

ground, which Watson did not object to—the fact that the defendants in Potvin

opted to release the plaintiff from jail earlier than previously planned. 

Nevertheless and contrary to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion, the Court finds, as 

discussed above, that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Watson, 

there is circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that 

Defendants drew an inference of a substantial risk of harm to Watson. 

7. Ninth Objection

Watson’s ninth objection is to a portion of the Report and Recommendation 

that discusses Flores v. Lenawee Cnty., No. 07-11288, 2008 WL 4601404 (E.D. 

Mich. Oct. 15, 2008). The Magistrate Judge distinguished the case, stating: 

In Flores, the defendants had the plaintiff’s medications in their 

possession and failed to dispense them. In addition, Judge Lawson 

pointed to specific evidence of “vindictiveness” by the defendants 

which he concluded presented a question of fact. As to one defendant, 

there was evidence that Flores cried[,] “[H]elp me[, h]elp me,” but her 

cries were ignored. As to another defendant, there was evidence that 

he failed to give Flores her medications because he was too busy and 

was aware that she had been “begging” for her medications. As to yet 

another defendant, there was testimony that the deputies were 

overheard stating that Flores was not receiving her medications as 

punishment for the crimes she had committed. . . . There is no such 

similar evidence in the present case, which would tip the scales into 

finding a question of fact on the issue of deliberate indifference . . . .

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(Doc # 39, Pg ID 488-89) Watson first argues that a showing of vindictiveness is 

not required for a finding of deliberate indifference. This portion of Watson’s 

ninth objection is overruled because the Magistrate Judge did not conclude 

otherwise or apply a vindictiveness standard. Watson next argues that there are 

questions of material fact in this case on the issue of deliberate indifference. The 

Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s interpretation of Flores itself. 

Nevertheless and contrary to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion, the Court 

concludes that there is evidence in the present case that tips the scales into finding 

a question of fact on the issue of deliberate indifference, as discussed above. 

Accordingly, this portion of Watson’s ninth objection is sustained, and the Court 

rejects this portion of the Report and Recommendation.

8. Tenth Objection

Watson’s tenth objection is to a portion of the Report and Recommendation 

that discusses Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 2006). The 

Magistrate Judge distinguished the case, stating: 

Lastly, Clark-Murphy is distinguishable because it involved an 

interlocutory appeal on the issue of qualified immunity. The Court 

concluded that while the evidence did not show that the defendants 

singly or as a group showed deliberate indifference, for summary 

judgment purposes, they “could have perceived a substantial risk of 

serious harm to Clark.” . . . Consequently, the defendants were not 

entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The facts showed 

that all defendants were appraised that the plaintiff required 

psychiatric treatment, but took the position that since someone had 

notified healthcare, they did not need to worry about it further. Many 

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were also aware of the water being turned off in plaintiff’s cell. The 

plaintiff later died of dehydration. Given the differing procedural 

posture (the record here has been fully developed through discovery), 

and the vastly different facts, the Court does not find this case to be 

helpful in analyzing the present circumstances.

(Doc # 39, Pg ID 489) Watson argues that some of the facts in Clark-Murphy are 

analogous to the instant case, so the case should not have been dismissed for 

procedural reasons. After review of the Report and Recommendation, Watson’s 

Objections, Defendants’ Response, and the case, the Court overrules Watson’s 

tenth objection. Rather than disregarding the case, as Watson contends, and in 

addition to noting the different procedural posture, the Magistrate Judge found that 

the facts in Clark-Murphy were quite different from the facts in the instant case. 

The Court agrees that the cases are not factually analogous in many respects. 

9. Eleventh Objection

Watson’s eleventh and last objection is to the Magistrate Judge’s ultimate 

conclusion that Watson has not met the subjective prong of the deliberate 

indifference inquiry. This objection is overruled as an improper general objection. 

See Howard, 932 F.2d at 509. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the Court finds 

that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Watson, there remain 

genuine issues of material fact regarding Kading and Schieman’s actions that 

preclude summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court rejects this portion of the 

Report and Recommendation.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Stephanie Dawkins Davis’s Report 

and Recommendation (Doc # 39) is ADOPTED IN PART and REJECTED IN 

PART as set forth above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed 

by Defendants Willow Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Port Huron Hospital Industrial 

Health; Sarah Kading, LPN; and Brandi Schieman, LPN (Doc # 30) is DENIED

for the reasons set forth above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is set for a Final Pretrial 

Conference on Monday, May 15, 2017 at 2:30 p.m.. The proposed Joint Final 

Pretrial Order must be submitted by May 8, 2017. The jury trial is set for Tuesday, 

June 27, 2017 at 9:00 a.m..

Dated: March 31, 2017 s/Denise Page Hood

Chief, U.S. District Court

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of 

record on March 31, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/LaShawn R. Saulsberry

Case Manager

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