UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 ) 

HOLMES, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) Civ. No. 14-1243 (RMC) 

 ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) ANSWER 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S ANSWER 

 Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) submits this answer 

to the Complaint for Declaratory Relief filed by plaintiffs Laura Holmes and Paul Jost. Any 

allegation not specifically responded to below is DENIED. The Commission answers as follows: 

1. This first sentence of this paragraph summarizes plaintiffs’ complaint, the 

allegations of which speak for themselves, and requires no response. The remainder of this 

paragraph purports to paraphrase and characterize specific provisions of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act (“FECA”), which speak for themselves, and does not require a response. 

 2. ADMIT that plaintiffs purport to challenge certain provisions of FECA under the 

First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

 3. ADMIT that plaintiffs purport to challenge certain provisions of FECA under the 

Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This paragraph also includes citations to, and 

characterizations of, certain judicial decisions, which speak for themselves, and require no 

response. 

 4. DENY. 

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 5. ADMIT that 2 U.S.C. § 437h (recently recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30110), provides 

the Court with jurisdiction to make necessary findings of fact and to screen to determine whether 

any substantial constitutional questions should be certified to the United States Court of Appeals 

for the District of Columbia en banc, but DENY that this case presents any substantial 

constitutional questions that warrant certification under that provision. 

 6. DENY. See Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 

 7. ADMIT. 

 8. The Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the 

allegations contained in this paragraph. 

9. ADMIT this paragraph to the extent that it alleges that the Commission has 

exclusive civil jurisdiction with respect to administration and civil enforcement of the FECA. 52 

U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1)). 

10. This paragraph purports to quote and characterize a specific provision of FECA, 

which speaks for itself, and does not require a response. To the extent a response is required, 

DENY that “FECA splits the candidate contribution limits.” 

11. ADMIT that the cited statutory and regulatory provisions set forth and explain the 

definition of “election,” which includes general, special, primary, and runoff contests. DENY 

that this paragraph sets forth the complete statutory or regulatory definition of “election.” 

12. ADMIT that the limits on contributions to candidates set forth in 2 U.S.C. 

§ 441a(a)(6) (recently recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(6) apply separately with respect to 

each election; DENY this paragraph to the extent it alleges that FECA only defines “election” in 

terms of “primary and general elections.” 

 

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13. ADMIT that the Commission has promulgated regulations pursuant to its 

authority under FECA, including 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b), and ADMIT that 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b) 

provides, inter alia, the rules for determining for which election a particular contribution is 

made, and otherwise DENY the remainder of this paragraph. 

14. ADMIT that Commission regulations provide for a contributor to designate a 

contribution for a particular election and that absent a proper designation, a contribution is 

deemed to have been made for the next election for federal office. To the extent this paragraph 

purports to paraphrase specific Commission regulations, those provisions speak for themselves 

and require no response. 

15. ADMIT that Commission regulations define the circumstances in which a 

contribution designated for an election that has already occurred may be used, ADMIT that 

Commission regulations define what constitutes net debts outstanding from a particular election, 

and otherwise DENY the remainder of this paragraph. 

16. DENY. 

17. ADMIT that Commission regulations permit a contribution to be redesignated for 

another election; otherwise DENY that this paragraph accurately or completely describes the 

redesignation process. 

18. The Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the 

allegations contained in this paragraph regarding the wishes of the plaintiffs; DENY that FECA 

or its amendments contain any “artificial distinction between primary and general elections.” 

19. The Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the 

allegations contained in the first sentence of this paragraph, regarding Plaintiff Holmes’s desire 

to support a certain candidate. The Commission ADMITS that candidate Carl DeMaio finished 

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second in the Congressional primary election for the 52nd District in California, and that this 

ensures his placement on the ballot for the November 4, 2014 general election. 

20. ADMIT that Carl DeMaio and incumbent Scott Peters will compete in the 

November 4, 2014 general election to represent California’s 52nd District and ADMIT that 

Congressman Peters was the only member of the Democratic Party on the June 3, 2014 primary 

ballot, and that this paragraph correctly identifies his FEC candidate ID number. The 

Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations 

contained in the second sentence of this paragraph to the extent they depend on plaintiffs’ 

subjective meaning of “significant primary challengers,” but DENY this sentence to the extent it 

alleges that Congressman Peters’s status as the only member of the Democratic Party deprived 

him of primary challengers under California’s “top two” primary system. 

21. ADMIT that plaintiff Holmes contributed $2,600 to DeMaio after the California 

primary election. The Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the allegations in the second sentence of this paragraph. 

22. The FEC lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the 

allegation in this paragraph regarding plaintiff Jost’s support of a particular candidate. ADMIT 

that Mariannette Miller-Meeks is a candidate to represent Iowa’s second Congressional District, 

that this paragraph correctly identifies her FEC candidate ID number, and that Miller-Meeks won 

the Republican primary election for that seat on June 3, 2014. 

23. ADMIT the allegations contained in this paragraph regarding the candidates who 

will participate in the November 4, 2014 general election for Iowa’s Second Congressional 

District and ADMIT that Congressman Loebsack was the only candidate listed on the ballot in 

the Democratic primary for that seat. The Commission lacks knowledge or information 

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sufficient to admit or deny the allegations contained in the second sentence of this paragraph to 

the extent they depend on plaintiffs’ subjective meaning of “significant primary challengers,” but 

ADMIT that Congressman Loebsack was not challenged in the primary by another candidate 

listed on the Democratic primary ballot. 

24. ADMIT that plaintiff Jost did not make a contribution to candidate Miller-Meeks 

during her primary election campaign and that he has contributed $2,600 to Miller-Meeks for the 

general election. The Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

the allegation regarding plaintiff Jost’s wishes to make additional contributions. 

25. The FEC lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny plaintiffs’ 

allegations regarding their wish to exceed FECA’s contribution limits. DENY that FECA 

imposes a “base candidate contribution limit” for “the combined primary and general election 

periods.” To the extent this paragraph purports to paraphrase specific statutory or regulatory 

provisions or a Federal Register notice, such documents speak for themselves and require no 

response. 

26. The Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the 

allegations in this paragraph concerning plaintiffs’ wishes; otherwise DENY this paragraph. 

27. The Commission incorporates by reference its responses to paragraphs 1 – 26. 

28. ADMIT that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), 

describes the extent to which contribution limits implicate the First Amendment. 

29. This paragraph purports to characterize and paraphrase part of the Supreme 

Court’s opinion in Buckley, which speaks for itself, and requires no response. 

30. ADMIT that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Buckley includes the quoted 

language, without plaintiffs’ alterations. 

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31. This paragraph purports to paraphrase a legal conclusion in one or more Supreme 

Court opinions, each of which speaks for itself, and requires no response. 

32. This paragraph purports to characterize part of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 

McCutcheon v. FEC,134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), which speaks for itself, and requires no response; 

DENY that the language in quotation marks accurately or completely quotes that opinion. 

33. This paragraph purports to characterize and paraphrase part of the Supreme 

Court’s opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), which 

speaks for itself, and purports to state a legal conclusion, neither of which requires a response. 

34. This paragraph purports to characterize part of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 

McCutcheon, which speaks for itself, and purports to state legal conclusions, neither of which 

requires a response. 

35. This paragraph purports to paraphrase part of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government, which speaks for itself, and purports to state legal 

conclusions, neither of which requires a response. 

36. ADMIT that Supreme Court’s opinion in McCutcheon uses the term “base 

limits”; DENY the remainder of this paragraph. 

37. DENY the first sentence of this paragraph; ADMIT that the Supreme Court’s 

opinion in McCutcheon includes the language that appears in quotation marks, but not the 

ellipses. 

38. DENY the first sentence of this paragraph; ADMIT that the Supreme Court’s 

opinion in McCutcheon includes the language that appears in quotation marks, but not plaintiffs’ 

modification. 

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39. The Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their wishes; DENY the characterization that FECA’s 

contribution limits are “bifurcated.” 

40. DENY that FECA’s contribution limits are “[a]rtificially bifurcat[ed]” and 

otherwise DENY this paragraph. 

41. The Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny 

plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their “planned contributions.” DENY that FECA’s contribution 

limits are “[a]rtificially bifurcate[ed]” and otherwise DENY the remainder of this paragraph. 

42. The Commission incorporates by references its responses to paragraphs 1 – 41. 

43. ADMIT that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes an equal 

protection guarantee like that guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent this 

paragraph purports to summarize the Supreme Court’s opinions in Buckley or Bolling v. Sharpe, 

347 U.S. 497 (1954), those opinions speak for themselves and require no response. 

44. ADMIT that the Supreme Court in McCutcheon struck down FECA’s aggregate 

limits on candidate contributions; otherwise DENY this paragraph including the implication that 

FECA contains “bifurcated individual candidate contribution limits.” To the extent the second 

sentence of this paragraph purports to characterize or paraphrase part of the Supreme Court’s 

opinion in McCutcheon, that opinion speaks for itself and requires no response. 

45. ADMIT that the Supreme Court in Buckley upheld FECA’s contribution limits on 

their face and that the opinion includes the language in quotation marks but not plaintiffs’ 

alteration; DENY the first sentence of this paragraph to the extent that it alleges the Buckley

opinion was limited to that holding. 

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46. ADMIT that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Buckley includes the quoted 

language, but not plaintiffs’ alterations. To the extent this paragraph purports to characterize or 

summarize part of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Buckley, that opinion speaks for itself and 

requires no response. 

47. DENY. 

48. ADMIT. 

49. ADMIT. 

50. DENY that FECA’s contribution limits are “bifurcated” and ADMIT that some 

plaintiffs in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), challenged BCRA’s amendment to the 

amount of FECA’s contribution limits and that the Court declined to address that challenge. 

51. ADMIT that Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) concerned a candidate’s 

challenge to asymmetrical contribution limits. 

52. ADMIT that Davis concerned a provision of BCRA known as the “millionaire’s 

amendment” that would permit certain candidates opposing a self-financing opponent to raise 

amounts up to a higher contribution limit under certain circumstances. The Commission lacks 

knowledge or information regarding other unspecified “substantive changes to law” plaintiffs 

intend to reference in this paragraph sufficient to admit or deny such vague allegations. 

53. DENY. 

54. ADMIT that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis contains the language in 

quotation marks but not plaintiffs’ alteration. 

55. ADMIT that the Court in Davis found the asymmetrical contribution limits 

established by the millionaire’s amendment to be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 

56. ADMIT. 

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57. The Commission lacks knowledge or information regarding what plaintiffs mean 

by “this reasoning” sufficient to admit or deny the allegations in the first sentence of this 

paragraph. ADMIT the second sentence of this paragraph. 

58. DENY that McCutcheon and Riddle v. Hickenlooper address “a similar problem” 

and DENY that Riddle v. Hickenlooper purports to address any “problem of bifurcated limits.” 

The second sentence of this paragraph purports to characterize the Colorado statute at issue in 

Riddle v. Hickenlooper, 742 F.3d 922, 924 (10th Cir. 2014), which speaks for itself and requires 

no response. 

59. ADMIT that the language in this paragraph is a quote from the cited part of the 

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Riddle. 

60. DENY that this paragraph accurately describes the nature and scope of law at 

issue in Riddle. 

61. DENY that this paragraph accurately describes the scope of the case before the 

Tenth Circuit in Riddle. 

62. ADMIT that the language in quotation marks, but not plaintiffs’ alterations, 

appears in Riddle and that the Court of Appeals focused on whether two groups of contributors 

were “similarly situated.” 

63. ADMIT that the language in quotation marks, but not plaintiffs’ alterations, 

appears in Riddle. 

64. ADMIT that the language in quotation marks, but not plaintiffs’ alterations, 

appears in Riddle. 

65. ADMIT that the language in this paragraph is a quote from the cited part of the 

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Riddle. 

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66. DENY the first and third sentences of this paragraph. DENY the second 

sentence of this paragraph to the extent it alleges that under “the federal system,” only certain 

candidates that participate in a primary election “can use the ‘primary’ contributions to run 

advertisements promoting his campaign or attacking candidates of the opposing party.” 

67. The Commission lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the 

allegations contained in the first sentence of this paragraph. DENY the remainder of this 

paragraph. 

68. ADMIT. 

69. DENY. 

70. DENY that this case is similar to Riddle, that the government makes any 

“artificial” decisions regarding “how money is contributed,” and otherwise DENY the 

allegations in this paragraph. 

71. The first sentence of this paragraph is vague and purports to state a generalized 

legal conclusion that requires no response; DENY that FECA “allow[s] for ‘extra’ contributions” 

by anyone, DENY that the challenged contribution limits impose any “asymmetry,” and 

otherwise DENY the remainder of this paragraph. 

PRAYERS FOR RELIEF 

The Court should deny plaintiffs’ requested relief. 

 

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 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 

The Complaint fails to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted. 

 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Deputy General Counsel 

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

 

/s/ Erin Chlopak 

Erin Chlopak (D.C. Bar No. 496370) 

Acting Assistant General Counsel 

Steve Hajjar 

 Benjamin A. Streeter III 

Attorneys 

 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

 999 E Street NW 

 Washington, DC 20463 

September 29, 2014 (202) 694-1650 

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