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Filed 3/3/15 P. v. Hughes CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONALD PIERRE HUGHES,

Defendant and Appellant.

C071536

(Super. Ct. No. TF036608A)

Defendant Ronald Pierre Hughes was charged in a first amended information with 

assault with intent to commit rape during the commission of a first degree burglary (Pen. 

Code, § 220, subd. (b); count 1)1 and two counts of first degree burglary (§ 459; counts 2 

& 3). Counts 1 and 2 are based on the same incident. At his arraignment, defendant 

pleaded guilty to the first degree burglary charges (counts 2 & 3), and thereafter was tried 

and convicted by a jury of the more serious charge of assault with intent to commit rape 

during the commission of a first degree burglary (count 1). The trial court sentenced 

defendant to an aggregate term of life plus four years in state prison, consisting of life 

 

1

 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

with the possibility of parole on count 1, and a consecutive four years on count 3. The 

trial court imposed and stayed defendant’s sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654.

Defendant appeals. His primary contention is that his trial and conviction on

count 1 following the trial court’s acceptance of his plea of guilty to count 2, a lesser 

included offense of count 1, violated the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state 

Constitutions. Alternatively, he claims that his conviction for count 2 must be dismissed

because it is a lesser included offense of count 1. Defendant also asserts claims of 

instructional error and ineffective assistance of counsel.

We shall modify the judgment to dismiss defendant’s conviction on count 2, and 

affirm the judgment as modified. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At his arraignment on December 15, 2011, defendant indicated that he wanted to 

enter guilty pleas to both counts of first degree burglary (counts 2 & 3). The prosecutor 

cautioned that “[b]y . . . pleading guilty to Count 2, he’s essentially admitting to the 

enhancement of the [section] 220, which is a lifetime -- it’s basically life -- life -- a life 

sentence. So by doing that, I just want to make sure that [defendant] understands that, 

that he’s already -- one of the enhancements for the life sentence is in play now, that if he 

gets convicted on that [section] 220, it’s an automatic life sentence. I mean that is my 

plan to convict him on that, but I just want to make sure that he understands that what 

he’s doing right now is essentially getting to the first step of that enhancement. It’s very 

unusual for people to do this this soon.” Defendant said he understood what the 

prosecutor had said and confirmed that he had discussed the matter with his trial counsel. 

After advising defendant of the consequences of his pleas, the trial court asked the 

prosecutor to set forth a factual basis for counts 2 and 3. The prosecutor recited the 

following factual basis for count 2: “On September 2nd, 2011, the defendant entered the 

home of the victims, which is located in Tracy, California. . . . When he entered the 

home, he had the intent to commit the [sections] 220 or 261(a)(2) [(forcible rape)]. [¶] 
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Again, Judge, [defendant] shouldn’t be pleading to this right now. When he entered the 

home, he attacked the victim in this matter, took off her underwear. She screamed. He 

attacked her. He struck her. She left the apartment.” The trial court found there was a

factual basis for counts 2 and 3, accepted defendant’s guilty pleas as to those counts, and 

set count 1 for trial.

Trial on count 1 commenced on February 14, 2012. The following evidence was 

adduced during the prosecution’s case-in-chief: At approximately 5:00 a.m. on 

September 2, 2011, Jane Doe was asleep with her nine-month-old baby when she heard a 

sound coming from the bathroom of her one bedroom apartment. Believing her 

boyfriend and father of her baby had returned from out of town, she went to the bathroom 

and called out, “Can I help you?” She pulled on the door knob, but the person inside the 

bathroom pulled the door shut. At that point, her baby began to cry, and she turned to 

return to her bedroom. As she did so, the person inside the bathroom, later identified as 

defendant, came up behind her and pushed her face down on her bed. He then straddled 

her as she lay on her back and demanded money. Doe told him she did not have any 

money and attempted to grab her cell phone. Defendant told her he had a gun and 

threatened to kill her if she reached for anything else. Doe kicked, screamed, and bit 

defendant, and defendant punched her in the head four times. Defendant continued to 

demand money, and Doe explained she was unemployed and did not have any money. 

Defendant remarked, “You got something in here,” and when Doe assured him she did 

not, defendant said, “Well, you’re gonna give me something.” He then motioned to unzip 

his pants, and Doe kicked him in the genitals. Defendant removed Doe’s underwear, 

pulled her toward him by her legs, and slid his hand up her thigh toward her vagina. He 

did not touch her vagina because she fought him off. Defendant eventually stopped and 

ran out of the apartment. At one point, Doe asked defendant if he was “going to rape me 

in front of [my] baby?” Defendant said he did not want to hurt her baby. Defendant 

never said he was going to rape her.
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When defendant left, Doe called 911, and police were dispatched to her apartment 

at approximately 5:50 a.m. When they arrived, Doe was hysterical and shaking. Doe’s 

bed was unmade, and there was a pair of white underwear on the floor next to the bed. 

There were muddy footprints outside the bathroom window, inside the apartment leading 

from the bathroom to the bedroom, and leading from Doe’s apartment to defendant’s 

nearby apartment. Mud also was smeared on the bed sheets. Defendant’s fingerprints 

were found on the exterior of the bathroom window and on the interior bathroom door 

handle. Doe had scratch marks on the left side of her face and neck and injuries to her 

upper and lower lips.

A few days prior to the attack, defendant asked Doe where her boyfriend was, and 

she told him that he was in Chicago. Defendant asked her when her boyfriend would 

return, and she said she did not know. Defendant told Doe that he had his eye on her for 

quite some time.

At the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the transcript of the prior 

proceeding during which defendant entered his guilty pleas to counts 2 and 3 was 

admitted into evidence, and a portion of that transcript, including the factual basis for 

count 2, was read to the jury.

Defendant testified in his defense at trial and confirmed much of Doe’s testimony 

concerning his entry into the apartment, the subsequent struggle, including punching Doe 

in the head multiple times, and his demands for money. He denied that he intended to 

sexually assault her and said that he only was looking for money or something of value. 

He pushed Doe onto the bed because he thought she was “running for a weapon or a 

phone.” He denied ever getting on top of Doe or being on the bed, and when asked about 

the mud on the bed sheets, he said he used his feet to block her kicks while she was on 

the bed. He admitted Doe’s “underwear got pulled down,” but denied that he did so 

intentionally, stating that his “hand may have pulled her underwear while [he was] trying 

to get away from her.” As for Doe’s claim that he slid his hand up her thigh toward her 
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vagina, defendant said that his arm rubbed against her thigh as he was knocking her legs 

away. Defendant knew that Doe had a baby and that her boyfriend was not around but 

denied telling her he was interested in her a few days before the incident. Rather, he

asked her about her boyfriend and told her to have her boyfriend call him. Another man 

“initiated something with her and . . . was talking to her while she was walking away.” 

When asked why he did not leave after Doe told him she had no money, he said he tried 

to leave but “she was stead[ily] kicking and punching and grabbing me.” Defendant was 

in Doe’s apartment for 10 to 15 minutes.

DISCUSSION

I

Defendant’s Continued Prosecution for Assault with Intent to Commit Rape During the 

Commission of a First Degree Burglary (Count 1) Following His Plea of Guilty to First 

Degree Burglary as Charged in Count 2 Did Not Violate Double Jeopardy

Defendant claims that “the trial court’s acceptance of his plea of guilty to first 

degree burglary of Jane Doe as charged in count 2 (a lesser included offense of count 1) 

barred his subsequent trial and conviction of count 1 as a violation of double 

jeopardy . . . .” As we shall explain, double jeopardy is not implicated here. 

“The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Unites States 

Constitution guarantees that no person shall ‘be subject for the same offense to be twice 

put in jeopardy of life or limb,’ and is made applicable to the states through the due 

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] [¶] Protection against double 

jeopardy is also embodied in article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, which 

declares that ‘[p]ersons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense.’ ” 

(People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 297-298.) While defendant is correct that first 

degree burglary and assault with intent to commit rape during the commission of a first 

degree robbery constitute the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy (see People 

v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, 660 [“greater and lesser included offenses constitute the 

‘same offense’ for purposes of double jeopardy”], overruled on other grounds in People 
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v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 550, fn. 6; People v. Dyser (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1015, 

1021 [first degree burglary is lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit rape 

during the commission of a first degree burglary]), the state’s continued prosecution of 

defendant following his guilty plea did not violate double jeopardy.

The double jeopardy clause does not prohibit the state from prosecuting a 

defendant for multiple offenses in a single prosecution. (Ohio v. Johnson (1984) 467 

U.S. 493, 500 [81 L. Ed. 2d 425, 434].) It protects against a second prosecution for the 

same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, 

and multiple punishments in successive proceedings for the same offense. (Id. at pp. 

497-498.) 

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Johnson is instructive. 

There, the defendant was indicted for four offenses arising from the same incident and 

pleaded guilty to two of the offenses--involuntary manslaughter and grand theft. (Ohio v. 

Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 494.) Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendant’s 

motion to dismiss the other two more serious charges--murder and aggravated robbery--

“on the ground that because of his guilty pleas, further prosecution on the more serious 

offenses was barred by the double jeopardy prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments.” (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that 

“prosecuting [the defendant] on the two more serious charges would not constitute the 

type of ‘multiple prosecution’ prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” (Ibid.) The 

court explained that “[n]o interest of [the defendant] protected by the Double Jeopardy 

Clause is implicated by continuing prosecution on the remaining charges brought in the 

indictment. Here [the defendant] offered only to resolve part of the charges against him, 

while the State objected to disposing of any of the counts against [defendant] without a 

trial. [The defendant] has not been exposed to conviction on the charges to which he 

pleaded not guilty, nor has the State had the opportunity to marshal its evidence and 

resources more than once or to hone its presentation of its case through a trial. The 
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acceptance of a guilty plea to lesser included offenses while charges on the greater 

offenses remain pending, moreover, has none of the implications of an ‘implied acquittal’ 

which results from a verdict convicting a defendant on lesser included offenses rendered 

by a jury charged to consider both greater and lesser included offenses. [Citations.] 

There simply has been none of the governmental overreaching that double jeopardy is 

supposed to prevent. On the other hand, ending prosecution now would deny the State its 

right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws. 

[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 501-502.)

The court’s reasoning in Ohio v. Johnson is equally applicable here, where 

defendant offered to plead guilty to counts 2 and 3 with the understanding that he would 

thereafter be tried on count 1. Defendant had not been exposed to conviction on count 1 

prior to his trial on the same. Nor has there been any of the governmental overreaching 

that double jeopardy is supposed to prevent. Accordingly, we hold that defendant’s 

continued prosecution on count 1 following his plea of guilty to count 2 did not violate 

double jeopardy.

II

Defendant’s Conviction for First Degree Burglary as Charged in Count 2 Must Be 

Dismissed Because First Degree Burglary Is a Lesser Included Offense of Assault with 

Intent to Commit Rape During the Commission of a First Degree Burglary

Defendant contends, and the People agree, that defendant’s conviction for first 

degree burglary as charged in count 2 must be dismissed because first degree burglary is 

a lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit rape during the commission of a

first degree burglary. We agree and shall dismiss count 2.

“In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to 

convictions ‘of any number of the offenses charged.’ [Citations.] But a judicially created 

exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included 

offenses. [Citations.]” (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034.)
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As previously discussed, first degree burglary is lesser included offense of assault 

with intent to commit rape during the commission of a first degree burglary. (People v. 

Dyser, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1021.) Accordingly, we will dismiss count 2. 

III

Any Error in Failing to Instruct the Jury on First Degree Burglary as a Lesser Included 

Offense of Assault with Intent to Commit Rape in the Commission of a First Degree 

Burglary Was Harmless

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct 

the jury on first degree burglary as a lesser included offense of assault with intent to 

commit rape in the commission of a first degree burglary. As we shall explain, any error

was harmless.

“ ‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial 

court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the 

evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those 

principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are 

necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘That 

obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when 

the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense 

were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than 

that charged.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239.) Assuming for 

argument’s sake that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on first degree 

burglary as a lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit rape during the 

commission of a first degree burglary, we conclude that any such error was harmless. 

We review an erroneous failure to instruct on lesser included offenses for 

prejudice according to the standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. 

(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955.) “ ‘[U]nder Watson, a defendant must 

show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent 

the error.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on 
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what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the 

absence of the error under consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate court 

may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing 

judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so 

comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the 

defendant complains affected the result.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 956, italics omitted.)

While the jury in this case was not instructed on the lesser included offense of first 

degree burglary, it was instructed on the lesser offense of simple assault. Thus, contrary 

to defendant’s assertion, the jury was not left with an all or nothing proposition. Had the 

jury believed that defendant did not intend to rape Doe, it could have found him guilty of 

the lesser offense of simple assault. It did not. Moreover, the evidence defendant 

intended to rape Doe is strong. He knew Doe’s boyfriend was gone when he entered her 

apartment; he entered the apartment early in the morning when Doe was likely to be 

home; when Doe told defendant she did not have any money, he told her she was “gonna

give [him] something”; there was mud smeared on the bed sheets indicating defendant, 

who had muddy shoes, had been on the bed; defendant pulled down Doe’s underwear; 

Doe’s underwear was on the floor when the police arrived; defendant remained in the 

apartment after Doe told him she did not have any money; and he did not take anything 

when he left. Although defendant testified that he accidentally pulled Doe’s underwear 

down and denied intending to rape her, such evidence was relatively weak when 

compared to the evidence he did intend to rape Doe cited above. 

Given the evidence and the jury’s failure to find defendant guilty of the lesser 

offense of simple assault, we find that there is no reasonable probability defendant would 

have received a more favorable result at trial had the jury been instructed on the lesser 

included offense of first degree burglary.
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IV

Defendant Has Not Demonstrated That but for Counsel’s Alleged Errors, He Would 

Have Obtained a More Favorable Result at Trial

Defendant argues that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance “by failing to 

object to the factual-basis statement proffered by the prosecutor -- which admitted all the 

elements of count 1 -- either at the time it was made or later when it was introduced [into]

evidence at the trial on count 1.” We need not determine whether counsel’s alleged 

errors amounted to ineffective assistance because defendant has not demonstrated a 

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error, the result would have been more 

favorable to him. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 

674, 698 (Strickland).)

After advising defendant of the consequences of his guilty pleas, the trial court 

asked the prosecutor for a “factual basis . . . as to Count 2 and Count 3.” The prosecutor 

recited the following factual basis as to count 2: “On September 2nd, 2011, the 

defendant entered the home of the victims, which is located in Tracy, California. . . . 

When he entered the home, he had the intent to commit the 220 or 261(a)(2). [¶] . . . 

When he entered the home, he attacked the victim in this matter, took off her underwear. 

She screamed. He attacked her. He struck her. She left the apartment.” Defendant’s 

trial counsel did not object to the factual basis, and the trial court found there was a 

factual basis for defendant’s pleas to counts 2 and 3. Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty 

to counts 2 and 3. The transcript containing the factual basis for defendant’s guilty plea 

to count 2 was admitted into evidence at his trial on count 1 and was referenced by the 

prosecutor during his opening statement, cross-examination of defendant, and closing 

argument.

Defendant first contends that his trial counsel’s conduct was so egregious as to 

constitute a complete abandonment under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 [80 L.Ed.2d 657] (Cronic).) “Under Cronic, 
11

if defense counsel ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful 

adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes 

the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable,’ and the conviction must be 

reversed without further prejudice analysis. (Id. at p. 659.) ‘A complete denial of 

counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings’ is sufficient to trigger the Cronic 

presumption of prejudice. (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 86.) ‘But when 

the defendant is represented by counsel, the [Cronic] presumption of prejudice will only 

stand when counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful 

adversarial testing. (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 695; Cronic, at p. 659.)’ 

(Benavides, at p. 86.) Otherwise, ‘specific errors and omissions’ by trial counsel must 

generally be litigated as ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland. 

(Cronic, at p. 657, fn. 20.)” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1169-1170

(Banks).) 

In Banks, the defendant’s trial counsel told the jury during her opening statement 

that the evidence would show that her client admitted to being present at the scene of the 

murder he was charged with committing but denied shooting the murder victim or raping 

a second victim. (Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 1168-1169.) After being advised that 

the prosecutor did not intend to introduce the defendant’s confession, defense counsel did 

not persist, and during closing argument reminded the jury that some of the evidence the 

parties discussed during their opening statements was not presented and that “ ‘[w]hat we 

said in opening statements and what we say now is not evidence in the case. What came 

from the stand is the evidence in the case.’ ” (Id. at p. 1170.) “Furthermore, counsel did 

not concede any critical element of the . . . murder, the robbery special circumstance, the 

attempted murder, or the rape charges.” (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court held that the 

“defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be analyzed under Strickland

because his ‘argument is not that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout 

the . . . proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points.’ 
12

(Bell v. Cone, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 697; see In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727-

728.)” (Ibid.) The same is true here.

In the present case, defendant’s trial counsel failed to object when (1) the 

prosecutor included factual allegations not contained in the information and unnecessary 

to defendant’s plea in his recitation of the factual basis for count 2. He also failed to

object when the prosecutor introduced the transcript containing the factual basis for count 

2 at the trial on count 1 and attempted to use defendant’s failure to object to the same to 

argue that defendant admitted removing Doe’s underwear and intending to rape her. 

Contrary to defendant’s assertion, however, defense counsel’s failure to object to the 

factual statement did not amount to an admission of the truth of the factual allegations 

recited by the prosecutor as a matter of law. (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 

50-51.)2 While the prosecutor argued that such was the case, defense counsel never 

conceded those “facts” at defendant’s trial on count 1.

3

 To the contrary, defense counsel 

argued defendant was not guilty of count 1 because he did not intend to rape Doe. 

During his opening statement, he told the jury that “[t]his case is about what 

[defendant’s] intent was” and asserted that the evidence would not show that defendant 

intended to rape Doe. During his direct examination of defendant, he elicited testimony 

that defendant did not intend to remove Doe’s underwear or sexually assault her in any 

 

2

 For this reason we reject defendant’s claim that “[t]he admissions made . . . in 

connection with [defendant’s] plea of guilty to count 2, . . . were obtained in violation of 

his constitutional rights to trial by jury, to confrontation, and against self-incrimination.” 

As just discussed, the failure to object to the factual basis did not amount to an admission. 

(People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 50-51.) 

3

 The prosecutor’s argument was essentially that defendant’s failure to object amounted 

to an admission under Evidence Code section 1221, the adoptive admission exception to 

the hearsay rule. Evidence Code section 1221 provides: “Evidence of a statement 

offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one 

of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct 

manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.” 
13

way, chose Doe’s apartment because the window was open, and entered the apartment 

intending to steal money or other valuables. During his closing argument, defense 

counsel argued defendant did not intend to rape Doe, emphasizing defendant’s repeated 

demands for money and his explanation that his hand got caught on Doe’s underwear

during the struggle. He also suggested that defendant’s hands were at his waist because 

he was attempting to protect his genitals from Doe’s kicks and not because he was 

attempting to unzip his pants.

Because this is not a case where defense counsel entirely failed to subject the 

prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, defendant’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim must be analyzed under Strickland. (Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1170.)4

In order to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland, defendant must show that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) 

Where no prejudice showing has been made, we need not determine whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient. (Id. at p. 697.)

At trial, defendant admitted many of the factual allegations contained in the 

prosecutor’s factual basis, including entering the apartment, pushing Doe onto the bed, 

striking Doe, and pulling down Doe’s underwear. Moreover, there was strong evidence

defendant intended to do more than just steal money or valuables--he knew Doe’s 

boyfriend was gone when he entered her apartment, he had previously stated he had his 

eye on her, he entered the apartment at a time Doe would likely be home, he failed to 

 

4

 As defendant points out, the “Cronic exception” was applied where defense counsel 

conceded during argument that there was no reasonable doubt as to the only factual issues 

in dispute, and therefore conveyed to the jury that counsel believed his client to be guilty. 

(United States v. Swanson (9th Cir. 1991) 943 F.2d 1070.) As detailed above, nothing 

comparable occurred here.
14

leave after Doe told him she had no money, he did not take anything when he left, there 

was mud smeared on the bed sheets indicating defendant had been on the bed, and Doe’s 

underwear was on the floor next to the bed when the police arrived. On this record, we 

find there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a more 

favorable result at trial had the jury not learned about the factual basis given by the 

prosecutor for count 2 and defendant’s failure to object thereto.

We reach the same conclusion with respect to defendant’s assertion that his trial 

counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the prosecutor repeatedly asked 

defendant whether he believed Doe was a “liar” or was “lying” when she testified at trial. 

These isolated omissions do not fall within the Cronic exception; thus, they are subject to 

the Strickland analysis, and for the reasons set forth above, we conclude there is no 

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s 

challenged questioning of defendant, the result would have been more favorable to him. 

Accordingly, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail.

V

Cumulative Error

Finally, defendant contends the cumulative effect of the alleged errors was 

prejudicial. The premise behind the cumulative error doctrine is that while a number of 

errors may be harmless taken individually, their cumulative effect requires reversal. 

(People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189.) Any of the potential errors identified above 

“were harmless, whether considered individually or collectively. Defendant was entitled 

to a fair trial but not a perfect one. [Citations.]” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 926, 1009.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to dismiss defendant’s conviction on count 2 (first 

degree burglary). As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to 
15

prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a copy of the amended abstract to 

the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

 BLEASE , J.

We concur:

 RAYE , P. J.

 MURRAY , J.