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i 

68–462 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–61] 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS 

AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES FROM 

FORMER CHAIRMEN OF THE JOINT 

CHIEFS OF STAFF 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, September 8, 2011, The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from Former Chairmen of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff ............................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, September 8, 2011 ................................................................................. 45 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2011 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN 

YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES FROM FORMER CHAIRMEN OF 

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Andrews, Hon. Robert, a Representative from New Jersey, Committee on 

Armed Services ..................................................................................................... 2 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Giambastiani, ADM Edmund P., Jr., USN (Ret.), Former Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .................................................................................. 8 

Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF (Ret.), Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff ................................................................................................................... 4 

Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC (Ret.), Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff ....................................................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Giambastiani, ADM Edmund P., Jr. ............................................................... 66 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 49 

Myers, Gen. Richard B. .................................................................................... 53 

Pace, Gen. Peter ............................................................................................... 59 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 86 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 81 

(1) 

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. 

MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES 

FROM FORMER CHAIRMEN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 

STAFF 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, September 8, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The committee will come to order. 

We have a very special hearing today. We have very special witnesses with us, and we are all back from our summer work period. 

Everybody looks rested, tanned, excited, ready to go. 

And we have a brand new member of our committee, Kathy 

Hochul. We just had a nice visit in back before we came out, and 

she introduced herself, told me a little bit about her, and I am really looking forward to getting to know her better and working with 

her on the committee. She said she is wanting to reach across the 

aisle and work well together, so I know we are going to have a 

great time together. 

Welcome to the committee. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Largest committee in Congress, and when you 

are sitting way down there it seems like it will take forever to get 

up here. It goes pretty fast. 

Good morning, all. The House Armed Services Committee meets 

this morning to receive testimony on ‘‘The Future of the National 

Defense and the U.S. Military Ten Years After 9/11.’’ Perspectives 

of former Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

are here with us. As our Nation marks the 10th year anniversary 

of the attacks on our Nation this Sunday, we remember and commemorate the lives lost on that day. We also honor the sacrifices 

made every day since then by our military and their families, as 

our Armed Forces have taken the fight to the enemy to ensure our 

continued safety here at home. 

This somber marker serves as a call for reflection. Therefore, the 

committee will undertake a series of hearings over the next month 

to evaluate the lessons learned and to apply those lessons to decisions we will soon be making about the future of our force. 
2 

With the decade mark approaching, our Nation finds itself at a 

strategic juncture. Osama bin Laden is dead. Al Qaeda is on its 

back. The Taliban has lost its strategic momentum in Afghanistan, 

and Iraq is an emerging democracy. 

Yet with success comes the danger of complacency that will erode 

our resolve. Faced with serious economic challenges, we are slipping back into the September 10th mentality that a solid defense 

can be dictated by budget choices, not strategic ones. 

As members of the Armed Services Committee, our duty is to 

make sure that the choices we make concerning the Federal budget 

are dictated by our National Security Strategy, not the other way 

around. I believe the Department of Defense has already absorbed 

more than its fair share of cuts, over a half-trillion dollars through 

2021. Nevertheless, if the Joint Select Committee’s recommendations are not adopted, an additional half a trillion could be taken 

away from our military automatically. What is more, the White 

House has told DOD [Department of Defense] to include similar 

levels of cuts in next year’s budget request. Therefore, it would appear that regardless of what actions Congress takes, the Administration will propose to cut the military further. 

As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I have two principal concerns that stem from recent military atrophy. The first is 

a security issue. In a networked and globalized world, the Atlantic 

and Pacific Ocean are no longer adequate to keep America safe. 

September 11th taught us that. 

The second is an economic concern. While it is true that our military power is derived from our economic power, we must recognize 

that this relation is symbiotic. Cuts to our military defense, either 

by eliminating programs or laying off soldiers, comes with an economic cost. While the U.S. military is the modern era’s greatest 

champion of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, it is time 

that we focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of the debt instead 

of the protector of our prosperity. 

With that in mind, I look forward to a provocative and enlightening discussion this morning. 

Mr. Andrews. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT ANDREWS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW JERSEY, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me wish you 

an early happy birthday. I understand tomorrow is your birthday. 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yeah. 

Mr. ANDREWS. We wish you many, many more years of good 

health and good life. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ANDREWS. It is great to have you as a friend. 

Mr. Smith is on his way. He will be joining us for the hearing, 

but I would ask unanimous consent that his opening statement be 

entered in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 
3 

Mr. ANDREWS. And just briefly, I would like to make a couple 

comments which I share with Mr. Smith and I think reflect the 

spirit of his comments as well. One is a reflection of thanksgiving 

and success; the second is to challenge orthodoxy; and the third is 

to encourage us to think strategically. 

The success that the United States has had in the 10 years since 

9/11 is very significant. By citing this success, we by no means are 

saying that we should let our guard down. We are by no means declaring an unconditional victory and saying, don’t worry about 

these risks anymore. Nothing could be farther from the truth. 

But let us take a moment and praise and thank the men and 

women both in and out of uniform that brought us these successes 

for the last 10 years. 

And these three witnesses this morning, Mr. Chairman, are excellent witnesses to educate us but also to hear our words of praise 

because each of the three of them has played a pivotal role in the 

success that we have seen, and I suppose one of the many highlights was the successful operation on the 1st of May in Pakistan 

against Osama bin Laden. And we understand that there were tens 

of thousands of Americans who stood behind that operation, who 

did the hard work out of the limelight and succeeded. And they 

were supported by millions of both uniformed and non-uniformed 

personnel. 

We thank each one of them, and we are glad that the three of 

you are here to receive that thanks. 

We would encourage people to challenge orthodoxy. We have had 

a stale debate in this country for a long time about the deficit. And 

one side says it is a spending problem; the other side says it is a 

revenue problem. We think it is both, and we think that a fair and 

reasonable approach to solving this problem must consider both, 

and the same applies to the military debate that we have had 

about more versus less. 

We think we should think strategically and that the choice between a secure country and a smaller military budget is a false 

choice. If we think strategically, find the areas of common agreement based upon that strategic thinking, we think that we certainly can have both a more secure country and more modest outlays in this area. 

Reaching that strategic objective requires us to do two things. 

One is to check our ideology at the door, and the second is to listen 

to and learn from those who have done the real work of protecting 

the country, to educate us about where reductions in expenditures 

can be made, where they cannot be made, where investments are 

fruitful and where they are not. 

This committee, Mr. Chairman, is not only the largest in the 

House, I think it is maybe the best, certainly one of the best, in 

the House because there has been a long tradition that has been 

extended under your chairmanship of an apolitical approach to 

solving our country’s problems. I think you have been very much 

a part of that. I hope we can conduct these hearings in that same 

spirit, listen to each other, learn from the witnesses, and find a 

way forward that secures our country. 

I thank you. 
4 

The CHAIRMAN. Now let me welcome General Richard Myers, 

General Peter Pace, Admiral Edmund Giambastiani. 

I say that like an Irishman. Gentlemen, it is good to have you 

back before the committee to provide your perspectives on how the 

military has evolved since 2001 and how we should apply the lessons of the last 10 years to the future of our force. Your unique perspectives as leaders of the U.S. military during the Nation’s past 

decade of war is vital in understanding where our military goes 

from here. Thanks in no small measure to your leadership in the 

days and the years following 9/11, the U.S. military has kept our 

country safe. 

I think the day after 9/11, even later that day, all of us around 

this Capitol were expecting further attacks, and probably none of 

us at that time would have thought that we would go 10 years 

without another major attack on our homeland. You really helped 

to see that that was so. We are grateful for your continued service 

to our Nation and your presence here today. 

We will hear first from General Myers. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF (RET.), 

FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the committee members for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

First, I would like to thank you all for your unwavering support 

of our service men and women as they dedicate their lives to our 

freedom. The support from this committee for our military has been 

stalwart for many decades, and from those of us that used to wear 

the uniform, we really appreciate that. 

This country has been at war for the last 10 years. The burden 

of our conflicts and engagement around the world has fallen predominantly on the shoulders of the U.S. military and their families. 

The resilience of our Active Duty and Reserve troops has been remarkable. 

However, as our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down and 

it presents the opportunity for fewer people forward deployed, now 

is not the time to lessen support for our fighting force. 

The best thing we can do for our men and women in uniform as 

they strive to protect us is to provide them with good leadership, 

robust training, and world-class equipment. For the last 10 years 

we have done this. Given our fiscal concerns, the question is, what 

support is America willing to provide going forward? 

Even though our forward deployed troops are predicted to be 

fewer in number in the near future, the threats to our security are 

still very great. Let me mention just three of these concerns. I believe that violent extremism continues to represent the biggest 

threat to our way of life. And while Al Qaeda is badly wounded, 

they and their ilk are not finished in their quest for a different 

world, a world dominated by their extreme brand of Islam and little tolerance. 

Living as we do in a free society, we will always be at risk to 

those who wish us ill, who are willing to die for their cause, and 

who consider innocent men, women, and children legitimate targets 

in their fight. The actions of the last 10 years have made us safer 

than we were on 9/11, but we are not free from this scourge. It will 
5 

take many years, a comprehensive multinational strategy, and the 

focus of all instruments of national power, including the military 

instrument of national power, to make this world safe from this 

threat. 

The nexus between violent extremism and the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction is another concern for our security. 

There is no question that if terrorists could obtain weapons of mass 

destruction, they would use them to maximum advantage for their 

cause. In this regard, Iran is particularly troubling. 

Iran’s quest for nuclear weapon capabilities is disturbing for several reasons. Chief among these is the proliferation threat from 

Iran’s newly acquired nuclear capability. If fissile material or a nuclear weapon were to fall in the hands of a terrorist group, the impact could be much greater than the tragedy of 9/11. The fact that 

we have little apparent leverage over Iran’s actions makes this 

threat all the more concerning. And if Iran does develop a nuclear 

weapon capability, that would dramatically increase the potential 

for the development of nuclear weapons in the region. Obviously, 

this would be destabilizing. Regardless of the solution to the Iranian problem, a strong military will be necessary for any successful 

outcome. 

And, finally, the Asia-Pacific region has experienced unprecedented economic prosperity over the last several decades. As a Pacific nation, we must realize and remind ourselves that the prosperity of the Asia-Pacific nations contributes significantly to our 

prosperity. The U.S. military has played an important role in helping to ensure the security and stability of this area. The forward 

stationing of our land, sea, and air forces has served us well, but 

our influence in the region is now being challenged by China. We 

will need highly capable sea, land, air, and space forces to deal 

with China’s anti-access, area denial efforts in this region that is 

so vital to our security and economic well-being. 

In addition to these and many other security concerns, we must 

realize the impact the reductions in defense spending will have on 

our force structure. History tells us that during reductions in defense spending, despite our best intentions, the procurement and 

research and development accounts take a disproportional share of 

the cuts. This leaves our Services without the modern equipment 

they need to replace old, outdated, and worn out equipment. As a 

Nation, we have always taken great pride in the fact that our military is the best equipped in the world. Deep budget cuts to defense 

will bring that fact into question. 

And, finally, we must be able to provide world-class health care 

to those who have been wounded in our current conflicts. As you 

know well, some of these wounds are visible, and some aren’t easily 

seen. Nevertheless, our obligation is to provide the best health care 

we can to those who have put their lives on the line for us. Health 

care is not cheap, but any reduction in health care resources would 

be breaking faith with those who willingly go in harm’s way. 

In my view, the world is a more dangerous and uncertain place 

today than it has been for decades. The three security concerns I 

have outlined above are all different in nature. However, they all 

will require a strong military to deal with them. Our historic lack 

of ability to predict where and when the next big threat to our se-
6 

curity is coming from is well known, but we can be certain that a 

security surprise is in our future. What stands between these 

threats and our freedom is the U.S. military. 

Our fiscal difficulties are serious indeed. So are the potential security challenges facing us. We don’t need to be the world’s policemen, but we do need to provide leadership in this uncertain world. 

Our military must remain strong with the best leadership, superior 

training, and the best equipment. In doing so, our men and women 

in uniform will help keep us free and provide the stability that ensures our prosperity. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Myers can be found in the 

Appendix on page 53.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. 

General Pace. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, USMC (RET.), FORMER 

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General PACE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

this opportunity. 

I have appeared before this committee many times before, but 

every time in uniform. This is my first opportunity to be here as 

a private citizen, and it is a uniquely different perspective, and I 

appreciate the opportunity. 

Although I don’t have the privilege of representing the incredible 

men and women who serve in our Armed Forces anymore, I do take 

pride and privilege in joining you in thanking them and their families for the sacrifice they have made in keeping us free. It has been 

a long 10 years, and they have really been taking good care of us. 

So thank you, sir, for your opening comments about that. 

As you know, the economy and defense are two sides of the same 

coin. To the extent that you strengthen one, you strengthen the 

other. To the extent that you weaken one, you weaken the other. 

But I think we need to be very careful when we get into the budget 

discussions, which are necessary, that we look at defense not from 

a dollar and cents perspective. It is a unique entity of what our 

government provides to its citizens, which is security. It should be 

strategy-based. What do you want your military to do for your 

country? Is it what we are doing today plus one other thing? What 

is it? 

If we know what the strategy is that we want our military to 

execute, then the folks across the river in the Pentagon who do this 

for a living can tell you how many planes, how many ships, how 

many troops they need to execute the combatant commander’s war 

plans. You can then apply budget numbers to that, and you will 

come up probably with numbers that are bigger than we can afford. 

Fair enough. 

But once we have the strategy and we know what it would cost 

to implement that strategy, then we can talk about additional risk 

by spending a little bit less here, spend a little bit less there. So 

I would simply urge this committee to please insist on a strategybased approach to how you fund your military. 

Next, there has been an incredible strain on our force. Less than 

1 percent of the Nation has been defending the other 99 percent 
7 

for 10 years. They are volunteers to do it. God bless them. They 

are doing extremely well. They are not complaining. But we have 

got troops and their families who have sustained 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 

deployments in the last 10 years. We have got moms and dads who 

are deploying away from their families every year or every other 

year. As we look at how to balance the budget, the message that 

Congress sends to the military and how you determine pay, and 

benefits and retirement, all of those will have significant impact on 

the men and women who serve today. 

Even today, as I walk through and I see Active Duty folks, the 

question they ask me, as they did when I was on Active Duty is, 

are the American people behind us? And it has been the absolute 

belief that even though some of our fellow citizens prefer that we 

not be fighting where we are, almost all appreciate the fact that 

we have warriors who are willing to put themselves in harm’s way, 

and that message has come across loud and clear, both from our 

fellow citizens in the way they have treated our returning soldiers 

and service members in airports around the country, but also the 

way that Congress has allocated resources. 

We need to be careful not to be premature in cutting back on the 

resources that we are allocating to our Armed Forces. This is 10 

years into a war that, unfortunately, our enemies have a war plan 

that calls for a 100-year war, and that does not mean we need to 

be in Afghanistan or Iraq or doing that size operation for 100 

years, but it does mean that we have a tenacious enemy. And even 

though we have had great success, as you pointed out in your opening comments, Mr. Chairman, that can quickly be overturned if we 

are not vigilant. So the allocation of resources are—will be very important, not only to the standpoint of our troops and their families 

and their ability to fight, but also in how our industrial base is able 

to raise to the challenge. 

As General Myers just said, we don’t know where the next challenge is coming from, but we have always had the ability to bring 

all of our strength to bear, which includes our industrial base. As 

we start allocating fewer resources, the impact on our industrial 

base must be looked at very carefully. We are very, very thin as 

a Nation in some of our capabilities, some of which could literally 

disappear overnight if we are not careful. 

Lastly, the challenge of which I am most concerned is not one of 

another nation, where we might have to deploy forces. You can go 

around the globe and talk about all the hot spots, and I know that 

our military today, if told to go do something, is capable of doing 

it and that it is simply a matter of deciding whether or not we 

want to apply what we know how to do, except in one area, and 

that area is cyber attack and cyber defense. 

The more anything is dependent on computers, the more vulnerable it is. And I know what we can do as a Nation as the attacker 

in cyber, and I know that we cannot defend against what we can 

do as a Nation. And therefore, as a military man, I have to presume that my enemies can either do the same thing, or they will 

be able to soon, or they may very well have something that we 

haven’t thought of yet. 

So as we look at the budget and we look at strategic places to 

apply it, certainly the growing concern of cyber must be taken into 
8 

account. Cyber is having and will continue to have an impact on 

the relations between nations similar to that of the advent of nuclear weapons, the difference being that nuclear weapons have 

been used and thank God have not been used again. Cyber weapons are being used thousands of times a day every day, and we are 

uniquely vulnerable. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for listening, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Pace can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. 

Admiral Giambastiani. 

STATEMENT OF ADM EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, JR., USN 

(RET.), FORMER VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 

STAFF 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, Chairman and members of 

the committee for inviting me to testify alongside the two gentlemen to my right, who I had the privilege of serving as vice chairman under. 

I would like to compliment all of you for holding this hearing and 

for discussing this incredibly important topic at an important time. 

Thank you also for your unwavering support of our men and 

women in uniform, and we look forward to continued strong support in that area. I know you will provide it. 

Not only are we here to remember the event that led to the pivotal change in our national strategy, National Security Strategy, 10 

years ago, we are here to undertake an important discussion of 

where we go from here. This discussion of our National Security 

Strategy is urgently needed and has been sorely lacking, in my 

view, in the recent debate about the greatest economic crisis our 

country has faced in the last eight decades. 

Our national security and economic health are, in fact, inextricably linked and interdependent. They must be considered together, and they must be addressed together. As you know, there 

are those who believe that drastic cuts should be made to our defense spending to help pay or help offset our Nation’s debts. If the 

new Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction does not reach its 

targeted level of cuts, unprecedented automatic cuts to defense will 

be triggered. Huge cuts to defense spending combined with little to 

no analysis of their impact on our overall national security would 

have devastating consequences, something I think is akin to performing brain surgery with a chainsaw. 

Further, I would characterize this debate as nothing less than 

determinative of what our role in the world will be in the future. 

Will we continue to be a global superpower and a force for good? 

Or will we allow ourselves to become one amongst many, forfeiting 

both the freedom of action and leadership role in the world which 

has done so much for our citizens and for free people everywhere. 

Providing for the national defense is the most fundamental responsibility of our Federal Government. I know I don’t have to tell 

this committee that. There are certainly ways to be more cost-effective, and it is unrealistic that the Department of Defense would be 

spared from shared sacrifices, but in my view, it is critical that we 
9 

analyze our spending levels in the proper context that you have 

been hearing already this morning. 

Our national security is the one area for which our Federal Government is solely responsible. There is little room for error. Our 

National Security Strategy must drive any debate over the level of 

resources that the Nation should devote to national defense, and 

the ability of the American economy to generate these resources 

must inform our strategic thinking. A failure to do so, a failure to 

do either is likely to cost the United States more in the long run 

in both dollars and unfortunately in lives. 

A lack of discussion and agreement about strategy will ensure 

that any cuts in our security budget will be driven by, at best, arbitrary budget targets rather than reasoned, strategic goals, rational 

operational concepts, and executable investment plans. 

Mr. Andrews, I thank you for your comments about listening to 

the people who, in fact, do this on a daily basis and, to this committee chairman, your comments about listening to the folks who 

work on these issues day in and day out. Thank you again for the 

opportunity to testify. 

I will submit the rest of my statement for the record, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Giambastiani can be found 

in the Appendix on page 66.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

As I alluded to in my opening statement, cuts to the military 

come with economic consequences as well as consequences for our 

national security. For example, let’s consider the impact of such 

cuts on end strength. In the event of a sequestration or a 10-percent reduction to the fiscal year 2013 budget request, military 

spending would be reduced by about $55 billion a year, starting 

next October. That is huge. If the Department chooses to shed end 

strength to meet just part of this goal, we could easily be back 

below pre-9/11 levels for the Army and Marine Corps. We already 

are below pre-9/11 levels for the Navy and the Air Force. 

A couple of years ago, Secretary Gates was giving speeches saying that we could not take the defense budget below 1 percent increase year over year or we would continue falling behind. Then he 

asked the Joint Chiefs to find $100 billion savings that they would 

be able to keep to use for more important things, savings through 

efficiencies. Then when he came back, he said, well, you are only 

going to be able to save about 70—keep about $74 billion of it. The 

other $26 billion will be needed for must-pay expenses. And while 

we were doing that we found another $78 billion across the board 

in savings. 

I think he was doing that to try to preempt further cuts. I don’t 

think these were cuts that he especially wanted to see made, but 

it resulted, those cuts would result in the Army and Marine end 

strength being reduced by 47,000 by the year 2015. 

And then the President gave a speech saying that we needed to 

cut another $400 billion. And then we had the big fight over the 

deficit reduction and all of that. And then we came up with this 

committee that is going to cut $350 billion. And if that doesn’t 

work, if they are not successful, then we have to do the sequestration, which increases it another $500 billion. 
10 

But these things have been coming down the road so rapidly that 

it is hard to know where to even try to defend. And they are all 

based, in my view, on budgets rather than on strategic needs. Just 

reversed, I think, from the way it should be done. 

It was bad enough thinking that we would reduce end strength 

by that amount over the next 4 years, but then to have that accelerated up to a year from this December to achieve those savings 

actually in the year 2013 of the $55 billion, that could result in end 

strength reduction in the next year of over 100,000 troops while we 

are still fighting in Afghanistan. And we haven’t decided yet what 

is going to happen in Iraq, and we don’t know what is going to happen in other parts of the world. 

Based on your experience, what would the consequences be to the 

force and to military readiness by reducing the Army and Marine 

Corps’ end strength to or below the pre-9/11 levels by fiscal year 

2013? 

General PACE. Mr. Chairman, I will start. 

If I am going to be critical, I should first admit my own errors 

in judgment. In 2004, as the Vice Chairman, I remember sitting in 

a tank with the other chiefs having a discussion about, should we 

build the Army and build the Marine Corps because of the op 

tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan? And I remember General Pace saying to his fellow Chiefs, it will take us 2 years to increase the size 

of the Army, increase the size of the Marine Corps, and that will 

take us to 2006, and if we are still this heavily engaged in Iraq in 

2006, we will have done something really wrong. 

Well, as you know, we were still very heavily involved in 2006, 

and then we went to the President and asked for an increase in 

the size of our force. 

We finally have the force now to where we can almost get to 

where they are not 1 year over and 1 year back. I mean, 1 year 

over, 1 year back, 1 year over, 1 year back, 1 year over, 1 year back 

for years has put an enormous strain on our troops and, most importantly, on their families. 

The very last place I would cut before I knew what the strategy 

is and how many troops we need to execute that strategy would be 

in troops, because when you cut them, if you decide to turn it 

around again, you are looking at a 2-year at least ramp-up to 

where you can get the right size force. 

You want to have, if you can, the ability to have 1 year over and 

2 years back so you have some family time and some training time. 

One of the problems with the force today is that during the 1 year 

they are back, they are training to go back and do the mission that 

they know they are going to do. So other skills that they would normally get a chance to train for in peacetime are atrophying. It is 

just a fact. 

But the Nation now has the chance as we draw down in Afghanistan and draw down in Iraq to give our Armed Forces the chance 

to breathe, to give them the chance to train up, to be properly prepared to do what they were able to do 10 years ago and arguably 

cannot do at the same efficiency now as they could 10 years ago, 

not because they are not great troops but because we have got 

them fighting one kind of fight continuously. 
11 

General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, let me just add to what General 

Pace was describing there. 

When he said 1 year over, 1 year back, and he said that several 

times, it is 1 year back, 1 year over in harm’s way, 1 year back, 

which puts incredible stress on the families left behind as they 

think about their loved ones going over for another year. And then 

when they come home, a lot of stress because they know it is only 

going to be a year, a year of some rest, but a year of lots of training 

before they go back in harm’s way again. And that is what Pete 

was saying, but I just—it is this harm’s way that makes this, I 

think, so difficult. 

To answer your question, you are going to hear this a lot I think 

at least from this panel, and you have already said it and Mr. Andrews has said it, that somewhere in here strategy has to play a 

part. And so when we talk about end strength reductions, the question needs to be asked, okay, can we still execute the strategy that 

we signed up to as a Nation and as a military? We can’t answer 

that. The folks that are currently on Active Duty and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can answer that, but I would say a precipitous decline in end strength could have the impact—I think this 

was the heart of your question—could have the impact of breaking 

unit integrity. If you have to draw down so fast, you are not at liberty to say, well, it is all going to come out of this brigade of the 

10th Mountain or it is going to come out of this Marine Corps Division. It doesn’t work that way. It will be spread broadly, and then 

I think you would have to think about—if you are going to try to 

do this by 2013, you have to think about the impact it would have 

on those units and their combat readiness, so that is how I connect 

the readiness dots to your question, Mr. Chairman, is that if you 

do it very, very quickly, you could, Services would have to answer 

this question, but my guess would be they would be worried about 

unit cohesion, unit integrity as they are preparing perhaps for the 

next deployment or just preparing for the war plans that the Defense Department is responsible for. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Chairman, as the Navy officer on this 

panel, General Pace talked about these rotation rates. Having deployed, and most Navy people deploying and a lot of Marines, for 

their lives, the ultimate and optimum rotation we found is always 

what we would call 1 in 3, in other words 2 years—2 out and 1 

back, whether it is 6-month rotations, 9-month rotations, 1-year rotations. And we found that was the best for families. It was the 

best for the service personnel. And if we stuck by those rotations— 

and we learned that lesson very hard, a very hard lesson, as a result of Vietnam. And we stuck to that for years and years and 

years in the Navy to make sure that we didn’t create personnel 

problems. 

I think as Yogi Berra said, if you don’t know where you are 

going, any road will lead you there. So if you are talking about 

troop cuts and you don’t know the context, it makes no sense. 

One of the problems that typically occurs in these type of situations is when you focus only in one area, for example on troop 

strength, and you talk about cuts, what we have found in 

drawdowns that have occurred—and all three of us have been 

through three of them in our careers, after Vietnam, after the Gulf 
12 

War, the Reagan buildup. When you look at these, typically what 

happens—and General Myers referred to this in his opening statement—is not only you draw down personnel, but you draw down 

the procurement, the modernization, and the things that make a 

difference for them, and that is where you get that term hollow 

force comes out. So all I would suggest to you is, again, if we don’t 

have a strategy, if we don’t have a policy, and if you don’t know 

where you are going, it is hard to even judge what levels you need. 

Finally, General Pace mentioned about the 1 year out and the 1 

year back. I want to remind everybody in the committee here that 

actually back in 2007, we had to extend Army units to 15 months 

out because we just didn’t have enough people to perform the mission to be at 1 and 1. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We have been fighting this war now for 10 years, and as you 

pointed out, Admiral, I believe it was you that stated there was a 

plan, their plan was a 100-year war. It might have been General 

Pace. 

The longest war we had previously was the Revolutionary War, 

where we fought for our independence. That was 7 years, and I 

think at that time, troops would kind of come and go as they felt 

the need to be home harvesting crops or whatever. It was a different time. 

But one of the big problems we have facing the country is unemployment. 

General Pace, you work with a charitable organization called 

Wall Street Warfighters. You are doing great work there. Your mission is to place service-disabled veterans in careers in the financial 

sector. Currently, we have unemployment rate of 13 percent among 

our Iraq and Afghan veterans. What do you believe the impact on 

the job market would be if we separated over 100,000 service members beginning next year over the next year? 

General PACE. As you point out, Mr. Chairman, the national unemployment rate is just a little over 9 percent. Amongst our veterans as a group, about 13 to 15 percent. For those who are veterans who are 18 to 24, the rate is closer to 21 percent, and for 

those veterans who are wounded, it is almost 41 percent. Those are 

today’s numbers. If you put 100,000 more U.S. citizens back into 

the job-hunting market, I presume that those numbers would 

ratchet up somewhat. 

The CHAIRMAN. And then we pay unemployment, so we save 

money by cutting defense and then spend it for unemployment. So 

we weaken our military without a strategy in place and don’t probably end up saving money. I think we really need to do some real 

thoughtful evaluation of this whole process that we are involved in. 

Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The chairman’s comments earlier indicated that there was a specific instruction from the White House to the Defense Department 

to make downward adjustment in defense spending. I think the 

record more accurately would show that the relevant committees of 

the House have written to the DOD and asked what guidance they 

have received. And they have not yet responded to that. So I did 

want the record to reflect that. 
13 

General Pace, I think you framed this exactly perfectly when you 

said the question we have to consider collectively is, what do we 

want our military to do for our country? I want to ask the three 

of you your considered professional opinion about whether our mission in Western Europe and our mission, our basing mission, in the 

Korean peninsula is—to prioritize that mission for us. If you are 

answering that question about what we want our military to do for 

us, do we want to maintain the presence in Western Europe and 

the Korean peninsula that we do now? If yes, why? If no, why? Any 

of the three of you, I would be interested in your answer. 

General MYERS. When it comes to Europe, I think, this is my 

personal view, that the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

security alliance has been very successful for many years. I think 

it continues to be needed. I think European security and our security are tied and that any lessening of that alliance would put us 

in a riskier place. 

Having said that—and I was still in uniform when we started to 

reduce our troop strength in Europe, which I at the time and still 

do think is appropriate. I think at the end of the Cold War we 

started that process, and now the numbers are quite a bit down 

from where they were at the height of the Cold War. I think all 

that is appropriate, but I don’t think we can lessen our support to 

and reliance on the NATO alliance. NATO has, the alliance has 

lots of issues, but I think abandoning it at this time would be a 

real mistake. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think that we could maintain that strategic alliance with NATO at a lower level of troop and base presence in Western Europe? 

General MYERS. Lower than today? Again, this is without a careful analysis that the Pentagon would go through, but I think we 

are probably getting down to the point where we have, with the 

cuts that have already been announced and the troops that are 

coming back, I think we are getting to the point where we are pretty close to minimum numbers. I mean, maybe you could save a few 

here or there, but it is a pretty minimal force now that is forward 

deployed in Europe. And I think there is real value to forward 

presence. That is my personal opinion. So I guess I think it would 

have to be very carefully evaluated before you reduce that strength 

any more. 

Mr. ANDREWS. General Pace, what do you think? 

General MYERS. Can I talk about Korea for a second—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Sure. 

General MYERS. Because you brought up the Korean peninsula. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes. 

General MYERS. Again, when I was in uniform as Chairman, we 

did reduce our forces on the Korean peninsula. Again, I think that 

was appropriate. I believe we have a division left, more numbers 

than that, but basically a division, a fairly heavy complement of 

tactical air, which would be important in that conflict if it ever 

broke into conflict again, and I think that is important. 

You know, what we do, what you all will do in the end in terms 

of the Defense Department’s budget is going to be watched by lots 

of folks, not just Americans, but our friends and allies and our adversaries. And it all comes down in the end to, what is America 
14 

willing to do? Are we going to stand up to obligations that we have 

made? Where is our will and resolve on issues of our security and 

the security of our friends and allies? 

So I think some presence in Korea, the numbers are pretty small 

today, I would say that is, my view again, is roughly appropriate 

for where we are, and I think the danger is it could be seen—you 

know, weakness can be provocative. So if we were to leave the Korean peninsula, it might give those in the North a sense that nobody is going to come to their aid if we start a conflict to dominate 

the peninsula. I mean, I don’t know if that scenario would ever 

come to pass, but weakness can be provocative. And I think we 

need to show some strength in light of the fact that we have already reduced quite a few numbers over there. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I am sorry, to the others, I have about 21 seconds, 

but if you want to say something, you are welcome to do so. 

Thank you, General. 

General PACE. Mr. Andrews, if I may, clearly we have treaty obligations with our NATO allies. We have treaty obligations, and in 

fact, we have armistice obligations in Korea, so presumably, then, 

the strategy would be that we would—would include the fact that 

we would adhere to our international obligations. Fair enough. 

The question then becomes, on what timeline do you want me to 

do that? If you want me to be able to do it on today’s timelines, 

then today’s force laydown is about right. If you were to say to me, 

okay, instead of X days, we can go X plus some other number days, 

because we are in an unclassified room, then I would say to the 

military man, okay, with that amount of time to do the job, I can 

bring more troops home. I am going to have to deploy them. I am 

going to need the planes and the ships to be able to do this, but 

you tell me what you want me to do, which presumably is continue 

to defend Europe and continue to defend Korea, if needed, and the 

timeline in which you want me to do it, and I can lay out for you 

where I need the troops stationed and what kinds of transport I 

need to get them there. And then we can add the dollar and cents 

figures to that when we are done. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. In a sense, we face the perfect storm. 

We are just winding down two wars, more than a decade now. Our 

troops are worn out, many of them deployed a half a dozen times 

or more. Our equipment is worn out. We face two potentially very 

different kinds of enemies in the future. 

Will we choose to prepare our military to fight the hugely expensive asymmetric wars that we have been fighting, or will we prepare the military to fight for our life against a peer? There could 

be one, a resurgent Russia or a China. We don’t have enough 

money to prepare for both of those wars without any cut in our 

budget. 

And then we face a huge debt crisis. Our deficit is several hundred billion dollars more than all the money we vote to spend, and 

of our discretionary spending, defense is more than half of that. So 

it is unrealistic to expect that we are going to do anything mean-
15 

ingful in terms of addressing the debt crisis without looking at defense. 

When the Republican budget was Paul Ryan’s road map in the 

last Congress, it was so austere that only seven of us signed on as 

cosponsors to that bill. He reintroduced it again this Congress, and 

13 of us signed on. And then it became the Republican road map. 

As severe as it is, it does not close, the budget does not balance 

for 25 years, and during those 25 years, our debt could essentially 

double. And it balances then only if you make what I think are unrealistic assumptions about economic growth, because another part 

of this perfect storm is the reality that the world has now 

plateaued in oil production. For 6 years now, we have been at 84 

million barrels of oil a day. The IEA [International Energy Agency] 

has just recently recognized that conventional oil production will do 

nothing but go down from now on. 

Will we do something United States could not do? Will we, the 

world, do something the United States could not do? Because we 

reached our maximum oil production in 1970. No matter what we 

have done since then, we have produced less and less each year. 

In spite of drilling more oil wells than all the rest of the world put 

together, today we produce half the oil that we did in 1970. Unless 

we can do something different in the world than we did, and I don’t 

think that will happen, oil production from now on is simply going 

to be going down inexorably. It happened in the United States; it 

will happen to the world. 

What is the greater threat to our national security? This debt 

which may bury us? I have 10 kids, 17 grandkids, and 2 great 

grandkids. Every vote I take, I ask myself, is this vote in their best 

interest? 

Will we continue—will we be better off with a huge national debt 

or a restructured military looking at different missions? How do we 

resolve these competing demands? We can’t do both. Mike Mullins 

said that the biggest threat to our national security was our national debt, and I think there are many in the country who would 

concur with that. How do we resolve these conflicting demands? 

General PACE. Mr. Bartlett, I will take a shot at it. As I mentioned in my opening comments, I do believe very strongly that a 

strong economy and a strong military are two sides of the same 

coin. And yes, of course, the military’s budget must be part of the 

overall country’s budget, but I think in the not-too-distant past, we 

had an increasing military budget that was a decreasing part of the 

U.S. budget because our economy was growing. So it is possible to 

have a very strong economy and a defense that is not eating a 

large part of the budget. 

We have gotten now to where we are in deep trouble, and therefore, yes, the military’s budget should be looked at. But I think as 

we look at it and as you make the decisions you have to make, that 

we need to keep our military strong enough to not encourage any 

other adversaries to make things even worse for us. 

It is possible in the short term to have some efficiencies in your 

military, but in the long term you are going to need a strong military, as we have had in the past, to have a strong economy, as we 

have had in the past. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 
16 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding 

this hearing. I apologize I was late this morning. 

I want to join the committee in, first of all, welcoming Kathy 

Hochul, the newest member of the committee. Thank you. It is 

great to have you on board. You will enjoy this committee. It is 

very bipartisan. We work on a lot of very interesting issues. Welcome aboard. 

And I thank the gentlemen for their testimony. I thank the 

chairman for holding this hearing. 

And there are really, sort of, two pieces of the problem. I think 

Mr. Bartlett hit one of the big ones, which I will touch on more in 

a minute. But the other is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman suspend for just a second? 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

The CHAIRMAN. This demonstration that is going on outside is 

not to do with us, but it is peripheral because the debt commission, 

the ‘‘supercommittee,’’ is meeting across the hall, and this is a jobs 

demonstration. 

So, just as kind of a spillover, I just wanted to try to buy you 

some time so that we could hear what you are saying. 

Mr. SMITH. We will use that as a backdrop for our discussions, 

to think about it. 

I think one of the things that is important to point out is the Administration is going through a strategic review of the Department 

of Defense and of our national security objectives and figuring out 

how to match them up. So the proposed reductions in the defense 

budget over the course of 10 years are not happening in a vacuum. 

They are not really just sort of saying, ‘‘Well, we got to cut this 

money; we will figure it out later.’’ They are, in fact, doing, you 

know, if not a zero-based budgeting approach, because that is difficult to achieve, they are going back to our first principles and saying, ‘‘Where should we be spending our money on national security 

priorities,’’ as, frankly, we have to do for the entire budget. 

[Disruption outside hearing room.] 

Mr. SMITH. I will hold off for just a second here. 

So there is that review being undergone, and I think it should 

be. We are looking at a changing set of circumstances over the 

course of the next, you know, 5 to 10 years. We are beginning to— 

you know, we have certainly substantially drawn down in Iraq. We 

are going to begin to draw down in Afghanistan. You know, it is 

reasonable to assume that 4 to 5 years from now, we will go from— 

I guess at our peak we had well over 200,000 troops deployed in 

active theaters, down, you know, potentially to none, but certainly 

down to a few thousand. How does that change our plans? I think 

we need that strategic review. 

And we still had, you know, through the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and the planning process, a national security strategy that was largely based on the two major regional contingencies 

approach, imagining we have to fight a major war in Europe and 

a major war in Asia. That is not necessarily the most plausible sce-
17 

nario at this point that we need to plan for. So that strategic review is perfectly appropriate. 

But the other part of the problem is the problem that Representative Bartlett laid out, and that is we are in a very, very difficult 

budget situation, and everything has to be on the table. And, certainly, 20 percent of the budget, which is the Department of Defense, has to be on the table. 

But the one point I want to make that I don’t think has been 

made yet is if we are passionately concerned about cuts in defense, 

it is not enough to simply make the argument as to why those cuts 

would be damaging, as you three gentlemen have done quite well, 

as the committee has done. We have to then look at the budget situation and say, well, what are we going to do in other parts of the 

budget so that we don’t have to make those cuts? 

Because right now defense is in an incredibly vulnerable position. 

It is part of—I hate calling it the ‘‘discretionary’’ portion of the 

budget because that right away plants in the minds of the American people that we don’t really need to do it. And it is defense, 

amongst other things. So let’s just think of it as the nonentitlement 

portion of the budget—probably a better way to put it. That is the 

one portion of the budget that Congress has to approve every year. 

The House, the Senate, and the President have to agree or no 

money gets spent. And until very recently, we could all say, well, 

yeah, but they would never do that. But given what happened in 

April and what happened in late July, we may have to rethink that 

outlook. 

So it makes it vulnerable. The entitlement portion of the budget? 

That money keeps going out unless Congress acts. Taxes, they stay 

where they are at unless Congress acts. The nonentitlement portion of the budget is incredibly vulnerable. 

So my point is, anyone on this committee, anyone who testifies 

before us who passionately cares about making sure that the defense budget does not get cut too much needs to spend—you can’t 

spend all your time simply talking about the defense cuts. You 

have to spend more of your time saying, here is the revenue we are 

going to raise; here is where we need to make cuts in entitlements 

in order to make sure that we don’t have to make those cuts. 

And we have a situation where, you know, the majority party is 

saying, no new revenue, absolutely not, absolutely, under any circumstances, that is off the table. Okay, that is gone. So we are not 

getting any more money. So now we are dealing with a budget that 

is 40 percent out of whack. 

Well, if you—and then the second thing the majority is saying is 

that we have to balance the budget as soon as possible. Well, to do 

that, if you don’t touch defense, you have to cut everything else by 

almost 50 percent. And as those shouting folks down the hall will 

tell you, making any cut whatsoever in entitlements is brutal. Fifty 

percent? 

So if, in fact, it is this committee’s position that we cannot cut 

defense, then this committee better come up with some places 

where we are going to cut and/or better rethink the issue of whether or not we need more revenue. I will go on record as saying we 

need more revenue. Yes, we have a significant spending problem. 

We have also seen a dramatic decline in our revenue. 
18 

So it is not enough to just say, please, please, please don’t touch 

our portion of the budget. If you don’t deal with those other arguments, our portion of the budget is sort of—well, we are last in line 

at a buffet that is rapidly running out of food. So we have to put 

the entire picture on the table and talk about that. 

The question that I wanted to give the three of you a chance to 

take a stab at: The main reason it costs so much for our defense 

is because power projection is a central part of our national security strategy. That is why we are in Europe, that is why we are 

in Korea, that is why we are in Asia. And as you gentlemen have 

pointed out, we have a number of alliances that are dependent, in 

part, on our promise of that power projection. You know, our presence in Asia, the reason we have a lot of allies, our military presence is something that has been there for quite a while that a lot 

of folks have come to count on. It is the same in Europe. And our 

ability to live up to the alliances that we have made is dependent 

upon projecting that power, and that is very, very expensive. 

If we were to have to make the kind of cuts—you know, say that 

we don’t get any more revenues, say that we don’t touch entitlements, and we are just faced with this, we are going to make a dramatic reduction in our national security budget—how does that 

change the equation of power projection? 

And then, what does that do to us? What if, all of a sudden, we 

don’t have troops in Europe, we don’t have troops in Asia, we are 

just, frankly, like pretty much every other country in the world? 

We have a national security force here at home and try to protect 

ourselves that way; how does that fundamentally change our national security posture? 

General MYERS. I will take a stab at that, Mr. Smith. 

As I said in my opening statement, I think, as General Pace has 

said, that security and economic prosperity are heads of the same 

coin. And in terms of Asia-Pacific, I think our presence there has 

brought about a stability that the countries in the region have 

counted upon, so capital is not afraid, capital goes in. And, again, 

as I mentioned in my opening statement, unprecedented economic 

prosperity in the Asia Pacific nations—historic, never before seen 

in the world. I would say that a part of the reason is because of 

our presence there. 

So, as you think about a limited ability to project our power 

abroad, to have forces stationed overseas, I think then you call in 

to question our own economic prosperity. We are so dependent on 

Asia-Pacific today for economic prosperity. 

So, I mean, I was commander of U.S. Forces Japan, and General 

Pace and I served there together. And later on, I was over there 

as the Pacific Air Force’s commander. And the thing you heard as 

you went around to every nation was how much they appreciate 

the United States being in the region, because they saw us—our 

friends and foes alike saw us as the honest broker in the region— 

the honest broker in the region. Left to their own devices, there are 

a lot of animosities that go way back, but you certainly don’t have 

to go back much further than World War II to understand what 

some of these are. And you have to worry, I think, about stability 

and, perhaps, economic consequences of instability in the region if 

we weren’t there. 
19 

I think you can see the same thing in Europe, to a degree. Obviously, more well-developed, perhaps less needed in some parts of 

Europe. But in the newly independent states, I think we have 

played a very important role, both in NATO and on the continent 

there. 

And around the world—another scenario—Mr. Bartlett talked 

about oil. If we had a situation in the Persian Gulf where oil flow 

from Saudi Arabia, for instance, were disrupted for whatever reason—we can all think of scenarios—what nation on Earth could 

help restore stability in that region? Right now, it is only us. We 

would probably need help from our allies, but it is only us. 

Mr. SMITH. And that is not a hypothetical. In the first gulf war, 

I mean—— 

General MYERS. Yeah, well, we flagged tankers for a long time 

and provided their safety. 

So I think this notion—you mentioned power projection, but I 

think the notion of being able to project power brings with it stability, which then allows economic prosperity to happen. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could, I am way over time, but if you two gentlemen would take a quick stab at it, I would be curious. 

General PACE. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Again, we are back to strategy. What do you want your Nation’s 

military to be able to do for you? 

And I absolutely understand what you said about entitlements 

and all the other things. I am not going to pretend to be something 

I am not. I am here as a private citizen who used to be in Active 

Duty military, and I will give you my best military advice, understanding that you, the members of this committee, the President, 

and the folks who have been elected and appointed need to weigh 

much more than that. 

But the military advice is, what do you want me to do? And if 

you tell me what you want me to do, I can tell you what it is going 

to cost. If you tell me to bring troops home, I am going to need 

more power projection capability. If you tell me to bring troops 

home and you cut my power projection, I am no longer a superpower. 

That is a strategic decision for the Nation. But if you want to 

continue to be the planet’s only superpower and if you want to be 

able to continue to protect our citizens and our way of life and the 

way we do business around the world, then we are going to need 

to have a strong, conventional military. 

And I understand the dollar-and-cents piece of this. I am just 

giving you my best military advice on, either have us overseas deployed or if you want me to be able to impact there, give me the 

resources to get there and the timelines you want me there. If you 

don’t have me overseas and you don’t have the deployment resources, I am not going to be able do my mission for you. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral, did you want to add anything? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Yeah, I just want to emphasize that 

point, and that is on the power projection piece and basing. 

So much of what we are able to do today is because we have, in 

some cases, a minimal presence and a minimal basing structure in 

different areas. When you remove both of those or a significant portion of one or the other, your freedom of action is different. 
20 

And remember, when you do these types of things, in my view, 

you wind up putting our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines at 

risk when they have to perform a mission where they don’t have 

the proper equipment or they don’t have the proper bases to operate from. That is what I worry about most. And then casualty rates 

go up in the long run. 

Lastly, I would say none of us are suggesting that defense should 

be off the table for cuts. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I worry, just as Mr. Bartlett does, about 

my children and my grandchild right now and what they are going 

to wind up being the benefactors of that we do. What I have 

learned in the past, though, is when we make very bad choices because we don’t think about this strategy clearly and decisively 

enough, future generations wind up having to pick up the pieces. 

I would like to say that it is amazing what you can do if you 

don’t have to do it and the ones 10 years from now are the ones 

who are trying to pick up those pieces. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. Understood. And, you know, I completely 

agree; defense does have to be on the table. You know, I am just 

worried that the way things are going and the reason I did not vote 

for the, you know, deficit-ceiling deal that created the supercommittee across the street there was because it lumped it all on the 

nonentitlement portion of the budget. 

And the last thing I would say is, you know, General Pace, I certainly take your point about, you know, you are generally folks on 

national security stuff, not this other stuff. But, unfortunately, the 

way our budget works is, you know, if you care about a piece of 

it—and this is what people always say to us—they will say, ‘‘Well, 

we want this spending, we want that tax cut, we want the other 

thing,’’ and we say, ‘‘Well, you know, we got some budget issues,’’ 

‘‘Well, you figure that out.’’ And I get that. But, eventually, you 

know, if the people don’t support the taxes or the cuts in other programs that enable you to then support the program that they care 

about, then we can’t do it. 

You know, we can’t—I mean, right now we got a public that has, 

like, 80 percent of them oppose cuts entitlements, 70 percent oppose tax increases. They oppose every specific cut imaginable, and 

then they strongly support balancing the budget. We have to begin 

to confront that inconsistency if we, as policymakers, are going to 

have the political space to make the choices that need to be made. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here today. 

You have all made comments about the importance of tying 

budget to strategy, which is something that I think is a crucial 

point. And yet, in my time on this committee, I think I have seen 

very little of that generally. We set up this QDR process that is 

supposed to be an initial overall strategy that then we would go 

and fund and execute. But what really happens is the QDR turns 

out to be a budget-driven exercise as much as anything. And, es-
21 

sentially, you are given an amount of money and say, ‘‘Here, go 

make the best of it.’’ 

I may exaggerate slightly, but I would be interested to know 

what that is like from your perspective. You all have been at the 

pinnacle of military strategy-making in our country. What is it like 

to not have a White House and a Congress make those strategic 

choices, but rather to just say, ‘‘Okay, here is how much money you 

get; go deal with it’’? Because it seems to me that it is kind of 

where we have been and maybe where we are headed. 

General MYERS. You know, in an ideal world, you develop your 

strategy and then, as General Pace said, you try to fund it. Obviously, you can’t fund it all, so you make your tradeoffs and then 

you develop a risk assessment. And you say, okay, here is our 

strategy, we can’t do it all, here is the risk of that. 

And it is not an ideal world. It works exactly as you described, 

Congressman Thornberry, exactly like you described. And it is 

sometimes frustrating, you know, to see—on both sides of the river, 

by the way—things being taken, puts and takes that aren’t strategic in nature but are serving other purposes. 

I do think, if you haven’t read recently the Chairman’s risk assessment—every year, Congress asks the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to provide his own risk assessment against the 

strategy—the national security strategy, military strategy that is 

appropriate at the time. I did, I think, four of them. General Pace, 

I think, did two of them. They are classified. I haven’t seen the recent ones. 

But I think a good baseline for all of this debate would be to see 

what Admiral Mullen said this spring. Usually, it is required over 

here in January or February. I know we have been late before. I 

am sure Admiral Mullen did better than I did in getting them here 

on time. But to get those out of the safe and see how Admiral 

Mullen looks at the current environment, the current strategy, and 

the risks of that strategy. And I think what you can expect from 

the Department of Defense is a hard look at the current strategy 

and those risks again. 

And those are all really good questions to ask the current Chairman, the incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ask 

them to give you their risk analysis—probably would have to be 

done in a classified setting—so you can get some feeling for where 

budget and strategy meet and what the tradeoffs are and, most importantly, what the risk is if we fail to fund something. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I would just say that, to follow on General Myers, your appetite for strategy and what you can do generally in these QDRs—and I have been involved in every single one 

of them—is generally larger than what you wind up being able to 

execute. 

However, you do balance them by going through these risk equations, and you try to look at where you can, in fact, take more risk. 

And I find the exercises exceptionally important to go through, 

from my perspective when I was in the Pentagon. Because if you 

don’t think about them, once again, you don’t have a good idea how 

to judge those risks as you move into the future. 

Finally, you can never plan for every contingency, you can never 

plan for every surprise. And one of the things that you need to do 
22 

in these exercises is to think about what type of flexibility that you 

build in to your force. That is why they are very important. And 

I would suggest to you that you really do need to continue to do 

them, because our ability to predict what is going to happen in the 

world just isn’t very good, as you have already heard. It is a fact 

of life. 

So going through these exercises and being able to go through 

risk assessments is very important. So that is my perspective on 

this. 

General PACE. I would just quickly add, sir, that there is a very 

disciplined process on the Joint Staff, run by the J8 on the Joint 

Staff, called ‘‘operational availability.’’ And it has been going on 

now for the last 12 years. And, each year, the Joint Staff, under 

the J8’s direction, working with the Services, looks at various contingencies, one of these here, one of these there, continuing to fight 

here, and does all kinds of mixes and matches and comes up with 

the size force that would be needed. 

And that is used by the Services and by the Department to help 

produce these budgets so that we have a war-plan-based approach 

to our requests. But it needs to have a capstone of a strategy of 

what you want us to do, and we can then feed all of this homework 

into that strategy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate your service to the Nation. 

Admiral Mike Mullen has said publicly that the greatest threat 

that America faces is not external but internal, our debt and deficit 

situation. 

When the greatest threat, according to the most recent Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is internal, does that then make it a 

responsibility of the Joint Chiefs to make recommendations regarding this internal threat? 

General PACE. From the standpoint of helping to be part of the 

solution, absolutely—— 

Mr. COOPER. Yes. 

General PACE [continuing]. Sir, absolutely. 

And I wouldn’t propose to speak for Admiral Mullen, but I think 

you could also say that a strong military is essential to a strong 

economy. 

So we are not saying the military budget should be off the table. 

What we are trying to do is give our best military advice as you 

wrestle with all of the other things you have to wrestle with. We 

are talking about the military slice of what this country does, and 

we understand there is much more that has to be dealt with. 

But I am not going to do you any good if I start averaging averages, so to speak, if I start thinking I know what you can accept 

and not accept. I need to give you my best military advice about 

how to have the best military security for the country, and then 

you will tell me how much we can afford. 

Mr. COOPER. You gentlemen know that these are the first wars— 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—the first wars in American history that we didn’t even try to pay for. There was no war tax. 

There were no war bonds. 
23 

So this is a problem that has grown over many years, but it 

started with the realization that, for first time in our history, we 

did not take prudent fiscal steps to back up our men and women 

in uniform with adequate resources to fund these wars. Instead, we 

borrowed the money from China and other foreign nations. 

So how is that part of a responsible national security strategy? 

General PACE. Sir, I can’t answer that because I don’t think anybody in the Pentagon went to China and borrowed any money. 

Mr. COOPER. But were recommendations made in the Joint 

Chiefs circle to Administration and congressional officials that, perhaps, just as the public should support our troops publicly, that we 

support them financially? 

General MYERS. There was actually a lot of discussion about, if 

we are a Nation at war, why is it that a lot of the Nation doesn’t 

feel like we are at war? And I think it gets to your question. There 

wasn’t a war tax. Most Americans weren’t asked to sacrifice a 

whole lot for the last 10 years of war unless they had loved ones 

that were involved in it or members of the State Department or 

Justice, Commerce, whoever was going forward to carry out our 

country’s bidding. 

So, in that sense, I think the Joint Chiefs were—you know, we— 

and I think voiced our concerns that—not particularly on the budget. I mean, we didn’t have 2008 in our mind and the collapse of 

the housing market and all of which—we didn’t know any of that. 

We did feel that there ought to be a way to connect most Americans to this effort. And, you know, we talked about it, but we are 

not experts in that area. We just provide our advice, and that is 

what we did. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Mr. Cooper, if I could just add, I am certainly not going to speak for the defense leadership that is currently in right now, but from what I have seen in their statements, 

they have come up with a series of plans—to start with Secretary 

Gates and Admiral Mullen, they have come up with a series of initiatives to reduce the overall defense spending through a variety of 

ways. 

And I think now what you are hearing is they are at a point 

where they are at a crossroads. We are at a limit of what we think 

we can do to stay on the path we are currently on, from a military 

strategy standpoint. 

So I don’t disagree with Admiral Mullen. The reason why we 

have had such a wonderful military is because of this phenomenal 

engine and free enterprise here in the United States. And without 

it, you are not going to have that wonderful military. 

Mr. COOPER. Admiral Giambastiani, you have the headline of the 

hearing with your statement that automatic across-the-board budget cuts, including on the military, would be like ‘‘brain surgery with 

a chainsaw.’’ That is a pretty stark phrase. 

But that is exactly where the supercommittee is headed unless 

it can get one Democrat to vote with the Republicans or one Republican to vote with the Democrats or if some miracle happened and 

they were all unanimous. Otherwise, it is likely to be six-six split, 

and then the default option is automatic across-the-board budget 

cuts. 

Can you think of a way to make this supercommittee do its job? 
24 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I guess I am an optimist, and I am looking forward to this supercommittee doing what the right thing is— 

and that is, not to let those triggers take effect. 

Mr. COOPER. Uh-huh. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I have no suggestions beyond that. I am 

an optimist, and I do think the way we operate in this Government 

should be able to manage this. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired. 

General PACE. If I may just add, sir, I would ask the supercommittee members to think about the fact that there are so many 

military members and families who have defended this Nation to 

the best of their ability from external threat. And, as you have 

pointed out now, this is an internal threat that these 12 individuals have been tasked to help us solve. 

If they would think about, I would hope, the sacrifices made by 

their military to give them this opportunity to do what they need 

to do now, I believe, as Admiral G. just said, that they are good 

people and we should all be encouraging them to do the right 

thing—not whatever is politically right, but the right thing for the 

Nation. 

General MYERS. Let me just add, I think the way I look at it is, 

the men and women we have in harm’s way today, the over 2 million men and women in uniform who have raised their right hand 

and said they will support and defend the Constitution at their 

own risk show great courage. I think that committee of 12 needs 

to show great courage. 

It is going to take courage. Sometimes courage is dodging bullets. 

Sometimes courage is doing the right thing in a congressional setting. Those 12 have a chance to show some real courage here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here. 

I am going to try to bring us back to what this committee normally does and deal with defense issues. Ranking Member Smith 

alluded to the fact that many on this side of the aisle are a little 

reluctant to raise revenues or tax the American people more. And 

he is right, because it really doesn’t matter how much new revenue 

you raise. If you squander it on $800 billion stimulus packages or 

health-care agendas that destroy American businesses and jobs 

they created, it doesn’t do us any good to raise the revenue. 

But the purpose of this committee is not to determine tax policy 

or Social Security and Medicare entitlements. It is to defend and 

protect the United States of America. And you three gentlemen 

have 120 years of experience between you. Over four decades each 

one of you have. 

And during that period of time, I dare say that every marine, 

sailor, soldier, or airman that got up in the morning and put on 

their uniform and looked in the mirror never questioned who they 

were or who America expected them to be. We expected them to be 

part of the greatest military in the world. 

And, secondly, you three know better than any of us that no matter how good those men and women who serve in our military may 
25 

be, we must have a consistent and correct military strategy if we 

are going to be the greatest military in the world. 

The real battle we are facing is who will define who those men 

and women in our military are and who will write the strategy that 

will determine their success or failure. The question is, will it be 

bureaucrats who have stared for years at spreadsheets or admirals 

and generals who have stared for decades in the eyes of our enemies? Now, I know who I choose, but I don’t know who this Congress will choose, and I don’t know who this White House will 

choose. 

And I will tell you this, as I look—General Pace, you mentioned 

that we have to have two cornerstones; we have to have a strong 

military and a strong economy. And that is exactly what the Chinese Defense Minister said in December of 2010 if they are going 

to rejuvenate China. 

And one of the things that concerned me is General Breedlove 

sat where you sat, and he said, if China says they are going to do 

something, they are going to do it. If they say they are going to 

have 300 J–20s in 5 years, they are going to have 300 J–20s in 5 

years. 

But I look at it us—and we had a QDR this Administration came 

out with in February 2010. In 18 months, they are throwing it, 

abandoning it, walking away from it and saying we have got to totally change it. We have weapons programs and, you know, we fail 

to stick with them. We end up buying fewer planes, tanks, et 

cetera, or canceling the program. We came out with our military 

just months ago and said, if you find $178 billion in efficiencies, we 

are going to reprioritize and put it in places important in the military, and 4 months later we come back and say, now we are going 

to cut another $400 billion out. 

The Chinese right now are developing and attracting talented 

military professionals, and our professionals in our military have 

to be looking and saying, where are we going tomorrow? What is 

the future for me, for my profession, for my family? And the QDR 

independent panel looking at our QDR force structure says it might 

not be sufficient today to assure others that the United States can 

meet its treaty commitments. 

So my question to the three of you, with all this expertise that 

you have, is this: It doesn’t matter in the long run whether we just 

can’t afford it or whether we just don’t want to spend the money; 

the risk is there if we don’t do what we need to do to defend the 

United States of America. 

With the curve that you see moving with China, with their modernization and what they are doing, and the curve that you see us 

going in, what concerns you about the out-years in that curve if we 

don’t do something and change it? 

And I would love to have all three of your comments on that. 

General PACE. You don’t know when the date is, but there is a 

tipping point. Let me just use nuclear weapons, if I may, as an example. 

I was part of the discussions about reducing nuclear weapons, 

and as a member of the Joint Chiefs, my recommendation was, yes, 

that we should reduce nuclear weapons from what we had to what 

we have now. And part of that strategy was that the triad would 
26 

be not just ground-based and air-delivered missiles, but that that 

triad would become one piece of the new triad, which would also 

include a very strong, conventional armed force and an industrial 

base that could respond to national emergencies. And we all were 

comfortable with that. 

And the Nation has funded two of those three legs. We have not 

funded the industrial base part of that. That is another discussion. 

There is a point—and, unclassified numbers, I think the Chinese 

have about 300 nuclear weapons. Right now, if we have 2,200 and 

they have 300, they are probably not sitting there thinking to 

themselves, ‘‘Let’s spend the money on adding to our nuclear arsenal.’’ They have plenty to do what they need to defend themselves, 

and they are probably not thinking, ‘‘Let’s allocate those resources.’’ 

There is a number someplace out there, as we come down to it, 

that they might say to themselves, ‘‘Hmm, all we need to do is 

build a couple hundred more and we will have absolute parity with 

the United States. Let’s do that.’’ And you can take that same logic 

and apply it to ships and aircraft carriers, of which they now have 

one. How many are they going to build? I don’t know. 

So, as we allow ourselves to have a smaller and less capable 

force, if we make that decision, we have to understand that, as we 

come down, we are encouraging others to strive to be near-peer. I 

believe in the long run for the Nation, when you look at the 20- 

to 30-year horizon, the cost to the U.S. Treasury in having a strong 

military that prevents wars is much better than having a weakened military that must respond to more aggressive potential adversaries. 

General MYERS. Let me take a conventional—I guess you took 

somewhat conventional, but also the nuclear piece of that. 

But as I said in my opening statement, I think one of the things 

that we need to be concerned about is China’s rising influence in 

Asia-Pacific, not necessarily that it is going to bring us to combat 

between the United States and China, but certainly there will be 

sparring for influence. And when you look at China’s need for resources and the resource-rich South China Sea and the other nations in the region that have claims on those resources, then I 

think the best way to work through that in a peaceful, 

nonconfrontational way is to have the United States present in the 

region. 

And I think, as a smaller military, a weakened military, we may 

not be able to respond in a way that would be able to exert the influence to keep conflict from breaking out in a region over resources when you have one very powerful nation and several pretty 

small nations, actually. 

So I think it goes back to, sort of, the honest-broker role in the 

region. I think we play an incredibly important role there and that 

any diminution of our capability to do that would, in the end, harm 

our own economic prospects. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Very briefly, I think that strength allows 

us to provide a tremendous moderating influence. If you go through 

the Asia-Pacific region right now and talk to both diplomatic and 

military leaders, businesspeople, they all are very happy that we 

are there in the presence we have and in the numbers we have. 
27 

And when we start doing things like significantly reducing nuclear weapons and the rest, or when we allow proliferation to occur, 

what happens is they lose that reassurance. And then you hear 

talk of allies thinking that they need to go nuclear, if you will, and 

the rest. Those are not reassuring for long-term security. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much, all of you, for being here and 

for your long years of service. 

I am pleased that you actually spoke—I think all of you spoke 

at one point or another about our families, and I think that is a 

very good message to send. We know that we really have been a 

military at war and not a Nation at war. And I think, more than 

anything else, our families have felt that. And in survey after survey, they noted that they didn’t believe that the American public 

really understood, I think, the sacrifices they have. So I appreciate 

the fact that you have all mentioned that because you have been 

dealing in so many different levels over the years. 

What I would like to ask you about is really in line with some 

of the prevention that you just mentioned, particularly, is the 

whole-of-government approach that probably was not well-developed, I would think, during your time of leadership. 

And I wonder if you could comment on that and if you believe 

that we have a more coherent strategy in using all the tools of Government today, and where you see that perhaps that is not being 

used as well as it should, and where we have gone—I think, not 

understood how we might use it in the future. Would you comment 

on that? 

General MYERS. I will try. 

This is an important point for me. I think my time as Chairman 

was frustrated by the fact that this country had difficulty harnessing all our instruments of national power to focus on the pressing problems. And the pressing problems, of course, I was confronted with: Afghanistan and Iraq; others, as well. 

James Madison would be proud. Sometimes we are not too well 

organized and we can’t bring things to bear in our government. We 

are just more inefficient. So James Madison would be proud. At the 

same time, when our security is at risk, I think you need to make 

some changes. 

It is a very—I have seen this serving in the Clinton administration as both assistant to the Chairman when President Clinton was 

in office and then as Vice Chairman, and then Chairman under 

President Bush. I have seen two different Presidents struggle with, 

how do you focus our instruments of national power? And if it is 

a multinational effort, how do you focus other instruments of national power? 

And just to be clear, I am talking about the military instrument, 

diplomatic-political instrument, the economic instrument, and, I 

would add, the informational instrument of power today because I 

think information plays a different role than it—a more important 

role than it ever has in the past. How do you bring all those to bear 

on the problem? And it is imperfect. 
28 

I think it starts at the strategic level. I don’t think we, as a Nation, develop a cohesive strategy, in many cases. The Defense Department might have one piece, State might have another, somebody else might have another. Pulling all that together, you need 

somebody who is responsible and held accountable. And it can’t be 

the President. The President has got lots of things to worry about. 

And I think this is a real issue. And I don’t think we—I think 

we are probably better today, but, you know, there have been other 

commissions and think-tanks and groups that have said, how do we 

reorganize ourselves since the way we are organized for national 

security comes out of the National Security Act of 1947, which 

means we are perfectly organized for World War II. Not quite true 

because it has been modified several times, but it still kind of has 

that cold war, Clausewitzian view of conflict. And today we are 

much more in the Sun Tzu, in my view—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. 

General MYERS [continuing]. Mode of conflict, and maybe we 

need a little different apparatus to handle that. 

So I found it a frustration when I was Chairman, and I think it 

is probably still an issue in this country. And it is just the way we 

are organized to deal with it. 

And just the last thing—I know I have taken too much time 

here, but the last thing I would say is that the war on terrorism, 

the war against violent extremism, the way you keep men and 

women from wanting to join jihad can’t be solved by our military 

alone. It needs those other instruments of power, in my view. 

And most of the problems of the world that we deal with that are 

security issues are not just military issues. There are other instruments of national power, as well. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. Thank you. 

General PACE. It took the Congress of the United States in the 

1980s to come up with the Goldwater-Nichols Act that directed 

your military to learn how to share our toys and play together in 

the sand. And because of that, your military is enormously more 

powerful and efficient and effective than it would have been had 

we been left to do it the way we had always been doing it. 

I would recommend—and this is a whole other hearing, but I do 

believe it deserves a separate hearing—I would recommend that 

the Congress consider a Goldwater-Nichols-like act for the interagency. Take everything that was decided in Goldwater-Nichols 

and see how you can apply it to relationships between State, DOD, 

Treasury, et cetera. 

I will save you my 45-minute presentation on that, ma’am, but 

the bottom line is—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. There are some, General, who might feel that we are 

doing a lot more of that today, but it sounds like you are saying 

we have to look at it. 

General PACE. We are doing much better, but it is going to take 

the energy of Congress and the Administration to change some of 

the laws of the land to allow us to do things. Right now, your military does things because we are the only ones who can, who have 

the authority. And sometimes we are a very blunt instrument when 

what we need is a scalpel. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 
29 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Heck. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, thank you all for being here today and for your distinguished service throughout your lifetime to our Nation. 

Recent budget pressures within the Department of Defense have 

resulted in greater awareness of the increasing costs of military 

personnel programs, to include military compensation, health care, 

and military retirement. The Defense Business Board recently declared the military retirement system unaffordable and proposed a 

plan that would convert the system from a defined benefit plan to 

a defined contribution plan. Benefits would vest at 3 to 5 years, as 

opposed to 20 years in today’s system, and would not be payable 

until age 60 or 65, as opposed to immediately upon retirement like 

in today’s system. Obviously, this would be a very significant 

change in the culture of military retirement. 

Having served at the most senior levels of military leadership, 

what is your opinion as to whether or not we have arrived at the 

point where reform of military retirement is necessary? Is the proposal of the Defense Business Board the right solution to replace 

the 20-year retirement that has been so successful in peace and 

war in maintaining an All-Volunteer Force? And is retirement an 

area, in general, where we should be looking to make defense cuts? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Dr. Heck, I am going to go back to my 

written statement and I am just going to read you a portion of it, 

because I addressed that. I am not a fan of simply using the Defense Business Board approach, and there is a variety of reasons, 

and I think my statement will tell you that. 

But in one of my recommendations, I said, ‘‘I believe Congress, 

working with the Administration, should stand up a panel to carefully examine military benefits.’’ This is compensation, health care, 

retirement and the rest. And I believe that there is room to examine those benefits, but such an examination should be comprehensive, thoughtful, employ significant grandfathering of provisions, 

with the ultimate aim to preserve the vitality and sustainability of 

the All-Volunteer Force, which is a key asymmetric advantage. As 

one who served during both the draft era and then the All-Volunteer Force, our military today is far better than anything I ever 

served in. 

And I would just tell you, I understand from talking with the 

senior leadership that the single most repeated question that is 

going on out in the field is, what are you doing with my military 

retirement? These are combat people who are forward deployed. 

So before you run off and take somebody’s suggestion somewhere, 

there are a lot of hearings that this committee and Congress needs 

to deal with, because this is an important issue, and the reason 

why we have such a fine military is what you have built here. Does 

that mean we can’t make some changes? No. It just means that you 

need to do it very carefully, from my perspective. 

Thank you. 

General PACE. I think, sir, we also have to be very conscious of 

unintended consequences. If you give me, as a military guy, an opportunity to have the kind of retirement that, at the 5-year mark, 

7-year mark, 12-year mark, I can walk away, and the only difference between what I have when I walk away and what I could 
30 

have had if I stayed is the multiple of the succeeding years, today’s 

system, one of the benefits of it is that it means that for those who 

stay, when they are at the 12-, 14-, 16-year mark, we know they 

are going to stay until at least 20. 

They are very, very talented people. We don’t want them walking 

out the door. So we want to be careful that if we look at the system 

that we don’t have the unintended consequence of our most capable 

individuals having the door opened up for them, so to speak, number one. 

Number two, we recruit individuals, but we retain families. And 

as I have mentioned here today before, our families are serving this 

Nation, as well as the individual service member, and they are 

under a great strain. And the message that we send them about 

the value of their service will be very strong depending upon what 

this committee and the Congress decides to do about paying benefits. 

I am not trying to put a stake in the ground. I don’t mean that. 

We should be discussing it. But we need to understand very clearly 

that whatever the decision is is going to be a very strong message 

to our military families about the value of their contribution to the 

Nation. And I think we need to approach that very, very deliberately. 

General MYERS. I think we can underestimate the discussion 

now that is out in the system of these proposals. I think that there 

are a lot of our troops and their families that are kind of worried 

and wondering what is coming next. 

I don’t have the answers to all those. I think the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the Service chiefs and the Chairman and Vice Chairman, 

would be excellent witnesses to talk and describe about the pluses 

and minuses of a 401(k) system versus our own. 

Just to tag on just for a second, I think we built a system that 

encourages people to stay to 20 years because there is a 20-year retirement. The reason so young is we work them pretty hard for 20 

years; we put them in harm’s way. The military has got to be, basically, a relatively young force, so that seems to make some sense. 

And in the current system, you have some predictability in terms 

of retention and building your force structure, where you don’t 

have all privates and no corporals and no sergeants. I think there 

would be unintended consequences, perhaps, to the current 401(k). 

The Services can probably talk about that. Maybe there are some 

surveys they have done and focus groups that would give you a better sense of that. 

But we have built a system for a specific purpose. It can always 

be relooked at; that is a fair thing. Whether this is the right answer or not, I don’t know, but I bet the Services have thought 

about it already. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I received a call last week from a constituent 

who is—I think he has 12 years in, and he is looking at reenlisting 

and wanted to know from me what he could plan on for his retirement, should he do it or should he not. That is out there, and it 

is very serious. 

Yes? 
31 

General PACE. Mr. Chairman, may I have just 30 seconds? Because a very important point that I should mention is, whatever 

the retirement system is, from where is the money going to come? 

I participated in the Thrift Savings Plan as a volunteer, and I 

thought my money was going out of my paycheck into, at the time, 

a Barclay’s-run investment fund. When I retired, I asked to have 

my money back, and I got my check from the U.S. Treasury. And 

I didn’t understand that. 

So I worry that the current Thrift Savings Plan and perhaps 

some other retirement program might be another Social Security 

account, where you take—you take Pfc. (Private First Class) Pace’s 

money and you spend it someplace else and you give him a piece 

of paper that says, ‘‘We owe you this amount of money.’’ I would 

not subscribe to that for military retirement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

You know, this hearing is about 10 years after 9/11 and what is 

the future for the military. And you have all used the word ‘‘strategy,’’ and you have all said that, you know, how, for example, military spending and all has to be tied to strategy. 

Now, my question is, the word ‘‘strategy.’’ I am not sure at 9/11 

that we were a military that was ready for what we are facing in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. I am not sure that when we talk about strategy in a very broad and generic way, whether we recognize how different and complex, for example, the Pacific is. You know, if you 

were to look at China, you probably would use a conventional strategy; or North Korea, you would probably look at a more conventional type of military strategy. But when you start to go to the 

South Pacific and you look at Philippines and all of the other areas 

where you have Al Qaeda presence, you may look at something like 

counterterrorism or this word ‘‘counterinsurgency’’—and I am still 

not quite sure what the difference is. But we have all of these different strategies. 

So how do we prepare for the future when we have such, in my 

opinion, diverse types of arenas that we have to contend with, for 

example, even in the Pacific itself? So, any one of you want to tell 

me how you then apply that to where we sit, which is, okay, how 

do you budget based on the strategy that may have three or four 

different heads? 

Thank you. 

General PACE. So, as best I remember, in the late 1990s, we were 

looking at and budgeting for the potential of perhaps having to go 

to Iran and having to go to Korea as two possible places where 

your military would have to be employed. And we looked at the war 

plans then and the kinds of skills and equipment that would be 

needed to go to those two countries as examples. 

As has always happened and seems to always happen, we ended 

up going to Afghanistan or someplace we hadn’t been thinking 

about. And we sure as heck had not been thinking about Afghanistan. But the fact that we did not have correctly where we would 

have to go did not mean that we did not have correctly the kinds 

of capabilities that we would need to go wherever needed. And it 
32 

was the plan for the possible Irans and the possible Koreas that 

gave us the equipment, the skills, the training that allowed us to 

go to Afghanistan as quickly as we did. 

So you are absolutely right, ma’am, to say that there is a plethora of things that can happen out there, each of which is unique. 

But there are some fundamental similarities amongst all: the deployments, the size of the force, the speed, precision, interoperability, intelligence, the technical pieces of this. All of those are 

common threads that you can work on, train to, and fund so that, 

wherever you are called on, you can go do what you need to do. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Before everybody else—General Pace, I understand that. However, one of the issues that we contend with is end 

strength. So I think end strength, if anything, is going to be defined by the, quote, ‘‘arena’’ that we are focusing on. And that 

makes the decisions, and that is what we are faced with. 

So I will just toss it out to—I saw everyone else reaching for 

their mics, so please. 

And after this I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could just add, General Pace talked 

about these plans. It is the process of planning—and I won’t go 

through defense planning guidance and start naming all of the 

things that happen inside the Department of Defense, but it is this 

planning process that gives you the construct and provides the capabilities that you need to go after a certain set of scenarios. 

And as we said already, there are many surprises out there. 

There will always be surprises. And, hopefully, you can do them as 

lesser included cases in that overall planning process. I think General Pace and I are saying the same thing in two different ways. 

General MYERS. Just to tag on to what they both said, but I 

think in terms of our planning, what General Pace is getting at is, 

you know, if you have a set of capabilities, you can scale those capabilities. 

So when we had to go to Afghanistan and Iraq, what we scaled— 

one of the force elements we scaled up was our Special Operations 

Forces. So they have been the beneficiary of more manpower, more 

and newer equipment, and so forth. And if you have a military that 

can do a variety of tasks, you can scale. It takes you time. There 

is risk in that, and we found that out. There certainly is risk. But 

you can’t afford to have it all ready at a moment’s notice. 

I would just say, to go back—I think you were saying or talking 

strategically. You know, this all ought to stem from our vital national interests. At least in the executive branch, define your vital 

national interests. Out of that comes your national security strategy, and out of that comes your military strategy. It finally gets 

down to your military strategy. And that is the construct at our 

war colleges and so forth people follow. 

And as we have talked about in this hearing, sometimes the urgency of our issues—the budget issue here, in this particular case— 

you know, we don’t go through that construct. We just kind of get 

down to the budget, and then we hope that whatever is left will 

trickle back up. And as you look up at our vital national interests, 

oh, yeah, we can support those, whatever they might be, in AsiaPacific or wherever around the world. 
33 

So I would just remind people that there is really a construct 

that those that work in strategy try to follow. It is an imperfect 

world. We never do it perfectly. 

Mr. WITTMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa. 

I would like to go now to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. West, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And to the distinguished panelists, great to see some of you all 

in this uniform and not the previous uniform. 

One of the things that we have talked about is the strategy aspect. And this 21st-century battlefield is very different, and the 

enemy definitely has a vote. But when I look at getting away from 

a forward-deployed military and maybe going to a power-projection 

type of military—and we look at some of the things that are affecting us right now, where, in the last 20 years, we have gone from 

546 Navy vessels down to 283. We look at—our F–15 and A–10 

platforms are starting to show some signs of wear and tear, as well 

as our F/A–18s. And also we talked already about the five and six 

times that we have seen some of our soldiers and marines, especially, going over to these combat zones. 

So, when we talk about defense cuts, I want to make sure that 

we are not so much focusing down the operational level and below, 

to the tactical level, because I think that is so important. 

But if we look at what we did with JFCOM [Joint Forces Command], is it possible for us to look at our headquarters and see a 

means by which we can streamline some of these headquarters? 

Maybe they are, you know, once again looking at that 

Clausewitizian-type of structure, and we can make it more functional to, like General Myers said, more of a Sun Tzu-type of approach that really is in concert with the 21st-century battlefield. 

So your thoughts on how we can, you know, streamline some of 

the headquarters that we have here in our military? 

General MYERS. I will take a stab at that because I have been, 

I guess, around long enough and participated in other cuts to our— 

what we call our management headquarters. They are always painful. 

I don’t have a good baseline today to tell you where our headquarters are. Can you streamline? Always. The question is, okay, 

what are the risks again? We have streamlined our headquarters 

to the point that, in 2001, after 9/11, when we asked CENTCOM 

[Central Command], ‘‘Okay, start thinking about Afghanistan; we 

want you to give the President some options,’’ we had to augment 

his staff. I don’t know how big it grew. I can’t remember the numbers. But I bet the staff down there was two to three times, maybe 

more, larger than the staff he had sitting there before 9/11, because 

he didn’t have the staff to do the job. 

So I can remember in the—I think it was in the ’90s, in an effort 

to be more efficient, we said, well—somebody, some panel, civilian 

panel said, ‘‘Well, we don’t need all these cooks in the military. 

Why do you have all these cooks? You can hire cooks.’’ Well, you 

can, except when you are in Fallujah and the troops are hungry 

and there is no firm—and artillery shells are coming in, there is 

no firm willing to kind of go do that, you know, it is nice to have 

some cooks in the Army or the Navy or the Air Force or the Ma-
34 

rines that say, hey—you know, they will go until you can get, 

maybe, a situation stabilized. 

So I think there is always a risk to these sorts of things, and that 

is what the question ought to be. Okay, we would like you to cut 

management headquarters 10 percent; tell us the risk. And I think 

people now have the history, they can, especially in the last 10 

years, can tell you what that risk might be. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I would just suggest not to focus solely 

on the military side of this. The uniform side is what I am talking 

about. We have some pretty sizable headquarters staffs with pretty 

sizable numbers of civilians. And those numbers have grown pretty 

dramatically here over the last few years. And my view is that we 

ought to look very carefully at them because the last time—we 

need our professional civilian workforce in the Department of Defense. The question is, how much of it do we need, since they are 

not toting rifles. They help us develop the rifles. They help us, with 

industry, produce the rifles, but the question is, how many do you 

need? 

And I think that, frankly, a good look at the civilian side would 

be also very helpful in this whole process. 

General PACE. And there are definitely efficiencies to be had in 

headquarters, sir, you know that from your experience. I mean, of 

course, your natural enemy was next higher headquarters, anyway, 

so it depends what level you are, depends on how you see a particular staff. But as we do this, the Joint Forces Command example 

is one that we ought to take a very hard look at and see how it 

plays out. As best I know, the Joint, the J7 on the Joint Staff, 

which used to be a one-star, two-star job, is now a three-star job, 

and he now has 1,500 individuals inside of J7 who used to be Joint 

Forces Command. So I am not quite sure, did we simply move the 

deck, chairs on the deck, or have we, in fact, gotten some kind of 

efficiencies? I am not in place now. I haven’t been in the building 

in 4 years in a job, so I have got to be careful how I say that, but 

I do believe that sometimes this can be a whack-a-mole contest if 

we are not careful. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. West. 

I would like to recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a couple of preliminary comments here. A paper written 

by—a draft—Captain Porter and Colonel Mykleby suggest that our 

fundamental strategy is out of place. They write, ‘‘It is time for our 

military to evolve from a strategy based on containment to a strategy focused on the sustainability of our security and prosperity in 

a dynamic and uncertain strategic environment.’’ 

And then another article written more recently or recently by 

Larry Korb, Laura Conley, and Alex Rothman, ‘‘A Return to Responsibility: What President Obama and Congress Can Learn from 

Defense Budgets of Past Presidents,’’ in which they write, still 

keeping our military budget at the Reagan administration level, 

the peak Cold War levels of approximately $580 billion, and bringing the defense budget down to levels that existed in Eisenhower, 
35 

Nixon, Bush, Clinton would require a $250 billion to $300 billion 

annual reduction. 

And finally, a fellow that I have come to respect more and more 

as the years go by, Eisenhower, in his farewell address, he wrote 

of the military industrial complex and the power that it has and 

the problems that it can present. Prior to that speech, he gave a 

speech in 1953 that said, and I quote this, ‘‘every gun that is made, 

every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final 

sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who 

are cold and not clothed. This is a world in arms. This world in 

arms is not spending money alone; it is spending the sweat of its 

laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This 

is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of 

threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.’’ 

We need to think deep thoughts around here. These three papers, one by current military officers, who are suggesting that we 

need to rethink how we exercise our power in this uncertain and 

very changing world; another writing about past military expenditures and whether we can make significant reductions today and 

still maintain our security; and finally, the words of perhaps one 

of the most famous generals in American history and Presidents, 

when he talked about how the role of the military and what it ultimately means. 

In that context, we are now, perhaps because of the deficit and 

the concerns that are present in it and the sword of Damocles 

hanging over most of our programs, we are in a situation where we 

can and are probably forced to rethink, and in that context, these 

three papers and comments I think are well worth it. 

I would just like to hear your reflections on those three points 

or philosophies, and I will note that I guess all three of you are 

currently involved in the military industry in one way or another. 

Mr. Myers, and then we will go down the table. 

General MYERS. The first two papers you referred to, I am not— 

I haven’t read the articles, so I am not sure I can comment on 

them. Of course, President Eisenhower’s comments are well known 

and well understood I think. 

I wonder what President Eisenhower would have done in New 

York City on 9/12/2001, what his view would have been at that 

time towards our security. And I think our view coming out of 

World War II was one thing. I think our view in the Cold War toward our overall economic prosperity, I think we found a way to 

do what I think President Eisenhower thought we couldn’t do. And 

that is before World War II, we didn’t have a large standing Army. 

Since World War II, we have. That was a completely different construct for the American people to understand. But I think people 

understand the benefit of having a large standing Army that can 

provide that security in peacetime as well as in times of in conflict. 

So I think the times have changed around that comment. They are 

still clearly dangers that he articulated. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We are nearly out of time. 

General MYERS. Okay. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you for your comment. I hate to cut you 

off. I would love to discuss this for several hours with all three of 

you gentlemen. 
36 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I would just quickly say that General 

Myers asked the right question. If I look at President General Eisenhower, if you think about it, he is used to mass. He was used 

to watching and dealing and operating in World War I and World 

War II with huge numbers of people. Today, suddenly, we have 

groups, not states, who want to create mass casualties with small 

numbers of people. It is a very different situation. 

Number two, on the papers you mentioned, I haven’t read them. 

I have just read reviews of them, and I would just tell you that I 

think in the military, we try to encourage our people to write and 

think and debate so that we can have these discussions as we work 

through strategy. And I would encourage that to continue to happen. 

General PACE. Absolutely agree on the strategy piece. We started 

this conversation and I think we should end it when we do end it 

on strategy, strategy, strategy. What do you want your military to 

do? And the young captains and majors today and the sergeants, 

they have got years of combat experience. We have an Armed 

Forces now that has an enormous amount of combat experience. 

We should be listening to them from their perspective about their 

part of the strategy. 

I mean, how can you fault what President Eisenhower said? 

Every dollar spent on war is a dollar that could be spent someplace 

else. The bottom line becomes at what level do you become a notfree nation? So I agree with that. I mean, the casualties at Normandy on one day in World War II are unfathomable in today’s environment. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I would love to have you three gentlemen in my 

office for several hours to talk through these things. These are profoundly important issues as we rethink and deal with the issues 

that are before us in this Congress, and particularly in this committee, which concerns such a large part of the Federal budget. 

Thank you so very much. 

And for the additional time, Mr. Chairman, I thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. 

With that—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry, I wasn’t recognized yet. Let me—go ahead, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Please, please. I would like to recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Indiana. 

Mr. YOUNG. I am so excited about this topic. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

A strategy-based approach to our military spending. This comes 

up time and again. It is something that, since I was sworn in, in 

January, I have heard from a number of policy experts, uniformed 

personnel, some of my colleagues here in Congress, yet we continue 

to talk in terms, we benchmark current military spending against 

historical military spending. That may be of some use, and perhaps 

you want to speak to that later. I don’t find that a particularly useful construct as we are thinking about strategy-based military 

spending. I also understand that there are implications on our 

economy, on job creation. As we think about reducing military 

spending, we need to continue to ensure we have some base within 

our economy where we can develop the technologies of tomorrow. 
37 

Nonetheless, I think that is overstated sometimes. Maybe for parochial reasons. 

So how do we develop this strategy-based approach? Well, first, 

we need a robust strategy, as I see it, coming out of a robust strategic planning process, and we already have some law in place, as 

you know. Goldwater-Nichols requires the President to annually 

submit his report on National Security Strategy. It seems to me 

that this could be improved. Perhaps Congress needs to act to actually require the executive branch to prioritize among various national security objectives, and then we need to specifically, one 

would think, assign responsibility to specific agencies for achieving 

each of these different national security objectives. 

Then we have the QDR process. Presumably this ought to be a 

process through which we challenge preexisting thinking. We think 

long term and think anew about some of the challenges facing us, 

not just sanction some existing biases within the Pentagon or beyond. And the independent panel commissioned by Congress not 

long ago came up with some recommendations that I hope this 

committee adopts and improves that process. 

But, you know, this all comes down to—a national security planning process to produce that strategy—comes down to this risk 

analysis that General Pace spoke directly about. 

I think you indicated to one of my colleagues earlier, General 

Pace, that we ought to be able to pull in the current Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff into a SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility] and press him on what are these trade-offs between budget savings, on one hand, and defense expenditures on 

the other. 

Now, I guess I would ask each of you gentlemen, during your 

professional lives were you aware of ever any documentation of 

these trade-offs being made, even in a classified setting? Have we 

documented where we could trade off spending on one hand and 

defense savings on the other and prioritize to each of these different areas? Has this ever been done? 

General PACE. There is certainly documentation about what possible force options you might be required to execute, if this is the 

operational availability analysis that has gone on now for the last 

12 years. There is not a dollar sign applied to that. It is simply the 

folks on the Joint Staff for the Chairman doing their job, which is 

to tell him, if this happens, if this happens, if this happens, and 

it happens within these timelines, this is the kind of force we will 

need. And they mix and match that kind of like a kaleidoscope, if 

you will, of various options that might take place. And the Chairman uses that as he goes forward with his recommendations about 

force size based on what he is told he is going to be required to 

do from the National Strategy level. 

So all the things that you have laid out step by step are exactly 

right, but sometimes parts of this get short sheeted. The QDR, for 

example, last time was wrong. It is supposed to be a wide open look 

ahead 20 years, come back and tell us what you might need, but 

there were prerequisites put into this QDR process that said, you 

cannot have more than this, you cannot have more than this, you 

cannot have more than this. What good is a QDR process that is 
38 

supposed to look out 20 years and tell you what you might need 

if you are told ahead of time where some of the limits are. 

Mr. YOUNG. Where were those parameters set? Through Congress and—— 

General PACE. No, no, inside the Pentagon. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. How can we, through your informed experience, how can we improve that process? 

General PACE. To the best of my knowledge, every time you have 

ever invited a military officer over here to come see you, they have 

shown up. And they have responsibility to support and be very precise about the programs that are on the table. 

They have also sworn to you and they were confirmed by you, by 

the Senate, that they would give their personal opinions, their professional military opinions, when asked. Congress, when Congress 

asks a military officer in uniform for their personal opinion, they 

are required to give it. My recommendation to you would be, ask 

them their opinion. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, could I have an additional 30 seconds? 

Mr. WITTMAN. Please. 

Mr. YOUNG. General Pace, would you be so bold as to recommend 

specific people that we call before this committee and ask those 

personal opinions, people that might be able to help us do this risk 

analysis? 

General PACE. Sir, you already have them, you already have all 

the leaders you should have appearing before you. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. 

General PACE. You have the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, 

you have the combatant commanders. My simple recommendation 

would be that there is a very powerful question you can ask when 

it comes to specific things, and you are going to get a very unvarnished answer when you ask them their opinion because they 

promised you in their confirmation hearings that they will give you 

their personal opinion. 

Mr. YOUNG. Great, it is all teed up. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Young. 

I would like to recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, it is great to see you all again. 

You are looking very dapper in the new uniforms. 

General Pace, I remember one time about 20 years ago when you 

were my next higher at headquarters, but I am over holding that 

against you at this time. 

Look, I want to pick up on—a little bit on what Mr. Young was 

saying and others, and that is about the information that we get 

from witnesses here. You have been, all of you have been here 

many times before wearing those other uniforms, and I am not suggesting that you were never not telling the truth, but I am also 

fairly certain that in those other uniforms, you came here and you 

were defending the President’s budget. We understood that. But 

getting sometimes really hard answers, the exact answers, is a little bit tough for us to ask exactly the right question exactly the 

right way to get at what we are getting at. 
39 

So, for example, right now, the Pentagon, using whatever strategy they are using, QDR modified or something like that, is undergoing budget-cutting drills, and you know what those are like. But 

these are big, and they are right in front of them. And they are 

looking at numbers like, what if we have to cut $60 billion or $500 

billion over 10 years? And what sort of cuts are we going to make? 

And I am worried that sometimes when those budget drills are 

going on and they are cutting drills and they turn into real cuts, 

I am not sure that we have an understanding in this committee, 

nor do the American people, about what the impact would be. 

Let’s take, for example, that in one of these cuts, you decide to 

cut—Pentagon proposes, Chairman proposes, comes to us, you are 

going to cut end strengths to an earlier point, and you are going 

to cut the end strength of, I will pick on the Marine Corps, by 

20,000, and you are going to do it right now over the next year to 

18 months. Well, I think we know that would be, have a horrific 

effect on the Marine Corps’ ability to do its mission. Not just on 

morale, but you would end up with imbalances and rank structures 

and MOSs [Military Occupational Specialties], but I am not sure 

that we are going to get that kind of information unless we go and 

ask exactly the right question. I happen to be picking end strength 

here, but you could say the same thing on, what if you cut this ship 

or what if you cut those planes? 

And so my plea to you is that in your new dapper uniforms, that 

you stay engaged. You are not here to defend the President’s budget, not that your uniformed successors are going to be dishonest 

with us, but they may not be as forthcoming as I think we—sometimes we need some real answers, and so, on an earlier note, there 

was a discussion about the drill that is going on about slashing, 

cutting the retirement benefits. I am not sure we are getting, you 

know, sort of input from people in uniform. Maybe we need to get 

the right guy and ask exactly the right question, what is the impact this is going to have on recruiting and retention and morale. 

I mean, I know because I spent the Labor Day weekend with my 

favorite soldier and his family, and that is ripping through the 

Army Times and through the Services, and it is pretty devastating 

what it is having. 

But we need that kind of input. So my guess, I have got a minute 

left, the question is what about these budget cuts and what are the 

kind of dangers that we ought to really be looking at that would 

have immediate tough effects? Any of you. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Let me just quickly say that with regard 

to the retirement budget cuts and the rest, besides just bringing 

over the senior leadership and doing as General Pace has suggested, which I think you will get pretty straightforward answers 

from these leaders because they have been in combat here for a 

long time, and they are going to give you what they think. Field 

hearings are also an important thing to do, where you go out and 

talk with troops. You know, when we have had major events in the 

past, the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate have 

gone out and done field hearings, and they have done them with 

troops. And I think it is a pretty powerful way of hearing what 

they think. 
40 

General MYERS. Just to tag on, maybe not to your direct question, but to—you know, I think the ability to speak in an environment where it is a secure environment, whether we are secure— 

I think we have secured this room before, you all have done that 

before. 

Mr. KLINE. Uh-huh. 

General MYERS. I think that really enables a franker discussion 

than an open hearing where there are cameras present and so 

forth. You can get to some of those because a military person is 

going to be loath to say to the world, including our adversaries, 

well, if you do that, it is going to mean this kind of capability or 

this risk, and that is usually the kind of thing that we like to keep 

to ourselves and of course with Congress, but I think that would 

help a lot as well. 

I guess to your point, you know, any dramatic cuts that are over 

a very short period of time are going to have a lot more impact on 

the Services, and you know that, you said you were with your favorite soldier. I guess that is your son or son-in-law. You know, the 

more uncertainty out there in the system, they have enough uncertainty in their lives—when I am going to deploy next, am I going 

to live through this, what happens if something happens to me—— 

Mr. KLINE. Right. 

General MYERS [continuing]. Who is going to take care, the 

whole—all that sort of thing, and this is just one more level of uncertainty which hits in the pocketbook, which is—we ought to be 

really careful, given that we are a Nation at war, a military—or 

somebody said, but a Nation at war, that when we do things, we 

do them in a way that just doesn’t shock the system and cause either more uncertainty or more hardship on our troops. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you very much. I have gone over—oh, yes? 

General PACE. Sorry, sir. If I might just have 30 seconds. If I 

could just buy one precise weapons system, if I only had X dollars 

left, I would buy PFC Pace and his family, and we need to be very, 

very careful. These families have sacrificed and sacrificed and sacrificed. They have done so willingly, but they have done so knowing 

that the American people and the Congress of the United States 

has been supporting them. 

The instant that we tell them we don’t love them, we are going 

to have a quick unraveling of our All-Volunteer Force because we 

are riding them hard, putting them away wet, and they need to 

know that we are going to take care of them. That does not mean 

that things should not be on the table, but if you are asking me 

what budget things to worry about, in addition to all the other 

strategies, what executes at the end of the day is PFC, Lieutenant 

Major Pace and their families, and we need to make sure we take 

care of them. 

Mr. KLINE. Well said. Amen. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kline. 

I would like to recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your service to our country, and my question 

has to do with nuclear modernization. 
41 

Many of the Senators who voted for that treaty did so on the assurance by the Administration that we would be devoting more dollars in the future to modernizing the aging nuclear stockpile, but 

almost before the ink was dry, that funding is becoming a target 

for budget cutting because of different pressures from different 

sources. 

What concern do you have about our lack of modernization if we 

don’t follow through on what the Senate and Administration had 

agreed to was necessary and we in the House, many of us agreed 

to as well, needed to be done to modernize the nuclear stockpile? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Let me quickly take that one and just 

tell you that one of the problems with nuclear weapons is that— 

and I will use the term binary—you either have them or you don’t 

have them. And when you have them, you really do have to take 

care of them and fully fund them. And there were a lot of debates 

and discussions, Perry-Schlesinger Commissions and the rest, who 

looked into these issues. And all of them unanimously talked about 

keeping these weapons fully up to speed and up to date. And the 

problem is a nuclear weapons safety issue. There is a whole variety 

of things, reliability of weapons and the rest. 

So I would just tell you that it is very important to do what the 

country said it was going to do when that treaty was signed. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Either of you two other gentlemen? 

General MYERS. Right. Let me—I think you only have nuclear 

deterrence if you have a credible nuclear force, and I think this has 

been a question that has gone on now for over a decade about the 

safety and the security and the effectiveness of our nuclear weapons. We can’t forget the safety piece here because you would worry 

about that in your home State, I think. So we are only credible if 

we keep them safe and secure and effective. Otherwise, adversaries 

very quickly figure out they aren’t a credible force and may take 

risks that they wouldn’t otherwise take. 

So I think it is just not the modernization of the stockpile itself; 

it is the infrastructure in DOE [Department of Energy] that helps 

make all that possible, and I confess I have not followed that debate or the funding that has gone into DOE, but when I left the 

office as Chairman, there were lots of promises made, but the DOE 

infrastructure was still fairly fragile. My assumption is it is still 

fairly fragile, and that is not a good place to be because our whole, 

the whole theory for our nuclear posture reviews and the plans for 

reductions that come out of that is that we will have this inventory 

that will be credible, and so all of that goes out the window if you 

don’t have a credible inventory in my view. 

General PACE. This is an unclassified hearing, so let me just recommend if I may, sir, a couple questions to ask in a classified setting. Number one, how many weapons do we have? 

Mr. LAMBORN. How many what? 

General PACE. How many weapons do we have? 

Number two, if we had to, how long would it take to design a 

new piece or part of one of those weapons? How long would it take 

our industrial base to be able to respond to stimuli that says we 

need to fix or replace all or part of one of our weapons? 
42 

Number three, how many times a year can we take our active 

weapons, take them apart, clean them up, satisfy ourselves that 

they are in working condition, put them back on the shelf? 

Those kinds of questions, I believe, will lead you to the answers 

you are seeking for the status of our industrial base. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

And lastly, do either—any of you have concern over the shift in 

focus on missile defense in Europe? We cancelled the third site and 

are now going to a phased adaptive approach in Europe, using 

more reliance on Aegis Destroyers, for instance. Do you have any 

concerns about that shift in focus? 

General MYERS. I have got to tell you, I am not sufficiently up 

to date on that issue to offer an informed opinion. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I haven’t studied it carefully, but I will 

just give you one issue that I think is important related to it, and 

that is, I don’t think we worked very well with our allies when we 

announced this and started to execute the strategy. And the reason 

why I bring that up is you certainly don’t reassure your friends 

when you reverse course without even asking them to participate 

with you in that discussion. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Anything else, General Pace? 

General PACE. I would just emphasize, it is not good to play Lucy 

in football with your friends. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you all. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. 

Gentlemen, again, I want to thank you for taking time to come 

to this hearing to provide your insights into the challenges ahead. 

I do want to finish with a couple of questions of my own. 

And General Pace, I will begin with you. In looking at our Marine Corps and looking at the challenges that they have faced, I 

think we have seen clearly that there is a need for an expeditionary force. We have heard that from former Secretary Gates, 

from former Commandant Conway, from Commandant Amos today, 

but looking forward, and we have certainly seen that also with the 

need for humanitarian aid and helping out through disasters; certainly our Marine Corps has been there in the forefront. 

Let me ask this, as you look into the future, how do you see the 

Marine Corps functioning post-Iraq and Afghanistan, and how can 

the Marine Corps effectively reset if it leaves Afghanistan after 

2014? And another question is, can the Marine Corps sustain an 

on-call at-sea expeditionary force while at the same time being engaged in heavy combat operations just as we see today? Because 

we see a world that is pretty dynamic, both with asymmetric 

threats and with conventional threats. I want to get your perspective on that about your projection about where the Marine Corps 

sees its challenges in the future. 

General PACE. I will answer your question, sir, but as you know, 

I was chairman of the Joint Chiefs and I would not want my response about the Marine Corps to have anybody on Active Duty or 

whoever worked around me thinking, a-ha, he was a closet Marine 

all the time. So you have asked me Marine questions, and I will 

give you Marine answers. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

General PACE. But my focus was on the Joint Force. 
43 

Mr. WITTMAN. It was, it was. I just wanted to get your perspective as one element of the total force that this United States 

projects. 

General PACE. And I appreciate that, sir. 

And General Jim Amos, obviously, is the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps and is the guy who has the detailed answers to your 

questions, but the Nation, in the eyes of the Marines, our Nation 

has always relied on our Marine Corps to be the most ready when 

the Nation is least ready, so Marines are mentally prepared to 

start taking on a heavier load, to be more ready, to be more of the 

tip of the spear as the overall capacity of the Armed Forces goes 

down, if it does go down. So Marines are thinking to themselves 

right now, how do we make sure that we have enough amphibious 

ships? How do we make sure that we have enough forward deployment? How do we make sure that we have enough training? How 

do we make sure we have enough troops to do those kinds of rotations? Because, as you point out in your question, if you are involved in heavy combat ashore or heavily involved ashore, with or 

without combat, then you are not aboard ship. 

So you either have enough Marines to do both, or you start making the strategic choices. Marines on board Navy ships are one of 

the country’s most flexible assets, and because they are armed and 

ready and can go at a moment’s notice, they can go ashore and help 

with humanitarian, or they can go ashore and start delivering effective lethal power if they need to. So your Corps of Marines, I am 

sure, because I have been one for 40-plus years, is sitting there 

right now figuring out, how can we be even a larger part of what 

the Nation leans on as we go forward? 

So Marines will be coming to you saying, you are going to get 

this percent of ground combat for this percent of the budget. You 

are going to get this percent of air power for this percent of the 

budget. And the numbers from the Marine Corps’ standpoint is always that our percent of air, ground, and other power is all smaller 

than the amount of money we ask in the budget compared to the 

overall budget. So I am not sure if I answered your question, sir, 

but I know your Marines are leaning forward and anxious to stay 

on the tip of the spear. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, that did, General Pace, and I appreciate 

that. 

I do have one additional question for Admiral Giambastiani. In 

the strategic sense on the Navy, looking at what we are facing in 

the future, obviously, we look at the metric from the conventional 

sense, but we also see a world around us that is changing. We see 

an asymmetric threat. We see nonstate-sponsored extremism 

abounds throughout the world. Within that context, where do you 

see our Navy evolving in the years to come? We all talk about the 

metric of 313 ships and making sure that we have that force to 

project influence around the world, but where do you see within 

this newer context the Navy going in years to come? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I guess in a larger sense, I would say 

that the Nation, the United States is a maritime power, and it is 

an aerospace power. And what you see, for example, on the Chinese 

side is that they understand that navies make a huge difference, 

which is why they are building a navy, to be a more global player. 
44 

I think that our Navy and our naval capability is going to have 

to remain robust for years to come. It gives us tremendous flexibility to both go into an area and withdraw rapidly, to bring tremendous power, air, Marines, everything with it, just as our aerospace power does. So I will just tell you in general terms, that is 

where I see us staying, I hope, and going. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, thank you. 

I just returned back from visiting our Pacific partners last week, 

and I heard loud and clear from them. In fact, one of the members 

of the Japanese Diet asked me specifically how we felt about the 

Chinese acquiring an aircraft carrier. So they are concerned about 

it, and they see the importance of a naval force and wanted to get 

our perspective on it. I appreciate your perspective. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for taking your time to join us 

today. Very insightful comments. We appreciate your perspective 

as this committee as well as this Congress is challenged with making some very tough decisions going forward, but ones that are critical to the national interest and making sure that we look out after 

the threats that are out there. 

And as you have heard from panel members today, it is about 

making tough decisions, but it is also about communicating specifically about the decisions and what risks those might pose for the 

United States if resources are taken away to a large extent in certain areas of the military. 

So we appreciate your perspective. That is very helpful in making decisions, and again, thank you all so much for your time today 

and thank you again for your service to our Nation. And with that, 

I will adjourn our hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2011 

(49) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from 

Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

September 8, 2011 

The House Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of former Chairmen 

and a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

As our Nation marks the ten-year anniversary of the attacks on 

our Nation this Sunday, we remember and commemorate the lives 

lost on that day. We also honor the sacrifices made every day since 

then by our military and their families, as our Armed Forces have 

taken the fight to the enemy to ensure our continued safety at 

home. This somber marker serves as a call for reflection. Therefore, 

the committee will undertake a series of hearings over the next 

month to evaluate lessons learned and to apply those lessons to decisions we will soon be making about the future of our force. 

With the decade mark approaching, our Nation finds itself at a 

strategic juncture—Osama bin Laden is dead, Al Qaeda is on its 

back, the Taliban has lost its strategic momentum in Afghanistan, 

and Iraq is an emerging democracy. 

Yet, with success comes the danger of complacency that will 

erode our resolve. Faced with serious economic challenges, we are 

slipping back into the September 10th mentality that a solid defense can be dictated by budget choices, not strategic ones. As 

members of the Armed Services Committee, our duty is to make 

sure that the choices we make regarding the Federal budget are 

dictated by our national security strategy—not the other way 

around. 

I believe the Department of Defense has already absorbed more 

than its fair share of cuts—over half a trillion dollars through 

2021. Nevertheless, if the Joint Select Committee’s recommendations are not adopted, an additional half a trillion could be taken 

away from our military automatically. What’s more, the White 

House has told DOD to include similar levels of cuts in next year’s 

budget request. Therefore, it would appear that regardless of what 

actions Congress takes, the Administration will propose to cut the 

military further. 
50 

As Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I have two principal concerns that stem from recent military atrophy. The first is 

a security issue. In a networked and globalized world, the Atlantic 

and Pacific Ocean are no longer adequate to keep America safe. 

September 11th taught us that. The second is an economic concern. 

While it is true that our military power is derived from our economic power, we must recognize that this relationship is symbiotic. 

Cuts to our military defense, either by eliminating programs or laying off soldiers, comes with an economic cost. 

The U.S. military is the modern era’s greatest champion of life, 

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is time we focus our fiscal 

restraint on the driver of the debt, instead of the protector of our 

prosperity. 

With that in mind, I look forward to a provocative discussion. 
51 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Future of National Defense and the U.S. 

Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from 

Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

September 8, 2011 

I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing here today. 

General Myers, General Pace, and Admiral Giambastiani all served 

for many years on behalf of our country, and we owe you our 

thanks for your service. I hope that today we can prevail on you 

again to provide us with your advice. 

I will not take too much time to belabor the point here, but our 

Nation is faced with a long-term, systemic budget dilemma. Simply 

put, revenues and expenditures are substantially misaligned. We 

don’t collect enough revenue to cover our expenditures. Going forward, it is my belief that we are going to have to fix this problem 

from both ends—spending will have to come down, and we’re going 

to have to fix the revenue problem. 

It is the decrease in spending, however, that most concerns us 

here today. Defense spending makes up about 20 percent of all 

Federal spending and about half of all nonentitlement. Since 9/11, 

defense spending has risen, in real terms, somewhere over 40 percent without counting the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it’s not clear that we have actually gotten that much 

value from our spending. Nonetheless, like many, if not most, of 

our members here, I share the view that large, immediate cuts to 

the defense budget would have substantially negative impacts to 

the ability of the U.S. military to carry out those missions we assign them, and this is in fact why I voted against the recent agreement to raise the debt ceiling. But, and I would like to be clear, 

I believe that we can rationally evaluate our national security 

strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current set of missions 

we ask the military to undertake and come up with a strategy that 

requires less funding. We can, I believe, spend smarter and not just 

more. 

In fact, the Administration has announced that just such a comprehensive overview is underway, and I congratulate them for undertaking it. Faced with the end of the war in Iraq, the beginning 

of the transition period in Afghanistan, the death of bin Laden, and 

the prospect of declining budgets, undertaking a strategic review is 

a rational and responsible choice. We on this committee like to say 

that strategy should not be driven by arbitrary budget numbers, 

but by the same token not considering the level of available resources when developing a strategy is irresponsible and leads inevitably to asking our military to undertake jobs for which we do not 

have the resources. 

So my hope for this hearing is that our witnesses here today will 

help us think through the strategy changes about which we should 
52 

think. Rather than just focus on the potential damage to national 

defense that could be caused by large and arbitrary cuts or coming 

up with imaginary numbers and asking the witnesses how bad 

they would be, we should ask the witnesses, how can we put together a sustainable national defense strategy? If you were asked, 

what would you tell those undertaking the comprehensive review? 

I don’t believe anyone here thinks defense funding will stay level 

or increase in real terms in the future, so what missions should we 

think about cancelling? What can we do smarter? And what principles would you use to prioritize the interests in the world that we 

must defend or the threats we must defend against? 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And 

thank you Generals Myers and Pace and Admiral Giambastiani for 

appearing here today. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2011 

(81) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Impact to the land-based deterrent: The Air Force is in the midst 

of an ambitious effort to extend the life of the Minuteman III force out to 2030. At 

the same time, there are significant bills to be paid to operate and sustain the 450 

ICBMs that are presently deployed (though some of these will be moved to non-deployed status or eliminated altogether around 2017–2018 under the New START 

treaty with Russia). Even when those reductions are implemented, they will not 

likely save significant funds, especially as the Air Force is expected to continue to 

maintain three missile wings spread across Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and 

Nebraska to maintain a viable land-based deterrent. What would your concerns be 

about failure to provide for the necessary modernization activities to extend the life 

of the Minuteman III missiles out to 2030, and if the U.S. simply ceased 

sustainment activities to the current fleet of Minuteman III missiles, as might happen as a result of the dangerous cuts to the Defense Department under the Lew 

Memorandum to Federal agencies or the sequestration mechanism of the Budget 

Control Act? In FY13 alone, these cuts could amount to almost $200 million out of 

a projected $566 million budget for Air Force ICBM activities. 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. In December of 2010, during consideration of the New START treaty 

between the United States and Russia, the President stated: ‘‘I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment for the long-term . . . that is my commitment to the Congress—that my administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as I am President.’’ If you were still the principal military advisor to the President, would you urge him to continue to stand by that commitment? 

Has anything changed since December of last year when the President made this 

commitment to the Congress that would make the modernization of the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent now less important? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The so-called Perry-Schlesinger Commission stated that it ‘‘recommends retention of the current triad. Each leg of the triad has its own value. Resilience and flexibility of the triad have proven valuable as the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons has declined. They promise to become even 

more important as systems age and if back-up systems within each leg of the triad 

are reduced.’’ Do you agree with this finding of the bipartisan commission? If so, 

do you believe that continued investment in the TRIAD is imperative? Because of 

the unique role played by each leg of the triad to the security of the United States, 

what are the risks, in your mind, to losing one or more of those legs? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. As Chairman, you were all involved in the process of reporting on 

the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. You may also be aware that under law, the 

directors of our nuclear weapons labs are required to be independent and offer the 

Congress and the President their best technical judgment. Do you believe this is an 

important principle? Do you believe the directors of our nuclear weapons labs must 

be persons of integrity and unquestioned technical expertise in the nuclear weapons 

field and that they should be independently chosen on that basis, free of political 

interference? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 NPR stated that because of the conventional military superiority of the United States, it could reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. How will 

significant cuts in U.S. conventional military power affect the assumption that we 

can continue to reduce our nuclear forces that deter attacks on the United States 

and its allies? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Earlier this year, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said with 

regard to a decision not to fully fund the modernization of our nuclear deterrent 

that: ‘‘This [nuclear weapons] modernization program was very carefully worked out 

between ourselves and the . . . Department of Energy. And, frankly, where we came 

out on that also, I think, played a fairly significant role in the willingness of the 

Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the risks are to our own program 
82 

in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a security and a political standpoint, really 

important.’’ In view of your previous roles at the pinnacle of the U.S. military’s officer corps, responsible for the security of this Nation, do you believe it is important 

that the modernization plan agreed to last year during the New START ratification 

process should be fully funded? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Extended Deterrent and U.S. nuclear weapons modernization: The 

United States is on an aggressive path to modernize its B61 gravity bomb, with a 

first production unit needed by 2017 in order to keep an extended deterrent deployed in NATO. A significant budget cut—such as that possible under sequestration through the Budget Control Act or the Lew Memorandum to Federal agencies, 

which asks the agencies to plan for a 10 percent cut below FY11 enacted appropriations—would guarantee that the United States cannot meet the 2017 timeline. This 

could mean the United States would have to immediately withdraw its nuclear 

weapons from Europe, which provide the so-called extended deterrent. What would 

your concerns be about the U.S. simply failing to modernize its forward deployed 

B61 bombs in view of its commitment to NATO and the Obama Administration’s 

own NATO Strategic Concept commitment that as long as nuclear weapons exist, 

NATO will be a nuclear armed alliance? What signal would be sent to our European 

allies in NATO by such a failure? What signal would that send to Russia with its 

several thousand tactical nuclear weapons, many of which are located near the borders of our NATO allies? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. According to the 2010 edition of the annual report of the Director 

of National Security on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction, Iran continues ‘‘developing space launch vehicles, which incorporate technology directly applicable to longer-range missile systems’’ and North Korea ‘‘continues to pursue the development, production, and deployment of ballistic missiles 

with increasing range and sophistication . . . [and] continues to develop a mobile 

IRBM as well as a mobile solid-propellant’’ ballistic missile. In view of the risks 

these growing ballistic missile threats pose to the U.S. homeland, do you have concerns about the failing budget support for missile defense, especially missile defense 

of the United States? As you may know, the ground-based midcourse defense element of our ballistic missile defense system has been cut by almost $1 billion since 

President Obama came to office. 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission also stated that ‘‘A quick survey 

of the potential nuclear candidates in Northeast Asia and the Middle East brings 

home the point that many potential proliferation candidates are friends and even 

allies of the United States. A decision by those friends and allies to seek nuclear 

weapons would be a significant blow to U.S. interests.’’ Do you agree with that assessment? Do you believe that it therefore follows that the United States has to 

make investments in the reliability and credibility of its nuclear deterrent not just 

for itself but in terms of what assures our allies, many of whom have only foregone 

the choice to develop their own nuclear weapons because of their confidence in the 

reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright 

stated that ‘‘[W]e do have challenges around the globe with strategic depth and [a] 

lack of [nearby] infrastructure and basing . . . [w]e’ve got to have a way to address 

those [urgent targets] credibly for our deterrent postures [to work].’’ That ‘‘way’’ was 

known as conventional prompt global strike. Do you support the development by the 

United States of a conventional prompt global strike capability? Can you offer an 

example, perhaps from your time as Chairman, of when this capability could have 

been useful in dealing with a threat to the national security of the United States? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. In December of 2010, during consideration of the New START treaty 

between the United States and Russia, the President stated: ‘‘I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment for the long-term . . . that is my commitment to the Congress—that my administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as I am President.’’ If you were still the principal military advisor to the President, would you urge him to continue to stand by that commitment? 

Has anything changed since December of last year when the President made this 

commitment to the Congress that would make the modernization of the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent now less important? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
83 

Mr. TURNER. The so-called Perry-Schlesinger Commission stated that it ‘‘recommends retention of the current triad. Each leg of the triad has its own value. Resilience and flexibility of the triad have proven valuable as the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons has declined. They promise to become even 

more important as systems age and if back-up systems within each leg of the triad 

are reduced.’’ Do you agree with this finding of the bipartisan commission? If so, 

do you believe that continued investment in the TRIAD is imperative? Because of 

the unique role played by each leg of the triad to the security of the United States, 

what are the risks, in your mind, to losing one or more of those legs? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. As Chairman, you were all involved in the process of reporting on 

the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. You may also be aware that under law, the 

directors of our nuclear weapons labs are required to be independent and offer the 

Congress and the President their best technical judgment. Do you believe this is an 

important principle? Do you believe the directors of our nuclear weapons labs must 

be persons of integrity and unquestioned technical expertise in the nuclear weapons 

field and that they should be independently chosen on that basis, free of political 

interference? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 NPR stated that because of the conventional military superiority of the United States, it could reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. How will 

significant cuts in U.S. conventional military power affect the assumption that we 

can continue to reduce our nuclear forces that deter attacks on the United States 

and its allies? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Earlier this year, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said with 

regard to a decision not to fully fund the modernization of our nuclear deterrent 

that: ‘‘This [nuclear weapons] modernization program was very carefully worked out 

between ourselves and the . . . Department of Energy. And, frankly, where we came 

out on that also, I think, played a fairly significant role in the willingness of the 

Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the risks are to our own program 

in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a security and a political standpoint, really 

important.’’ In view of your previous roles at the pinnacle of the U.S. military’s officer corps, responsible for the security of this Nation, do you believe it is important 

that the modernization plan agreed to last year during the New START ratification 

process should be fully funded? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Extended Deterrent and U.S. nuclear weapons modernization: The 

United States is on an aggressive path to modernize its B61 gravity bomb, with a 

first production unit needed by 2017 in order to keep an extended deterrent deployed in NATO. A significant budget cut—such as that possible under sequestration through the Budget Control Act or the Lew Memorandum to Federal agencies, 

which asks the agencies to plan for a 10 percent cut below FY11 enacted appropriations—would guarantee that the United States cannot meet the 2017 timeline. This 

could mean the United States would have to immediately withdraw its nuclear 

weapons from Europe, which provide the so-called extended deterrent. What would 

your concerns be about the U.S. simply failing to modernize its forward deployed 

B61 bombs in view of its commitment to NATO and the Obama Administration’s 

own NATO Strategic Concept commitment that as long as nuclear weapons exist, 

NATO will be a nuclear armed alliance? What signal would be sent to our European 

allies in NATO by such a failure? What signal would that send to Russia with its 

several thousand tactical nuclear weapons, many of which are located near the borders of our NATO allies? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. According to the 2010 edition of the annual report of the Director 

of National Security on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction, Iran continues ‘‘developing space launch vehicles, which incorporate technology directly applicable to longer-range missile systems’’ and North Korea ‘‘continues to pursue the development, production, and deployment of ballistic missiles 

with increasing range and sophistication . . . [and] continues to develop a mobile 

IRBM as well as a mobile solid-propellant’’ ballistic missile. In view of the risks 

these growing ballistic missile threats pose to the U.S. homeland, do you have concerns about the failing budget support for missile defense, especially missile defense 

of the United States? As you may know, the ground-based midcourse defense element of our ballistic missile defense system has been cut by almost $1 billion since 

President Obama came to office. 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
84 

Mr. TURNER. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission also stated that ‘‘A quick survey 

of the potential nuclear candidates in Northeast Asia and the Middle East brings 

home the point that many potential proliferation candidates are friends and even 

allies of the United States. A decision by those friends and allies to seek nuclear 

weapons would be a significant blow to U.S. interests.’’ Do you agree with that assessment? Do you believe that it therefore follows that the United States has to 

make investments in the reliability and credibility of its nuclear deterrent not just 

for itself but in terms of what assures our allies, many of whom have only foregone 

the choice to develop their own nuclear weapons because of their confidence in the 

reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright 

stated that ‘‘[W]e do have challenges around the globe with strategic depth and [a] 

lack of [nearby] infrastructure and basing . . . [w]e’ve got to have a way to address 

those [urgent targets] credibly for our deterrent postures [to work].’’ That ‘‘way’’ was 

known as conventional prompt global strike. Do you support the development by the 

United States of a conventional prompt global strike capability? Can you offer an 

example, perhaps from your time as Chairman, of when this capability could have 

been useful in dealing with a threat to the national security of the United States? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. In December of 2010, during consideration of the New START treaty 

between the United States and Russia, the President stated: ‘‘I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment for the long-term . . . that is my commitment to the Congress—that my administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as I am President.’’ If you were still the principal military advisor to the President, would you urge him to continue to stand by that commitment? 

Has anything changed since December of last year when the President made this 

commitment to the Congress that would make the modernization of the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent now less important? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The so-called Perry-Schlesinger Commission stated that it ‘‘recommends retention of the current triad. Each leg of the triad has its own value. Resilience and flexibility of the triad have proven valuable as the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons has declined. They promise to become even 

more important as systems age and if back-up systems within each leg of the triad 

are reduced.’’ Do you agree with this finding of the bipartisan commission? If so, 

do you believe that continued investment in the TRIAD is imperative? Because of 

the unique role played by each leg of the triad to the security of the United States, 

what are the risks, in your mind, to losing one or more of those legs? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. As Chairman, you were all involved in the process of reporting on 

the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. You may also be aware that under law, the 

directors of our nuclear weapons labs are required to be independent and offer the 

Congress and the President their best technical judgment. Do you believe this is an 

important principle? Do you believe the directors of our nuclear weapons labs must 

be persons of integrity and unquestioned technical expertise in the nuclear weapons 

field and that they should be independently chosen on that basis, free of political 

interference? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 NPR stated that because of the conventional military superiority of the United States, it could reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. How will 

significant cuts in U.S. conventional military power affect the assumption that we 

can continue to reduce our nuclear forces that deter attacks on the United States 

and its allies? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Earlier this year, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said with 

regard to a decision not to fully fund the modernization of our nuclear deterrent 

that: ‘‘This [nuclear weapons] modernization program was very carefully worked out 

between ourselves and the . . . Department of Energy. And, frankly, where we came 

out on that also, I think, played a fairly significant role in the willingness of the 

Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the risks are to our own program 

in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a security and a political standpoint, really 
85 

important.’’ In view of your previous roles at the pinnacle of the U.S. military’s officer corps, responsible for the security of this Nation, do you believe it is important 

that the modernization plan agreed to last year during the New START ratification 

process should be fully funded? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Extended Deterrent and U.S. nuclear weapons modernization: The 

United States is on an aggressive path to modernize its B61 gravity bomb, with a 

first production unit needed by 2017 in order to keep an extended deterrent deployed in NATO. A significant budget cut—such as that possible under sequestration through the Budget Control Act or the Lew Memorandum to Federal agencies, 

which asks the agencies to plan for a 10 percent cut below FY11 enacted appropriations—would guarantee that the United States cannot meet the 2017 timeline. This 

could mean the United States would have to immediately withdraw its nuclear 

weapons from Europe, which provide the so-called extended deterrent. What would 

your concerns be about the U.S. simply failing to modernize its forward deployed 

B61 bombs in view of its commitment to NATO and the Obama Administration’s 

own NATO Strategic Concept commitment that as long as nuclear weapons exist, 

NATO will be a nuclear armed alliance? What signal would be sent to our European 

allies in NATO by such a failure? What signal would that send to Russia with its 

several thousand tactical nuclear weapons, many of which are located near the borders of our NATO allies? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. According to the 2010 edition of the annual report of the Director 

of National Security on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction, Iran continues ‘‘developing space launch vehicles, which incorporate technology directly applicable to longer-range missile systems’’ and North Korea ‘‘continues to pursue the development, production, and deployment of ballistic missiles 

with increasing range and sophistication . . . [and] continues to develop a mobile 

IRBM as well as a mobile solid-propellant’’ ballistic missile. In view of the risks 

these growing ballistic missile threats pose to the U.S. homeland, do you have concerns about the failing budget support for missile defense, especially missile defense 

of the United States? As you may know, the ground-based midcourse defense element of our ballistic missile defense system has been cut by almost $1 billion since 

President Obama came to office. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission also stated that ‘‘A quick survey 

of the potential nuclear candidates in Northeast Asia and the Middle East brings 

home the point that many potential proliferation candidates are friends and even 

allies of the United States. A decision by those friends and allies to seek nuclear 

weapons would be a significant blow to U.S. interests.’’ Do you agree with that assessment? Do you believe that it therefore follows that the United States has to 

make investments in the reliability and credibility of its nuclear deterrent not just 

for itself but in terms of what assures our allies, many of whom have only foregone 

the choice to develop their own nuclear weapons because of their confidence in the 

reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright 

stated that ‘‘[W]e do have challenges around the globe with strategic depth and [a] 

lack of [nearby] infrastructure and basing . . . [w]e’ve got to have a way to address 

those [urgent targets] credibly for our deterrent postures [to work].’’ That ‘‘way’’ was 

known as conventional prompt global strike. Do you support the development by the 

United States of a conventional prompt global strike capability? Can you offer an 

example, perhaps from your time as Chairman, of when this capability could have 

been useful in dealing with a threat to the national security of the United States? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Can you briefly talk about your views of the importance and impact that Non-Kinetic Effects such as electronic and cyber warfare had on the post9/11 battle space, and what recommendations you would you make to capture the 
86 

lessons we’ve learned about the integration of these effects, to ensure the Joint force 

is not forced to relearn painful lessons. 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. GIFFORDS. The A–10C is an amazingly tough, durable and lethal aircraft. Can 

you discuss the A–10’s distinctive capabilities, post-9/11 contributions, and future 

role within the Air Force. 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Can you briefly talk about your views of the importance and impact that Non-Kinetic Effects such as electronic and cyber warfare had on the post9/11 battle space, and what recommendations you would you make to capture the 

lessons we’ve learned about the integration of these effects, to ensure the Joint force 

is not forced to relearn painful lessons. 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Can you briefly talk about your views of the importance and impact that Non-Kinetic Effects such as electronic and cyber warfare had on the post9/11 battle space, and what recommendations you would you make to capture the 

lessons we’ve learned about the integration of these effects, to ensure the Joint force 

is not forced to relearn painful lessons. 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you support or oppose the sale of F–16 C/Ds to Taiwan? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you support or oppose lifting the ban on U.S. flag and general officers visiting Taiwan? 

General MYERS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you support or oppose the sale of F–16 C/Ds to Taiwan? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you support or oppose lifting the ban on U.S. flag and general officers visiting Taiwan? 

General PACE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you support or oppose the sale of F–16 C/Ds to Taiwan? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you support or oppose lifting the ban on U.S. flag and general officers visiting Taiwan? 

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Æ