IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN DOE 1, et al., 

Civ. No. 17-cv-2694 (ABJ) 

 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

 Defendant. 

BRIEF OF CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON AND 

ANNE WEISMANN AS AMICI CURIAE 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 45 Filed 02/12/18 Page 1 of 16
i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1 

I. FECA Requires Plaintiffs’ Identities to Be Made Available to the Voting Public .............. 1 

II. There Is No First Amendment Right to Make Anonymous Campaign Contributions ........ 4 

III. FOIA Exceptions Are Not Relevant to this FECA Case ..................................................... 6 

IV. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy the Additional Requirements for a Permanent Injunction ........... 7 

V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 10 

 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES*

Cases Page(s) 

AFL-CIO v. FEC, 

 333 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ....................................................................................................4 

Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 

 No. 17-2554 (ABJ), __ F. Supp. 3d __, __, 2017 WL 6314142 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2017).............8 

*Buckley v. Valeo, 

 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .............................................................................................................. passim 

*Citizens United v. FEC, 

 558 U.S. 310 (2010) .......................................................................................................... passim 

CREW v. DOJ, 

 746 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ..................................................................................................7 

Disner v. United States, 

 888 F. Supp. 2d 83(D.D.C. 2012) ...............................................................................................5 

FCC v. AT&T, 

 562 U.S. 397 (2011) ....................................................................................................................7 

*McConnell v. FEC, 

 540 U.S. 93 (2003) .............................................................................................................. 1-2, 4 

Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB, 

 785 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ....................................................................................................7 

Nken v. Holder, 

 556 U.S. 418 (2009) ....................................................................................................................9 

Speechnow.org v. FEC, 

 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ....................................................................................................4 

Stewart v. Evans, 

 351 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................. 5-6 

Townsend v. United States, 

 236 F. Supp. 3d 280 (D.D.C. 2017) ............................................................................................6 

U.S. Ass’n of Reptile Keepers, Inc. v. Jewell, 

 103 F. Supp. 3d 133 (D.D.C. 2015) ............................................................................................9 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

 555 U.S. 7 (2008) ........................................................................................................................9 

                                                            

*

 Cases chiefly relied upon marked with an asterisk. 

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Statutes Page(s) 

11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a).........................................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) .............................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(B)(ii) ........................................................................................................3 

52 U.S.C. § 30122 ............................................................................................................................2 

Other Authorities Page(s) 

FEC, Reports of Receipts and Disbursements for Other than Authorized Committee (FEC Form 

3X) ...................................................................................................................................................2 

Third General Counsel’s Report, MUR 6920 (American Conservative Union et al.) 

(Sep. 15, 2017) .................................................................................................................................2 

 

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 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and Anne Weismann (collectively 

“CREW”) respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae pursuant to the Court’s Order of January 

31, 2018.1 

Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) correctly notes that its own procedures 

governing closed enforcement matters require disclosure of plaintiffs’ identities. But the Court 

need not reach the FEC’s internal procedures to decide this case. The Federal Election 

Campaign Act (“FECA”) itself mandates that plaintiffs’ names and addresses be made available 

to the voting public. And because there is no First Amendment right to anonymously make or 

transfer significant campaign contributions, plaintiffs’ claims to be constitutionally exempt from 

disclosure must fail. 

ARGUMENT 

I. FECA Requires Plaintiffs’ Identities to Be Made Available to the Voting Public 

Disclosure of the source and path of contributions to federal candidates is necessary to 

protect “the free functioning of our national institutions.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 

(1976) (quotation marks omitted). Such disclosure “allows voters to place each candidate in the 

political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and 

campaign speeches.” Id. at 67. Disclosure “deter[s] actual corruption and avoid[s] the 

appearance of corruption” because “[a] public armed with information about a candidate’s most 

generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in 

return.” Id. And disclosure provides “an essential means of gathering the data necessary to 

detect violations” of other parts of federal campaign finance law. Id. at 68; see also McConnell 

                                                            

1

 Pursuant to LCvR 7(o)(5) and Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E), amici affirm that no counsel for a party authored 

this brief in whole or in part, no party or counsel for a party contributed money that was intended to fund preparing 

or submitting this brief, and no person other than amici or their counsel contributed money that was intended to fund 

preparing or submitting this brief. 

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v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (reaffirming “the important state interests that prompted the 

Buckley Court to uphold FECA’s disclosure requirements”); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 

310, 369-70 (2010) (upholding disclosure of candidate-related spending so that “citizens can see 

whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests” and “who is 

speaking about a candidate” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). 

To effectuate these compelling public interests, FECA and the FEC mandate disclosure 

of anyone who makes a contribution over $200 to a political committee or acts as a conduit for a 

contribution. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a); FEC, Reports of Receipts and 

Disbursements for Other than Authorized Committee (FEC Form 3X) at 11, 

https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/fecfrm3xi.pdf. That disclosure must 

identify the name and address of the contributor and each conduit who passes the funds along to 

the recipient. Id. FECA prohibits a contributor from making, or a political committee from 

accepting, a contribution that conceals the identity of the person or persons behind it. See 52 

U.S.C. § 30122. 

The dispositive fact in this case is that plaintiffs never deny that the FEC’s investigative 

file correctly identified them as the sources of, or conduits for, a $1.71 million contribution to a 

federal political committee.2

 To the contrary, plaintiffs acknowledge that they are involved in 

this matter because of “their political activity,” Pls.’ Br. at 14, ECF No. 13, and the only such 

activity at issue here is the making of “a contribution to a Super PAC that made independent 

expenditures in support of candidates for federal office,” id. at 2. Indeed, that activity is the 

basis for one of their claims here — that disclosure of their contribution activity would infringe 

                                                            

2

 Third General Counsel’s Report, MUR 6920 (American Conservative Union et al.) (Sep. 15, 2017), 

http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/17044435484.pdf. 

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on their First Amendment rights. Id. at 17. It is therefore undisputed that plaintiffs were the 

source of, or served as conduits for, the contribution, and they accordingly have no right to 

anonymity under FECA. This case should end there. 

Unable to deny that their activities triggered mandatory disclosure under FECA, plaintiffs 

argue instead that they should be exempt from disclosure because the FEC did not find that 

plaintiffs violated the law. But disclosure of contributors and conduits is not triggered by the 

result of an FEC enforcement action, or even the existence of such an action. Cf. Citizens 

United, 558 U.S. at 368-69 (rejecting argument that disclosure can be required only for activity 

that is also legally restricted or banned). Millions of contributors make federal contributions and 

are therefore subject to disclosure; almost none of those contributors have their conduct 

adjudicated before the FEC. But under plaintiffs’ theory that disclosure may be mandated only 

for law-breakers; each of the more than 99% of contributors who has acted lawfully is entitled to 

an injunction barring disclosure of its identity unless and until a complaint is filed with the FEC, 

investigated through the entire (multi-stage and lengthy) FEC enforcement process, and then 

litigated through a civil action brought by the FEC.3

 This would make a mockery of FECA’s 

disclosure regime. 

Disclosure of plaintiffs’ identities became mandatory the moment they made or served as 

conduits for a federal contribution — conduct that they do not deny.4

                                                            

3

 The FEC does not have authority to find that the law has been violated; the FEC must either negotiate a 

voluntary agreement with the violator or bring a civil action against it. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6). 

4

 As the FEC correctly notes, FECA also requires disclosure of plaintiffs’ identities upon the conclusion of 

the enforcement action. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(B)(ii); FEC Surreply at 8-13. Plaintiffs raise a convoluted 

argument that this statute applies only to entities that the FEC finds to have either violated or not violated the statute, 

not to entities whose cases are resolved on other grounds. See Pls.’ Br. at 9-10, ECF No. 13; Pls.’ Reply at 7-10, 

ECF No. 25. But it would be exceedingly odd if FECA were construed to require that an entity unanimously found 

to have not engaged in activity requiring reporting must have its name revealed in the FEC’s investigative file, while 

the identity of an entity dismissed from enforcement simply because a non-majority of the Commission chose not to 

investigate it or clarify the law need not be revealed. 

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II. There Is No First Amendment Right to Make Anonymous Campaign Contributions 

 Although FECA unambiguously mandates disclosure of their identities, plaintiffs 

nonetheless ask this court to grant them an unprecedented exemption under the First 

Amendment. See Pls.’ Br. at 13-16. The specific First Amendment interest that plaintiffs assert 

is their desire to serve as anonymous sources of or conduits for a contribution to federal political 

committee. See Pls.’ Br. at 2 (identifying First Amendment activity as “a contribution to a Super 

PAC”). Their argument fails for the simple reason that the First Amendment does not grant a 

right to make campaign contributions anonymously. 

 An unbroken, forty-year string of Supreme Court decisions emphatically refutes 

plaintiffs’ claim that the First Amendment should be interpreted to bar mandatory disclosure of 

the identities of those engaged in campaign-related spending. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 

U.S. at 368-70; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194-99; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68; see also 

Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696-98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (upholding mandatory 

disclosure of contributions to what are now known as super PACs). As noted above, the Court 

has identified numerous compelling interests that are directly furthered by such disclosure and 

has consistently concluded that those interests outweigh the attenuated First Amendment burdens 

arising from committees not being allowed to hide the sources of their funds. See supra at 1-2. 

 Nor is the public’s interest in disclosure limited to “two interests” of agency 

accountability and deterrence discussed in AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2003), as 

plaintiffs contend, Pls.’ Reply at 18. Rather, the court was evaluating the two offered 

justifications, id. at 178; it did not purport to call into question the long line of cases beginning 

with Buckley that recognized the public’s interest in knowing details of campaign-related 

spending. Moreover, unlike “confidential internal materials” (of an entity whose identity was 

itself disclosed), see AFL-CIO, 333 F.3d at 177, the information at issue here is the identities of 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 45 Filed 02/12/18 Page 8 of 16
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two parties indisputably involved in reportable campaign activity: the very information to which 

the public is legally entitled. 

 The Supreme Court has recognized one — and only one — constitutional exception to 

campaign disclosure: when disclosure of a donor’s identity gives rise to a reasonable probability 

that the donor will be subject to “threats, harassment, or reprisals.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 

370 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 198); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74. Plaintiffs do not even 

attempt to present evidence that such threats, harassment, or reprisals will ensue if their identities 

are disclosed. Accordingly, their claim for a First Amendment exemption to disclosure must fail. 

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370 (rejecting claim for exemption where entity subject to 

mandatory disclosure “offered no evidence that its members may face . . . threats or reprisals”). 

 Rather than satisfying their evidentiary burden under existing law, plaintiffs attempt to 

create new categories of disclosure exemptions from whole cloth: they allege that making their 

identities known would constitute “invasion of privacy,” cause “harm to their reputations,” and 

place a “chill [on] the future exercise of their free speech rights.” Pls.’ Br. at 14-15. None of 

these claims has First Amendment merit in the campaign finance context. The plaintiffs could 

not have had any reasonable expectation of privacy in their activity as conduits for a federal 

contribution, see Disner v. United States, 888 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that 

plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in funds that plaintiff voluntarily transferred to 

third party), aff’d mem., 2013 WL 1164502 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20, 2013), particularly given that 

disclosure of such activity is mandated by longstanding federal law, see Stewart v. Evans, 351 

F.3d 1239, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“When the threat of mandatory disclosure accompanies the 

transfer of documents to a third party, little reasonable expectation of privacy exists.”) (citing

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Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)).5 Plaintiffs cite no case law for the 

proposition that the First Amendment protects against alleged reputational harm — nor has 

amici’s research disclosed any such precedent — and in any event plaintiffs have abandoned this 

claim.6

 And the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the theoretical chill from disclosure of 

such contributions is outweighed by the public’s interest in disclosure. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 68 (upholding mandatory disclosure to further public interests even though “[i]t is 

undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will 

deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369-70 

(rejecting argument that disclosure unconstitutionally chills contributions because the public’s 

“informational interest . . . is sufficient” to justify disclosure absent evidence of reasonable 

probability of “threats, harassment, or reprisals”). 

 Disclosure of plaintiffs’ identities, as required by law, is entirely consistent with the First 

Amendment. 

III. FOIA Exceptions Are Not Relevant to this FECA Case 

Plaintiffs raise a number of arguments under FOIA. But in denying amici’s motion to 

intervene, the Court noted that FOIA and its associated case law are inapposite here. ECF No. 

44 at 7-8 (“[W]hile plaintiffs have cited FOIA case law in various pleadings, they are relying on 

the language of the Federal Election Campaign Act, and this is not a reverse FOIA case. The 

decision here will turn on different legal principles . . . .”). Furthermore, the trust plaintiff has no 

                                                            

5

 The fact that plaintiffs might have expected their coconspirators to help keep plaintiffs’ identities secret 

does not change this analysis: An expectation of privacy “typically evaporates when information is ‘revealed to a 

third party, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purposed and 

the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.’” Townsend v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 3d 280, 323 

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 

6

 See Pls.’ Reply at 6 (alleging only “privacy and free speech rights”); Pls.’ Surreply at 10 (alleging only 

“privacy and speech interests”). 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 45 Filed 02/12/18 Page 10 of 16
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privacy interest cognizable under FOIA. See FCC v. AT&T, 562 U.S. 397, 408-09 (2011). Nor 

can the trustee plaintiff bootstrap an interest for the trust: the disclosure of any corporate or 

other entity will necessarily disclose its human agents, so such an entity cannot rely on its human 

agents’ privacy interests without rendering the FCC decision a nullity. Finally, Exemption 7(C) 

requires balancing, CREW v. DOJ, 746 F.3d 1082, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and against the 

plaintiffs’ complete lack of cognizable privacy interest, see supra at 5-6, the public’s immense 

interest at stake here, see infra at 9-10, easily prevails. The FEC was investigating compliance 

with a disclosure regime, and plaintiffs are involved only because they engaged in activity that 

obliges the release of their identities. Releasing their names therefore does not implicate the 

concerns behind Exemption 7(C). 

IV. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy the Additional Requirements for a Permanent Injunction 

 In addition to meeting its burden of proof on the merits of its claims, a plaintiff seeking a 

permanent injunction must show “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 

available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) 

that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity 

is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” 

Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB, 785 F.3d 684, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiffs satisfy none of these requirements. 

 First, plaintiffs have suffered and will suffer no cognizable injury from release of the 

unredacted FEC documents. As noted above, they constructively consented to the disclosure of 

their names when they agreed to serve as the source of, or as conduits for, a contribution to a 

federal political committee. The FEC files do nothing more than identify them in relation to a 

reportable contribution. The release of the FEC’s investigative file inflicts no injury upon them 

— irreparable or even cognizable — given disclosure is what FECA already mandates for the 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 45 Filed 02/12/18 Page 11 of 16
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activity plaintiffs do not dispute that they engaged in. Because plaintiffs’ sole claim of injury is 

that their First Amendment rights would be infringed by the disclosure of their identities — a 

meritless claim as discussed above — they face no risk of irreparable injury. See, e.g., 

Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 17-2554 (ABJ), __ F. Supp. 3d 

__, __, 2017 WL 6314142, at *19 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2017) (“Plaintiff’s [claim of irreparable harm] 

is its assertion that the loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable injury. Since 

plaintiff alleges no other harm that it seeks to avert, its irreparable harm argument rises and falls 

with its merits arguments.” (citation omitted)). 

 Second, because plaintiffs will not be injured at law by the unredaction of the 

investigative file, the issue of monetary damages is moot. 

 Third, the balance of equities tips steeply towards rejecting plaintiffs’ desired injunction. 

Plaintiffs’ briefs make no mention of equitable considerations; their equitable claim seems to be 

no more than a fervent wish that the law not mandate disclosure of their identities. Plaintiffs 

themselves suffer no hardship as their identities are already subject to mandatory disclosure 

under the FECA due to the activity they concede they engaged in. On the FEC’s side of the 

scale, an injunction would cast into doubt the FEC’s enforcement disclosure procedures — 

procedures that reflect careful consideration of statutory mandates, judicial opinions, and the 

need to provide sufficient notice to the regulated community of the agency’s interpretations of 

law. See FEC Br. at 6-7; FEC Surreply at 18-21. And the FEC’s enforcement regime for 

nondisclosure of contributions would be upended as well, with donors having a new judicial path 

to proactively prevent their identities from being made public, or at least to delay such disclosure 

until a point when it is of little value to the voting public. Finally, the Court should consider the 

hardship to amici, who will lose their right to receive information subject to disclosure under the 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 45 Filed 02/12/18 Page 12 of 16
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FECA and FOIA, which they need to pursue their claims in other proceedings. See Winter v. 

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 30-32 (2008) (reversing entry of preliminary injunction 

and holding that granting permanent injunction would be abuse of discretion where district court 

failed to account for the harm that injunction would cause to important governmental 

operations). 

 Finally, the interests of the public would be severely disserved by a permanent injunction. 

Plaintiffs concede that their conduct is “a matter of significant interest to the public.” Pls.’ Br. at 

15. The public has a statutory right to receive the information that Congress and courts have 

determined is necessary to free governance; therefore, each of the FEC’s interests mentioned 

above is also a public interest, as the public is the ultimate beneficiary of the disclosed 

information. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (“[A]ssessing the harm to the 

opposing party and weighing the public interest . . . merge when the Government is the opposing 

party.”); U.S. Ass’n of Reptile Keepers, Inc. v. Jewell, 103 F. Supp. 3d 133, 163 (D.D.C. 2015). 

Indeed, “[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach 

consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.” 

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339. That information includes the identity of “who is speaking 

about a candidate” through contributions to PACs, id. at 369, and the names of the “candidate’s 

most generous supporters” whether through direct contributions or independent advocacy, 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. Yet the source and path of the $1.71 million that ended up in federal 

elections remain unknown to the public, and plaintiffs seek to ensure by gag order that the public 

is permanently deprived of that knowledge. The public would also be harmed by an injunction 

because it would hinder prompt disclosure of FEC investigative files, which is necessary for 

journalists and watchdogs (such as amici) to identify and disseminate information from those 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 45 Filed 02/12/18 Page 13 of 16
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files that might be of interest to voters. And regular redaction of investigative files would harm 

administrative complainants’ ability to seek judicial review of the FEC’s non-enforcement 

decisions. See FEC Br. at 7; FEC Surreply at 11 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)).7 

V. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiffs acknowledge that this case concerns “a matter of significant interest to the 

public: the conduct of elections and political speech.” Pls.’ Br. at 15. Indeed, the public interest 

at stake in this case is fundamental to the American democratic system. This interest is not 

merely some voyeuristic curiosity regarding the subjects of a government investigation; rather, it 

goes to the heart of the voters’ right to know who was responsible for routing a major 

contribution to influence the result of a federal election. That interest — as statutorily 

implemented by FEC and constitutionally upheld by the Supreme Court — compels the rejection 

of plaintiffs’ claims. 

Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction should 

be denied and final judgment should be entered for the FEC.8

                                                            

7

 Amici respectfully disagree with the Court’s conclusion in its January 31 Order that such litigation can be 

conducted effectively using pseudonyms. As the record in this case demonstrates, redacting a case file to conceal a 

respondent’s identity entails removing much more material than just the respondent’s name. Once all of the 

identifying information is redacted, the relevant portions of key documents are often essentially impossible to 

decipher. 

8

 By filing this brief in compliance with the Court’s Order of January 31, 2018, amici do not waive their right 

to appeal that Order within the time provided by Fed. R. App. P. 4. 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 45 Filed 02/12/18 Page 14 of 16
 Respectfully submitted, 

Stuart C. McPhail (D.C. Bar No. 1032529) 

Adam J. Rappaport (D.C. Bar No. 479866) 

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 

455 Massachusetts Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20001 

(202) 408-5565 

 smcphail@citizensforethics.org 

 arappaport@citizensforethics.org 

 /s/ Mark P. Gaber 

 Mark P. Gaber (D.C. Bar No. 988077) 

 Campaign Legal Center 

 1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400 

 Washington, DC 20005 

 (202) 736-2200 

 mgaber@campaignlegalcenter.org 

 Counsel to Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and Anne Weismann 

 February 12, 2018 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 45 Filed 02/12/18 Page 15 of 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on February 12, 2018, I caused the foregoing Brief of Citizens for 

Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and Anne Weismann as Amici Curiae to be served on 

the following through the Court’s electronic case filing system: 

William W. Taylor , III, Esq., wtaylor@zuckerman.com 

Dermot W. Lynch, Esq., dlynch@zuckerman.com 

Adam L. Fotiades, Esq., afotiades@zuckerman.com 

Kathleen C. Neace, Esq., kneace@velaw.com 

Kevin Deeley, Esq., kdeeley@fec.gov 

Charles Kitcher, Esq., ckitcher@fec.gov 

Gregory John Mueller, Esq., gmueller@fec.gov 

Haven G. Ward, Esq., hward@fec.gov 

 /s/ Mark P. Gaber 

 Mark P. Gaber (D.C. Bar No. 988077) 

 Campaign Legal Center 

 1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400 

 Washington, DC 20005 

 (202) 736-2200 

 mgaber@campaignlegalcenter.org 

 Counsel to Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and Anne Weismann 

 February 12, 2018 

Case 1:17-cv-02694-ABJ Document 45 Filed 02/12/18 Page 16 of 16