UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DARLA HUNT, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

 

Case No. 2:14-cv-13774 

District Judge Robert H. Cleland 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 13) AND TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 10) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons that follow, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment, DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and AFFIRM the 

Commissioner’s decision. 

II. REPORT 

 Plaintiff, Darla Hunt, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 

1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance. This matter is 

before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (DE 10), the Commissioner’s 

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memorandum in opposition and cross motion for summary judgment (DE 13), and 

the administrative record (DE 7). 

 When this action began, Plaintiff’s was represented by attorney, Richard J. 

Doud of the law firm of Davidson, Breen, Doud, Steele & Ferguson, P.C. (the 

“Davidson firm”). During the pendency of this action, this case was temporarily 

transferred to a three-judge panel for consideration of the Commissioner’s request 

for a global 60 day stay and the question of substitution of counsel in all pending 

cases of attorney Richard J. Doud. (See Text-Only Order dated 5/20/15 and 

Administrative Order 15-AO-033.) On June 9, 2015, the case was stayed. (DE 

15.) On October 19, 2015, the panel concluded its work and transferred the case 

back to the judge to whom the matter was originally assigned, indicating that it was 

the responsibility of the originally assigned judge to determine when to lift the stay 

in the case. (See Text-Only Order dated 10/19/2015 and Administrative Order 15-

AO-045.) This Court lifted the stay in this matter on January 8, 2016. (DE 17.) 

 As a result of the panel’s work, the Davidson firm was directed to send 

Plaintiff a letter indicating that no lawyers at that firm are permitted to represent 

her in this case. The letter was also to provide her with the names of other lawyers 

who handle Social Security disability cases, as well as the State Bar of Michigan’s 

attorney referral telephone number. Plaintiff was given 60 days from October 19, 

2015 to retain a new lawyer or proceed without the assistance of counsel. To date, 

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there is no indication that Plaintiff has retained alternate counsel. On January 8, 

2016, the Court issued a notice to inform Plaintiff that she could file a new motion 

for summary judgment or supplement the existing motion by informing the Court 

of her intention to do so on or before January 15, 2016. The Court did not receive 

any notice from Plaintiff and will therefore proceed on the current briefing. 

A. Background 

 Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for benefits on April 3, 2012, 

alleging that she has been disabled since April 23, 2008. (R. at 17.) Plaintiff’s 

application was denied and she sought a de novo hearing before an Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”). ALJ Regina Sobrino held a hearing on April 8, 2013 and 

subsequently determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act. (R. at 17-49.) On July 29, 2014, the Appeals Council denied 

Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 1-4.) ALJ Sobrino’s decision became the 

Commissioner’s final decision. Plaintiff then timely commenced the instant 

action. 

B. Plaintiff’s Medical History 

 Plaintiff was in a car accident on April 23, 2008. She presented to the 

Genesys Regional Medical Center with complaints of right thigh and shoulder 

pain. (R. at 200.) She was diagnosed with a right midshaft femur fracture and a 

middle one-third clavicle fracture, and admitted to the hospital under the direction 

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of Jason Sadowski, M.D. (R. at 201.) Dr. Sadowski, an orthopedic surgeon, 

performed an open reduction internal fixation on her clavicle and an intermedullary 

rodding of the right femoral shaft. (R. at 209-212.) Plaintiff was discharged to 

inpatient rehabilitation on April 30, 2008, and was discharged from inpatient 

rehabilitation on May 13, 2008, with instructions to follow up in a week. (R. at 

218-220.) 

 Plaintiff began seeing Dr. Sadowski, following her surgeries, on July 17, 

2008. He recommended that she continue with aggressive physical therapy (R. at 

333.) Plaintiff followed up with her primary care physician, John Stoker, D.O., on 

July 25, 2008. (R. at 241-44.) Dr. Stoker recommended that Plaintiff rest the 

affected area for twelve weeks and continue physical therapy. (R. at 243-44.) 

 She presented to occupational therapy with Steven Schultz, M.D., on June 

10, 2008. (R. at 249-250). Dr. Schultz recommended that Plaintiff continue with 

physical therapy and remain off work until August of 2008. On September 4, 

2008, Dr. Schultz noted that Plaintiff reported continued improvement, including 

the ability to ambulate short distances without the use of her cane. (R. at 241.) He 

indicated that Plaintiff was recovering well from her injuries and recommended 

advancing physical therapy. On October 2, 2008, Plaintiff reported continuing 

progress, but noticed increasing pain in her right knee and hypersensitivity in her 

left shoulder. (R. at 252.) On October 29, 2008, however, Plaintiff reported 

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continued improvement with less knee pain due to wearing a patellar stabilization 

brace. She also reported improved range of motion in her shoulder. (R. at 253.) 

On November 26, 2008, Dr. Schultz reported that Plaintiff was “doing quite well,” 

with full range of motion in her knee and left shoulder, and that she could be 

discharged from therapy. (R. at 255.) Dr. Schultz also noted, “I feel that she will 

be able to return to her previous job as a nursing assistant unrestricted,” but 

indicated that he also supported her changing to a more sedentary career. (Id.) On 

December 4, 2008, Dr. Sadowski cleared Plaintiff for work with respect to her 

clavicle and femur injury, but noted that she may need to remain off work for her 

back pain, and deferred to her physiatrist as to when she could return to work.1

 (R. 

at 332.) On December 11, 2008, Plaintiff underwent an x-ray of her lumbar 

spine, which revealed rotoscoloiosis. (R. at 257.) She underwent an MRI of the 

lumbar spine on December 20, 2008, which “except for minimal degenerative 

changes,” was unremarkable. (R. at 258.) On December 30, 2008, Plaintiff 

followed up with Dr. Schultz, who noted that she was continuing to improve and 

making excellent progress. (R. at 259.) 

 On August 27, 2009, an x-ray of Plaintiff’s left knee revealed mild 

degenerative arthritis. (R. at 264.) A February 4, 2011 MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar 

 

1

 As noted above, however, her physiatrist cleared her to return to work on 

November 26, 2008. 

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spine was normal. (R. at 313.) An October 25, 2011 x-ray of her lumbar spine 

showed no significant abnormality. (R. at 274.) 

 On June 9, 2011, Plaintiff presented for follow-up with Dr. Sadowski. 

Plaintiff reported no knee symptoms, but mild sensitivity in the buttock region and 

indicated that she was ready to stop therapy and transition to a gym membership. 

(R. at 316.) Dr. Sadowski recommended that she get a gym membership to stay 

active and fit and “continue to live with her mild implant sensitivity symptoms.” 

(R. at 317.) On May 7, 2012, Dr. Stoker recommended that Plaintiff increase her 

exercise daily. (R. at 342.) On May 10, 2012, Dr. Sadowski noted that Plaintiff 

had difficulty walking long distances but did not do additional physical therapy or 

join a gym. (R. at 314.) He noted that regular exercise and a gym membership 

would be reasonable. (R. at 315.) On July 26, 2012, Dr. Stoker found that 

Plaintiff had no difficulty walking or standing. (R. at 345.) 

 C. Hearing Testimony 

 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

At the April 8, 2013 hearing, Plaintiff testified that she lived with her 

husband and had attained a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration. (R. at 

34.) Plaintiff indicated that she stopped working in 2008 because of a car accident. 

(R. at 35.) As a result of the accident and subsequent surgeries, Plaintiff explained 

that she had trouble reaching over her head with her left arm, although she is right2:14-cv-13774-RHC-APP Doc # 18 Filed 02/05/16 Pg 6 of 28 Pg ID 491
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hand dominant. (R. at 36.) She further noted that she had trouble bending at the 

waist due to back and hip pain. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff testified that she had trouble bending and crouching because of the 

pain in her leg following the car accident. (R. at 36.) She noted that she had had 

constant pain in her right leg that started at the hip joint. (R. at 40.) She indicated 

that the pain was a seven out of ten with medication, and a ten out of ten without 

medication. (R. at 41.) She further noted that the pain sometimes “flared,” and she 

dealt with that by lying on a heating pad. (R. at 41.) Plaintiff indicated that she 

had trouble sleeping because of the pain. (R. at 43.) 

 According to Plaintiff, she could stand for ten minutes, walk for ten minutes, 

and sit for ten or fifteen minutes at a time. (R. at 35.) She was not using a cane. 

(Id.) Plaintiff also noted that she could lift between eight and ten pounds and had 

no trouble using her hands. (Id..) She could “go up and down” stairs, but guessed 

that she was “a little slower than usual.” (R. at 36.) She further testified that the 

side effect of her pain medications “is just drowsiness.” (R. at 37.) She noted that 

she tried physical therapy for her pain, but indicated that it did not help. (R. at 38.) 

 In addition to her physical symptoms, Plaintiff testified to having 

depression. (R. at 41.) She noted that her symptoms included crying and staying 

to herself. (R. at 41.) Plaintiff further testified that she was not comfortable in big 

crowds and had some memory problems. (R. at 42.) She indicated that she had 

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suicidal thoughts twice a month, but that she had not talked to her therapist about 

them. (R. at 42-43.) She explained that her symptoms were not constant and that 

she would have three or four bad days per week. (R. at 42.) She stated she had not 

gone to the emergency room or been hospitalized overnight since 2008. (R. at 39.) 

 Plaintiff testified that she cooked, cleaned, did laundry and other chores, and 

“can go to the store and get those couple of items,” although her husband took care 

of the weekly “big grocery shopping.” (R. at 36.) She indicated that she could 

bathe and dress herself, but that she was “just a little slower.” (R. at 37.) Plaintiff 

clarified, however, that she could only do these activities for twenty or thirty 

minutes before taking a break. (R. at 41.) Plaintiff testified that she drove within 

the city, but had not made a trip of over 75 miles since 2008. (R. at 37.) 

 2. Vocational Expert Testimony

 Polly McCathen testified as the Vocational Expert (“VE”) at the 

administrative hearing. (R. at 45-49.) The VE identified Plaintiff’s past relevant 

work as “direct care worker,” a semi-skilled position at the heavy exertional level. 

(R. at 46.) The ALJ then presented a series of hypotheticals to the VE. In the first 

of these, the ALJ asked the VE to determine if a hypothetical individual of 

Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience could perform her past relevant 

work with the following limitations: 

Assume person who cannot perform more than light work as that term 

is defined in the Social Security regulations and in the Dictionary of 

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Occupational Titles. And . . . the person should not have to climb 

ladders or crawl; can occasionally only climb stairs, stoop, and 

crouch. The person should not have to reach above shoulder level, 

and there should be no more than occasional reaching in other 

directions with the left arm. That’s the non-dominant arm. The 

person should not have to use right foot or leg controls. There should 

be no concentrated exposure to fumes, dust, or gases; no exposure to 

hazards; no exposure to vibration. There should be no exposure to 

extremes of temperature or humidity. 

(R. at 46.) The VE testified that the hypothetical individual could not perform 

Plaintiff’s past work. (Id.) However, according to the VE, the hypothetical 

individual could perform a variety of jobs at the light and sedentary exertional 

levels. In the light, unskilled category, the hypothetical individual could perform 

the following: general office clerk, with 8,000 jobs regionally; inspector, with 

7,000 jobs regionally; and information clerk, with 1,800 jobs regionally. Likewise, 

the individual could perform the following jobs at the sedentary exertional level: 

surveillance system monitor, with 2,000 jobs regionally; general office clerk, with 

5,000 jobs regionally; and order checker, with 4,000 jobs regionally.2

 (R. at 47.) 

 The VE clarified that all of the positions were simple, routine, and would not 

involve more than minimal changes in the work setting. (R. at 47.) Further, the 

VE noted that all of the sedentary positions would allow a sit-stand at will option, 

as well as a reduced number of office clerk and inspector positions. (R. at 47.) 

 

2

 The VE explained that the region consisted of the lower peninsula of the state of 

Michigan. 

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 The VE testified that missing more than one day per month or eight days in a 

twelve-month period would be work preclusive, as would the need for unexpected 

breaks other than two fifteen minute breaks and a half-hour lunch period per day. 

(R. at 48.) Finally, the VE testified that being off task for more than twenty 

percent of the day would preclude competitive employment. (R. at 49.) 

 D. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

 On May 28, 2013, the ALJ issued her decision. (R. at 17-27.) At Step 1 of 

the sequential evaluation process,2

 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantially gainful activity since April 23, 2008. (R. at 19.) 

 

2

 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a 

five-step sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). 

Although a dispositive finding at any step terminates the review, see Colvin v. 

Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential 

review considers and answers five questions: 

 1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

 2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

 3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet 

or equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s 

Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

 4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the 

claimant perform his or her past relevant work? 

 5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work 

available in the national economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th 

Cir. 2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 

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 At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: degenerative joint disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 

and depression. (R. at 19.) 

 At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed 

impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, specifically, 

Listings 1.02, 3.02, and 12.04. (R. at 19-20.) 

 Between Steps 3 and 4 of the sequential process, the ALJ evaluated 

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)3

 and determined that Plaintiff had 

the capacity to perform light work with the following limitations: 

[N]o climbing of ladders; occasional climbing of stairs, crouching, 

and stooping; no crawling; no reaching above shoulder level, and no 

more than occasional reaching in other directions with the left (nondominant) arm; no exposure to hazards or vibration; no use of right 

food or leg controls; no concentrated exposure to fumes, dusts, or 

gases; and no exposure to extremes of temperature or humidity. She 

can perform simple, routine work with minimal changes in the work 

setting. 

(R. at 21.) 

 Relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined at Step 4 that Plaintiff 

was unable to perform her past relevant work. (R. at 26.) 

 

3

 The claimant’s “residual functional capacity” is an assessment of the most the 

claimant can do in a work setting despite his or her physical or mental limitations. 

20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a); Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 239 (6th 

Cir. 2002). 

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 At Step 5, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing other 

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. at 26.) She 

therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. 

 E. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final 

administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case 

under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s decision 

if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal 

standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009) 

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. at 2007)); see 

also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as 

to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under 

this standard, “substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence 

but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 

(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 

1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide 

questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); 

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Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, 

to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). 

 Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. 

The Court must “‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from 

[the] weight’” of the Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 

395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 

(1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this 

Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that 

would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). 

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a 

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its 

own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or 

deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting 

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)). 

F. ANALYSIS

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by improperly discounting her 

credibility (DE 10 at 6-11, 14), which in turn led to a cascade of errors, namely an 

improper RFC and consequently an inaccurate hypothetical to the VE (Id. at 6, 9, 

11.) Her RFC argument is mentioned only in a topic heading without further 

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development. (Id. at 6) In addition, she briefly mentions the treating source rule, 

but does not explain how the ALJ erred in this regard. 

The Commissioner opposes the motion and asserts that the ALJ’s opinion is 

supported by substantial evidence. She also interprets Plaintiff’s first argument as 

a challenge to the RFC, rather than a challenge to the hypothetical posed to the VE, 

and argues that the RFC assessed is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ 

properly discounted her credibility. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff waived 

her argument with respect to the treating source rule by failing to develop it 

beyond citing the law. 

Plaintiff has been put in an unfortunate situation by her former counsel, who, 

among other significant shortcomings in his briefing, thrice refers to her by the 

wrong name, presumably that of another client. (DE 10 at 10.) As noted above, 

due to myriad issues, her counsel of record and his law firm were removed from 

this case (and all Social Security appeals in the Eastern District of Michigan). 

Plaintiff did not take the opportunity to retain new counsel and chose not to re-file 

or supplement the current briefing, despite this Court’s invitation to do so. (DE 

17.) However, in an abundance of caution, I will not restrict my review to the 

arguments presented in Plaintiff’s brief, but will consider the entire record to 

ensure that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. See Brinkley v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-13560, 2015 WL 1637598, at *2-3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 

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13, 2015) (where Plaintiff is pro se, the Court may “review[] the administrative 

record for obvious errors in order to affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions . . . .” 

(internal citations and quotations omitted)). 

1. The RFC is Supported By Substantial Evidence in Light of 

 the Proper Weighing of Plaintiff’s Credibility 

Plaintiff’s RFC is “the most [he or she] can still do despite the physical and 

mental limitations resulting from [his or] her impairments.” Poe v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The determination of Plaintiff’s RFC is an issue reserved 

to the Commissioner and must be supported by substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(3), 416.927(e). ‘“ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play 

doctor and make their own independent medical findings.’” Simpson v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 344 F. App’x 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rohan v. Chater, 98 

F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996)). 

Pursuant to Social Security Rule 96-8p, the RFC assessment must 

include: 

[A] narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each 

conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and 

nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations). In 

assessing RFC, the adjudicator must discuss the individual’s ability to 

perform sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a 

regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or 

an equivalent work schedule), and describe the maximum amount of 

each work-related activity the individual can perform based on the 

evidence available in the case record. The adjudicator must also 

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explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the 

evidence in the case record were considered and resolved. 

S.S.R. 96-8-, 1996 WL 374184, at *6-7. 

 Here, Plaintiff takes issue with the RFC assessment solely because it was 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony, which she alleges the ALJ to have 

improperly deemed less than credible.4

 Plaintiff argues that objective medical 

evidence supports her testimony. As support for this position, she points to: 

 An April 23, 2008 CT scan that revealed “mild multi-level degenerative disc 

disease . . . with anterior spondylosis and probable old avulsion fracture of a 

left anterolateral osteophyte . . .” (R. at 189); 

 A report indicating that, immediately following her 2008 car accident she 

had an “obvious deformity of the anterior thigh” (R. at 200); 

 Plaintiff’s complaint of low back pain on April 3, 2012 (R. at 222); 

 A December 20, 2008 MRI revealing minimal degenerative changes (R. at 

258); 

 An April 23, 2008 x-ray indicating a displaced fracture of the left clavicle 

(R. at 196); and 

 A report of her tearful state and depressed affect (R. at 198). 

According to Plaintiff, these records lend credibility to her reports of pain, her 

inability to lift more than then pounds, and her need to take a forty minute break 

following thirty minutes of housework. She further argues that these symptoms 

indicate that she would miss more than one day per month and would need a work-

 

4

 Defendant is correct in observing that Plaintiff failed to develop her RFC 

argument any further. (DE 13 at 24.) 

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preclusive number of breaks. I conclude that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is 

supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ did not err by discounting 

Plaintiff’s credibility. 

 The ALJ’s “assessment of credibility is entitled to great weight and 

deference, since he [or she] had the opportunity to observe the witness’s 

demeanor.” Infantado v. Astrue, 263 F. App’x 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2008). “It is of 

course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses, including that of the claimant.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 

F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2007). “Discounting credibility to a certain degree is 

appropriate where an ALJ finds contradictions among the medical reports, 

claimant’s testimony, and other evidence.” Walters v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 

525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). 

 Here, the ALJ pointed out multiple contradictions in the medical reports and 

Plaintiff’s testimony that tend to undermine her credibility. For example, although 

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she could lift only eight to ten pounds, she 

reported on April 29, 2012 that she could lift twenty pounds. (R. at 25 and 155.) 

In addition, her treating physician Dr. Sadowski limited her to a thirty pound lifting 

maximum (R. at 319) and the results of a May 12, 2010 functional capacity 

evaluation revealed that she could safely lift forty pounds from floor to waist and 

twenty pounds from waist to shoulder (R. at 23 and 371-72). In fact, the record 

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evidence reveals multiple instances of normal test results and recommendations 

that Plaintiff pursue regular exercise that call into question her complaints of 

disabling pain. (See, e.g., R. at 315, 317, 319, and 320-21.) 

 Further, the April 23, 2008 x-ray and CT scan to which Plaintiff cites were 

taken immediately following her car accident, so it is unsurprising that she 

sustained thigh and shoulder injuries at that point. The ALJ acknowledges as 

much in her opinion, specifically stating that Plaintiff “was involved in an 

automobile accident on April 23, 2008, and was treated for right thigh pain and left 

shoulder pain. X-rays revealed a mid-shaft displaced femur fracture and a 

displaced left clavicular fracture . . . .” (R. at 22.) Plaintiff does not indicate how 

this 2008 evidence is somehow more persuasive than the years of evidence 

following Plaintiff’s car accident that demonstrates her progressive improvement. 

(See, e.g., R. at 241, 252, 259.) 

 Moreover, some of the evidence to which Plaintiff’s cites in support of her 

position tends to weigh against her complaints of disabling pain and depression. 

For example, the record summarizing the April 3, 2012 appointment at which 

Plaintiff complained of low back pain also contains notations that her motor 

strength was five out of five. (R. at 222.) The December 20, 2008 MRI findings 

also paint a different picture than the one summarized by Plaintiff. Although there 

were “minimal degenerative changes,” the lumbar spine was described as 

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“unremarkable,” with vertebral alignment within normal limits, no spondylolysis 

or spondylolisthesis, well preserved disc spaces, and no significant central or 

neural foraminal stenosis or focal disc protrusion. (R. at 22 and 258.) 

 In addition, Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Stoker recommended that she 

exercise daily and pursue a gym membership. (R. at 314 and 342.) Likewise, Dr. 

Sadowski also recommended that Plaintiff engage in regular exercise. (R. at 315.) 

This seems to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s physicians found her physical problems 

to be less problematic than the symptoms to which she testified. 

 The ALJ also properly discounted Plaintiff’s statements related to the 

disabling impact of her depression. She summarized Plaintiff’s infrequent mental 

health treatment, missed appointments, and ability to attend to her personal needs, 

read, cook, clean, handle her finances, and communicate with the phone and 

computer on a daily basis, and concluded that Plaintiff’s depression would not 

preclude her from simple, routine work with minimal changes in the work setting. 

(R. at 25-26.) This is consistent with the record evidence, which reveals that 

Plaintiff’s mental status examinations were generally normally, other than an 

indication of depressed mood. (R. at 223, 229, 234, 309, 342, and 351.) Nothing 

in the record supports further limitations than those assessed by the ALJ. 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err either in her credibility assessment, or in the RFC 

assigned and both are supported by substantial evidence. 

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 2. The ALJ Propounded a Proper Hypothetical to the VE at 

 Step 5 

When, as here, an ALJ concludes that a claimant does not have the RFC to 

perform his or her past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to 

show that Plaintiff “possesses the capacity to perform other substantial gainful 

activity that exists in the national economy.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. 

Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). This requires the Commissioner to 

“make a finding supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the 

vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs.” Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 

Such substantial evidence “may be produced through reliance on the 

testimony of a vocational expert (VE) in response to a ‘hypothetical’ question, but 

only if the question accurately portrays [the claimant’s] individual physical and 

mental impairments.” Id. “A response to a flawed hypothetical question is not 

substantial evidence and cannot support a finding that work exists which the 

Plaintiff can perform.” Edwards v. Barnhart, 383 F. Supp. 2d 920, 927 (E.D. 

Mich. 2005). 

Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant 

work because she was limited to a light RFC, and her past work was performed at 

the heavy exertional level. She relied on the VE’s testimony that there were 

sufficient jobs available in the regional economy at the light exertional level that 

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could be performed by an individual with Plaintiff’s limitations. Plaintiff argues 

that, because the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility, her 

hypothetical to the VE relied upon an inaccurate RFC that did not reflect Plaintiff’s 

impairments. However, as addressed above, the ALJ’s decision to discount 

Plaintiff’s credibility and the resulting RFC were well-supported by the record. 

Accordingly, it was not in error for the ALJ to rely on the VE’s response to a 

hypothetical question that incorporated the RFC finding. 

 3. The ALJ Appropriately Weighed Opinion Evidence 

The ALJ must consider all medical opinions that he or she receives in 

evaluating a claimant’s case. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). The regulations define 

medical opinions as “statements from physicians . . . that reflect judgments about 

the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis 

and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or 

mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2). “Administrative law judges are 

not bound by any findings made by State agency medical or psychological 

consultants, or other program physicians or psychologists.” 20 CFR § 

404.1527(e)(2)(i). The ALJ must, however, “consider findings and other opinions” 

of State Agency medical or psychological consultants. Id. 

The ALJ generally gives deference to the opinions of a treating source 

“since these are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a 

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detailed, longitudinal picture of [a patient’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring 

a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the 

objective medical findings alone . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2); Blakley v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2009). To qualify as a treating 

source, the physician must have an “ongoing treatment relationship” with the 

claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. 

If the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician’s 

opinion, the ALJ must meet certain procedural requirements. Specifically, if an 

ALJ does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight: 

[A]n ALJ must apply certain factors—namely, the length of the 

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature 

and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the 

opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and 

the specialization of the treating source—in determining what 

weight to give the opinion. 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (discussing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Furthermore, an ALJ 

must “always give good reasons in [the ALJ’s] notice of determination or decision 

for the weight [the ALJ] give[s] [the claimant’s] treating source’s opinion.” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasoning “must be sufficiently 

specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave 

to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Friend v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-3889, 2010 WL 1725066, at *7 (6th Cir. 2010) 

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(internal quotation omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit has stressed the importance of the good-reason requirement: 

“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants 

understand the disposition of their cases,” particularly in situations 

where a claimant knows that his physician has deemed him disabled 

and therefore “might be especially bewildered when told by an 

administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some reason for the 

agency’s decision is supplied.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d 

Cir.1999). The requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies the 

treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s 

application of the rule. See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32–33 

(2d Cir. 2004). 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544–45. 

 In her brief, Plaintiff merely mentions the treating physician rule, but does 

not specify how the ALJ purportedly erred in this matter, or even provide the name 

of a treating physician whose opinion she contends was improperly weighed. In 

most cases, I would conclude that Plaintiff had waived the issue, but given the 

special circumstances in this case, I will address the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion 

evidence. 

 The only opinion evidence in the record to which the ALJ cites is Dr. 

Sadowski’s opinion concerning Plaintiff’s physical limitations. Specifically, Dr. 

Sadowski opined that Plaintiff had a thirty-pound lifting restriction (R. at 319) and 

was encouraged to exercise (R. at 315). The ALJ assigned “significant weight” to 

his opinion, noting that he treated Plaintiff from 2008 through 2012 and performed 

clinical examinations. Dr. Sadowski’s opinion is consistent with the ALJ’s 

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assessment of a light RFC.5

 Accordingly, as the ALJ seemingly afforded de facto 

controlling weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician and his opinion is 

consistent with the RFC assessed, I find nothing in the record to indicate that the 

ALJ erred in her weighing of the opinion evidence, nor does Plaintiff point to any 

such error, notwithstanding her stock tutorial on the law of the treating physician’s 

rule. (DE 10 at 12-14.) Quite frankly, given the ALJ’s clear reliance upon Dr. 

Sadowski throughout her decision, this appears to be nothing more than a “canned” 

or template argument with no relation to the actual facts of this case. 

 4. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence

 A review of the record as a whole demonstrates that the ALJ’s conclusion is 

supported by substantial evidence. Although Plaintiff suffered severe injuries 

following her April 23, 2008 car accident, the record after April 2008 is replete 

 

5

 Pursuant to the regulations, “light work” involves: 

lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or 

carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight 

lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a 

good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of 

the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be 

considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, 

you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If 

someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do 

sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as 

loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. 

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. 

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with examples of normal MRI and x-rays. (See, e.g., R. at 258, 274, and 313.) Her 

physician anticipated she would return to work by August 2008 (R. at 250) and she 

was cleared for work by Dr. Sadowski in December of that year. (R. at 332.) She 

showed and reported dramatic improvements in upper extremity range of motion 

the following year. (R. at 253, 255.) 

 In addition, Plaintiff’s treating physicians recommended that she exercise 

daily and noted her continued improvement with physical therapy, which cuts 

against her complaints of disabling pain. Consistent with this, Plaintiff’s 

functional capacity evaluation demonstrated that she could safely lift 40 pounds 

from floor to waist, could lift 20 pounds from waist to shoulder, and could safely 

carry 35 pounds. (R. at 371-72.) Her quad, hamstring, deltoid, and rotator cuff 

strength was measured at 5/5 in 2008. (R. at 335.) In 2011, her deltoid, bicep, and 

tricep strength was measured at 4/5. (R. at 316.) Thus, it cannot “be said that the 

evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is nonexistent.” See Salmo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-14926, 2012 WL 6929176, at 

*4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-

14926, 2013 WL 273205 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2013) (internal quotations omitted). 

 Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument here, the ALJ’s RFC does take her 

subjective complaints into account in the RFC assessment, by limiting her to no 

reaching above shoulder level and no more than occasional reaching with her left 

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arm, which was injured in the accident. Likewise, she limited Plaintiff to no use of 

right foot or leg controls due to her previous injury. In addition, the ALJ limits 

Plaintiff to simple, routine work with minimal changes in the work setting, to 

account for her complaints of depression. To the extent Plaintiff’s complaints of 

pain were supported by the record, the ALJ took those complaints into 

consideration and incorporated them into the RFC. She then appropriately relied 

on the VE’s response to her hypothetical questions to conclude that jobs existed in 

significant numbers in the regional economy for an individual with Plaintiff’s 

limitations, and appropriately concluded that she was not disabled under the Social 

Security Act. I see nothing in Plaintiff’s briefing or in the record as a whole that 

should disturb that finding, and the ALJ’s opinion is clearly supported by 

substantial evidence. 

G. CONCLUSION

 In sum, from a review of the record as a whole, the Undersigned concludes 

that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. 

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and 

AFFIRM the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision. 

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III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Hum. Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers 

Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

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28

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

Dated: February 5, 2016 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that the foregoing document was sent to parties of record on 

February 5, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

 Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

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