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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RACHEL TURNER and SHAWN HUNT, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

GRAND BLANC COMM. SCHOOL DIS., 

Defendant. 

 / 

Case No. 14-cv-14034 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

MONA K. MAJZOUB

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [19]

IN PART AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [21] 

I. INTRODUCTION

Rachel Turner and Shawn Hunt (“Plaintiffs”) commenced this action on October 14, 

2014 against Grand Blanc Community School District (“the District” or “Defendant”) in 

Michigan State Court. See Dkt. No. 1-2. On October 20, 2014, the action was removed to federal 

court. See Dkt. No. 1. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs contend that the District (1) violated the 

Michigan Open Meetings Act (“OMA”), (2) violated Article 1 §§ 3, 5 and 17 of the Michigan 

Constitution, (3) violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution, (4) is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (5) is liable for breach of contract.1 See 

Dkt. No. 1 (Exhibit 2). 

 On August 20, 2015, the District moved for Summary Judgment on all Counts. See Dkt. 

No. 19. On the same day, Plaintiffs moved for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I. See Dkt. 

No. 21. While both parties filed responses to the Motions, neither party submitted Reply briefs. 

 

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 In the Amended Complaint [1], Plaintiffs allege two claims for breach of Contract. However, upon review of the 

Complaint, the Court finds they are the same. See Dkt. No. 1. Nevertheless, the Court will treat them as Counts V 

and VI. 

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A hearing was held on October 13, 2015. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court DENIES

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion IN 

PART. 

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Rachel Turner was an administrator in the Grand Blanc Community School 

District. She was hired on as a principal at Brendel Elementary School (“Brendel”) in 2008. Dkt. 

No. 19 at 13 (Pg. ID No. 113). Her contract was renewed on several occasions between 2008 and 

2011. Id. Plaintiff Turner’s final contract was executed on July 1, 2011 and effective until June 

30, 2013. See Dkt. No. 19 (Exhibit 6). Under the terms of the final contract, Plaintiff Turner 

could be dismissed or demoted for “reasonable cause.” Id. Furthermore, the Board of Education 

could also decide to not renew the contract, as long as the non-renewal was neither arbitrary nor 

capricious. Id. In the event of either a dismissal or non-renewal, she would be afforded at least 90 

days written notice prior to the renewal date (April 12), and would be provided the reasons for 

her dismissal. Id. 

On January 31, 2013, the Deputy Superintendent for Grand Blanc Community Schools, 

Clarence Garner, sent a letter to Rachel Turner notifying her that her contract would not be 

renewed. See Dkt. No. 19 (Exhibit 11). The reasons behind the decision were listed in the letter: 

(1) lack of professional attention regarding communication to foster a positive atmosphere for 

staff and students; (2) lack of a systemic plan to address concerns regarding student safety and 

discipline matters; (3) concerns from parents regarding fair treatment and attention to student 

issues; (4) lack of professional attention in written communication to staff, parents, and 

colleagues. Id. The letter also notified Plaintiff Turner that she would have the “opportunity to 

meet with a majority of the Board of Education either in an open or closed session at the March 

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18, 2013 Board meeting to discuss the reason for the proposed nonrenewal of her contract.” Id.

At the March 18 meeting, the Board of Education (“the Board”) scheduled a special meeting to 

take a final vote at a public hearing on April 22, 2013. Dkt. No. 19 (Exhibit 13 at p. 2). 

At the opening of the April 22 hearing, Lori Steinhauer, the hearing officer, gave the 

following instructions: 

Once all the testimony has been given, then each side again may make a brief 

closing statement or some closing statements you may want to make to the Board 

of Education. Following the closing statements, we will go into public comments. 

Following the public comments, we will go into future business. After future 

business, then we will go into an executive session, at which time the Board of 

Education, the superintendent and myself will go into another room, where the 

Board will review the evidence and deliberate over what they have heard this 

evening. 

Dkt. No. 19 (Exhibit 15). During the hearing, the Board called several witnesses, Ms. Turner 

cross examined, and both sides gave closing statements. Id. Ms. Turner declined to call any 

witnesses. Id. 

At the end of the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Steinhauer invited public comment. Id. Several 

individuals who had signed in and indicated that they wished to address the Board were not 

permitted to speak, including Plaintiff Shawn Hunt. Id. Following the public comment, the Board 

adjourned to their closed portion of the meeting. Id. Upon their return, the Board elected to not 

renew Plaintiff Turner’s contract.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) “directs that summary judgment shall be granted if 

‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 779 

(6th Cir. 1998). The court must view the facts, and draw reasonable inferences from those facts, 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

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242, 255 (1986). No genuine dispute of material fact exists where the record “taken as a whole 

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus., 

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Ultimately, the court evaluates “whether 

the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Counts II, III, and IV 

a. Michigan Constitutional Claims

The Defendant has moved for the dismissal of the claims brought under the Michigan 

Constitution. Defendant argues that “[i]n order for a plaintiff to have an independent cause of 

action for a violation of individual rights guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution, there must be 

no other means by which to vindicate the rights which were allegedly violated.” Dkt. No. 19 at 

30 (Pg. ID No. 129). Under Michigan Law, the question is “whether compensatory relief is 

‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ to the vindication of the interest asserted.” Cremonte v. Michigan 

State Police, 232 Mich. App. 240, 251 (1998) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 

Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1999) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims arise from Article I, sections 3, 5 and 17, which relate to free 

assembly, free speech and due process respectively. See Mich. Const. art. 1, §§ 3, 5 and 17. 

These sections do not provide any language that enables the Court to enforce them in the event 

of a violation. Id. However, as stated above, the Court may still infer damages if “necessary.” 

Cremonte, 232 Mich. App. at 251. The Plaintiffs have brought similar causes of action under the 

First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 

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Dkt. No. 1 (Exhibit 2). Having brought a claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs’ state constitution claims 

are not necessary. Therefore, Defendant’s Michigan Constitutional claims will be dismissed. 

b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

The Defendant has also moved for the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims as to violations of 

the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Dkt. No. 19. Specifically, 

Plaintiffs allege that the Board’s ‘sign-in policy’ and refusal to allow Plaintiff Hunt to speak 

violated the First Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the 

evidentiary hearing itself violated Plaintiff Turner’s right to Due Process. Dkt. No. 1 (Pg. ID No. 

13–14). 

As stated above, the Plaintiffs have brought these claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 

order to successfully bring a § 1983 action under Bivens, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that he was 

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the 

deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law.” Webb v. U.S., 789 F.3d 647, 659 

(6th Cir. 2015). That the Board was acting under the color of law is not in dispute. The sole 

question is whether the Board deprived Plaintiffs of their Constitutional rights. 

i. The First Amendment Claim

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides “Congress shall make 

no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 

to assemble . . .” U.S. Const. Amend. I. “Courts apply a ‘forum analysis’ to determine whether a 

limitation on speech is permissible under the First Amendment.” Timmon v. Wood, 316 F. App’x 

364, 365 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2005)). 

Both parties agree that the Board’s hearing is a “limited forum.” See Lowery v. Jefferson County 

Bd. Of Educ., 586 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the Board may apply restrictions to the 

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“time, place, and manner of speech so long as those restrictions are ‘(1) content-neutral, (2) 

narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and (3) leave open ample alternative 

channels for communication of the information.’ ” Id. at 432 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for 

Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). “In this context, ‘the requirement of narrow 

tailoring is satisfied so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that 

would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,’ and does not ‘burden substantially 

more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’ ” Tucker, 398 

F.3d at 463 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). 

The Plaintiffs argue that the Board’s sign-in policy and decision to enter a closed meeting 

violated the citizens’ “right to discuss any issue” that may have been of “public concern.” Dkt. 

No. 25 (Pg. ID No. 814). Plaintiffs further contend that “Defendant was in error when it limited 

speech related to [the non-renewal of the contract], based on content.” Id. (Pg. ID No. 816). 

The Court finds the sign-in policy to merely be a process by which the Board can identify 

citizens who wish to speak. Citizens are neither required to provide the subject matter of their 

comments, nor their particular viewpoint on that subject matter before commenting. They are 

only required to keep their comments brief, and to mark the form. Whether the citizens are 

provided the opportunity to speak is “justified without reference to the content.” Clark v. Cmty. 

For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). Therefore, the sign-in policy is a contentneutral restriction on the manner of speech, and is permissible. 

Plaintiffs reliance on Gault v. City of Battle Creek, 73 F. Supp. 2d 811 (W.D. Mich. 

1999) is misplaced. Not only is Gault non-binding on this Court, it is distinguishable. The Court 

in Gault wrote: 

Therefore, the First Amendment rights of citizens would be unduly restricted 

based on content if a public body was allowed to rule out of order any speech 

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concerning a subject that was being considered or that might be considered in a 

closed meeting. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ rights under the 

First Amendment and the OMA were improperly restricted when they were ruled 

out of order for attempting to speak on an issue that was the subject of a closed 

meeting. 

Gault, 73 F. Supp. at 818 (emphasis added). If Plaintiffs had been ruled out of order based on 

something they had said, as in Gault, Plaintiffs’ rights would have been violated because such a 

rule would be content-based. However, there are no facts present that suggest Plaintiffs (or 

anybody else) was ruled out of order. 

Similarly, Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that the Defendant closed the 

hearing based on something said at the hearing. The evidence before the Court only suggests that 

the public comments session was ended due to timing reasons. See Dkt. No. 19 (Exhibit 15 at p. 

112) (“If you’ll remember that we actually started the meeting late, because we sent her around 

to ensure that we had the name of every person who had signed up.”). The Board is not required 

to allow every citizen with an opinion to make a comment. Not only would it potentially take all 

night, but it would effectively remove the Board’s ability to control the manner of the hearing. 

Therefore, seeing no violation of the First Amendment, Defendant’s Motion as to this Count will 

be granted, and this claim will be dismissed. 

ii. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

“In the context of employment rights, the Supreme Court has explained that the root 

requirement of the Due Process clause is that an individual be given the opportunity for a hearing 

before he is deprived of any significant property interest.” Mitchell v. Fankhauser, 375 F.3d 477, 

480 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). The former employer must give (1) oral or written 

notice, (2) an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and (3) an opportunity for the employee to 

present his/her side of the story. Id. Whether or not a hearing is constitutionally sufficient 

depends on its “meaningfulness.” Id. 

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Here, Plaintiff Turner was given written notice of the District’s decision not to renew her 

contract. Dkt. No. 19 (Exhibit 11). The written notice contained an explanation of the District’s 

reasons behind the decision. Id. Plaintiff was also given a chance to present a case. See Dkt. No. 

19 (Exhibit 15). These facts are not in dispute. However, Plaintiffs argue, albeit nebulously, that 

the decision was based on an “incomplete record.” Dkt. No. 25 (Pg. ID No. 816). 

At the beginning of the hearing, Plaintiff Turner was notified that the district would call 

witnesses and Turner would be given the opportunity to cross examine. Dkt. No. 19 (Exhibit 15, 

pp. 7–8). Plaintiff Turner would then be given the opportunity to call witnesses. Id. Then both 

sides would be given the opportunity to give closing statements. Id.

The District called five witnesses, and Plaintiff Turner cross examined each one. Id. at 

pp. 12–65. Plaintiff Turner declined to call any witnesses. Id. Both sides then gave their closing 

statements. Id. at 76–96. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the process was unfair, biased 

or “incomplete.” Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Due Process claim as well. 

B. Counts I, V and VI 

“Where, as here, federal claims are dismissed or non-suited subsequent to a proper 

removal, this Court has the discretion to retain jurisdiction over the supplemental state law 

claims, because jurisdiction ‘depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.’ ” 

B & B Enterprises of Wilson County, LLC v. City of Lebanon, 422 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906 (M.D. 

Tenn. 2006) (quoting Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004). 

Furthermore, the Court also retains discretion to “remand to state court a removed case involving 

pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be 

inappropriate.” Carnegie Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). 

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This action was originally filed in state court. Furthermore, although Counts V and VI 

appear relatively weak, the record indicates there may be issues of fact with regard to Count I. 

Moreover, resolution of Count I also requires the interpretation of language found in the Open 

Meetings Act, MICH COMP. LAWS § 15.263(5). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the 

remaining state law claims without prejudice and remand them back to state court. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion IN PART. 

Counts II, III, and IV will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment is DENIED. Counts I, V, and VI will be DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE and remanded to state court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 19, 2015 s/Gershwin A. Drain 

 Detroit, Michigan GERSHWIN A. DRAIN 

 United States District Judge 

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