UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MICHIGAN PARALYZED VETERANS 

OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 14-14601 

 HON. TERRENCE G. BERG

THE CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF HON. MONA K. MAJZOUB 

OAKLAND, MICHIGAN 

 

Defendant 

 and 

MOCERI/DM INVESTMENTS, LLC, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. Case No. 14-14697 

 HON. TERRENCE G. BERG

THE CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF HON. MONA K. MAJZOUB 

OAKLAND, MICHIGAN 

 

Defendant 

 / 

ORDER RESOLVING PENDING MOTIONS, CONSOLIDATING CASES, 

AND DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 

OVER STATE LAW CLAIMS 

 Before the Court are two cases brought against Defendant, the Charter 

Township of Oakland, Michigan, arising from the Township’s disapproval a plan to 

allow the construction of a multi-family housing development intended to serve the 

needs of elderly and disabled residents in the Township. For ease of reference, Case 

No. 14-14697, brought by Plaintiffs Moceri/DM Investments, LLC, and Joan M. 

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Buser, shall be called the DM case; while Case No. 14-14601, brought by Plaintiff 

Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America, shall be referred to as the Veterans case. 

 In the DM case, a number of motions have been filed in relation to the 

pleadings. These motions include Plaintiffs’ motion challenging the sufficiency of 

Defendant’s answer and affirmative defenses, filed on March 6, 2015 (Dkt. 12); 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count VI of Plaintiffs’ complaint, filed on April 28, 

2015 (Dkt. 19); and Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint, filed on 

May 27, 2015. (Dkt. 21.) 

 The pendency of these motions was preventing the Court from issuing a joint 

scheduling order1 because the issues raised in the motions bore on the scope of 

discovery in both of the above-captioned cases. On June 11, 2015, the Court held a 

telephonic status conference attended by all parties to discuss the pending motions 

and the need to go forward with the discovery process. (June 11, 2015 text-only 

entry.) 

 After careful review and consideration of the parties’ briefs, the Court finds 

that oral argument would not significantly aid the Court’s decision. Accordingly, the 

motions filed in the DM case, Case No. 14-14697, will be decided without a hearing. 



1 This case was reassigned to this Court on January 13, 2015 as a companion to Michigan Paralyzed 

Veterans of America v. The Charter Township of Oakland, Michigan, Case No. 14-14601. (Case No. 

14-14697, Dkt. 4.) On March 10, 2015, all parties in the above-captioned cases filed a joint discovery 

plan pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Case No. 14-14601, Dkt. 11; 

Case No. 14-14697, Dkt. 13.) In this plan, the parties agreed to consolidate the cases for the purposes 

of discovery only. (Case No. 14-14601, Dkt. 11, p. 8; Case No. 14-14697, Dkt. 13, p. 13.) On June 11, 

2015, the parties were directed to confer and submit a revised joint discovery plan. (June 11, 2015 

text-only entry.) On June 25, 2015, the parties filed a second joint discovery plan that revises the 

original recommended case management dates. (Case No. 14-14601, Dkt. 13, pp. 8-9; Case No. 14-

14697, Dkt. 29, pp. 9-10.) No scheduling order has been entered in either case. 

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See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). With regard to the DM Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file 

an amended complaint (Dkt. 21), the motion will be GRANTED. Consequently, the 

DM Plaintiffs’ earlier filed motion to strike Defendant’s answer (Dkt. 12) will be 

DENIED AS MOOT. The DM Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, attached to the 

motion as Exhibit 1, will be accepted for filing.2 

 As to both the DM case and the Veterans case, the Court is declining to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law claims, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(2) and (4). As a result, these claims will be 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Because the Court will dismiss all of the 

state law claims in the above-captioned cases, which include Count VI in the DM 

complaint, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count VI of the DM Plaintiffs’ complaint 

(Dkt. 19) will also be DENIED AS MOOT. 

 Finally, because these cases involve common questions of law or fact, they 

will be ORDERED CONSOLIDATED in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 42(a), under the lower case number of 14-10601. Case No. 14-14697 will 

be statistically DISMISSED. The Court will then issue a scheduling order in the 

consolidated case, Case No. 14-14601. 



2 Defendant will be permitted to file an amended answer. In anticipation thereof, the Court notes, 

however, that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a Defendant respond to all 

allegations in one of the three ways listed in Rule 8(b). In its first amended answer (Dkt. 15), 

Defendant responded to certain allegations by stating that it “neither admits nor denies the 

allegations contained therein for the reason that said allegations constitute conclusions of law rather 

than allegations of fact and, therefore, leave Plaintiffs to their proofs.” (E.g., Dkt. 15, ¶ 42.) Such an 

answer is not authorized under the Rule. Pursuant to Rule 8(b), Defendant may admit an allegation, 

deny an allegation, or state that it lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the 

allegation’s truth. Refusing to admit or deny an allegation because it calls for a legal conclusion is 

not permissible under the Rule. In fashioning any future responsive pleadings, Defendant is directed 

to avoid such language. 

 

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I. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiffs in both cases challenge Defendant Oakland Township’s denial of a 

plan to build a multi-family housing development for the elderly and disabled. 

Defendant maintains that its denial of Plaintiff Moceri/DM Investments, LLC’s 

application for a special accommodation use was not motivated by discriminatory 

animus and that Plaintiffs simply failed to meet the requisite standard for approval. 

Plaintiff Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America filed its Complaint in Case No. 

14-14601 on December 5, 2014 alleging violations of: (1) the Fair Housing Act; (2) 

the Americans with Disabilities Act; and (3) Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities 

Civil Rights Act. (Dkt. 1.) 

 On December 11, 2014, Plaintiffs Moceri/DM Investments, LLC and Joan 

Buser filed a Complaint in Case No. 14-14697 against Defendant alleging violations 

of: (1) the Fair Housing Act; (2) the Americans with Disabilities Act; (3) the Equal 

Protection and Due Process clauses of the United States and Michigan State 

Constitutions; (4) Michigan’s Zoning Enabling Act; (5) Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen 

Civil Rights Act; and (6) Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. 3

(Dkt. 1.) Case No. 14-14697 was then reassigned to this Court on January 13, 2015 

as a companion to Case No. 14-14601. (Case No. 14-14697, Dkt. 4.) 



3 The 68-page Complaint in the DM case is a far cry from being a “short and plain statement” of 

Plaintiff’s claims, as a complaint should be according to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Many of the allegations are duplicative and compound, consisting of numerous sentences 

or multiple subparagraphs. Others are legal arguments that would be more at home in advocacy 

briefs or memoranda of law. (E.g., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 25, 28, 31, 44-45, 58, 73, 85, 130, 131, and 169.) Such 

unnecessary prolixity and surplusage obscures, rather than clarifies, the nature of the DM Plaintiffs’ 

claims. 

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 The parties in the DM case have been locked in a battle over the scope of the 

pleadings for three months and as a result, no scheduling order has been issued in 

either of these cases. (See Case No. 14-14697, Dkts. 12, 19, 21.) The DM Plaintiffs 

filed a motion to strike Defendant’s answer on March 6, 2015, alleging that some of 

Defendant’s responses were invalid under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and 

that Defendant’s affirmative defenses should be stricken as “boiler plate.” (Dkt. 12.) 

Defendant responded on March 30, 2015 (Dkt. 13), and voluntarily filed an 

amended answer on March 27, 2015 (Dkt. 15), but Plaintiffs maintained in their 

reply brief that the amended answer did not cure the original pleading’s defects 

(Dkt. 17, pp. 3-4.) 

 Then, on April 28, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Count VI of 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Dkt. 19.) 

Count VI alleges discrimination under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. 

(Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 205-210.) The motion is fully briefed. (See Dkts. 19, 22, 26.) 

 Finally, on May 27, 2015, the DM Plaintiffs filed for leave to amend their 

Complaint. (Dkt. 21.) Defendant initially objected, arguing that any amendment 

would be futile because Count VI would still not be able to survive Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss despite Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments.4 (Dkt. 27, p. 8.) The 

Court will now address each motion. 



4 On June 18, 2015, the parties in the DM case submitted a proposed order in which they stipulated 

to allowing Plaintiffs fourteen days to file their first amended Complaint, and to denying Plaintiffs’ 

motion to strike Defendant’s answer (Dkt. 12) and Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file their first 

amended complaint (Dkt. 21) as moot. In addition, the parties stipulated to denying without 

prejudice Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count VI of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. In lieu of adopting this 

stipulation, the Court enters this Order. 

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A. DM Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 

The DM Plaintiffs wish to amend their complaint to include: (1) additional 

facts related to “the impact the Township’s discriminatory practices have had on 

Plaintiff Buser”; and (2) “additional facts and evidence supporting Plaintiffs’ claim 

under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.” (Dkt. 21, p. 1.) After initially opposing 

the motion to amend, as stated, Defendant has now proposed stipulating to allow 

Plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The decision to grant or deny a motion to 

amend a pleading is left to the discretion of the Court. See Robinson v. Michigan 

Consol. Gas Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 579, 591 (6th Cir. 1990). A party may amend a 

pleading after the opposing party’s responsive pleading has been filed only by leave 

of court or by written consent of the adverse party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 

15(a) provides that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Id.

Amendments, however, should not be permitted in instances of “undue delay in 

filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated 

failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party, and futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 

(1962). 

Applying this standard, the Court finds that granting the DM Plaintiffs leave 

to file a first amended Complaint is appropriate. There is no evidence of undue 

delay, lack of notice, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue 

prejudice to Defendants.5 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ proposed first amended Complaint 



5 In addition, the parties in the above-captioned cases agreed in the March 10, 2015 joint discovery 

plan to allow Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings through June 15, 2015. (Case No. 14-14601, Dkt. 

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(Dkt. 21, Ex. 1) is accepted for filing. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count VI of the 

earlier Complaint (Dkt. 19) is now therefore moot. Defendants shall file responsive 

pleadings to the first amended Complaint within the time limits set forth in Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) and shall take account of the Court’s direction to abide 

by the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. 

B. Declining Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims 

 As stated above, the Court will accept the DM Plaintiffs’ proposed amended 

Complaint for filing. However, the Court declines to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over all state law claims.6 “A district court has the power to dismiss or 

remand claims sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” See, e.g., 

Commodities Exp. Co. v. City of Detroit, No. 09-CV-11060-DT, 2010 WL 3905482, at 

*15 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2010). Claims with original jurisdiction in a district court 

have either federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In some circumstances, additional purely 

state law claims may be heard under the supplemental jurisdiction granted federal 

courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In addition to federal causes of action, Plaintiffs in 



11; Case No. 14-14697, Dkt. 13.) Plaintiffs filed for leave to amend their complaint on May 27, 2015. 

(Dkt. 21.) On June 25, 2015, the parties filed a second joint discovery plan that revises the original 

recommended case management dates, allowing Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings through 

September 15, 2015. (Case No. 14-14601, Dkt. 13, pp. 8-9; Case No. 14-14697, Dkt. 29, pp. 9-10.) 

Although the Court has not yet entered a scheduling order in this case, the parties informed the 

Court during the June 11, 2015 telephonic status conference that they are proceeding as though the 

joint discovery plan had been entered and was in force. The Court therefore gives some weight to the 

parties’ agreement. 

6 As will be discussed in greater detail below, these cases will be consolidated. Consequently, the 

Court is declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction with respect to state law claims in both 

cases. 

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the above-captioned cases have alleged a series of state law claims. In the DM case, 

Plaintiffs have alleged the following state law claims: 

1) In Count III, a violation of the Due Process clause of the Michigan State 

Constitution arising from Defendant’s refusal “to allow rezoning of the Land in 

the manner approved by the Planning Commission” and Defendant’s denial of 

Plaintiff DM’s reasonable accommodation request (See Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 172-183); 

2) In Count IV, a violation of Michigan’s Zoning Enabling Act based on Defendant’s 

refusal “to grant a reasonable accommodation” and its adoption of an 

exclusionary zoning regime that “exceeds and abuses the authority given the 

Township under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act.” (See Id. at ¶¶ 173-194); 

3) In Count V, a violation of Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act 

based on Defendant’s refusal “to make a reasonable accommodation necessary to 

afford persons with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy residential 

property in Oakland Township.” (See Id. at ¶¶ 195-204); and 

4) In Count VI, a violation of Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, as shown 

by “public sentiments and prejudices revealed in the public debates about 

Blossom Ridge [which further] revealed an unlawful animus against the 

employment of persons from Pontiac or Detroit or ‘outside the Township’” (See 

Id. at ¶¶ 205-210). 

In the Veterans case, Plaintiff alleges a state law claim in Count III of its 

Complaint: that Defendant violated Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil 

Rights Act by refusing “to make a reasonable accommodation necessary to afford 

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persons with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy residential property in 

Oakland Township.” (See Case No. 14-14601, Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 232-223.) 

 The decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state 

law claims is within the Court’s discretion, because these claims “form part of the 

same case or controversy” as the claims over which the Court has original 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also United Mine Workers of America v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). At the same time, it is also within the Court’s 

discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction where appropriate under the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and in consideration of the interests of comity and 

judicial economy. In this case, the Court believes that §§ 1367(c)(2) and (4), as well 

as considerations of comity and judicial economy, counsel in favor of declining 

supplemental jurisdiction. 

1. Legal Standard 

 A district court’s authority to decline supplemental jurisdiction is governed 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The statute recognizes a court’s discretion to decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction if: 

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which 

the district court has original jurisdiction, 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction, or 

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 

declining jurisdiction. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

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 The United States Supreme Court has recognized a district court’s discretion 

in hearing state law claims: “[P]endent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of 

plaintiff’s right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, 

convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should 

hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims ....” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; 

Baer v. R & F Coal Co., 782 F.2d 600, 603 (6th Cir.1986). The Gibbs Court stated 

that pendent jurisdiction may be denied “if the federal claims are dismissed before 

trial,” if “it appears that the state issues substantially predominate,” or “if the 

likelihood of jury confusion” would be strong without separation of the claims. 383 

U.S. at 726-27. 

 Congress’ adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 codified Gibbs, and the Court has 

since affirmed that “a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at 

every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, 

and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in 

that court involving pendent state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 

U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Supplemental jurisdiction is thus “a doctrine of flexibility, 

designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner 

that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values.” Id. A district 

court may therefore, in its discretion, decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state 

law claim even if jurisdiction would otherwise be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

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1. Declining Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) 

While the state law claims in the above-captioned cases are, in some senses, 

related to the federal issues, the state law claims would substantially predominate 

over the three federal claims. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction pursuant to section 1367(c)(2) if “the [state] claim substantially 

predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original 

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Under this exception, dismissal is appropriate 

where the state law claims will either require elements of proof distinct from the 

federal claim, or cause a substantial expansion of the suit beyond that necessary 

and relevant to the federal claim. Burch v. Medilodge of Port Huron, LLC, No. 12-

CV-13454, 2013 WL 1499344, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2013).

 The DM and Veterans Plaintiffs have alleged federal claims pursuant to the 

Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act for discriminatory 

housing practices under theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact, and, 

in the DM case specifically, under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of 

the United States Constitution. The state law claims are broader, and more 

numerous, and allege violations of Michigan’s Constitution, Zoning Enabling Act, 

Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, and Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. 

These state law claims span substantive due process violations, exclusionary 

zoning, discrimination because of a disability, and, apparently, employment 

discrimination based on race as well as age and familial status discrimination. 

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There is no doubt that the state law claims would substantially expand the scope of 

the above-captioned cases. 

 The Court recognizes some benefits to litigating all related claims in the 

same forum, but it is also aware that it is appropriate to decline supplemental 

jurisdiction “where permitting litigation of all claims in the district court can 

accurately be described as allowing a federal tail to wag what is in substance a state 

dog.” Commodities Exp. Co., 2010 WL 3905482, at *18-20 (quoting Borough of West 

Mifflin v. Lancaster, 43 F.3d 780, 789 (3rd Cir. 1995). 

 The DM and Veterans Plaintiffs, at the heart of their case, want the Court to 

overrule Oakland Township’s denial of Plaintiff Moceri/DM Investments, LLC’s 

request for a special accommodation under local zoning regulations and allow 

Blossom Ridge to be constructed. Retaining the state law claims will allow this 

uniquely state law issue to predominate over any federal issues. Under such 

circumstances, dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). See, e.g., 

Detroit Mem’l Park Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Detroit Bd. of Zoning Appeals, --- F.Supp.3d 

----, 2015 WL 2343879, at *10 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2015) (declining supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claim where Court explained that “Count I of Plaintiffs’ 

complaint, the zoning appeal claim, is the heart of this matter and this Court 

concludes that it substantially predominates over the federal claims in this action. 

That zoning appeal claim predominates over the federal claims in this action in 

terms of proof, scope of issues raised, and comprehensiveness of remedies. It is the 

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only claim that can potentially give Plaintiffs the ultimate relief they seek—an 

outright reversal of the zoning decision.”) 

2. Declining Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) 

 Dismissal is also appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). As noted 

above, Plaintiffs’ state law claims primarily concern the validity of local zoning 

regulations and the validity of Defendant’s denial of a reasonable accommodation 

request under those regulations. Section 1367(c)(4) allows a district court to “decline 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... (4) in 

exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 

jurisdiction.” Under this exception, the District Court must articulate why the 

circumstances of the case are exceptional and then balance “economy, convenience, 

fairness, and comity,” as the Supreme Court instructed in Gibbs. Carnegie–Mellon, 

484 U.S. at 350 (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27). The Court finds that the strong 

federalism and comity concerns implicated in these cases counsel against exercising 

jurisdiction. 

 Both exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons are present here. As 

other district courts in this Circuit have noted, mixing federal and state law claims 

can, in some circumstances, cause procedural and substantive problems that should 

be avoided. See, e.g., Detroit Mem’l Park Ass’n, Inc., 2015 WL 2343879, at *8-10; 

Commodities Exp. Co., 2010 WL 3905482, at *18-20. As the Court in Frankel v. 

Detroit Medical Center, 409 F.Supp.2d 833 (E.D. Mich. 2005), held: 

Federal and state law each have a different focus, and the two bodies of law 

have evolved at different times and in different legislative and judicial 

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systems. Because of this, in almost every case with supplemental state 

claims, the courts and counsel are unduly preoccupied with substantive and 

procedural problems in reconciling the two bodies of law and providing a fair 

and meaningful proceeding. 

The attempt to reconcile these two distinct bodies of law often dominates and 

prolongs pre-trial practice, complicates the trial, lengthens the jury 

instructions, confuses the jury, results in inconsistent verdicts, and causes 

post-trial problems with respect to judgment interest and attorney fees. 

Consequently, in many cases the apparent judicial economy and convenience 

of the parties’ interest in the entertainment of supplemental state claims may 

be offset by the problems they create. 

Frankel, 409 F.Supp.2d at 833, 835. 

 In above-captioned cases, for example, the litigation has already resulted in 

prolonged pre-trial practice and the simultaneous consideration of state and federal 

claims could further complicate the trial and jury instructions, potentially confusing 

the jury and leading to inconsistent verdicts and even post-trial problems.7

Although the federal and state claims in the above-captioned cases arise out of the 

same facts, and as a result there may be some duplication of effort required if 

Plaintiffs chose to pursue their state law claims in state court, the advantage of 

convenience in this particular circumstance is outweighed by the possibility of 

confusion about the issues, legal theories, defenses, and possible relief. 

 These cases also present compelling reasons for declining supplemental 

jurisdiction. In their Complaints, the DM and Veterans Plaintiffs urge the Court to 

declare Defendant’s “zoning regime” to be unlawful and to grant a reasonable 

accommodation allowing the development to be built on the land owned by Plaintiff 

Moceri/DM Investments, LLC. (Case No. 14-14601, Dkt. 1, pp. 40-42; Case No. 14-



7 Defendant has made a jury demand in both of the above-captioned cases. (Case No. 14-14601, Dkt. 

7; Case No. 14-14697, Dkt. 15.) 

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14697, Dkt. 1, ¶¶A-G.) Federal courts, however, “are ill-suited to reviewing the 

decisions of local zoning boards and their particularly local concerns.” Baskin v. 

Bath Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1996 WL 678228 at *7 (6th Cir., Nov. 21, 1996). 

As the Sixth Circuit has held, although “concerns for efficiency and convenience 

may weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction, the fact that zoning regulations are of 

primarily local concern in which the principles of federalism are particularly 

strong,” can weigh in favor of declining jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Charter 

Township of West Bloomfield, No. 90-1039, 1990 WL 208597 *4 (6th Cir., Dec. 17, 

1990)). 

 The Court recognizes that the exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) “should 

be interpreted quite narrowly.” Baskin, 1996 WL 678228 at *7. Federal courts, 

however, “were not created to be the Grand Mufti of local zoning boards nor do they 

sit as super zoning boards or zoning boards of appeals.” T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. City 

of Grand Rapids, No. 1:06-CV-747, 2007 WL 1287739, at *7 (W.D. Mich. May 2, 

2007) (quoting Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 

822, 832 n. 5 (9th Cir.2003) and collecting cases). Because strong federalism and 

comity concerns counsel against this Court issuing rulings on matters of state law 

that federal courts are “ill-suited” to resolving, the Court will, in the early stage of 

litigation, dismiss all claims in the above-captioned cases that Defendant’s actions 

violated Michigan state law.

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C. Consolidation 

 Finally, in light of the similarity of the claims, issues of fact and law, and 

parties, these cases ought to be consolidated. On January 13, 2015, Case No. 14-

14697 was reassigned to this Court as a companion to Case No. 14-14601. (Case No. 

14-14697, Dkt. 4.) For purposes of discovery, the parties have already agreed to 

consolidate. (Case No. 14-14601, Dkt. 13, p. 8; Case No. 14-14697, Dkt. 29, p. 9.) 

 Because these cases involve common questions of law or fact that arise out of 

the denial of Plaintiff Moceri/DM Investments, LLC’s plan to build a multi-family 

housing development in the Defendant township for the elderly and disabled, Case 

No. 14-14697 and Case No. 14-14601 will be consolidated in accordance with 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), under the lower case number of 14-14601. 

Case No. 14-14697 will be statistically dismissed.

II. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, in Case No. 14-14697, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file their 

first amended complaint (Dkt. 21) is GRANTED and the complaint attached to the 

motion as Exhibit 1 is accepted for filling. 

 The state law claim alleged in Count III in Case No. 14-14601, and the state 

law claims alleged in Counts III, IV, V, and VI in Case No. 14-14697, however, are 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

 Therefore, in Case No. 14-14697, Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Defendant’s 

answer (Dkt. 12) and Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count VI of Plaintiff’s 

complaint (Dkt. 19) are DENIED AS MOOT. 

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 Finally, Case No. 14-14697 and Case No. 14-14601 are HEREBY 

ORDERED to be consolidated under the lower case number of 14-14601, and the 

Clerk’s Office is directed to amend the case caption accordingly. Case No. 14-14697 

is statistically DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED.

s/Terrence G. Berg 

TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: July 2, 2015 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on July 2, 2015, 

using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party. 

By: s/A. Chubb 

Case Manager 

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