Russian Nuclear 

Weapons:

Past, Present,

AND future

Stephen J. Blank

Editor

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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Strategic Studies Institute Book

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Stephen J. Blank

Editor

November 2011

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ISBN 1-58487-504-6
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword ........................................................................v

Introduction .................................................................vii

Stephen J. Blank

Part I

1. Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons:

The Broken Relationship .........................................1

Dale R. Herspring

2. Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces:

Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020 ...............33

Roger N. McDermott 

Part II

3. Nuclear Weapons in Russian Strategy and

Doctrine ...........................................................99

Andrei Shoumikhin 

4. Russia’s Security Relations with the

United States: Futures Planned and 

Unplanned..............................................................161

Pavel K. Baev 

5. Nuclear Weapons in Russian National

Security Strategy ............................................187

Nikolai Sokov
Part III

6. Caught between Scylla and Charybdis: The

Relationship between Conventional and 

Nuclear Capabilities in Russian Military 

Thought .................................................................261

Daniel Goure

7. Russia and Nuclear Weapons..............................293

Stephen J. Blank 

8. Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Current

Policies and Future Trends..................................365

Richard Weitz

9. New START and Nonproliferation: Suitors or 

Separate Tables?....................................................417

Stephen J. Cimbala

10. Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat

 that Dare Not Speak its Name............................459

Jacob W. Kipp

About the Contributors ............................................505

iv
v

FOREWORD

While the Cold War is long past, the importance 

of arms control in Russo-American relations and the 

related issue of nuclear weapons for Russia remain 

vital concerns. Indeed, without an appreciation of the 

multiple dimensions of the latter, progress in the former domain is inconceivable. With this in mind, the 

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is very pleased to present the following essays, which were presented at a 

conference at the National Defense University on June 

28, 2010. These essays explore many, if not all, of the 

issues connected with Russia’s relatively greater reliance on nuclear weapons for its security. As such, they 

constitute an important contribution to the analysis of 

the Obama administration’s reset policy, Russo-American relations, Russian foreign and defense policy, and 

international security in both Europe and Asia. Additionally, questions concerning the approach taken by 

other nuclear power nations in reference to the arms 

control agenda provide a crucial backdrop for the 

progress toward curbing the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons, a long-standing central goal of U.S. security 

policy.

We offer these essays to our readers in the belief 

that the information and analyses contained herein 

will strengthen our understanding of Russia’s extensive nuclear agenda and provide a deeper understanding of the many issues in international security 

connected with Russia and its nuclear posture.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vii

INTRODUCTION

As of November 2010, the so-called “New START 

(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)” treaty between the 

United States and Russia that was signed in Prague, 

Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, awaits a ratification 

vote in the Senate. Regardless of the arguments pro 

and con that have emerged since it was signed, it is 

clear that the outcome of the ratification vote will not 

only materially affect the Obama administration’s reset policy towards Russia, but also the strategic nuclear forces of both signatories. Indeed, throughout 

the Cold War, both sides built up their forces based 

on what each was thought to have or be building. Although the Bush administration (2001-09) rhetorically 

announced its intention to sever this mutual hostage 

relationship, it failed in that regard. As a result, critical aspects of that relationship still survive in Russia’s 

orientation to the United States and in the language of 

the treaty, especially in its preamble, which explicitly 

affirms a link between nuclear offense and defense.1

Therefore, whatever the fate of the treaty and the 

reset policy, it is clear that both Moscow and Washington stand before crossroads in regard to the future of 

their strategic nuclear programs and force structures. 

Moreover, each side’s course of action will tangibly 

affect the future course of action of the other side regarding the panoply of issues and policies connected 

with the development of nuclear weapons and the 

missions for them. With this in mind, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) organized a conference 

bringing together several distinguished experts on 

Russian nuclear weapons. The conference took place 

at the National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, on June 28, 2010, and the pa-
viii

pers that follow are the revised versions of the papers 

presented at this conference.

Each author was asked to answer several different 

questions pertaining to the present and future posture of Russia’s nuclear weapons (including tactical 

nuclear weapons). Moreover, it quickly became clear 

that Russia’s nuclear future in many ways, large and 

small, depends greatly on the degree of success that 

Moscow will have in its current large-scale efforts at 

comprehensive military reform. These reforms encompass virtually the entire military structure and are 

the most thoroughgoing reforms since Mikhail Frunze’s reforms in 1924-25. Consequently, no analysis of 

nuclear present and future posture is possible without a systematic analysis of those reforms and their 

impact. Therefore, the following chapters provide an 

examination of Russia’s military and political motives 

behind nuclear weapons policy as they pertain not 

only to the U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), but also to China, whose rising power has 

clearly caught the Kremlin’s attention. 

Dale Herspring and Roger McDermott present 

a systematic exposition and analysis of the reforms 

of the conventional forces and the impact this might 

have on nuclear issues. Andrei Shoumikhin, Pavel 

Baev, and Nikolai Sokov closely examine the ways in 

which Russia has previously thought about nuclear 

weapons, how it does so at present, and as well as 

how it might think about them in the future. Daniel 

Goure and Stephen Blank analyze some of the larger 

strategic issues driving Russian security and defense 

policy and their connection to nuclear weapons. Stephen Cimbala relates both the U.S. and Russian structures to issues tied to nonproliferation and to what 
ix

future reductions to a 1,000 warhead level might look 

like, while Jacob Kipp analyzes the deep-seated strategic challenges that Russia faces in its Asian-Pacific 

Far East. Richard Weitz provides an in-depth analysis 

of the vexing issue of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) 

that are already a source of friction between the two 

sides and one that will figure prominently in any future arms control negotiation.

In many cases, it will become clear that in the attempt to answer the questions asked of them, the 

authors of this book have produced a considerable 

amount of overlap, i.e., more than one author addressing the same point. However, what is equally as 

clear is that there is no agreement among them. There 

was a deliberate attempt to avoid a “pre-cooked” 

consensus. Rather, each author’s individual view is 

asserted in their chapters, underscoring the inherent 

opacity of Russian programs and the different analytical approaches of each writer. This outcome is hardly 

surprising in view of the strategic importance, complexity, many-sidedness, and ambiguity of Russia’s 

approach to nuclear weapons. While the differences 

among the writers may produce difficulties for readers not necessarily versed in the intricacies of Russian 

strategic thinking and policy, they reflect the true reality of the material and the issues, which are inherently 

difficult and contentious in the United States (as the 

debate over the NEW Start treaty clearly illustrates).

The difficulty and complexity is inherent in the subject 

matter, and we deliberately sought to avoid imposing 

predetermined outcomes or conclusions in organizing 

the conference and these papers. We hope that these 

papers serve to illuminate some of the most important, 

yet also intractable, defense policy issues facing the 

United States (and other states as well, not just Russia) 
x

and that they contribute to an even richer discussion 

and debate here in the United States, if not abroad.

ENDNOTE

1. Stephen Blank, ”Cold Obstruction: The Legacy of US-Russia 

Relations Under George W. Bush,” in Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., The 

George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy, & War, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010, pp. 113-138; TREATY BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION 

AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf; PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION 

OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, available from www.state.

gov/documents/organization/140047.pdf.
1

CHAPTER 1

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL 

WEAPONS:

THE BROKEN RELATIONSHIP

Dale R. Herspring

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin’s leaders and generals have consistently believed 

that whatever happens to their conventional forces, if 

worst comes to worst, they can rely on their nuclear 

weapons as a deterrent. After all, no country was 

about to attack the Russian Federation with its triad of 

nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, for the Russians this 

was more of an illusion than a reality because in spite 

of some minor improvements (e.g. the addition of the 

Topol-M, and the SS-24), the fact is that its nuclear 

forces are deteriorating along with its conventional 

forces. Indeed, at present, Moscow has neither a competent conventional nor a nuclear force. The former 

are in the midst of a major reform project—encouraged by Moscow’s poor performance in the war with 

Georgia—while two-thirds of its nuclear triad is for 

the most part unusable.

BACKGROUND 

When the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)/(RVSN) 

were created in 1959, they were primarily an extension of the Soviet Army’s long-range artillery. Indeed, 

most of the officers came from that tradition, and 

it would be the ground leg of the nuclear triad that 

would be the most important. Of the other two legs 

of the triad, the Navy was second in importance, fol-
2

lowed by the air force.1 This meant that the land-based 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were the 

most powerful components of the Soviet and later the 

Russian military’s nuclear forces. As a consequence, 

over the years they received the majority of resources 

and attention. Indeed, the domination of the ground 

based systems led the Soviets to ignore or at least pay 

minimal attention to coordinating the three legs. For 

practical purposes, they were three independent arms.

By the beginning of the 1990s, a significant part of 

the Russian nuclear triad had come to the end of their 

service life. After all, the majority of the missiles had 

been deployed in the 1960s and 1970s. Even the seabased ballistic missile submarines, the Yankee, Delta 

I, and Delta II had been put into operation in 1968-74.2

The Soviets were well aware of the need to modernize their nuclear forces, but the collapse of the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) interrupted the 

nuclear modernization process. Moscow had planned 

to deploy new types of missiles with shorter delivery 

times and a shorter booster phase, and to equip them 

with multi-element last stages, or “buses” to saturate 

and thus disable the information processing systems 

and destruction capabilities of the future American 

antiballistic missile (ABM) defense.3

 Unfortunately for 

the Russians, by the time the regime collapsed in 1991, 

the ICBM modernization program was not completed. 

The same was true of the other two legs of the triad. 

In 1991, Gorbachev established the Strategic Deterrence Forces (SDF) which unified the three legs. However, the collapse of the USSR meant that the SDF were 

located all over the country, as well as in many of the 

newly independent countries. There was an attempt 

to save the SDF by creating a combined military force 

under control of the Commonwealth of Independent 
3

States (CIS). For a number of reasons, by the beginning of 1992, it was clear that the CIS option was dead 

on delivery.4 Indeed, by the middle of 1992, the key 

question was how to withdraw the nuclear weapons 

from CIS countries—how to get them back to Russia. 

New countries like Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus 

wanted no part of the nuclear force. However, the 

process of withdrawing and re-stationing these missiles on Russian soil undermined whatever progress 

had been made in coordinating the actions of the three 

legs. To make matters worse, budgetary allocations 

were insufficient just to maintain these systems, let 

alone modernize them.

NUKES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN 

THE 1990s

The 1990s were a difficult time for the SDF. For example, Moscow’s nuclear arsenal fell to a level 4-4.5 

times below its once impressive figure. The reason was 

simple: the collapse of the Russian economy made it 

increasingly difficult for Russia to purchase and maintain its nuclear stockpiles. In 2002, one Russian source 

claimed that since 1991, “Russia has no resources to 

maintain the previous nuclear force of about 10 thousand on strategic delivery vehicles and about 20 thousand of sub-strategic nukes.”5

The situation confronting Moscow’s conventional 

forces was dismal at best. Consequently, Russia’s generals had to watch American conventional forces roll 

unopposed through Iraqi troops during Operation 

DESERT STORM in 1991. They realized that Russia’s 

chances for keeping up with the West were dimming 

quickly. This was obvious in the area of procurement, 

which fell by more than 80 percent between 1991 and 
4

1994.6 Similarly, by October 1994, “some 85 nuclear 

submarines were docked because the Navy could 

not afford to turn to conventional forces, consider the 

following. In 1991 the military ordered and received 

585 combat aircraft. In 1995 it received only 2 combat 

aircraft.”7

 This was not only the case in the air force 

but throughout the armed forces. To quote the same 

source, “In most developed countries, between 60 

and 80 percent of all weapons are new: in Russia the 

figure is 30 percent. Assuming this situation remains 

unchanged, by the year 2005, the military will have 

only 5.7 percent new weapons. Gradually, we will 

slide toward the category of armies of third-world 

countries.”8

THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF 1993

Something had to be done. Accordingly, Moscow decided to modify its military doctrine. Thus on 

November 2, 1993, the Russian government issued a 

document entitled, Principle Guidance on the Military 

Doctrine of the Russian Federation (PGMD).9

 This statement of military doctrine was based on the first ever 

National Security Concept (The Basic Provisions of a 

Foreign Policy Concept) previously adopted by the Security Council. In it, Moscow essentially stated that it 

had no alternative but to rely on nuclear weapons in 

an emergency, and that it was prepared to use them 

first if the country’s survival was at stake. This was 

Moscow’s form of deterrence. Indeed, the only mission assigned to the nuclear forces was to “remove the 

threat of nuclear war by deterring its initiation against 

the Russian Federation and its allies.”10

It would be wrong to think that Russian military 

experts seriously believed that Russia could get along 
5

with nuclear weapons alone. General Makmut Gareev, 

generally considered one of Russia’s leading military 

thinkers provided the following observation: 

But it is impossible to ensure a reliable defense with 

nuclear weapons alone. First, many countries have 

even now the ability (to be increased in the future) of 

developing a surprise attack not only with nuclear, but 

also with conventional precision weapons, in order to 

destroy the nuclear bases of other countries, depriving them of the ability to retaliate or carry out nuclear 

retribution.11

Regardless of how desperate the Kremlin was for 

new conventional-type weapons, the 1990s would 

continue to be a disaster for the Russian military for 

both conventional and nuclear weapons. To quote 

Rose Gottemoeller: “The debate over the role of nuclear weapons in Russian national security has been at 

the center of military reform, with the key questions 

very much in play.”12

YELTSIN IGNORES THE MILITARY 

Gottemoeller was right. The problem, however, 

was that Boris Yeltsin did not take military reform, 

whether on the nuclear or conventional level seriously. He did not consider the West to be a threat, 

and thus, unlike his generals, was more concerned 

with his domestic power or the economy than he was 

with upgrading and reforming the military. In fact, he 

ignored the military and regularly provided it with 

far less than even a subsistence budget—the military 

might only get 40-50 percent of what it was authorized 

because the tax collection system in Russia was broken. It led to situations where soldiers were sent out to 

pick mushrooms to supplement their diet.13
6

In 1996, the budget shortfall was 25,000 billion 

rubles (R). The situation inside the military was so 

bad that the average officer was due about R10,000 in 

back pay.14 The next year, the shortfall was R34,000 

billion.15 Because of budgets like the foregoing, there 

was no money for procurement. What money there 

was, had to be spent on maintenance and provisions 

for the troops. As Alexei Arbatov put it, the budgets 

from 1997 to 1999 allocated up to 70 percent for maintenance, while cutting personnel by 30 percent. This 

left almost nothing for research and development. 

Funds allocated to them “were barely sufficient for 

modernization of the minimal strategic forces.”16 With 

this background, it is not surprising that there were 

serious differences between advocates of conventional 

and strategic forces. In fact, the battle was bitter, made 

worse by the personal dislike between the two main 

actors: General Anatoly Kvashnin and Igor Marshal 

Sergeyev.

THE BATTLE BETWEEN KVASHNIN AND 

SERGEYEV

General Anatoly Kvashnin was an army officer, a 

man who had worked his way up serving in a variety of posts in the infantry (Ground Forces) to become 

Chief of the General Staff. It should also be noted that 

Kvashnin’s personality matched his infantry background. He was open and blunt, and a person willing 

to engage in bureaucratic fisticuffs even if that meant 

being insubordinate vis-à-vis his boss. 

Meanwhile, the defense minister, Igor Sergeyev, 

was a career missile officer. Indeed, he spent his entire career concerned about nuclear weapons. He was 

a polished officer who eschewed the kind of bureau-
7

cratic politics that Kvashnin reveled in. It was his job 

to advise Yeltsin, while attempting to keep the defense 

establishment on an even keel. Not surprisingly, the 

outcome was constant conflict between these two men 

with Sergeyev constantly touting the value of nuclear 

weapons, while Kvashnin argued in favor of expanding conventional forces.

As with so many other areas, Yeltsin was a major 

part of the problem. First, he changed the law to place 

both the defense minister and the Chief of the General Staff directly under him. As a result, the Chief of 

the General Staff was no longer subordinate to the defense minister. That meant that while the defense minister could do his best to convince the Chief to carry 

out a specific policy, he could not force him to do so. 

Furthermore, since the General Staff was primarily in 

charge of operational matters, the Chief could implement his orders as he saw fit. From a military policy 

standpoint, the result was bureaucratic chaos. No one 

knew for certain what Yeltsin’s policy was, nor what 

the Ministry of Defense (MoD) policy was on a variety 

of issues.

In fact, Yeltsin’s only policy was to keep the military off balance, to create a situation in which the military would never threaten his position domestically. 

After all, he was well aware that it was the military 

that came to his aid in the 1993 coup attempt. Had the 

generals decided to sit that conflict out, the outcome 

might have been very different—with Yeltsin sitting 

in a Russian jail. He was not about to take a chance 

with these generals and admirals. If that meant a 

weaker military, that was too bad, but it was not that 

important during the 1990s. 

One of the few positive things Yeltsin did vis-àvis the military was to order the Security Council to 
8

come up with a new National Security Concept. It was 

completed on May 7, 1997, and enacted by presidential decree on December 17, 1997.17 While the Concept 

laid the basis for a revision of military doctrine, it was 

far too broad and ambiguous when it came to setting 

priorities, national interests, and responsibilities.

Meanwhile, in an effort to make structural changes, Sergeyev sought and achieved permission to recreate the SDF. The purpose was to establish a force 

that combined the strategic nuclear capabilities of the 

Strategic Rocket Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force, 

as well as other units having responsibility for early 

warning command and control units. Additionally, 

the country’s reconnaissance satellites would be subordinated to the SDF. 

Finally on March 15, 1999, Yelstin approved a 

document called “Main Provisions of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy.” The document made it clear 

that Russia’s nuclear forces were the guarantor of the 

country’s national security.18 The problem with the 

Concept was that it did not bring about the stability 

and predictability (stabil’nost’ i predvidenie) that is so 

much a part of military thinking the world over. Generals and admirals cannot plan for the future if they 

do not know what kind of a conflict they are preparing 

for, or if they do not know what kind of weapons systems and personnel they will have at their disposal. If 

there were two words that would describe the 1990s 

from the generals’ and admirals’ point of view, they 

were confusion and chaos. It was clearly time for a 

new military doctrine.
9

PUTIN AND THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF 2000

When Vladimir Putin took over as president of 

Russia, he faced a military that was in need of just 

about everything. Ships did not sail, planes did not 

fly, and tanks were not in working order. Indeed, the 

country did not carry out a single division level exercise during the 1990s, and there were many officers at 

the lieutenant colonel and colonel level that had not 

commanded an active unit larger than a company. 

This lack of military experience would come back to 

haunt the Russian military, for example, in the war 

against Georgia. Meanwhile, Putin took as one of his 

primary tasks the stabilizing of the Russian military. 

After all, Russia was fighting a war in Chechnya, and 

its military problems could not be ignored. 

The 2000 Military Doctrine was approved by Russian Presidential Edict 706 on April 21, 2000.19 As it 

would on other occasions, the Russians refused to 

clarify the issue of a nuclear threshold. The document 

made clear that Moscow “keep the right to use nuclear 

weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons 

or other WMD [weapons of mass destruction] against 

Russia or its allies, as well as in response to large-scale 

conventional aggression in critical situations for Russian national security.”20 Given the desperate condition of its conventional weapons, it is not surprising 

that the Russians wanted to preserve freedom of maneuver. That included the use of nuclear weapons, 

even if a conventional war deteriorated badly. In fact, 

the Russian military included such an option in its exercises—West 99 and Autumn 2002.21 The document 

did not resolve the question of which side the Kremlin 

should or would favor—nuclear or conventional. Indeed, if there was anything new in it, it was the recog-
10

nition of the threat presented by international terrorism. 

While Washington may not have realized it at the 

time, its decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM 

Treaty meant that the Kremlin did not have to get 

rid of its multiple warhead missiles as demanded by 

the treaty. From a policy standpoint, the urgency of 

modernizing existing missiles disappeared. The current ones would suffice. The Kremlin had found a way 

to maintain its nuclear weapons “on the cheap.” Such 

a policy may work over the short run, but to remain 

effective the missiles had to be modernized and new 

ones had to be developed to counter the other side’s 

countermeasures.

Meanwhile, the very expensive naval arm of the 

Russian triad suffered one problem after another. First 

was the sinking of the submarine Kursk—one of the 

modern submarines in the Russian fleet—in August 

2000, which presumably was the result of an onboard 

missile explosion Then there was the case of the Yuri 

Dogorukiy, a strategic submarine that was under construction throughout the 1990s. The intention was for 

it to enter service in 2001. However, when the missile 

that was designed for it (the SS NB-28) failed, it was 

redesigned for the Bulava missile. It was not until February 13, 2008, that it was finally launched. As a consequence, there was no way the Navy could argue for 

a dominant position in the Russian strategic arsenal. 

This brings us back to the ongoing battle between 

Kvashnin and Sergeyev, which had major overtones 

for the relationship between nuclear and conventional 

weapons. The battle between the two men reached 

the point where, to quote Alexei Arbatov: “In reality, 

under the umbrellas of the official Russian doctrine, 

there are now two military doctrines, with all the con-
11

sequences flowing therefrom.”22 The battle was over 

the heart of the Russian military—which side would 

be favored: nuclear weapons as favored by Sergeyev 

or conventional forces as favored by Kvashnin? The 

former maintained that, given Russia’s weak conventional forces, Moscow’s only alternative was to 

develop its nuclear capabilities to the point where 

no other state or organization would consider attacking Russia. Kvashnin, on the other hand, maintained 

that Russia was already faced with threats that could 

only be handled by conventional forces. After all, one 

could not seriously consider using nuclear weapons in 

Chechnya or Bosnia. The military had to have modern 

conventional weapons to meet these challenges.

For his part, Sergeyev made the familiar argument that all of the conventional forces in the world 

would not protect Russia in the face of an opponent 

who had nuclear weapons and the will to use them. 

To quote Arbatov: “Russia’s nuclear arsenal should 

be sufficient to inflict pre-set damage to any aggressor under any circumstances.”23 However, according 

to Federov, an analysis of Moscow’s nuclear capabilities at that time led to “the major conclusion that Russia’s nuclear weapons cannot perform the mission of 

deterrence against the hypothetical aggression at the 

regional level.”24 The obvious problem, as pointed out 

by Alexandr Golts, is that “nuclear weapons are less 

capable against terrorism than any other.”25

The simple fact is that “Moscow lacks a coherent 

military strategy. In particular, the Military Doctrine 

of the Russian Federation was approved only in April 

2000, while the Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation

was approved in July 2001. Programs and plans of 

military construction were out of proportion to Russia’s economic capabilities.”26 To make matters worse, 
12

Russia’s generals could not get rid of the idea of a 

large scale conflict requiring mass armies. They were 

still mentally tied to fighting the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO). To quote Locksley: 

There are consistent allegations that the doctrine and 

training sections of the General Staff are governed 

by ’Germans’, veterans of the Group of Soviet Forces 

in Germany, who are nostalgic about planning and 

conducting big multi-theatre warfare rather than setting the doctrinal conditions and introducing suitable 

training regulations. Russian military forces have not 

fully reformed and adapted to the changed threat environment.27

Regardless of what approach Moscow adopted, 

Putin had to find a way to stop the constant bickering 

between Sergeyev and Kvashnin. 

On July 12, 2000, there was a meeting in the Kremlin, in which Kvashnin argued in favor of disbanding the SRF. He had in mind cutting the number of 

intercontinental missile divisions from 19 to 2. ICBMs 

would go from 756 to only 150 by 2003. This would 

also decrease the SRF’s share of the budget from 18 

percent to 15 percent. Sergeyev responded in a newspaper article in which he called Kvashnin’s plan, 

“criminal stupidity and an attack on Russia’s national 

interests.” The next day Putin ordered both generals 

to “silence their debate and come up with realistic 

policy proposals.”28

Kvashnin repeated his criticism at an August 11 

Security Council meeting attended by Putin. The latter was frustrated, but realized that he would have to 

do something. He stated, “I have been rather tolerant 

of the debates in the defense ministry and society as 

a whole. . . . Now is the time to bring the matter to 
13

its rightful conclusion.”29 In the meantime, matters 

appeared to be going Kvashnin’s way. For example, 

the 1997 decision by Sergeyev to get rid of the Ground 

Forces as a separate service was reversed.

There was a particularly important meeting of the 

Security Council on November 9, 2000. During the 

meeting, Putin acknowledged the importance of nuclear weapons, but he also mentioned the need to “see 

other challenges.” It was clear from his comments that 

his primary concern was improving the Army’s conventional capabilities. The plan adopted at the meeting foresaw a two-staged process. Phase one covered 

2001 to 2005 and would focus primarily on personnel. 

The second focused on giving the military the logistical support it needed.

On March 24, 2001, it was announced that Putin 

had signed Decree No. 337, “On Supporting the Plan 

for Conversion and Development of the RF Armed 

Forces and Improving Their Structure.” The decree 

broke the SRF in two commands: The Strategic Missile 

Troops and the Space Troops. Four days later Putin 

fired Sergeyev, making him a presidential advisor. 

He was replaced by Sergei Ivanov, a former KGB general and close confidant of Putin. Ivanov’s task was to 

smooth matters over with Kvashnin, while helping to 

create stability inside the military.

In spite of Ivanov’s best efforts, it soon became 

obvious that he could not work with Kvashnin. The 

latter ignored him just as he had Sergeyev. As noted 

above, the problem was that the Law on Defense 

stated that Kvashnin worked for the president, and 

did not have to clear his actions or ideas with Ivanov. 

Then on June 14, at Putin’s urging, the Duma changed 

Article 13 of the Law on Defense to mention only the 

Defense Ministry: “Oversight for the Armed Forces of 
14

the Russian Federation is carried out by the defense 

minister via the Defense Ministry.”30 Furthermore, 

Article 15, which had listed the main functions of the 

General Staff, was declared null and void. This meant 

that henceforth the Chief of the General Staff worked 

for the Defense Minister. Several weeks later Kvashnin was fired as well. 

RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR FORCES

According to Institute for International Security 

Studies (IISS) figures, in 2000, the SRF had a total of 

771 ICBM launchers. However, there were problems 

with the Navy’s new follow-on submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and it was cancelled in August 1998 after three test failures.31 During the same 

year, Vladimir Yakovlev, head of the SRF, stated that 

Moscow “would have 20-30 Topol-Ms each year for 3 

years and 30-40 in each of the subsequent 3 years.”32

In fact, Russia deployed only 10 during 1998 and 1999, 

and six during 2000. 

By 2004, matters had further deteriorated. As one 

observer noted: 

The situation in the manufacturing sector is so serious, 

that in 2004 serial production of the Topol-M had to be 

stopped twice. This was the last straw. . . . If the government does not make the necessary steps in the next 

2-3 months, the strategic nuclear force’s development 

program will be disrupted.33

In fact, Ivanov tried to put a good face on matters, 

noting in 2005 that the Kremlin intended to acquire 

six ICBMs and one Tu-160 strategic bomber.34 From 

a strategic standpoint, this was a joke as one writer 

noted:
15

The words about the priority of nuclear deterrence are 

as usual hanging in the air, because the plan to buy six 

intercontinental ballistic missiles and one strategic Tu160 missile carrier in 2006 means nothing to anyone. 

Vladimir Dvorkin, who earlier headed the 4th Defense 

Ministry’s research for strategic arms stated. With 

such tempos there is absolutely no certainty about 

what will remain of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces 

in 2012-2015, after the completely outdated weapons 

are withdrawn, and whether we will be able to maintain the nuclear balance with the United States at 2,200 

warheads determined by the Russian-U.S. Strategic 

Offensive Reduction Treaty.35

On May 29, 2007, Moscow tested a new ground 

based missile. The SS-24 multiple warhead ballistic 

missile is similar to the Topol-M except that its primary purpose is to overcome air defense systems such 

as the one the United States previously intended to 

deploy in Europe. To quote the now former defense 

minister Ivanov: “These complexes are capable of 

penetrating all existing and perspective anti-missile 

systems.”36 It was tested in its MIRVed (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) form in November of 2008.

THE SITUATION WITH THE BULAVA

Just as the SRF needed a new, more modern missile, so did the Navy. New submarines were being 

constructed, and a new missile had to be developed. 

Each of the new Project 955 submarines would carry 

12 of these new missiles. In addition, these new missiles would be back-fitted into the Project 941 submarines. The Bulava, however, was to become a major 

headache for the Kremlin. In the beginning, Moscow 

was convinced that this new missile would be a savior 

for the Russian submarine fleet.
16

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that in 

2007 the armed forces will acquire a new strategic ballistic missile, the S-30 Bulava . . . . Ivanov said that the 

new supersonic MIRV missile has no equivalent in the 

world. On 27 September, a Northern Fleet submarine 

in the White Sea launched a Bulava, which after a 30 

minute flight successfully hit a target in the testing 

ground in Kamchatka. . . . That same day, President 

Vladimir Putin said during his nationwide teleconference that the Bulava can change its route and altitude 

in such a way that it makes the missile invulnerable to 

the strategic-missile-defense systems of ’some of our 

partner countries’.37

Reality, however, would be quite different from 

Ivanov’s and Putin’s predictions. For example, a few 

days later, the MoD reported that “several minutes after the launch, the automatic system of self-destruction 

was triggered as a result of a deviation of the mission 

from its trajectory.”38

Some background is needed before discussing the 

Bulava’s problems. In 1998 when the decision was 

made to build this missile, cost was a key concern. 

Yuri Solomonov, the chief designer at the Moscow 

Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), promised 

to create a new system, the Bulava-30, which is both 

a land and sea missile. As a consequence, the project 

was transferred from the Makeyev Design Bureau, 

which had been building the Topol-M, to MITT. The 

amount of money sunk into this project by 2009 was 

$7 billion.39 Believe it or not, according to some estimates, 40 percent of the MoD’s budget was being devoted to the Bulava project.40 Still, as late as 2008, the 

MoD was reportedly commenting privately that “the 

strategic nuclear forces are in particularly catastrophic 

situation.”41
17

If the constant failures by the Bulava were not 

enough, the Navy was becoming increasingly embarrassed. Why? Because the Kremlin was building submarines to be equipped with the Bulava missile. The 

MoD expected to have them in service in 2008. The 

submarine Dmitri Donskoy had been refitted in time to 

accommodate the Bulava missiles. In addition, a new 

submarine, the Yuri Dolgorukiy, was launched in 2009 

and ready to go to sea by 2010. Moscow had also begun work on two additional submarines, the Aleksandr 

Nevsky and the Vladimir Monomakh. This meant that 

the Kremlin was faced with the very embarrassing 

situation of having one submarine that was supposed 

to be equipped with Bulava missiles going to sea with 

its missile tubes empty—with two more on the way!

For his part, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy maintained that one of the major problems confronting the 

military in Russia was the decrepit state of its military-industrial complex. There is a lot of truth in his 

comments—the technology in many of the industrial 

plants is from the 1970s or 1980s. Furthermore, the average age of most of those who are competent to work 

in most of those factories is over 60. The majority of 

the younger qualified workers left the military factories to work in better paying jobs elsewhere. 

Faced with this dismal situation, Yuri Solomonov, 

the Chief Designer who in 1998 claimed that he could 

design the new missile, was fired. After all, the missile had failed 7 times out of 11 launches since 2004. 

Despite the poor performance , Moscow appears to be 

stuck with the Bulava missile. There was talk of inserting the Sineva missile, but it is a completely different system. Furthermore, taking the Bulava tubes 

and related equipment out of submarines like the Yuri 

Dolgorukiy and replacing them with tubes that would 

fire the Sineva missiles would be cost prohibitive. 
18

In 2008, Moscow tried to test the Bulava missile 

once again with one successful attempt in September 

and yet another failure in December. In the latter case, 

not one of the reentry vehicles hit their targets at the 

Kamchatka range. It marked the fifth failure out of 

10 launches. As one Russian source put it, “the 10th 

graded launch from on board the submarine missilecarrier Dmitry Donskoy ended in full-scale disaster.”42

The bottom line stated by Admiral Vysotskiy was 

that “The Navy has nothing to replace it with.” According to Vysotskiy, in spite of the unsuccessful tests, 

the Navy had no choice but to press ahead with the 

program. The missile is slated to be the mainstay of 

the sea leg of Russia’s nuclear deterrent through 2040-

45.43

According to Russian sources, the next test of a 

Bulava was scheduled for the end of June 2010 on 

board the Dmitri Donskoy. But this was modified in 

May when it was announced that the missile would be 

tested “no earlier than November this year [2010].”44

The reason, according to the Navy, is that they have 

still not been able to determine “the reason for the 

previous launch failures.”45 The Navy suspects that 

the problem is in the assembly of the missile; the only 

way they can explain why some missiles have worked 

successfully, while others have not. In the future, the 

Navy stated that it will launch three Bulava missiles at 

the same time in an effort to pinpoint the problem. In 

the meantime, the new submarines will undergo sea 

trials, but not really put to sea doing the job they were 

intended to perform until the Bulava is perfected, 

whenever that happens. 
19

LONG-RANGE AVIATION

Using the one or two Tu-160s available to him, 

General Igor Khovorov, the commander of LongRange Aviation (LRA), stated that during 2006, he 

planned to carry out 10 launches of cruise missiles; not 

exactly what one would expect from the air force of 

a superpower.46 The next year, the commander of the 

Air Force announced that an upgraded Tu-160 would 

enter service with the Air Force, and that another one 

was in the pipeline.47 Imagine if the effective air arm of 

the Russian nuclear triad consisted of only four or five 

old, if modernized, strategic aircraft!

The situation did not improve over time. For example, every time a senior Air Force officer spoke of new 

planes, his comments were clearly focused on fighter 

aircraft, which appears to be the major concern of the 

Air Force at present—the Fifth Generation Fighter. 

Consider the follow comments from a critic of LRA:

Strategic missile-armed aircraft are designed to destroy enemy targets with ...known coordinates. Recently within the scope of the LRA command and staff 

drill conducted under the direction of DA (LRA) Commander Major-General Anatoliy Zhikharev, crews 

took up Tu-95MSs with practice cruise missiles aboard 

from Engles Airbase. They unsuccessfully executed 

launches to maximum range (around 2,500) against 

targets on the northern Pemboy Range (Vorkuta). It 

was “whispered” to me that the missiles’ deviation 

from the center of the target did not exceed 20m. This 

is something of which to be proud!48

The bottom line is that LRA has a very long way 

to go before it can be considered a critical part of the 

strategic nuclear triad.
20

THE SEARCH FOR A NEW MILITARY 

DOCTRINE 2010

Even though it had only been in effect for 3 years, 

by 2003 there were calls for an updating of Russian 

military doctrine. As General Anatoliy Kulikov put it:

Bearing in mind the recent war in Iraq, the current 

military doctrine of Russia does not meet modern requirements for national security. It should be the basis 

for drafting a national security doctrine of Russia to 

clearly define modern threats and challenges to Russian armed forces.49

From an organizational standpoint, Putin and Ivanov 

had succeeded in stabilizing the military. However, 

there were continued problems—funding for the military was increased, but there was still not enough to 

purchase the weapons needed either to modernize the 

country’s conventional forces, or to build the nuclear 

forces the country needed. As a result, in 2005 Putin 

formally charged Russia’s military leaders to come up 

with a new military doctrine. 

One of the key factors of any nuclear doctrine is 

preemption. Putin had made his position on this issue 

very clear in 2003, when he remarked, “If the practice 

of preventive strikes should de facto become widespread and grow stronger, Russia reserves the right 

to such practice.” He continued, remarking, that “We 

are against this, but we retain the right to carry out 

preventive strikes.”50

So what were the major—problems beyond the 

reoccurring issue of preemption? First, as Arbatov 

noted, was the failure of the doctrine to tell the Armed 

Forces “what kind of enemy they are supposed to 
21

prepare themselves against.”51 A second factor was 

the absence of a discussion of the threat of terrorism. 

Meanwhile, under Ivanov’s direction (as President of 

the Security Council), the latter was preparing a new 

concept of national security, which according to the 

Russian constitution is supposed to proceed and guide 

the drafting of military doctrine. In fact, the drafting 

of both documents would turn out to be more lengthy 

than anticipated. 

There was little change in the concept of nuclear 

deterrence. Theoreticians like General Gareyev maintained that it was critical to continue to build up Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Interestingly, he also noted that 

it would be important for the doctrine to pay attention 

to “the development of general-purpose forces; the 

Air Force, the Navy, and ground troops.”52

In May 2009, Medvedev signed the National Security Strategy Document, which laid the basis for the new 

Military Doctrine document that he signed on February 

5, 2010. Insofar as nuclear weapons were concerned, 

the doctrine of preemption was not mentioned, but 

the idea was retained. As the document states:

The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize 

nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction 

against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the 

use of conventional weapons when the very existence 

of the state is under threat.53

This led one commentator to call Russia’s new military doctrine “An Exercise in Public Relations”—a 

reference to the avoidance of the term preemption.54

Otherwise, when it comes to nuclear weapons, the 

document is not significantly different from previous 

editions.
22

THE SHRINKING NUCLEAR FORCES

Throughout the 1990s and into the next century, 

not only did Moscow experience problems with particular weapons systems, the number of nuclear weapons was decreasing. Note the following criticism: 

At the start of 1992, the Russian Federation had 6,347 

nuclear warheads. When Boris Yeltsin resigned at the 

end of 1999, he left his successor 5,842 warheads. At the 

start of 2007, Russia had 681 ICBMs (including SLBMs 

carried by submarines) with 2,460 warheads and 79 

strategic aircraft with 884 cruise missiles. That’s a total 

of 3,344 warheads. If current trends persist (new missiles are being built at an extremely slow rate, while 

the withdrawal of old missiles is accelerating), the 

Strategic Nuclear Forces might have no more than 300 

ICBMs by the middle of the next decade with no more 

than 600 warheads.55

In short, insofar as Moscow’s nuclear forces were 

concerned, the future looked anything but bright.

THE STATUS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, 

2010 

If there were problems with nuclear forces, the 

problems with conventional weapons were even 

greater. This was brought home to the Kremlin in 

great clarity by the War with Georgia. The war began 

in chaos—especially among the high command in 

Moscow. As one Russian source put it:

The Main Operations Directorate and the Main Organization Directorate found themselves on August 8, 

2008, in the street in the direct sense of the word. On 
23

that day the directorates were engaged in carrying out 

a very strict directive of Defense Minister Anatioliy 

Serdyukov. Ten KAMAZs [a type of Russian truck]

were lined up at entrances, and property of the General Staff’s two main directorates, packed in boxes and 

bundles, was being loaded into them.56

The result was that “many officers learned the news 

that Georgia had begun military operations against 

South Ossetia from morning news publications.”57

When the generals sat down to evaluate Russian 

performance during the war, they were shocked and 

quite vocal in discussing problems. This discussion 

became the impetus for the greatest change in Russian 

conventional forces since World War II. In an interview in May 2009, a former Russian Airborne Troop 

(VDV) intelligence chief, Colonel Pavel Popovskikh, 

underscored the dated condition of combat training 

within the elite airborne forces, as well as reflecting on 

the situation within conventional forces.

Our army is still being trained based upon regulations, which were written in the 1960s! The regulations, manuals, combat training programmes, and 

the volumes of standards have become obsolete. An 

old friend recently sent me the volume of standards 

that is in force, which we wrote in 1984, 25 years ago. 

This volume is a reflection of the operation and combat training of the troops and their operating tactics. If 

the Airborne Troops have remained at the prehistoric 

level, then we can confidently say that the General 

Staff and the rest of the troops continue to train for a 

past war.

The Georgian War was a watershed for Russia. It 

was clear that the Russian military was plagued with 

aged equipment, hardware, and weaponry, which 
24

were dangerously coupled with ineffective command 

and control systems, poor communications, and interservice coordination. There were also intelligence 

support failings, failure of the global satellite navigation system (GLONASS), and higher than anticipated 

casualties partly as a result of problems with inadequate Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment. 

In August 2008, the independent Russian military 

newspaper, Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, noted 

that 60-75 percent of 58th Army tanks deployed in 

Georgia were the old T-62, T-72M, and T-72BM, none 

of which could withstand Georgian antitank warheads. 

There was even controversy among the new weapons that were being produced: when discussing the 

new T-90 tank in July 2008, then commander-in-chief 

of Ground Forces Army General Alexei Maslov openly admitted that Russian tanks were lagging behind 

other countries in the use of modern electronics. As he 

put it, “although work to develop a tank battlefield information management system is already under way, 

its installation on outdated tank models is too costly 

and therefore not recommended.”58

One could go on, but the bottom line is that weapons and equipment in the current Russian Army is 

antiquated at best. In June 2009, the MoD stated that 

“the outfitting of troops (forces) with arms and with 

military and special equipment currently remains at 

a level of from 60 to 100 percent, but the proportion 

of modern models is around 10 percent.”59 It will be 

many years—perhaps not until 2020, a year often 

suggested by Russian military analysts—before the 

military that has been reduced to close to one million 

personnel and is undergoing major structural changes 

will have a relatively modern armed force once again.
25

USING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO 

OFFSET CONVENTIONAL WEAKNESSES 

It is clear that the Kremlin’s attempt to maintain a 

strong nuclear deterrent to provide an umbrella while 

Russia’s conventional forces were modernized failed 

on both grounds. First, while Russia maintained a nuclear deterrent of sorts, if anything it decreased during 

the Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev periods. As long as 

one has the option of a nuclear first use, Moscow has 

a nuclear deterrent, but it is far less than it was in 1993 

or even 2000. Furthermore, for practical purposes, it is 

limited to ground based ICBMs for the immediate future. The other two legs of the nuclear triad—the Bulava naval variant is dysfunctional to this point, and the 

few obsolete Tu-95MS and TU-160 LAR bombers—for 

all practical purposes are irrelevant. 

Turning to the conventional forces, the military 

is clearly in a period of transition. Defense Minister 

Serdyukov has undertaken a major restructuring of 

the Russian military and faces a monumental task in 

updating and modernizing its weapons systems. If 

anything, the quality of the current inventory has continued to deteriorate despite some efforts to modernize them. Weapons systems from the 1970s, 1980s, and 

even 1990s are everywhere, but they are of little use 

against weapons systems based on technology from 

the 21st century. 

There is a major problem facing both the modernization of nuclear and conventional weapons, and that 

is the sad state in which the military-industrial complex finds itself. As a Russian general put it in April 

2010, “The Defense Ministry cannot buy something 

that does not guarantee parity in the event of a conflict. . . . The army cannot buy artillery with a range of 
26

20 kilometers when the enemy has 70 kilometers.”60 In 

another instance, the same officer made it clear that if 

incompetence and corruption mean that Russia cannot find quality conventional weapons in Russia, it 

will have to purchase them abroad—a stinging indictment of the country’s domestic industrial complex. To 

quote him again: 

Vladimir Popovkin said . . . that the military paid defense industry a R5 billion advance for the building of 

unmanned aerial vehicles, but never did acquire the 

vehicles, which are so much needed by the field. And 

this is why it was forced to purchase them in Israel. 

The problem is not a lack of know-how or ability, it 

is the backwardness of the available technology of 

enterprises of the OPK (defense industrial complex). 

The fact is that certain directors of design bureaus and 

plants, instead of channeling the allocated funds into 

the purchase of modern production lines, put them 

into the bank to obtain interest to build up their margins.61

How and when Russian industry will be in a position to produce quality weapons, whether it is a 

Bulava missile or a modern fighter jet or an armored 

vehicle, is uncertain. Until it is able to do so, however, 

the chances of Moscow catching up with the West in 

either area are minimal unless it purchases all of its 

weapons abroad.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Rose Gottemoeller, “Nuclear Weapons in Current Russian 

Policy,” in Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin, eds., The Russian 

Military: Power and Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004, pp. 

183-186.
27

2. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces after 

the USSR: Reforming and Prospects,” in Yuri Fedorov and Bertil Nygren, eds., Russian Military Reform and Russia’s New Security 

Environment, Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish National Defense College, 2003, p. 114..

3. Ibid., p. 115.

4. For a discussion of the problems from a Russian perspective, see Dale R. Herspring, The Kremlin and the High Command: 

Presidential Impact on the Russian Military from Gorbachev to Putin, 

Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006, esp. chap. 3.

5. Yuri Federov, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, London, UK, 

Pugwash Meeting No. 27, November 15-17, 2002, p. 2.

6. “Defense Ministry on Reform Efforts - Budget,” RFE/RL 

Daily Report, August 22, 1994.

7. “Conversation without Middlemen,” Moscow TV, September 14, 1995, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia 

(FBIS SOV), September 18, 1995.

8. Ibid.

9. For a copy of this doctrine in English, see “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” available from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.

html. 

10. Ibid., p. 3.

11. General Makmut Gareev, Jacob Kipp, ed., If War Comes Tomorrow: The Contours of Future Armed Conflict, London, UK: Cass, 

1998, p. 84.

12. Gottemoeller, in Miller and Trenin, p. 186.

13. Herspring, The Kremlin and the High Command, pp. 79-119.

14. As cited in Michael J. Orr, The Deepest Crisis: The Problem 

of the Russian Army Today, Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research 

Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, October 4, 1996, p. 1.
28

15. “The Sword of Crisis Over the Military Budget,” Krasnaya 

zvezda, January 30, 1999, available from FBIS SOV, February 1, 

1999.

16. Alexei Arbatov, “The Transformation of Russian Military 

Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya,” Marshall 

Center Papers, No. 2, July 20, 2000, p. 8.

17. For a detailed discussion of the politics involved with this 

Concept, see David J. Betz, Civil-Military Relations in Russia and 

Eastern Europe, London, UK: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p. 61.

18. See “New Military Doctrine Still Includes Nuclear First 

Strike,” The Russia Journal, May 12, 1999, available from www.

therussiajournal.com.index.htm?cat’4&type’3”obj’529.

19. A copy of the 2000 document is as Document, available 

from www.scrf.gov.ru.April.

20. Fedorov, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, p. 3.

21. Ibid.

22. Alexei Arbatov, “The Dilemma of Military Policy in Russia,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 6, 2000, available from ng.ru/

printed/ideas/2000-11-16/8_dilemma.html. 

23. Ibid., p. 2.

24. Federov, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, p. 6.

25. Alexandr Golts, Armiya rossi: 11 poteryannykh let, Moscow, 

Russia: Zakharov, 2004, p. 139.

26. Victor I. Esin, “The Military Reform in the Russian Federation: Problems, Decisions and Prospects,” in Federov and Nygren, 

p. 102.

27. Christopher Locksley, “Concept, Algorithm, Indecision: 

Why Military Reform Has Failed in Russia since 1992,” Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2001, p. 16.
29

28. “Hope Glimmers for Reform,” Moscow Times, March 29, 

2001, Johnson’s List, March 29, 2001.

29. “Development Strategy of the Armed Forces Defined,” 

Military News Bulletin, No. 8, August 2000.

30. “Federalnyi zakon ob oborone” April 24, 1996, available from 

www.mil.ru/articles/articles3863.shtml. 

31. International Institute For Strategic Studies, The Military 

Balance, 1999-2000, London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999, 

p. 111. 

32. Arms Control Association, “Russia Deploys Six Topol-M 

Long-Range Missiles,” January/February 2001.

33. “Development of Russia’s Nuclear Forces Said Threatened by Lack of Funding,” Agentstvo Voynnykh Novostey, October 

29, 2004, available from FBIS SOV, November 2, 2004.

34. “Stenograficheskiy otchet o soveshchanii rukovodyashchego 

sostave Vooruzhennykh Sil,” available from president.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/11/09/2022_trebe6337tyre63381_969885.shtml.

35. “Russia’s Rearming Too Slow to Compete,” Interfax, November 11, 2005, available from FBIS SOV, November 12, 2005.

36. “Russia Tests Missile Able to Penetrate Defense as Putin 

Warns of European Powder Keg,” Space War, May 29, 2007.

37. “Defense Minister Presents New Strategic Missile,” RFE/

RL Report, September 29, 2005.

38. “Russian Navy Official Confirms Failure of Bulava Missile 

System,” Interfax, October 25, 2006.

39. See “The ‘Bulava’ Should Be Put in the Kremlin: It Does 

Not Fly,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets Online, August 2, 2009, available from FBIS SOV, August 4, 2009.

40. Ibid.

41. “Ministry of Defense has Written Latest Concept,” Nezavi-
30

simoye vooyennoye obozreinye, August 19, 2008, available from FBIS 

SOV, August 20, 2008.

42. “Programmed for Failure,” Pravda-KPRF, February 2, 

2009.

43. “Navy Commander in Chief: There’s Nothing with which 

to Replace the Bulava,” Grani.ru, December 16, 2009, available 

from FBIS SOV, December 17, 2009.

44. “Three-Way Error Method,” Kommersant Online, May 25, 

2010, available from FBIS SOV, May 26, 2010.

45. Ibid.

46. “Commander of Long-Range Aviation Outlines Future 

Plans,” RIA-Novosti, December 21, 2005, available from FBIS SOV, 

December 22, 2005.

47. “Russian Air Force Getting New Bombers, Fighters and 

Helicopters,” Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, June 17, 2006, available from FBIS SOV, June 18, 2006.

48. “Strategic Aviation Maintain Formation! Supersonic Tu160s Over the Ocean Broke Away from NATO Interceptors,” Argumenty Nedeli Online, May 10, 2010, available from FBIS SOV, 

May 11, 2010.

49. “Russian General Calls for Drafting New National Security Doctrine,” Interfax, April 17, 2003, available from FBIS SOV, 

April 18, 2003. 

50. “Putin on Preemption” AFP, available from Johnson’s 

List, October 9, 2003. 

51. “True Military Reforms are Entirely Up to the President,” 

Novye Izvestiya, April 6, 2004, available from Johnson’s List, April 

6, 2004.

52. “General Gareyev Says Russia Changing its Military Doctrine,” RIA-Novosti, January 8, 2007, available from FBIS SOV, 

January 8, 2007.
31

53. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 

2010,” available from www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010.

54. Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine: An 

Exercise in Public Relations,” February 8, 2010, available from russiamil.wordpress.com/2010/02/08/russias-new-military-doc. 

55. “Eight Years of Falling Behind and Weakening,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 27, February 13, 2008, available from FBIS SOV, 

February 14, 2008.

56. “Sword of the Empire,” Zavtra, October 5, 2008, available 

from FBIS SOV, October 6, 2008.

57. Ibid.

58. “Russian General Outlines Plan to Supply Army with 

New Armored Equipment,” Interfax, November 15, 2008, available from FBIS SOV, November 16, 2008.

59. “National Security Priorities: Improving Legislative Support for Military Organizational Development,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, June 20, 2009, available from FBIS SOV, June 

21, 2009.

60. “Russian Military Refuses to Buy Russian Army’s Inferior 

to Foreign Counterparts,” Interfax, April 19, 2010, available from 

FBIS SOV, April 22, 2010.

61. “Ultimatum to Defense Industry: The Russian Army 

Has Already Been Forced to Purchase Weapons form Overseas 

Firms,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 11, 2010, available from FBIS 

SOV, April 12, 2010.

33

CHAPTER 2

RUSSIA’S CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES:

REFORM AND NUCLEAR POSTURE TO 2020

Roger N. McDermott

Although Russian defense reform was already in 

its advanced planning stages prior to August 2008, the 

Russia-Georgia war served to facilitate launching the 

new effort to reform and modernize the conventional 

armed forces. This reform, repackaged as the “new 

look,” was not only ambitious in its scope and aims 

but would, if implemented, fundamentally transform 

the Russian military. Formally announced in October 2008, with the administrative or organizational 

elements rapidly carried out throughout 2009, and 

progressing towards achieving key targets by 2012, 

Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov’s reforms have 

revealed contradictions and unforeseen challenges, 

while the resulting corrective processes exposed a 

degree of reconceptualization.1

 The delicate balance 

achieved in avoiding the reform being undermined, 

either through institutional inertia or until now largely 

ineffective or at times irrationally-inspired critics, will 

continue until these issues are resolved; most likely, 

not before 2012.2

SERDYUKOV’S REFORM

On October 14, 2008, after leaks about the reform 

agenda and a period of reflecting on the operational 

lessons of the campaign in Georgia, Serdyukov briefed 

the defense ministry collegium in closed session. Viktor Zavarzin, the Head of the Duma’s Defense Com-
34

mittee, and Viktor Ozerov, the Head of the Defense 

and Security Committee of the Federal Council, were 

reportedly not permitted to attend.3 As the agenda 

emerged, Viktor Ilyukhin, a member of the State 

Duma, said its success would largely depend upon 

developing improved social conditions for servicemen, procuring modern weapons, and enhancing the 

manageability and discipline of the troops. Aleksandr 

Vladimirov, the Vice-President of the College of Military Experts, advocated developing new programs 

and styles of teaching officers aimed at producing a 

generation of officers with a deep understanding of 

geopolitics and global trends.4

 The trouble is that few 

understood the agenda precisely, which often resulted in criticism not really matching what was unfolding, or focusing upon one aspect at the expense of the 

broader picture.

Serdyukov secured the formal approval of the collegium, briefing them on Perspektivny oblik Vooruzhennykh Sil RF i pervoocherednye mery po ego formirovaniu 

na 2009-2020 gody (The Future Outlook of the Russian 

Federation Armed Forces and Priorities for its Creation 

in the period 2009-2020). At its heart, the reform concept meant the abandonment of the mass mobilization principle that had served the interests of the state 

since the 19th century reforms conducted by Dmitry 

Milyutin. This being the case, it would no longer make 

sense to argue that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) posed any military threat to Russia that required mobilization. That controversy was 

well-concealed beneath plans to downsize, or more 

accurately “streamline,” the officer corps.5

In Orenburg on September 26, 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev met with the commanders of 

military districts, outlined the reasons for reforming 
35

the armed forces, and referred to five decisive factors 

in military development.6 These were:

1. Improving the organization and structure of the 

forces by converting all divisions and brigades to permanent readiness brigades, abolishing the mass mobilization principle and abandoning the division-based 

system.

2. Enhancing the overall efficiency of command 

and control (C2

) (later interpreted as opting for a 

three-tiered structure: operational command-military 

district-brigade). 

3. Improving the personnel training system, including military education and military science. 

4. Equipping the armed forces with the latest 

weapon systems and intelligence assets, primarily 

high-technology, in order to “achieve air superiority, 

deliver precision strikes on ground and maritime targets, and ensure operational force deployment.”

5. Improving the social status of military personnel, including pay and allowances, housing, and everyday living conditions as well as a broad range of 

support packages.7

Careful analysis of the structure of foreign, including NATO, militaries had convinced the reformers to adopt an officer to enlisted personnel ratio of 

1:15. The pre-reform 355,000 officer positions would 

thus be pared back to only 150,000 and new demands 

would be placed on these officers.8 As not all positions 

were filled, the planning envisaged shedding 205,000 

officer posts by 2012 in order to optimize the system 

by addressing its “top heavy” features that resulted 

in having more colonels and lieutenant-colonels than 

junior officers.9

 The officer reductions were severe: the 

number of serving generals was to be reduced from 
36

1,107 as of September 1, 2008, to 886 by 2012. Colonel 

posts were slashed from 25,665 to 9,114; majors from 

99,550 to 25,000; and captains from 90,000 to 40,000. 

The only increase was to affect lieutenants, increasing 

from 50,000 to 60,000. In an interview with Rossiya TV

in March 2010, Serdyukov explained that another 3 

years were required, and he reported that 67,000 officers had been dismissed from service in 2009.10 If that 

figure was reliable, they were approximately 50,000 

away from the set target by the spring of 2010 (allowing for shedding the 2-year officers) and on course to 

complete the downsizing by 2012. However, some defense officials questioned whether 15 percent was the 

correct target and even suggested further paring back 

the officer corps to 9 percent of the overall manning 

structure.11

Upon completion, the “new look” would abandon 

the traditional division-based system and replace it 

with a brigade-based structure geared towards maneuverability. Cadre units were to be jettisoned and 

in their place only “permanent readiness” formations 

would remain. Although the transformation impacted 

on the air force and navy, the greatest impact was on 

the ground forces, with 85 brigades formed in 2009 

and divisions disbanded, while their pre-reform total 

of 1,890 units was earmarked for reduction to only 

172 units and formations. In the air force, which converted to a squadron-based system, only 180 of the 340 

units would remain; while the navy was scheduled 

to move from 240 units to 123. The Strategic Rocket 

Forces (SRF) (Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya [RVSN]) were to be streamlined from 12 to 

8 divisions. The airborne forces (Vozdushno Desantnye 

Voyska [VDV]) were reduced from 6 to 5 and faced a 

brigade-based restructuring, an indication of a one-
37

size-fits-all approach, although this was later successfully resisted by the VDV, despite the fact that it had 

always deployed at sub-divisional level with a brigade headquarters in its recent combat history.12 The 

air force had to shed 50,000 positions,13 or around 30 

percent of existing air force officer positions. In January 2009, Colonel-General Alexander Zelin, the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Voyenno-Vozdushnyye 

Sily (VVS) confirmed that the restructuring of the air 

force was underway: reforming 80 percent of units, 

among which 10 percent were to be disbanded, 22 

percent redeployed, and 68 percent would experience 

staff changes.14 The overall driving force in the transition to the brigade-based structure was to enhance the 

maneuverability of the ground forces.15

Serdyukov also targeted the navy. Initially this 

centered on relocating its headquarters to St. Petersburg, though the costly move was postponed in response to concern over the recession and opposition 

from serving admirals.16 In April 2009, the transfer 

process was “suspended”: of the main command’s 

800 staffers, only 20 favored the move.17 Rear Services 

were downsized, losing 40 percent of all officers, including a number of generals: 12,500 posts including 

5,600 officers and warrant officers. Between 23 to 40 

percent of all civilian posts were eliminated,18 leaving 

around 300 individuals in the Rear Services central 

apparatus.19 Many of its functions were civilianized, 

ranging from catering services, using civilian enterprises to provide fuel, to the provision of bathing and 

laundry services for the troops.20
38

Implementation.

Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Army-General 

Nikolai Makarov, a critical supportive figure in the 

reform, noted in December 2008 that to oversee and 

monitor the implementation of the reform, the General Staff sent its representatives into line units. Their 

sole task was to report on any instances of individuals seeking to sabotage the reform.21 During 2009, the 

structural reforms planned as part of Serdyukov’s 

reforms were largely successful, in what by any standard represented a significant organizational achievement. In the process the mass mobilization system, 

cadres, and divisions (apart from the VDV) all passed 

quietly into history. Officer downsizing proved more 

complex, with various figures cited at different times 

as it progressed. However, by late 2009, officially, 85 

permanent readiness brigades had been formed as 

well and the new three-tiered command and control 

system was in place. Medical staff lost 10,000 officer 

posts and 22 military hospitals were closed.22 Additionally, 80 percent of all lawyers were dismissed, and 

only 20 officer positions in military media organizations remained—preserving those working for the official defense ministry publication, Krasnaya Zvezda.

Military educational institutions were also earmarked 

for reduction from 65 to 10; three military educational 

centers, six academies, and one military university 

(streamlining the General Staff Academy), which 

was needed to serve a new role based on filling the 

brigades with effective commanders and promoting 

efficiency and higher standards in these institutions. 

Deputy Defense Minister Army-General Nikolay Pankov said most of the previous 65 institutions were 

only 60-70 percent full, and consequently they were 
39

combined.23 The prestigious General Staff Academy 

had its 17 chairs reduced to two (the art of war and 

national security and defense) and instead of its usual 

100-120 annual graduates, admitted only 16 students 

at the one-star level in 2009-10. These were taught a 

revised curriculum (for example, students no longer 

needed to study the division).24

It is also worth noting that, just as President Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are commonly 

referred to as the ruling “tandem,” so too in defense 

terms there is also an effective tandem: Serdyukov and 

Makarov. The latter had his service extended by presidential decree after reaching retirement age (60) in 

October 2009. This partnership between the first truly 

civilian Russian defense minister (Sergei Ivanov was a 

former Federal Security Service (Federal’naya Sluzhba 

Bezopasnosti) [FSB] officer) and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) may well be instrumental in promoting 

and conducting the reform, but it would be misleading to characterize the reform as being the work of a 

small or maverick elite: it simply could not be enacted 

without the active participation of many other actors; 

particularly the siloviki (military politicians).

Contradictions and Challenges.

Almost 2 years into the reform, numerous contradictions and challenges have surfaced. How can such 

high levels of readiness be achieved if the manning of 

such brigades is mostly based upon 12-month-service 

conscripts? Is this enough time to train and achieve 

necessary standards? There is no consensus within the 

defense ministry and General Staff on the precise nature of the manning system: a widespread recognition 

that the experiment with contract personnel has failed 
40

has not been followed by any obvious solution. There 

is disagreement over the length of conscript service, 

or, faced with a dwindling conscript pool, whether to 

increase the maximum age for service from 27 years of 

age to 30. 

Much has been made of extensive planning to 

introduce a new professional non-commissioned officer (NCO), with the first of these being trained in a 

new NCO training center at the elite Ryazan airborne 

school. The Commander of the VDV, LieutenantGeneral Vladimir Shamanov, was specifically tasked 

with inculcating the “spirit” of the VDV among these 

new NCOs. All were required to make parachute 

jumps and were meticulously trained in a course lasting 2 years and 10 months. Yet, despite the shortage 

of entrants to the center (it opened in December 2009 

with under 260 students), there are also contradictory 

statements concerning the underlying NCO concept: 

will these NCOs in the future take on the burden of 

commanding their units, and will their commanding officers come to terms with delegating authority? 

Addressing the defense ministry collegium on March 

5, 2010, President Medvedev said such NCOs in the 

future may take on command roles, which does not 

help to clarify their actual role. Medvedev stated that: 

“NCOs should be capable, if required, to substitute for 

officers of the primary level.”25

Another critical factor in measuring the success 

of Serdyukov’s reform will be the transformation of 

the officer corps. Yet, there is also no clear consensus on what model officer Russian defense planners 

have in mind, nor has there been any planning for 

how to achieve this. Instead, there are loosely framed 

aspirations calling for better types of officers. Reportedly, corruption persists within the officer corps. If 
41

there is a concerted effort to minimize or eliminate 

this scourge, how will the defense ministry conduct 

such a policy? Will an officer known for his competence and command abilities be sacked if he is found 

guilty of corruption? Indeed, the challenges facing 

the new look may be more rooted in manning issues 

such as these than in overcoming the problems associated with equipment and weapons modernization. Of 

course, these demands are emerging from the drive 

to modernize the inventory, as well as from efforts to 

upgrade command and control and adopt networkcentric warfare capabilities. Such a technological and 

information-based military environment will necessitate a significantly higher level of education to equip 

officers to meet such demanding challenges.

Surprisingly in this context, the defense ministry 

expended substantial energy and time on paper chasing. Serdyukov commissioned the drafting of a written 

code of honor. In November 2010, the 3rd All-Army 

Conference of army and navy officers was scheduled 

in Moscow to discuss formulating principles of corporate ethics among Russian officers in the longer-term 

look of the armed forces. That debate was encouraged 

within units. This is an important step, as Colonel (Retired) Vitaliy Shlykov believes that a code of corporate 

ethics will result in a fundamentally “new level” of 

professionalism within the Russian military. Nonetheless, the development of an ethos and a code of ethics 

among officers will take time to develop. It is a positive 

initiative to introduce a clear code for officers. However, as American officers say, they need to “walk the 

walk,” not simply be aware of a codified approach to 

their important role, but also to live and serve as an 

inspirational example to their men. Higher standards 

of justice and moral character are demanded from of-
42

ficers compared with society and those whom they 

lead, and the formulation of a codified document in 

Russia will no doubt set a benchmark against which 

officer standards can be outlined and measured, 

though the longer-term task is to encourage a constant 

striving for excellence among officers through a variety of mechanisms including incentives.26 As these 

issues are examined by Russian officers, all too often 

they regard society simply as a source of problems for 

the military, failing to appreciate just how much Russian society has changed over the past 20 years. This 

institutional myopia will likely persist until an effort 

is made to adapt any agreed officer model to reflect 

societal realities. 

An analysis of the reform in the period 2009-10 

highlights numerous obstacles and ongoing challenges:

• The downsizing of the Russian officer corps, 

planned well in advance of the current reforms, 

is being ruthlessly implemented. Its unintended 

consequence has been to reduce officer morale 

and place additional burdens on those serving.

• Senior defense and military officials have 

avoided offering precise detail on how the 

downsizing is being conducted, and consequently official statements and figures are often 

misleading and contradictory.

• Senior level officer rotations, dismissals, or retirements since the reform began reveal a systematic campaign to avoid the emergence of 

any coherent and organized anti-reform movement.

• The officer cuts were driven by the need to 

enhance C2, and improve the efficiency of the 

manning system and were rooted in a Russian 

analysis of the structure of western militaries.
43

• The General Staff wants to develop a new type 

of officer, more akin to their western counterparts, but presently lack any clearly defined 

model for officer development.

• Corruption and ill-discipline has increased 

since the reform began.

• The General Staff has identified that the mentality of serving officers is the main stumbling 

block in the path of officer reform.

• Russian operational-strategic exercises conducted since the reform was launched confirm 

that an unstated aim of the “new look” is the 

adoption of network-centric warfare capabilities.

• Elements of testing network-centric command, 

control, and communications (C3) systems established the need to adjust officer training and 

exposed design flaws in the new technology.

• Exercises, however, remained mostly focused 

on contact warfare, including both offensive 

and defensive operations.

• Officers are now being rapidly taught the principles and practical skills needed in order to 

transition towards network-centric warfare.

• Weaknesses in tactical level capabilities were 

also revealed and resulted in shifting the training focus in 2010 towards improving individual 

skills.

• The independence and capability of the “new 

look” brigades are likely to be impaired for 

many years by the slow rate of modernization 

and by further efforts to improve the manning 

system and reform the officer corps.27
44

Many of these challenges are unlikely to be overcome rapidly. In the case of officer reform for example, 

rather than achieving the leadership’s objectives (if 

clearly defined) by 2020, it is more realistic to expect 

the process (if pursued consistently) to take a generation. Perhaps one of the central challenges facing the 

reform relates to its undeclared aim, which is evident 

in military exercises and several aspects of officer 

training and procurement: the adoption of networkcentric warfare principles. 

While Russian military theorists have long written 

about and advocated network-centric warfare, this 

has intensified in two stages, with the first following 

an analysis of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in 2003, 

and, more recently, after the announcement of the 

“new look.” Although there is clearly theoretical understanding, even sophistication within this “debate,” 

it is equally accurate to designate the Russian military 

as currently being at the beginning of a very long road 

towards fully adopting such concepts and applying 

them within their structures. This is not, as some commentators or government officials appear inclined to 

believe, merely a question of technology, procuring 

the necessary high-technology assets including having enough GLObal’naya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS) satellites in orbit, but it also 

places demands on the culture of the armed forces extending into thought processes and attitudes.28

Russia is still in the early stages of adopting network-centric warfare, which will transition from the 

current contact-based capabilities towards being able 

to conduct noncontact operations. However, it is necessary to stress that there are reasons to suggest this 

will not happen as rapidly as the Russian leadership 

might like. This is not only linked to the slow rate of 
45

procurement (estimates within the Russian defense 

industry suggest that there is capacity to transfer five 

brigades per annum to automated C3 systems) but also 

raises important defense planning issues.29 If networkcentric warfare capabilities are the central aim of the 

reform, has this been adequately factored into current 

procurement plans? In other words is the state prioritizing the correct equipment and weapons systems? 

Officers receiving additional training during 2010 on 

how to issue orders using such automated technology 

reported that the software is overly complicated and 

the icons and other aspects of the systems need to be 

simplified. If officers are experiencing such user issues 

it raises fundamental questions about the end-user being a 12-month conscript. This seems to be more than 

mere teething issues.30

An additional, deeper, and more complex problem, 

or rather set of problems, relates to the division, disagreement, and misunderstanding that currently exists on how simple or complex these challenges really 

are and what it means for force structure and training. 

Reading Russian writers on network-centric warfare, 

it is quite striking how advanced and sophisticated 

their knowledge can be, revealing deep understanding of these developments in the U.S. and Chinese 

armed forces in particular. However, there are gaps 

and a lack of fully agreed approaches to overcoming 

such issues, which may well serve to complicate planning decisions. Here the risk is, to paraphrase the former Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, 

“we wanted the best, and ended up with what usually 

happens.” In a recent article in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye assessing the contours of this debate, 

Major-General Vasiliy Burenok, the Director of the 

Defense Ministry’s 46th Research and Development 
46

Institute, examined some of these inconsistencies. 

Noting that the model of network-centric warfare is 

formed of three grids (sensor, information, and combat) he then demonstrated the way that many theorists over-simplify the issues.31

He noted that some Russian military scientists attempt to prove that adopting network-centric warfare 

requires no changes to the plans to develop the armed 

forces and their weapons systems or combat manuals 

and instructions. Others argue precisely the opposite, 

and recommend procuring next generation armaments as well as mass-produced network-centric robotic technologies that are not even available in western armies. Burenok succinctly encapsulated the sheer 

complexity in forming armed forces oriented towards 

network-centric operations, since it entails seeking 

a synergy between human and technologically advanced factors. Yet, some theorists persist, in his view, 

in claiming that progress can be achieved by making a 

massive and sudden jump to introduce such new concepts and technology. He concludes that if there is no 

real understanding of how this type of war should be 

fought, then it is impossible to verbalize and formulate algorithms for conducting network-centric wars. 

The scientific understanding must precede software 

development and procurement decisions.32

After the transition to the new model of the armed 

forces, we have found ourselves at the beginning of 

the journey, because both the structure and the composition of the military formations have changed 

considerably (and continue to change).33 And what 

about information compatibility? It begins with the 

unified information space (standard classifications, 

vocabularies and databases of models, their tactical 

and technical performance characteristics and so on), 
47

whose creation in Russia progresses at a pace which 

requires considerable acceleration. And the situation 

with information transferability is far from the ideal 

altogether, given our mind-boggling diversity of automated systems and means of data transfer which were 

designed using different fundamental, design, and 

software principles.34

Resolving such issues and making appropriate 

refinements where needed also, as Burenok stressed, 

has implications for force structure and development. 

Thus, while the “new look” is marked by its switch 

from the system it displaced, it is not yet in its final 

form: it will continue to change in response to the demands of network-centric warfare models and how 

this is achieved practically and in a way that suits Russian requirements. 

Reconceptualization.

Considering the overall conceptual basis of 

Serdyukov’s reform revolving around restructuring 

and focusing on permanent readiness brigades with 

enhanced combat capability and combat readiness, it 

is worth tracing the formative intellectual influences 

that led to adopting and planning the new look. Of 

course, brigades were not “new” as such in the Russian military experience. They were, after all, actively 

utilized in mechanized formations during the Great 

Patriotic War, and, more recently, Soviet and Russian 

defense ministers had certainly toyed with the idea 

of either enhancing the number of brigades or even 

transitioning more fully to a brigade-based system. In 

October 1990, Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov signed 

a draft reform program envisaging such a transition, 

Pavel Grachev later planned to increase the number 
48

of brigades in the table of organization and equipment (TOE) and he, as well as Igor Sergeyev and Sergei Ivanov, considered forming operational-strategic 

commands. Nonetheless, the most striking feature of 

Serdyukov’s reforms is the extent to which they draw 

upon an analysis of foreign military experience. 

In April 2004, the Foreign and Defense Policy 

Council (SVOP) in Moscow published an important 

70-page study. Colonel (Retired) Vitaliy Shlykov 

headed the team of writers, including Alexei Arbatov, 

Alexander Belkin, Major-General (Retired) Vladimir 

Dvorkin, Sergei Karaganov, Mikhail Khodorenok, 

and Andrei Kokoshin.35 The report, Voyennoye stroitelstvo i moderinzatsiya Vooruzhennykh sil russiy (The Development and Modernization of the Russian Armed 

Forces), identified 15 traits present in the world’s leading militaries, though absent from the Russian armed 

forces, and recommended dramatically reducing the 

officer corps, abolishing warrant officers, training 

professional NCOs, introducing military police, and a 

number of other measures (later featuring in Serdyukov’s reform).36

This was referred to in a letter from Serdyukov to 

Sergei Karaganov, the Chairman of SVOP, on September 30, 2009:

The issues which are raised in the report are important during the period of profound reforms in the 

Russian Federation armed forces. In the process of the 

transition to the new model of the Russian Federation 

armed forces, the Russian defense ministry is currently 

implementing the most important measures which are proposed in the report, including the transition to the new TOE 

and establishment of the military formations, optimization 

of the command and control bodies, comprehensive technological rearmament of the troops (forces), improvement of 
49

the system of staffing, optimization of the system of military 

education, improvement of the system of mobilization planning and other measures.

37

Serdyukov’s letter also promised that the defense 

ministry planned to involve SVOP experts in future 

development and modernization of the Russian military in the broader, “consultative interaction within 

the framework of the activities of the Public Council of the Russian Federation defense ministry.”38 In 

April 2010, while attempting to explain why the defense ministry had suspended its plans to introduce a 

military police structure, Serdyukov interestingly said 

that additional time was required to “study foreign 

experience.”39

It is important to emphasize, however, that there 

was and is no Russian effort to copy western experience. Although this analysis is playing a formative 

role in the current reform, it is highly unlikely that the 

Russian armed forces will ever simply become a copy 

of any western model. Although the report cannot be 

seen as representing sole justification for aspects of the 

reform concept, it is nevertheless possible to discern 

many of its features and identify both the strength and 

weakness of the new look. For many western observers, the conceptual approach involved in Serdyukov’s 

reform makes sense precisely because it does draw 

upon western experience. As the reform concept was 

applied, the defense ministry and General Staff discovered weaknesses or unforeseen problems requiring correction or revision to the original concept. 

Absent from the original declaratory concept, for instance, was the intention recently outlined by the General Staff, to replace the existing six military districts 

with four enlarged operational-strategic commands 

(by December 1, 2010).
50

The performance of the brigades, for instance, during operational-strategic exercises in 2009 (Kavkaz, 

Ladoga, and Zapad 2009) revealed that they were 

heavy and cumbersome, consequently taking longer 

than anticipated to move over large distances. Such 

brigades, retaining the firepower of a division and in 

many cases as much heavy artillery, seemed more like 

small divisions. This “one size fits all” approach was 

unsustainable. Senior commanders publicly admitted 

that recalculation was required. Notably, the CINC 

of the Russian ground forces, Colonel-General Aleksandr Postnikov, appointed in January 2010, stated 

that further refinements were needed in order to make 

the forces more flexible and mobile. He particularly 

recommended that instead of maintaining such heavy 

brigades, three types were required: heavy, multirole, 

and light.40 Postnikov was effectively saying that a key 

feature of the reform, rapidly conducted throughout 

2009, now required refinement, or additional reform. 

For critics of this reform, this appeared to admit inadequate planning. Yet, the opposite is probably more 

accurate: it showed that the planners were implementing, assessing, re-evaluating, discussing, and where 

necessary making corrections, even if that involved 

altering key concepts. In other words, paradoxically, 

it confirms that a real and systemic reform is in progress with mistakes being made, adjustments demanded, and new challenges encountered. Postnikov, in 

fact, described the brigades as less than perfect, and 

said that the defense ministry was actively working 

to correct mistakes. He said the brigades were badly 

equipped (after all, at the start of the reform, there was 

only 10 percent modern weapons and equipment in 

the TOE) and characterized readiness levels as “low.”41

Postnikov was not isolated in holding such views, as 
51

an interview by the Deputy Defense Minister for Armament, Vladimir Popovkin, confirmed. On February 20, 2010, Popovkin told Ekho Moskvy that the new 

brigade structure had turned out to be “cumbersome, 

they are all heavy.” He added that “light brigades with 

light equipment” were needed in order to correct this 

imbalance. In turn, this would demand a diverse approach toward training, adopting new combat training models, and might also add to the procurement 

needs of the brigades.42

Such calls to further fine tune the brigade structure 

were also present in work by highly respected military theorists such as Major-General (Retired) Ivan 

Vorobyev, co-writing in Voyennaya Mysl, (along with 

Colonel Valeriy Kiselev) in the spring of 2010, advocating three brigade types based on enhancing their 

maneuverability. The co-authored article began with 

a brief overview of brigade development in the U.S. 

armed forces and then turned to the history of Soviet 

brigades during the Great Patriotic War. It highlighted the fact that deficiencies within the TOE can result 

in military defeat and noted in passing the five TOE 

reorganizations during the first 6 months of the Great 

Patriotic War. The article then recommended adopting three types of brigade (heavy, medium, and light) 

depending on the operational axis.43 They also stressed 

that the restructuring of the TOE was no panacea, and 

the effectiveness of these brigades would depend on 

several factors:

Much will depend on technical outfitting, the quality 

and combat effectiveness of arms and military equipment, brigade manning, the personnel’s proficiency 

and moral-psychological and combat qualities, materiel support, and above all the officers’ professional 

training, which cannot be improved overnight. Brigade 
52

employment will be effective when they are trained 

to preempt the enemy, deliver surprise attacks, and 

execute swift maneuvers, and when they have high 

protection and survivability.44

It is also worth highlighting in passing the way in 

which the authors utilized the legacy of World War II 

as a basis to advocate changing the TOE rather than 

retaining the pre-existing structures. The experience 

gained during the war, in their view, had exposed the 

inadequacies of the TOE and compelled its displacement in order to meet new requirements. Thus, Vorobyev and Kiselev centered their argument on the 

often unifying legacy of the Great Patriotic War and 

simultaneously advocated restructuring the TOE.45

CGS Makarov has already lamented the low quality of brigade commanders, saying that many of those 

appointed in 2009 have been sacked because they were 

simply not up to the task. If Vorobyev and Kiselev’s 

model were adopted, which would certainly contribute to mobility and maneuverability, it would actually result in the basic building block of the new look 

becoming the battalion rather than the brigade. Consequently, the training burden would expose deeper 

problems; since finding suitable brigade commanders 

is clearly proving difficult.

As the reform concept is reconceptualized, moving 

from a uniform brigade size towards perhaps three 

basic types and determining their mission type and 

operational utility, it is equally possible that the claim 

regarding permanent readiness brigades may also 

require adjustment. The likelihood is that in future 

there will be a stratified approach to readiness levels 

on differing strategic axes. Equally, these structures 

need to be optimized to suit the development and 
53

adoption of network-centric warfare capabilities, and 

as this is introduced and experience is gained, it may 

well elicit further adjustments. In short, having successfully abandoned the mass mobilization principle, 

jettisoning cadre units, and forming the new brigadebased structure, the leadership is now reviewing the 

reform concept itself in order to correct weaknesses 

discovered after assessing these new structures. The 

timescale to complete this process is likely to be between 2012 to 2016, while more significant challenges 

lie ahead in relation to developing the officer corps, 

educating and training brigade commanders, forming 

professional NCOs and modernizing the TOE. Despite 

the officially declared target of reaching a 70:30 ratio 

of modern equipment and weapons by 2020, progress 

to date has proved much slower than expected. Rather 

than the 9-11 percent modernization per annum, the 

rate appears to be closer to 2 percent. How will this 

mismatch be corrected? Will the defense ministry opt 

for more upgrades? Will there be a greater appetite 

for foreign procurement? Can the problems facing the 

Russian defense industry be overcome? 

Analyzing and assessing foreign military experience and calibrating these features into reform planning, however, will only take Russian defense reform 

so far. They may understand, often quite thoroughly, 

the principles involved, but without practical experience they will not appreciate why it works or exactly 

how. The reform processes could be cut short or facilitated by asking for foreign defense reform assistance, 

even though such a step is potentially controversial, 

especially if that assistance were to be provided by 

NATO or Alliance members, it is nonetheless possible 

at least in theory, and could form part of intensified 

trust building measures.
54

RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE 2010: 

“STRATEGIC DISCONNECT”

The long awaited new Russian military doctrine, 

first mooted by the then President Vladimir Putin in 

the spring of 2005 and intended to replace its previous version in 2000, was finally signed by President 

Medvedev on February 5, 2010.46 Although western 

and Russian analysts focused their speculation on the 

nuclear elements of the doctrine, there was no explicit 

move toward lowering the nuclear threshold, though 

as many noted there can be no certainty on the issue 

since further detail on the nuclear posture was contained a classified addendum (The Foundations of State 

Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020). The 

military doctrine, tactically released during the ongoing START negotiations and sandwiched between the 

publication of the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review and 

the 46th Munich Security Conference, appeared balanced, encapsulating a compromise between hawks 

and doves and really offering something in its text for 

everyone, avoiding being either too provocative or 

controversial. Little in its content fitted with the image 

of a “resurgent Russia.”47

Nonetheless, as many Russian analysts and commentators noted, the doctrine is remarkable for a 

number of less positive reasons. First, and perhaps 

most striking, it bears no resemblance to the new look 

armed forces. In fact, it is quite the opposite since it 

is almost entirely divergent from the actual ongoing 

military reform.48 The gap between official theory and 

practice is therefore staggering by any rational measurement. Moreover, the doctrine occasionally contradicts the May 2009 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 
55

even contains self-contradictory statements, offering 

little clarity on the nature of warfare or threats that 

the armed forces should be prepared to meet. Parts 

of its content simply make no sense whatsoever. One 

example of this confused approach, which exposes the 

dichotomy between the doctrine and Serdyukov’s military reform, can be demonstrated by the latter having 

abolished the mass mobilization principle as a result of 

the organizational transformation in the armed forces 

in 2009, while the former document mentions “mobilize” or “mobilization” more than 50 times. The 2000 

doctrine specified the role of the General Staff in terms 

of command and control, also referring to the function 

of the defense ministry and the military districts. All 

this has been jettisoned in the new doctrine and in its 

place there is a vacuum. The new doctrine notes the 

potential hazard posed by information warfare and 

the need for the state to possess the means to conduct 

such operations, yet information warfare is largely 

ignored in the doctrine, while its only counterpart 

(The Information Security Doctrine, 2000) now appears 

somewhat dated. The “balance,” if this was what was 

intended on the part of those drafting the doctrine, is 

in reality a sea of confusion, in which the military are 

tossed to and fro and any sense of strategy is left helplessly sinking. Long-term trends, clear guidance, or 

nuanced interpretation in this context must be treated 

cautiously and often with multiple caveats. 

The sense of strategic disconnect contained in the 

new military doctrine is perhaps better understood by 

examining certain features of its content coupled with 

how the document was formulated, noting which actors were involved, and finally linking the doctrine to 

the actual condition of the conventional armed forces.
56

The Search for the “New:” Defining “Dangers” and 

“Threats.”

The military doctrine takes account of its previous 2000 version as well as other strategic planning 

documents (Concept for the Long-Term Socioeconomic 

Development of the Russian Federation for the Period 

through 2020, National Security Strategy through 2020, 

and relevant provisions of the 2008 Russian Foreign 

Policy Concept and the Russian Federation Maritime Doctrine for the Period through 2020). In general terms, the 

doctrine appeared too loosely constructed, lacking 

specificity. This prompted Colonel-General (Retired) 

Leonid Ivashov to observe: “This doctrine can be used 

in military academies for seminars on the subject of 

how to compile such documents, but this doctrine has 

little to do with Russian reality.”49 However, the doctrine contained little that was fundamentally “new,” 

though there were shifts, text left unchanged since the 

2000 version, and aspects that failed to connect with 

changes in the strategic environment since 2000.50 Unlike the 2000 doctrine, the new military doctrine makes 

a crucial distinction between opasnosti (dangers) and 

ugrozy (threats) facing Russia. This allows Moscow to 

continue to designate NATO enlargement, as opposed 

to the existence of the Alliance per se, as a danger, rather than an imminent threat. In so doing, however, and 

by placing this as the primary “danger,” Moscow has 

signaled that the previously anti-western paradigm 

evolving within its doctrinal thinking persists, albeit 

in a slightly more muted manner.51 Allowing for the 

innovation of distinguishing the difference between 

dangers and threats, as well as the general less specific 

framing of language regarding the latter, it is worth 

noting the perception of the Russian security elite that 

the dangers facing the state have grown. 
57

To begin with, the doctrine defines how these terms 

are used: a military danger is “a state of interstate or 

intrastate relations characterized by an aggregate of 

factors that can, under certain conditions, lead to the 

emergence of a military threat.” Whereas a military 

threat is: 

a state of interstate or intrastate relations, characterized by the real possibility of the emergence of a military conflict between opposing sides, a high degree of 

readiness of some state (group of states) or separatist 

(terrorist) organizations for the use of military forces 

(violence with the use of weaponry).52

In other words, in certain situations the former 

may evolve into the latter more serious scenario.

Dangers and Threats.

These dangers are delineated into 11 points. Pole 

position, as already noted, is given to NATO (in 

the 2000 doctrine not specified, only referred to as a 

“bloc”), especially the aim of assigning global functions to the Alliance, both violating international law 

and moving relentlessly towards Russia’s borders by 

its expansion; attempts to destabilize individual states 

or regions, or undermine strategic stability; deployment or build-up of foreign troops on the territories 

or waters of states contiguous with Russia and its allies; creating and planning to deploy strategic missile 

defense systems to undermine global stability and 

nuclear parity, militarizing outer-space and the deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon 

systems; territorial claims on Russia or its allies and 

interference in their internal affairs; proliferation of 

weapons of masss destruction (WMD), missiles, and 

related technology, and the increase in nuclear weap-
58

on states; individual states violating international accords and noncompliance with existing treaties; the 

use of military force close to Russia in violation of the 

United Nations (UN) Charter or other norms of international law; the emergence of armed conflict and 

possible escalation of such conflicts on the territories 

of states close to Russia and its allies; the spread of 

international terrorism; and the emergence interfaith 

tension, international armed radical groups in areas 

adjacent to Russian borders and those of its allies, and 

the growth of separatism and religious extremism in 

various parts of the world. Internal dangers stem from 

efforts to compel change to the constitution; undermine the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity 

of the state; and disrupt the functioning of the organs 

of state power, state and military facilities, and the 

information infrastructure of Russia (Section II.8.a-k; 

9.a-c).53 The proliferation of WMD and the increase in 

the number of states with nuclear weapons as well as 

international terrorism, according to the military doctrine, pale in comparison with NATO.

As noted, the reference to NATO is not new. What 

is new is the way it is presented more exactly as a 

“danger,” which probably also reflects dissatisfaction 

with the lack of western interest to date in Medvedev’s European security architecture initiative. The 

second seems to be an insertion that fails to make clear 

to what it might refer, while the next appears a more 

nebulous variant on a similar statement in the previous doctrine. An additional new danger appears to 

relate not only to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) but 

also obliquely to U.S. “global strike” planning. Reference to territorial claims against Russia has been condensed in the new doctrine, since the old formula had 

an additional element concerning a multipolar world. 

The next two dangers were absent in the old doctrine: 
59

WMD proliferation and related technology and the 

violation of international treaties and agreements. 

The first of these could be explained by reference to 

North Korea and possibly Iran, while the latter seems 

linked to the abrogation of the 1972 ABM (antiballistic 

missile) Treaty and the collapse of the Conventional 

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The danger posed by 

the use of military force near Russia in violation of the 

UN Charter follows a similar formula used in the old 

doctrine. Finally, the references to interfaith tension 

and international armed radical groups must surely 

have Afghanistan in mind. Internal dangers relate to 

separatism and terrorism mainly in the North Caucasus, as well as possible attempts to penetrate information security.

The main military threats stem from a drastic deterioration in the (interstate) military-political situation resulting in escalation to the use of military force; 

impeding the functioning of command and control 

systems in the country; disrupting the functioning of 

the Strategic Rocket Forces, missile early warning systems, space-based monitoring systems, nuclear weapons storage facilities, and other potentially hazardous 

facilities; forming and training illegal armed formations on Russian territory or on the territory of its allies or contiguous state; demonstrations of military 

force during military exercises on the territories of 

states contiguous with Russia; and, finally, increased 

activity on the part of armed forces of individual states 

or group of states involving partial or complete mobilization and the transitioning of the states’ organs of 

state and command and control to wartime conditions 

(Section II.10.a-e).54

The first of these threats does not appear in the 2000 

doctrine, while the second follows the earlier formula 
60

almost verbatim. The third threat, though present in 

the old doctrine, seems to signal concern that an enemy may try to establish and train illegal armed formations on Russian territory. However, the fourth and 

fifth threats are new and, in terms of the latter, while 

the doctrine does not explicitly mention China, which 

is taboo in Russian security documents, it might reflect 

growing concern in Moscow over military exercises 

conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 

that appear to have rehearsed future Chinese military 

intervention in Russia and Central Asia.55 Thus, as the 

military doctrine outlines the dangers and threats facing the Russian state, these are often contradictory, 

give rise to questions concerning their order of importance, countermand other strategic planning documents such as the Foreign Policy Concept 2008 or the 

NSS 2009, and are so loosely framed as to appear nebulous. NATO is represented as a danger and its global 

functions decried, while the same doctrine advocates 

a much firmer version of Article 5 in relation to the 

Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization 

(CSTO) and, in its list of multilateral organizations 

with which to pursue cooperation, mentions NATO 

(albeit in last place after the CSTO, Commonwealth 

of Independent States [CIS], Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO] and the European Union 

[EU]) (Section III.19.e).56

Lengthy Gestation Period: Infighting, Military 

Reform and Other Factors.

The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 

on September 11, 2001 (9/11), followed by the global 

war on terrorism, and intervention in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, combined with the progress of the second 
61

Chechen war and instances of domestic terrorism in 

Russia such as the Nord Ost theater attack in Moscow 

in October 2002 or the Beslan school siege in September 

2004 appeared to necessitate revision of the military 

doctrine passed in 2000. Adjustment to the post-9/11 

security environment, enhanced for a time by Moscow’s willingness to pursue international counterterrorist cooperation, finally resulted in the then President Vladimir Putin ordering a new military doctrine 

in June 2005. That the gestation period for this new 

doctrine was so long, almost 5 years, requires some 

explanation. In seeking that bureaucratic insight, it is 

necessary to scrutinize, as far as possible, features of 

the drafting process to understand how the “balance” 

represented in the new doctrine was achieved and 

where the sensitivities were located.

On January 20, 2007, a consultative conference was 

held in Moscow to examine the issue of formulating a 

new military doctrine. Those attending the conference 

were representative of the bodies with vested interests 

in the military doctrine: the presidential staff, government, Duma, Federation Council, Security Council, 

Ministry of Defense, Interior Ministry, Emergencies 

Ministry, the Federal Security Service, Federal Protection Service, Academy of Sciences, and Academy of 

Military Sciences. In January 2008, the Academy of 

Military Sciences held an additional conference that 

also paid close attention to such issues. In December 

2008, more formal plans for a new military doctrine 

were announced. During a meeting of the Russian 

Security Council a working group was formed consisting of delegates from state bodies and civilian 

and military academic experts and led by the Deputy 

Secretary of the Security Council, Army-General Yuri 

Baluyevsky (former Chief of the General Staff). Colonel-General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn headed the defense 
62

ministry working group. Army-General Makhmut 

Gareev, President of the Academy of Military Sciences 

and one of the country’s foremost military theorists, 

also played a key role in drafting the doctrine. Thus, 

the most significant players leading the process shared 

a military background and probably brought military 

interests to the fore. What is remarkable is that the 

reporting on the drafting in 2007-08 bears a striking 

resemblance to the final content of the 2010 military 

doctrine.57

A key paper in the January 2007 conference entitled “Doctrinal Views of NATO on the Nature of 

Wars and on Security” presented by an unnamed 

Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) officer, reportedly stressed the issue of NATO expansion. Another 

paper, “The Role and Place of Strategic Nuclear Arms 

in Russia’s Military Doctrine,” asserted that the security of the Russian state is 90 percent dependent upon 

nuclear deterrence. Colonel-General Aleksandr Rukshin, the then Chief of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate, covered the organizational development and use of Russia’s armed forces. Papers 

were given in order of importance, with air and space 

defense placed above naval aspects of doctrine. Papers on international terrorism were therefore given 

less priority, in part since the armed forces saw this 

as a function of the interior ministry and intelligence 

services, while a paper on military education failed 

to reach the top 10. Yet, Baluyevsky emphasized that 

the main threat was hidden in the fact that the conduct of hostile information activity against Russia has 

incommensurately grown, the initiator of such activity appeared clear to all military chiefs assembled in 

the hall. Critically, following the conference, MajorGeneral (Retired) Vladimir Belous, Professor in the 

Academy of Military Sciences, said that he saw few 
63

differences between the military doctrine in 2000 and 

that being worked out:

There was no military doctrine in Soviet times, but 

there was a powerful army. The organizational work 

of the top was aimed at increasing the professional capabilities of the armed forces. Now in the post-Soviet 

period the Chief of the General Staff is motivated by 

the assessments of the Americans on the highest state 

of the Russian armed forces. Apparently he does not 

realize that this is said to a great extent in order to increase the Pentagon’s budget. And meanwhile the organizational work of the highest military circle degenerates into primitive paperwork, as if the paper itself 

will solve the problems of the armed forces.58

The die was largely cast then during 2007-08 and 

there were intermittent rumors that the new doctrine 

would be signed in the latter part of each year. The 

question arises, why was it delayed? Some analysts 

suggested that evaluating BMD, or the presidential 

transition from Putin to Medvedev, or indeed waiting 

to assess the outcome of the U.S. presidential election 

may have played some part in shelving the doctrine. 

However, the necessity for the new doctrine emerged 

more sharply after the Russia-Georgia war in August 

2008 and the launching of Serdyukov’s new look reforms in October 2008. For instance, the inclusion in 

the doctrine of the affirmation of the right to deploy 

troops abroad “to defend the interests of the Russian 

Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security,” directly follows Medvedev’s 

December 2008 (Section III.26) change to the law on 

defense permitting this type of intervention.59
64

Nuclear Posture and Redrafting.

Despite the reset in U.S.-Russian relations that 

largely took place in the fall of 2009 around the ongoing START talks, senior Russian security officials 

not only implied that consideration was being given 

to lowering the nuclear threshold, but also to the extension of nuclear deterrence to involve local conflicts. 

Although he was not intending to promote an image 

of continued conventional military weakness, Secretary of the Security Council and former Director of the 

FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, revealed details of changes to 

the draft military doctrine in relation to the country’s 

nuclear posture. In an interview with journalists in 

Novosibirsk on October 8, 2009, Patrushev signaled 

that the doctrine was being “fine-tuned,” and may include the right to use a “preventative nuclear strike.”60

He also stated that Moscow’s greatest priority was to 

“keep its nuclear state status” and that “conditions of 

the deployment of nuclear weapons” were corrected 

to allow their use “not only in global but also regional 

and even local conflicts.” He also said: “The conditions for the use of nuclear weapons to repel aggression with the use of conventional weaponry in largescale, but also in regional and even in a local war have 

been corrected. Moreover, in situations critical for national security, the inflicting of a preventive nuclear 

strike upon an aggressor is not excluded.” However, 

his meaning was clear, since during his interview he 

left little scope for doubt, using the word preventivnyy

(preventive) several times and only once using the 

term uprezhdayuschiy (preemptive).61 It is also important to note that General Baluyevsky provided tacit 

support for these comments, confirming on October 
65

15, 2009, that such revisions were being made to the 

draft doctrine.62 Such comments aroused trepidation 

even on the part of Russia’s closest allies.63

Russian commentators were also uneasy about 

Patrushev’s comments, though largely in agreement 

that despite Serdyukov’s reform agenda, it implied 

continued conventional weakness. Konstantin Sivkov, 

the Vice-President of the Academy of Geopolitical 

Problems, said that due to the serious problems in 

the armed forces, “Russia can ensure its national security and ward off military threats on the scale of 

local wars and above [regional and large-scale] only 

by recourse to the threat or direct use of nuclear weapons.”64 Aleksandr Pikayev, a government critic and a 

high-ranking member of the Russian Academy of Science, said that the planned shift in the new doctrine 

reflected conventional weakness and an admission 

that the armed forces simply were unable to carry out 

their “assigned missions.” Igor Korotchenko, a member of the Defense Ministry’s Public Council and the 

then editor of Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, said that 

the new doctrine had to “compensate for the degradation of the Russian armed forces,” adding that to 

preserve its great power status Russia “is ready to 

use nuclear weapons.”65 Some even suggested that the 

lack of progress in military reform had increased reliance upon nuclear weapons as the only possible way 

to deter aggression against Russia.66

Other officials and experts were more guarded 

in their assessments, linking any possible inclusion 

of Patrushev’s leaks in the new doctrine, once finalized, to progress in the START talks. An unnamed 

source in the presidential administration, for instance, 

told Vedomosti that the new doctrine was “still being 

worked out,” and the final decision would be left to 
66

Medvedev.67 Although much of the doctrine had already been drafted, it appears on closer examination 

that some redrafting occurred following the meeting 

between Obama and Medvedev in Moscow on July 7, 

2009, and that these revisions were further affected by 

the ongoing START negotiations. In February 2009, 

Serdyukov claimed the new doctrine would be ready 

for signing in September 2009, while later in the same 

month CGS Makarov explained that doctrine had been 

“worked out” and “will remain in its current form.”68

By May 2009, Colonel-General (Retired) Vladimir 

Karabushin, the Vice-President of the Academy of 

Military Sciences, said the new doctrine would receive 

Medvedev’s signature in early August.69 Nonetheless, 

in early August Patrushev, far from implying imminent signature, said that in fact “substantial revisions” 

were made and claimed that the latest draft bore little 

resemblance to the earlier one. It is likely that the point 

of neuralgia and disagreement related to the nuclear 

issue.70

The abandonment of the mass mobilization system 

and transition from the division-based structure in 

the ground forces to the brigade-based replacement, 

implemented rapidly throughout 2009 meant the doctrine could only realistically be signed at the end of 

that year.71 As that organizational transition occurred 

and the new brigades were tested in operational-strategic exercises in 2009 (Kavkaz, Ladoga, and Zapad 

2009), the General Staff had to contend with convincing skeptics that the new look may result in lowering 

readiness levels. That in turn led to the hawks pushing the nuclear threshold and preemptive strike issues 

onto the agenda, while the General Staff leadership attempted to portray the new brigades as more combat 

capable and combat ready.72 Despite the public claims 
67

that the conventional transformation had resulted in 

achieving the capability to deploy brigades within “1 

hour,” it seems that a tenuous consensus was reached 

amounting to recognition that the reforms had not 

damaged readiness levels (which were very low prior 

to launching Serdyukov’s reform).73 An additional 

area of widespread disagreement related to abandoning Russia’s traditional self-reliance on its defense 

industry for its procurement needs. The admission in 

September 2009 that talks were underway between 

Moscow and Paris on the possible procurement of the 

Mistral class amphibious assault ship brought the controversy over seeking foreign armaments and equipment to the fore and this internal tussle most likely 

carried over into the issue of finalizing the military 

doctrine.74 The reformers also knew the draft paid 

scant regard to the new look and had to brace themselves to press ahead with the reform despite the impending publication of a doctrine that seems at odds 

with the agenda. 

While nuclear preemption and lowering the threshold was clearly on the agenda, an event in early December 2009 in Moscow may well have proven to be 

an opportunity to move a voice of reason center stage. 

On December 8, 2009, an assembly of the Academy 

of Military Sciences held in Moscow examined urgent 

problems in the development of military science and 

improving the country’s defense. In the presence of 

many of the military top brass, the keynote speech was 

given by the President of the Academy, Army-General 

(Retired) Makhmut Gareev. His wide-ranging speech 

covered the situation in Afghanistan, the expansion of 

NATO, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, transnational threats, and changes in the strategic environment. 

Gareev said that insufficient attention was given to 
68

identifying the intentions and forecasting the practical 

actions of numerous international and transnational 

forces, particularly the western think tanks producing 

closed work for government. “This is why many important processes end up outside our field of view,” 

he asserted. However, he noted forms of opposition, 

economic, information-based, and psychological, having a substantial impact on the nature of warfare and 

the development and training of armed forces. Stressing that nuclear weapons remain the most important 

and reliable means to ensure the security of the Russian state, he said that with the nature of new threats 

nuclear weapons could not be regarded in absolute 

terms. Gareev noted:

Having a mindset that Russia’s security is guaranteed 

as long as there are nuclear weapons do not conform 

fully to the new realities. We know the Soviet Union 

had nuclear weapons, but nuclear weapons remain 

and there is no union state.75

Moreover, he emphasized that such weapons cannot be general-purpose, stressing their use is futile 

in local situations such as Chechnya or to neutralize economic and information threats or all types of 

subversive activity. Drawing on the experience of the 

Great Patriotic War, Gareev said it was time to assess 

the merits of the decisive importance not only of the 

initial period of war, but above all the first strategic 

strike. Reminding his audience of the difficulties the 

Red Army faced in the first few months following the 

German invasion in 1941, then referring to more recent 

conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia (1991 and 

1999 respectively), he said in modern conditions it is 

impossible to withstand a massive first strike. “Therefore, as in the fight against terrorism, more aggressive 
69

actions are needed and preemptive actions as well, if 

necessary,” he concluded.76 His appeal seemed less 

nuclear than it did conventional. An aspect later taken 

up in April 2010 by Andrei Kokoshin, a member of the 

Russian Academy of Sciences and former member of 

the Security Council: “The new Russian-U.S. treaty on 

strategic offensive armaments lays the basis for strategic stability for the foreseeable future. However, this is 

not an automatically achievable objective. It can only 

be achieved if Russia continues to carry out a whole 

range of improvements to its strategic forces.” He explained that Russia should keep its strategic forces secure against attacks and increase their capacity to penetrate any potential missile defense, adding: “Strategic 

stability will largely depend on precision weapons 

with conventional warheads, to which a great deal of 

attention should also be paid, providing Russia with 

a potential for non-nuclear or pre-nuclear deterrence.”77

“The latter by the way, is prescribed by the new Russian military doctrine,” he said.78 His reference to prenuclear deterrence drew upon Gareev’s thinking, but it 

is still a long way off, as the conventional modernization of the Russian armed forces faces technological 

and defense industry-related challenges. In any case, 

Gareev’s was a voice of reason: nuclear weapons cannot be considered as general-purpose options.

Patrushev’s leaks were ultimately absent from the 

new military doctrine which, if anything, assumes a 

more cautious stance on the nuclear issue than did its 

previous version in 2000. There is no commitment to 

preventive or preemptive strikes, or reference to local 

conflict. Its comment on the issue, briefer than in 2000, 

describes nuclear use “when the very existence of the 

state is under threat,” instead of the earlier: “in situations critical to the national security of the Russian 

Federation.”(Section III.22).79
70

The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize 

nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction 

against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the 

use of conventional weapons when the very existence 

of the state is under threat. (Section III.22).80

As if to stress still further the level of extreme caution involved, the doctrine also adds: “The decision 

to utilize nuclear weapons is made by the Russian 

Federation president.” Its inclusion seems calibrated 

to remind the military that the decision rests with the 

supreme political leadership. Despite the controversy 

in the fall of 2009, the doctrine did not adopt a more 

aggressive nuclear posture, suggesting that a struggle 

occurred in the hiatus resulting in the victory of more 

moderate forces in the Russian security elite.81 While 

there was a fudge on the issue of the new look, on 

the nuclear issue and foreign procurement the hawks 

were plucked and their hopes for rapid feather growth 

lay in questioning whether the new look will prove 

successful in the future and in clinging dogmatically 

to nuclear deterrence. Paradoxically, the new doctrine 

subsequently allowed slightly more scope to those 

advocating reform to openly discuss the “teething” 

problems of the new look armed forces.

PANDORA’S BOX AND GROWING 

INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC CONFUSION

This uneasy consensus reflected in the new military doctrine, which appears weighed in favor of old 

approaches, manifests itself in a curious way in the 

country’s nuclear posture. Military justification for 
71

such reluctance to reduce or eliminate Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) is less rooted in strategic 

deterrence capabilities than either Russian politicians 

or experts admit. The Defense Ministry’s 12th Main 

Directorate (Glavnoye Upravleniye Ministerstvo Oborony—GUMO) tasked with responsibility for nuclear 

weapons, maintains that such weapons are needed in 

the Kola Peninsula at naval facilities. Equally, it is fair 

to say that within the Russian armed forces, the navy 

is the main advocate of maintaining these capabilities, 

since they are considered as a necessary part of confronting the U.S. Navy in any conflict. In August 2009, 

the naval main staff indicated that the role of TNW 

was set to expand on attack nuclear submarines for 

that very reason.82 GUMO and the uniformed armed 

forces, however, would place much greater currency 

upon long-range systems, rather than on tactical 

weapons when attempting to relate nuclear strategy 

to actual military planning. As the Russian state seeks 

to update and modernize its strategic nuclear forces 

by 2020, many are expressing skepticism that this will 

be fully implemented, not only owing to budgetary 

setbacks, but also due to the ongoing design problems 

experienced in connection with the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Nevertheless, 

the political inertia and sensitivity surrounding the issue of nonstrategic weapons has long resonance after 

previous futile efforts to make progress on the issue. 

While many have questioned the military value of 

TNW, a belief in such military value most certainly 

persists in the Russian strategic context, but primarily 

in relation to China. This is due to several factors all 

linked to Russian conventional weakness vis-à-vis the 

PLA. In the first instance, in any military conflict the 

Russian VVS cannot guarantee air superiority against 
72

the Chinese. Moreover, they do not possess sensorfused cluster munitions, though in theory their surface to surface missiles (SSM’s) could deliver cluster 

munitions depending on whether the missile troops 

remained intact long enough. Faced with an advancing PLA division or divisions, early use of TNW would 

present a viable option.

In February 2010, Aleksey Arbatov, the Head of 

the Moscow-based World Economics and International Relations Institute of the Center for International 

Security, explained that such weapons are for Moscow, “the chief guarantee for maintaining a balance of 

forces with the United States,” adding: “Considering 

the colossal U.S. superiority in conventional weapons 

and the growing lag above all in delivery vehicles of 

the strategic forces, the role of TNW only grows as an 

instrument of foreign policy.” Yet, the military significance of the tactical weapons is far eclipsed by the issue 

of how to verify and monitor any binding joint reductions, since, as he admits, this is in order of magnitude 

much more complex than any reduction in strategic 

nuclear forces. “Technically it is practically impossible 

to verify a reduction,” he suggested. “While intercontinental missiles simply can be destroyed, you cannot 

do it so simply with dual-purpose delivery systems,” 

Arbatov believes, pointing out that frontal aviation artillery and the navy can be equipped with such capabilities, but monitoring their storage facilities would 

be “unprecedented.”83

Colonel-General (Retired) Viktor Yesin, a former 

Chief of the Main Staff of the RVSN, linking recent assurances over U.S. BMD plans with the possible future 

participation of Russia, expressed the need for caution 

on the part of Moscow: 
73

When the issue is national security, attention must be 

given to the capabilities of the arms system being developed and not to assurances, which can change in 1 

hour. Moscow should not fall into the same trap that 

it fell into in the past when the West promised that, 

after the unification of Germany, NATO would not 

advance to the East.84

Such skepticism, distrust, and outright opposition to 

cooperation with the United States or NATO in the 

areas traditionally featuring in Russian anti-western 

foreign policy rhetoric is more pronounced in the 

discussion on TNW. Any sense that such discussions 

may serve to benefit Russian security is at best a minority view. While its U.S. and European advocates 

appear to suggest that the reduction of U.S. TNW 

based in Europe would result in strong pressure on 

Moscow to reciprocate, Russian experts adopt a more 

nuanced stance, partly based on attacking western 

thinking or in pointing out the contradictions in the 

strategic thinking at play. Major-General (Retired) 

Vladimir Dvorkin, a senior researcher at the Institute 

of World Economy and International Relations of the 

Russian Academy of Sciences,85 recently encapsulated 

that approach by noting that Russia need not respond 

to any future withdrawal of such weapons from Europe, since, as he suggested, this would take the form 

of a unilateral action, and Russia has no such weapons 

deployed beyond its territory. Only after a unilateral 

withdrawal of U.S. TNW from Europe could bilateral 

talks commence between Moscow and Washington 

aimed at a balanced reduction of these weapons. As 

Dvorkin stated in what could only have been a passing reference to the China factor, “This does not mean 

that we must achieve the same ceilings (that is, the 

same levels of TNW), since, in comparison with the 
74

United States, Russia is in a different regional situation.” Yesin also supports such a position, arguing 

that Moscow must set as a pre-condition to any talks, 

that all strategic and TNW must be located exclusively 

on the national territories of those states possessing 

them.86 Dvorkin implied that any policy designed to 

“place the onus on Russia” would be doomed from 

the outset.

On April 21, 2010, prior to traveling to Washington 

for talks on a range of security issues, CGS General 

Makarov indicated that this represents official policy, 

stating that any future negotiation must be preceded 

by withdrawing U.S. weapons from Europe. He also 

argued that given the conventional imbalance in Europe between NATO and Russian forces, including 

precision weapons, TNW play an important role for 

Russia.87

Due to the lack of official transparency on these 

weapons, estimates as to the precise numbers in the 

Russian inventory vary widely from 2,000 to 6,000, 

with the lower figure concentrated more on deployed 

weapons, while others are stored. One estimate claimed 

the ground forces still have access to more than 1,100 

tactical warheads with more than 2,200 available for 

naval deployment. By 2007, GUMO reported that all 

tactical weapons reductions among those assigned to 

the ground forces had been completed.88 In late 2003, 

senior Russian military officials suggested that such 

weapons were needed to counter possible development of new types of U.S. weapons, and in late 2008, 

CGS Makarov said these were required as long as 

the European continent was unstable and so heavily 

armed. Sergei Karaganov, on the basis of available 

reports commented: “According to unofficial information (we usually do not provide official informa-
75

tion), Russia has 5,400 of these warheads, 2,000 are in 

a combat-ready state, and the majority of them are in 

Europe.”89

Hawkish members of the Russian security elite 

tend to unite around the idea that it is too early to 

begin to discuss the tactical nuclear issue. On March 

5, 2010, addressing a nonproliferation conference in 

Moscow dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Army-General 

Yuri Baluyevsky, Deputy-Secretary of the Russian Security Council and former CGS, said that such talks 

could begin, but only after the United States withdrew such weapons from Europe, stressing the United 

States is unique in being only country that has TNW 

on the territories of other states. Baluyevsky stressed 

that “American tactical nuclear armaments in Europe 

are strategic for Russia because their delivery vehicles 

have a small distance to cover.”90 Baluyevsky also reacted negatively to the shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine, 

saying that it was rooted in the growing capability of its 

high-precision strike systems, and echoed the concern 

of other Russian military officials about placing conventional warheads on strategic delivery systems.91 In 

October 2009, Lieutenant-General Andrei Shvaichenko, Commander of the RVSN, expressed deep concern 

that international security might be damaged by the 

formation of the U.S. Global Strike Command. He said 

that as conceived, strikes could be launched carrying 

a nuclear or conventional payload, and he noted that 

no detection system was capable of distinguishing the 

type of warhead after its launch. The state targeted 

by such a strike would need to evaluate the degree 

of threat and appropriate retaliatory measures to be 

taken, he said. “In the short time span involved, the 

response will be quite predictable, which could push 
76

mankind to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe,” the 

general explained.92

Other aspects of Moscow’s attitude towards the 

issue of reducing TNW appear entirely unrealistic. 

In early April 2010, Lieutenant-General Yevgeny Buzhinsky, the former Head of the Defense Ministry’s 

International Legal Department, said that Russia 

could begin such discussions only after first achieving 

conventional parity with the United States, including 

in relation to high-precision weapons. 

We should not start negotiations on the reduction of 

tactical nuclear armaments as long as we have disparity in conventional armaments, especially high-precision ones. Under these circumstances, tactical nuclear 

armaments are means of deterrence and any reductions will inevitably damage Russian security.93

Clearly, given the ongoing problems facing the Russian defense industry combined with the technology 

lag between its research and development compared 

to the United States, as well as the woefully inadequate level of modern equipment and weapons in 

the Russian TOE, such parity will prove impossible 

to achieve. But his assertion underscores a far deeper 

anxiety relating to long-term Russian conventional 

forces weaknesses that will prove to be a significant 

barrier among the security elites in placing the tactical 

nuclear reduction issue on the table. Buzhinsky went 

further than many experts. Referring to the precondition that the United States unilaterally withdraws its 

TNW from Europe prior to entering US-Russian talks, 

he added that all related infrastructure in Europe must 

be dismantled in order to rule out redeployment later.
77

Following the signing of the New START, Sergey 

Rogov, the Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences, United States, and Canada Institute, was interviewed in the defense ministry publication, Krasnaya 

Zvezda, on April 7, 2010. Like other Russian experts, 

Rogov broadly welcomed the new START and outlined a number of its features that suited Russian 

policy concerns. However, he went on to realistically 

assess the START breakthrough by highlighting a 

number of its weaknesses. His starting point was to 

explain that a balance of forces is not restricted to strategic nuclear arms and that the new treaty continues 

to preserve U.S. and NATO superiority over Russia 

in nuclear and conventional terms. Then he noted 

that the treaty fails to address Moscow’s concern that 

precision weapons being developed by the United 

States are not limited by the new START, which he 

highlighted as anomalous since such weapons systems as part of the global strike program might pose 

a threat to Russian strategic facilities. Moreover, since 

the number of Russian missiles capable of carrying a 

large quantity of warheads will be stood down in the 

future owing to aging, Rogov argued that the United 

States will maintain its superiority in return potential, 

though not at the same level as under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Continued work on 

BMD, while not representing an immediate issue for 

Moscow, will pose a potential problem in 15-20 years, 

which Rogov suggested demands the development of 

Russian countermeasures. Finally, he said that bilateral nuclear treaties must give way to a wider multilateral framework that takes account of the growth in 

the number of nuclear states.94
78

Tactical Nuclear Reduction Talks as a Risk to 

Russian Military Reform.

Sergey Karaganov, the Chairman of the Presidium 

of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, in an 

article published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta on April 23, 

2010, argued strongly against Russia entering such 

negotiations on the basis that they would serve to undermine Serdyukov’s military reform. Placing TNW 

on the agenda, in his view, would strengthen the hand 

of those opposed to the radical conventional reform 

underway in Russia, which he said was geared toward shifting these forces away from their traditional 

fixation on NATO toward enhancing their capabilities 

to deal with “more plausible threats and challenges.” 

Karaganov continued: 

Withdrawal of American TNW (token arsenals as they 

are) from Europe will weaken the U.S.-Europe link. A 

good deal of Europeans—and particularly in the socalled New European countries—will start clamoring 

for better defense from the mythical Russian leviathan.95

While noting that he also assumed a unilateral American withdrawal as a precursor to joining this process, 

he emphatically characterized it as a highly dangerous step leading to strategic confusion and what Karaganov viewed as opening Pandora’s Box: “Euphoric 

over the Prague treaty signing, so called experts insist 

on tactical nuclear arms reduction talks. Left to their 

own devices, they will open this Pandora’s Box in no 

time at all.”96 This was not the first time he used the 

Pandora’s Box argument, but here he was clearly signaling that the delicate balance that exists within the 

Russian defense and security elite over the current 
79

military reform would be upset by playing the tactical 

nuclear card, a balance reflected in the compromise 

that led to the new military doctrine in February 2010 

and one that appeared vulnerable as discussions continued in Moscow on the future shape of the manning 

system in the armed forces. Should this unpredictable 

process be unleashed, the likely key indicator that the 

opponents of military reform have gained the upper 

hand would be signaled by an increase in the term of 

conscript service from 1 year back to 2 years, representing political and psychological defeat for Serdyukov’s reform. 

The bedrock of Karaganov’s argument, however, 

is rooted in the traditionally sacrosanct position of 

nuclear weapons in Russian security strategy, which 

underlies his utter opposition to what he sees as the 

senseless and idealistic call for global zero in nuclear 

arms reduction advocated by the Obama administration. His assessment of Russia’s geopolitical position 

is bleak: with its modernization impaired by corruption. Russian security is guaranteed by its nuclear capability, which is also the main source of its political 

economic weight in the world. In this context, Karaganov believes that any move toward abandoning 

these weapons would prove suicidal for the Russian 

state. The only purpose arms control talks serve for 

Moscow, he claimed, is to build trust and transparency between the world powers, “This is all Russia 

needs arms control talks for.”97

Karaganov’s influential work in this area cannot 

be separated from wider strategic issues and areas 

of divergence within the complex and evolving U.S.-

Russian bilateral relationship. These include the precise nature and trajectory of the reset and how this is 

interpreted both in Washington and Moscow as well 
80

as among Alliance members, future BMD plans, Medvedev’s European security treaty initiative, and how 

the global zero concept is viewed by the Russian security elite. Karaganov has expressed skepticism over 

the meaning and objective content in the reset policy, 

openly questioned the administration’s plans to deploy BMD components in Bulgaria and Romania by 

2015, and has fiercely criticized global zero both in 

terms of the centrality of nuclear deterrence in Russian security policy and the contradictory posture adopted by its architects.98

Karaganov’s critique of global zero stemmed from 

his overview of how the concept was first outlined in 

January 2007 by the former U.S. Secretaries of State 

Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, former Senate 

Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, 

and former Secretary of Defense, William Perry. Despite initially supporting what he regarded more as 

an aspiration than a policy, Karaganov soon revised 

his stance, saying that mankind continued to need the 

nuclear Sword of Damocles.99 The movement had in effect been launched, and the aspiration was announced 

by U.S. President Barack Obama in Prague in April 

2009 and broadly welcomed by Medvedev and Putin. 

However, he then objected that in an article in January 2010, the four same authors called for increased 

spending to increase the reliability and effectiveness 

of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In his view, this shift reflected an acknowledgement that the U.S. nuclear 

capability had been underfinanced in recent years, 

as well as an admission that the nuclear proliferation 

genie had appeared. In typically Russian style, he delighted in the semblance of hypocrisy, suggested U.S. 

power faced a strategic crisis following its experience 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and made clear that if anyone 
81

expected the Kremlin to pursue global zero, they must 

be thinking centuries ahead.100 Washington’s strategic 

thinking was, in his assessment, becoming increasingly confused, ignoring that India, Pakistan, North 

Korea, and Israel had all joined the nuclear club. 

Rather than considering how to deal with the new 

geostrategic situation, the Americans preferred to philosophize such weapons out of existence, Karaganov 

argued while noting the massive imbalance in favor 

of the United States that global zero would achieve 

based on American technological advances in the use 

of high-precision conventional weapons. NATO’s intervention in the Balkans in 1999 and U.S. intervention in Iraq combined with the various attempts to site 

components of BMD in Central and Eastern Europe all 

featured in his assertion that a new European security 

treaty is required, perhaps more than one, and eventually a political-military alliance between Moscow 

and Washington or Russian membership in NATO.101

Finally, on the issue of TNW and their possible reduction he highlighted the glaring blunder in the appeal 

made by the Polish and Swedish Foreign Ministers, 

Radek Sikorski and Carl Bildt respectively, in their 

article in February 2010 which called on Russia to remove TNW from the Kola Peninsula and Kaliningrad 

Oblast, even though none were stationed in the latter. He ridiculed the whole concept, pointing out that 

withdrawing these weapons from European Russia 

would hardly help Moscow in its relations with Beijing.102

Europeanizing the Debate.

Within a short period, a response to the call for 

tactical nuclear reduction in Europe made by Sikorski and Bildt was the subject of a scathing demolition 
82

in Krasnaya Zvezda. Their proposal that Russia should 

withdraw its TNW from Kaliningrad was highlighted 

as not only politically incorrect, since a similar appeal 

was not directed towards the United States, but entirely flawed in as much as these weapons are not based 

there. The Kola Peninsula was treated differently, and 

here the author argued that such an appeal could only 

be considered if the United States eliminated its naval 

bases in San Diego or Norfolk. It further asserted that 

the United States, by basing these weapons on the territories of European allies, had violated the first and 

second articles of the NPT, and stressed that such articles must be followed without exception. The list of 

flaws in the Sikorski and Bildt hypotheses was extensive, and placed high value on the sovereign right of 

any state to freely deploy its armed forces in any way, 

place, or time on its territory. The proposal was described as ill-conceived and unfounded, as the author 

then proceeded to outline a plausible compromise:

Before the beginning of official discussions on this 

theme, Washington and Moscow must take the same 

starting position in the negotiations. [The United 

States must agree] to withdraw all of its TNW from the 

European continent and bring them back to its own 

territory. That is, it must do what Russia did 15 years 

ago.”103

During the 46th International Security Policy Conference in Munich, Germany, in February 2010, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, who led 

a 30-person strong Russian delegation, said that it 

was likely that following the signing of the follow-on 

START, Washington and Moscow would come under 

pressure to negotiate joint reduction of their tactical 

nuclear stockpiles. Ivanov expressed a similar position 
83

to that adopted in the Krasnaya Zvezda article: “But it 

should not be forgotten that our country has been 

dealing with this problem since the 1990s. We voluntarily reduced this arsenal, concentrated it on our own 

territory, removed it from the field, and warehoused it 

in special storage facilities.” In other words, Moscow 

has already assumed the moral high ground.104

Such themes were revisited in a March 2010 article 

by Viktor Ruchkin in Krasnaya Zvezda, emphasizing 

how Russia had withdrawn nuclear weapons from the 

territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this thesis, 

the onus was on the United States to reciprocate and 

follow this Russian model. “It is perfectly clear that 

the United States must unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw its TNW from Europe. That would realize the aspirations of the Europeans, who view those 

TNW as a threat to their security, and it would also 

correspond to the declared intentions of Washington 

to free the planet of nuclear weapons,” Ruchkin asserted. Nothing could be simpler: Washington must 

learn from the virtuous conduct of Russian nuclear 

policy.105 The same author claimed that, far from intending to withdraw these weapons from Europe, 

Washington instead planned to extend their service 

lives and modernize them. He provided various figures on the numbers of combat ready U.S. TNW based 

in Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, 

and Turkey which appeared incongruous in the context of the withdrawal of Russian weapons from former Soviet Republics. 

Consequently, for a range of reasons, Moscow 

views the tactical nuclear issue as mostly a process 

it would like, at least initially, to observe as unfolding between the United States and its European allies, 
84

fearing that, unless handled sensitively, it may exacerbate East European and Baltic clamor for greater 

defense against Russia, or provide an opportunity to 

further divide the United States and its allies in Europe. Reluctantly dragged into bilateral talks aimed at 

joint reduction of these weapons, Moscow would seek 

to prolong such discussions, at least until the organizational phase of its conventional reform is complete 

(2012 at the earliest), and thereafter would attempt to 

form linkages to other issues ranging from BMD and 

CFE to its advocating a new European security treaty.

Indeed, some Russian commentators portrayed 

the domestic German political dimension at play in 

pushing for the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons 

on German territory. Originally proposed in the fall 

of 2009 by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, the leader of the Free Democratic Party in the 

ruling coalition, who demanded such withdrawal in a 

separate paragraph in the coalition treaty with Angela 

Merkel’s Christian Democrats. Addressing the Munich 

Security Conference in February 2010, Westerwelle 

confirmed his intention to pursue the elimination of 

the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Germany by 2013 (the end 

of the ruling coalition’s period in office). It was also 

noted that the Free Democratic Party is ideologically 

opposed to nuclear energy in any form and advocate 

withdrawing German troops from Afghanistan and 

that Merkel most likely agreed to compromise on the 

issue of nuclear weapons in order to preserve the German presence in Afghanistan.106

While Russian analysts recognized that START 

III represented a key element within the reset policy 

and, more importantly, the only forum within which 

Moscow can hold discussions with Washington on an 

equal footing, this translated neither into confidence 
85

in extending such discussions to include TNW, nor an 

appetite to hold such talks in perpetuity. Fyodor Lukyankov, for instance, rightly characterized the April 8, 

2010, signing of START III as a political-military compromise allowing both sides to claim success without 

undermining the claims by either side, though he also 

placed the treaty in the category of the last of the Cold 

War model agreements, pursued by Washington as an 

instrument rather than for its intrinsic value or merit. 

That process, underway since the 1960s, had drawn 

to a close. A similar approach was unworkable in the 

realm of TNW, since it could “bring about the absurd 

remilitarization of the political debate in Europe, but 

will do nothing to create a stable security system 

there.”107

Policy Implications.

As the obsessional phrase in the Russian security 

lexicon has evolved from “star-wars,” to “missile 

defense,” so it is likely that we are already witnessing that progression to include over the course of the 

next decade “U.S. global strike,” and if compromise 

is reached on BMD or Russian concerns are allayed, 

the more pronounced the global strike phrase will become. This reflects sensitivity within the Russian security elite about future strategic parity, the potential 

for conventional capabilities in the hands of the U.S. 

Global Strike Command to strike anywhere globally, 

coupled with an acute awareness of the crisis in the 

domestic defense industry and possible downward 

spiral for the Russian economy.

A “straight” horse trading over TNW would most 

likely fail. Its potential appears more rooted in the 

policy being linked to a range of other issues as part 
86

of strategic engagement with Russia, but this would 

need to include an offer of assistance with conventional defense reform to assuage concerns on the part 

of some NATO members.

Thus far, Serdyukov’s reform agenda has been implemented rapidly and with significant achievements. 

These are mostly administrative achievements, such 

as the transition to the permanent readiness brigades. 

Yet, the challenges ahead are far deeper, and are more 

connected with the value of the Russian state: its people. More than the introduction of any new weapons 

or equipment, the future of the Russian armed forces 

will center on whether the state can harness and develop a new generation of Russian officers, and for 

each individual that will entail serving as an example, delegating authority, bringing the best out of his 

subordinates, encouraging a culture of initiative and 

problem solving: in short leadership. 

Russia is only in the early stages of conventional 

defense reform, a process likely to endure for many 

years, not least in terms of the transition towards network-centric warfare capabilities. It is clear that many 

critical issues are still in the melting pot, and are unlikely to witness any speedy resolution. Consequently, this domestic defense reform, coupled with the 

China factor, makes it unlikely that TNW reduction 

currently presents a realistic option. Serdyukov and 

Makarov, probably in an effort to shore up support for 

the reform, have undoubtedly exaggerated its success 

to date and perhaps there will be a need, at some point 

deemed as politically safe, to admit that major tasks 

still lie ahead demanding more time. In this sensitive 

context, any attempt to place TNW reduction on the 

agenda risks unraveling that reform, possibly damaging the reset in U.S.-Russian relations, and missing po-
87

tential defense cooperation opportunities based on the 

collateral damage to the current conventional defense 

reform: from a Russian perspective it may represent 

the correct policy but at the wrong time.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Aspects of the following analysis of the long-term challenges facing Russian defense reform is based on the author’s 

presentation found in “Russian Defense Reform: Contradictions, 

Challenges and Reconceptualization,” Prague, Czech Republic: 

Institute of International Relations, May 27, 2010.

2. Dale Herspring and Roger N. McDermott, “Serdyukov Promotes Systemic Russian Military Reform,” Orbis, Spring 2010.

3. Daniyal Ayzenshtadt and Yelizaveta Surnacheva, “The Abkhaz-Israeli Reform of the Russian Armed Forces,” November 19, 

2008, available from www.gazeta.ru.

4. Viktor Baranets, “The Army Will Be Getting the Latest 

Weapons and Lodgings and Will Be Rid of Hazing: Dmitry Medvedev Has Formulated Five Principles of Development of the 

Armed Forces,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 1, 2008.

5. Yuriy Gavrilov, “General’s Reduction: They Will Reduce 

the Armed Forces and Change Their Look,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta,

October 15, 2008; Mikhail Barabanov, “Reform of the Combat 

Spirit,” Kommersant-Vlast, October 20, 2008; “The Army Needs to 

be Protected from Dilettantes,” October 22, 2008, available from 

www.utro.ru, Юрий Трифонов, “В рамках реформирования 

Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации. Генералов станет 

меньше, лейтенантов – больше,” Военно-промышленный курьер, 

No 42 (258), октября 22-28, 2008 года, available from www.archive.

vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2008.258.articles.army_02; 

Yuri Trifonov, “V ramkah reformirovaniya Vooruzhennih Sil 

Rossiiskoi Federacii. Generalov stanet men’she, leitenantov – 

bol’she,” Voenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, Vol. 42, No. 258, October 

22-28, 2008.
88

6. Baranets, “The Army Will Be Getting the Latest Weapons.” 

7. Nikolay Poroskov, “Military Arrangements,” Vremya Novostey, October 8, 2008.

8. Gavrilov, “General’s Reduction,” Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Interview with Serdyukov, Rossiya, No. 24, March 6, 2010.

11. “CINC Ground Troops Press Conference on New Brigades, Armament Plans,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 26, 2010.

12. Ibid.

13. Вадим Соловьев, “Военная реформа 2009–2012 годов, ”

Независимое Военное Обозрение, декабря 12, 2008 года, available 

from nvo.ng.ru/forces/2008-12-12/1_reform.html; Vadim Solov’ev, 

“Voennaya reforma 2009-2012 godov,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye, December 12, 2008. 

14. “Around 30 Percent of Russian Air Force Officers to be 

Dismissed During Reform,” Interfax, February 11, 2009.

15. Иван Николаевич Воробьев, Валерий Александрович 

Киселев, “Переход Сухопутных войск на бригадную структуру как этап повышения их маневроспособности,” Военная 

Мысль, Номер 2, 2010; Ivan N. Vorobyev and Valeriy A. Kiselev,

“Perehod Suhoputnih voisk na brigadnuu strukturu kak etap povisheniya ih manevrosposobnosti,” Voennaya Mysl, No. 2, 2010; 

Major-General (Ret.) Ivan Vorobyev and Colonel Valeriy Aleksandrovich Kiselev, “Ground Troops Transition to Brigade Structure as a Phase of Improving Their Maneuverability,” Voyennaya 

Mysl, No. 2, 2010.

16. “The Black Sea Fleet is Being Demoted,” Moskovskiy Komosmolets, February 11, 2009.

17. “Admirals Suffer Fear of the Sea, Navy Main Command 

Cannot be Moved from Moscow to the Baltic,” Kommersant, April 

22, 2009.
89

18. Виктор Ю� �инобороны начинает разъяснительно-пропагандистскую кампанию,” Независимое Военное Обозрение, ноября 28, 2008 года, 

available from nvo.ng.ru/forces/2008-11-28/1_generaly.html; Viktor 

Yuzbashev, “Generali poshli k oficeram. Minoborony nachinaet 

raz’yasnitelno-propagandistskuu kampaniu, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Oborzreniye, November 28, 2008. 

19. “Blow to Rear Services,” November 26, 2009, available 

from www.gazeta.ru. 

20. Тыл на пути преобра�зований,” Красная �зве�зда, 18 ноября 2008 года, available from www.redstar.ru/2008/11/18_11/2_01.

html; “Til na puti preobrazovanii,” Krasnaya Zvezda, November 

18, 2008. 

21. Viktor Baranets, “Chief of General Staff Nikolay Makarov: 

‘Having Commanded Paper Regiments, Lost Their Bearings in 

Real War’,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 18, 2008.

22. “Russia to Close 22 Military Hospitals, Cut Over 10,000 

Medical Officer Posts,” Interfax, May 27, 2009; “Military Reform 

2009-2013, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, January 1, 2009; 

“Defense Ministry to Close Officer Jobs in Military Media,” Interfax-AVN online, December 3, 2009.

23. “Cuts in Russian Military Higher Educational Establishments Will Start in 2009,” Interfax, December 23, 2008.

24. “Russian CGS quizzed about Military Reform,” Interfax, 

June 7, 2009.

25. Russia: Text of Medvedev Speech to Defense Board, March 

6, 2010, available from www.kremlin.ru.

26. Roger N. McDermott, “The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges and Policy Implications,” (forthcoming).

27. Ibid.
90

28. “Putin Chairs Meeting in Voronezh to discuss Re-equipping the Russian Armed Forces,” Interfax, January 19, 2010; Перов E.A � � перспективной цифровой системе связи Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации,” Военная 

Мысль, номер 3, март 2008, стр. 7-11; E. A. Perov, A.V. Pereverzev, “O perspectivnoi cifrovoi sisteme svyazi Vooruzhennih Sil 

Rossiiskoi Federacii,” Voennaya Mysl, No. 3, March 2008; Александр Кондратьев, “Новые возможности для нового облика,” 

Военно-промышленный курьер, номер 45, ноября 18-24, 2009 

года; Aleksandr Kondratyev, “Novie vozmozhnesti dlya novogo 

oblika,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, No. 45, November 18-24, 

2009.

29. Иван Карев, “Связь дорогого стоит. Цена комплекта 

средств управления для бригады – 8 миллиардов рублей,” 

Военно-промышленный курьер, номер 3, января 27 – февраля 2, 

2010 года; available from www.vpk-news.ru/3-319/qq/10379; Ivan 

Karev, “Svyaz dorogogo stoit. Cena komplekta sredstv upravleniya dlya brigadi – 8 milliardov rublei,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer, No. 3, January 27-February 2, 2010.

30. Denis Telmanov, “Russian Army Transformed into 85 

Mobile Brigades: General Staff to Offer Net-Centric Warfare to 

Military Students,” Gazeta, February 22, 2010.

31. Василий �Михайлович �Буренок, “�Ба�зис сетецентрических войн – опережение, интеллект, инновации,” Независимое 

Военное Обозрение, Апреля 2, 2010, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-02/1_bazis.html; Vasilii M. Burenok, “Bazis setecentricheskih voyn – operezhenie, intellect, innovacii,” Nezavisimoye 

Voyennoye Obozreniye, April 2, 2010/ Vasiliy Burenok, “Basis for 

Network-Centric Wars: Anticipation, Intellect, Innovations,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, April 2, 2010.

32. Ibid.

33. Author’s emphasis.

34. Burenok, “Basis for Network-Centric Wars.” 

35. Виталий Шлыков, “Блицкриг Анатолия Сердюкова. 

Почему современные вооруженные силы невозможны без

гражданского Министерства обороны,” Военно-промышленный 
91

курьер, номер 4, февраля 3-9, 2010, available from www.vpk-news.

ru/4-320/2009-05-02-13-24-27/10988; Vitalii Shlykov, “Blitzkig 

Anatoliya Serdyukova. Pochemu sovremennie vooruzhennie sili 

nevozmogni bez graddanskogo Ministerstva oboroni,” Voyenno 

Promyshlennyy Kuryer, No. 4, February 3-9, 2010; Vitaliy Shlykov, 

“Blitzkrieg of Anatoliy Serdyukov,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 19, 2010.

36. Among the recommendations made in the SVOP report, 

which have not been adopted by Serdyukov are resubordinating the GRU from the General Staff to the defense ministry, insisting that all officers have a first degree before commencing 

officer training, further transforming the defense industries, 

and reforming the security structures. See Voyennoye stroitelstvo

i moderinzatsiya Vooruzhennykh sil russiy (The Development and 

Modernization of the Russian Armed Forces), Moscow, Russia: SVOP, April, 2004, available from www.svop.ru/live/materials.

asp?m_id=8481&r_id=9303.

37. Author’s emphasis. See Shlykov, “Blitzkrieg of Anatoliy 

Serdyukov.” 

38. Ibid.

39. “Russian Defense Ministry Rules Out Need for Special 

Army Police,” Interfax, April 6, 2010.

40. “CINC Ground Troops Press Conference on New Brigades, Armament Plans,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 26, 2010.

41. “Will Have to Serve Without Contract,” Izvestiya, February 26, 2010.

42. “Military Board,” Ekho Moskvy, February 20, 2010.

43. Vorobyev was born in 1922. During World War II, he 

served as a cadet, was promoted to major, and commanded a rifle 

battalion. He was awarded the Svechin prize of the Academy of 

Military Sciences in 2000 for his series of works on tactics. He is 

the author of more than 200 works on tactics and operational art, 

and is a professor at the armed force combined arms academy. 

Vorobyev and Kiselev, “Ground Troops Transition to Brigade 

Structure.”
92

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine 

of the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010, available from www.

scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html.

47. Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, available from www.defense.gov/qdr/; 46th Munich Security Conference, February 2010, 

available from www.securityconference.de/Conference-2010.muenchn

ersicherheit.0.html?&L=1.

48. Mikhail Tsypkin, “What’s New in Russia’s New Military 

Doctrine?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 27, 2010.

49. Interview with General Leonid Ivashov by V. Tetekin, Segodnya, February 25, 2010.

50. Aleksey Nikolskiy, “New Words for Old Threats. New 

Version of Military Doctrine Does Not Differ Fundamentally 

From 2000 Document—Something That Elicited Negative Response From NATO,” Vedomosti, February 15, 2010.

51. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “Comparison of New Military 

Doctrine with the Military Doctrine of 2000,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 18, 2010.

56. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 

57. Reporting in ITAR-TASS, Interfax, and Gazeta, December 

8-10, 2008; Interview with Army-General Gareev, Nezavisimoye 

Voyennoye Obozreniye, December 12, 2008; “Russian Defense Min-
93

ister, General Staff at Odds Over Reform, Doctrine,” Moskovsky 

Komsomolets, February 15, 2007; “Partial Text of Army-General 

Gareev’s Report on New Russian Military Doctrine,” Voenno-Promyshlenny Kuriyer, January 24, 2007.

58. Viktor Myasnikov, “Serious Discussion of the New Doctrine Impends: the Academy of Military Sciences Will Be Gathering for its Annual Conference in January,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, January 9, 2007; Vadim Solovyev, “There Are 

More Enemies and the Enemies Have Become More Aggressive,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 10, 2007.

59. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 

60. Patrushev Interview, Interfax, October 13, 2009; Security 

Council’s Patrushev Interviewed on Military Doctrine, Izvestiya,

October 14, 2009.

61. Ibid.

62. Available from www.lenta.ru, October 15, 2009.

63. Author interviews with Central Asian diplomats, December 2009.

64. “Pundit Says Patrushev Remarks Signal Lowered Nuclear 

Threshold, Russkaya Liniya, St. Petersburg, October 14, 2009.

65. Rosbalt, October 14, 2009, available from www.rosbalt.

ru/2009/10/14/680419.html.

66. “Patrushev: New Military Doctrine to Stipulate Preemptive Nuclear Strikes,” October 14, 2009, available from www.segodnya.ru.

67. “New Military Doctrine Unlikely to Provide for Preventive Strikes,” Vedomosti, October 9, 2009; “Kremlin ‘Source’ Outlines New National Security Strategy,” April 29, 2009, available 

from www.gazeta.ru.

68. “Russian Defense Minister Reports to Duma on Military 

Reform,” Zvezda Television, February 11, 2009; “CGS Makarov 
94

Visits Abu Dhabi Arms Show, Talks of New Military Doctrine,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 25, 2009.

69. Krasnaya Zvezda, May 14, 2009, available from www.redstar.ru/2009/05/14—05/1—05.html.

70. “Russian Security Council Discusses Future Military Doctrine,” ITAR-TASS, August 5, 2009.

71. Roger N. McDermott, “The Restructuring of the Modern 

Russian Army,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, 

2009.

72. Vitaliy, Shlykov, “Serdyukov’s Blitzkrieg,” Rossiya v Globalnoy Politike, No. 6, November-December 2009.

73. Mikhail Rastopshin, “Voyennaya Mysl’ Versus the General Staff,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March 31, 2010; 

Yuriy Borodin, “Brigade Fires Without a Miss,” Krasnaya Zvezda,

November 23, 2009; Yuriy Borodin, “Proficiency Test,” Krasnaya 

Zvezda, November 23, 2009; Vladimir Semenchenko:, “What the 

Inspection Revealed,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, November 

20, 2009; Aleksandr Sargin and Denis Telmanov, “An Army of 

Units That Are Rated ‘Satisfactory’,” Gazeta, November 12, 2009; 

“Russian Military Units’ Readiness Time Cut to One Hour-Makarov,” ITAR-TASS, November 17, 2009.

74. Jacob, W. Kipp, “Mistral Procurement Divides Russian 

Defense Leadership,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue 225, December 8, 2009.

75. Gennadiy Miranovich, “Military Science: Assignment for 

Tomorrow,” Krasnaya Zvezda, December 21, 2009.

76. Ibid.

77. Emphasis by author.

78. “Ex-Security Official: Russia Should Keep Improving Strategic Forces,” Interfax, April 9, 2010.

79. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 
95

80. Ibid.

81. Aleksandr Konovalov, “Take Tender Care of the Hawks,” 

Ogonek, February 25, 2010; Roger N. McDermott, “New Russian 

Military Doctrine Opposes NATO Enlargement,”Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 27, February 9, 2010; Jacob. W. Kipp, “Medvedev Approves New Russian Military Doctrine,”Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 26, February 8, 2010.

82. ”The Role of TNW on Multipurpose Submarines Set to 

Grow,” RIA Novosti, August 23, 2009.

83. Aleksandr Artemyev, “Washington Goes for Tactical Reduction,” February 6, 2010, available from www.gazeta.ru.

84. Andrey Terekhov, “The United States May Withdraw Its 

TNW from Europe,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 28, 2010.

85. Dvorkin is a recognized authority on these issues. He was 

one of the authors of all major documents related to the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). He was an expert involved in preparing 

SALT II, the INF Treaty, START I, and START II. He made a significant contribution to Soviet and Russian strategic arms reduction talks, and from 1962 to 2001 he worked in the 4th Central 

Research Institute of the Soviet and Russian Defense Ministries, 

heading the institute in 1993-2001.

86. Ibid.

87. “Chief Of Russia’s General Staff to Visit US Over Nukes, 

Missile Defenses,” Interfax-AVN Online, April 21, 2010.

88. Miles Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 52, No. 1, February–March 

2010, pp. 75–96.

89. Joshua Handler, “The 1991-1992 PNI’s and the Elimination, 

Storage and Security of TNW,” in Brian Alexander and Alistair 

Millar, eds., TNW, Washington DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2003; Robert S. 

Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010,” 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2010, p. 79; “US 
96

Nuclear Development Concerns Russia,” Interfax, November 26, 

2003; “Russian Military Chief Defends Nonstrategic Nukes,” 

Interfax, December 17, 2008; Andrea Gabbitas, “Non-strategic 

Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Definition,” in Jeffrey A. Larsen 

and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds., Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear 

Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, Washington, DC: U.S. Air 

Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2000; Robert 

S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Russian 

Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 

2009; William J. Perry, Chairman and James R. Schlesinger, Vice 

Chairman, America’s Strategic Posture, The Final Report of the 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 

States, Washington, DC, April 2009, available from www.usip.org/

files/America’s_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf; Commentary by 

Sergey Karaganov, “The Echo of the Past War or Strategic Confusion,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 17, 2010.

90. “Too Early To Discuss Reduction Of Tactical Nuclear Armaments-Expert,” ITAR-TASS, March 5, 2010.

91. “US Lowering Role of Nuclear Weapons in Doctrine Because of Superiority in Conventional Arms,” Interfax-AVN Online, 

April 19, 2010.

92. “Conventional Warheads on Strategic Carriers Are Threat 

to International Security-RVSN Commander,” Interfax, October 

12, 2009; “Creation of Global Strike Command in US Air Force 

‘a Threat’-Russian Air Force Commander-in-Chief,” Interfax, August 11, 2009.

93. “Conventional Arms Parity Needed To Discuss TNW,” 

ITAR-TASS, April 6, 2010.

94. Interview with Sergey Rogov by Aleksandr Frolov, “The 

Treaty Has More Pluses Than Minuses,” Krasnaya Zvezda, April 

7, 2010.

95. Sergei Karaganov, “Nuclear Free World is a Dangerous 

Concept That Ought to be Abandoned,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, April 

23, 2010.

96. Ibid.
97

97. Ibid.

98. Karaganov, “The Echo of the Past War,” 

99. For more detail on the place of nuclear deterrence in Russian strategic thought and the high value placed on these weapons by the Siloviki, see Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russian Politics, PolicyMaking and American Missile Defence,” International Affairs, Vol.

85, No. 4, 2009, pp. 781–799.

100. Karaganov, “The Echo of the Past War or Strategic Confusion”; Kissinger, Schultz, Nunn, and Perry articles, available from 

online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html, 

online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870415280457462834428273

5008.html; Roger N. McDermott, “Russian Analysts Question the 

Viability of the ‘Reset’,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 61, 

March 30, 2010.

101. Karaganov, “The Echo of the Past War or Strategic Confusion.” 

102. Radek Sikorski and Carl Bildt, “Next, the Tactical Nukes,” 

The New York Times, February 1, 2010.

103. Vladimir Kozin, “TNW: Ill-Conceived Messages from the 

Foreign Ministers of Poland and Sweden,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 21, 2010.

104. Yuriy Gavrilov, “Getting to Zero: Russia and the United 

States Are Prepared To Fight Together for the Complete Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 13, 2010.

105. Viktor Ruchkin, “Old Bombs and New Problems,” Krasnaya Zvezda, March 16, 2010.

106. Fedor Lukyanov, “Last Treaty: Russia and United States 

Have Exhausted Potential for Two-Way Nuclear Disarmament,” 

Vremya Novostey, March 30, 2010; Karaganov, “The Echo of the 

Past War or Strategic Confusion.” 

107. Lukyankov, “The Last Treaty.” 

99

CHAPTER 3

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RUSSIAN STRATEGY 

AND DOCTRINE

Andrei Shoumikhin

INTRODUCTION

The Russian Federation (RF) remains in possession of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Despite the 

elimination of some key foundations of superpower 

rivalry, most notably the intense ideological schism 

between Communism and Western-type democracies 

that sparked and fueled the Cold War, the RF Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) continue to target the United 

States and its allies. While the significant disequilibrium in economic, technological, military, power 

projection, and other capabilities between the United 

States and the RF continues to expand, Russia remains 

the only global power presenting an existential threat 

to the United States.

It is not the weapons, but the people possessing 

them who kill. Detailed information about the composition, combat readiness, and procedures of RF SNF 

is important.1

 However, understanding the nature of 

the Russian political regime, the mentality of Russian 

leaders, and the underpinnings of Russian nuclear 

strategy as reflected in Russian doctrinal documents 

may help assess whether or not that country will ever 

resort to the ultimate weapon of destruction. 

Soviet and Russian military and nuclear doctrines 

reflect the leadership’s threat assessments, perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the military, 

national goals and tasks for the military organization 
100

of the state, and other factors. To the extent they are 

not used for propaganda or disinformation purposes, 

they may provide insights into disagreements and 

competitiveness within policymaking elites. Doctrines 

usually comprise classified components and are accompanied by declaratory and interpretive statements 

that clarify or, for that matter, complicate the understanding of their intent and purpose. 

This chapter deals with the evolution of Russian 

thinking and policy on nuclear-related issues. It also 

seeks to understand motivations of the Russian leadership in its continued reliance on nuclear weapons 

and maintaining an adversarial posture towards 

other nuclear powers, especially the United States. 

Past and current doctrinal documents are studied to 

provide the background of evolving nuclear weapons 

programs, military-political relations with the United 

States, perceived defense and security threats, and requirements.2

Chronologically and substantively, the main emphasis is on the independence period of Russia from 

December 1991 to the present. However, a reference 

to the Soviet period is appropriate. After all, most of 

the strategic weapon systems Russia possesses today 

were created during the Soviet period. Moreover, 

while Russian leaders invariably underline substantive differences between the Soviet regime and the 

new socio-economic and political environment in 

contemporary Russia, there are still many similarities 

between current Russian and former Soviet thinking 

and behavior. To a large extent, the RF finds itself in 

a geopolitical situation resembling that of the Soviet 

Union. Despite considerable changes in the structure 

and composition of the bureaucracies responsible for 

the development and implementation of Russian mili-
101

tary and foreign policy, many political appointees and 

professionals currently in charge of this policy have 

strong backgrounds in the Soviet system.3

SOVIET EXPERIENCE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE PURSUIT OF 

PARITY

Starting in the early-1950s, the Soviet leadership, 

driven by the need to buy time to bridge the technological gap in nuclear weapons and delivery systems 

with the United States, put a huge effort into disarmament negotiations and debates at the United Nations 

(UN). They regarded these efforts as a vital means of 

slowing down, if not reversing, the U.S. progress in developing advanced weapon systems while the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) accelerated its 

own weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. 

Nuclear disarmament, or rather the politics of nuclear 

disarmament, had also become a central component of 

the “peaceful competition of opposite social systems” 

promoted by the communist regime. 

Fiery demagogue Nikita Khrushchev put his 

unique stamp on nuclear disarmament at the UN by 

proposing in 1959 a patently unrealistic, but ideologically enticing, plan of “general and complete disarmament” that would start with the nuclear-missile 

arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. 

From that time on, the Soviets often began negotiating 

processes by launching initiatives that had little or no 

chance of acceptance by the opposite side but could 

score big in the “war of ideas,” particularly among 

the “progressive world public opinion,” e.g., the antiwar and antinuclear groups in the West. Additional 

advantages of this methodology were to draw oppo-
102

nents into protracted bargaining and to eventually 

reach compromise by demonstrating flexibility while 

lowering the original excessive demands.4

Khrushchev’s bold peace initiatives were clearly 

predicated on the rapid progress of the Soviet nuclear 

and missile programs. As the result of intense efforts, 

the Soviets had by October 1957 already put into orbit 

the first artificial satellite with a clear implication that 

Soviet missiles were now able to hit U.S. territory by 

flying through space.

Even during periods of relative relaxation of tensions in U.S.-USSR relations, Soviet perspectives on 

bilateral arms control were heavily tinted by ideological preconceptions. The Soviets invariably believed 

that the American side sought unilateral advantages 

for themselves. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko recalled in his memoirs:

For Carter, as all other American Presidents—his 

predecessors, the paramount goal had always consisted in limiting the Soviet nuclear potential, while 

keeping the main U.S. strike forces intact. Only with 

great effort, and under the influence of the irrefutable 

arguments and the constructive line of the USSR that 

enjoyed wide support in the world, he would deviate 

from his position aimed at achieving unilateral advantages for the United States.5

A real breakthrough for the Soviets in the pursuit 

of equilibrium in strategic relations with the United 

States began to emerge by the late-1960s when the 

United States took note of Soviet efforts to develop 

a strategic antiballistic missile (ABM) system that 

eventually became the foundation for the Moscow 

ABM system.6

 The United States apparently became 

concerned with the prospect of an arms race in ABM 

systems.7
103

In June 1967, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson raised 

the ABM issue in his meeting with Soviet Premier 

Aleksey Kosygin in Glasborough, NJ. Johnson said he 

could delay a decision to deploy a U.S. defense system 

if he could announce that talks with the Soviet Union 

on the subject would start shortly. Kosygin repeated 

his personal view: “Defense is moral, attack is immoral,” and reiterated the Russian Politburo’s position 

that ABM systems could only be discussed together 

with setting limits for offensive weapons.8

However, Soviet progress in ABM systems and 

progress by both sides in testing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) finally 

convinced the Politburo that it was time to start talks. 

In October 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon was 

informed that Moscow was prepared to start official 

negotiations on the subject. Nixon agreed and talks 

opened on November 17, 1969, in Helsinki, Finland. 

It took another 2 1/2 years to prepare the relevant 

treaties for signature. The ABM Treaty was signed 

in Moscow on May 26, 1972, the same day as the 

first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-1). The 

Brezhnev leadership announced that the ABM and 

SALT talks and agreements signified that both superpowers had reached parity in their strategic capabilities, even though by the time both agreements were 

ready for signing (1971), the Soviet Union had 2,163 

strategic warheads deployed, and the United States 

possessed 4,632 warheads.9

 SALT-1 did not stop the 

nuclear arms race: by 1981, the Soviets increased their 

nuclear arsenals nearly fourfold to a total of 8,043 warheads, while the United States more than doubled its 

own numbers to 10,022.10

It should also be understood that the Soviet leadership at no time entertained plans to build a national 
104

ABM system. According to information that became 

available long after the initial bilateral debates, negotiations and agreements on the offensive-defensive 

linkage, feasibility studies ordered by the Soviets at 

the time resulted in a definite conclusion that such a 

system would not only be prohibitively expensive but 

would also be totally ineffective and could be easily 

penetrated in a massive nuclear attack.11

Therefore Moscow decided at an early stage that 

it would not waste resources on constructing such a 

system. To be absolutely certain that the United States 

would under no circumstances achieve a technological 

breakthrough in defensive systems where the Soviets 

anticipated failure, thereby gaining strategic superiority over the USSR, they agreed to conclude the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). The complete reversal of the Kremlin’s initial skeptical attitude towards 

regulating strategic defensive systems was based on 

pragmatic calculations. Establishing a moratorium on 

developing strategic defensive systems that lasted until the early 2000s may be considered a serious Soviet 

achievement in arms control. 

With the conclusion in May 1972 of the ABM 

Treaty and SALT-1, the paradigm of “Mutual Assured 

Destruction” (MAD) became dominant in U.S.-Soviet 

strategic relations.12 Negotiations on subsequent major 

arms limitation and arms reduction treaties (SALT2, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] I and 

START II) were conducted with the background of 

continued reliance on mutual vulnerability to retaliation. 

The Russians proclaimed the ABMT “the cornerstone of strategic stability” in bilateral relations and 

the foundation of geopolitical “parity” between the 

superpowers.13 Diplomatic experiences of the early-
105

1970s had long-term effects on later Soviet and current 

Russian thinking. They suggested to the Kremlin that:

• Arms control is an extremely valuable means 

of equalizing capabilities of nuclear adversaries 

if one of them lags in levels of armaments and 

technological prowess.

• Success in negotiations is possible as the result 

of subtle and deceptive moves, as in the game 

of chess.

• The linkage between strategic offensive and defensive systems is quintessential in preventing 

unilateral advantages and creating balance in 

strategic relations.

Soviet nuclear strategy and doctrine were evolving 

together with the changing balance of strategic forces 

and progress in arms control negotiations:

Since the second half of the 1960s, the leadership of the 

Armed Forces and the state experienced a transformation of views on the possible nature of the world war. 

The Soviet military doctrine began to take into account 

the possible initial stage of a military conflict with the 

sole use of conventional weapons. There began to 

emerge doubts about the possibility of gaining victory 

after a massive exchange of nuclear strikes. Since this 

time, the Soviet leadership began to seek the conclusion of treaties with the U.S. on banning or limiting 

strategic nuclear weapons. . . . Beginning in the early1970s, the main concept of developing Soviet strategic 

weapons was the concept that could be described as 

“strategic sufficiency.” It defined the quantitative and 

qualitative composition of carriers, their distribution 

among the Strategic Missile Troops, the Navy and the 

Air Force, with due account of potential use under different conditions. They established scientifically the 

optimal ratio of the number of carriers and warheads 
106

for them. It also took into account the process of strategic arms limitations that had already begun between 

the Soviet Union and the United States.14

According to one Western view, by the late-1980s, 

the Soviets had a fairly elaborate nuclear-use doctrine 

that included the following elements:

• Preemption (first strike).

• Quantitative superiority (a requisite for preemption and necessary because the war may 

last for some time, even though the initial hours 

are decisive).

• Counterforce targeting.

• Combined-arms operations to supplement nuclear strikes.

• Defense, which has been almost totally neglected by the United States under its concept 

of mutual deterrence.15

However, the Soviet leadership insisted publicly 

that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. 

The first official declaration to this effect was made by 

Leonid Brezhnev at the Second Special Session of the 

UN General Assembly on June 15, 1982.16

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV’S “NEW THINKING” 

Soon after his advent to power in early 1985, 

Mikhail Gorbachev, the youngest General Secretary 

in the history of the USSR, announced his own vision and proposals on the in-depth curbing of nuclear 

armaments. In September 1985, he offered to reduce 

strategic offensive weapons to 6,000 warheads on each 

side, while concurrently prohibiting the deployment 

of offensive weapons in outer space, including weap-
107

ons aimed at satellites.17 Clearly, despite his reformist rhetoric, on strategic nuclear matters Gorbachev 

continued to abide by the concept of MAD and the 

traditional Soviet position on the offensive-defensive 

linkage.

Gorbachev’s proposals were specifically aimed 

against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) announced by the Ronald Reagan administration in January 1984. Together with American counterproposals, 

they were discussed at the Geneva, Switzerland (November 1985) and Reykjavik, Iceland (October 1986) 

bilateral summits. In negotiations, while Gorbachev 

agreed in principle with Reagan’s proposal to reduce 

by half the numbers of strategic offensive weapons, 

he also emphasized that this would not be possible if 

the United States went ahead with creating a strategic defense shield. He argued that in this case, the Soviet Union would have to concentrate on developing 

its strategic strike capacity in order to neutralize the 

“space shield.”18

In effect, Gorbachev was the first to offer the antiballistic missile defense (BMD) rationalization that 

is currently used by leaders of the RF. For example, 

he doubted the American suggestion to share ABM 

technology with the Soviet Union once it was ready 

for use. He told the Americans that “the creation of 

a shield . . . would allow a first strike without retaliation.” He also said that the Soviet Union had already 

developed a response to SDI that would be “effective, 

far less expensive and ready for use in less time.”19 In 

still another effort to reconfirm the rigid linkage of 

strategic offensive and defense weapons, Gorbachev 

declared that the SDI stood in the way of a 50 percent 

cut in strategic arms and insisted that the U.S. administration should do something about it if the administration wanted to reduce the nuclear stockpiles.20
108

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences 

Andrei Kokoshin, who at the time of the ReaganGorbachev summits worked as Deputy Director of the 

U.S. and Canada Studies Institute, was a member of 

the Gorbachev-appointed interagency group to study 

Soviet asymmetrical responses to the United States. 

The SDI program confirmed years later that the Kremlin had indeed agreed on a variety of efficient and 

cost-effective counteractions to the U.S. strategic defenses if and when they would turn into reality.21 This 

more or less rejects the argument of those Russian 

analysts who claim that the Soviets overreacted in a 

massive way to the U.S. SDI and that it was enormous 

appropriations for fighting the “terrifying” American 

program that finally broke the backbone of the Soviet 

economy.22

 Gorbachev continued to press for spectacular new 

agreements with the United States. By December 1987 

when the Soviet leader arrived in Washington for his 

new summit with Reagan, both sides were prepared 

to sign a treaty banning intermediate range missiles in 

Europe (the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces [INF] 

Treaty). However, during that summit Gorbachev 

again did not fail to refer to the U.S. SDI as a stumbling block and reaffirmed the link between offensive 

and defense weapons. 

Finally, a preliminary compromise was reached. 

Both sides would commit themselves to the ABM 

Treaty as signed in 1972. Research and development 

(R&D) and testing would not be contrary to the Treaty. The Soviet Union and the United States would 

not withdraw from the Treaty for a specified period 

of time yet to be determined.23 During his May 1988 

visit to Moscow, Reagan confirmed that understanding. This cleared the way for further discussions on 
109

reducing strategic armaments and eventually resulted 

in the signing of START I in Moscow on July 31, 1991.

However, in the course of START I preparation, 

that part of the 1987 understanding that dealt with 

the ABM Treaty “was somehow lost on the way.”24

On June 13, 1991, the Soviet Union made a unilateral 

statement to the effect that a U.S. withdrawal from the 

Treaty could present a force majeure leading to the possible Soviet withdrawal from START I.25

Even more importantly, no mention was made in 

START I itself of its linkage with the 1972 Treaty. This 

omission was brought to Gorbachev’s attention, and 

he promised to make an oral statement at the signing 

to the effect that if the ABM Treaty was abrogated, 

the Soviet Union would not consider itself tied by 

START I. But for reasons unknown, he failed to do so. 

Allegedly, as claimed by one of his aides, he did not 

want to spoil the “festive atmosphere.” Actually, in 

the Russian expert opinion, “this was another of those 

significant errors Gorbachev made in his last years in 

office.”26

Gorbachev’s critics in Russia widely accuse him of 

having consistently given in to American pressures in 

arms control negotiations. Allegedly, Gorbachev was 

so carried away by his personal ideas of perestroika

and détente with the West, and enamored by summitry with Western leaders, that he was prepared 

to compromise on more important Soviet interests, 

such as agreeing to stop construction of the large Soviet phased-array radar near the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk, while turning a blind eye to similar American 

installations in Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, 

United Kingdom (UK).27

Gorbachev’s handling of other issues, including 

conditions for the reunification of Germany, Soviet 
110

troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, elimination 

of short and medium-range missiles under the INF 

Treaty, and promises to get rid of tactical nuclear 

weapons all reverberate today in the Russian disappointments and attempts at revising former agreements and understandings. 

THE BORIS YELTSIN REGIME

While Mikhail Gorbachev’s ouster from power 

and the disbandment of the 75-year-old communist 

regime was generally received in Russia without huge 

regrets, the effects of the ensuing disintegration of the 

imperial Soviet state left a deep imprint on the lives of 

millions of Russian citizens. Without underrating the 

novelty and magnitude of the problems faced by the 

government of Boris Yeltsin—the first President of the 

new Russian state—and minimizing certain achievements in their resolution, it is clear that, by and large, 

throughout the Yeltsin rule, Russian society continued 

to slide into moral degradation, structural disintegration, and economic morass. 

On top of the significantly diminished territory, 

population, economy, resources, military, and power 

projection capabilities, the society continued to be 

plagued by traditional Russian woes: bureaucratic 

dictates, mismanagement, and corruption, as well as 

public apathy and despondency epitomized by alcoholism and addiction. Uncontrolled redistribution, 

i.e., plunder of what was left of the unwieldy albeit 

bountiful Soviet inheritance, was accompanied by 

rampant criminality. By the late-1990s, Russia looked 

like a failed state on its way to disintegration and collapse. 
111

Internationally, the RF earned a dubious nickname 

of “Upper Volta with nuclear weapons.”28 Frequent 

claims at the early stages of the Yeltsin regime that 

Russia seeks adherence to the “club of civilized Western nations,” were not backed up by serious efforts at 

internal evolution to comply with international standards of democratic governance. 

The Yeltsin government was unable to define 

coherently and explain to the public the goals and 

orientation of Russian foreign, military, and nuclear 

policies. Despite a flurry of international exchanges 

between Russian officials and foreign dignitaries, the 

Russians remained ultimately confused whether the 

RF was “with” or “against” the United States and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on most 

global and regional issues. It appears that Yeltsin himself thought that the Russian nuclear potential was an 

“automatic guarantee” of Russian security and a barrier to others’ alleged anti-Russian policies.29

While the Yeltsin government supported denuclearization of other former Soviet Republics and actually helped in this process, e.g., under the “Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,”30 it continued to rely 

heavily on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence 

strategies. Moreover, it was under the Yeltsin regime 

that Russia started a movement away from the nonfirst-use of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. 

The process was typical for Yeltsin’s erratic style of 

policymaking when lots of people in his immediate 

entourage competed for the right to define and represent Russian interests to the outside world. 

On December 21, 1991, at a meeting in Alma-Aty, 

Kazakhstan, where leaders of former Soviet republics 

joined the declaration on the creation of the Commu-
112

nity of Independent States (CIS), the heads of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—states with 

the still-deployed Soviet nuclear weapons—signed 

an Agreement on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear 

Weapons. Article 2 of the Agreement stated that its 

member-states “reconfirm the obligation on the nonfirst-use of nuclear weapons.”31 Supreme Soviets of 

Russia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan (that actually never 

signed the Agreement) ratified it on December 25, 

1991, June 10, 1993, and March 6, 1992, respectively. 

According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 

International Treaties, Russia was supposed to abide 

by this Agreement, unless it reconsidered the decision 

on its ratification.

However, the Yeltsin government soon started 

drifting away from the non-first-use obligation. Yeltsin’s decree No. 1833 on “Main Clauses of the RF 

Military Doctrine” of November 2, 1993, was never 

published officially. However, according to publicly 

available sources familiar with the document,32 it failed 

to make any reference to the non-first-use obligation.33

In February 1997, then-Secretary of the RF Security 

Council Ivan Rybkin declared in an interview to the 

government Rossiiskaya Gazeta that the Soviet obligation not to use nuclear weapons first was a mistake 

and that Russia was prepared “in case of a direct challenge” to use these weapons.34 At the time, the President’s Office tried to distance itself from Rybkin’s 

“personal opinion.” However, a short while later, this 

personal opinion became part and parcel of the official 

Russian military doctrine.

Despite this and other policy vacillations and inconsistencies, throughout his rule, Boris Yeltsin tried 

to appear accommodating and “progressive” on mil-
113

itary-political relations with West and eager to compromise on arms control. However, internal political 

bickering between Yeltsin and the leaders of the State 

Duma prevented the government from assuring ratification of the key arms control agreement negotiated 

with the United States—the Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty II (START II).35 By the time of his voluntary resignation on December 31, 1999, Russian foreign and 

internal policies appeared to be heading into an impasse. In effect, the RF was standing on the brink of 

chaos and imminent national disintegration. 

THE VLADIMIR PUTIN PRESIDENCY

In sharp contrast, Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor, 

originally a little-known apparatchik, Vladimir V. Putin36 could become not only a widely popular Russian 

leader, but actually a symbol of Russian economic and 

political revival.37 Putin worked consistently to create 

a new nation-wide ruling elite based strongly on personal devotions and vassal-type dependencies. The 

construction of a rigid “vertical of power”38 and the 

use of blunt force in subduing regional secessionism, 

while criticized as “overly authoritarian,”39 strengthened the central authority and eliminated much of the 

centrifugal tendencies in Russian regions. Confining 

Islamic radicalism and terrorist activities predominantly to southern Russia created a sense of relative 

security in populous hinterland regions. 

Under Mr. Putin, a considerable effort was devoted to filling in the “ideological void” created by the 

disappearance of communist ideology and the Soviet 

propaganda apparatus.40 In the search for the new “national idea,”41 wide use was made of traditional tools 

of social mobilization in Russia—nationalism, religion 
114

and patriotism.42 While there is no single distinct, let 

alone dominant ideology in Russia so far, it is not exactly true that “Russian strategic policymakers have 

no ideology.”43 The Russian ruling elite is driven by 

strong “Great Russian” instincts and mentality. Another important component of the emerging system of 

prevailing values and concepts in Russia is the rejection of the geopolitical model that has at its center the 

conglomerate of advanced Western powers headed 

by the United States. In the current Russian political 

vernacular this aspect of the emerging official ideology and strategy is usually identified as opposition to 

“unipolarity” and American global dictate.

Putin’s grand strategy called for mobilizing all 

available internal resources to restore Russia’s political, economic and military grandeur. Nuclear weapons and arms control diplomacy were called upon to 

play crucial roles in the program of national revival. 

By late 2002, Putin reversed all plans promoted by 

the government of his predecessor to reorganize and 

downsize the Strategic Missile Troops (SMT). Expanding U.S. BMD programs were the strongest argument 

in favor of preserving the status of the SMT and extending the service lives of aging heavy ICBMs, expressly to counter the alleged U.S. BMD threat to the 

Russian deterrence potential. Any doubts the Russian 

military-political leadership could have had previously about the value and importance of the Russian 

offensive missile-nuclear capability vanished completely. 

Ultimately, Vladimir Putin argued that stopping 

the decay of Russian military power was among the 

main achievements of his 8-year presidency. In 2006, 

Vladimir Putin reported to the Russian legislature:
115

The situation in the armed forces today has changed 

dramatically. We have created a modern structure 

for the armed forces and the different units are now 

receiving modern, new arms and equipment, arms 

and equipment that will form the basis of our defense 

through to 2020. . . . Naval shipbuilding has got underway again and we are now building new vessels 

of practically all types. The Russian Navy will soon 

commission two new nuclear submarines carrying 

strategic weapons. They will be equipped with the 

new “Bulava” missile system, which together with 

the “Topol-M” system will form the backbone of our 

strategic deterrent force. I emphasize that these are the 

first nuclear submarines to be completed in modern 

Russia. We had not built a single vessel of this type 

since 1990.44

In effect, it was under Vladimir Putin that the Russian missile-nuclear potential became the symbol of 

Russia’s survival as a nation-state and the absolute 

guarantee of its security. In the Russian President’s 

words, “When looking at today’s international situation and the prospects for its development, Russia is 

compelled to realize that nuclear deterrence is a key 

element in guaranteeing the country’s security.”45

During his presidency, he consistently alluded 

to the Russian nuclear potential as the foundation of 

Russia’s special role in geopolitics. Above all, in the 

eyes of the Russian leadership, a robust nuclear potential created preconditions for “strategic parity” with 

the United States. The Russian logic was simple:

Russia and the United States are the biggest nuclear 

powers. Our economy might be smaller, but Russia’s 

nuclear potential is still comparable to that of the United States... Also important is that we have the years of 

experience, the technology and the production potential, the technological chains and the specialists. Rus-
116

sia is a great nuclear power. No one disputes or doubts 

this. And the United States and Russia definitely have 

a shared interest in ensuring security on this planet.46

The Putin government offered full support to the 

Strategic Nuclear Forces and parts of the military-industrial complex (MIC) responsible for the development, maintenance and modernization of the country’s missile-nuclear shield. In a typical statement 

dated June 9, 2006, at an important meeting with heads 

of enterprises belonging to MIC, the second Russian 

President declared:

Our country’s nuclear potential is of vital importance 

for our national security interests. The reliability of our 

‘nuclear shield’ and the state of our nuclear weapons 

complex are a crucial component of Russia’s world 

power status. I do stress that our work to develop our 

nuclear arsenal must go hand in hand with the most 

stringent demands on reliability and security of operation and, of course, with strict compliance with all 

non-proliferation regimes. In this respect Russia’s position is firm and unchanging.47

The idea of using nuclear weapons in limited war 

was also gaining momentum under Vladimir Putin’s 

presidency. Senior Russian generals started talking 

about using them in exercises and in limited war already in the late-1990s.48 The new version of the RF 

Military Doctrine of April 21, 2000, developed under 

Boris Yeltsin but signed by Vladimir Putin in his capacity of Interim President, elaborated the provisions 

pertaining to the limited use of nuclear weapons that 

were set out four months earlier in the “National Security Concept” and in this regard marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of Russian nuclear doctrine.49 In particular, it stated: 
117

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use 

nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear or 

other types of weapons of mass destruction against it 

and (or) its allies, as well as in response to a large-scale 

aggression involving the use of conventional weapons 

in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation will not use 

nuclear weapons against states-members of the Treaty 

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that do 

not possess nuclear weapons, except in case of an aggression against the Russian Federation, the Armed 

Forces of the Russian Federation or other troops, its 

allies or against a state with which it has agreements in 

the area of security, committed or supported by such 

a state that does not possess nuclear weapons, jointly 

or in the presence of allied obligations with a statepossessor of nuclear weapons.50

Besides the “RF Military Doctrine,” the Putin government approved other doctrinal and strategy documents that reserved a special place for the strategic 

weapons in assuring Russian security, including the 

Federal Law “On Defense,”51 the “National Security 

Doctrine,”52 the “Foreign Policy Doctrine,”53 as well as 

policy statements by high government officials, e.g., 

annual “Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly,” etc. While these documents did not identify the 

“potential adversaries” of Russia by name, it was obvious that the United States and NATO powers were 

at the top of the list of the “threat factors” for Russia.54

Bellicose statements on Russian readiness to use 

nuclear weapons continued throughout Vladimir Putin’s presidency. In February 2007 then-Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told the Duma that, “As regards 

the use of nuclear weapons in case of aggression, of 

course [we will use them in this case]. What else were 
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they built for?”55 He did not mention any of the caveats 

associated with official Russian nuclear use doctrine. 

A few days later Colonel-General Nikolay Solovtsov, Commander of the Strategic Missile Troops, 

made nuclear threats against Poland and the Czech 

Republic if they were to allow U.S. missile deployment.56 Despite U.S. protests against such inflammatory tactics, then-Commander of the RF General Staff 

Army General Yurii Baluyevskii in April 2007 once 

again threatened to target U.S. missile defense facilities in Europe: “If we see that these facilities pose a 

threat to Russia, these targets will be included in the 

lists of our planners—strategic, nuclear, or others. The 

latter is a technicality.”57

The Putin government’s decision to put nuclear 

weapons and arms control in the center of its military 

and foreign policy agenda was apparently taken with 

several important goals in mind. Firstly, by associating arms control failures with the weakness of Russia’s global power and statue, Moscow was creating 

justifications for intensified efforts at internal militarization in general and modernization of the Russian 

strategic forces in particular.

Secondly, by playing the arms control “card,” 

Vladimir Putin was subtly distancing himself from 

the preceding Boris Yeltsin administration, which was 

associated in the Russian mind with many troubles of 

their country in the 1990s. Thirdly, emphasis on nuclear-related issues was Vladimir Putin’s way of signaling to the United States and other nuclear powers that 

Moscow would not sit idle while others augment their 

own capabilities.58 In a way, the Russians were offering a choice between a new race in advanced weapon 

systems and return to binding restraints and limitations in developing and introducing these systems.59
119

In the latter case, they expected opponents, the United 

States in particular, to recognize that Russia deserves 

a “special place” in geopolitics by virtue of its military 

and economic potential, size, history, and culture.60

In an obvious demonstration of his readiness to 

deflate tensions and fulfill Russia’s arms control obligations, shortly after his formal election to the presidential post, Vladimir Putin moved to expedite ratification of the START II Treaty. On April 14, 2000, Putin 

could master the majority of votes in the State Duma 

in support of the Treaty. In assuring the ratification 

that eluded his predecessor for many years, the new 

Russian President was motivated as much by the desire to bring the Russian legislature under his control 

as by the need to avoid the image of a “weakling” in 

the eyes of Washington. 

However, Vladimir Putin and people around him 

were evidently well aware of the serious misgivings 

of the Russian military about START II. Almost from 

the moment it was signed by Presidents Bill Clinton 

and Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993, many in the Russian political elite and the expert community argued 

against its ratification because allegedly it worked 

against Russian interests and represented a “huge 

concession” to the United States.

Moscow was also well aware that parallel to efforts at making START II effective, the United States 

was considering changes to or abrogation of the ABM 

Treaty in order to implement its BMD programs. 

Clearly, it was with Putin’s acquiescence that the State 

Duma added a provision to its START II ratification 

document stating that Russia would not be tied by this 

or other arms control agreements if the ABM Treaty 

was violated by the United States According to Russian experts, “Thus, the link that Gorbachev failed to 
120

insist upon in 1991 was re-established nine years later 

by Russia” under Vladimir Putin.61

The START II Treaty had never entered into force. 

Besides linking the fate of the Treaty to U.S. adherence to the ABMT, the Russian legislative decision on 

ratification made its implementation contingent on 

the U.S. Senate ratifying a September 1997 addendum 

to the treaty that included “Agreed Statements on 

ABM-TMD Demarcation.”62 Neither of these occurred 

because of U.S. Senate opposition, where a faction 

objected to any action supportive of the ABMT. On 

June 14, 2002, one day after the United States formally 

withdrew from the ABMT, Russia announced its withdrawal from START II. 

However, Russian “firmness” was of dubious political and practical value. In effect, failure to prevent 

the demise of the ABMT was apparently a good lesson for the Putin government. It demonstrated that 

no amount of rhetoric and verbal threats can affect 

actions of a stronger and determined opponent. The 

Russians realized that dragging their feet with START 

II ratification, refusal to accept earlier compromise 

proposals on BMD modification to accommodate particular U.S. interests in developing limited ABM capabilities, and, generally speaking, lack of flexibility and 

failure to use windows of opportunity in fluid diplomatic exchanges had resulted in the ultimate loss for 

the weaker side. 

To the credit of the Putin government and Vladimir 

Putin personally, they refused the temptation to react 

hysterically and stir up still another massive accusatory campaign against the United States in response 

to the actual U.S. moves to withdraw from the ABMT 

(the U.S. announcement on the withdrawal was issued 

on December 13, 2001, and the Treaty ceased to exist 

on June 13, 2002.)63
121

As seen by a Russian expert: 

In mid-2001 Putin suddenly softened the linkage [between strategic offensive and defensive weapons] . . .

eventually permitting George W. Bush to scrap the 

ABM Treaty without worrying about an adequate 

Russian response. By doing so, Putin also undermined 

the arguments of the opposition in the United States to 

Bush’s decision that claimed that scrapping the Treaty 

would lead to a new armaments race.64

Similar realpolitik calculations apparently played a 

mitigating role in defining Russia’s reaction to the initial NATO enlargement.65 Obviously, Vladimir Putin 

was personally responsible for preventing outbursts 

of indignation and promises of counteractions that 

could not be supported by actual demonstrations of 

Russian power and could do more harm than good to 

the Russian reputation in Europe and beyond. 

Moscow saw a relative “compensation” for ceding 

ground on the ABMT and taking an accommodating 

stand on global issues in the U.S. agreement to negotiate and conclude the “Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty” (SORT), also referred to as the “Moscow 

Treaty. 66 The Kremlin presented the signing of the 

Treaty on May 24, 2002 as its “big success” despite 

the Treaty’s alleged deficiencies, such as lack of explicit elaborate verification and other implementing 

arrangements, on the analogy with START, and the 

possibility of “uploading” warheads removed from 

their carriers for storage and not elimination at some 

point in the future.67

As the Soviets before them, the Russians saw arms 

control negotiations and agreements creating a quintessential paradigm for “equalizing” Russian and U.S. 

roles in such key areas of international diplomacy 
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as WMD nonproliferation, global and regional security systems, etc.68 Director of the Russian Institute for 

Strategic Studies Yevgenii Kozhokhin described Russian “self-interest” in arms control in connection with 

the signing of SORT and other bilateral agreements in 

Moscow in May 2002: 

Russia does not conceal its vested interest in the agreements that have been signed. It looks like Moscow is 

primarily motivated by the desire to enshrine in the 

agreement equality in the relations with the U.S. and, 

if possible, to maintain at least a seeming parity in 

strategic arms. A factor of no less importance is Russia’s hope that it will be able to put an emphasis on 

the principle of interdependence between strategic 

offensive and defensive weapons. These must be the 

reasons why Moscow insisted on a legally binding 

character of the future agreement. From Russia’s point 

of view, no other document could help it achieve these 

goals.69

SORT was particularly welcome for Moscow, especially since it came at a time when the structure of 

traditional arms control was shattered by the disappearance of the ABMT of 1972, which was long considered by the Russians to represent the cornerstone 

of the entire bilateral strategic arms control.70

By consenting to a significantly less structured 

arms control and the abandonment of the direct qualitative and quantitative parity in offensive and defensive capabilities, the Kremlin appeared to have not 

only accepted the unavoidable, but also untied its own 

hands in pursuing modernization of nuclear forces in 

line with internal economic and political exigencies. 

The Russians took advantage of the relatively improved strategic relations with the United States to 
123

facilitate the elimination of weapon systems that were 

either too old, or too costly to maintain for purposes 

of “sufficient” deterrence while concentrating on the 

development and production of modern and more effective systems. They also sought to promote bilateral 

and multilateral cooperation with the West in areas 

where Moscow lacked resources and/or advanced 

technologies, e.g. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). 

A key Russian diplomatic initiative, intended as 

an alternative to the U.S. global BMD system, was the 

offer to create a “European ABM system.” The EuroABM was supposed to be built with the help of Russian tactical ABM technologies that could allegedly 

protect the European continent, including the European part of the RF, against non-strategic ballistic missiles71 Moreover, the Russian government proposed to 

participate in developing “strategic” ABM systems 

in cooperation with the United States on the basis of 

“equality of rights” and under an “appropriate legal 

framework.”72

THE MEDVEDEV-PUTIN DUUMVIRATE

The elevation of Dmitrii Medvedev to the pinnacle 

of the Russian political hierarchy did not and apparently could not make any major changes to the Russian nuclear strategy, especially the reliance on nuclear weapons. Medvedev was hand-picked by Vladimir 

Putin as his successor. Both share power in a duumvirate arrangement. Disagreements between the two are 

limited to secondary matters.

As a symbolic gesture addressed to the Russian 

people and the rest of the world, on May 15, 2008, 

hardly a week after his formal inauguration as the RF 

President (May 7, 2008), Dmitrii Medvedev visited the 

field positions of the 54th missile division of the Stra-
124

tegic Missile Troops at the Teikovo Missile Complex 

(Ivanovo Region). On the occasion, the presidential 

press service announced proudly:

The 54th missile division is the first formation in 

charge of the new, refitted mobile land-based missile 

system Topol-M. In 2006 the first missile battalion 

armed with such weapons came into active service. 

In December of last year a second Topol-M missile 

battalion with three launchers was put into service at 

the Teikovo Missile Complex. The Topol-M missile 

complex represents the latest achievements of science 

and technology. The take-off weight of the missiles is 

47 tons, their military payload is 1200 kilograms, and 

their flight range 10,000 kilometers.73

Medvedev’s first year in power was marked by 

the worst crisis in Russia’s relations with Georgia. 

The August 2008, war between the two former Soviet 

republics was ostensibly handled primarily by Medvedev as the new Russian Commander-in-Chief even 

though it is evident that Mr. Putin participated fully in 

war planning and eventual resolution of the conflict.74

While criticizing the United States for “unilateralism” and foreign “adventurism” the Russian leaders 

sought cooperation with the United States on many 

evolving negative global phenomena—from fluctuating market conditions to the rise of radicalism, international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, etc. In 

effect, despite its displeasure with the Republican Administration, the Medvedev government demonstrated eagerness to involve Russia in global cooperative 

ventures led by the United States, e.g., the Group of 8 

(G-8) and the Group of Twenty (G-20). 

With the coming to power in the United States of 

the Democratic Administration, both Medvedev and 
125

Putin saw added opportunities for promoting Russian 

strategic interests and, in particular, the Russian arms 

control agenda. Moscow took advantage of Washington’s intention (many think idealistic and eventually 

detrimental to better U.S. interests)75 to significantly 

reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons, 

in order to expedite negotiations on the new bilateral 

strategic arms reduction treaty (START III).

The Kremlin praised the signing of the treaty on 

April 8, 2010 to replace both SORT and START I (that 

had actually expired in December 2009) as a symbol 

of “continued strategic parity.”76 Pro-government 

experts hailed the new treaty as extremely beneficial for the RF. As stated by the Director of the U.S. 

and Canada Institute of the RF Academy of Sciences,

Sergei Rogov:

We will not have to reduce anything prematurely. 

In effect, the ceilings established by the new START 

Treaty do not force us to reduce currently available 

strategic offensive forces, in contrast to previous treaties that banned or limited our heavy missiles as well 

as our mobile MIRVed ICBMs. These limitations have 

disappeared, and the Treaty allows us to conduct the 

modernization of our strategic forces since the old 

Soviet weapons have long exhausted their life-terms. 

From now on, each side defines the composition and 

structure of its strategic forces independently. Russia 

now has the capability—previously denied to us—to 

deploy new MIRVed ICBMs as well as new sea-based 

systems. In effect, only budgetary allocations and 

the potential of our industry will define how many 

Topol-M and RS-24 missiles—that would apparently, 

together with the Bulava, form the foundation of Russia’s strategic offensive weapons—we would be able 

to build. It may not be excluded that before the Treaty 

expires and unless Russia and the U.S. conclude new 

agreements on further reductions, as championed by 
126

Obama, there will appear a new type of Russian heavy 

ICBMs. Only the United States will have to conduct 

reductions, albeit not very dramatic ones.77

However a less enthusiastic perspective was offered by analysts without links to the Russian officialdom. For example, Major General (Ret.) Vladimir 

Dvorkin warned that numerical reductions of nuclear 

weapons between the two leading nuclear powers do 

not solve numerous global security problems—from 

nuclear terrorism to regional nuclear conflagrations. 

In the case of Russia, diminished nuclear deterrence 

potential raises uneasy questions about the weakness 

of Russian conventional forces, vulnerability to attack 

with precision weapons; medium- and shorter-range 

missiles no longer possessed by Russia and the United 

States; and the need to take into account the nuclear 

arsenals of U.S. allies, China and other existing and 

emerging possessors of nuclear weapons.78

Some government critics came to regard the new 

START as a “conspiracy” to eventually deprive Russia 

of its nuclear deterrence entirely. The signing of the 

treaty gave rise to numerous publications in Russia on 

the “fallacy” of unilateral nuclear disarmament.79

Parallel to the arms control activity, Medvedev, 

who prides himself on legal expertise and adherence 

to “international legality,” engaged in preparation 

of numerous internal Russian doctrinal documents, 

including an update of the RF Military Doctrine and 

Foreign Policy Concept. In effect, the work on the revision of the 2000 RF Military Doctrine started long 

before Medvedev’s coming to power. For years, Moscow periodically and apparently purposefully circulated rumors on the imminence of the document and 

its forthcoming major novelty, particularly related to 
127

the expanded uses of nuclear weapons. As early as 

October 2003 the military top brass, President Vladimir Putin, administration officials, ministers, security 

chiefs, Duma deputies, and journalists gathered in the 

Defense Ministry to hear Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov present a document titled the “Public Part of the 

Military Doctrine.”80

News on the preparation of a new version of the 

Russian Military Doctrine that was supposed to “concretize” Russian threat perceptions and strategy began 

to circulate with particular intensity around mid-2006, 

at a time when U.S.-Russia relations were at their lowest ebb in years.81 According to media reports, the new 

document was intended not only to directly identify 

the United States and NATO as Russia’s key “potential adversaries,” but also equate threats from Western 

sources to the threat of terrorism.82

On January 20, 2007, at the “Military-and-Scientific 

Conference” of the Academy of Military Sciences, the 

leadership of the RF Armed Forces formally reviewed 

the structure and the content of the new version of 

the Doctrine. According to the report of the conference proceedings by the Academy’s President, Army 

General Makhmud Gareev, nuclear issues occupied 

a special place in the discussions.83 The Doctrine was 

reported to stress the reemergence of the “existential 

nuclear threat” to the RF. As emphasized by General 

Gareev, “nuclear weapons of all states that possess 

them are ultimately aimed at Russia.” In particular, 

as seen by the Russian military, “NATO is engaged in 

creation of powerful groupings of armed forces that 

are dramatically changing the military balance” in Europe and globally.84 Not surprisingly, in light of such 

dire assessments, the proposed new military doctrinal 

document was expected to call for “augmenting the 

[Russian] nuclear potential” in the future.85
128

Justifications for modernization of the Russian 

strategic triad were sought and found in American 

declarations of intentions, statements, and announced 

programs, such as the decision to resume the production of plutonium parts for nuclear bombs86 and 

develop new types of efficient low-yield warheads.87

Alarmist Russian media reports accompanied the appearance of practically any official U.S. policy statement dealing with the issue of nuclear weapons.88

For many years leading to the emergence of a new 

version of the RF Military Doctrine, Moscow tried to 

fight off politically and diplomatically the expanding 

U.S. BMD program and, in particular, U.S. plans to deploy a third BMD site to deal with the growing threat 

of Iranian missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Medvedev government picked up the task of 

opposing the third-site idea with enthusiasm. In his 

first Annual Address to the Federal Assembly in November 2008, he threatened to move Iskander missiles 

capable of carrying nuclear warheads into the Kaliningrad area and provide other responses if and when the 

United States deploys third site elements into Eastern 

Europe.89 Other asymmetrical countermeasures were 

also mentioned with a clear intention to forewarn 

the United States and threaten U.S. European allies. 

For example, former RF Air Force Commander Petr 

Deikin suggested adding nuclear X-55 cruise missiles and the most recent non-nuclear version, X-555 

(both may be carried on Tu-95M and Tu-160 strategic 

bombers), to augment the political impact of Iskander

deployments.90

Expediting work on a “tougher” version of the RF 

Military Doctrine that would emphasize wider potential use of nuclear weapons became an additional 

measure in the Russian arsenal of “asymmetric mea-
129

sures” to counter the U.S. BMD and other perceived 

American technological advances. In early August 

2008, Russian media sources commented briefly on a 

document allegedly prepared by the RF Defense Ministry titled “Draft Concept of the Development of RF 

Armed Forces Until 2030.” The official status of the 

document was unclear. In all probability, it represented a trial balloon by the Russian military establishment intended to check expert and public reactions in 

Russia and abroad to potential changes to the existing 

RF Military Doctrine.91

In December 2008, Russian media sources carried 

a brief official statement attributed to Army-General 

Yuri Baluyevsky, then-deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council (formerly head of the Russian 

General Staff), announcing that the “Security Council, 

together with the Defense Ministry, other interested 

bodies of state power, and both chambers of the parliament commenced the preparation of the new military 

doctrine of Russia.”92 Baluyevsky was quoted saying: 

I was charged to head the working groups of the RF 

Security Council to prepare the draft of a new wording of the country’s military doctrine that would respond to contemporary challenges and threats, and 

the existing changes in the geopolitical and militarypolitical situation in the world, including the growing 

role of military power in politics... The new version 

of the military doctrine should become the response 

to the most topical problems of assuring Russian military security, including the legal foundations for the 

legitimate use (“pravoprimemenie”) of nuclear weapons 

as an instrument of strategic deterrence.93

Along with Medvedev’s threats of forward missile 

deployments, reviving the idea of a “tougher” revi-
130

sion of the Military Doctrine was obviously intended 

to coincide with the U.S. election campaign. This was 

Moscow’s way of sending a message to the future U.S. 

Administration on prospects of bilateral strategic relations. 

Russian observers also linked the flurry of statements on the imminent appearance of the new RF 

Military Doctrine to the new effort by Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov at reforming RF Armed Forces 

undertaken under Dmitrii Medvedev. From the very 

beginning, the reform met with considerable skepticism and criticism by various military and civilian authorities.94 It clearly affected the interests of powerful 

groups in the military-political establishment besides 

thousands in the Officer and General Corps. 

Announcing the resumption of work on the RF 

Military Doctrine, and especially the appointment of 

Yuri Baluyevsky to chair the Editorial Commission to 

define the Doctrine’s basic parameters and substance, 

may have represented a concession to the conservatives who began to regard the Serdyukov reform as 

an attempt to undermine Russia’s ability to engage 

actively in geopolitics and, especially, to use military 

might in the promotion of Russian interests abroad.95

Long before his forced transfer to the RF Security 

Council from the post of General Staff Commander, 

Baluyevsky campaigned for turning the original 2000 

RF Military Doctrine into an aggressive tool justifying 

the use of nuclear weapons not only for retaliation purposes but as a practical tool for defeating aggression 

against Russia with the use of superior conventional 

forces, and even for preemption and suppression of 

activities inimical to Russia’s interests outside its borders, for example those by terrorists and radicals.96

Baluyevsky also consistently spoke in favor of offering an “adequate asymmetrical response to American 
131

and NATO provocations.” In particular, he argued in 

support of targeting the proposed elements of the U.S. 

third BMD site in Eastern Europe by Russian tactical 

and strategic means including nuclear.97

In 2009, the current Secretary of the Security Council and former Director of the Federal Security Service, 

Nikolai Patrushev, sent up still another apparent trial 

balloon dealing with expanded uses of nuclear weapons for preemption and prevention in the RF Military 

Doctrine revision. While asserting that Moscow’s 

main goal was to preserve its nuclear power status, 

he claimed the Doctrine will change conditions for 

the deployment of nuclear weapons to allow their use 

“not only in global but also regional and even local 

conflicts.” According to Patrushev,

The conditions for the use of nuclear weapons to repel aggression with the use of conventional weaponry 

in large-scale, but also in regional and even in a local 

war have been corrected. Moreover, in situations critical for national security, the inflicting of a preventive 

nuclear strike upon an aggressor is not excluded.98

The new RF Military Doctrine was finally approved 

by President Dmitrii Medvedev by virtue of his Decree No. 146 of February 5, 2010. At the same time, 

Medvedev signed “The Foundations of State Policy 

in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020,” which 

was not made public. Opinions differed on the significance of this version of the Doctrine, particularly 

on the meaning of clauses related to nuclear weapons 

use. In the opinion of some Russian experts, “it made 

one more step away from Russia’s obligation not to 

be first in the use of nuclear weapons.”99 A Western 

observer notes in this connection:
132

There are reasons to assert that the Doctrine sanctions 

the use by Russia of nuclear weapons in preventive 

(preemptive) strikes. In its time, this clause stirred a 

lot of hullabaloo and criticism in the West. Currently, 

this clause has been removed from the text of the Doctrine. However, was it removed as such? I do not think 

so. It is probable that the “Foundations of State Policy 

in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020” comprise 

stipulations on preventive (preemptive) strikes.”100

Other experts maintained that “the new Military 

Doctrine appears to reduce, at least somewhat, the role 

of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy.”101 In effect, the 2010 RF Military Doctrine states: 

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use against it and 

(or) its allies of nuclear and other types of weapons 

of mass destruction, as well as in the case of an aggression against the Russian Federation with the use 

of conventional weapons when the very existence of 

the state is placed under threat. 

Doctrine-writing under Medvedev was marked 

by major contradictions. A characteristic example is 

the RF “Foreign Policy Concept” adopted by Dmitrii 

Medvedev on June 12, 2008. The Concept was promoted by the Kremlin as a demonstration of Russia’s 

resolve “to position itself on the international arena 

as a civilized, rule-of-law state.” It professed Russia’s 

trust in “international law as the most stable foundation in relations among states,” and the reliance on the 

UN to ensure international peace.102

Events of the Russian-Georgian war that took place 

shortly after the publication of the Concept apparently forced Medvedev and the Russian political elite to 
133

reconsider its key postulates. Already on September 6, 

2008, at the meeting of the RF State Council, the Russian President announced “the discussion of Russia’s 

new foreign policy strategy,” i.e., the renewed work 

on revising the Concept, to proceed together with activities aimed at “national security consolidation.”103

On May 12, 2009, in his decree No. 537, Dmitrii 

Medvedev approved still another Russian doctrinal 

document—“The Strategy of National Security of the 

Russian Federation to 2020” (NSS). In a sense, it replaced the ill-fated Foreign Policy Concept signed into 

law less than a year before.104 The document reiterated 

that the United States and NATO present threats to 

Russian military security: 

Threats to (Russian) military security include: policies of a number of leading foreign countries aimed 

at attainment of overwhelming dominance in the military sphere, primarily in strategic nuclear forces, by 

means of developing precision, information and other 

high-tech means of military warfare; strategic weapon 

systems with non-nuclear warheads; formation, in a 

unilateral fashion, of the global system of anti-missile 

defense and militarization of the outer space, which 

may lead to a new loop in the arms race, as well as 

proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological technologies, production of mass destruction weapons or 

their components and means of delivery. The state of 

the military security of the Russian Federation and its 

allies is being further negatively affected by the departure from international agreements in the area of 

the limitation and reduction of weapons, as well as by 

actions aimed at the disruption of the stability of the 

systems of state and military command, missile early 

warning, space control, the functioning of strategic 

nuclear forces, installations of nuclear warhead storage, nuclear energy, nuclear and chemical industries, 

and other potentially hazardous installations.105
134

Measures to deal with the above “threats” were, 

however, rather cautious and ambiguous. Besides 

pursuing the reform of the RF Armed Forces to give 

it “a totally new image,” the NSS called for improving 

strategic deterrence and national defense. “Strategic 

deterrence” was defined as implying “the development and systemic implementation of a complex of 

interrelated political, diplomatic, military, economic, 

information and other measures aimed at forestalling 

or reducing the threat of destructive actions by the 

aggressor state (coalition of states).”106 It was further 

clarified: 

Strategic deterrence is conducted with the use of 

the economic capabilities of the state, including the 

resource support of the national security forces by 

means of developing the system of military-patriotic 

education of RF citizens, as well as the military infrastructure and the system of managing the military organization of the state.”107

As far as “national defense” is concerned, the NSS 

stipulated:

The RF assures national defense on the basis of the 

principles of rational sufficiency and effectiveness, including by methods and means of non-military reaction, mechanisms of public diplomacy, peacekeeping 

and international military cooperation. Military security is assured by means of developing and improving 

the military organization of the state and the defense 

potential, as well as by earmarking for these purposes 

of sufficient financial, material and other resources.108

The “Strategy of National Security of the Russian 

Federation to 2020” struck many observers in Russia 

as a fairly eclectic, poorly organized and poorly edited 

document.109
135

CONCLUSION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES 

DEFINING RUSSIAN DOCTRINES

Barring unpredictable major changes at the top of 

the Russian ruling elite or dramatic transformations in 

the internal Russian situation and/or Russia’s international environment, Russian doctrinal thinking will 

continue to be affected by the following circumstances, considerations, and perceptions that contributed to 

the emergence recent Russian strategic documents. 

Paranoiac Threat Assessments.

Despite repeated calls for strategic partnership 

between Russia and the West, and limited progress 

in select areas, such as arms control, as well as some 

cooperation in areas where Russian and U.S. interests and policies converge, the ruling political elite 

in Moscow remains deeply suspicious of American 

intentions and policies. The Russians usually see 

American advances, especially in the geopolitical and 

military-technological areas, as intrinsically inimical 

to Russian interests. In a typical alarmist assessment 

by Colonel General Andrei Nikolaev, Chairman of the 

State Duma Defense Committee: 

The gap between good intentions on establishing 

world peace and the real policy on the use of force 

is not diminishing but expanding. Tendency to militarizing the international life is becoming more and 

more awesome. . . . In recent years some progress 

was achieved in the sphere of reducing and limiting 

weapons. However, that process mostly involved 

qualitative parameters of the “man-killing industry”, 

while quantitative transformations in the area of the 
136

creation of new weapon systems and particularly new 

methods of conducting contemporary warfare remain 

without attention and critical analysis. High precision weapons, arms based on new physical principles, 

new methods of using space for the conduct of war... 

have no legal or moral limits. It is difficult to talk 

about international legal limitations for the new race 

in super new weapons when the international law is 

subjected to the revision by states (the U.S., Britain) 

that should be guarantors of international stability... 

Today, the U.S. and NATO have occupied such strategic boundaries in Europe and the Central Asian region 

that they could not even dream about before. Military 

structures, created for purposes of the Cold War are 

not only being preserved but are also expanding... 

Indeed, today, there exists perhaps no clear threat for 

Russia. But what will happen tomorrow when the balance of forces changes dramatically? In case of need, 

NATO may create any military scenario that suits its 

interests... like in the Balkans.”110

The prevailing Russian opinion is that the United 

States seeks to establish its dominance in both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. Current U.S. 

championship of total nuclear abolition is also generally suspect despite Moscow’s eagerness to pay lip 

service to the abstract ideal of the non-nuclear world. 

“Nuclear zero” proposals are often seen as a thinly 

veiled attempt to disarm Russia by neutralizing its 

nuclear potential. A widely held view among Russian 

experts is that their country would not be able to compete with the United States and other Western powers 

and probably even China in advanced non-nuclear 

systems, and may eventually become victim of pressures and blackmail if left without nuclear weapons:

Today, nuclear weapons are a factor of deterrence. 

However, take a closer look: the Americans are al-
137

ready developing the theory of strategic non-nuclear 

deterrence... Actual use of nuclear weapons... puts an 

end to any deterrence because it results in irreversible 

processes. In contrast, strategic high-precision nonnuclear weapons may be used both for deterrence and 

punishment. This is why in America. . . . they are now 

seriously looking at strategic non-nuclear deterrence 

that offers significantly more flexible capabilities for 

use and punishment of any aggressor specifically for 

purposes of deterrence.111

Importantly, since the collapse of the bipolar 

world, Russian policymakers no longer base their military and foreign policy decisions only on the analysis of the state of relations with the United States and 

NATO. Currently, Russian leaders recognize the existence and growth of multiple sources of threats and 

challenges to their country in proximity to Russian 

borders and across the world. It is highly doubtful 

that, even if bilateral U.S.-Russian relations miraculously evolved into a strategic partnership in the near 

future, Moscow would be prepared to give up nuclear 

weapons as an ultimate guarantee of Russian security. 

In view of the persistently negative Russian threat 

assessments, it is highly questionable that the Russian military-political leadership would make drastic 

changes to their country’s doctrines and strategies in 

the foreseeable future, let alone relinquish instruments 

of power painstakingly restored in recent years, particularly the Strategic Nuclear Forces. A more probable development would be the inclusion into Russian 

doctrinal documents of certain abstract statements on 

benign Russian intentions that would be attractive to 

the general public but totally unbinding for policymakers. In effect, this is exactly the way Soviet policies 

were presented to the outside world as compendiums 
138

of grand declarations that often had no link to real intentions and actions of the political elite.

Reliance on MAD.

Russian politicians and experts remain nostalgic 

of the strategic balance paradigm based on MAD and 

would like to go back to similar arrangements in current U.S.-RF strategic relations. Many of them would 

actually like the bilateral strategic balance to remain 

the foundation of global stability. As explained Major 

General (Ret.) Vladimir Belous:

During the Cold War there emerged an approximate 

balance between both sides in strategic offensive 

weapons that contributed naturally to strategic stability and the concept of nuclear deterrence based 

on the central model of mutual assured destruction 

(MAD) that has never lost its topicality... The process 

of globalization and ‘restructuring’ of the world order 

creates strong premonitions since neither a unipolar, 

nor a multi-polar system would be able to assure the 

desired global stability. The unipolar model cannot do 

that because of the extreme egocentrism of the single 

state at its center, and the multi-polar one because of 

the interaction of the mostly antagonistic conglomerate of vectors of geopolitical and geo-strategic interests 

of many countries. Under these conditions, the role of 

the nuclear policies, especially of the U.S. and Russia 

that inherited huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and 

traditional views on their military uses from the time 

of the Cold War, is clearly growing.112

Under both Presidents Putin and Medvedev, the 

concept of MAD continued to form the de-facto basis of Russian views on bilateral relations with the 

United States in the nuclear sphere despite the formal 
139

termination of the Cold War and the disappearance 

of the main document that used to codify MAD-type 

relationship—the ABMT. In the view of many Russian 

experts:

Despite the changes in the world, in U.S.-Russian relations and the policies of both countries, in their doctrines and operational plans for the use of strategic 

nuclear forces, both Russia and the U.S.A. continue 

to proceed from the concept of mutual nuclear deterrence113. 

Russia will most probably continue sticking to its 

opposition to BMD and the need to restore formal 

linkages between strategic offensive and defensive 

systems in line with the “classical” model of MAD.114

However, expert demands in favor of developing 

Russia’s own BMD,115 as well as other hi-tech systems, 

such as non-nuclear strategic missiles are growing.116

It may not be excluded that the military-political leadership will sooner or later recognize the validity of 

these demands. Russia’s interest in cooperation with 

the United States and other technological powers in 

developing such systems may grow in the future and 

lead to changes in adamant Russian views on offensive-defensive linkages.

Search for Strategic Parity.

The Russian psyche was traumatized by the collapse of the Soviet Union. By and large, the new Russian policymaking elite that progressively acquired 

a distinct nationalistic orientation, refuses to abide 

by the global status-quo that reserves only secondary roles for Russia in world affairs. The nuclear area 

is virtually the only area where Russia had retained 
140

approximate equality of capabilities with the United 

States. 

It is with this quasi-parity in nuclear potentials in 

mind, and emboldened by the progress in reconstructing Russia’s economic and military potential as the result of favorably changing global prices for energy raw 

materials, that in early 2007 the Kremlin stepped up 

efforts to reclaim greater political equality with Washington in global and regional affairs. In a landmark 

presentation at the “Munich Conference on Security 

Policy” (February 10, 2007), President Vladimir Putin 

declared Russian rejection of American unilateralism 

in international affairs.117

The RF President accused the United States of 

“overstepping its national borders in every way” 

and essentially declared Moscow’s determination to 

oppose Washington’s “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions.”118 Mr. Putin reiterated Russia’s 

intensely negative reactions to NATO’s advancement 

towards its borders, U.S. BMD-related deployments 

in Eastern Europe, and “space militarization” and reasserted that his government is prepared to provide 

“asymmetric responses” to these perceived “threats to 

Russian security.”119 Importantly, Dmitrii Medvedev, 

while slightly toning down the anti-American rhetoric 

of his predecessor in his public statements, essentially 

continued the critique of American global policies after becoming the RF President.120

Liberal Russian politicians and experts were 

thrilled to hear from the new U.S. Administration 

that it plans “to stop the development of new nuclear 

weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian 

ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; and seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of 

nuclear weapons and material.”121 In line with these 
141

goals and the promise “to extend a hand if others are 

willing to unclench their fist,”122 both sides rushed to 

renew strategic arms control negotiations on a followon agreement to START I123 and broader areas of cooperation to reduce the number of nuclear weapons 

and prevent further proliferation in accordance with 

joint statements issued by President Obama and Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev in London on April 

1, 2009.124

The signing of the new START agreement brought 

many in Moscow to near-euphoria. In Russian eyes, it 

vindicated Russian adherence to MAD and the linkage between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, and carried a promise of limiting the U.S. global 

BMD effort, especially as far as deployments close 

to Russian borders are concerned. The Kremlin will 

most probably be able to assure the treaty’s ratification in the State Duma where it enjoys a comfortable 

majority (both countries need to proceed to the ratification simultaneously). The situation in the United 

States, where many question the basic MAD-oriented 

premise of the treaty, the ultimate value it may have 

for U.S. security, and the direction it gives to U.S. nuclear strategy, may be very different.125 In case START 

ratification stalls or the treaty fails to enter into force 

altogether, the Russian Federation may experience 

an upsurge in anti-Americanism. This is bound to be 

reflected at some stage in Russia rewriting its military and foreign policy guidelines. Even if the treaty 

is ratified, Russia may change its attitude towards it 

depending on the on-going U.S. BMD programs in Europe and other regions in accordance with Moscow’s 

clarifying statement on missile defense at the signing 

of START.126
142

Internal Russian Evolution.

Russia’s military and foreign policies depend on 

internal political, economic, and security stability. At 

this point, the Medvedev-Putin duumvirate appears 

to be in control of the situation in the country. However, it faces mounting challenges:

• Russia failed to evolve into an open democracy-based society. An authoritarian regime may 

hold the country together for a relatively long 

time, especially if it indulges in populism and 

has resources to maintain a reasonably reliable repressive apparatus, docile legislature 

and mass media. However, as the Soviet and 

other similar experiences demonstrate, collapse 

of this type of a regime usually comes precipitously and acquires devastating proportions. 

Regime changes that took place in some former 

Soviet republics serve as pertinent examples.

• The global and internal Russian economic crises forced the government to make adjustments 

to ambitious plans of expansion and growth 

in many areas, including defense modernization. Resources previously available from such 

sources as exports of oil and gas and were in 

part used to maintain stability, are dwindling. 

The gap between the haves and the have-nots 

in Russia is expanding rapidly, fueling public 

discontent. 

• The authorities are largely incapable of eradicating massive corruption and criminality, as 

well as the flight of capital from Russia that 

could otherwise be used for development.127

• Frenetic attempts to streamline, restructure and 

improve the performance of the government 

apparatus have been ineffective. 
143

• Reforms of the army, law-enforcement and judicial systems that traditionally provide stability and security for the regime are failing. 

• According to some worst-case predictions, 

Russia may soon be unable to effectively defend itself with conventional forces. Under this 

scenario, the emphasis on nuclear weapons’ 

use will undoubtedly grow.

• Serious deterioration or eventual collapse of 

law-and-order in the country may again raise 

the vital question of security and safety of nuclear and other sensitive materials and installations, and potential WMD proliferation from 

Russian sources. 

• The seemingly amicable relationship between 

two top Russian leaders may deteriorate or 

break down, especially if the duumvirate comes 

under serious pressures from opponents, rivals, 

and an unhappy and irate public, including the 

military and other people in uniform.

These and many other so far unforeseen developments may change the Russian scene. Any major 

transformations in Russia are bound to modify that 

country’s policies, stated strategic goals and doctrines. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. On May 12, 2010, The Russian Federation (RF) Foreign 

Ministry announced it is “considering the possibility of publicizing data on its nuclear weapons” following similar moves by 

the United States and Great Britain and in the spirit of the new 

arms control treaty signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and 

RF President Dmitrii Medvedev in Prague, the Czech Republic, 

on May 8, 2010. See “Russia May Divulge Data on Its Nuclear 

Arsenal,” RIA Novosti, May 12, 2010, in Russian, available from 
144

army.lv/ru/yadernoe-oruzhie/901/24532. It has not been indicated, 

however, whether Moscow intends to include the numbers and 

types of tactical nuclear weapons in its possession if and when 

this information is released.

2. For a more detailed assessment of these issues, see Andrei 

Shoumikhin, “Goals and Methods of Russian Arms Control Policy: Implications for U.S. Security,” National Institute for Public Policy, August 2008, available from nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/

Publication%20Archive%20PDF/Russian%20Arms%20Control%20

web.pdf.

3. The Kremlin relies on various institutional mechanisms 

in defining the Russian military, including nuclear and foreign 

policy. They include the Russian Security Council, the presidential administration, appropriate legislative and technical bodies 

of the Federal Assembly—the Russian two-chamber parliament 

consisting of the State Duma and the Council of Federation, such 

as the committees and commissions on defense, national security, 

and international affairs; as well as professional apparatuses of 

government ministries and other bodies, particularly the Foreign 

Ministry of the Russian Federation, the Defense Ministry, and the 

Ministry of Atomic Energy. Relatively speaking, there is currently 

a greater variety of sources for military and foreign policymaking than under the Soviet system. The ongoing, albeit slow, process of the formation of civil society in Russia, including greater 

freedom of speech and expression allowed various academic and 

educational institutions, public organizations, think-tanks, expert 

associations, individual specialists, and representatives of mass 

media to speak freely on foreign and military matters, particularly arms control policy and negotiation; the military reform; and 

civilian control of the armed forces. The Council on Foreign and 

Defense Policy (see www.svop.ru); Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics 

and Technology (see www.armscontrol.ru/); The Russian Center for 

Policy Studies (see www.pircenter.org); and the Institute for Political and Military Analysis (see www.ipma.ru). 

4. See Andrei Shoumikhin, “Change and Continuity in Russian Arms Control,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, Issue 2, 2009, 

pp. 140-153.
145

5. Andrei A. Gromyko, “To Be Remembered,” Vol. II, Moscow, Russia: Politizdat, 1990, p. 221.

6. The Russians pride themselves on being the first in the 

world to test a prototype ballistic missile interceptor on March 

4, 1961, at the Sary-Shagan testing ground near Lake Balkhash. 

(See “The Birth of System ‘A’,” Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, Vol. 

33, No. 149, August 5, 2006, in Russian, available from www.vpknews.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2006.149.articles.army_03). The 

warhead used was a conventional one and intercepted a ballistic 

missile of the R-12 type that was moving at the speed of 3 km per 

second. See Stanislav Menshikov, “Missile Defense: A Russian 

Perspective,” ECAAR-Russia Paper, July 21, 2002, available from 

www.fastcenter.ru/ecaar/UNdraft.PDF).

7. See Anatolii Dobrynin, Highly Confidential. Ambassador in 

Washington under Six U.S. Presidents, 1962-1986, Moscow, Russia: 

Avtor Publishers, 1997, in Russian, p. 133.

8. Ibid., pp. 150-152.

9. Menshikov. 

10. See “Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, A Status Report,” Fact Sheet, Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute, June 2001, available from editors.sipri.se/

pubs/Factsheet/Missile_defence.pdf.

11. Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, (With 

contributions from Oleg Bukharin, Timur Kadyshev, Eugene Miasnikov, Pavel Podvig, Igor Sutyagin, Maxim Tarasenko, and Boris Zhelezov), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 620-622.

12. See R. M. Dyachkov, “The History of the Conclusion of the 

Treaty on Limiting Antiballistic Missile Defense of 1972,” IX International Conference “Lomonosov-2002,” available from www.hist.

msu.ru/Science/LMNS2002/23.htm.

13. See A. A. Gromyko, A. A. Bessmertnykh, P. Zhilin, G. 

M. Kornienko, and V.F. Petrovskii, eds., The Struggle of the USSR 

against Nuclear Danger, Arms Race and for Disarmament. Documents 

and Materials, Moscow, Russia: Politizdat, 1987, in Russian.
146

14. See “Concepts of SNF Development of the USSR in 40s90s,” Arms.ru, in Russian, available from www.arms.ru/nuclear/1.

htm. 

15. Richard Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could 

Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” reprinted from Commentary, 1977, 

available from www.etpv.org/bills_page/nuclear.html.

16. “Address by the General Secretary of the CC of CPSU, 

Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the 

Second Special Session of the UN,” June 15, 1982, in Russian, 

available from www.nasledie.ru/politvne/18_6/oonb.htm.

17. Dobrynin, pp. 598-599.

18. Ibid., pp. 623- 629.

19. Mikhail Gorbachev, “Memoirs,” New York: Doubleday,1996, pp. 406-408.

20. Gorbachev.

21. See Andrei Kokoshin, “The Competition of ‘Asymmetrical 

Responses’ Began in the 80s,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, July 

7, 2007, in Russian.

22. Maksim Kalashnikov, “The Empire’s Broken Sword,” 

available from www.e-lib.info/book.php?id=1121022183&p=0.

23. Gorbachev, pp. 445, 451.

24. Ibid., Menshikov.

25. Podvig, ed., “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” p. 655.

26. Dobrynin, p. 661.

27. Ibid., Menshikov.

28. Aleksandr Golts, “Why Russia Has Let Its Nuclear Arsenal Go for Soap and Sausage,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 

5, 1995, available from www.fas.org/news/russia/1995/sov95175.htm.
147

29. “Yeltsin Rattles Nuclear Sabre after Criticism over Chechnya,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 42, December 1999, available from www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/dd/dd42/42sabre.htm.

30. See Ashton B. Carter, “U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in Dismantling 

Their Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Congressional Hearings, 

“Special Weapons: Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Missile,” 

House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 21, 1993, available 

from www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1993_h/930921-ash.htm. 

31. The First-Strike Doctrine, Scilla.ru, June, 13, 2010, available 

from www.scilla.ru/content/view/3533/2/.

32. See “There Will Be No RAKs without MAKs,” Rossiiskaya 

Gazeta, March 11, 1999, available from www.buran.ru/htm/11-3-99.

htm.

33. Decree No. 1833 was submitted for the consideration of the 

RF Federal Assembly (parliament) elected on December 12, 1993, 

however, the latter refused to consider it for reasons of continued 

confrontation between the executive and legislative branches in 

Russia.

34. See “Rybkin Reasserts Moscow’s Right To Use Nuclear 

Weapons,” Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, May 13, 1997, GlobalSecurity.org, available from www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/

russia/1997/drsov05131997000591.htm.

35. The Treaty was signed on January 3, 1993, by President 

George Bush, Sr., and President Boris Yeltsin. It codified the “Joint 

Understanding” arrived at by the two Presidents at the Washington summit on June 17, 1992. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and 

consent to ratification of START II on January 26, 1996. Ratification of the Treaty in the Russian Duma proved elusive for Yeltsin 

in view of the strong opposition of the Russian legislature. See 

Eugene Myasnikov, “Problems of START-2 Treaty Ratification in 

Russia. Is START-3 Possible?” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 12, 

1996, in Russian.
148

36. See Andre de Nesnera, “Who Is Putin?” GlobalSecurity.

org, available from www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia

/2000/000128-rus1.htm. 

37. See “The Insider’s Guide to Vladimir Putin,” October 

26, 2006, CNN International, available from edition.cnn.com/2006/

WORLD/europe/10/25/insider.putin/.

38. See “Vladimir Putin Lines Up the Parties Under the Vertical 

of Power,” Newsru.com, April 15, 2005, in Russian, available from 

www.moscow2000.ru/news/view2.asp?Id=13767&IdType=2; “The

Russian Opposition Is Unhappy with the Power ‘Vertical’ Built by 

Putin,” Information-Analytic Portal of the Union State, July 9, 2006, 

in Russian, available from www.soyuz.by/second.aspx?document=21

540&uid=4&page=4&type=Qualifier. 

39. “The Russian Opposition Is Unhappy with the Power 

‘Vertical’ Built by Putin.” 

40. See “Sergei Kortunov, “On the Quality of the National 

Elite,” Intelligent, January 23, 2006, in Russian, available from 

www.c-society.ru/wind.php?ID=244495&soch=1. 

41. See V. S. Elistratov, “The National Language and National 

Idea,” Gramota.ru, in Russian, available from www.gramota.ru/

mag_rub.html?id=54; “The Russian National Idea,” Vostok14.ru. in 

Russian, available from www.vostok14.ru/?page=idea.

42. See Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the Benediction Ceremony of the Cross-and-Banner Procession,” President of Russia 

Official Web Portal, in Russian, available from www.kremlin.ru/appears/2003/07/31/1518_type63374_49692.shtml.

43. Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic 

Posture,” Russian Security Strategy under Putin: U.S. and Russian 

Perspectives, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, November 2007, p. 35.

44. Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia Official Web 

Portal, May 10, 2006, available from www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml. 
149

45. Vladimir Putin, “Opening Address at Meeting on Developing Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Complex,” President of Russia 

Official Web Portal, March 30, 2006, available from www.kremlin.ru/

eng/speeches/2006/03/30/2300_type82913_104010.shtml.

46. Vladimir Putin, Interview with Al Jazeera Television Channel, October 16, 2003, President of Russia Official Web Portal, available from www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2003/10/16/1648_54238.

shtml.

47. “Opening Remarks at Meeting with Heads of the Russian Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy Complexes,” NovoOgaryovo, June 9, 2006, President of Russia Official Web Portal, 

available from www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/06/09/1952_

type82912type82913_106757.shtml.

48. Vladimir Sokirko, “Top-ol, Top-ol!!” Moskovskii Komsomolets, December 23, 1999, OSC Doc. FTS19991222001392; 

“CINC Yakovlev Interviewed on 40th Anniversary of RVSN,” 

Nezavisimoe Voennoye Obozrenie, December 17, 1999, OSC Doc.

CEP19991229000022.

49. Nikolai Sokov, “Russia’s 2000 Military Doctrine,” October 

1999 (revised July 2004), NTI.org, available from www.nti.org/db/

nisprofs/over/doctrine.htm. 

50. See “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 

Adopted by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 

No. 706, April 21, 2000, in Russian, available from www.rg.ru/

oficial/doc/ykazi/doc_war.htm. 

51. See “The Law of the Russian Federation on Defense,” adopted by the State Duma on April 24, 1996, and approved by the 

Federation Council on May 15, 1996, in Russian, available from 

www.hro.org/docs/rlex/defence/index.htm.

52. See “The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,” adopted by the Decree of the President of the Russian 

Federation No. 1300,f December 17, 1997, in the “Edited Version 

of the Presidential Decree No. 24 of January 10, 2000,” in Russian, 

available from www.iss.niiit.ru/doktrins/doktr01.htm.
150

53. See Robert Legvold, “Russia’s Unformed Foreign Policy,” 

Foreign Affairs, September/October 2001, available from www.

foreignaffairs.org/20010901faessay5570/robert-legvold/russia-s-unformed-foreign-policy.html.

54. Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, eds., Nuclear Deterrence and Non-Proliferation, Members of Working Group: Pavel 

Kamennov, Elina Kirichenko and Vladimir Pyryev, Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2006, p. 4, available from www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/books/9735arbatov_eng_blok.pdf.

55. “Russia Reserves the Right to Preemptive Strikes,” Moscow Agentstvo Voennykh Nosostei, February 7, 2007, Open Source 

Center (OSC) Doc.CEP200707950213.

56. “General Says Russia May Target Missile Defense Sites in 

Eastern Europe,” Channel One Television, February 19, 2007, OSC 

Doc. CEP20070219950390.

57. “Baluyevskii Says U.S. European Missile Defense Poses Threat to Russia,” WebDigest.ru, May 3, 2007, OSC Doc. 

CEP2007054358001.

58. See Andrei Yashlavskii and Inga Kumskova, “Moscow 

Flexes Its Muscles,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, March 1, 2007, OSC 

Doc. CEP20070301021003.

59. Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at 

the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” February 10, 2007, 

President of Russia Official Web Portal, available from www.kremlin.

ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82914type84779_118135.shtml.

60. See Nikolai Zyatkov, “Where Is the Smell of Gunpowder 

Coming From?” Argumenty i Fakty, February 19, 2007, OSC Doc. 

CEP20070224950135.

61. Menshikov.
151

62. See Amy F. Woolf, “Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues,” CRS 

Report to Congress, April 27, 2000, available from www.cnie.org/nle/

crsreports/international/inter-68.cfm.

63. Putin’s short statement in response to the American withdrawal announcement made the following points: “The U.S. has 

the legitimate right to abandon the Treaty in accordance with its 

provisions; though an American ‘mistake’ the withdrawal decision does not create immediate threats to Russian security; abandonment of the ABM Treaty leads to the emergence of a legal 

vacuum in the elaborate system of agreements in the sphere of 

disarmament and the nonproliferation; that ‘vacuum’ should be 

filled up by rapid elaboration of a ‘new framework’ of strategic 

mutual relations; under that ‘framework’ considerable reductions 

of offensive weapons should take place (preferably to the level of 

1,500-2,200 warheads for each side).” See Vadim Markushin, “Bad 

News for the World Community,” Krasnaya Zvezda, December 15, 

2001, in Russian.

64. Menshikov.

65. “Russian Reaction to NATO’s Enlargement,” Analitik, 

March 4, 2004, in Russian, available from analitik.org.ua/ukr/current-comment/ext/407412da4f691/pagedoc1095_25/. 

66. “The SOR Treaty calls for the reduction of the strategic nuclear warheads of both Russia and the United States by the end of 

2012 to 1,700-2,200, i.e., approximately by three times compared 

to the level provided by the START 1 Treaty. START 1 itself is 

to remain in force until December 5, 2009, and may then be extended. The SOR Treaty ensures continuity in disarmament and 

arms control in the conditions when the ABM Treaty has ceased 

to be operative, the question of the entry of the START II Treaty 

into force has fallen away, and other disarmament agreements 

are undergoing serious trials. The new Treaty was called upon 

to assist substantially the strengthening of the nonproliferation 

regime as well.” See “Statement by Alexander Konuzin, Deputy 

Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations, at the 

Session of the UN Commission on Disarmament Held on April 1, 

2003.” SORT was ratified by the Duma on May 14, 2003 by votes 

of 294 deputies with 134 voting against and none abstaining.
152

67. See Nikolai Sokov, “The Russian Nuclear Arms Control 

Agenda After SORT,” Arms Control Today, April 2003, available 

from www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/sokov_apr03.asp.

68. While keeping a competitive posture on strategic weapons, Russia is prepared to play a partnership role with the United 

States in curbing WMD proliferation and other areas where both 

nations face similar challenges and threats. For example, in July 

2006, Presidents of both countries launched the joint Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism aimed “to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and 

radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using 

such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities.” “Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin announcing the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” St. Petersburg, Russia, 

July 15, 2006, President of Russia Official Web Portal, available from 

www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2006/07/108727.shtml. 

69. Yevgenii Kozhokhin, “U.S.-Russian Relations: Facts 

and Mutual Expectations,” IAIR Publication, December 2002, in 

Russian, available from www.ipmi.ru/html_en/publication_en/m_

en/06_%20_1_december_2002_en.htm. 

70. According to Nikolai Sokov: “Coupled with the end of 

the ABM Treaty and START 2, SORT marks the end of traditional 

arms control. Further reductions are unlikely in the near future 

because, after SORT is implemented, the United States and Russia will have reached what they feel is the optimal (or close to the 

optimal) level of strategic arsenals that they need: 2,200 deployed 

warheads for the United States and 1,500 for Russia. One possible 

additional step is codification of the ongoing reduction of Russian 

nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but its chances are remote. More 

importantly, managing first-strike capability, which was the key 

motive of traditional arms control, is no longer urgent following the end of the Cold War.” See Nikolai Sokov, “The Russian 

Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT,” Arms Control Today, 

April, 2003.
153

71. “Sergei Ivanov: Russia is for the Creation of Europe’s 

Non-Strategic Anti-Missile Defense System,” Itar-Tass, August 

30, 2005 in Russian.

72. Itar-Tass, August 6, 2005, in Russian.

73. “Visit to Ivanovo, Kostroma, and Yaroslavl Regions.” Teikovo (Ivanovo Region), Kostroma, Yaroslavl, President of Russia 

Official Web Portal, May 15, 2008, available from www.kremlin.ru/

eng/events/chronicle/2008/05/200822.shtml. 

74. According to Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev, “The 

United States of America actively helped Georgia to erect its military machine, pumped money and weapons into it. Unfortunately, at some stage they gave Mr. Saakashvili a carte blanche for any 

actions, including military ones. All this materialized in the aggression that was launched on the night of 7-8 August.” See “Russian President Attacks Georgian Leader, USA in TV Interview,” 

Vesti TV, September 2, 2008, OSC Doc. CEP20080902950547.

75. See Andrei Shoumikhin and Baker Spring, Strategic Nuclear Arms Control for the Protect and Defend Strategy, Global Security, available from www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/

russia/1997/drsov05131997000591.htm, Washington, DC: Heritage 

Foundation, May 4, 2009, available from www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/05/strategic-nuclear-arms-control-for-the-protectand-defend-strategy.

76. See “Russian-US Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of 

Strategic Offensive Arms Has Been Signed. Joint News Conference with US President Barack Obama,” April 8, 2010, Prague, 

The Czech Republic, President of Russia Official Web Portal, available from eng.kremlin.ru/news/271.

77. Sergei Rogov, “Attempt Number 6: the Balance of Achievements and Concessions. Only the United States Will Have to Reduce Its Strategic Forces,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, April 9, 

2010, in Russian, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-09/1_

snv.html.
154

78. Vladimir Dvorkin, “START on the Balance of Strategic 

Stability. The Time Has Come to Rethink Notions Such As Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe 

Obozrenie, April 16, 2010, in Russian, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-16/1_snv.html.

79. See Sergei Brezkun (Kremlev), “The World That Ran 

Away from the Bomb and Was Exploded Afterwards,” Foundation 

of Strategic Culture, February 2, 2010, in Russian, available from 

www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2746.

80. See “Russian Military Doctrine,” GlobalSecurity.org, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/doctrine.htm.

81. See Yurii Kirshin, “Generals Blueprint New Military Doctrine,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 28, 2006, in Russian.

82. See “The Draft New RF Military Doctrine: U.S. Equated to 

Terrorists,” Agentura.ru, September 19, 2006, in Russian, available 

from www.agentura.ru/?p=14&col=1&id=1158642000.

83. See Makhmut Gareev, “New Conditions—New Military 

Doctrine,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 2, 2007 in 

Russian.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Yevgenia Borisova, “U.S. Restarts Its Nuclear Machine,” 

Moscow Times, April 24, 2003.

87. “The U.S. Develops a Super Bomb,” Utro.ru, May 19, 2003, 

in Russian; Vasilii Sergeev, “Nuclear Bombs Become Smaller,” 

Gazeta.Ru, May 21, 2003, in Russian.

88. Alla Yaroshinskaya, “Is the World Moving Towards the 

Nuclear War?” Rosbalt.ru, March 23, 2006, in Russian. 

89. See “Medvedev Sent a Revolutionary Message: He Responded to the U.S. BMD and Increased the Term of Presidency 

to 6 Years,” NEWs.ru, November 5, 2008, available from www.

newsru.com/russia/05nov2008/poslanie1.html.
155

90. Vladimir Ivanov, “Iskanders Alone Are Not Enough. It Is 

Proposed to Use Strategic Aviation to Act against the American 

BMD in Europe,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, November 21, 

2008, in Russian, available from nvo.ng.ru/armament/2008-11-21/8_

iskander.html.

91. See “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” 

Adopted by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 

No. 706 of April 21, 2000, in Russian, available from www.rg.ru/

oficial/doc/ykazi/doc_war.htm. 

92. “They Prepare a New Military Doctrine in Russia—

“Response to Problems,” Russianews.ru, December 12, 2008, in 

Russian, available from russianews.ru/news/20211/.

93. Ibid.

94. See Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “The Institute of Political 

and Military Analysis Raises Alarm. The Reformed Russian Army 

Will Be Able to Fight against Only One Adversary,” December 12, 

2008, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, in Russian, available from 

nvo.ng.ru/forces/2008-12-26/5_analiz.html; Mikhail Rastopshin, 

“’Military Thought’ against the General Staff. It Is Impossible to 

Achieve Permanent Readiness for All New-Look Troops,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, March 12, 2010, in Russian, available 

from nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-03-12/1_genshtab.html?mthree=3.

95. Olga Bozhieva, “Russia Prepares an Anti-Military Doctrine,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, December 11, 2008, in Russian, 

available from www.mk.ru/blogs/MK/2008/12/11/russia/385672/.

96. See for example: “Head of the General Staff: the RF Develops a New Military Doctrine and Plans Military Measures against 

the U.S. BMD,” Newsru.com, May 7, 2007, in Russian, available 

from www.newsru.com/russia/07may2007/baluevskij.html.

97. Ibid.

98. “Patrushev Interview,” Interfax, October 13, 2009; “Security Council’s Patrushev Interviewed on Military Doctrine,” Izvestiya, October 14, 2009.
156

99. “The First-Strike Doctrine,” Scilla.ru, June, 13, 2010, available from www.scilla.ru/content/view/3533/2/.

100. Marcel de Haas, “Doctrinal Stipulations and Political Realities. What Should Be the Western Response to the New Doctrine?” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 2, 2010, in Russian, available from www.ng.ru/realty/2010-02-26/1_doktrina.html.

101. Nikolai Sokov, “The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle,” CNS Feature Stories, February 5, 

2010, available from cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_

doctrine.htm.

102. Olga Mefodyeva:, “Policy Without Double Standards. 

Russian Foreign Policy Concept Seen in Context of Medvedev 

Speech to Ambassadors,” Politcom.ru, July 17, 2008, OSC Doc. 

CEP20080718379002.

103. “State Council to Discuss New Foreign Policy Strategy,” 

Itar-Tass, September 6, 2008, OSC Doc. CEP20080906950051.

104. “The Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020.” in Russian, available from www.nsnbr.ru/strategiya_nb_rf.html.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107 . Ibid.

108. Ibid.

109. See Andrei Konurov, “The Strategy of National Security: the Word and the Deed,” Moscow, Russia: Strategic Culture Foundation, May 18, 2009, available from www.fondsk.

ru/article.php?id=2152; Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia’s Defense 

Modernization Without a Doctrine,” Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 26, 2009, available from search.yahoo.com/

search?p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ocnus.net%2Fartman2%2Fpub
157

lish%2FDefence_Arms_13%2FRussia_s_Defense_Modernization_

Without_a_Doctrine.shtm&ei=utf-8&fr=b1ie7.

110. Andrei Nikolaev, “Old Strategy Refurbished,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 12, 2003, in Russian.

111. Vladimir Slipchenko, “What Kind of War Should Russia Be Prepared to Wage,” Polit.ru, November 23, 2004, available 

from www.flb.ru/info/32983.html.

112. V.S. Belous, “Deterrence and the Concept of First Use of 

Nuclear Weapons,” Personal Web Page, available from www.c-society.ru/wind.php?ID=240498&soch=1.

113. See V.V. Prozorov, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Theory 

of the Application of Strategic Missile Forces,” Part I: Theoretical 

Aspects of the Activity of SMF Groups in Implementing Nuclear Deterrence, Moscow, Russia, 1999.

114. Vladimir Ivanov, “The American Anti-Missile Circle—the 

Pentagon Presented the Plan on Developing BMD Systems,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 26, 2010, in Russian, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-02-26/1_anti-usa.html?mthree=2.

115. Yulii Estenko, “The Capital’s Hole-Ridden Umbrella. The 

Country Lacks Newest AD/ABM Systems,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe 

Obozrenie, February 26, 2010, in Russian, available from nvo.ng.ru/

forces/2010-02-26/1_pro.html?mthree=1.

116 . See Leonid Orlenko, “National Security and Modernization of the Army. To Increase Russia’s Security We Need Accelerated Rearmament of the Army with Newest Non-Nuclear Weapons,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, June 11, 2010, in Russian, 

available from nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-06-11/1_safety.html; Vasilii 

Burenok, “The Basis for Net-Centric Wars—Acceleration, Intellect, Innovations,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, April 2, 2010, 

in Russian, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-02/1_bazis.

html?mthree=4; Mikhail Rastopshin, “’Military Thought’ against 

the General Staff. It Is Impossible to Achieve Permanent Readiness 

for All New-Look Troops,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, March 

12, 2010, in Russian, available from nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-03-12/1_

genshtab.html?mthree=3.
158

117 . Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion 

at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” February 10, 2007, 

President of Russia Official Web Portal, available from www.kremlin.

ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82914type84779_118135.shtml.

118. Ibid. 

119. Ibid.

120. Tatyana Stanovaya, “Medvev Set the Tone of Russian-American Relations,” Politcom.ru, June 9, 2008, OSC Doc. 

CEP20080610015002. 

121. “The Agenda: Foreign Policy,” Washington, DC: The 

White House, March 19, 2009, available at www.whitehouse.gov/

agenda/foreign_policy/ .

122. President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address, January 

21, 2009, Washington, DC: The White House, The White House 

Blog, available from www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.

123. “Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding,” Treaties in Force, Washington, DC: Department of 

State, 2007, p. 5, at www.state.gov/documents/organization/83043.pdf.

124. “Joint Statement by Dmitrii A. Medvedev, President 

of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the 

United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further 

Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arm,” Washington, DC: The 

White House, April 1, 2009, available from www.whitehouse.gov/

the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-BarackObama; and “Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev 

of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the 

United States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, 

April 1, 2009, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/

Joint-Statement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-Federation-and-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America.
159

125. See Keith B. Payne, “Disarmament Danger,” National Review, April 7, 2010, available from article.nationalreview.com/430551/

disarmament-danger/keith-b-payne; Kim R. Holmes, “New START 

Negotiations: Show Us the Records!” Washington, DC: Heritage 

Foundation, May 26, 2010, available from www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/05/New-START-negotiations-Show-us-therecords.

126. See “Statement by the Russian Federation on Missile Defense,” April 8, 2010, President of Russia Official Web Portal, available from eng.news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/4. 

127. Anti-government opposition provides scathing critical 

data on the internal situation in Russia. One of the latest publications of the opposition “Solidarity” movement is a brochure by 

Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, “Putin. Results. 10 Years,”

available from www.putin-itogi.ru/

161

CHAPTER 4

RUSSIA’S SECURITY RELATIONS

WITH THE UNITED STATES:

FUTURES PLANNED AND UNPLANNED

Pavel K. Baev

INTRODUCTION

In the last 5 years, the pattern of security relations 

between Russia and the West has changed twice: first 

towards confrontation resembling a new Cold War, 

and then towards cooperation maturing to a strategic 

partnership. The real amplitude of this swing is significantly less than often presented in the media commentary. The deterioration of relations, which reached 

its nadir in the second half of 2008 following the Russian-Georgian war, was tempered by a mutual desire 

to minimize damage, while cooperation remains hampered by lack of trust. Even so, the shift from a quasiCold War to a partial reset has been remarkably swift; 

it is essential to point out in this context that RussiaU.S. relations have experienced greater volatility than 

the more stable relations between Russia and the key 

European states. It is also useful to establish that the 

escalation of tensions was primarily of Russia’s making, starting with President Vladimir Putin’s memorable Munich speech in February 2007, while the breakthrough towards rapprochement was initiated by the 

U.S. administration of President Barack Obama. The 

Prague Treaty on reducing strategic arsenals signed 

in April 2010 is the main achievement in resetting the 

relations on the cooperative track.
162

The positive shift in relations coincided with the 

lowest phase of the economic crisis, which originated 

in the U.S. financial market but has hit Russia with 

greater force than any of the 20 largest economies in 

the world. The impact on mainstream political and 

security thinking has also been the most profound in 

Moscow, and not only because of the depth of economic contraction but also due to the sudden overturning of the prevalent worldview. Indeed, during Putin’s second presidential term, the perception 

of fast-strengthening Russia that would reclaim its 

natural position among several great powers in the 

emerging world system, which would no longer be 

shaped by U.S. domination, became a political axiom 

for the Russian elites. The extent of Russia’s economic 

vulnerability and political weakness revealed by the 

crisis is not yet fully understood by the disoriented 

policymakers, so the current thinking comes out as an 

incoherent mix of residual assertive ambitions, more 

sober assessments of power balances, and growing 

concerns about the country’s further trajectory.

This chapter does not try to sort out these puzzles, 

but aims at identifying key inconsistencies in the evolving security perceptions and plans while also seeking 

to evaluate the gaps between these perceptions and 

real shifts in Russia’s security posture, offering a few 

propositions about possible development of the latter. 

It starts by presenting the general picture of RussiaU.S. relations as painted and imagined by the present 

leadership in Moscow and then moves to analyzing 

the military-security scenarios and options, narrowing down on specific issues of missiles defense and the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The 

last section attempts to outline possible changes in the 

nature of Russia’s relations with the United States, the 
163

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the 

European Union (EU).

THE MULTI-POLAR WORLD ACCORDING 

TO PUTIN

The vision of a multipolar world constitutes the 

main mental framework in which Russian-U.S. relations are conceptualized, even if it represents a mix 

of several ill-compatible ideas rather than a coherent 

concept. The perception of several global power centers competing for influence is geopolitical in nature, 

and the conviction that their behavior is determined 

by pursuit of national interests could be characterized 

as neo-realist, while there is also a distinctly neo-liberal commitment to upholding international law and 

a preference for strengthening the regulatory authority of international institutions, primarily the United 

Nations (UN). In rhetoric, much attention is given to 

new-age security challenges, from nuclear proliferation to terrorism to climate change, but in real terms, it 

is the traditional interstate power-play that is seen as 

the main source of security threats and dangers.1

The U.S. hegemony in the world system is believed 

to be temporary and fast declining to be replaced by 

a more natural arrangement with five to seven great 

powers interacting free from fixed alliances but forming flexible coalitions in key regions of the world. It 

is logical in this worldview to expect determined and 

even desperate U.S. efforts aimed at prolonging its 

privileged position as the dominant hyper-power, so 

the emphasis on multilateralism in the new U.S. National Security Strategy is seen as a means to this end, 

while unilateralism is the prevalent style of behavior. 

For that matter, the reassurances in this document 
164

and in other public statements that the United States 

would want Russia to be strong and self-confident are 

interpreted in Moscow merely as diplomatic courtesy or transparent deception. The experience of the 

1990s, and in particular the Kosovo war, is accepted 

as proof positive of U.S. intentions to exploit Russia’s 

weaknesses. These intentions are not seen as driven 

by preferences of particular presidents but constitute 

a fundamental strategic line towards marginalization 

of Russia as a potential rising power.2

The assessment of NATO aims and perspectives is 

rather different, despite the extremely hostile attitude 

in 2007-08 towards its supposed enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine. The Alliance is generally perceived as 

a relic of the Cold War destined to drift to irrelevance 

with the weakening of U.S. leadership.3 The war in 

Afghanistan, believed to be unwinnable, is expected 

to push the allies apart, accelerating the fundamental 

trend of consolidation of the EU as an independent 

power pole. At the same time, Western Europe is typically portrayed as a declining and incoherent global 

actor, which is unable to develop sufficient hard power capabilities for projecting its influence. 

This somewhat condescending view illustrates an 

important evolution in Russian security thinking: At 

the start of the 2000s, it was heavily tilted towards 

military-strategic matters, but at the start of 2010s, it 

has become distinctly economized. Vladimir Putin has 

never had a strong military background, but at the 

start of his presidency, his worldview was shaped by 

the heavy impact of the Kosovo war and the imperative to secure a victory in the second Chechen war. 

During his second term, however, the spectacular 

growth of oil and gas revenues caused a corresponding shift of political attention, so that Russia was re-
165

conceptualized as an energy super-power.4 Dmitri 

Medvedev has very little understanding of, and less 

interest in, the traditional hard security agenda, so 

the emphasis on economic globalization and competition has become even more pronounced during 

his presidency. His personal impact on shaping the 

mainstream political perceptions may be limited, but 

the drastic contraction of the oil and gas revenues in 

2009-10 has added convincing power to his discourse 

of modernization, so energy export is now depicted as 

humiliating dependency rather than as a major source 

of power.

There are several serious problems with this pseudo-pragmatic worldview, but perhaps the central one 

is Russia’s doubtful ability to establish itself as an independent and influential pole in the envisaged multipolar world.5

 In this respect, the implications of the 

rise of China are particularly poorly examined beyond 

the rather thin official guideline on developing strategic partnership. The very real and historically sound 

proposition that a multipolar world would bring a 

more tough and less restrained competition between 

great powers, which could put Russia at greater risk 

of confrontation with revisionist predators, is typically neglected.6

 There is a pronounced preoccupation 

with (if not fixation upon) relations with the United 

States that are supposed to deliver evidence of Russia’s status as nearly equal. The economic dimension 

in these relations is, nevertheless, quite underdeveloped, particularly in the energy interactions, which 

are generally at odds with the main thrust of Russian 

foreign policy. This weakness of the economic foundation causes greater volatility in this key fixed dyad

compared with the more stable but highly complex 

Russia-EU relations. Overall, acting as a main pro-
166

tagonist of the cause for dismantling the unfair U.S.-

centric world order, Moscow remains poorly prepared 

for the challenges of Hobbesian futures.

THREATS ARE MANY, BUT DEFENSES ARE FEW

Envisioning the turbulent advent of a multipolar 

world, the Russian leadership adopts a very broad 

interpretation of security, enunciating doctrines not 

only of information security but also of climate security and even food security. Each of these doctrines 

identifies numerous threats and risks, and the aggregate list is provided in the National Security Strategy

to 2020, approved in May 2009. The document establishes that a qualitatively new geopolitical situation 

is emerging in which “interstate tensions caused by 

uneven development resulting from globalization” 

are growing (Article 8), but states that in Russia “the 

foundations for guaranteed prevention of external 

and internal threats to national security are created” 

(Article 1).7

 It would have been logical to expect that 

in the area of military security, the rather vague but 

unmistakably U.S.-focused threats defined in this 

document (“. . . policy of some leading states aimed 

at acquiring decisive military superiority, first of all 

in strategic nuclear forces . . .,” Article 30) would be 

elaborated in the Military Doctrine approved in February 2010. In fact, this document defines threats in the 

most abstract terms (for instance, the first one is “. . . 

sharp aggravation of military-political situation [international relations] and emergence of conditions for 

the use of military force,” Article 10), and is no more 

specific in describing “external military dangers” (for 

instance, “. . . attempts to destabilize situation in some 

states or regions and to undermine strategic stability,” 

Article 8).8
167

This great variety of poorly specified threats and 

risks that are not prioritized in any meaningful way 

makes it impossible to figure out the key parameters 

of real threat assessments on the basis of a bunch of 

recently adopted official documents. It should also 

be noted that the Russian strategic tradition does not 

include such common analytical exercises as scenariobuilding (or, for that matter, game-type modeling), so 

planning for crisis situations typically is linear with 

no alternatives for possible asymmetric responses of 

an adversary. In real-life crises, such inflexible leadership often results in confusion over unintended consequences, but in strategic forecasting, it makes it very 

problematic to suggest how Moscow would react if 

one thing leads to another. The only way to construct 

a sequence of rational choices is to derive intentions 

from available capabilities, assuming that the deciders 

are not misinformed about the latter. In this respect, 

the determined execution of reform of conventional 

armed forces could provide some clues about the security challenges and conflict situations that are seen 

as highly probable by the current Russian leadership.9

The wisdom of launching such a radical military 

perestroika at the start of a devastating and protracted 

economic crisis is questionable, and the reform is definitely generating greater pain and necessitating higher expenditures than budgeted, while its provisional 

results are far from the expectations.10 One of the unannounced but logically deducible guidelines is that 

Russia is no longer expecting or preparing for a largescale conventional war against NATO in the Western 

theater. Indeed, one of the first targets of the reform 

was disbandment of hundreds of skeleton units in 

the Ground Forces and the Air Force, which amounts 

to scrapping of the old Soviet infrastructure of mass 
168

mobilization.11 It is possible to speculate that Defense 

Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, who has never pretended to have a grasp of high strategic matters, opted for 

this goal as one of the easiest in implementation, since 

those empty shells of regiments performed no useful 

role. However, even if abandoning a strategic model 

(dating back to World War I) was not intentional, the 

swift implementation of the disbandment order means 

that under no circumstances would Russia be able to 

deploy even a dozen of cadre divisions by calling reservists. This also means that no minimally meaningful conventional defense could be built in the Far East 

in case of a confrontation with China.12

One implicit reflection on this shift in the Military 

Doctrine is the proposition that:

Despite the diminishing probability of launching a 

large-scale war against the Russian Federation with 

conventional and nuclear weapons, in several directions military dangers for the Russian Federation are 

increasing (Article 7). 

This guideline remains open to interpretation, but it 

is possible to suggest that a June 22-type conventional 

offensive from NATO is now perceived as a negligible 

threat, not least due to unwinnable but inescapable 

engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. What is assessed as a real and high-impact threat (demonstrated 

in the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999) is a series of surgical strikes with long-range high-precision 

weapon systems against which Russia has no effective 

defense and cannot respond in kind.13

The only conceivable, even if unthinkable, option 

for countering such a threat is escalation to the nuclear 

level, and this option needs to be credible in order to 

prevent the execution of punishing strikes. This credi-
169

bility cannot be created by declaring readiness to cross 

the nuclear threshold, which would be politically 

inappropriate, so the Military Doctrine takes a very 

cautious stance on the issue of “first use,” which is reserved for the situation of “threat to the very existence 

of the state” (Article 22).14 The strategic arsenal is supposed to counterbalance the U.S. nuclear triad, as well 

as the nuclear capabilities of France and the United 

Kingdom (UK), so the main means for upholding this 

deterrence of conventional noncontact aggression is 

sub-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons. Complete 

lack of information about these weapons is creating 

a high degree of uncertainty for the potential adversary, and there is practically no guidance for or debate about the character of their instrumentalization.15

Moscow remains highly reluctant to engage in any 

talks on possible reduction of these weapons, which 

should necessarily start with establishing greater 

transparency. 

It is possible to hypothesize that tactical nuclear 

weapons are seen as the major instrument for securing Russia’s ability to dominate the escalation of several local conflicts around its borders.16 In principle, 

the on-going military reform is aimed at creating 

mobile “permanent readiness” brigades that should 

be capable of performing interventions of sufficient 

forcefulness. In reality, however, the cuts in the officer 

corps and failure to build a corps of professional (or 

at least serving on contract) noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs) has led to a sustained decline in the combat 

readiness of the new look Ground Forces.17 This creates a high-risk situation for the near future where 

Russia could find itself so badly trounced in a fastmoving small-to-medium scale hostility that delivering a nuclear strike would become a practical solution.
170

Since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR), it has been the Caucasus that registered the highest level of instability with a great variety of violent conflicts overlapping and resulting in 

nonsustainable deadlocks. Russia performed a number of interventions of different scale, but in 2007-08 

the end of the second Chechen war left it with significant and usable free military capacity, which was put 

to use against Georgia in August 2008.18 Despite the 

spectacular victory, that war has left a highly controversial legacy, as Russia is tempted on the one hand 

to replay the easy walkover and bring the conflict to 

a final solution, but on the other hand, has much diminished military capabilities. What might make this 

conflict prone to nuclear escalation is a possibility of 

U.S. involvement, which Moscow would be desperate 

to pre-empt.

Another potential seat of conflict that attracts priority attention of Russian policymakers is Ukraine, 

which is seen as deeply divided and even artificial 

state. With the election of Viktor Yanukovich as the 

president in February 2010 and his remarkably swift 

consolidation of control over the unruly Ukrainian 

political process, Moscow has become more confident 

in building brotherly relations with the most important of its neighbors.19 Nevertheless, the prospect of 

a new political spasm, similar to the orange revolution of November-December 2004 (which remains a 

looming specter for Putin’s coterie), is perceived as 

fairly high, particularly as the devastating economic 

crisis generates massive discontent. Such a replay of 

the West-sponsored coup against pro-Russian elites 

could result in a split, or indeed multiple splits, of the 

failed Ukraine, which would open a door for NATO 

intervention. The weakness of Russia’s conventional 
171

forces would make nuclear capabilities the only way 

to prevent this politically unacceptable intervention, 

but this non-strategic deterrence could fail, and the 

Kremlin could refuse to accept that its bluff has been 

called. 

MUCH ADO ABOUT MISSILE DEFENSE

AND NOTHING ADO ABOUT THE INF

The plan for deploying some assets of the U.S. 

anti-missile defense system in East-Central Europe 

attracted intense attention of the Russian leadership, 

which, in retrospect, appears to have been disproportional. The National Security Strategy asserts that 

“The capacity for preserving global and regional stability will significantly decline with the deployment 

in Europe of global system of anti-missile defense of 

United States of America” (Article 12); and the Military Doctrine defines “creation and deployment of 

strategic anti-missile systems undermining global stability and violating the existing balance of forces in 

nuclear-missile sphere” as one of “external military 

dangers” (Article 8).20 With the signing of the Prague 

Treaty on reduction of strategic offensive weapons, 

the campaign against (rather than debates about) the 

U.S. missile defense system in the Russian media and 

expert community has sharply subsided, but the issue 

could make a fast comeback if NATO turns down Russian wishes to be inside the defensive perimeter, or if 

a breakthrough in U.S. research and development in 

this area happens.

It appears probable that the Russian leadership 

did fall into a self-made trap of making a claim too far 

and then escalating the rhetoric to justify its mistake 

while at the same time trying some backpedaling to 
172

avoid the need to act on this rhetoric. The underlying reason for that self-defeating over-focusing is the 

lack of competence on strategic matters in the Kremlin, which was aggravated by the severe purges of the 

top brass and mistrust in the few available sources of 

independent expertise. The level of understanding of 

the problem is illustrated by Putin’s explication:

As everyone knows, our American partners are building a global missile-defense system, and we aren’t. 

But missile defense and strategic offensive weapons 

are closely interrelated issues. A balance of forces 

was what kept aggression at bay and preserved peace 

during the Cold War. The missile and air defense 

systems and offensive weapons systems contribute 

equally to this balance. If we do not develop a missile defense system, the risk arises that our partners 

will feel entirely secure and protected against our offensive weapons systems. If the balance I mentioned 

is disrupted, they will feel able to act with impunity, 

increasing the level of aggression in politics and, incidentally, in the economy. In order to maintain the 

balance without planning to develop a missile defense 

system, which is very expensive and of unclear effect, 

we should develop offensive strike systems. But there 

is a catch. In order for this balance to be maintained, 

if we want to exchange information, then our partners 

should give us information about their ballistic missile defense system and in return we would give them 

information about our offensive weapons.21

Fortunately, this demand was dropped without 

any damage done to the real talks in Geneva, but 

Moscow is still bound by the self-imposed commitment to withdraw from the Prague Treaty if the U.S. 

strategic defense system becomes moderately effective. It is possible to find two distinct directions in 

Russia’s struggle against this destabilizing system: 
173

a) preventing the United States from building a position of strategic invincibility, and b) separating bilateral strategic matters from multilateral security 

arrangements in Europe. The main problem with 

President George W. Bush’s plan for deploying 10 interceptor-missiles in Poland and a long-range radar in 

the Czech Republic was exactly that it brought these 

two directions together. The cancellation of this plan 

by President Barack Obama has undermined the solid 

Russian Nyet-position, and now Moscow has to construct is opposition more accurately. 

In the big strategic picture, there is hardly much 

doubt that at some point in the mid-term, effective 

defense against ballistic missiles would become technically possible, and the United States would then 

proceed with determination to building a protective 

shield.22 This new invulnerability is certain to destroy the traditional balance of offensive capabilities, 

so Russia had to reserve for itself the right to withdraw from the Prague Treaty.23 The problem with this 

logically consistent position is two-fold. First, even 

abandoning the commitment to reduce the strategic 

arsenal, Russia would hardly be able to increase it, as 

many of its weapon systems are approaching the end 

of safe service life, while the replacements are coming in small numbers (and the future of the Bulava 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs] remains in doubt). Second, there has been much upbeat 

reporting about Russia’s own anti-missile systems, in 

particular the prospective S-500, which is supposed 

to be a major upgrade from the currently deploying 

S-400 and capable of even hitting targets on low space 

orbits. When the United States makes the decision for 

full deployment of the missile defense system, Russia 

should thus be able to answer in kind—even if in fact, 
174

the technology behind its modern air-space defenses 

is antiquated beyond any updates.24

As far as the anti-missile shield for Europe is concerned, Russia remains very reluctant to engage in a 

meaningful cooperation with NATO, where in principle its new early warning radar in Armavir (as well as 

the very old radar in Gabala, Azerbaijan) and its tactical S-300 surface-to-air missiles could be valuable assets. Its main concern, in the words of Dmitri Rogozin, 

the ambassador to NATO, is “who will give the order 

on combat use of the system.” Furthermore, behind 

the claim to be accepted as an equal partner in developing the architecture of the anti-missile system, it is 

not difficult to see the intention to make it unusable 

against Russia.25 The key feature of the new U.S. plan 

that gradually takes shape (and its major difference 

from the plan advanced by the previous U.S. administration) is that the multi-element defense would be 

aimed not against ICBMs but against missiles of intermediate range, which Russia does not have according 

to the INF Treaty (1987).

Debates in Moscow about the pros and cons of 

withdrawing from this treaty reached a peak in 2007, 

as Putin proceeded with suspending Russia’s participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 

Treaty and hinted that “it would be difficult” to maintain a commitment not to deploy two classes of missiles (500-1,000 kilometers (km) and 1,000-5,500 km), 

while other states keep building their arsenals. A key 

point in these debates was, however, that Russia could 

inflict serious damage to its strategic interests by a politically motivated dismantling of this crucial pillar of 

the much weakened nuclear arms control regime.26

In the near future, with the Prague Treaty in force, 

Moscow would hardly feel much temptation to aban-
175

don the INF Treaty, particularly since the production 

line at its only missile plant in Votkinsk is busy with 

the orders from strategic forces. The only possible controversy involves the Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) mobile 

tactical missile currently deployed in replacement of 

the Tochka (SS-21 Scarab B); its range is officially reported at 400 km, but may in fact exceed 500 km—so 

the missile is capable of performing effectively the 

tasks of the Oka (SS-23) missile destroyed in 1988-90. 

This controversy could be focused on the Kaliningrad 

exclave, but its strategic vulnerability cannot be reduced by deploying the Iskander-M missiles there (as 

Medvedev briefly ordered in early 2009), so it is plausible that Moscow could agree on a self-imposed commitment to withdraw all nuclear weapons from this 

region. Much would depend upon NATO’s position 

on the U.S. nuclear assets in Europe, which at present 

are practically unusable.

THINGS THAT MIGHT GO WRONG

This evaluation of evolving Russian perceptions of 

strategic relations with the United States and Europe 

cannot lead to an informed conclusion about their further evolution because they not only remain seriously 

incoherent, but primarily because their connection 

with reality is rather ambivalent. The mix of risingpower ambitions and declining-power fears requires 

psychological diagnostics rather than rational choice 

analysis, but there is nevertheless a common denominator in this pragmatic-schizophrenic worldview. The 

present Russian leadership takes for an absolute imperative the preservation of its monopolistic control 

over the political system, even if the experimental and 

somewhat unnatural construct of Putin-Medvedev 
176

duumvirate might be modified or abandoned as soon 

as 2012. This fundamental posit is, in fact, a rather 

questionable proposition as the economic foundation 

of Putinism—the steadily expanding petro-revenues—

is shaken by the global crisis and cannot support the 

functioning of bureaucratic pyramid.

The crisis of the political super-structure of a petro-state could take various turns determining a wide 

spectrum of possible shifts in the nature of Russia’s security relations with the United States and NATO, but 

before examining the breaks of the current trajectory, 

it is essential to establish where it leads. The primary 

goal of preserving the existing political order logically 

makes Russia a status quo power deeply reluctant to 

experiment with testing the limits of security arrangements, imperfect as they are. It might seem that the 

August 2008 war with Georgia was exactly this kind 

of experiment, and indeed in its aftermath there were 

plentiful speculations that Russia would behave as a 

revisionist power.27 It has become clear by now, however, that even in that war Russia settled for a symbolic victory, which makes it easy for the EU and NATO 

to resume business as usual.

Clinging to status quo in a fast-changing environment is a vulnerable position, and Moscow finds itself 

again and again overtaken by events that do not fit 

into the correct picture of the multipolar world. One 

such fast-moving intrigue focuses on Iran, and Moscow was quite content with the pattern of some cooperation with Washington and some strengthening 

of the good-neighbor ties with Tehran that has been 

sustained since the mid-1990s but is coming to an unavoidable end. Russia takes its privileges as a member 

of the nuclear club very seriously and would have certainly preferred Iran not to have nuclear weapons. At 
177

the same time, a nuclear-armed Iran is not seen as a 

grave security threat, merely as an undesirable development, which might be preventable (hence the readiness to support some “smart” sanctions) but falls far 

short of the category of “unacceptable.”28 A far greater 

security challenge from the Russian perspective is the 

risk of a unilateral U.S./Israel military action against 

Iran, which could trigger a chain of asymmetrical responses and, no less important, would signify a disregard for Russian disapproval.

A similar unsustainable stance is maintained by 

Moscow towards the U.S. and NATO operation in Afghanistan, which is seen both as a neutralization of 

the direct threat from the Taliban to Central Asia and 

as a massive drain on Western resources. The Russian leadership shares the view propagated by the top 

brass that the war is unwinnable, but it certainly does 

not want to be seen as a spoiler of an international effort, and so is prepared to provide cost-free support, 

such as granting transit rights.29 The best option, as 

far as Moscow is concerned, would be for the United 

States and NATO to remain involved in sorting out 

the Afghan disaster for years to come, and thus remain unable to engage in any other conflict situations, 

with the possible exception of the Balkans. This option, however, is expiring, and Russia—as its response 

to the state failure in Kyrgyzstan shows—is not prepared to take on additional responsibilities for guaranteeing security in Central Asia and has diminishing 

military capabilities for such interventions.

Forced Western retreats from Afghanistan and Iraq 

are seen in Moscow as logically following from the 

multipolar dynamics, but there is as little planning for 

such disastrous outcomes as there is in Washington 

and Brussels, where a victory of sorts is still believed 
178

to be non-negotiable. Putin believes that a humbled 

hyper-power would learn a lesson, but he might yet 

discover that an isolationist post-Obama America 

would also be determinedly unilateralist and inclined 

to project its unsurpassable military power in the form 

of punishing strikes. Corrupted by absolute power 

as he is, Putin still understands perfectly clearly that 

Russia cannot afford any real confrontation with the 

West or the United States because the economic consequences would be too hurtful. In fact, in the situation 

of protracted recession, Russia needs as much cooperation with the EU and the United States as it can get, 

and this essentially means that the imperative of preserving control over the political system would push 

Putin towards greater amity with the West whatever 

his personal idiosyncrasies may be.30

The issue is not whether the current leadership 

might decide that it could better advance its goals by 

turning again to a quasi-Cold War stance (the mobilization potential of such a maneuver is very limited) 

but how stable is this leadership. Putin may orchestrate his return to the natural position at the top of the 

pyramid in 2012, but this comeback would not render 

this issue irrelevant. The system of Putinism is deeply 

rotten and may collapse in a no less spectacular way 

than the USSR did in 1991.31 Unlike Gorbachev, Putin 

is a ruthless political animal and any sign of opposition has been meticulously exterminated, but his court 

is riddled with clan squabbles that are exacerbated by 

the shrinking of petro-revenues. 

It may be a fascinating occupation to monitor the 

discord between different factions of siloviki (a much 

over-estimated political body) or to uncover the feuds 

inside Gazprom exploited by the rising TimchenkoKovalchuk business empire, but it is hardly possible 
179

to figure out which combination of courtiers might 

stage a coup against the national leader.32 It is clear, 

however, that undiluted mercantilist interests are the 

main driver of this lively competition, so no alternative 

to the tight business integration with the EU—and by 

extension to the security policy of rapprochement and 

de-facto disarmament—is shaping up. Three propositions on the current state of this Byzantine policyspinning can be advanced on the basis of scant evidence and gut feeling. The first one is that at the end 

of Medvedev’s presidency, he is hardly considered 

by the key clans as a possible successor to the domineering Putin. The second proposition is that Putin no 

longer relies upon—or commands loyalty from—the 

special services, including the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the KGB. Finally, 

several rounds of purges have left the top brass disorganized and disheartened, so political ambitions in 

this traditionally influential caste have all but disappeared, while discontent is widespread. 

What follows from this unsubstantiated reasoning 

is that a probable attempt to rescue the self-serving 

predatory regime by replacing Putin would not resolve any of the underlying faults, but might trigger a strong and unexpected political reaction not 

dissimilar to that in the USSR after the August 1991 

putsch. The possibility that a more democratic and 

pro-Western government would emerge out of this 

turbulence appears rather slim. Leaving aside various 

catastrophic options (which are by no means improbable), it is possible to suggest that the most probable 

outcome is a populist patriotic regime that would set 

forth a program for rescuing Russia from failure by 

strengthening the state and expropriating the stolen 

property and capital.
180

Such a hard-driven Russia might turn out to be a 

difficult neighbor (except for China), but its behavior 

would in a decisive measure depend upon the economic and political dynamics in the West. A moderately functional NATO under a reconstituted and 

sensible U.S. leadership has nothing to worry about 

from this troubled and struggling not-so-great power. 

European security would look very different if an 

EU pulled apart by centrifugal forces cannot rely on 

support from an isolationist United States. The Baltic states in particular could be exposed to pressure 

from Russia, but this might not be seen as a serious 

security challenge in Washington or even in Brussels. 

Russia cannot achieve any absolute increase in power, 

and specifically military power, and cannot strongly 

influence its security environment, which can, nevertheless, change in such a way that Russia would find 

itself with a significant relative gain in power—and 

would be tempted to use it. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. The term is introduced in the Military Doctrine, which was 

approved after delays in February 2010, and defined as a “state 

of international or internal affairs characterized by a combination 

of factors that under certain conditions could lead to emergence 

of military threat.” The list of these external military dangers is 

opened by “The desire to grant global functions to the military capacity of NATO, which could be executed in violation of norms of 

international law, to deploy the military infrastructure of NATO 

member-states closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by enlargement of the bloc.” The above is the author’s 

translation; original in Russian available from news.kremlin.ru/

ref_notes/461.

2. These views are extensively analyzed in Stephen F. Cohen, 

Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives, New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2009, see particularly Chapter 7, “Who lost the post-Soviet 

peace?” pp. 162-198.
181

3. A key proponent of this view is Sergei Karaganov, “Strategic Havoc,” Russia in Global Affairs, January-March 2010, available 

from eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/30/1329.html.

4. For the author’s more elaborate analysis of that evolution, 

see Pavel Baev, Russian Energy Policy and Military Power, London, 

UK: Routledge, 2008.

5. See Fedor Lukyanov, “Russian dilemmas in a multipolar 

world,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2, Spring-Summer 2010, pp. 19-32.

6. This risk is emphasized in Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Dreams 

about a multi-polar world,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 18, 

2008, in Russian.

7. It is interesting to note that some threats in this document 

are described in very definite terms (“Global informational struggle will increase”), while others are presented in a more circumspect way (“In competition for resources, attempts at resolving the 

emerging problems with military force cannot be ruled out. . . .”).

Author’s translation, the Russian text is available from www.scrf.

gov.ru/documents/99.html. 

8. Some threats appear to be invented specifically for making 

diplomatic protestations, for instance “Demonstration of military 

power in the course of exercises on territory of states bordering 

the Russian Federation or its allies with provocative aims.” One 

useful overview is Keir Giles, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010,” Research Review, Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, February 2010, available from www.ndc.nato.int/

research/series.php?icode=9.

9. One insightful evaluation of this reform is Vitaly Shlykov, 

“The secrets of Serdyukov’s blitzkrieg,” Russia in Global Affairs, 

January-March 2010, available from eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/30/1331.html.
182

10. A more detailed analysis of this transformation is found 

in Pavel Baev, “Military reform against heavy odds,” Anders Åslund, Sergei Guriev, and Andrew Kuchins, eds., Russia After the 

Global Economic Crisis, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010.

11. Expert discussion of this issue is in “Current problems and 

logic of the military reform,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, May 

14, 2009, in Russian. See also Aleksandr Hramchihin, “All in all—

85 permanent readiness brigades,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 

October 16, 2009, in Russian.

12. For a critical analysis of the Vostok-2010 exercises in July 

2010, see Aleksandr Hramchihin, “Inadequate Vostok,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, July 23, 2010, in Russian.

13. On the dismal state of Russian air defense system, which 

currently can intercept at best 20 percent of aircraft or missiles 

targeting Moscow, see Oleg Vladykin, “Holes in space defense,” 

Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, May 21, 2010, in Russian.

14. Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine 

of the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010, available from www.

scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html.

15. One useful analysis of this issue is Aleksei Arbatov, “Tactical nuclear weapons—problems and prospects,” Voenno-promyshlennyi kuryer, May 5, 2010, in Russian, available from www.

carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=40747.

16. Thus, Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security 

Council, revealed that “conditions for use of nuclear weapons for 

repelling aggression with the use of conventional weapons are 

corrected not only for a large-scale but also for a regional or even 

a local war.” He further clarified that “in situations critical for national security, the possibility of a preemptive (preventive) nuclear strike on the aggressor is not ruled out.” The Military Doctrine 

does not contain such propositions, but he was in charge of revising several earlier drafts. See Vladimir Mamontov, “Russia is 

changing, and its military doctrine is changing also,” interview 

with Nikolai Patrushev, Izvestiya, October 14, 2009, in Russian.
183

17. See Sergei Zhuravlev, “On combat readiness: The 

1,000,000-strong army cannot fight,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, April 2, 2010, in Russian.

18. My more detailed evaluation can be found in Pavel Baev, 

“Russia in the Caucasus: Exploiting the victory for building a position of strength,” Bo Huldt et al., eds., Russia on Our Minds: Strategic Yearbook 2008-2009, Stockholm, Sweden: National Defense 

University, 2010.

19. See Aleksandr Karavaev, “Russian-Ukrainian symbiosis,” 

Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 2, 2010, in Russian; Gleb Pavlovsky, 

“Pax Medvedica,” Russkii zhurnal, May 4, 2010, available from 

www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Pax-Medvedica.

20. Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, do 2020 Goda, 

Moscow, Russia: Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 

12, 2009, available in Russian from www.scrf.gov.ru, available in 

English from FBIS SOV, May 15, 2009, in translation from the Security Council website; Voyennaya Doctrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii

(Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation).

21. The official translation of the conversation with journalists on December 29, 2009, available from premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/ru/8759/events/8815/. One sharp comment is Aleksandr Golts, 

“Putin derails the talks?” Ezhednevny zhurnal, December 30, 2009, 

ej.ru/?a=note&id=9772.

22. One good assessment of this prospect is Viktor Mihailov 

and Vladimir Stepanov, “Key directions of the new US administration in anti-missile defense,” Security Index, Vol. 16, No. 2, 

Summer 2010, pp. 115-119.

23. On the link between strategic offense and defense, see Viktor Litovkin, “Russia and US have to have a serious talk on the 

balance of strategic arms,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, May 21, 

2010, in Russian.

24. See Vladykin; on the problems with research and development of the S-400 Triumph surface-to-air missile complexes, see 

“’Triumph’ without a triumph,” Information memo, December 

16, 2009, available from pro-spe-ro.livejournal.com/260.html. A solid 
184

analysis can be found in Aleksei Arbatov, “Strategic surrealism of 

dubious concept,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, March 5, 2010, in 

Russian.

25. See Dmitri Rogozin, “NATO faces the choice,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 17, 2010, in Russian. See also Vladimir Ivanov, 

“NATO builds an anti-missile shield,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, May 21, 2010, in Russian.

26. See Aleksei Arbatov, “An unnecessary and dangerous 

step,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, March 2, 2007, in Russian. 

It should be noted that Rose Gottemoeller, then the Director of 

Carnegie Moscow Center, made an important contribution to 

those debates. See “Treaties on the brink of failure,” Nezavisimaya 

gazeta, October 22, 2007, in Russian.

27. An influential work elaborating this idea is Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World, New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2010. The author has also put forward a challenging thesis 

about “Finlandization” of Eastern Europe. See Transatlantic Take, 

May 27, 2010, available from blog.gmfus.org/2010/05/27/the-specterof-finlandization/. His conclusion that “we need a new strategy of 

enlargement” appears positively pro-active, but the obvious unfeasibility of this plan makes it necessary to re-examine the point 

of departure. 

28. See Dmitri Trenin, “Russia, Iran and uranium,” Inosmi.ru, June 11, 2010, available from www.carnegie.ru/

publications/?fa=40982; Alexander Pikayev, “Why Russia supported sanctions against Iran?” CNS Report, June 2010, available from 

cns.miis.edu/stories/100623_russia_iran_pikayev.htm.

29. A good sample of Russian attitude is Boris Gromov and 

Dmitri Rogozin, “Russian advice on Afghanistan,” New York 

Times, January 11, 2010. A more nuanced analysis is Dmitri Trenin 

and Aleksei Malashenko, Afghanistan: a View from Moscow, Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Center, April 2010.

30. On Putin’s meeting with the 10 pseudo-spies caught in the 

United States, see Dmitri Sidorov, “The Motherland starts again,” 

Novaya gazeta, July 28, 2010, in Russian.
185

31. Mikhail Gorbachev has recently argued about the risks of 

the split between the regime and the society; see Pavel Baev, “Gorbachev warns of explosive problems with Medvedev’s “modernization,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 26, 2010, available from www.

jamestown.org/programs/edm/archivesedm/2010/.

32. A good source on the petro-politics is the bi-weekly bulletin, “Political risks in the Russian oil-&-gas complex,” produced 

by the National Energy Security Fund, available from www.energystate.ru/eng/.

187

CHAPTER 5

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN

RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Nikolai Sokov

Speaking on November 11, 2009, during a visit 

to the oldest Russian nuclear weapons laboratory 

at Sarov, Patriarch Kirill, head of Russian Orthodox 

Church, endorsed nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Calling the closure of the St. Seraphim monastery at the place of the nuclear lab by Soviet authorities a “sinful act,” he also congratulated the lab 

employees who, “at the home of St. Seraphim [developed] a weapon of deterrence that prevented World 

War III.” “We must strive for a world without nuclear 

weapons,” he emphasized, “but in a manner that does 

not hurt our country.”1

This statement, which stands in stark contrast to 

the position advocated by the majority of church leaders in the West, is in tune with the dominant view 

among the Russian public. Nuclear weapons are widely regarded as a symbol and a guarantee of Russia’s 

influence, independence, and security—the ultimate 

unbeatable card in global power politics. The world 

is regarded as a dangerous place, full of potential or 

actual enemies that would attack or subjugate Russia 

any moment if it is unable to crush the attacker; the 

United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a whole (and, more rarely, China) top 

the list of threats. 

Self-reliance and especially reliance on the nation’s own military power has deep roots in the Russian psyche. Even a casual visitor to many Russian 
188

Internet forums will find participants fondly quoting 

Alexander III, a late 19th century Russian tsar known 

as “Peacemaker” (Russia did not wage major wars 

during his reign) that Russia had only two reliable allies—its Army and its Navy. Many now add the third 

ally—Strategic Rocket Forces. 

The government readily supports this sentiment. 

Both President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister 

Vladimir Putin make frequent statements about their 

attention to nuclear forces. The Duma readily approves 

budgets for Strategic Forces. Road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) roll through the Red 

Square during holiday parades. Certainly, this means 

that Moscow is and will remain constrained when it 

comes to concessions in arms control negotiations—

nuclear weapons are not a card that could be readily 

traded. 

The Russian government publicly supports the 

goal of a nuclear-free world, but that goal is regarded 

so long-term that it becomes impractical. When Putin 

recently signed a law on funding for upgrades to facilities and equipment for a nuclear weapons complex 

(primarily to ensure reliability of weapons), he mentioned that the country would need them for the next 

“30-40-50 years.”2

The profile of nuclear weapons is further increased 

by the wide (and perhaps even unbridgeable) gap between Russia and the United States/NATO in modern 

technology. This gap prevents Moscow from shifting 

emphasis from nuclear to conventional assets and further strengthens long-term reliance on nuclear weapons in national security policy. 

At the same time—and in apparent contrast to 

public posturing—funding for maintenance and modernization remains limited. Production of new deliv-
189

ery vehicles is apparently below the optimal level (the 

lowest cost per unit) and research and development 

(R&D) programs remain underfunded or, at best, 

funded at bare minimum. Effectively, the government 

can be said to take a “minimalist” attitude toward 

its nuclear capability. While this pattern began during the time of relative financial scarcity, it continued 

through the more financially favorable period almost 

without change and remains the same today. There is 

no indication that Moscow plans to radically increase 

funding for either production or modernization of its 

nuclear arsenal. The question remains open whether 

limited funding reflects a relatively skeptical view of 

the possible role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s security. This chapter will address the following issues 

relevant to the understanding of the future of the Russian nuclear capability:

• The role of nuclear weapons in security policy. 

While the public profile of nuclear weapons is 

enormous, of greater relevance are the missions 

assigned to nuclear weapons and their evolution in the last 20 years. Of special interest are 

the roles, if any, of tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear weapons, which are increasingly visible in 

international debates.

• Modernization programs. What are the reasons 

for the apparent gap between the high public 

profile of nuclear weapons and the relatively 

limited funding? How are modernization programs related to nuclear missions?

• What are the prospects for transition from nuclear to conventional capability? This has been 

a stated goal of the Russian government, but 

can Russia actually implement it? This section 

will also tackle debates about abrogation of the 
190

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: While that agreement provided for reduction of nuclear weapons, it is has apparently 

become part of a policy aimed at enhancing 

conventional capability.

• What is the impact of U.S. missile defense plans 

on the Russian nuclear posture, and how has 

it changed in the last year or so? Is there any 

prospect for cooperation with the United States 

and NATO on missile defense and what are the 

limits of that cooperation?

Key conclusions can be summarized as follows:

1. During the last 10-15 years, Russian nuclear policy has experienced approximately the same evolution 

as that of other nuclear weapons states (NWS)—gradual increase in the perceived role of these weapons, 

emergence of new missions, and then, toward the end 

of this decade, gradual reduction of their role. In Russia, the decrease of the role of nuclear weapons has 

been somewhat less pronounced than in other NWS.

2. Nuclear weapons have two missions. One is traditional strategic deterrence—prevention of a largescale aggression against Russia. The other, which is 

considered more pertinent under present circumstances, is deterrence of a more limited conventional 

attack by a powerful country or an alliance (a clear reference to the United States and NATO), which cannot 

be repelled with Russian conventional forces alone. 

Recently, the perceived urgency of the latter mission 

has somewhat receded, but it remains on the books.

3. Russia seeks to gradually shift emphasis from 

nuclear to long-range high-precision conventional assets. It has been at least 15-20 years behind the United 

States and its allies, however, and the verdict is still 
191

out as to whether it will be able to cover that gap. It is 

clear that efforts will continue, in particular because 

nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as unusable 

and thus not very relevant for security policy.

4. Nuclear posture has seen rather radical changes 

in the first half of this decade following a fundamental 

revision of long-term plans in 2000 and then a series 

of partial revisions to new policy. Currently, Russia seems to be moving toward a posture that can be 

characterized as a balanced dyad—a relatively equal 

(60 to 40 percent) distribution of nuclear warheads between the land and the sea legs. The air leg remains 

part of the nuclear triad, but only formally—the main 

mission of long-range aircraft is increasingly conventional and, furthermore, its nuclear assets are subject 

to the least modernization.

5. The Russian nuclear force remains old—the bulk 

of delivery systems are still those produced in the Soviet Union. The rate of production and deployment 

of new weapons is below what production capability 

can sustain. More importantly, production capability 

gradually decreases as well, and the Russian government does not appear interested in sustaining ability 

to expand production. This strongly suggests that the 

overall size of the nuclear force will gradually decline 

and that delivery vehicles will carry the maximum 

load of warheads.

6. Contrary to common perception, short-range nuclear assets (nonstrategic nuclear weapons [NSNW]) 

do not appear to play a significant role in Russia’s 

security policy, and there are no discernible missions 

assigned to them with the exception of naval assets. 

Continued Russian resistance to arms control measures with regard to NSNW is primarily explained by 

the alignment of domestic politics.
192

7. The current trends will make Russia interested 

in further reductions of nuclear weapons, perhaps to 

the level of around 1,000 strategic warheads. It seems 

that Russia will probably want to pause at about that 

point. Reaching new agreements will not be easy, 

however, due to the multiplicity of divisive issues that 

have emerged in the last 20 years and especially during this decade. Post-New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START) negotiations are likely to be difficult 

and time-consuming.

8. The urgency of the missile defense issue has receded rather considerably in the last year, although 

public statements do not reflect that. The greatest concern is not about the current or the short-term American capability, but rather about the capability that 

might emerge by the end of this decade. This leaves 

considerable margin of opportunity to further discuss 

this issue and perhaps develop a set of predictability 

and transparency measures that might help alleviate the controversy. Cooperation in missile defense 

remains possible and could be the “real” long-term 

answer.

9. On the surface, the trajectory of Russian strategy 

is similar to what the United States has been doing 

in the last 2 decades—emphasis is gradually shifting 

toward long-range high-precision conventional capability, Russia actively develops missile defense capability, etc. This similarity is misleading, however, and 

will hardly make arms control negotiations any easier 

because there is an important asymmetry between the 

two countries. Whereas the United States, for reasons 

of its geographical location, needs strategic capability 

in both conventional and defense assets, Russia emphasizes theater-range assets. Consequently, it will remain highly suspicious about U.S. plans to the extent 
193

that they could theoretically affect the credibility of 

strategic deterrence that is regarded as the foundation 

of the existing international system.

RUSSIAN VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS

Nuclear weapons have three partially overlapping 

roles in Russian national security policy, which can be 

described as status symbol, existential deterrence, and 

plans for use of nuclear weapons under certain specific contingencies, first and foremost to deter largescale use of conventional forces against Russia by the 

United States and NATO. 

1. The role of nuclear weapons as a symbol of status is quite straightforward, although rather difficult 

to define in clear-cut, unambiguous terms. Status as a 

recognized nuclear weapons state, along with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council 

(UNSC), coupled with the right of veto, are the most 

visible and perhaps the only remaining vestiges of 

great-power ambitions. Partially, this self-image satisfies the nostalgia—particularly widely spread among 

the public—for the Soviet Union’s number two place 

in the Cold War international system. 

More importantly, nuclear status fits very well 

with the forward-looking conceptualization of the 

emerging post-post-Cold War (to borrow Colin Powell’s term) international system as multipolar, in which 

Russia sees itself as one of the centers of power and 

influence. It should be noted, however, that the term 

(multipolarity) is seriously misused in Russia.3

 In fact, 

Russian leaders, when they talk about multipolarity, 

appear to mean a “concert”—a system similar to the 

1815 Vienna Congress arrangements. They see the 
194

future international system as based on a consensus 

of key players—countries with the greatest economic 

and military power. In that conceptualization, Russia 

is accorded the place of one of the pillars of the emerging system—a state with special rights and responsibilities. Although Moscow recognizes—and welcomes—the rise of new centers of power beyond the 

five permanent members of the UNSC (such as India, 

Germany, Japan, Brazil, etc.), it is also keen on preserving certain special privileges. For example, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently described India 

as a potential new permanent member of the UNSC, 

but cautioned that only “old” permanent UNSC members should have the right of veto.4

The prospect of nuclear disarmament puts Russian 

leaders into a rather awkward situation. On the one 

hand, they cannot question the legal (under Article VI 

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]) or the 

moral obligation to disarm. On the other hand, elimination of nuclear weapons would deprive Russia of 

one of its key status symbols. Speaking in February 

2008 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 

Lavrov endorsed the nuclear disarmament initiatives 

of George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, 

and Sam Nunn, but in a rather half-hearted manner 

and referred to it as a very long-term prospect.5

 In 

December 2008, at a meeting with the Association of 

European Businesses in Russia, Lavrov characterized 

nuclear disarmament as an “uncertain” goal whose solution is hampered by multiple “unresolved issues.”6

The apparent contradiction is resolved, it seems, by 

postponing the final solution into a distant future. 

2. “Existential deterrence” refers to a general, vague 

notion that no rational country or alliance, including 

the United States and NATO, will attack Russia be-
195

cause Russia can respond with nuclear weapons. This 

is a guarantee against a threat that, for all intents and 

purposes, does not exist. As a result, nuclear weapons are often portrayed as a “just-in-case” deterrence 

for the unlikely situation when, some time in the indefinite future, the United States or another powerful 

country or coalition becomes hostile to Russia. 

At a deeper psychological level, reliance on nuclear deterrence reflects uncertainty about the unpredictable international environment and the lack of 

confidence in Russia’s power and influence. Nuclear 

weapons played a similar role during the Cold War—

a prop for a country that more or less acutely sensed 

that the enemy, the United States and the Western 

community in general, were too powerful. The trauma 

of the 1990s, when Russia suddenly found itself weak 

and vulnerable, reinforced the psychological need for 

the ultimate security guarantee. The need for that prop 

should disappear if the place of Russia in the emerging 

international system becomes clearer and, especially if 

the country becomes more deeply integrated into the 

global economy. 

The latter process has been developing quite well 

where relations between Russia and the European 

Union (EU) are concerned: even today not only are 

many EU states (in particular the “Old Europe”) reluctant to enter into a conflict with Russia, but Moscow 

is equally reluctant to enter into a conflict with them. 

The U.S.-Russian relationship, unfortunately, does 

not have a solid economic foundation yet, and consequently political and security relations lack stability. 

The need for stronger interdependence is further reinforced by the belief of Russian leaders (particularly 

strong among the Putin and Medvedev generation) 

that economic interdependence is central to coop-
196

eration and war prevention: this belief was borrowed 

from American political science literature during their 

formative years in the 1970s and 1980s.

Another complicating factor is the weakness of 

economic and political levers of influence in the international arena, which serves to enhance the perceived 

importance of military instruments. Although Russia 

could potentially use its position as an exporter of oil 

and gas, this is, in reality, a double-edged sword: an attempt to use it could harm the most important source 

of revenue for the government and private (semi-private) business and vastly strengthen the desire of its 

customers to diversify energy sources (thereby eliminating Russian influence as well as profit). Instead, 

Moscow is trying to build a reputation as a reliable 

supplier and has been reluctant to even hint at interruption of exports. The fact that dependence on Russian oil and gas exports does not affect the rather cold, 

sometimes even hostile, attitude of Eastern European 

countries (such as Poland) toward Russia suggests 

that the utility of this dependence as a political lever 

is, at best, very limited. Seen through Russian eyes, 

Russian exports actually depend on other countries—

on Ukraine, which provides the main transit route, 

and on Central Asia, which is an important source 

of natural gas that is re-exported to Europe. Instead 

of using oil and gas exports as a lever, Moscow has 

to fight to hold on to its market against alternative 

routes (across the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus). 

Several crises in relations with Ukraine, when transit 

to Europe was interrupted or nearly interrupted (all of 

these cases were blamed on Russia), created an acute 

sense of dependence in Russia and a desire to build alternative routes of its own through the Baltic Sea and 

the Balkans. Strong objections by Poland, the Baltic 
197

states, and Nordic countries to that alternative have 

only served to reinforce the feeling of vulnerability. 

3. As long as nuclear weapons and the research and 

industrial infrastructure supporting them continue to 

exist, political and military planning for their use must 

take place. Planning for nuclear use involves development of scenario-specific missions that pit nuclear assets against real or perceived threats. These missions 

provide formal rationales for continued maintenance 

of nuclear capabilities, for distribution of targets, for 

posture planning, as well as for research and development. The underlying assumption of this type of 

planning is the belief that certain threats are difficult 

or even impossible to counter with other, non-nuclear 

assets or that non-nuclear assets are less reliable or effective. 

At the center of nuclear planning in today’s Russia is concern about U.S. and NATO conventional superiority. Although a large-scale war with Russia is 

widely regarded as improbable, the threat of superior 

conventional force could, according to the prevalent 

logic, be used to extract political or economic concessions. A long series of limited wars (the Gulf War of 

1991, the use of force in Bosnia, the war in Kosovo, and 

the 2003 war in Iraq) have demonstrated, in the view 

of Russian policymakers and elite, that (1) American 

conventional power vastly surpasses anything that 

Russia has or might hope to have in the foreseeable future, both in technological level and in sheer numbers, 

and (2) that the United States is prone to use that force 

with few second thoughts. The continuing weakness 

of Russian conventional forces vis-à-vis U.S. and combined NATO power as well as the close proximity of 

NATO forces to Russian territory (making limited use 

of force both more feasible and more effective) have 
198

led Russian military planners to rely on nuclear weapons for the purposes of de-escalation—the threat of a 

limited nuclear strike in response to a conventional attack that cannot be repelled by conventional forces is 

supposed to deter the attack in the first place.

A relatively recent new concern is deployment of 

U.S. missile defense, which eventually could, in theory, intercept a Russian nuclear second strike and thus 

undermine both the existential deterrence capability 

and the de-escalation mission. Deployment of missile 

defense leads Russian military planners to suspect 

that the United States intends to make the world safe 

for conventional war and only serves to enhance the 

perceived value of nuclear weapons for Russia. 

Finally, there is the emerging issue of China, which 

Russians rarely discuss in the open. While the two 

countries are close partners or a broad range of issues, 

have solved outstanding problems (border issues in 

particular), and their economic relationship continues to develop, many in Russia are concerned that 

the partnership might not survive continued growth 

of China’s economic, political, and military power. 

Nuclear weapons are regarded as “just-in-case” protection against the risk that China becomes a foe or at 

least attempts to transform Russia into a subordinate 

power.

Evolution of Russian views on the role of nuclear 

weapons can be traced through Military Doctrines adopted in the last 17 years. Military Doctrine is a primarily political document that defines the broad contours 

of defense policy and outlines of military postures as 

well as provides a link between overall national security policy and, more narrowly, defense policy. The 

term “doctrine” is somewhat misleading, because its 

meaning in Russian and English are not the same. It 
199

should be more properly translated as “strategy” or 

“guidance.” This caveat should be kept in mind during any discussion of Russian defense policy.

1993-99.

The end of the Cold War and the diminished relevance of strategic nuclear deterrence were reflected in 

the first Military Doctrine approved by Boris Yeltsin 

in November 1993 (“Main Provisions of the Military 

Doctrine”7

), which assigned nuclear weapons only to 

that “old” mission and thus codified their relatively 

low tangibility in Russia’s national security policy. The 

only innovation of that document was a provision that 

allowed for first use of nuclear weapons (until then, 

the official Soviet policy, which was set in the 1970s 

and confirmed in 1982, allowed for the use of nuclear 

weapons only in response to a nuclear attack). While 

this new plank attracted close attention both in Russia 

and in the West, of greater relevance was the fact that 

nuclear use was only conceptualized in response to a 

large-scale attack that threatened the sovereignty and 

the very survival of the country, i.e., a mission whose 

probability was officially assessed as low.

The official view of nuclear weapons remained unchanged despite a flurry of proposals in 1996-97 to increase reliance on nuclear weapons in response to the 

first phase of NATO enlargement. The 1997 National 

Security Concept retained the plank reserving “the 

right to use all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case an armed aggression 

that creates a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state.”8

This was effectively a ‘‘just-in-case’’ mission against a 

conflict that was virtually ruled out.
200

In a review of an unpublished early draft of a 

new Military Doctrine produced in 1997, two officers 

of the General Staff noted that “some ‘specialists’ 

. . . attempted to introduce into the documents language that would toughen nuclear policy,” but said 

that these proposals were rejected by the interagency 

working group charged with drafting the document. 

It was decided, they said, to retain the 1993 language, 

“which passed the test of time and was supported by 

the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”9

At that time, the Russian government adopted a 

series of documents that confirmed earlier policy and 

laid out development and deployment plans based on 

the assumption that the sole mission of nuclear weapons was deterrence of a large-scale attack. In line with 

this policy, several decrees signed by Boris Yeltsin in 

1997 and 199810 foresaw deep reductions of the Russian nuclear arsenal. 

THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE IN 

RUSSIAN SECURITY STRATEGY

The mission of strategic deterrence has remained 

largely unchanged from Soviet times to the present 

day. It is based on the traditional notion of mutual 

vulnerability—deterrence through ability to inflict 

unacceptable damage in a response strike. 

The main mode of operation has also remained the 

same—strike on warning. It should be noted that this 

mode has always been a forced choice, and since at 

least the late 1960s, the Soviet Union tried to develop 

assured second-strike capability by enhancing survivability of weapons systems. Nevertheless, efforts 

to develop relevant systems succeeded only in the 

1980s—mobile ICBMs (SS-25 Topol and SS-24) as well 
201

as reduced-noise submarines. In post-Soviet Russia 

reliance on strike on warning even enhanced due to a 

number of reasons: (1) the deep economic crisis, which 

forced drastic reduction of funding, (2) the breakup of 

the Soviet Union, which left many relatively modern 

weapons outside Russia, reduced deployment options, 

and undermined the production capability limiting 

ability to develop and produce weapons systems, and 

(3) the deterioration of early warning capability due to 

the loss of several key radars. 

Traditional strategic deterrence is regarded as a 

skeleton of international security—the underlying 

structure that keeps the system stable. Speaking at 

the London Institute of International and Strategic 

Studies, Sergey Ivanov (at that time still Minister of 

Defense) called strategic deterrence the foundation of 

global stability.11 Similar views have been expressed 

by almost every official and unofficial source in Russia. 

Strategic deterrence is primarily aimed at the United States and, to a smaller extent, its allies. China is 

present in the background—Russian officials just do 

not speak about the need to deter China, and relatively few nongovernmental experts are prepared to discuss this mission. The reasons why the United States 

remains the focus are:

• The United States has demonstrated the willingness to use force, including for humanitarian interventions.

• A U.S. decision to use force cannot be overruled 

by the UN or its allies.

• It is commonly believed that a large-scale attack (regional conflict) can only be successful if 

the United States leads it.
202

• It is assumed that if Russia can deter the United 

States, it can deter any other state or a coalition 

of states. The United States, in effect, serves as 

a benchmark.

• Finally, many among the Russian elite, and 

especially among the military, still view the 

United States with unease and suspicion. Only 

a few years ago, one could hear talk about the 

intent of undisclosed countries (some directly 

mentioned the United States) to partition Russia.

One element of strategic deterrence conceptualization that has experienced considerable change in 

the post-Soviet period is the criterion, “how much 

is enough,” to deter the potential adversary. During 

the Soviet period (including late 1980s), the goal was 

assured delivery of 500 warheads to U.S. territory; 

in the 1990s, the figure apparently decreased to 150-

200; recently one can hear an even lower figure—assured delivery of about 50 warheads. The reduction 

of this all-important criterion is consistent with the 

acknowledgment in the 1993 and subsequent Military 

Doctrines of very low probability of a global war, and 

reflects a fundamental change in the international 

system after the end of the Cold War. In addition, the 

lower criterion reduces pressure for creating an assured second-strike capability as well as requirements 

for nuclear posture and modernization programs. Basically, it means that Russia can be reasonably relaxed 

with regard to the future of its strategic arsenal and 

can afford limiting spending and resources necessary 

to maintain and modernize its strategic force. 

Adherence to traditional views on strategic deterrence dictates Russia’s negative or, at least, very 
203

cautious attitude toward missile defense. At its core, 

Russian strategy still rests on the theorems of the late 

1960-early 1970s embodied in the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

(ABM) Treaty: (1) offensive and defensive weapons 

are inextricably linked, (2) robust defense can vastly 

complicate the calculation of strategic stability (i.e., it 

becomes difficult to predict how many warheads will 

reach the adversary in a response strike), and (3) uncontrolled missile defense developments can irreparably upset strategic stability and will result in an arms 

race. Russia’s preferred response has traditionally 

been in the area of offensive weapons, which are more 

cost-effective, although in the 1980s, the Soviet Union 

actively explored strategic missile defense options, 

i.e., simultaneously pursued both symmetric and 

asymmetric response. For Russia, symmetric response 

(development of its own advance strategic missile defense system) has been out of the reach for financial 

and technological reasons. As a result, it has pursued 

both political options (through arms control negotiations, mobilization of international community, close 

cooperation with China, etc.) and the defense penetration capability of new strategic delivery systems. 

2000-10.

The 2000 Military Doctrine rather radically changed 

the role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security strategy by introducing a new mission—that of 

limited nuclear use in response to a limited conventional attack, i.e., one that did not threaten the survival and sovereignty of Russia, but still was beyond the 

capability of Russian conventional forces. According 

to the new document, in addition to “the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction” 
204

against Russia or its allies, nuclear weapons could also 

be used “in response to large-scale aggression involving conventional weapons in situations that are critical for the national security of the Russian Federation 

and its allies.”12

The new document divided all possible armed 

conflicts into four categories:

1. “armed conflict”—a predominantly domestic 

conflict, in which insurgents have outside support 

(effectively, the war in Chechnya, whose resumption 

was already obvious by the time of the adoption of the 

new Doctrine in the spring of 2000);

2. “limited war”—a war with one foreign states 

with limited goals (a recent example is the war with 

Georgia in 2008);

3. “regional war”—a war with a powerful state or 

a coalition, which Russian forces cannot win or terminate on favorable conditions. Russian military publications of the period believed that regional war could 

be a direct result of escalation of “armed conflict” (for 

example, as a result of outside interference into the 

war in Chechnya13); and,

4. “global war”—a war against a coalition of powerful states in which sovereignty and very survival of 

Russia are at stake.

That is, compared to the 1993-97 documents, which 

assigned nuclear weapons only to the fourth type of 

conflicts, the 2000 document expanded nuclear missions to the third type. This was a direct result of the 

war in Kosovo, whose impact on Russian national security of the period is difficult to overestimate. Paradoxically, until 1999 Moscow seemed to believe that 

the right of veto in the UNSC made it immune to the 

use of force. Kosovo, as well as the 2003 war in Iraq a 
205

few years later, demonstrated that the United States 

and NATO could use force without UNSC authorization. At the same time, since U.S. and NATO stakes in 

a Kosovo-size conflict with Russia were expected to 

be relatively low (at least, not central to U.S. interests), 

threat of even limited nuclear use was expected to become a sufficiently strong deterrence. 

The decision to enhance reliance on nuclear weapons in a departure from all documents adopted in the 

1990s was apparently made while the war in Kosovo 

was still underway—at a meeting of the Russian Federation Security Council in April 1999, the first chaired 

by Vladimir Putin in the capacity of the council’s secretary.14 The key tenets of the new approach were tested in May 1999 during large-scale maneuvers called 

‘‘West-99.’’ The new role of nuclear weapons was formalized in the January 2000 National Security Concept

and the April 2000 Military Doctrine.

15 The White Paper, a document adopted in the fall of 2003,16 added 

the final touches.

While the obvious, and perhaps initially, the only 

targets of the new mission were the United States and 

NATO, subsequently Russian military leaders unveiled that the same provisions applied also to ‘‘developing countries, some of which have large, wellarmed militaries.’’17 This represented a thinly veiled 

reference to China; perhaps also to some other countries (for example, Iran). 

The new mission, which came to be known as deescalation of conventional conflicts, is similar to NATO’s flexible deterrence of the 1960s. A possible scenario was clearly reflected in the “West-99” exercises: 

a large-scale conventional attack (“West-99” actually 

simulated an attack by a NATO force exactly the same 

as the one used in the war in Kosovo), relatively brief 
206

resistance by Russian conventional forces, then a limited nuclear strike, after which the opponent was expected to back down because its stakes were not worthy of resulting destruction and losses. 

Central to the concept of de-escalation was the notion of calibrated damage (zadannyi ushcherb), defined 

in the 2003 White Paper as ‘‘damage, which is subjectively unacceptable to the enemy and which exceeds 

the benefits the aggressor expects to gain as a result of 

the use of military force.’’18 This notion is more flexible 

than the more common notion of ”unacceptable damage” and, in addition to promising to deny benefits 

from aggression, also conveys a message that damage 

would be commensurate to the level of conflict rather 

than devastating. Calibrated damage gave the opponent a choice to back down without escalation to the 

strategic level.

Even limited strikes were supposed to reach faraway targets: according to the 2003 While Paper, in all 

wars in the 1990s and early 2000s (Balkans, Kosovo, 

Afghanistan, and Iraq) American victory was ensured 

by ability to involve out-of-theater assets. Consequently, counterstrategy, whether nuclear or conventional, had to emphasize the ability to defeat targets at 

large distances. 

Accordingly, the White Paper postulated “the utmost necessity of having the capability to strike military assets of the enemy (long-range high-precision 

weapons, long-range Air Force) outside the immediate area of conflict. To achieve this, [we] need both our 

own long-range high-precision strike capability and 

other assets that enable [us] to transfer hostilities directly to enemy territory.”19

Targets for limited nuclear use with calibrated 

damage could be gleaned from a series of large-scale 
207

exercises since 1999. All of them were military targets 

involved in a potential attack against Russia and the 

number of warheads involved in simulated strikes 

was small (fewer than 10): 

• Airbases as well as command, communications, and support facilities in European NATO 

countries and in at least one case in Japan. New 

members of NATO are clearly considered first 

candidates for basing countries for launching 

an attack against Russia;

• Unknown targets in the continental United 

States (most likely bases from which B-52s and 

B-2s would fly missions against Russia);

• Aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific Ocean and 

the Baltic Sea. Similar operations were simulated at least one in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean; and,

• U.S. bases on Diego Garcia and Guam.

An integral part of making sure that threat of limited nuclear strike is credible is demonstrated ability 

to escalate to the strategic level (the level of large-scale 

nuclear exchange).20 This condition necessitated the 

maintenance of credible strategic nuclear deterrence 

capability, giving additional prominence to the “traditional” mission and strategic weapons modernization 

programs. 

The decision tree underlying the de-escalation scenario is pictured in Figure 5-1. The 2003 White Paper also 

cautioned that nuclear deterrence of regional conflicts 

requires capable modern conventional forces: “only in 

that case will the threat of nuclear use in response to 

an attack be credible.”21 This principle closely mirrors 

one of the seminal documents in U.S. nuclear policy 

from the 1950s, NSC-68. This is only logical: reliance 
208

on nuclear weapons alone is simply not sustainable because threat of nuclear use is not sufficiently credible 

except in a relatively narrow range of circumstances.

Figure 5-1. Decision Tree.

It should be noted, however, that Russia’s 2000 

National Security Concept regarded reliance on limited 

nuclear use as a temporary fix until Russia builds up 

its conventional capability, especially its precisionguided weapons. A more modern conventional capability together with modern reconnaissance and 

targeting assets was supposed to enable Russia to 

successfully deter, or, if deterrence fails, fight regional 

conflicts. Thus, at least in theory, the limited-use missions should eventually fade away. That thinking remains valid today: in 2009, then-Commander of the 

Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Nikolai Solovtsov said 

that reliance on nuclear weapons in the near future is 

intended to buy time while Russia conducts military 

reform and upgrades its conventional capability.22
209

2010 AND INTO THE FUTURE

The new, third Russian Military Doctrine, which 

ushered in yet another turn in the role of nuclear 

weapons, was revealed in February 2010.23 Work on 

that document was launched by a special conference 

convened at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in January 2007. Speakers at that meeting, including 

then-Chief of General Staff Yuri Baluyevskii, agreed 

that nuclear weapons would still play a central role in 

Russia’s security, but the overall tone suggested that 

the nuclear component of the 2000 Doctrine would 

remain unchanged; attention focused instead on the 

upcoming reforms and modernization of general-purpose forces.24

Quite unexpectedly, however, the nuclear section 

of the draft became a contested issue in the months 

preceding its release and was perhaps one of the reasons for multiple delays (it was initially scheduled to 

be released in the fall of 2009). In an interview in October 2009, Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai 

Patrushev indicated that the future document might 

assign nuclear weapons to yet one more type of war—

”local conflicts.”25 This would have represented a 

massive expansion of the role of nuclear weapons: 

whereas the 1993 Doctrine assigned them to “global 

wars,” and the 2000 one added “regional wars,” the 

further expansion described by Patrushev would have 

assigned them to conflicts similar to the 2008 war with 

Georgia. 

In the end, however, the trend set by the new 

Doctrine was opposite to what Patrushev described. 

Instead of further expanding the role of nuclear weapons, it somewhat reduced it by tightening conditions 
210

under which these weapons could be used. Specifically, whereas the 2000 Doctrine foresaw the resorting to nuclear weapons “in situations critical for [the] 

national security” of Russia, the 2010 version allows 

for their use in situations when “the very existence of 

[Russia] is under threat.”26 At least in this regard, the 

new Doctrine returned to the principles of the 1993 

and 1997 strategies. 

Otherwise, the new document seemed to closely 

follow the line set in 2000. The role of nuclear weapons, according to the new Doctrine, is “prevention of 

nuclear military conflict or any other military conflict.” 

They are regarded as “an important factor in the prevention of nuclear conflicts and military conflicts that use 

conventional assets (large-scale and regional wars).” 

The new document also clearly indicates that a conventional regional war could escalate to the nuclear 

level. In a slight change from 2000, the latter provision 

is formulated in broader terms—this is now not only 

seen as a means of deterring or dissuading states that 

might attack Russia with conventional armed forces, 

but also an expression of concern that similar escalation might take place elsewhere.27 That is, that the mission of de-escalation remains on the books. The new 

Doctrine mandates the maintenance of nuclear capability “at the level of sufficiency,” which means ability to inflict calibrated damage, same as the previous 

guidance. An interesting feature of the 2010 Doctrine 

is the emphasis on strategic deterrence capability. The 

choice of terms seems to indicate that Russia does not 

assign a visible role to substrategic (or tactical) nuclear 

weapons.

Overall, the 2010 Doctrine devotes less attention 

to the nuclear component of Armed Forces than the 

previous one. At the most superficial level, there are 
211

fewer paragraphs about the use of nuclear weapons 

and nuclear posture than in the 2000 document. The 

doctrine places considerably more emphasis on conventional forces and in particular on high-precision 

assets, communications, command, and control systems, and other elements in which Russia has been 

traditionally behind other major military powers. 

Overall, the change in the role of nuclear weapons appears to be positive, but limited: the missions 

remained the same as before, albeit the criterion for 

nuclear use was somewhat tightened. The direction of 

the trend is similar to that in the United States under 

the new administration, but the degree of change is 

noticeably smaller. Notwithstanding the fact that the 

new strategy will remain in force for at least several 

years, one can hardly expect a significant downgrading of the status of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable 

future. They continue to enjoy elite and public support as a symbol of Russian power and independence 

and thus any government that might consider further 

downgrading of that component of Russian armed 

forces is likely to encounter stiff resistance. Furthermore, modernization of Russian conventional forces 

proceeds at a very slow pace. In the foreseeable future, 

concern about conventional forces of the United States 

and NATO and, increasingly, of China will remain 

high, necessitating continued reliance on nuclear capability. 

THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

PARADOX

Tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons (TNW) 

enjoy a special and highly controversial place in 

Russia’s nuclear policy. They gained visibility in the 
212

mid-1990s during debates about possible response to 

NATO’s first round of enlargement. They are still often conceptualized as a counterweight to NATO conventional superiority, but this view primarily resides 

with conservative nongovernmental experts while the 

government and (with one exception noted below) 

uniformed military remains silent about possible missions for these assets. Instead, all political-military 

guidance documents issues in the last 15 years have 

not mentioned them. Moreover, the 2003 White Paper

referenced above specifically insisted that in case of 

large-scale (regional or global) war Russia needed 

long-range capability to strike out-of-theater assets of 

the adversary. Thus TNW apparently do not have a 

mission to speak of.

The only exception to that general rule is the Russian Navy. Russian naval commanders admit that 

they simply cannot confront the U.S. Navy—in case of 

a direct clash between Russia and the United States—

without reliance on nonstrategic nuclear assets. Accordingly, crews of surface ships and submarines have 

reportedly trained to mate warheads to submarine 

launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and launch them.28

In fact, Vice-Admiral Oleg Burtsev, deputy chief of 

the Navy’s Main Staff, declared recently that the role 

of tactical nuclear weapons on attack nuclear submarines would increase. “The range of tactical nuclear 

weapons is growing, as is their accuracy. They do not 

need to deliver high-yield warheads, instead it is possible to make a transition to low-yield nuclear warheads that could be installed on the existing types of 

cruise missiles,” he asserted.29 Paradoxically, nuclear 

warheads for short-range naval systems are supposed 

to be in the status of nondeployed under the presidential nuclear initiatives (PNIs), unlike those for the Air 
213

Force, whose leaders rarely if ever mention tactical 

nuclear weapons. 

Indicative of the attitude toward the possible role 

of TNW was the rejection by the Russian government 

and the military of proposals to deploy short-range 

nuclear-capable assets in response to the U.S.-planned 

missile defense assets in Poland in 2008—at the time 

when George W. Bush plans were regarded as a serious and immediate threat to Russia. The General Staff 

was quick at dismissing rumors (apparently, originating in Lithuania) that Russia would equip surface 

ships and submarines of the Baltic Fleet with tactical 

nuclear weapons.30 Similarly, a September 2008 highlevel meeting in Kaliningrad oblast, involving representatives from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign 

Affairs at the level of deputy minister, General Staff, 

Administration of the President, as well as security 

services, rejected the proposal to deploy nuclear weapons in the exclave.31 Chairman of the Duma Defense 

Committee retired General Viktor Zavarzin explained 

that preference was given instead to high-precision 

conventional assets.32 Proposals about deployment of 

tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus were similarly not 

taken to heart. Russian ambassador to Minsk Aleksandr Surikov announced that Russia would not return nuclear weapons to Belarus but would consider 

deployment of tactical conventional Iskander missiles 

and short-range aircraft with precision-guided weapons.33

Short-range weapons are also often said to have 

another role—that of deterring Chinese conventional 

forces.34 The logic is similar to the common beliefs 

about the role of TNW vis-à-vis NATO: if the opponent has superior conventional forces, Russian needs 

to rely on nuclear weapons. The Western and the East-
214

ern theaters differ by the nature of challenge—technological in the West and numerical in the East. 

This logic appears questionable, however. The 

Russian-Chinese border is primarily a land border, 

but, if public statements of Russian officials are to be 

believed, Russia no longer has land-based short-range 

nuclear weapons. Also, there are few valuable targets 

on the Chinese side of the border and, if TNW were 

used to repel a hypothetical Chinese offensive, nuclear weapons would be used on the Russian side of that 

border in densely populated and economically developed areas. Indeed, confidential interviews with highlevel Russian military indicate that nuclear weapons 

assigned to deterrence of China are strategic and airlaunched intermediate-range, i.e., weapons capable 

of reaching political, military, and economic targets 

deep inside China. That is, the logic here is similar to 

the one used in the Military Doctrine for deterrence of 

the United States and NATO: the emphasis is on longrange assets. 

Thus, logically speaking, Russia could, without 

changing its present-day nuclear strategy, reduce the 

entire short-range category of nuclear weapons. Yet, 

it refuses to do that. Instead, Moscow consistently, 

stubbornly, and very forcefully resists attempts of the 

United States and its NATO allies to launch almost 

any kind of arms control measures with regard to its 

TNW. Thus, up until now U.S. and Russian TNW are 

still subject to only one arms control regime—unilateral parallel statements of George H.W. Bush and 

Mikhail Gorbachev made in 1991 known as PNIs (in 

1992 Boris Yeltsin confirmed Gorbachev’s statement 

in the name of Russia). It only remains to regret that 

the Soviet proposal, made in the fall of 1991 shortly 

after PNIs, to launch negotiations on a legally binding 
215

and verifiable treaty on TNW was at that time rejected 

by Washington.

Moreover, since 2004 Russia no longer recognizes 

PNIs as even politically binding. The last time Moscow formally reported on the implementation of PNIs 

was at the NPT PrepCom in April 2004, when the 

Russian representative mentioned that his country 

had “almost completed implementation” of its “initiatives” except for warheads assigned to Ground Forces, and that the pace of elimination was constrained 

by the technological capacity and available funding.35

Six months later, an official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry declared Russia was not bound 

by the PNIs, which were characterized as a goodwill 

gesture rather than an obligation.36

That said, PNIs have apparently been implemented, even though Russia does not publicly recognize 

that. In a report distributed at the 2005 NPT Review 

Conference, Russia declared that it had reduced its 

TNW arsenal to one-fourth of what it was in 1991.37

The following year, the Chief of the 12th Glavnoye 

Upravleniye Ministerstvo Oborony (GUMO, the Main 

Directorate of the Ministry of Defense responsible for 

handling nuclear weapons), confirmed that information and even asserted that reductions exceeded the 

original promise (he asserted that the 1991 statements 

foresaw a 64 percent reduction while Russia had reduced its TNW arsenal by 75 percent).38 Speaking 

in 2007, the new Chief of the 12th GUMO, General 

Vladimir Verkhovtsev, confirmed the 75 percent figure and added that the promised elimination of TNW 

warheads assigned to Ground Forces had been completed.39

The exact number of Russian TNW is unknown because parties to the PNIs are not required to exchange 
216

it. It is commonly believed that Russia has about 2,000 

warheads for delivery vehicles that are not subject to 

START treaties—about double what the United States 

is assumed to have.40 Breaking down that uncertain 

number into categories is even more challenging. According to the Natural Resources Defense Council 

(NRDC), the Air Force has 650 warheads, the Navy 

700, and Air Defense and Missile Defense (nowadays 

united in the Aerospace Forces) 700.41 Russian nongovernmental experts use the same figures, but the 

method of calculation used by NRDC leaves many 

uncertainties.42

It is safe to assume that the overall size of the 

stockpile is going down. Russia continued to dismantle warheads with expired service life (warranty), and 

only some of those are refurbished. The rate of dismantlement and refurbishment is limited by the available industrial capacity. There is no saying at what 

point the decline will stop and the stockpile become 

stabilized. That time is probably near.

A solution to the paradox of TNW—assets that 

Russia apparently does not need, but continues to 

hold on to—can be found in domestic politics rather 

than in strategic planning. The Russian government 

attitude toward TNW appears to represent a complex 

mix of domestic and bureaucratic politics, (mis)perceptions, and idiosyncrasies. Its main elements could 

be summarized in the following way:

• “No More Unreciprocated Concessions.” Resistance to arms control measures with regard to 

TNW appears to reflect the deep-seated rejection of Gorbachev and early Yeltsin propensity 

to make wide-ranging concessions that Edward 

Shevardnadze used to call “concessions to 

common sense.” Russian numerical superior-
217

ity is regarded as an advantage that could be 

traded for something tangible and should not 

be given away. Western attempts to persuade 

Russia to act on TNW (which by default means 

asymmetric reductions) tend to be regarded 

with suspicion without serious thought about 

the reasons for these proposals. Instead, such 

attempts are seen as proof that these weapons 

are truly valuable.

• Inertia. The longer the same position is maintained, the more entrenched it becomes. A position that has been in place for over a decade can 

be changed either when the leadership changes 

(as happened when Gorbachev assumed the 

highest office in the Soviet Union) or when the 

external environment changes. Neither condition is present today.

• “Capabilities-Based Planning.” The Russian elite, 

including the military leadership, acutely feels 

the uncertainty of the international environment. The main threat is still associated with 

the United States and its allies, but other potential threats are emerging and the Russian 

military is reluctant to part with any assets. In 

2005-07, similar arguments were made in favor 

of the withdrawal from the INF Treaty.

• Parochial Group Politics. As noted above, the 

Navy is interested in keeping TNW as a “justin-case” option.43 In contrast, the Air Force 

appears much less interested in TNW except 

for weapons assigned to Tu-22M3 medium 

bombers. Other groups probably have even 

less interest in TNW, but are unlikely to invest 

political resources to get rid of these weapons. 

Similarly, the Foreign Ministry, another im-
218

portant player, has many other more pressing 

items on its agenda. Since no parochial group 

is seriously interested in changing the existing 

position, the Navy’s interest wins by default.

• Arms Control Challenges. Russian ambivalence 

with regard to TNW might also reflect the 

challenges of crafting a verifiable treaty. The 

traditional approach, according to which nuclear weapons are accounted for and reduced 

indirectly through accounting and reduction 

of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, is inapplicable to TNW. New accounting rules require 

much more intrusive verification at several 

categories of nuclear-related facilities that have 

never been subject to inspections—storage sites 

for nuclear weapons, dismantlement facilities, 

etc. While such procedures are, in principle, not 

unthinkable, it would take serious investment 

of political resources to overcome entrenched 

resistance and political opposition.

Russia’s response to all Western proposals has 

remained the same for years—any discussion is only 

possible after the United States withdraws its TNW 

from Europe. An interesting aspect of that condition 

is that Moscow apparently does not have a plan as to 

what it might do if the United States, indeed, complies 

with it. One can find a range of rather contradictory 

opinions on how Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) could be leveraged, but these come from 

any quarter except from high-level officials. By all indications, the sole purpose of the current Russian position is to deflect U.S. and European pressure. 

While American TNW in Europe are few, they provide a convenient justification for rejection of any ini-
219

tiatives aimed at reducing the Russian TNW arsenal. 

Effectively, Russia has calculated that NATO would 

be unable to part with U.S. TNW. So far this calculation has proven solid and, given the outcome of internal NATO debates in the spring of 2010, will continue 

to succeed at least in the near future. 

That said, recently some in the Russian military 

apparently began to entertain more forward-looking 

views on the future of the nonstrategic nuclear force. 

While complete elimination is hardly on the books 

and withdrawal of the small U.S. force from Europe 

is not challenged, some thought has been given to designing additional options. In fact, there is reason to 

believe that in 2009 some in the military establishment 

favored the inclusion of TNW into the New START 

negotiations—a proposal that was rejected by military 

leadership. There is also expectation that the United 

States would insist on tackling TNW in the next stage 

of nuclear arms reduction talks and that Russia should 

prepare a position of its own. While these are clearly 

minority views, the new developments represent a 

welcome sign that the stone wall might be cracking.

MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC 

NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Russian modernization programs are reasonably 

well known, and for the purposes of this chapter require only an overview of key trends. These can be 

summarized as follows.

All three legs of the triad undergo modernization. These programs are driven by the expiration of 

warranty periods of systems inherited from the Soviet Union (i.e., the intended length of service of the 

weapon)—even though the warranty or length of 
220

service time is regularly extended, this cannot continue indefinitely. The rate of replacement is low and 

new ballistic missiles, both land- and sea-based, carry 

fewer warheads than Soviet ones. This means that the 

arsenal undergoes gradual reduction. The strategic arsenal will probably stabilize by the end of this decade 

at about 800-1,200 warheads. 

It is hardly surprising that Russia chose to deploy a 

new generation of delivery vehicles instead of restarting production of existing types. Behind this decision 

is the Soviet tradition of uninterrupted modernization, 

which, in turn, was determined by the structure of the 

Soviet design and production complex.44 It should 

be noted, however, that the majority of new types of 

strategic weapons were still developed in the Soviet 

Union.

Technologically and conceptually, current strategic modernization programs represent linear continuation of Soviet programs. In this sense, the emerging 

Russian strategic nuclear posture is very traditional. 

SRF will probably account for the bulk of all deployed 

warheads (around 50-60 percent). The earlier plans to 

radically change the structure of the triad and shift the 

emphasis to the Navy, which were developed in 2000 

and approved by then-President Vladimir Putin, have 

been abandoned. Russia has continued the Soviet line 

toward reduction of vulnerability and maintenance 

of high degree of readiness for launch—according to 

the SRF, almost all ICBMs could be launched within 1 

minute.45

The air-based leg of the triad is gradually shifting 

to a new tangent, however—to conventional strike capability. Eventually its role in the triad will probably 

be primarily symbolic, and for all intents and purposes the Russian strategic arsenal will become a dyad. 
221

The pace and the success rate for each leg of the 

triad are different. Modernization of the land-based, 

ICBM force began in the 1990s and progresses slowly 

but surely. Introduction of new types of weapons systems into the sea-based leg has encountered major delays and its future remains uncertain. Modernization 

of the air leg has been postponed—Russia plans to 

rely on existing aircraft in the foreseeable future and 

only weapons for use by strategic bombers are being 

gradually modernized with an emphasis on conventional assets. 

ICBM FORCE

The ICBM force modernization has been both conservative and most successful. It its center is Topol-M, 

a new ICBM designed in the last years of the Soviet 

Union. The project was partially revised in the 1990s 

to adapt to the new industrial base (a large part of 

relevant enterprises remained outside Russia). In the 

2000s, the same ICBM was further redesigned to carry 

several warheads and was designated RS-24, or Yars. 

Beginning of deployment was postponed until after 

the expiration of START I. 

The rate of ICBM production is low—less than 10 

missiles each year; increase of production is unlikely. After 10 years, only six regiments (60 missiles) of 

silo-based ICBMs have been deployed and only two 

regiments (18 missiles) of road-mobile ICBMs. In the 

meantime, the SRF has been extending service lives of 

existing types of delivery vehicles—to 31 years for SS18 and to 23 years for Topol (SS-25) and SS-19.46

The low rate of missile production might be surprising, given the impressive Soviet capability to turn 

out large numbers of new weapons—in the 1980s 
222

production of Topol (SS-25) was reportedly at 50 per 

year. Speaking in late 2007, at the time of relative financial plenty, First Vice-Premier and former Minister 

of Defense Sergey Ivanov sought to make it clear that 

the government consciously chose “butter” versus 

“guns.” “We believe,” he stated, “that we do not need 

30 Topol-Ms a year.47 Of course, we would not mind 

having them, but this would mean that we would 

need to cut social programs, housing programs, and 

other things.” He added that the annual deployment 

of six to seven new missiles is sufficient for the SRF.48

At the same time, Ivanov emphasized that “military 

capability, especially nuclear capability, should be 

sufficient if we want to be at a [safe] level or even 

merely independent. No one likes the weak, no one 

listens to them, everyone abuses them, and when we 

have parity, others talk to us differently.”49

There are other explanations for the low rate of 

production. One is the breakup of the traditional Soviet networks: many Soviet-era enterprises that contributed to production of components remained outside 

Russia. It is known that the number of only first-order suppliers for Topol-M is around 200; recreating 

these networks from scratch is difficult, expensive, 

time-consuming, and probably outright impossible. 

Another possible explanation is that Russia sought to 

reserve some unused production capacity for the new 

submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Bulava.

Nonetheless, the SRF confidently promises that by 

2016 about 80 percent of all ICBMs will be new, i.e., 

deployed in the post-Soviet period.50 Reduction under 

New START and perhaps under the next agreement 

could certainly contribute to that goal, but it nevertheless appears wishful thinking without a significant 

increase of funding. 
223

Even more remote is the plan to develop a new 

liquid-fuel multiple independent reentry vehicled 

(MIRVed) ICBM to replace the Soviet SS-18 (the new 

ICBM will hardly classify as “heavy” under START I 

definitions, but its throw-weight will likely be significantly greater than that of Topol-M, probably at the 

level of SS-19).51 Development of the new ICBM is supposed to be completed by 2016, but the goal does not 

appear realistic. More likely, same as talk about the 

revival of the rail-mobile ICBM, it reflects the wishes 

of the military rather than definitive plans.

That said, liquid-fuel missiles have, in the eyes 

of the military, certain advantages that explain why 

this line of missiles is still alive in Russia unlike in 

the United States. Traditionally, Soviet liquid fuel has 

been more efficient than Soviet solid fuel, allowing for 

greater throw-weight for the same weight of missile. 

Liquid-fuel missiles have helped Russia retain an impressive strategic arsenal after two decades of financial, economic, and political turmoil: a large number 

of these systems that had been produced in the Soviet Union remained in “dry storage,” i.e., were kept 

without fuel. During the post-Soviet period, the military could simply take them from storage, fuel, and 

deploy. This cannot be done with solid-fuel missiles, 

whose length of service time period begins at the moment of production. 

Recently the SRF was criticized by the government 

for being insufficiently ambitious. Reportedly, chief of 

the Government’s Department for the Support of the 

Military-Industrial Commission, Sergey Khutortsov, 

declared that the SRF was bogged down in small-scale 

programs and does not have an ambitious long-term 

goal around which its future should be built, unlike the Navy or the Air Force. The new liquid-fuel 
224

MIRVed ICBM and even the rail-mobile ICBM did not 

classify as sufficiently ambitious, he said.52

The SRF proudly advertizes the defense-penetration properties of its new ICBMs53 but conveniently 

fails to mention that this capability was part of a Soviet-era design. In particular, Topol-M features reduced 

boost phase (about one-third of that of SS-18), which 

was intended to reduce the effectiveness of spacebased interceptors; today this capability is probably 

less relevant. Topol-M can also carry a maneuverable 

warhead known as Igla. There is no public authoritative confirmation that Igla is actually being deployed 

following a very small number of successful tests. 

Overall, the anti-missile defense capability of new 

Russian ICBMs should not be overestimated. 

SLBM FORCE

Modernization of the sea leg of the triad has encountered major technological and political failures. 

The initial plan was apparently fairly logical: retain 

the more modern Delta III and IV submersible submarine ballistic nuclear (SSBNs), and eventually only the 

latter, with replacement missiles, develop replacement 

missiles for Typhoon SSBNs, and build new SSBNs to 

carry the same missiles as Typhoons. This plan quickly 

fell apart. The replacement for SS-N-20, known as 

Bark, was canceled after three failed test flights. Although the failures had been attributed to production 

shortcomings and one Typhoon-class SSBN had been 

converted for further tests of the Bark,54 the contract 

for the new solid-fuel SLBM was nevertheless given to 

the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), 

the same that developed Topol and Topol-M ICBMs. 

Design of the new SSBN had to be radically altered: 
225

construction of the first submarine in the new class 

was put on hold until new designs could be drawn 

to accommodate a radically different missile. The 

Typhoon-class SSBN converted for Bark was converted 

once again to serve as a testing pad for the new missile. This decision, made in the late 1990s, was widely 

attributed to parochial fights, and in particular to the 

close relationship between the Director of MITT Yuri 

Solomonov and the then-Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, previously the Commander of the SRF.

MITT planned to make the new SLBM, codenamed Bulava, an example of a new approach to 

development of missiles—relatively fast, relatively 

cheap, with fewer test flights, and large-scale use of 

computer simulation. The new missile was supposed 

to become a major departure from Soviet traditions of 

SLBM design and be much lighter and smaller than 

Soviet solid-fuel SLBMs. The plan failed utterly—to 

date, seven out of 12 test flights have failed, and those 

by rather relaxed official criteria; the majority of nongovernmental experts classify only one or two tests as 

successful.

By the end of 2009 the government and the Ministry of Defense lost patience. Solomonov had to resign 

from the position of the head of MITT and a special 

commission was established to investigate the cause 

of failures concluded that the missile’s design was 

faulty.55 Resumption of tests was initially scheduled 

for early summer 2010, but then was postponed until late fall.56 Solomonov, however, continues to insist 

that failures were caused by substandard components 

supplied by the industry, which no longer can maintain high quality.57

In the meantime, the new SSBN program continued in spite of delays with the missile. The first 
226

submarine in the new class, Yuri Dolgoruki, has been 

commissioned, two more are being built, and the keel 

of the fourth was laid in January 2010. It was also decided to retain one more Typhoon SSBN and convert it 

for Bulava. Eventually this might mean that, given the 

low production capability, Russia will have serious 

problems producing the necessary number of SLBMs 

to equip all submarines (16 per each new Borey-class 

SSBN and 20 per each Typhoon; future Borey SSBNs are 

expected to carry 20 missiles each).

The sorry state of modernization of the Navy increasingly causes displeasure of the top echelons of 

the government—last year First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov revealed that the Navy consumes 

40 percent of the total defense budget, more than the 

SRF, Air Force, and Space Forces combined, and that 

the bulk of that spending goes to the nuclear submarine force.58 Implicit in the tone of his remarks was recognition that the yield from that investment remains 

unsatisfactory. 

In the meantime, the sea leg of the Russian triad 

consists of Delta III and IV SSBNs. These submarines 

were given an overhaul to extend their service lives. 

The Makeev design bureau, which had lost the contract for a new SLBM, produced a modernized version 

of SS-N-23. In the coming decade, Delta IIIs will be 

probably phased out and only slightly newer Delta IVs 

will remain in service. Thus, early completion of the 

Bulava program remains a must—without it, Russia 

risks losing the sea leg completely by the end of this or 

the beginning of the next decade. 

It might be interesting to contemplate the Russian 

strategic triad without the naval component. Proposals to phase out SSBNs were quite popular in the late 

1990s-early 2000s, when investment into moderniza-
227

tion of that leg was still minimal. In that case, Russia 

might seek much deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals than 

otherwise likely and the mission of strategic deterrence would be supported by the SRF while de-escalation would still be entrusted to the Air Force. In the 

end, transition from a triad to a dyad might be a good 

choice, but it appears unlikely for political reasons 

and also because too much money has already been 

spent on Bulava—it is difficult to imagine a political 

or military leader who would be willing to accept responsibility for the failure.

AIR FORCE

The Air Force never played a major role in the Soviet nuclear posture; its share in the strategic arsenal 

was limited to about 5 percent of deployed warheads. 

This choice is easy to explain by the traditional drawbacks of Soviet aircraft-building (especially in engines 

and navigational equipment) as well as the long distances heavy bombers had to cover to reach the United 

States, meaning a very long gap between decision to 

launch and delivery as well as very limited payload. 

The situation began to change somewhat in the 1980s 

after the Soviet Union succeeded in development of 

long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). 

Posture plans drawn in the late 1980s foresaw some 

(albeit still limited) increase in the share of warheads 

carried on heavy bombers.

In the post-Soviet time, the Air Force remained at 

the back burner during the larger part of the 1990s 

until Ukraine agreed to sell some heavy bombers to 

Russia instead of eliminating them under START I. 

This allowed increasing the number of heavy bombers to a level that had at least some military sense. In 
228

the 2000s, the Air Force became the leading asset to 

support the new mission, that of de-escalation.59

Nuclear-capable aircraft (heavy bombers Tu-160 

and Tu-95MS as well as medium Tu-22M3) have remained at the back burner of modernization efforts: 

existing heavy bombers are expected to last until at 

least the end of this decade, so there is no rush, in contrast to the ICBM and SLBM forces, which must be replaced as a matter of urgency. Instead, Russia has concentrated on upgrading the electronics and avionics of 

these aircraft; some heavy bombers designed to carry 

ALCMs are being converted to carry gravity bombs.

Modernization of nuclear weapons has been very 

limited. Russia is working on a new-generation (reportedly supersonic) ALCM, Kh-101, and its conventional version, Kh-102. Work on that program has 

been exceedingly slow—it began in the 1990s and the 

last mention of it is in 2000. After that, mentions of 

that program ceased until recently, when it surfaced 

only once and almost by accident. Obviously, the program is highly classified, but work continues, which 

is hardly surprising because at the moment the only 

long-range nuclear asset is a hopelessly outdated Kh55. There is also a plan to give high precision capability to gravity bombs using the emerging Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS).

Eventually aircraft have to be replaced, of course. 

Among the existing types, the Tu-22Ms will probably 

be phased out completely. Some suggest that Su-34 

could take up its roles, but it is unclear whether a decision has been made yet, which probably indicates 

that Russian military does not foresee many nuclear 

missions at Su-34 ranges.

Long-range plans of the Air Force are built around 

a brand new bomber, which will reportedly fall some-
229

where between Tu-22M3 and heavy bombers in range 

and load and is expected to be cheaper than the heavy 

bombers.60 Its main missions are reported to be in Eurasia and perhaps also the northern part of Africa. One 

wonders whether the new aircraft will actually fall 

under the traditional START I definition of a heavy 

bomber. The beginning of test flights is scheduled 

for 2015-16 and production could begin around 2020. 

These dates are certainly subject to revision, which is 

hardly surprising given the tradition of delays of all 

modernization programs: in fact, first reports about 

the new bomber appeared more than 10 years ago, but 

the Ministry of Defense concluded a formal contract 

with Tupolev design bureau for a new aircraft only in 

August 2009. 

Information about modernization of the air leg 

of the strategic triad is scarce, but is the information 

available leads to three conclusions. First, the Air 

Force is likely to lose a role in strategic deterrence, 

even though formally and for arms control purposes 

it will remain part of strategic arsenal. Second, the Air 

Force will maintain and perhaps even enhance a nuclear role at the theater level. This role will not require 

large capability and the number of long-range aircraft 

will remain relatively small. Third, long-range aircraft 

will increasingly support conventional long-range 

missions. In this, Russia follows the trends of the U.S. 

Air Force with about 15-20 years lag. More about this 

aspect of Air Force modernization will be discussed in 

the relevant section of this chapter. 
230

MISSILE DEFENSE IN U.S.-RUSSIAN 

RELATIONSHIP

American missile defense plans are an old issue 

in U.S.-Russian relations. They date back to Reagan’s 

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); tensions declined in 

the early 1990s, but began to build up again toward 

the end of that decade and reached the peak during 

the last decade as a result of U.S. withdrawal from the 

ABM Treaty and the subsequent announcement of the 

intention to deploy 10 interceptors in Poland and a 

radar in Czech Republic. The announcement in September 2009 of a change in missile defense plans for 

Europe helped to significantly alleviate the acrimony, 

but did not remove it completely.

Thus conflict has continued for almost 3 decades. 

A truly curious element of the picture is that strategic missile defense still does not exist. So far, it has all 

been about intentions and the projected capability of 

the future system. 

Another curious element is that there is actually 

very little to be said about the nature and the dynamic 

of that conflict. The fault lines are simple and straightforward; they have not changed in many years.

The Russian view of missile defense is informed 

by the traditional view of strategic deterrence built 

around mutual vulnerability. Underlying Russian opposition is fear that the United States could acquire the 

ability to deny Russia ability to respond to an attack; 

this concern was shaped in the 1980s by SDI plans. 

Even though the likelihood of a large-scale nuclear 

war is practically nonexistent, there is fear that such a 

capability could be used as a leverage to extract concessions and exert political pressure. In other words, 

it goes straight to the heart of the view that nuclear 
231

weapons guarantee Russia’s security and sovereignty. 

Hence, opposition to missile defense amounts to more 

than just a straightforward military calculation. The 

issue has become emotionally charged and suspicions 

now matter more than cool-headed assessment.

Virulent, often hysterical Russian opposition to 

the George W. Bush plans to build a limited strategic 

defense capability in Europe has demonstrated two 

underlying and intertwining trends that make conflict 

almost inevitable.

The first trend is the multiple capabilities of a system designed to protect the United States against Iranian or North Korean missiles. The same assets could 

theoretically intercept Russian missiles as well, and 

that residual capability conveniently feeds into the 

concern about the credibility of strategic deterrence. 

Almost no one in Russia believed the official justification provided by the Bush administration because, 

according to Russian military’s estimates, Iran will not 

acquire missiles with strategic range for many years. 

Hence, Russians tried to imagine the “real” purpose 

of the planned missile defense and, not surprisingly, 

concluded it was intended against Russia—worst-case 

planning and suspicions still to a large extent rule the 

day in Moscow. Washington’s assurances that the system would be limited were not taken seriously—the 

planned deployment was regarded as a “foot in the 

door,” with the first 10 interceptors supplemented by 

dozens more at a later stage. 

A further complication was the manner and style 

of Russian rhetoric, which almost always failed to 

clearly convey the true nature of concern—it was not 

about the system the Bush administration planned, but 

rather about its possible expansion in the future. Russian statements were usually devoted to short-range 
232

plans. Concern about future capability was further 

enhanced by the insistence of the White House that 

the plan was open-ended and refusal to set any limits, whether formally or informally. The open-ended 

nature of the proposed system further strengthened 

Russian belief that the “true” plans were much more 

ominous than those announced publicly.

Only relatively rarely did Russians clearly distinguish between immediate American plans and possible future expansion. Speaking in February 2007, 

Chief of the Air Force Vladimir Mikhailov said that he 

regarded “very calmly” the planned missile defenses 

in Eastern Europe.61 Former Chief of Staff of Strategic Rocket Forces Viktor Yesin opined that the main 

threat of missile defense came from “undefined architecture.” “Will there be 10 interceptors or a thousand? 

It’s 10 now, but no one can guarantee there will not 

be more.” He anticipated that eventually the United 

States would also deploy missile defense assets in Japan, Great Britain, or Norway.62 Deputy Chief of the 

Main Directorate of International Cooperation at the 

Ministry of Defense Yevgenii Buzhinskii said that current small-scale deployment plans were but elements 

of a broader vision—a global network of missile defense around Russia’s borders.63

This leads to the second and perhaps the most important feature of the conflict over missile defense—it 

has been about the lack of predictability. In the absence 

of reasonably clear-cut, definitive long-term plans, 

Russian thinking has been unavoidably informed by 

worst-case scenarios. The most important lesson that 

could be drawn from the conflicts of the last decade 

over missile defense is simple, but perhaps difficult 

to implement—the need for predictability. U.S. efforts to maintain transparency through provision 
233

of information about plans turned out to be insufficient.

It is no wonder that the lowest point in U.S.-Russian interaction on missile defense was the end of 

2007 and 2008. In October 2007, a two-by-two meeting (between foreign and defense ministers of the two 

countries) seemed to have achieved a preliminary 

agreement on a set of confidence building measures 

intended to alleviate Russian concerns. Neither side 

was fully satisfied with it, but about a week after that 

meeting Vladimir Putin (at that time still president of 

Russia) indicated that Moscow regarded that tentative 

deal as a foundation for possible future agreement.64

When the United States transmitted its proposals on 

missile defense in writing a month later (delay was 

ascribed to protracted bureaucratic in-fighting in 

Washington), however, Russian officials promptly 

rejected them, accusing the United States of retracting the compromises discussed during the Gates-Rice 

visit and returning the negotiations to square one.65

After that, Moscow came to regard dialogue with the 

United States on missile defense as impossible.

Against that background, the September 2009 announcement about a revision of plans for defense of 

Europe was seen as positive news. While principled 

opposition to missile defense did not disappear, the 

new architecture was at least logically explainable. It 

was clearly intended to defend Europe from existing

Iranian missiles and at the same time in the near future 

will not have capability to intercept Russian ICBMs. 

Acknowledgment by the United States in the New 

START treaty of a relationship between offensive and 

defensive weapons also contributed to a calmer tone 

of interaction on missile defense. New START did not 

resolve the issue from the Russian perspective but was 
234

a positive first step toward a final solution. Effectively, 

it bought time for a more constructive engagement, 

and this is probably the maximum that could be done 

at the current stage.

Nevertheless, the issue did not fade away completely. While current plans are not a source of serious 

concern, possible future capabilities still are. Chief of 

General Staff Nikolai Makarov declared that U.S. missile defense in its current shape and capability is not 

a concern for Russia, but long-term plans to develop 

strategic missile defense could become a threat.66

According to Vladimir Dvorkin, “the crisis between 

Russia and the United States over missile defense has 

been postponed [by the signing of New START], but it 

could return in an even more acute shape after the seabased missile defense system built around SM-3 interceptors and their ground-launched analogues acquire 

strategic capability by 2020.”67 That is, while the first 

irritant—multiple capabilities—has been removed, 

the other and more important one, predictability, still 

needs to be addressed.

A complicating feature that has emerged during 

the last decade was the emergence of close cooperation 

between Russia and China in opposition to U.S. missile defense plans. Both countries share many of the 

same concerns and have jointly acted in almost every 

conceivable international forum to oppose and derail 

American plans. A turning point in that cooperation 

was 2005, when Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Russia and China both face the same threat 

from U.S. missile defense plans. As a result, Russia’s 

ability to find accommodation with the United States, 

launch cooperative programs, etc., is now limited because it could be seen by China as a betrayal. 
235

Quite paradoxically, another, equally persistent 

theme in the Russian approach to U.S. missile defense 

programs has been proposals for cooperation. In the 

early 1990s, these proposals were built around a notion that Russia could contribute technologies developed during decades of R&D in missile defense. These 

included programs launched in the 1980s—although 

the Soviet Union vehemently opposed SDI and advertized “asymmetric” responses to it (i.e., through 

enhancement of offensive weapons capability), it 

simultaneously pursued a wide range of its own defense programs, a “symmetric” response. These were 

not particularly advanced and mostly remained at the 

stage of research, but their scale was quite impressive—they consumed more than half (about 52 percent) of all spending on strategic weapons. 

Since the late 1990s, Russia sought to showcase a 

defense system against tactical missiles, S-300, as well 

as another system, S-400 (at that time still in the pipeline), which was intended to counter intermediaterange missiles. Indeed, the 1997 New York Protocols, 

which drew a line between strategic and nonstrategic defenses (i.e., those that were banned or allowed 

under the 1972 ABM Treaty), were carefully crafted 

by Russia to protect S-400. The highest point of these 

initiatives was a proposal made in early 2001, which 

foresaw a relatively well-developed plan for the defense of Europe consisting of a combination of S-300 

and S-400; this proposal was overlooked by the United States, which, under the new administration, was 

moving toward abrogation of the ABM Treaty. 

It is important to understand the Russian definition of cooperation. It assumed that Moscow would 

supply weapons systems (and get paid for them), be 

an integral part of decisionmaking on the architecture 
236

of the defense system (and have the right to veto elements of the system that could be used to track and/

or intercept Russian missiles), and be part of operating 

the system (including the right to prevent launches of 

interceptors against Russian missiles). The definition 

of cooperation used by the George W. Bush administration was different. The most important practical 

contribution that was expected from Russia was data 

from the radar it operated—from Gabala in Azerbaijan and later from the new radar in Armavir. That is, 

Russian participation would have to be passive. This 

mode did not satisfy Moscow, and it was not prepared 

to supply data to an American-operated system, only 

to a joint one. 

Proposals about a joint missile defense resumed 

under the Obama administration and have recently 

become a central point in Russian official and unofficial statements on missile defense. President Dmitri 

Medvedev declared recently, in response to NATO 

overtures on cooperation in missile defense, that Russia would be interested in a joint system with NATO if 

the proposal was serious.68 Former Chief of Staff of the 

SRF Viktor Yesin opined that the United States and 

Russia could create a joint defense system to protect 

Europe against Iranian missiles and mentioned that 

such a system could be configured to intercept Iranian 

missiles with speeds up to 7 kilometers (km)/second 

(that is, it would be classified as nonstrategic under the 

1997 New York Protocols) and use data not only from 

American radars, but also from radars at Gabala and 

Armavir. According to Yesin, such a system could be 

created after 2015.69 Similarly, Vladimir Dvorkin wrote 

that a joint system building on simulations conducted 

between the United States and NATO during the last 

decade is the only way to resolve the continuing con-
237

troversy over missile defense. In his view, however, 

the system does not need to be fully integrated and 

instead could be built on dividing responsibility for 

different sectors. 70

The proposed Russian contribution is still S-300 

and S-400 systems, which are now in a more advanced 

stage than they used to be 10 years ago. In fact, the 

S-400 entered test deployment in 2007 and is expected 

to go into mass production later this year or in 2011, 

following long delays with development of a new interceptor. Moreover, Russia is conducting R&D on a 

still more advanced system, S-500 Triumphator, which 

is supposed to be ready for production in 2015 (given 

multiple-year delays with S-400, this official timeline 

does not sound very realistic, though). With S-500, 

Russia could reach the parameters proposed by Yesin 

(7 km/second for incoming missiles; S-400 can only 

intercept missiles with less than 5 km/second speed). 

All in all, solution to the issue of missile defense 

remains elusive. Perhaps the biggest challenge is lack 

of any clarity with regard to a final solution; thus, it is 

difficult to decide which way dialogue should steer. 

The Russian preference seems to be for a new ABM 

treaty of some sort that would regulate missile defense to guarantee mutual vulnerability of the United 

States and Russia. Such a solution is hardly feasible in 

the near future. Furthermore, the Russian position on 

missile defense is limited by its close cooperation with 

China, whose criteria for a new international regime 

in missile defense are likely to be even more restrictive 

than those of Russia. While a new politically or legally 

binding regime on missile defense seems improbable, 

it is nevertheless still advisable to discuss it, perhaps 

unofficially, to enhance predictability and promote 

better understanding of the positions of all parties.
238

In the absence of a final solution, a series of smallscale partial agreements on various elements of the 

relationship in the missile defense area seems more 

feasible. These could address confidence building 

measures and enhance transparency and predictability. That is, conflicts seem unavoidable, but they can be 

regulated and kept in check. There appears to be two 

ways of tackling differences, neither fully acceptable 

to the United States or Russia for reasons of domestic 

politics.

The first option is enhanced predictability. All the 

loud, sometimes shrill, statements notwithstanding, 

Russia has never been concerned about short-term 

American plans; even the George W. Bush administration’s system was not regarded as an immediate threat. 

Concern has been primarily about future capability, 

which has so far remained undefined. Interaction in 

the last decade has demonstrated that simple information about plans is not sufficient because plans can 

change; other ways to enhance predictability should 

be considered together with enhanced consultations. 

An ultimate predictability mechanism is a new fullscale treaty on missile defense, but other, more limited 

options should be considered.

The second option favored by Russia is a fully integrated missile defense system. A strong cooperative program in that area could change the lineup of 

domestic parochial groups in Russia in favor of a more 

moderate attitude toward American plans, but such a 

joint system would give Russia a role in decisionmaking on all aspects of building and operating it. That 

degree of involvement and especially the right of veto 

over the use of the system, whether formal or de facto, 

is likely to be unacceptable to Washington, too. 
239

A positive element in all the conflicts and debates 

over a possible missile defense system, which has not 

attracted sufficient attention, is that Russia is actually 

prepared to contribute to the defense of Europe and 

potentially of the United States from Iran as long as 

it is accepted as a full partner. This could finally and 

unequivocally put Moscow into the Western camp 

with regard to Iran and end the Russian attempts to 

straddle the fence when it comes to Russian-Iranian 

relations. Interestingly, the military and the defense 

industry seem to favor that solution and, for a change, 

the Foreign Ministry takes a more conservative approach. 

In the end, there is probably no prospect of a final 

solution to the issue of missile defense. In all likelihood, controversy and conflict will continue in the 

foreseeable future. The parties will continue to muddle 

through, 1 year after another with ups and downs and 

perhaps with some partial, small-scale agreements on 

various aspects of the issue. 

LONG-RANGE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY

Russian opposition to the emerging U.S. Global 

Strike is well-known. Multiple concerns voiced by 

Russian officials and uniformed military fall into three 

categories. 

First, high-precision conventional weapons could 

be used in a disarming first strike against the Russian 

nuclear arsenal. This was a major concern in the 1990s, 

but its urgency has been gradually declining. Among 

the military, there is still concern about the ability of 

high-precision conventional weapons to destroy soft 

targets, particularly road-mobile ICBMs, but even that 

is not considered a high-priority threat, at least not at 
240

the moment. By and large, this concern is now limited 

to conservative quarters. It should be noted however, 

that decline of this concern rests, to a large extent, on 

continued reliance on nuclear weapons. Even wellknown liberal expert Aleksei Arbatov emphasized 

recently that “as long as Russia has a reliable nuclear 

deterrence capability, the scenario of a massive and 

extended conventional air and missile U.S. strikes using high-precision conventional weapons remains an 

artificial threat.”71 Without it, Russia could have been 

much more concerned about U.S. conventional strike 

capability. 

Second, in a large-scale conflict conventional assets can do many of the same things as nuclear weapons, but are more usable. To some extent, this is not 

so much a concern as envy—where the United States 

could utilize conventional assets Russia is still limited 

to nuclear options. The recent Nuclear Posture Review

was assessed by Russian experts from precisely that 

angle—the United States no longer needs nuclear 

weapons for its security and can (or will in the near 

future) support almost all missions with conventional 

assets.72

Third, and finally, it is difficult to distinguish a 

long-range delivery vehicle with a conventional warhead from the same vehicle equipped with a nuclear 

warhead. Since trajectories toward the majority of 

likely targets cross Russian territory or closely skirt it, 

they could be interpreted by the early warning system 

as an attack.73 This concern appears real and needs to 

be addressed—the Russian military are clearly not 

going to be satisfied with U.S. notifications in case of 

a launch and will want the ability to verify it independently. Very limited (nonexistent for all practical 

purposes) Russian capability to detect single launches 
241

from submarines is likely to complicate the matter even further. Paradoxically, ICBMs armed with 

conventional warheads might be a better option for 

Global Strike because Russian inspectors could verify 

the type of warheads on designated ICBMs during reentry vehicle (RV) inspections under New START (on 

the other hand, to reach the majority of targets in Eurasia, the ICBM must fly over Russian territory, which 

can be a cause for concern as well). 

Even as Russian politicians, military, and nongovernmental experts continue to criticize American 

plans for Global Strike, they simultaneously advocate 

acquisition of similar capability by Russia. As a wellknown Russia expert, Aleksandr Khramchikhin, noted, “strategic weapons are not a panacea for defense 

against attack against Russia.”74 It is worth recalling 

that the 2000 National Security Concept and subsequent 

documents called reliance on nuclear weapons a temporary fix until Russia acquires a modern conventional capability.

Efforts toward that goal were started in the 1980s, 

but progress is slow. Nonetheless, it enjoys greater 

attention than modernization of the nuclear capability. Programs include long- and short-range precision 

guided air- and ground-launched missiles as well as 

new communication, command, and control assets, 

a Russian analogue to global positioning satellites 

(GPS) and GLONASS, which should enable precision 

strikes. 

In the early 2000s Russia began production of the 

Kh-555 conventional ALCM (a version of the nuclear 

Kh-55); in the 1990s, it also started to work on a brandnew Kh-101/102 ALCM: the 101 variant for a nuclear 

warhead and 102 for conventional. This R&D program 

has apparently been exceedingly slow and secretive—
242

it was fairly often reported in the media in the 1990s, 

but then all information about it disappeared from 

open sources until 2009, when it was mentioned only 

once and apparently inadvertently. The Air Force has 

also begun conversion of some Tu-160 heavy bombers 

from cruise missiles to conventional gravity bombs.

In the 1990s, Russia also developed a new tactical 

missile, Iskander; its production began in the mid2000s. Initially Iskander-E was reported to have the 

range of 280 km,75 but subsequently its range was reportedly increased to more than 400 km—about the 

same as the SS-23 Oka, which was eliminated under 

the 1987 INF Treaty. Later, a cruise missile was also 

developed for the Iskander launcher. The decision, 

announced in 2008, to deploy five brigades (probably 

60 launchers with two missiles each) of Iskanders in 

Kaliningrad oblast—officially in response to an American plan to deploy missile defense assets in Poland 

and the Czech Republic76—perhaps signaled a move 

in the shifting emphasis from nuclear to conventional 

capability vis-à-vis NATO. Moscow had to cancel 

these plans in 2009 after revision of the U.S. missile 

defense program, but this probably shows only that 

the pretext was wrong—a change of U.S. plans was 

apparently not expected. If deployment of Iskanders 

was indeed part of a move toward greater reliance on 

conventional assets, the idea will be revived in a new 

context.

An important element of the emerging conventional capability is multipurpose (attack) submarines. 

Russia is building new types of nuclear powered submarines (SSNs) and diesel-powered submarines—

Project 885 Yasen (the first SSN, Severodvinsk, should 

be commissioned this or next year), Project 677 Lada 

(construction of the first submarine was completed in 
243

2005, two more are close to completion). These and other submarines are equipped with dual-capable cruise 

missiles, both those intended against other ships and 

against land targets. As mentioned above, the Navy 

seeks to maintain its nuclear capability, especially visà-vis U.S. Navy, but conventional assets play an increasingly visible role in the long-term plans. 

The pace of conventional rearmament is set to increase following the “5-day war,” the conflict between 

Russia and Georgia in August 2008. Russia won this 

conflict largely due to the sheer size of the army it sent 

to battle. Speaking in September 2008, Dmitri Medvedev declared: 

We must achieve superiority in the air, in high-precision strikes against land and sea targets, in quick 

relocation of troops. . . . By 2020, we must solve the 

problem of . . . comprehensive equipment of forces 

with new models of arms and reconnaissance assets.77

More than 2 decades of work on GLONASS, which 

should allow precision guidance for conventional 

weapons, is gradually coming to completion as well. 

It currently features 21 satellites allowing coverage 

of Russia’s own territory, with two or three satellites 

for each location; launch of six additional satellites is 

planned for 2010. The system is still inferior to GPS—

the accuracy of its coordinates in Russian territory is 

reported to be six meters, several times worse than 

for GPS, but on the other hand its characteristics are 

gradually improving—in 2009 it was 10 meters.78 One 

of the main drawbacks of Soviet satellites that necessitates frequent replacement of satellites in orbit—short 

life span—is also slowly improving. A new satellite 

was introduced several years ago, and in 2010 Russia plans to launch the first satellites that will last 7 
244

or more years. Given multiple delays and the Russian 

propensity to overestimate the ability to deliver new 

products, GLONASS will probably reach full functionality only in the second half of the coming decade.

While Russian efforts to acquire long-range conventional capability seem to mirror what the United 

States has been doing for over 20 years, there is an 

important asymmetry that could complicate finding a 

common language. In contrast to Global Strike, which 

emphasizes strategic ranges because potential targets 

are located in southern Eurasia (Middle East, South 

Asia, etc.), Russia is developing a theater-level conventional capability. Ironically, American and Russian 

targets, if not the same, at least overlap, but Russia 

is simply closer to these targets. Furthermore, assets 

the United States needs to strike in the areas of ongoing and potential conflicts could also be used against 

Russia, which will remain a source of unending concern for Moscow, whereas Russian theater-range assets will not be able to strike the United States. Thus, 

Russian military and civilian experts will continue to 

voice concern about Global Strike. This concern could 

be alleviated somewhat through a set of confidence 

building measures, but hardly removed completely, 

at least not in the foreseeable future.

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INF

The 1987 INF Treaty has never been particularly 

liked by the Russian military. It is closely associated 

with major concessions on part of the Soviet Union, 

which had to eliminate many more missiles in that 

class than the United States. Characteristically, the security benefits the Soviet Union obtained from that deal 

(removal of American missiles with very short flight-
245

time) is practically never mentioned—the emphasis 

is almost always on the numbers of weapons subject 

to elimination. Particularly painful for the military is 

the agreement by Mikhail Gorbachev to include SS-23 

Oka missiles into the treaty: the range of that missile is 

widely believed (not without reason) to be below 500 

km and thus it should not have been subject to the INF 

Treaty, or so many still believe. In other words, the 

INF Treaty is often regarded as a symbol of betrayal 

and unwarranted concessions. This perception has 

strongly affected many other arms control issues, including Russian resistance to Western proposals with 

regard to reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the INF Treaty was not only implemented, but Russia continues to uphold it. Until relatively recently, there was no reason to believe that 

constant grumbling would translate into proposals to 

abrogate it. Such proposals did emerge, however, in 

the middle of 2000s.

When the United States withdrew from the ABM 

Treaty in 2002, many in Russia regarded this as an example that could be emulated—namely, that it is acceptable to withdraw from treaties once they are no 

longer regarded as serving national interest. U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty certainly undermined 

the argument about sanctity of international agreements, especially among the Russian military. Central 

to the argument about abrogation of the INF was its 

bilateral nature: “others have ‘em.” Official statements 

did not point at specific countries, but public debates 

mentioned China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, 

and Israel. 

An important point to bear in mind is that proposals for withdrawal from the INF Treaty were not 

part of a desire to enhance nuclear capability. Instead, 
246

they were part of Russian desire to develop longrange conventional assets. Indeed, for the first time, 

regret about the ban on intermediate-range missiles 

was voiced during the second war in Chechnya, when 

then-Secretary of the Security Council Sergey Ivanov 

complained that without such assets Russia could not 

take out Chechen training camps in Afghanistan.

The desire to add intermediate-range missiles to 

the planned conventional capability was officially 

spelled out during Ivanov’s meeting of U.S. Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in August 2006 in Alaska. Responding to Rumsfeld’s attempt to explain the 

benefits of the United States equipping some strategic 

missiles with conventional warheads to make them 

usable for strikes against terrorists, Ivanov said that 

conventionally-armed strategic missiles were not the 

only option for strikes against terrorists and far from 

the safest: 

Theoretically, one could use long-range cruise missiles with conventional warheads, . . . One could even 

consider a theoretical possibility of using intermediate 

range missiles, although the United States and Russia 

cannot have them, unlike many other countries, which 

already have such missiles.79

Uniformed military were clearly delighted to see 

their old favorite proposal pitched to the U.S. Secretary of Defense and quickly sought to elaborate it and 

calm possible American anxieties. An unnamed representative of the Ministry of Defense said that while 

the abrogation of the ABM Treaty opened a door to a 

similar step with regard to the INF Treaty, the United States should not be concerned because Russian 

intermediate-range systems cannot reach U.S. territory except from Chukotka, across the Bering Strait 
247

from Alaska, “but they will not be deployed there.” 

Referring specifically to North Korea, he stated that, 

for Russia, intermediate-range missiles would be far 

more useful as conventionally armed systems than 

intercontinental missiles, as proposed by the United 

States.80

Ultimately, however, the rationale for withdrawal 

from the INF Treaty changed and came to be linked 

to George W. Bush administration’s plans for missile 

defense in Europe. Early in 2007, Chief of the General 

Staff Yuri Baluevski declared that Russia was considering whether to withdraw from the INF Treaty, and 

the final decision was contingent upon U.S. actions 

with regard to deployment of a missile defense system 

in proximity to Russia. 81

The leading role in the push for withdrawal was 

often attributed to the SRF, which sought to expand 

its force and give it more relevance within the military establishment. It is noteworthy that Director of 

the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of 

Defense (the institute conducts research to support 

the SRF) Major-General Vladimir Vasilenko, in a departure from the standard Russian perspective, said 

that intercontinental strategic missiles were preferable 

to intermediate-range systems as conventional assets 

because the longer range of the former made them a 

more versatile asset.82 The Air Force was a more vocal voice of opposition—its representatives declared 

that they could support any conventional or nuclear 

mission at the theater level implying that there was 

no reason to spend all the political and financial resources to deploy intermediate-range land-based missiles. The Foreign Ministry was another force opposing the abrogation of an important treaty. There was 

also quite serious—and surprising—opposition in the 
248

ranks of retired generals who claimed that the United 

States could use the abrogation of the INF Treaty once 

again to deploy Pershing II and ground launched 

cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe; clearly, uniformed 

military, who are less wedded to Cold War concepts, 

did not regard that as a likely scenario. 

The outcome of the debates that raged in 2005-07 

reminded NATO’s 1979 “dual-track” decision (it is 

noteworthy how much contemporary Russian policies are influenced by examples set by past policies 

of NATO)—Russia would not withdraw from the INF 

Treaty, but would propose to make it a multilateral 

agreement. It was tacitly assumed that abrogation was 

not off the agenda, however, and the issue could be 

revisited if countries with intermediate-range missile 

programs do not join. The United States joined the initiative and in 2008 Moscow even tabled a draft multilateral INF Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament 

in Geneva. Thus the issue has remained on the agenda, 

and from time to time Moscow reminds other countries about the proposal. The specter of withdrawal 

from the INF Treaty has not disappeared completely, 

but is mentioned very rarely. It is possible that it could 

eventually die out quietly, but a new international crisis (for example, between Russia and Iran) could reignite it once again.

An important variable in any future decisions 

with regard to the withdrawal from the INF Treaty is 

funding. While resumption of production of SS-20s or 

extending the range of Iskander tactical missiles are 

technologically feasible, the Russian government has 

consistently limited funding for production of even 

existing classes of weapons—ICBMs and short-range 

missiles. It does not appear likely that it will be sup-
249

porting of an even more expensive programs for intermediate-range missiles. It seems likely that reluctance 

to allocate funds played an important role in the decision to pursue a diplomatic option and postpone the 

abrogation decision to an indefinite future. 

CONCLUSION

Nuclear weapons retain a high profile in Russian 

national security strategy and will keep it in the foreseeable future. Contrary to official statements, there is 

no reason to believe that Russia could agree to a very 

significant reduction, much less elimination, of its nuclear arsenal. Instead, 10 years ago nuclear weapons 

were given additional roles—those of deterring and 

deescalating limited (“regional”) conventional wars. 

They are likely to keep that role as well, at least during 

the coming decade.

At the same time, Russian leadership clearly understands the limited utility of nuclear weapons and 

seeks to enhance conventional capability. In this sense, 

Russia is moving in some of the same directions as the 

United States—it seeks to develop missile defense and 

precision-guided long-range conventional assets. According to long-term plans, eventually these efforts 

should allow Russia to reduce reliance on nuclear 

weapons. These programs encounter multiple delays, 

however, and progress much slower than anticipated. 

Russia will hardly succeed before the end of the coming decade and might never completely close the gap 

with the United States and NATO. In that case, reliance on nuclear weapons will continue indefinitely.

Certain similarities notwithstanding, differences 

between the United States and Russia will continue—

Moscow is likely to continue seeing U.S. Global Strike 

and missile defense plans as a potential threat. There 
250

exists an important asymmetry: While the United 

States emphasizes strategic capability (intercontinental-range conventional assets and ability to intercept 

strategic missiles), Russia seeks intermediate-range 

capability and will continue to view American programs from the perspective of strategic balance. 

Overall, the relationship will remain uneasy, but 

manageable. The key condition for a stable relationship is predictability—first and foremost careful management of American capabilities that can affect Russian strategic deterrence. This is not impossible, but 

might be difficult to achieve due to the dynamic of 

domestic politics in the two countries. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. “Rossii Poka Neobkhodimo Yadernoe Oruzhie—Patriarkh 

Kirill” (“Russia Still Needs Nuclear Weapons—Patriarch Kirill”), 

RIA-Novosti, November 11, 2009.

2. “Podpisano Dopolnenie k Programme Razvitiya YadernoOruzheinogo Kompleksa,” RIA-Novosti, June 9, 2010.

3. For an early critique of the Russian concept of “multipolarity,” see Nikolai Sokov, “Mnogopoluysnyi Mir v Zerkale Teorii Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii” (“The Multipolar World Reflected in the Mirror of International Relations Theories”), SShA: 

Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya (Journal of the Institute of USA and 

Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences), No. 7, 1998, pp. 19-

27; No. 8, 1998, pp. 19-31. For the latest Russian critique of this 

concept, see Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Mechty o Mnogopoluysnom 

Mire” (“Dreams about a Multipolar World”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 

September 18, 2008; Aleksandr Konovalov, “Mir Ne Dolzhen Byt 

Mnogopolyarnym” (“The World Must Not Be Multipolar”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 16, 2008.

4. The transcript of press conference of Minister of Foreign 

Affairs of the Russian Federation with Russian media, New Delhi, India, October 20, 2008, document 1650-22-10-2008, available 

from www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/168f

10e1ae44dd7dc32574ea0041988a?OpenDocument. 
251

5. Roman Dobrokhotov, “Obezoruzhivauyshchie Argumenty” (“Disarming Arguments”), Novye Izvestia, February 13, 2008.

6. Disarmament was tackled during the Question and Answer 

part of the meeting and was not addressed in the main speech. See 

Arkadi Dubnov, “Treugolnaya Diplomatiya” (“Triangular Diplomacy”), Vremya Novostei, December 11, 2008. 

7. “Osnovnyye polozheniya voyennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy 

Federatsii,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, November 18, 1993, pp. 1, 4.

8. Kontseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 17 dekabrya 1997 g. 

No. 1300, available from 194.226.83.2/documents/decree/1997/_1300-1.

html.

9. Anatoliy Klimenko and Aleksandr Koltuykov, “Osnovnoy 

dokument voyennogo stroitelstva,” Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, February 13, 1998, p. 4.

10. These included a decree of Boris Yeltsin, “On urgent measures toward reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” July 1997; and two Security Council documents: “The 

Concept of Development of Nuclear Forces until 2010” and “The 

Foundations (Concept) of State Policy in the Area of Defense Development until 2005,” July-August 1998. These documents are 

classified, but their general thrust could be gleaned from newspaper publications: “Sovet Bezopasnosti RF Reshil Sokhranit 

Trekhkomponentnyi Sostav Strategicheskikh Yadernykh Sil,” Interfax daily news bulletin, No. 4, July 3, 1998; “Russia to be Major 

Nuclear Power in 3d Millennium—Official,” ITAR-TASS, July 3, 

1998; Ivan Safronov and Ilya Bulavinov, “Boris Yeltsin Podnyal 

Yadernyi Shchit,” Kommersant-Daily, July 4, 1998; Yuri Golotuyk, 

“Yadernoe Razoruzhenie Neizbezhno,” Russkii Telegraph, July 11, 

1998; Yuri Golotuyk, “Moskva Skorrektirovala Svoi Yadernye Argumenty,” Russkii Telegraph, July 4, 1998; Anatoli Yurkin, “Perspektivy Voennogo Stroitelstva,” Krasnaya Zvezda, August 5, 1998, 

p. 1, 3; Oleg Falichev, “Vpervpe So Vremeni Miluykovskikh Reform,” Krasnaya Zvezda, August 18, 1998, p. 1, 2.
252

11. Sergei Ivanov’s statement at the International Institute of 

Strategic Studies, is found in ‘‘Sergey Ivanov: Terrorizm Iskhodit 

ot Nesostoyavshikhsya Gosudarstv’’ (“Sergey Ivanov: Failed 

States are the Source of Terrorism”), Strana.ru Information Service, 

July 13, 2004.

12. Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation), April 21, 2000.

13. V. Prozorov, Yadernoye Sderzhivaniye v Teorii Primeneniya 

RVSN (Nuclear Deterrence in the Theory of Use of the SRF), Moscow, 

Russia: Pyotr Veliki Military Academy, 1999, p. 19.

14. For details of this meeting, see Nikolai Sokov, ‘‘The April 

1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting On Nuclear 

Weapons,’’ NIS Nuclear Profiles Database, Monterey, CA: Center 

for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International 

Studies, June 1999, available from www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/rfsecmtg.htm. 

15. National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, January 2000; Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, April 2000.

16. ‘‘Aktualnyye Zadachi Razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil RF’’ 

(“Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the 

Russian Federation”), October 2, 1003.

17. Yuri Baluevski, Speech at the Academy of Military Sciences, January 2007. The full text of Baluevski’s speech was published about 2 weeks after the conference and can be found at the 

official site of the Ministry of Defense (in Russian), available from 

www.mil.ru/847/852/1153/1342/20922/index.shtml. See also Vadim 

Solovyov, ‘‘Voennaya Reforma Obyavlena Bessrochnoi’’ (“Military Reform Has Been Declared Unending”), Nezavisimoe Voennoe 

Obozrenie, January 26, 2007. 

18. “Aktualnyye Zadachi Razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil 

RF”(“Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of 

the Russian Federation”), p. 43.

19. Ibid., p. 24.
253

20. A. Khryapin and V. Afanasiev, ‘‘Kontseptualnye Osnovy 

Strategicheskogo Sderzhivaniya’’ (“Conceptual Foundations of 

Strategic Deterrence”), Voyennaya Mysl, January 2005.

21. “Aktualnyye Zadachi Razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil RF” 

(“Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the 

Russian Federation”) p. 30.

22. “Yadernyi Shchit Dast RF Vremya na Formirovanie Novogo Oblika Armii—RVSN,” RIA-Novosti, June 10, 2009. 

23. Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010, available from www.scrf.

gov.ru/documents/33.html.

24. For details, see Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Academy of Military Sciences Debates Role of Nuclear Weapons in Conference on 

New Military Doctrine,” WMD Insights, March 2007, available from 

www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_R2_RussianAcademy.htm. 

25. “Menyaetsya Rossiya, Menyaetsya i ee Voennaya Doktrina” (“As Russia Changes, its Military Doctrine Changes Too”), 

Izvestiya, October 14, 2009.

26. Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine 

of the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010, available from www.

scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html.

27. Ibid.

28. Interviews by one of the authors with Russian officials, 

who requested anonymity.

29. “Rol Takticheskogo Yadernogo Oruzhiya na Mnogotselevykh APL Vozrastet—VMF” (“The Role of Tactical Nuclear 

Weapons on Multipurpose Submarines Set to Grow—the Navy”), 

RIA-Novosti, August 23, 2009, available from www.rian.ru/defense_

safety/20090323/165742858.html.

30. Mark Franchetti, “Russia’s New Nuclear Challenge to Europe,” London Sunday Times, August 17, 2008.
254

31. Vadim Smirnov, “Kalinigradskii Platsdarm,” September 

8, 2008.

32. RIA-Novosti, September 4, 2008.

33. Olga Tomashevskaya and Viktor Volodin, “Do Czhekhii I 

POlshi Letet Nedaleko,” Vremya Novostei, August 7, 2008.

34. See, for example, Alexei Arbatov, “Deep Cuts and deAlerting: A Russian Perspective,” p. 321.

35. Vystuplenie Glavy Rossiiskoi Delegatsii A.I.Antonova na 

3 Sessii Podgotovitelnogo Komiteta Konferentsii po Rassmotreniyu Deistviya DNYaO (A Statement of the Head of the Russian 

Delegation A.I. Antonov to the 3rd Session of the Preparatory 

Committee of the NPT Review Conference), April 28, 2004, Document 927-28-04-2004, available from www.mid.ru/Ns-dvbr.nsf/10aa

6ac6e80702fc432569ea003612f0/432569d800226387c3256e840046adc

4?OpenDocument.

36. See Endnote 2.

37. “Prakticheskie Shagi Rossiiskoi Federatsii Oblasti Yadernogo Razoruzheniya” (“Practical Actions of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Disarmament”), Report presented at 

the 7th NPT Review Conference, slide 13, available from www.

mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/10aa6ac6e80702fc432569ea003612f0/526da088ef75

26e3c325700d002f81c7/$FILE/Presentation-Russian.pdf.

38. “Rossiya Perevypolnila Plany po Sokrashcheniyu Yadernogo Oruzhiya” (“Russia Has Overfulfilled the Plan for Reduction of Nuclear Weapons”), RIA-Novosti, June 22, 2005, available 

from www.rian.ru/politics/20050622/40566772.html.

39. To be sure, some analysts have pointed to statements from 

a few Russian officials that appear to argue that the weapons assigned to Ground Forces have not been eliminated. One prominent example is Colonel-General Vladimir Zaritski, commander 

of the Rocket and Artillery Forces, which are part of the Ground 

Forces (sometimes referred to as General Purpose Forces). In 

2003, Zaritski declared that “the main delivery assets for the use 

of tactical nuclear weapons are in the hands of Rocket and Artillery Forces.” (Oleg Falichev, “Bog Voyny v Zapas ne Ukhodit” 
255

(“The God of War Does Not Retire”), Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, November 19-25, 2003. In subsequent publications, Zaritski 

did not mention tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) at all or alluded 

to some nuclear role for the Ground Forces in a general, nonspecific way without identifying missions or assets and referring 

to earlier late 1990s military manuals or doctrines. See Vladimir 

Zaritski, “O Razrabotke Novoi Metodiki Planirovania Ognevogo 

Porazheniya Protivnika v Operatsii i Bouyu” (“Toward Developing New Methods for Planning of Use of Firepower Against Adversary in an Operation and a Close Fighting”), Voyennaya Mysl, 

No. 12, 2006; “Napravleniya Sovershenstvovaniya Form i Sposobov Boevogo Primeneniya RViA v Obshchevoiskovoi Operatsii 

(Bouyu)” (“Ways to Enhance the Ways and Means of Combat 

Use of Rocket Forces and Artillery in an Operation (Close Combat) of General Purpose Forces”) Voyennaya Mysl No. 11, 2006; V. 

Zaritski, L.Kharkevich, Obshchaya,Taktika (Foundations of Tactics), 

Tambov, Rusia, 2007. Information supplied by the Chief of the 

12th GUMO, the Defense Ministry agency directly responsible for 

handling of all nuclear weapons, should probably be regarded as 

more authoritative. The statements by Zaritski could also signify 

that nuclear weapons are still regarded by a significant sector of 

the Russian military as desirable both in terms of mission support 

and status. His attitude seems to be in line with the insistence of 

Russian Navy officials that they need nuclear weapons to support 

some of their missions. Although the value of Zaritski’s assertion 

as direct evidence with regard to the status of sub-strategic weapons in Russia should probably be questioned, it certainly testifies 

to the “nuclear romanticism” of many Russian military leaders.

40. There is no good way to calculate the numbers—the 2,000 

figure is most often cited by Western and Russian nongovernmental experts and is often privately confirmed by Russian officials. If, however, one takes as a baseline the number provided 

by Alexei Arbatov for 1991—21,700 (Alexei Arbatov, “Deep Cuts 

and de-Alerting: A Russian Perspective,” in The Nuclear Turning 

Point, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p. 

320), then the 75 percent reduction officially announced by Russia 

would leave it with 5,400 warheads by 2004—a figure that should 

be lower as dismantlement continues. 

41. Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook,” 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2009, available from thebulletin.metapress.com/content/h304370t70137734/fulltext.pdf.
256

42. The National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) has traditionally calculated both the overall number (2,050) and categories of Russian TNW by counting nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. Unlike strategic weapons, however, the relationship between 

delivery vehicles and warheads is far from direct where TNW are 

concerned—it is far from obvious that Russia keeps nuclear warheads for all nuclear-capable delivery vehicles (meaning that the 

stockpile number is lower than the number of delivery vehicles) 

or, alternatively, might have several warheads for each delivery 

vehicle.

43. It is ironic that confidential interviews collected in 1991-92 

among U.S. officials attributed the rejection by George H. W. Bush 

of the Russian proposal to start negotiations on a legally binding and verifiable treaty on TNW to the U.S. Navy, which was 

reluctant to allow on-site inspections of ships and submarines to 

confirm the absence of nuclear warheads.

44. For details, see Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization: Past and Future, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, 

chap. 1.

45. “Pochti Vse Puskovye Ustanovki RVSN Nakhodyatsya v 

Miutnoi Gotovnosti,” RIA-Novosti, February 11, 2009.

46. “Vtoroi Polk Mobilnykh ‘Topol-M’ Zastupit na Dezhurstvo do Kontsa Goda,” RIA-Novosti, November 18, 2009.

47. It is widely assumed that 30 Topol-Ms a year would be the 

cost-effective level of production—the lowest cost per unit—and 

has been regularly mentioned by leading figures of the Russian 

military-industrial complex.

48. “Rossiya ne Budet Narashchivat Proizvodstvo Raket v 

Ushshcherb Sotsialnym Programmam” (“Russia Will Not Increase Production of Missiles at the Expense of Social Programs”), 

RIA-Novosti, December 7, 2007.

49. “Pervyi Vitse-Premier Sergey Ivanov Zayavil o Neobkhodimosti Pariteta Yadernyih Sil Rossii i SShA” (“First VicePremier Sergey Ivanov Declared that Parity of Russian and U.S. 

Nuclear Forces is Needed”), RIA-Novosti, December 7, 2007.
257

50. For a recent statement to that effect, see, for example, a 

statement of the new SRF Commander Andrey Shvaichenko: 

“Udarnaya Gruppirovka RVSN Budet na 80 Protsentov Sostoyat 

iz Novykh Raket,” RIA-Novosti, October 12, 2009.

51. “RF Sozdast Novuyu Tyazheluyu Ballisticheskuyu Raketu na Smeny Kompleksu ‘Voyevoda’,” RIA-Novosti December 

16, 2009.

52. “Sredstva na RVSN Sostavlyayut Okolo Treti Finansirovaniya Yadernoi Triady,” RIA-Novosti, December 8, 2009. 

53. “Raketnye Kompleksy RVSN Sposobny Preodolevat 

Noveishuyu PRO SShA,” RIA-Novosti, September 10, 2009. 

54. Yuri Zaitsev, “Ot RSM-40 do ‘Sinevy’,” RIA-Novosti, 

March 11, 2009.

55. “Prichinoi Neudachnogo Puska ‘Bulavy’ Yavlyaetsya 

Konstruktorskaya Oshibka,” RIA-Novosti, January 12, 2010. 

56. Dmitri Litovkin, “’Bulavu’ Ispytayut Osenyu,” Izvestia, 

May 24, 2010.

57. ‘Solomonov Obyasnil Neudachi ‘Bulavy’,” Voeno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, No. 9, 2010.

58. “Lvinaya Dolya Buydgeta MO Idet VMF, v Osnovnom 

Yadernym Silam—Ivanov,” RIA-Novosti, June 3, 2009.

59. For an overview of the aspects of major military exercises 

relevant to the analysis of nuclear doctrine, see Nikolai Sokov, 

‘‘Significant Military Maneuvers,’’ Part V of Issue Brief: Russia’s 

Nuclear Doctrine, August 2004, available from www.nti.org/e_research/e3_55a.html.

60. “Dalnaya Aviatsiya: Perspektivy Strategicheskikh Mashin,” RIA-Novosti, December 23, 2009.

61. ‘‘Rossiya Perenapravit Rakety’’ (“Russia Will Retarget 

Missiles”), Vzglyad, February 19, 2007.
258

62. RIA-Novosti, July 24, 2008

63. Ibid., May 27, 2008; Vadim Udmantsev, “Pautina Vokrug 

Granits,” VPK, June 4-10, 2008.

64. Interview Iranskomu Gosteleradio i Informatsionnomu 

Agentstvu IRNA (An Interview with the Iranian TV, an Information Agency IRNA), October 16, 2007, Official Website of the President of the Russian Federation, available from president.kremlin.

ru/text/appear/2007/10/148471.shtml.

65. For details, see Nikolai Sokov, “Moscow Rejects U.S. Written Proposals on Missile Defense, Downplays New Iranian Missile Test,” WMD Insights, February 2008.

66. “PRO SShA v Nyneshnem Sostoyanii ‘Ne Volnuet’ Rossiiskikh Voennykh—Genstab,” RIA-Novosti, April 12, 2010. 

67. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Otlozhennyi Protivoraketnyi Krizis,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 20, 2010.

68. “Rossiya Skazhet ‘Da’ Predlozheniyu NATO po PRO, Esli 

Predlozhenie Seryoznie,” RIA-Novosti, April 26, 2010.

69. “Rossiya i SShA Mogut Sozdat Sovmestnuyu PRO v Evrope Protiv Irana,” RIA-Novosti, September 21, 2009.

70. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Otlozhennyi Protivoraketnyi Krizis,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 20, 2010.

71. Aleksei Arbatov, “Strategicheskii Surrealizm Somnitelnykh Kontseptsii,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, March 5, 2010.

72. Vladimir Ivanov, “Vashington Shagnul v Bezyadernyi 

Mir,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, April 16, 2010; Dmitri 

Ruyrikov, “...Plus Bystryi Globalnyi Udar,” Voennoe-Promyshlennyi Kurier, No. 10, 2010.

73. The 1995 “Black Brunt” incident, when a single Norwegian research rocket triggered a false alarm in the Russian strategic command and control system, serves as a reminder that this 

concern is not pure imagination: as it turned out later, the rocket 
259

closely fit one of first strike scenarios built into the early warning 

system. For details, see Nikolai Sokov, “Can Norway Trigger a 

Nuclear War? Notes on the Russian Command and Control System.” PONARS Policy Memo No. 24, 1997.

74. Aleksandr Khramshikhin, “Strategicheskie Vooruzheniya ne Panatseya ot Ugrozy Voennogo Napadeniya dlya Rossii,” 

Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, No. 11, 2010.

75. The Iskander-E was developed with a range of 280 km 

to avoid the restrictions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—the multilateral arrangement that seeks to restrict 

exports of missiles able to carry a 500 km payload to a distance 

of 300 km or more. The letter “E” in the missile’s name denotes 

the “export” variant. See Nikita Petrov, “Asimmetrichnyi Otvet” (“An Asymmetric Response”), Strana.Ru, February 16, 2007; 

Nikolai Poroskov, “Evropa pod Pritselom” (“Europe in Sights”), 

Vremya Novostei, February 16, 2007.

76. See the Address to the Federal Assembly by President of 

Russia Dmitri Medvedev on November 5, 2008, available from president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/11/208749.shtml. 

77. Vera Sitnina, “Voina Mozhet Vspykhnut Vnezapno,” Vremya Novostei, September 29, 2008.

78. Viktor Myasnikov, “GLONASS Dlya Vsekh,” Nezavisimoe 

Voennoe Obozrenie, June 4, 2010.

79. Artur Blinov, “Raketnyi Torg na Alyaske” (“A Missile 

Trade-off”), Oborona i Bezopasnost, August 30, 2006.

80. “Minoborony: Pri Neobkhodimosti Rossiya Mozhet Vyiti 

iz Dogovora po RSMD” (“Ministry of Defense: If Necessary, Russia Could Withdraw from the INF Treaty”), RIA Novosti, August 

25, 2006; “Ekspert: Rossiya Mozhet Vyiti Iz Dogovora po RSMD v 

Odnostoronnem Poryadke” (“Expert: Russia Could Unilaterally 

Withdraw from the INF Treaty”), Interfax, August 25, 2006.

81. “Rossiya Mozhet Vyiti iz Dogovora po Raketam Srednei 

Dalnosti” (“Russia Could Withdraw from the Intermediate-Range 

Missiles Treaty”), Strana.Ru, February 15, 2007; Nikita Petrov, 

“Asimmetrichnyi Otvet” (“An Asymmetric Response”), Strana.
Ru, February 16, 2007; Nikolai Poroskov, “Evropa pod Pritselom” 

(“Europe in Sights”), Vremya Novostei, February 16, 2007; Viktor 

Myasnikov, “Asimmetrichnyi Otvet naiden” (“An Asymmetric 

Response Has Been Found”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 16, 

2007; Ilya Azar and Dmitri Vinogradov, “Otvet Srednimi Raketami” (“A Response with Medium Missiles”), Gazeta.Ru, February 

15, 2007.

82. “SYaS Rossii: Narashchivanie Vozmozhnostei po Preodoleiyu Protivoraketnoi Oborony” (“Russia’s Strategic Rocket 

Forces: Enhancing the Capability to Penetrate Missile Defenses”), 

Voenno-Promyshlennyi Krier, March 8-14, 2006.
261

CHAPTER 6

CAUGHT BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS:

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR

 CAPABILITIES IN RUSSIAN MILITARY 

THOUGHT

Daniel Goure

INTRODUCTION

Russian security policies and military plans are 

undergoing the most profound set of changes of any 

period since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In some 

ways, this is the best of times for the Russian military. 

Moscow has the fortune of a government in Washington committed to “pushing the reset button” in 

U.S.-Russian relations. The Obama administration has 

made it clear that it intends to take Russian interests 

and opinions seriously in everything from the deployment of missile defenses to the imposing of new United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iran. A new Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement has been 

signed that allows Russia to make inevitable reductions in its strategic nuclear forces under the guise 

of the furtherance of strategic parity with the United 

States. If Russian sources are to be trusted, the U.S. 

Government committed to limiting its deployments of 

missile defenses in Europe. The pace of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastward expansion has been slowed, possibly halted for good. The 

Russian Navy’s lease on the naval base at Sevastopol 

was extended for an additional 25 years. All in all, it 

has been a good year for the Russian military. It might 
262

be assumed that Russia has never been in a better position to develop a new security partnership with the 

West or to feel more secure in general.

Yet, this is the time when the Russian government 

has chosen to undertake an ambitious, even radical, 

transformation of its conventional and nuclear forces. 

The publication of both a new National Security Strategy (NSS) and Military Doctrine provides the policy 

foundation, albeit somewhat schizophrenic, which 

justifies, even demands, the creation of military capabilities commensurate with Russia’s self-defined status as a major global power. Russian President Dmitry 

Medvedev has made a commitment to the military for 

more money and for an array of new weapons systems 

that is eye-watering in terms of its breadth and cost. 

Plans have been articulated by the chiefs of the major 

services intended to address the widely recognized 

problems of sclerotic command and control structures, 

obsolete personnel policies, and aging equipment. 

The path before Russia’s leaders may well be characterized as that between Scylla and Charybdis. As 

Homer’s epic, The Odyssey, tells the tale, the challenge 

is to chart a course between two dangers. The problem is that moving away from one danger causes an 

increase in the threat posed by the other. In the view 

of Russian leaders, Moscow cannot be too accommodating and forthcoming, either politically or militarily, without risking the appearance of being too weak. 

A Russia that is weak will have its interests ignored 

or even undermined. At the same time, if Russia is 

too belligerent, it risks a confrontation with states incomparably stronger than it is, thereby revealing how 

truly weak it is. 

The source of Russia’s Homeric problem is its 

determination to assert a position in global affairs 
263

completely out of proportion to its economic, political, technological, demographic, or military situation. 

Moreover, its principal adversary is the most powerful economic and military alliance in human history. 

Russia must do whatever it can to assert its position as 

an equal, recognizing that it lacks the means (with the 

exception, perhaps, of its nuclear arsenal) to enforce 

its claim of equality. As one observer described Russia’s dilemma:

The Russian Federation is certainly not in an enviable 

situation when it comes to foreign or security policy. 

Devoid of significant alliances, with an economic 

output comparable to that of France, and a standard 

of living that is far below that in Europe at large, it 

must find the means to secure a huge territory and 

overextended borders, end the violent conflicts in the 

Northern Caucasus, and maintain the strategic nuclear balance with the U.S. At the same time, the Russian 

leadership is laying claim to act as a hegemon in the 

post-Soviet space and as a great power on the international stage. The question is whether Russia has the 

economic, military, and political potential to resolve 

security issues successfully and to back up its international ambitions. The fundamental problem to be resolved by the country’s foreign and security policy is 

the disparity between aspirations and resources. That 

dilemma is further aggravated by the international 

financial crisis and plummeting energy prices, which 

have hit the Russian economy hard.1

Professor Alexei Bogaturov of the Moscow Institute for International Security Studies described the 

problem as “Medvedev’s dilemma.” On the one hand, 

Russia would prefer not to return to a policy of confrontation; on the other hand, the Kremlin cannot just 

stand by and watch the United States and NATO pur-
264

sue their policy of military superiority. The Russian 

solution, reflected in the new NSS, is to pursue a two 

track policy:

. . . without interrupting the dialogue with the U.S. on 

strategic issues, try to concentrate resources in order 

to create the capacity for a political and diplomatic 

counterweight to NATO, while taking all necessary 

steps to prevent the possibility of the neutralization of 

Russia’s ability to effectively confront even theoretically predicted attempts to dictate conditions under 

the threat of force.2

In order to understand the relationship between 

conventional and nuclear capabilities in Russian military thought, it is necessary to appreciate the extent 

of the dilemma Russian political and military leaders 

have created for themselves. The international environment is filled with malevolent forces intent on 

the diminution of Russia and the undermining of its 

national interests. These adversaries must be directly 

and aggressively countered, preferably with nonmilitary means. However, Russia cannot rely entirely on 

such means, particularly as its adversaries are intent 

on achieving overwhelming military superiority and 

undermining the strategic stability achieved through 

arms control agreements in the late 20th century. To 

be secure, Russia must develop a modern, largely nonnuclear military while retaining until the day that goal 

is achieved a nuclear capability that can deter both the 

conventional and nuclear might of its opponents. 

The U.S. Director of National Intelligence observed 

that Russia continues to rely on its nuclear deterrent 

and retaliatory capability to counter the perceived 

threat from the United States and NATO. For the past 

several years, Moscow has also been strengthening 
265

its conventional military force to make it a credible 

foreign policy instrument, both to signal its political 

resurgence and to assert its dominance over neighboring states like Georgia. Moscow has actively engaged in foreign military cooperation with countries 

such as China and Venezuela, in part to remind the 

United States and others of Russia’s global military 

relevance.3

 This tendency has been reflected in scenes 

not seen in some 2 decades: Russian subs off the U.S. 

coast, Bear bombers penetrating NATO airspace, and 

Russian warships repeating the old Soviet-era Caribbean cruise—this time to Venezuela. 

Recent military demonstrations cannot hide the 

fact that Russia’s conventional military stands on the 

precipice of irrelevance. Almost 2 decades of underfunding has resulted in obsolete equipment, inadequate maintenance, poor training, and low morale. 

In this same period, there has been a revolution in 

military capabilities centered on the exploitation of information technologies. The result has been an orderof-magnitude improvement in the lethality and operational effectiveness of conventional military forces. 

This is a revolution in which the Russian military has 

yet to participate. Whatever may be the Kremlin’s ambitions for the Russian military of 2020 and beyond, 

the decline of the Russian defense industrial base 

means there is little chance of Russia being able to 

reach those objectives. 

The likelihood that Russia can achieve its goal of 

a thoroughly modern conventional capability, one 

able to take on the West in a regional conflict by 2020 

is fanciful at best. The Kremlin is left, therefore, with 

two strategic options. One is to seek to constrain Western and particularly U.S. military advances through 

pursuit of an aggressive arms control agenda. The 
266

other is to try and return to the past, focusing the U.S.-

Russian relationship on nuclear issues. In order to do 

this, Russia must take the necessary steps to maintain 

and modernize its nuclear arsenals, both strategic and 

tactical. Unfortunately, on this path lies confrontation.

NEW SECURITY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINES

The publication of a new NSS and Military Doctrine set the stage for Russia’s Homeric challenge. 

These documents set out a formidable set of security 

challenges confronting Russia. In particular, both 

documents identify as the most serious threat activities and behaviors by foreign nations and groupings—read NATO—to create a condition of political 

and military superiority over Russia. In essence, the 

course between Scylla and Charybdis is that between 

different modes of competition, not between competition and cooperation.

The new Russian NSS offers something for everyone. The list of potential dangers and challenges is 

long, broad, and extremely varied. But with respect 

to military threats, the focus of concern is not with irregular warfare or so-called rogue states, but rather 

the behavior of the United States and its allies. In particular, the NSS identifies the threat as that posed by 

the drive of some countries to achieve overwhelming 

military superiority, to create new types of weapons 

and the means to engage in new forms of warfare, and 

the impact on Russian security of attempts to overturn 

existing international agreements. 

The threats of military security are: the policy of a 

number of leading foreign countries aimed at achieving overwhelming superiority in the military field, 
267

especially in the strategic nuclear forces, through the 

development of high-precision, information and other 

high-tech means of warfare, strategic weapons in nonnuclear form, the formation of a unilateral global missile defense system and the militarization of Earth’s 

space environment that could lead to a new arms race, 

as well as the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological 

technology, the production of weapons of mass destruction or their components and delivery systems. 

The negative impact on the military security of the 

Russian Federation and its allies exacerbated by a 

departure from international agreements on arms 

limitation and reduction, as well as actions aimed at 

violating the stability of systems of government and 

military control, missile warning, space control, the 

functioning of strategic nuclear forces, storage sites, 

nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, nuclear and chemical industries, and other potentially dangerous objects.4

This formulation is repeated almost endlessly in 

Russian political-military documents and articles by 

security analysts. It reflects the basic reality that the 

Russian leadership sees its security very much as a 

function of the ability to neutralize an ever-present 

threat posed by the West. One example is a report in 

the Guardian on remarks by Russia’s Minister of Defense, Anatoly Serdyukov:

Today, Russia’s defense minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, said the world situation meant the “likelihood of 

armed conflicts and their potential danger for Russia” 

was rising. “The military-political situation is characterized by the U.S. leadership’s desire ... to expand its 

military presence and that of its allies in regions adjacent to Russia,” he declared.
268

America was actively trying to steal energy and 

mineral resources in central Asia and other post-Soviet countries on Russia’s borders, he complained, adding that the U.S. was “actively supporting processes 

aimed at ousting Russia from the area of its traditional 

interests.”5

The existential nature of the threat means that it 

can only be countered by a condition not merely of 

military parity, but of absolute Western vulnerability. 

Moscow cannot conceive of its security in terms other than those of an adversarial relationship with the 

United States and NATO. That relationship is based 

on both global and regional deterrence and what Moscow calls strategic stability – where both sides are 

locked into the Cold War relationship of mutually assured destruction at the global and regional level. For 

Russia to be secure, not only must the United States 

not be able to defend itself against missile threats, 

neither can Europe, for then Russia cannot intimidate 

it by the threat of missile strikes. Russia still believes 

that the condition of its security is the insecurity of its 

neighbors and partners. Consequently, to secure itself, 

Russia must have the right to supervise the limits of 

Europe’s defense activity, thereby revising the settlements of 1989-91.6

Much of the NSS focuses on the actions to reverse 

Russia’s social, economic, and technological inferiority. Such steps are necessary certainly to improve the 

welfare of the Russian people. But they are vital also 

to the Kremlin’s goal of establishing Russia as a great 

power and creating the conditions to support a transformation of the Russian military. 

The new Russian Military Doctrine, signed on February 5, 2010, extends the vision of the threat contained 
269

in the NSS and brings it close to home. Although it acknowledges that the risk of large-scale conventional/

nuclear war has declined, the overall external threat 

to Russian security has intensified. The list of external 

military dangers includes:

• The desire to endow the force potential of 

NATO with global functions carried out in 

violation of the norms of international law and 

to move the military infrastructure of NATO 

member countries closer to the borders of the 

Russian Federation, including by expanding 

the bloc;

• The attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions and to undermine 

strategic stability;

• The deployment (buildup) of troop contingents 

of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian 

Federation and its allies and also in adjacent 

waters;

• The creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global stability and violating the established correlation 

of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, and 

also the militarization of outer space and the 

deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision 

weapon systems;

• Territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies and interference in their internal affairs; and,

• The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile technologies, and 

the increase in the number of states possessing 

nuclear weapons.7
270

The Military Doctrine provides a vision of future 

conflicts that frankly differs little from writings produced by the Soviet military some 2 decades ago. Future conflicts will involve the massed use of weapons 

systems based on new physical principles that are 

comparable to nuclear weapons in effectiveness; the 

expanded use of air space and outer space; intensified 

information warfare; reduced warning time based on 

an adversary’s preparation to conduct military operations; and, an increase in the responsiveness of command and control systems. The characteristic features 

of future military conflicts will be the employment of 

forces based on speed, maneuverability, and precision 

targeting. A wide variety of new technologies will be 

seen on these future battlefields beyond just precisionguided weapons including electromagnetic, laser, and 

infrasound weaponry; computer controlled systems; 

drones and autonomous maritime craft; and guided 

or robotic versions of manned platforms.8

There had been indications that the new Military 

Doctrine would expand further the role of Russian 

nuclear weapons in future conflicts. In an interview 

with Izvestia, Nikolay Patrushev, the secretary of the 

Russian Security Council, was quoted saying that in 

the Military Doctrine, “We have corrected the conditions for use of nuclear weapons to resist aggression 

with conventional forces not only in large-scale wars, 

but also in regional or even a local one.” Moreover, he 

went on “There is also a multiple-options provision 

for use of nuclear weapons depending on the situation 

and intentions of the potential enemy. . . . In a situation critical for national security, we don’t exclude a 

preventive nuclear strike at the aggressor.”9

As published, the Military Doctrine does not extend the role of nuclear weapons into the area of local 
271

wars. However, given expressions of concern made 

earlier in that document regarding the potential for 

future conflicts to involve destabilizing command 

and control, nuclear weapons sites, and other critical 

government assets, the point at which a regional war 

would place the existence of the state at risk, thereby 

warranting a nuclear response, is ambiguous, at best.

Nuclear weapons will remain an important factor 

for preventing the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts involving the use of conventional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional 

war). In the event of the outbreak of a military conflict 

involving the utilization of conventional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional war) and imperiling the very existence of the state, the possession of 

nuclear weapons may lead to such a military conflict 

developing into a nuclear military conflict. The NSS 

and Military Doctrine put enormous pressure on the 

Russian military to achieve across-the-board improvements in organization, capabilities, operations, and 

personnel. It is not clear that the military and its supporting industrial base will be able to meet those challenges. 

THE LIMITS OF RUSSIAN CONVENTIONAL 

FORCE RESTRUCTURING

Russian leaders have long recognized the need 

for comprehensive structural reforms of the military. 

Since the early 1990s, several attempts at reform have 

run afoul of a combination of institutional resistance, 

a lack of funds, the decline of the Russian defense 

industrial base, and recruitment and retention problems. The NSS and Military Doctrine both emphasize 
272

the importance of a transformation of the Russian 

military. 

The main task of national defense in the medium 

term is the transition to a qualitatively new look of the 

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the conservation potential of the strategic nuclear forces by improving the organizational and staff structure and system of territorial-based troops and forces, increasing 

the number of units of permanent readiness, as well as 

improve the operational and training, organization of 

interspecies interaction forces and forces.10

President Medvedev personally committed his 

administration to a complete overhaul of the Russian 

armed forces.

A guaranteed nuclear deterrent system for various 

military and political circumstances must be provided 

by 2020. . . . We must ensure air superiority, precision 

strikes on land and sea targets, and the timely deployment of troops. We are planning to launch large-scale 

production of warships, primarily, nuclear submarines with cruise missiles and multi-purpose attack 

submarines. . . . We will also build an air and space 

defense network.11

The weakness of Russia’s conventional forces has 

not been a secret to anyone. But the experiences of the 

Russian-Georgian conflict appear to have given the 

drive for reform a new impetus. The poor performance 

of Russian forces was an apparent shock to the Kremlin leadership. The conflict revealed a host of problems 

ranging from obsolescent equipment, an inability to 

operate during the night, archaic information systems, 

a lack of precision strike capabilities, communications 

failures, poor or nonexistent computer systems, inad-
273

equate command and control capabilities, bad training, inflexible or nonexistent logistics, and manpower 

problems.12 Equally important, the Georgian experience undermined a mixed conscript-contract Army. 

As Western militaries had discovered decades earlier, 

a mixed force of professionals and conscripts was on 

balance extremely expensive while providing little of 

value.13

The central purpose of the military reforms is to 

improve the ability of Russia’s armed forces to engage 

successfully in relatively small conflicts along that 

country’s periphery. If these reforms are successful, 

Russia would be able to place lesser reliance on its 

nuclear forces except to deter large-scale conflicts.

The publicly stated goal of the reform is to create a 

compact army of constant readiness, designed mainly 

to fight local and regional conflicts. At the same time, 

Russia will maintain its strategic nuclear forces as a 

safeguard in the event of a “big war.” The country’s 

nuclear capability should guarantee the possibility of 

inflicting unacceptable damage on any aggressor or 

coalition of aggressors.14

The design of what some are calling Russia’s New 

Model Army was announced by Defense Minister 

Serdyukov on October 14, 2008. The main elements of 

the reform were to include the following:

• A cut in the total number of military personnel from 1,130,000 to one million, including a 

reduction in the total number of officers from 

355,000 to just 150,000. The General Staff would 

be particularly affected, with 13,500 of its 22,000 

personnel positions slated for elimination.

• Remaining officers and contract soldiers will 

see a significant pay increase over the next 4 

years.
274

• Henceforth, all military units will be considered 

permanent readiness units and will be fully 

staffed with both officers and enlisted soldiers.

• The existing 140,000 noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs) will be replaced by 85,000 professional 

sergeants trained over the next 3 years.

• The four-tiered command structure will be replaced with a three-tiered structure, with the 

brigade serving as the basic unit.

• The disbandment of 23 divisions and 12 brigades, and the creation of 39 fully manned, 

combat ready all-arms brigades.

• The military’s Main Intelligence Directorate 

(GRU) will be cut in size and subordinated directly to the civilian defense minister.

• The consolidation of military institutes and 

medical facilities.15

The to-be-formed combat brigades must be 

equipped with modernized or upgraded equipment. 

Shrinking the size of the ground forces will result in 

an excess of equipment. Unfortunately, virtually all of 

it is aging and even obsolete. Moreover, the Ground 

Forces lack the equipment and systems in such areas 

as logistics, intelligence, medical care, and engineering needed to support a proposed mobile, high-readiness force.

Restructuring of the ground forces is only one 

thread in a complex weave of actions that must be taken in order to create a modern Russian conventional 

military. Similar initiatives have been declared in the 

Air Force and Navy. Air Force Commander in Chief, 

Colonel General Alexander Zelin, announced a series 

of reforms in his Service including a new command 

structure, consolidated logistics, and modernized 
275

weapons. The number of commands and air bases was 

to be drastically reduced. Army aviation and air transportation assets were being integrated into the new 

structure.16 The new Air Force structure appears to be 

designed to parallel the reforms in the Ground Forces 

so as to allow the creation of a truly joint capability.17

Organizational reforms will be meaningless unless 

the Air Force is able to overcome an almost 20-year 

procurement holiday. No less a figure than First Deputy Defense Minister Army-General Nikolai Makarov 

recently warned that the Russian Air Force was not 

procuring sufficient numbers of new modern aircraft 

and has fewer serviceable aircraft, manned by insufficiently combat-trained pilots, who are incapable of 

conducting modern-era combat operations.18

Former Chief of the Air Force General Anatoly Kornukov painted an even more dismal picture of conditions in the Air Force. According to him, Russia is 

lagging 25 to 30 years behind the United States in developing prospective air defense weapons because of a 

meltdown of its defense industries. General Kornukov 

complained that the nation’s air defense capabilities 

were waning with the S-330 approaching retirement 

and only two batteries of the new S-400 deployed. In 

addition, air defense fighters were often grounded 

due to a lack of engines and spare parts. “Regrettably, 

our air defense forces only have a limited capability to 

protect the nation’s security.”19

Colonel General Zelin claims that a major program 

to upgrade the Air Force’s platforms and systems was 

being undertaken. Central to these was the introduction of a so-called fifth-generation fighter, the TA-50, 

purchases of advanced fourth-generation aircraft such 

as the Su-34 and 35, S-400 and S-550 air and missile 

defense systems, and the KA-52 Alligator. In addition, 
276

the Air Force is reported to be receiving refurbished 

versions of older systems, such as the MiG-29s and 

31s, and Su-27 and 30 fighter, Tu-22 bomber, and Il76 transport. One report suggests that by 2020 the Air 

Force will have upgraded some 1,500 aircraft, while 

also introducing brand new platforms.20

The Russian Navy is facing the end of the projected 

service lives for virtually all of its deployed platforms. 

What scarce resources have been made available since 

the fall of the Soviet Union have gone largely to maintain the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Fleet. Even 

this portion of the Fleet is on shaky ground, with the 

Delta-class SSBNs fast becoming obsolete and the new 

Boray class just entering service. Even then, repeated 

test failures of the Bulova submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) raise concerns that one leg of 

the Russian strategic triad may be at risk. Elsewhere 

in the Fleet, the number of surface combatants and 

submarines continues to decline. There are programs 

to build new submersible nuclear ships (SSNs); submersible, guided missile, nuclear ships (SSGNs); longrange hunter-killer submarines (SSKs); frigates; and 

corvettes; but these are all progressing slowly. The 

most significant reform step the Navy took was to 

propose the creation of five or six carrier task groups 

built around a new aircraft carrier, the first of which 

will begin construction in 2012 or 2013.21

The sheer magnitude of reforms must give any 

reasonable observer pause. President Medvedev is 

reported to have ordered the upgrading of an average of 9-11 percent of the military’s weapons and 

military equipment each year, resulting in an overall 

modernization level of approximately 70 percent by 

2020. According to one Russian source, this means annual deliveries of 35 ballistic missiles, 50 new and 50 
277

upgraded warplanes, 20 to 25 military helicopters, 3-4 

sea-going and ocean-going warships, 2 nuclear-powered submarines and 1 diesel-powered submarine.22

The current plan requires the Air Force to receive 

100 new or refurbished aircraft a year. But even with 

all of these programs, the overall number of aircraft 

would decline by nearly 50 percent. In 2008, however, 

the Air Force received five Su-24M2s, eight Su-27SMs, 

four Su-25SMs, a couple of upgraded MiG-31Ms, one 

new and one upgraded Tu-160 strategic bomber, and 

a single Su-34 fighter, for a total of only 21. The current plan requires the Air Force to receive 100 new or 

refurbished aircraft a year. But even with all of these 

programs, the overall number of aircraft would decline by nearly 50 percent.23

If anything, the Navy is in the worst condition of 

all the Services. According to the Independent Military 

Review, Russia’s shipbuilding industry cannot sustain 

the overly ambitious plan proposed by the Ministry 

of Defense. The Russian shipbuilding industry is “incapable of producing warships in either the quantity 

or at the level of quality that their navy customer requires.”24 Perhaps reflecting this reality, in June 2009 

the Ministry of Defense announced that the widely 

touted plan to build five or six carrier battle groups 

had been postponed.25

It is clear that Russian military leaders are intent 

not simply on streamlining their military and making its assets more deployable and employable, but 

of developing means for neutralizing what they perceive as the most significant threat to Russia’s security: the advanced conventional military capabilities 

being deployed by the United States and, to a lesser 

extent, NATO and China. Russian defense experts recognize that they have little hope of matching the U.S. 
278

military’s conventional capabilities. Russia lacks the 

technological base or the financial resources for such 

an arms race. It is extremely unlikely that the Russian 

military will receive the quantities of new and upgraded platforms and systems it desires. But even if a 

miracle were to occur, the Russian military would still 

continue to fall behind the West (and China) which, 

as Russian threat statements underscore, are investing heavily in a wide range of military technologies 

including advanced command, control, and communications (C3); information warfare; unmanned systems; hypervelocity platforms; and directed energy 

weapons. 

This led Russia to examine the possibility asymmetric responses. Then President Vladimir Putin described such an approach in 2006. 

We are to keep our eyes open on the plans and development trends of other countries’ armed forces, and 

to know about their future developments. Quantity 

is not the end, however. . . . Our responses are to be 

based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical, and less costly.26

What form might such an asymmetric response 

take? One Russian author suggests that this would involve horizontal escalation against strategic targets in 

the enemy’s territory. 

Combining defensive operations undertaken to beat 

off aggression and asymmetrical actions relying on the 

efficiency of modern high-precision conventionally 

equipped strategic weapons systems, supported by 

subversive and reconnaissance groups is a persuasive 

enough factor for the enemy to cease military operations on terms favorable for Russia. This conclusion 

has a practical significance and relevance in view of 
279

the fact that the economy and infrastructure of any European country has a large number of objectives, some 

of them potentially dangerous, vital for the survival of 

its population and government. 

Strategically important targets that, if destroyed, 

lead to unacceptable damage include the top government administration and military control systems; 

major manufacturing, fuel, and energy enterprises 

(steel and engineering plants, oil refineries, defense 

industry enterprises, electric power plants and substations, oil and gas production, accumulation, and 

storage facilities, life support facilities, and so on); vitally important transportation facilities across the adversary’s entire territory (railroad hubs, bridges, strategic ports, airports, tunnels, and so on); potentially 

dangerous objectives (hydroelectric power dams and 

hydroelectric power complexes, processing units of 

chemical plants, nuclear power facilities, storages of 

strong poisons, and so on).27

THE CONTINUING LURE OF NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS

Russian leadership’s sense of their own vulnerability causes them to behave in a certain way on the 

international stage. Secular demographics and social 

and economic trends argue that Russia’s sense of its 

own weakness, and hence of vulnerability, will only 

grow. Moscow is determined to take what little time 

and few available resources it has to try and leverage 

itself into a secure position as a co-equal of the world’s 

great and rising powers.

As noted above, the NSS makes clear the Kremlin’s 

view that the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic 
280

Missile (ABM) Treaty and refusal to continue the bilateral process of strategic arms negotiations of its predecessors created a threat to the Russian Federation. 

From this point, it is easy to conclude that what the 

Russian leaders seek is a return to the bygone days of 

mutual assured destruction and continuous repetitive 

arms control. This relationship serves three functions. 

First, it justifies the Kremlin’s threat perceptions as 

detailed in the NSS and Military Doctrines. Second, 

it justifies a continuing reliance on nuclear weapons 

in military strategy and obviates the need for reforms 

of the scale and scope necessitated by an alternative 

strategy. Finally, the very process of negotiations 

serves to validate Russian claims of relevance and 

status in the international system. As one eminent 

analyst of both Soviet and Russian military thought 

observed recently:

The MAD-based U.S.-RF relationship organically presupposes continued tensions and the need for rigid 

controls over the nuclear weapons of both countries. 

Moscow is interested in maintaining the system of 

continuous strategic negotiations for many reasons. 

These negotiations are marked by the aura of uniqueness and unparalleled significance in international 

relations. They symbolize the equal status of the involved parties. Russians, like the Soviets before them, 

believe that the negotiations together with the accompanying summitry create a powerful background for 

and define the tone of all other bilateral exchanges. 

They also see direct linkages between maintaining the 

bilateral strategic balance and the global security situation, including Russia’s relations with NATO, the fate 

of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the role 

of tactical nuclear weapons systems and anti-ballistic 

missile defenses in Europe and other regions, the future of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear weapons 

testing.28
281

The threat environment fabricated by the Russian 

government may serve obvious domestic political 

needs. But it creates an important dilemma for Russia 

internationally. How can Moscow agree to the elimination of its nuclear weapons when they alone are the 

essential bulwark against those threats? Additionally, 

what would be the basis for Russia’s claim for a high 

place and unique status in the world were they not to 

retain one of the world’s largest arsenals of nuclear 

weapons?

The combination of domestic weakness and a 

sense of a continuing, even intensifying, external 

threat leads the Russian leadership to look for areas 

where they can shore up their situation. The truth is 

that Russia desperately needs nuclear weapons. It is 

a power on the international stage almost solely because it possesses nuclear weapons. The collapse of 

Russia’s economy following the end of the Cold War, 

the parlous state of Russian conventional forces, and 

the sense of proliferating threats result, in the minds 

of the Kremlin oligarchs, in a logical argument for increased reliance on nuclear weapons. It is no wonder 

that under these conditions, Russian leaders in general, and certainly the military, would view nuclear 

weapons as being the one capability that guaranteed 

Russia’s ability to deter aggression. Indeed, it appears 

as if strategic nuclear weapons are the only factor 

that contributes to Russia having any relevance in the 

evolving international system.

One Western political scientist with extensive experience in Moscow made the connection between the 

retention of nuclear weapons and Russian political 

and psychological needs explicit.
282

As the self-perceived isolated great power in a highly competitive global environment, Russia regards 

nuclear weapons as the mainstay of both its security 

posture and status among the major powers of the 21st 

century. Even though the likelihood of a war with its 

ex-Cold War adversaries—America, its European allies, and China—is extremely low, nuclear deterrence 

gives a measure of comfort to the Kremlin that Russia’s vital interests will be respected under all circumstances by Washington and Beijing, whose military 

power and “combined national might,” respectively, 

are now far greater than Russia’s.29

We should not be confused by Russia’s willingness to pursue strategic arms reductions and to sign 

a new arms limitation treaty with the United States. 

This is not a sign of a change in Moscow’s views of 

international relations or of an acceptance of the need 

to move beyond relations based on “old style” measures of national power. The new START Treaty was 

a matter of absolute necessity for Russia. Absent the 

new agreement, Russia would have been forced to reduce its strategic nuclear forces unilaterally. In an era 

in which the two former adversaries no longer view 

each other as principal threats, why should this be a 

problem? But for the leaders of the Kremlin, it was 

imperative that they bring down U.S. strategic forces 

equally. Any other outcome would be a clear admission of Russian weakness.

Russia’s nuclear strategy also does not help. Faced 

with a decaying conventional military and the perception of external threat, the Russian military doctrine 

focused on an expanded role for nuclear weapons. 

Nuclear weapons became the way not to lose a conventional conflict. As a senior U.S. defense official 

commented:
283

There are aspects to their nuclear doctrine, their military activities that we find very troubling. If you read 

recent Russian military doctrine they are going in the 

other direction, they are actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons, the role in nuclear weapons 

in their strategy.30

To make matters worse for Russia, the world is 

experiencing an ongoing revolution in the means of 

conventional warfare. As U.S. Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates has pointed out in a number of recent 

speeches, the capabilities that underlie this revolution 

are proliferating. He has made repeated reference to 

the so-called anti-access/area denial capabilities being deployed by China, Iran, and even Hezbollah. In 

response to such dangers, the Secretary, as well as 

other military leaders and defense experts, advocate 

accelerating investments in revolutionary capabilities. 

In many instances, these are precisely the kinds of 

weapons platforms and systems identified as leading 

threats in the new Military Doctrine. One senior Russian military leader put the problem this way:

By 2030 . . . foreign countries, particularly the United 

States, will be able to deliver coordinated, high-precision strikes against any target on the whole territory 

of Russia.31

The Final Report of the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States noted that, “Ironically, 

our edge in conventional capabilities has induced the 

Russians, now feeling their conventional deficiencies, 

to increase their reliance on both tactical and strategic 

nuclear weapons.”32

In a larger sense, nuclear weapons are an all-purpose instrument with which to address most of the 
284

military security challenges of the 21st century.33 Russian political and military leaders and defense analysts, echoing arguments made by their predecessors 

in the 1980s, have repeatedly argued that the threat of 

conventional precision-strike weapons could be countered by the employment of theater nuclear weapons.34

According to the NSS:

In the interest of ensuring strategic stability and equitable multilateral cooperation in the international 

arena Russia during the implementation of this Strategy will make every effort at the least cost level to 

maintain parity with the United States in the field of 

strategic offensive weapons under the conditions of 

deployment of a global missile defense system and realization of the concept of global lightning strike using 

strategic delivery systems with nuclear and conventional warheads.35

ARMS CONTROL, MISSILE DEFENSES, AND 

STRATEGIC STABILITY

The recent reset in U.S.-Russian relations should 

not be taken as a sign that all the difficulties between 

these two countries are a thing of the past. In fact, in 

many ways recent events may create a false expectation on both sides that it will be easy to bridge remaining differences on matters of security. In fact, the opposite condition may be true. 

Were Moscow able to achieve its desired ends 

with respect to conventional force modernization, 

there might be a reasonable chance that Russia and 

the United States could move along a common path 

towards a stable strategic relationship at very low 

numbers of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, Russia 

and the United States are on divergent strategic paths 
285

that are likely to result in greater friction and a more 

difficult security dialogue in the future. Simply put, 

the U.S. position is that conventional means, including missile defenses, offers a means for maintaining 

deterrence and reassuring allies while relying less on 

nuclear weapons and, possibly, even dissuading some 

potential proliferators from pursuing a nuclear capability. 

But it is precisely the U.S. advantage in advanced 

conventional weapons and defensive technologies, 

broadly defined, that poses the greatest near-term 

threat to the Kremlin’s conception of its security 

needs. The focus on conventional forces reduces the 

salience of nuclear weapons, certainly as a means of 

deterrence but also as the political lodestone of great 

power status. The growing U.S. concern about China’s 

military might is a reaction to that country’s investments in advanced conventional capabilities, particularly so-called anti-access and area denial systems and 

not to the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal. 

Some in the West have worried that if the promises 

held by the revolution in military affairs materialize, 

even incompletely, they may significantly lower the 

threshold of military intervention. This is exactly the 

outcome that Russia is worried about, for it believes 

that the new capabilities might open the way to a more 

aggressive interventionist policy of the United States 

and NATO that might well challenge Russia’s interests in various regions and especially in areas close to 

the Russian borders.36

There is virtually no chance that Moscow can meet 

its objectives for reforming the Russian military by 

2020. It will be a monumental challenge for the Kremlin simply to slow the pace of erosion of the Russian 
286

military. Technology limitations, industrial decay, resource constraints, and personnel problems may well 

force the Russian leaders to seek security in a smaller 

but modernized nuclear posture.

Another issue that holds the potential to increasingly divide the two countries is that of missile defenses, particularly the proposed deployment of a 

limited missile defense system in Europe. The Obama 

administration has confirmed the view of its predecessor that missile defenses are a legitimate, even central, 

part of the deterrence and reassurance equation. Properly managed in a so-called phased, adaptive strategy, such defenses can provide deterrence of missile 

threats and reassurance to allies that might otherwise 

only be attainable by explicit nuclear guarantees.

The Russian government and leading strategic 

experts were highly critical of the U.S. proposal to 

deploy a limited ballistic missile defense system in 

Eastern Europe. A number of officials have gone so far 

as to warn that Moscow will take offensive countermeasures, some of which would increase the threat to 

Europe, in the event that the system went forward. On 

the day President Barack Obama was elected, President Medvedev warned that unless the plan to deploy 

the missiles in Europe was halted, Russia would deploy additional short-range ballistic and cruise missiles against Eastern Europe.37

While it was assumed that Russian opposition to 

missile defenses in Europe was a function of their deployment in the absence of a formal agreement as well 

as the nature of the defenses themselves (the original 

Third Site was an extension of the National Missile 

Defense system), this may not be the case. Russia has 

raised concerns about the deployment of a land-based 

version of the Aegis/Standard Missile system in Eu-
287

rope. Recently, Moscow even objected to the deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery to Poland.

Russia has a two-fold problem with the U.S. pursuit of effective theater defenses. The first is the impact 

defenses may have on their efforts to deploy superior 

theater capabilities, both conventional and nuclear. 

The second is their belief that theater defenses, particularly if “Internetted” and connected to space-based 

and other mobile sensors, will be a dandy platform for 

creation of a highly effective strategic defense capability. Such a defense, employed in conjunction with an 

advanced, precision conventional offense, could provide the basis for a disarming first-strike scenario.

Missile defenses, particularly those in Europe, appear to strike at the very heart of the Russian concept 

of strategic stability and Moscow’s requirement to be 

able to hold Europe at risk regardless of the balance of 

forces between Russia and the United States. One analyst sought to answer the question why a defense of 

only 10 interceptors oriented towards the threat from 

Iran would so antagonize the Russian government.

Close examination of Russian policy reveals that 

these defenses entrench the United States in Eastern 

Europe’s military defense and foreclose Russia’s hope 

of intimidating Central and Eastern Europe or of reestablishing its hegemony there and possibly even in the 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If missile 

defenses exist in Europe, Russian missile threats are 

greatly diminished, if not negated. Because empire 

and the creation of a fearsome domestic enemy justify 

and are the inextricable corollaries of internal autocracy, the end of empire allegedly entails Russia’s irrevocable decline as a great power and – the crucial 

point – generates tremendous pressure for domestic 

reform.38
288

Russia needs either to build a conventional military commensurate with its sense of itself as a great 

power and reflecting its concern over the threat posed 

by the United States and NATO or to drag the focus 

of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship back to its 

erstwhile preoccupation with nuclear weapons and a 

stable balance of terror. The former is unlikely to happen. The latter strategy is the source of Medvedev’s 

Dilemma referenced above. Russia cannot take the 

bilateral strategic relationship back to the future without, at a minimum, undermining the Obama administration’s goal of moving towards zero or, more problematic still, stimulating a new era of confrontation. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. Henning Schröder, “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 

2020,” Russian Analytical Digest, June 18, 2009, p. 6.

2. Alexei Bogaturov, “Do you Want Open Systems? Build a 

Closed Bloc: Medvedev’s Military-Strategic Dilemma,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 15, 2009. 

3. Admiral Dennis Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, February 12, 2009, p. 27.

4. The National Security of the Russian Federation until 2020

(NSS), Presidential Decree No. 537, Moscow, Russia, May 12, 2009.

5. Luke Harding, “Russia announces new arms race,” The 

Guardian, March 17, 2009.

6. Dr. Stephen Blank, “Russia Challenges the Obama Administration,” Op-Ed, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, December 2008.

7. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia, 

February 5, 2010, p. 3.
289

8. Ibid, p. 6.

9. “Russia to broaden nuclear strike options,” RT, October 14, 

2009.

10. NSS.

11. President Dmitry Medvedev, cited in “Russia ready for 

Meaningful Military reform. Again. Really,” available from moscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2008/09/27.

12. Roger McDermott, Russia’s Armed Forces: The Power of Illusion, Russie.Nei.Visions No. 37, Brussels, Belgium: French Institute of International Relations, March 2009, pp. 16-18. Also see 

Roger McDermott, “Russia’s ‘Lessons’ from the Georgia War: 

Impacts on Military Reform Plans,” CACI Analyst, November 12, 

2008.

13. Andrew Liaropoulos, “The Russian Defense Reform and 

its Limitations,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, 

No. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 44-45. 

14. “Military reform: Basic guidelines,” RIA Novosti, February 

24, 2010.

15. Dmitriy Gorenburg, “Russia’s New Model Army: Radical 

Reform in the Russian Military,” August 14, 2009, available from 

russiamil.wordpress.com.

16. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wallace, “Challenges to Russia’s Air Force Reform,” The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. 16, No. 12, April 

22, 2010.

17. Roger McDermott, “Stall and Spin in Russian Air Force 

Reform,” Asia Times Online, August 22, 2009.

18. David Eschel, “In Spite of Medvedev’s Optimism, Russian 

Military is Facing Severe Crisis,” Defense Update online, July 24, 

2009, available from defense-update.com/analysis/russian_military_

crisis_240709.html.
290

19. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Former Russian Air Force Chief 

says Air Defenses have Weakened,”Associated Press, May 13, 

2010. 

20. “The Future of the Russian Air Force: 10 Years On,” RIA 

Novosti, available from en.rian.ru/analysis/20100317/158228523.

html.

21. Milan Vego, “The Russian Navy Revitalized,” Armed Forces Journal, April 2009.

22. “Russian Military Reform in a Time of Crisis,” RIA Novosti, March 15, 2010.

23. Alexey Komarov, “Russian Air Force Expects 100 New 

Aircraft,” Aviation Week, March 10, 2009.

24. Cited in Reuben F. Johnson, “Russian Navy Facing ‘Irreversible Collapse’,” The Weekly Standard, July 13, 2009.

25. Roger McDermott, “Naval Overhaul Slides off Russia’s 

Agenda,” Asia Times online, June 26, 2009.

26. V. V. Putin, “Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 89, May 11, 2006.

27. Colonel S. G. Chekinov and Lieutenant General S. A. Bogdanov, “Asymmetric Actions to Maintain Russia’s Military Security,” Military Thought, No. 1, 2010, p. 8.

28. Andrei Schoumekhin and Baker Spring, “Strategic Nuclear Arms Control for the Protect and Defend Strategy,” Backgrounder, No. 2266, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 

May 4, 2009, pp. 7-8.

29. Dmitri Trenin,“Russian Perspectives on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” Barry Blechman, ed., Russian and 

the United States, Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, July, 2009, 

p. 1.

30. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michelle Flournoy, 

“Moscow’s Nuclear Doctrine under Fire,” Financial Times, March 

18, 2010, p. 1.
291

31. Colonel General Alexander Zelin, Chief VVS, cited in RIA 

Novosti, August 11, 2009.

32. Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture.

33. Stephen Blank, Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009, p. xi.

34. Stephen Blank, “Undeterred: The Return of Nuclear War,”

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. I, No. 2, Summer/

Fall 2000, pp. 55-63.

35. NSS.

36. Pavel Podvig, Revolution in Military Affairs: Challenge to 

Russia’s Security, Paper Presented at the VTT Energy Styx Seminar, Helsinki, Finland, September 4, 200.1

37. Stephen J. Blank, “Russia Challenges the Bush Administration,” Op-Ed, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, December 2008.

38. Ibid.

293

CHAPTER 7

RUSSIA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Stephen J. Blank

Many U.S. analysts in and out of government maintain that nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant 

both politically and militarily. Allegedly at best, they 

can only deter other nuclear weapons, and in any case 

conventional capabilities are fast achieving a comparable capability, rendering the military-strategic utility of nuclear weapons increasingly dubious. A huge 

and growing literature speaks to the “senselessness” 

of nuclear weapons that are supposedly increasingly 

devoid of military utility and that they are becoming 

merely symbols of great power status.1

 Unfortunately, 

this largely U.S. and European view is not grounded 

in the “real world” about which these analysts sometimes speak disdainfully. Rather, it is often rooted in 

the wish to be rid of, delegitimize, or at least minimize 

the utility of nuclear weapons. Certainly the idea that 

nuclear weapons perform no discernibly useful military mission is rooted in theoretical exercises not, fortunately, empirical evidence. At the same time, much 

of this writing suffers from an excessive focus on U.S. 

policy and strategy and the corresponding neglect of 

other states’ thinking and experience. 

Analysis of Russia’s nuclear agenda, not to mention nuclear issues in other nuclear powers or proliferators, suggests, as this author noted a decade ago, that 

even if numbers decline, the range of missions is increasing, as is the overall importance of nuclear weapons for Russia.2

 Moreover, close examination of Russian defense issues, both in their domestic and foreign 
294

policy context, suggests that very strong objective and 

subjective forces are driving Russia toward enhanced 

reliance upon nuclear weapons, even as their numbers 

decrease, for a host of critical (as seen by Moscow) 

political and military missions. These factors exist irrespective of numbers, because no Western analysis 

known to this author has calculated how many nuclear 

weapons that Russia actually needs or for what missions (a common failing as well among much writing 

on U.S. forces). Consequently, regardless of the numbers of nuclear weapons that Russia may have in 2020 

or 2030, it is also unlikely that the new arms control 

treaty will lead Russia to embrace the idea of “global 

zero” despite many favorable statements by Russian 

leaders concerning this goal.3

 Indeed, the evidence to 

date suggests that Moscow will be reluctant to conisder any further reductions in nuclear forces without 

a sizable reduction in what it considers to be threats 

to Russian security. Those threats first comprise the 

U.S./the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and China. Beyond that, they also comprise the new 

nuclear proliferators, and then possibly terrorism. 

Since the new Russian defense doctrine openly expects the advent of new nuclear powers, the advent of 

these proliferators, many of whom are concentrated 

in Russia’s neighborhood, will provide added reasons 

for not reducing the number of nuclear weapons or at 

least Russia’s reliance on them.4

This conclusion obviously contradicts the rather 

rosy expectations of many U.S. analysts that the great 

powers can safely and unilaterally reduce nuclear 

weapons without experiencing any adverse consequences. This conclusion might well cause dismay 

among advocates of global zero. But Russian writing, 

obviously not without its own shortcomings, remains 
295

centered on the real possibility of fighting wars from 

an inferior strategic position. For example, a recent 

Russian article describing the need for a fundamentally new universal armored vehicle states that:

We must not neglect the preservation of the capabilities for the restoration of the combat capability during 

an exchange of nuclear strikes by the weapons and 

equipment (VVT) system. After the employment of 

weapons of mass destruction, a troop grouping must 

rapidly take heart, rid itself of radioactive contamination, restore its combat capability, and continue to 

accomplish the combat missions. If that will not occur, the permissibility of the conduct of a preventive 

nuclear strike by Russia, which is declared in the 

new Military Doctrine, simply doesn’t make sense.

The 1980s field regulations examined these variants of 

the developments of events. Today rehearsals of operations to restore combat capability after employment 

of nuclear weapons are actually not being conducted.5

(emphasis by author)

Moreover, Russia has incorporated nuclear warfighting scenarios into its exercises in Europe as in Zapad-2009 and in Asia in the Vostok-2010 exercise. In 

an otherwise unremarkable 2008 interview, General 

Vladimir Boldyrev, then Commander in Chief of Russia’s Ground Troops, described the missions of Russia’s tank troops as follows:

Tank troops are employed primarily on main axes to 

deliver powerful splitting attacks against the enemy 

to a great depth. Having great resistance to damageproducing elements of weapons of mass destruction, 

high firepower, and high mobility and maneuverability, they are capable of exploiting the results of nuclear 

and fire strikes to the fullest and achieving assigned 

objectives of a battle or operation in a short time.6
296

Indeed, from Boldyrev’s remarks we may discern 

that he, and presumably his colleagues, fully expect 

both sides to use nuclear weapons as strike weapons 

in combat operations. The comments above concerning armored vehicles point in the same direction.7

At the same time, an analysis of Russia’s current 

thinking about nuclear issues reveals ongoing and vigorous high-level debates about nuclear weapons. This 

debate is evidently linked to the domestic struggle for 

primacy between the factions around Prime Minister 

Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev. In 

other words, one vital subjective factor that will drive 

future Russian thinking about nuclear weapons, policies, and strategy is the identity of the chief decisionmaker, whatever his title. In a system devoid of checks 

and balances, any democratic control over the armed 

forces and where many military men, and maybe civilian elites, still harken for a military leadership like 

that of Stalin in World War II, the personality, outlook, and thinking of the leader is of much more critical importance than is the case in more structured and 

accountable polities.8 This point is even more compelling when we realize that the structure of Russian 

politics means that this absence of democratic controls 

in defense policy generates a constant temptation to 

use military forces to solve political problems.

This debate concerning nuclear weapons is not only 

visible in the controversies surrounding the recent defense doctrine of February 2010, indeed, it precedes 

the publication of the doctrine. 9 It involves several 

questions revolving around nuclear weapons. First, 

it comprises the question of using nuclear weapons 

in a preventive or even preemptive mode in smaller 

or so-called local wars that have hitherto been purely 
297

conventional wars. The public debate began in earnest 

in October 2009 when Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of 

Russia’s Security Council, told an interviewer that the 

forthcoming defense doctrine will be amended to allow for the possibility of preventive and preemptive 

first strikes, including nuclear strikes, even in the 

context of a purely conventional local war and even 

at the lower level of operational-tactical, as opposed 

to strategic, strikes.10 This triggered a major public debate over those questions that paralleled the private 

debate among Russia’s leaders. Although ultimately 

the published doctrine omitted to say these things, the 

citation above about armored vehicles suggests that 

for many Patrushev’s views are nevertheless reflected 

there.11 In addition, the doctrine was accompanied by 

a classified publication on nuclear issues that left foreign observers in the dark about when Russia might 

or might not go nuclear and for what purposes and 

missions.

At the same time, a concurrent and related debate became public between Putin and Medvedev as 

to whether or not Russia needs to build more offensive nuclear weapons than it had originally planned 

in order to meet the alleged challenge posed by U.S. 

missile defenses in Eastern Europe. Even as Medvedev was hailing the progress being made in negotiating this treaty, saying that a final version was close 

at hand, Putin decided to show who was boss and to 

play to the hawks’ gallery. On December 28, 2009, in 

Vladivostok, he said that: 

The problem is that our American partners are developing missile defenses, and we are not, . . . But the 

issues of missile defense and offensive weapons are 

closely interconnected....There could be a danger that 

having created an umbrella against offensive strike 
298

systems, our partners may come to feel completely 

safe. After the balance is broken, they will do whatever they want and grow more aggressive. . . . In order to 

preserve a balance, while we aren’t planning to build a 

missile defense of our own, as it’s very expensive and 

its efficiency is not quite clear yet, we have to develop 

offensive strike systems.12

But at the March 5, 2010, expanded session of the 

Defense Ministry Collegium, Medvedev made it clear 

that Russia does not need to increase its offensive 

nuclear capability any further than was originally 

planned.13 Thus the divisions between the two men 

on this issue are out in the open. But their resolution 

will take place in a tough context for innovative and 

nonbelligerent policymaking where strong trends for 

greater reliance on nuclear weapons, regardless of 

quantity, will exist.

In the domestic context, the recent admission that 

the effort to build a professional Army was a failure and that Russia is returning to conscription has 

profound objective consequences for overall defense 

policy.14 Indeed, Russia is even radically cutting the 

number of contract positions in ways that do not affect (so it says) its combat capability.15 As regards 

nuclear issues, this failure means that Russia had to 

forsake the dream of a professional highly educated 

and motivated Army capable of fighting a high-tech 

conventional, and most likely, local war. While there 

will undoubtedly be pockets of excellence, the ensuing 

Russian Army will probably be unable to fully optimize the use of high-tech systems and will be plagued 

by low morale, education, health levels, large-scale 

draft evasion, and corruption. This outcome suggests 

that Russia may well have to invoke nuclear forces in 

many cases to substitute for what would otherwise 
299

have been a much more robust high-tech conventional 

capability and deterrent. 

Russian defense industry’s concurrent failure to 

modernize to the point where it can satsify both the 

government and the armed forces’ demands for serial 

production of reliable high-tech weapons and platforms and system integration capabilities reinforces 

this likely outcome, and suggests that Russia will only 

partially realize its plan of a comprehensive modernization of the armed forces by 2020. Here again, 

rather than modernize the armed forces by 10 percent 

a year to 2020 as previously planned, Medvedev is 

now demanding that 30 percent of the armed forces’ 

weaponry be modernized by 2015, a sure sign of continuing failure.16 What makes this outcome even more 

likely is the fact that, due to the impact of the current crisis on the backward and overly statist Russian 

economy, budgetary spending will be constrained at 

least through 2015 if not 2020.17 Indeed, the recently 

approved State Armament Program from 2011-20 

spends only 13 trillion rubles to rearm the armed forces, a figure that the Acting Defense Ministry Chief of 

Armaments, Lieutenant General Oleg Frolov, claims 

will only allow for modernization of the strategic 

nuclear forces, air, and air defense forces, leaving the 

Navy and Army under-financed.18 Not surprisingly, 

the military demanded another 23 trillion rubles to 

modernize the Army through 2020 and to modernize 

all of the armed forces and their accompanying infrastructure.19 This pressure already forced the Finance 

Ministry to make concessions to the miliary, for instance whereas defense spending stood at 2.6 percent 

of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010, in 2011-12 it 

should increase to 2.9 percent of GDP and 3 percent in 

2013, after which it will grow to 3.1 percent, leading to 
300

increased purchases of weapons and hardware.20 But 

this did not appease the armed forces. Even within 

those constraints, we see rising defense spending as a 

percentage of the state budget and possibly the overall 

economy, i.e., signs of structural militarization. Moreover, we can also see rising pressure by the military on 

the budget. However, the government has gone even 

further down this road.

Earlier failures in the defense sector are now generating the tendencies toward militarization (albeit at a 

much lower level than in Soviet times) to compensate 

for these failures in Putin’s Russia and the continuing 

crisis of the economy and defense sector. As a recent 

Russian article observed, from 2000-10 defense spending has gone from 141 billion rubles to 2,025 trillion 

rubles, without leading to an equivalent growth in deliveries as these figures were consumed by rising costs 

for modernizing old models and for new models as 

well as losses due to corruption.21 Richard Weitz has 

summarized the trajectory of defense spending since 

2007. 

In 2007 the Russian government approved a $240 

billion rearmament program that will run through 

2015. In February 2008 Russia’s Ministry of Defense 

announced that it would further increase the military 

budget by about 20 percent, allocating approximately 

one trillion rubles (about $40 billion) to military spending in 2008. Following the August 2008 war in Georgia, 

the Russian government announced it would increase 

the defense budget yet again in order to replace the 

warplanes and other equipment lost in the conflict as 

well as to accelerate the acquisition of new weapons 

designed since the Soviet Union’s dissolution. This 

year [2008] the Russian military will spend over $40 

billion. The figure for 2009 should exceed $50 billion.22
301

Even though defense spending has been steadily 

rising and was projected before the economic crisis 

to rise still faster, the war in Georgia and the visible 

animosity to America has led the regime to embark 

on a return to quasi-Stalinist military planning. Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that the Ministry of Defense 

has already begun working on a 10-year plan for arms 

procurement and re-equipment from 2011-20 that 

was to be sent to the Duma for approval in 2010. This 

program grows out of the failure of the current arms 

program from 2006-15 that was budgeted at 5 trillion 

rubles ($155 billion). Typically, that plan proved to be 

“ineffective and expensive, leading to delays in introducing new armaments.”23 Indeed, “Not a single one 

of the previous arms programs was fulfilled even at 

20 percent of the planned level. Even the existing program, which came about during the years of oil-sale 

prosperity, is not being fulfilled.”24

Yet despite this continuing record of failure, it has 

not only led to ever greater state control of that sector 

but to neo-Stalinist answers. Even in late 2008 when 

crisis was apparent, Moscow sought to accelerate the 

utterly failed 2006-15 plan and compress it to be completed by 2011 when the new plan, which certainly 

entails even more state control and thus guaranteed 

suboptimal outcomes, is to begin.25 Thanks to the economic crisis, the unending inflation in the Russian defense industry and its inability to function in a market 

economy, the government first had to cut the 2009 defense budget by 15 percent and, despite its denials, cut 

procurement.26 By July 2009, funding cuts were hampering the acquisition of manpower for the planned 

new permanent readiness units, construction of the 

Yuri Dolgoruky class of ballistic nuclear submarines 

(SSBNs), and funding for the development of foreign 
302

naval bases.27 Yet the defense sector refused to accept 

this outcome as final.

Debates over defense spending clearly did not end 

in 2008 or even when they were originally supposed 

to end in 2009. Thus the Security Council was reportedly supposed to accept the national security strategy 

at its meeting on February 20, 2009.28 But that meeting 

did not occur until March 24, suggesting further objections. Apparently one major reason for the postponement of the appearance of the security strategy was the 

continuing economic crisis. It clearly had worsened to 

the point where the overall economy shrunk by 10.1 

percent from January-June 2009 and 8.5 percent for 

the year.29 By all accounts, this forced the drafters and 

the Security Council, not to mention those who would 

have to approve the document, to assert the importance of economic factors as a part of security. Thus in 

his address to the Security Council on March 24, 2009, 

Medvedev explicitly said that economic security was 

a part of national security.30

Consequently, a major struggle has broken out 

within the defense and defense industrial sector over 

access to resources, and it clearly involves the effort to 

buy weapons abroad, which has touched off a major 

debate within these two communities on the virtues 

of being autarkic or of buying abroad. The two key 

issues for now are the amount of money to be spent 

on military modernization and whether or not to buy 

foreign weapons systems. Frolov and his allies clearly 

brought substantial pressure to bear upon the government, but they were operating in a climate based on 

the precedent of rising outlays for procurement. The 

government is currently operating under the 2006-15 

program. It was supposed to cost 5 trillion rubles or 

$155 billion. The original program for 2011-20 that 
303

Medvedev announced in May 2010 substantially increased that spending to 13 trillion rubles or $420 billion, more than doubling the preceding figure. But, as 

Frolov said, this would essentially deprive the Army 

and Navy of funding for procurement that would allow it to make up for a generation of neglect. Instead 

he advocated an increase of the program to 36 trillion 

rubles for the entire armed forces or $1.161 trillion 

over the 2011-20 decade. If this proposal was unacceptable, then at a minimum a program costing 28 trillion rubles or $920 billion would allow the Army to 

rearm.31

Although many Duma deputies, officials, and 

commentators, including Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov who formerly supervised defense industry, derided Frolov’s demands as wishful thinking, he 

did in fact prevail. Vladimir Popovkin, Frolov’s boss, 

told audiences at the Farnborough Show that the government would spend 20 trillion rubles or $620 billion more on procurement, less than Frolov asked for, 

but still a large increase. Under these revised figures, 

spending on research and development (R&D) and 

procurement will exceed $50 billion annually. Perhaps 

more importantly, total Russian defense spending may 

reach 4-5 percent of GDP, more than any other major 

power and a sign of creeping structural militarization. 

Neither can we doubt the high rate of defense spending in the annual budget.32 Finance Minister Alexei 

Kudrin recently conceded that budgetary outlays on 

national defense would rise in 2010 by 13.3 percent, 

while spending on national security and law enforcement would go up by 8.8 percent. The overall rise in 

those sectors through 2013 will be 22.1 percent. Since 

spending on health care, culture, cinematography, and 

education are also going up by hefty amounts, general 
304

state expenditures will supposedly fall by 4.5 percent, 

allegedly through attrition of bureaucrats by 20 percent through 2013, reducing the rise of administrative 

costs, and the privatizations mentioned above.33

In addition, “Popovkin announced plans to spend 

this windfall to procure a thousand new helicopters in 

ten years including heavy Mi-26 helicopters that can 

carry 25 tons of cargo or more than 100 passengers for 

short distances.”34 The need for such weapons is quite 

visible in the North Caucasus, which is on fire. Likewise, Russia will also procure 20 new heavy AN-124 

Ruslan transport aircraft and 60 new T-50 “fifth generation” stealth jet fighters starting in 2013. Meanwhile, 

Russia is already deploying new RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).35 Thus by 2013, Russian 

defense spending will be 2 trillion rubles more than 

it is today and rise by 60 percent relative to 2010 figures. These sums will go largely to nuclear, naval, and 

air forces.36 Indeed, the budget through 2013 raises 

procurement by 50 percent above the earlier figures.37

However, if one takes into account the costs of actually 

procuring these airplanes, ships, etc., in reality rather 

little can be built (and costs will rise and inefficiencies, 

absent reform, will continue to add to these increased 

costs ) and ultimately the deployment of hundreds 

of airplanes and dozens of ships by 2015 and 2020 is 

quite unlikely to materialize.38

Obviously, lucrative and productive investment 

will be squeezed in the coming budgets as is already 

the case. It is most likely that without significant governmental reform these increased outlays will be inefficiently and ineffectively spent and will ultimately 

increase inflationary pressures. While these procurements plans were stimulated by real threats in the 

North Caucasus and to the alleged threat presented by 
305

NATO/U.S. and Chinese air and other strike capabilities in terms of both air defense and nuclear systems; 

they certainly add considerably to the burden on the 

Russian economy. If the new treaty fails to achieve ratification, as appears quite possible, Russia may decide 

it needs to undergo even more nuclear and conventional buildups from this level.

Even taking rising defense budgets into account, 

the inefficiency of much of that spending, the inherent inflationary pressures in the Russian economy, especially in the raw materials sector, the ineptitude of 

the defense industrial sector, and its vulnerability to 

the theft of 30-40 percent of the defense budget, which 

has not decreased despite a vigorous anti-corruption 

campaign, suggests a corresponding and ongoing 

structural inability to realize the goals indicated in 

the plans for modernizing the Russian armed forces 

by 2015 or by 2020.39 Moreover, given the constraints 

on the budget even under increased defense spending, Russia will probably not be able to afford the necessary outlays for this comprehensive technological 

modernization of the armed forces and will have to 

utilize nuclear capabilities more than others do. Those 

capabilities are also under pressure as the Bulava’s 

sorry experience indicates (the Bulava is Russia’s new 

submarine launched ballistic missile [SLBM] and, as of 

April 2010, it has failed during all of its first 12 tests). 

So we may likely see Russia assigning to its nuclear 

forces a broader range of missions than might otherwise be performed by conventional forces.40
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

Beyond domestic factors that generate considerable pressure to continue relying on a possibly 

smaller, albeit somewhat improved nuclear deterrent, 

the imperatives of both external trends and overall 

Russian national security policy also strongly incline 

toward enhanced reliance on nuclear weapons. The 

three external trends are: U.S. missile defenses initiatives; the rise of China; and, at least in some quarters, 

an increased concern about missile and nuclear proliferation, a phenomenon that Russia actually expects 

to increase by 2020 if its new defense doctrine is a reliable guide.41 But these phenomena are perceived and 

mediated through a unique cognitive and ideological 

landscape that underlies and drives Russian national 

security policy.42

Bluntly stated, Moscow approaches its security 

from the belief that while major war is not likely, 

smaller wars fought over access to resources, especially energy, around its border are increasing in likelihood. Worse, these wars are approaching Russia’s 

borders. Furthermore, these wars can easily grow into 

major conflagrations where the use of nuclear weapons could well be contemplated or even implemented.43 The aforementioned exercises in 2009-10 reflected 

such possibilities. Indeed, Russian elites believe that 

if Russia lacked nuclear weapons, NATO would then 

feel emboldened to intervene in some variant of a 

Kosovo-like scenario in those conflicts, for example, 

Georgia in 2008.44 In other words, it is the possession 

of nuclear weapons alone that gives Russia the means 

to declare the Commonweath of Independent States 

(CIS) off limits to foreign powers, maintain psychological and political equality with the United States, 
307

assert Russia’s identity as a great power, and most 

crucially back up that claim with a real force. Russia’s 

nuclear capability ensures Russia’s strategic independence as an international actor, but even more to the 

point, its identity as a truly soveriegn state, i.e., one 

that makes policy strictly on the basis of its own calculation of national interest, not the actions of other 

states. 

Furthermore, official documents like the new defense doctrine and the 2009 national security concept 

explictly state that the incidence of major power reliance on force and the bypassing of the United Nations 

(UN) is rising, making the outbreak of wars more 

rather than less likely.45 Thus Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov told the Defense Collegium in 2009 that: 

The military-political situation has been characterized by the U.S. leadership’s striving to achieve global 

leadership and by an expansion and buildup of military presence of the United States and its NATO allies in regions contiguous with Russia. The American 

side’s aspirations were directed toward gaining access 

to raw-material, energy, and other resources of CIS 

countries. Processes aimed at crowding Russia [out] 

from the area of its traditional interests were actively 

supported. International terrorism, religious extremism, and the illegal arms trade seriously influenced 

the military-political situation. They have been manifested more and more often in countries bordering on 

Russia. Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia was a direct 

threat to RF national interests and military security. 

This attempt to settle the conflict by force was aimed 

first and foremost at destabilizing the situation in the 

Caucasus. On the whole the analysis of the militarypolitical situation permits a conclusion about the 

growing likelihood of armed conflicts and their potential danger to our state [Author’s Emphasis].

46
308

Not only did Serdyukov accept this General Staff 

threat assessment, he intensified it by saying that the 

likelihood of threats to Russia in the form of wars and 

military conflicts is increasing. Yet, when he spoke, the 

share of modern armaments in the armed forces only 

made up 10 percent of their arsenal. At that time, 2008, 

only 19 percent of defense spending was earmarked 

for re-equipping the Army and Navy with that being a 

third priority behind organizational reform and maintenance of the nuclear forces.47 So the priority of the 

nuclear deterrent while Russia undergoes modernization is already evident from here. Neither has that priority changed since 2008 despite the current financial 

crisis or the increase in nuclear spending discussed 

above. 

Beyond the presupposition of actual militarypolitical conflict with the West and China (the latter 

being the threat that we dare not speak of), a constant 

factor in the relationship with the West irrespective of 

its political temperature at any time is the fact that the 

nuclear forces of both sides remain frozen in a posture 

of mutual deterrence that implies a prior adversarial 

relationship that could easily deteriorate further under any and all circumstances and devolve into that 

kind of shooting war.48 This point is critical: The problematic nature of the bilateral relationship, just as was 

the case during the Cold War—albeit less intensely today—is not due to deterrence. Rather, deterrence is a 

manifestation of a prior, underlying, comprehensive, 

and fundamental political antagonism in which Russia has settled upon deterrence as a policy and strategy because that strategy expresses its foundational 

presupposition of conflict with America and NATO.49

The fundamental basis of the rivalry with Washington is political and stems from the nature of the 
309

Russian political system which cannot survive in its 

present structure without that presupposition of conflict and enemies, and a revisionist demand for equality with the United States so that it is tied down by 

Russian concerns and interests. From Russia’s standpoint, the only way it can have security vis-à-vis the 

United States and Europe given that presupposition 

of conflict is if America is shackled to a continuation 

of the mutual hostage relationship based on mutual 

deterrence that characterized the Cold War, so that 

it cannot act unilaterally. At the same time, Europe 

must be intimidated by the specter of Russian military 

power which, given present realities, means nuclear 

weapons. To the degree that both sides are shackled 

to this mutual hostage relationship, Russia gains a 

measure of restraint or even of control over U.S. policy. For, as Patrick Morgan has observed, this kind of 

classic deterrence “cuts through the complexities of 

needing to have a full understanding of or dialogue 

with the other side.” Instead it enables a state, in this 

case Russia, to “simplify by dictating, the opponent’s 

preferences” [Italics in the original].50 Thanks to such 

a mutual hostage relationship, Russian leaders see all 

other states who wish to attack them or even to exploit 

internal crises like Chechnya as being deterred. Therefore, nuclear weapons remain a critical component of 

strategic stability and, as less openly stated, for giving 

Russia room to act freely in world affairs.51

Indeed, Moscow sees its nuclear arsenal as a kind 

of all-purpose deterrent that has deterred the United 

States and NATO from intervening in such conflicts 

as the Chechen wars and Georgia. Nevertheless, its 

military and political leaders, e.g., Serdyukov, the 

doctrine which is now official policy, and ColonelGeneral Nikolai Solovtsov, Commander in Chief of 
310

the Strategic Missile (Rocket) Forces in 2008 all charge 

that threats to Russia are multiplying. Thus Solovtsov 

argued that:

Some potential threats to the defense and security of 

the Russian Federation, including large-scale ones, remain, and in some sectors are intensifying. Moreover, 

the possibility cannot be ruled out that major armed 

conflict could arise near Russia’s borders, which will 

affect its security interests, or that there could be a 

direct military threat to our country’s security. This 

is graphically illustrated by the military aggression 

unleashed by Georgia overnight from 7 to 8 August 

against South Ossetia.52

While such statements represent the fantasy world 

of the Russian military where threats are always rising despite the plain evidence of Western demilitarization—and they also omit to mention that Georgia 

neither attacked Russia nor in fact started the war that 

was clearly a Russian provocation—his remarks do 

amply underscore the importance of deterrence and 

the permanent sense of being threat that drives Russian policy. Hence, the need for deterrence, primarily 

though not exclusively of the United States, at the price 

of accepting that Russia too, is deterred from a nuclear 

strike on the United States (or Europe or China). 

 In return for accepting that it too is similarly deterred, Russia postulates as one of the fundamental 

corollaries of its policy and strategy that it must retain 

a capability to intimidate and destroy Europe with 

its nuclear and other missiles. This is why the Russians have such reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) no matter the cost. Thus while Germany, 

Poland, and Norway have called on the United States 

to remove its TNW from Europe, Russian military 
311

leaders like Lieutenant General Yevgeny Bushinsky, 

former head of the Defense Ministry’s International 

Legal Department, argue that Russia should only enter into negotiations on TNW in case of parity in conventional armaments between Russia and the United 

States, i.e., never.53 This is because TNW are Moscow’s 

deterrent in a situation of conventional inferiority like 

the present.54 Worse yet, the Navy plans to introduce 

new TNW in the form of nuclear cruise missiles on its 

submarines.55 In any case, as Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt has stated regarding Russian threats in 

the Baltic: “According to the information to which we 

have access, there are already tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad area. They are located both at 

and in the vicinity of units belonging to the Russian 

fleet,”56 This means that Russia has effectively violated the Bush-Yeltsin Presidential Nuclear Initiatives 

of 1991-92, which barred TNW from naval vessels. 

Finally, Chief of Staff General Nikolai Makarov has 

publicly stated that Russia will retain its TNW as long 

as Europe is “packed with armaments” as a guarantee 

of Russian security and that priority of funding will be 

directed to Russia’s nuclear arsenal.57

In other words, believing a priori that Europe is the 

site of a presumptive enemy action against it, Russia 

demands as a condition of its security that the rest of 

Europe be insecure. Russia’s defense doctrine openly 

says that the United States and NATO represent the 

main threats to Russian security and that Washington 

will continue to seek military supremacy and disregard international law for a generation.58 Furthermore, 

unlike the United States, Russia is engaged in a comprehensive modernization and renewal of all of its 

nuclear weapons, clearly in the belief that it needs to 

deter America by military means, and maybe even to 
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fight using such weapons. Consequently, there will be 

enormous opposition to any plans for further reductions or curtailment of this modernization program.

Likewise, Moscow has consistently said that the 

deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe and 

Asia will disrupt existing balances of strategic forces 

and undermine global and regional stability.59 Moscow 

also tried hard to link the new treaty to the removal or 

missile defenses from Central and Eastern Europe.60

In addition, Russia’s leaders openly contend that one 

cannot discuss European security without taking into 

account the missile defense issue or the Conventional 

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.61 Certainly, Russian officials see the weaponization of space, the integration 

of space and terrestrial capabilities, missile defenses, 

the Reliable Replacement Weapons (RRW), and the 

U.S. global strike strategy as a part of a systematic, 

comprehensive strategy to threaten Russia. As Pavel 

Podvig has observed:

One of the consequences of this [U.S. military strategy] is that if the promises held by the revolution in 

military affairs materialize, even incompletely, they 

may significantly lower the threshold of military intervention. And this is exactly the outcome that Russia 

is worried about, for it believes that the new capabilities might open the way to a more aggressive interventionist policy of the United States and NATO that may 

well challenge Russia’s interests in various regions 

and especially in areas close to the Russian borders.62

So in response, Moscow must threaten Europe. Indeed, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov repeatedly has 

invoked the now habitual, but no less mendacious, 

charge that missile defenses in Europe, systems that 

allegedly used to be regulated by bilateral agreements 
313

to maintain parity are now being introduced close to 

Russia’s borders, thereby rupturing that parity in Europe and elsewhere.63 During his 2008 trip to Poland, 

Lavrov went even further, saying that,

For many decades, the basis for strategic stability and 

security in the world was parity between Russia and 

the United States in the sphere of strategic offensive 

and defensive arms. However, in recent years, the 

U.S. Administration chose a course towards upsetting 

that parity and gaining a unilateral advantage in the 

strategic domain. Essentially it’s not just about global 

missile defense. We also note that the U.S. has been 

reluctant to stay within the treaties on strategic offensive arms, and that it is pursuing the Prompt Global 

Strike concept, and developing projects to deploy 

strike weapons in outer space. This, understandably, 

will not reinforce the security of Europe or of Poland 

itself.64

Lavrov then went on to say that, under the circumstances, if Poland chose a “special allied relationship” 

with Washington, then it would have to bear the responsibilities and risks involved, and that Moscow, in 

principle, opposed having its relations with third parties being a function of Russian-American disputes.65

Thus Russia’s arms control posture also represents 

its continuing demand for substantive, if not quantitative, parity, as well as for deterrence with the United 

States in order to prevent Washington from breaking 

free of the Russian embrace and following policies 

that Russia deems antithetical to its self interests.66

Moreover, that parity is calculated not just globally, 

but in regional balances as well, so that Russia also 

demands a qualitative or substantive parity with 

America at various regional levels, most prominently 

Europe. Russia’s demand for restoring parity at both 
314

the global and regional levels entails not an unreachable numerical parity, but rather a strategic stability or equilibrium where both sides remain mutually 

hostage to each other in a deterrent relationship and 

where the United States cannot break free to pursue 

its global or regional interests unilaterally.

Several practical strategic consequences flow from 

this posture. First, under all circumstances, Russia 

must retain the capability to intimidate Europe with 

nuclear weapons and hold it hostage to that threat. 

Therefore, the elite unanimously believes or professes 

to believe that any U.S. missile defense is a threat, because it presages a network covering Europe that will 

negate Russia’s ability to threaten Europe and counter 

its first-strike capability, even though Lavrov admitted that the present stage of missile defense developments do not threaten Russia.67 This is particularly true 

as the Obama administration’s plans envisage extending the adapted phased construction of missile defenses throughout Europe until 2020. 68 The unanimity 

of the Russian elite puts the new treaty into jeopardy 

even before it is ratified, because Russian statements 

about missile defenses mean that if Russia should decide that U.S. missile defense programs exceed Russia’s definition of strategic stability within the treaty’s 

limits, and therefore threaten Russia’s strategic deterrence forces, then Russia can withdraw unilaterally 

from the treaty.69 Thus key members of the Duma, like 

Speaker Boris Gryzlov, threatened to block ratification 

if this legally binding linkage is omitted.70

Russian demands also relate to the fact that according to former Secretary of State George Shultz 

and former Secretary of Defense William Perry, the 

Russians that they have talked with still believe their 

country is encircled (their word) by hostile or poten-
315

tially hostile forces in both the east and west. Therefore, they are very loath to any further reduction of 

nuclear missiles. Indeed, many of them still express 

the idea of repealing the Intermediate Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty and building INFs and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to counter this 

threat. 71 As if on cue, Lavrov immediately afterwards 

called for, as have previous supporters of repeal of the 

INF treaty, a universal treaty banning intermediate 

and short-range missiles, a propaganda point if there 

ever was one, but one aimed also at China, not just the 

West.72

Consequently, Russian demands for nuclear weapons also relate to the fact that Moscow cannot conceive 

of defending itself against the threats it perceives, 

mainly from NATO, but also from China, without 

continuing to build, renew, and modernize nuclear 

weapons. Its capacity for doing so is visibly open to 

debate, a fact that creates many dilemmas for Russia’s 

strategic leadership. Certainly its continuing program 

to build new nuclear missiles and usable nuclear 

weapons like low-yield and fusion weapons and the 

RS-24 (Yars) missile shows what it thinks of President 

Obama’s quest for a global zero for nuclear weapons, 

as does the new doctrine’s expectation that there will 

be more nuclear powers by 2020.73 Therefore, it regards any U.S. missile defense, whether in Europe or 

Asia, as being a constant threat to its strategic stability 

and vital interests.

Second, Russia’s military is clearly unwilling to 

accept the notion of that there is no linkage between 

offensive and defensive weapons. It claims that the 

United States reshaped its missile defense posture 

in Europe in September 2009, “because, according to 

our clear assessment, this area would definitely cre-
316

ate risks for Russia.”74 But since then, this Russian demand to curtail even the new adaptive phased Obama 

program for missile defenses became the principal 

obstacle to the successful conclusion of the treaty.75 It 

has also become a matter of public controversy within 

Russian politics. Putin’s aforementioned remarks 

from December 2009 underscore that point.76 Putin’s 

demands relate both to the domestic power struggle 

in Russia and the Russian hawks’ demand that they 

be free to build nuclear weapons without constraint. 

Thus it appeared that Russia’s hawks were willing to 

obstruct the treaty to gain total freedom of action to 

build offensive weapons against a nonexistent threat.77

Putin, Defense Minister Serdyukov, and the General 

Staff all argued for slowing down negotiations to insist on linking offenses to defenses and to maintain 

the primacy of Putin’s line on these issues over Medvedev’s apparently less confrontational approach. 

They did so regardless of the fact that doing so placed 

chances for U.S. Senate ratification at greater risk.78

Indeed, during the final stage of negotiations, Russia demanded that the treaty include a joint statement 

signed by both sides stating Russia had the right to 

terminate the treaty should it deem U.S. missile defense programs to be dangerous.79 This, too, would 

have doomed the treaty in the U.S. Senate. Russia has 

also stated in the treaty-related documents its right to 

unilaterally withdraw from the new agreement if it 

believes U.S. missile defense deployments upset “strategic stability.”80 Even though this is in no way legally 

binding, in reply to this revelation: 

In a not-yet-released letter obtained exclusively by The 

Cable, Arizona Sens. Jon Kyl and John McCain, and 

Connecticut Sen. Joseph Lieberman, warn National 
317

Security Advisor James L. Jones, ’Even as a unilateral 

declaration, a provision like this would put pressure 

on the United States to limit its systems or their deployment because of Russian threats of withdrawal 

from the treaty.’81

Therefore even a unilateral Russian statement of 

expressing these views could become grounds for 

increased Senatorial opposition to the treaty, if not 

a failure to ratify, as increasingly seems possible. 

Should the treaty fail to be ratified, that would only 

further justify the arguments made by Russian hawks. 

Since the U.S. Government has just stated that it will 

complete the construction of a pan-European missile 

defense by 2018, Russia could easily execute its threat 

to withdraw from the treaty on those grounds.82

Nevertheless, despite the risks to the reset policy, 

the Russian military remains unappeased on this issue. Russian Chief of Staff General Nikolai Makarov 

warned that: 

The factor of parity should be accompanied by the 

factor of stability, if the U.S. missile defense begins to 

evolve; it will be aimed primarily at destroying our 

nuclear missile capabilities. And then the balance of 

force will be tipped in favor of the United States. . . .

With the existing and maintained parity of strategic 

offensive means, the global missile defense being created by the U.S. will be able to have some impact on 

the deterrence capabilities of the Russian strategic 

nuclear force already in the medium term. . . . This 

may upset the strategic balance of force and lower the 

threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Although 

missile defense is a defensive system, its development 

will basically boost [the] arms race.83
318

Neither is this just rhetoric. As one recent assessment of the obstacles encountered during the negotiations charged, Washington told Moscow that if it 

did not move forward on the treaty, the administration might take Russia off its priority list and move the 

issue from the President to some lower level official. 

Whether or not this conversation occurred, it was described as an ultimatum. This article also points out 

that current Russian nuclear programs aim to overcome or even neutralize U.S. missile defenses.84

The impression is that the Kremlin no longer believes in America’s military omnipotence. Russia responded to the ultimatum with a maiden flight of its 

latest T-50 fighter and the rearmament of its antiaircraft defense system with T-400 Triumph complexes 

(this may be referring to what we call the S-400 SAM). 

To all appearances, Triumphs are anti-satellite missiles (ASAT) that are also capable of intercepting and 

destroying inbound ballistic warheads. Continuation 

of Bulava missile tests was announced as well. Work 

on the missile will be brought to its logical end, sooner 

or later. Specialists are even working on a concept of 

the future strategic bombers that will replace TU-95s 

and Tu-160s one day.85

When it had to back off from this point due to 

President Obama’s steadfastness in regard to missile 

defenses, Moscow then demanded that the United 

States pledge to not do anything unilaterally, evaluate threats jointly with Russia based on corresponding reports from experts of both countries within the 

framework of the joint threats evaluation mechanism, 

and make decisions concerning the deployment of 

theater and eventually global missile defenses against 

ICBMs exclusively on that basis. Moscow also wants 

Washington to confirm that it will discuss missile de-
319

fenses once this treaty is ratified.86 Therefore, Russia 

still seeks a veto on U.S. force decisions. When seen 

in the context of Russian politics and overall defense 

policy, this is a most instructive episode.

Third, since Moscow rigorously adheres to this 

mutual hostage concept, it cannot trust the United 

States, and any U.S. unilateral advance in defenses 

must be compensated by greater Russian offensive 

capabilities. The following citations demonstrate this 

deep-rooted belief in the mutual hostage relationship, 

deterrence of the enemy, and the action-reaction process regarding armaments among the Russian political and military leadership. First,Lavrov told an interviewer in February 2007 that:

Our main criterion is ensuring the Russian Federation’s security and maintaining strategic stability as 

much as possible. We have started such consultations 

[on strategic nuclear weapons] already. I am convinced 

that we need a substantive discussion on how those 

lethal weapons could be curbed on the basis of mutual 

trust and balance of forces and interests. We will insist 

particularly on this approach. We do not need just the 

talk that we are no longer enemies and therefore we 

should not have restrictions for each other. This is not 

the right approach. It is fraught with an arms race, in 

fact, because, it is very unlikely that either of us will be 

ready to lag behind a lot.87

Here Lavrov signaled Russia’s unwillingness to 

leave a mutually adversarial relationship with America and its presupposition of mutual hostility as reflected in both sides’ nuclear deployments. Similarly, 

Alexei Arbatov ridiculed the Bush Administration’s 

view, stated by Ambassador Linton Brooks, that because the two sides are no longer adversaries, detailed 

arms control talks are no longer necessary, as either 

naiveté or outright hypocrisy.88
320

Since then Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov recently stated that:

Issues of strategic offensive and defensive arms are 

inextricably linked. To deny this relationship is meaningless because it is the essence of relations between 

the countries that have the appropriate potential in 

both areas. An augmented capacity of one of the parties in the realm of missile defense is automatically 

echoed in the form of plans and decisions of the other 

party in the realm of strategic offensive arms. And 

not even obliquely, but in the most direct way what is 

happening in the field of missile defense and U.S. relations with its East European allies on this topic has an 

impact on our START follow-on negotiations. Without 

recognition of the relationship between strategic and 

offensive defensive arms, there can be no such treaty, 

it cannot take place.89

Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov 

told the Munich Security conference in February 2010: 

It is impossible to speak of reducing nuclear potentials 

in earnest while a state that possesses nuclear weapons is developing and deploying systems of defense 

against means of delivery of nuclear warheads that 

other states possess. It is like the sword and shield 

theory, where both are continuously developing with 

the characteristics and resources of each of them being 

kept in mind.90

Putin’s aforementioned remarks fit right into this 

outlook. 

The problem is that our American partners are developing missile defenses, and we are not . . . But the 

issues of missile defense and offensive weapons are 

closely interconnected. . . . There could be a danger 
321

that having created an umbrella against offensive 

strike systems, our partners may come to feel completely safe. After the balance is broken, they will do 

whatever they want and grow more aggressive.91

Fourth, given these conditions, the danger (as 

listed in the new defense doctrine) of NATO enlargement, and the threat of missile defenses coming closer 

to Russia, Moscow believes that it is being placed under mounting military-political pressure, or at least 

professes to be so, even though it undoubtedly knows 

that NATO is hardly an offensive threat and that the 

U.S. missile defenses cannot threaten its systems.92

Therefore, it has been ready for at least a decade with 

its threat of striking first with nuclear weapons, even 

against conventional strikes, if the threat to its interests is dire enough. Thus in 1999 Colonel General 

Vladimir Yakovlev, commander in chief of Russia’s 

nuclear forces, stated that: “Russia, for objective reasons, is forced to lower the threshold for using nuclear 

weapons, extend the nuclear deterrent to smaller-scale 

conflicts and openly warn potential opponents about 

this.”93 Since then, there has been no mention of any 

further alteration of this threshold.

Consequently Russia sees nuclear weapons as 

warfighting weapons, and both doctrinal statements 

and exercises confirm this. This process of conventionalizing nuclear weapons, in and of itself, substantially 

lowers the threshold for nuclear use just as Moscow 

did in 1999. Since then, others have amplified upon 

this point. For example, Solovtsov stated that new 

military uses for nuclear weapons are coming into being. Thus:
322

The radical changes that have occurred since the end 

of the Cold War in international relations and the considerable reduction of the threat that a large-scale war, 

even more so a nuclear one, could be unleashed, have 

contributed to the fact that in the system of views on 

the role of nuclear arms both in Russia and the U.S., 

a political rather than military function has begun to 

prevail. In relation to this, besides the traditional forms 

and methods in the combat use of the RVSN [Strategic 

Rocket Forces], a new notion “special actions” by the 

groupings of strategic offensive arms has emerged—

Such actions mean the RVSN’s containment actions, 

their aim to prevent the escalation of a high-intensity 

non-nuclear military conflict against the Russian Federation and its allies.94

In other words, though there is no threat or a diminishing threat of large-scale war, a new mission for 

nuclear weapons will be for their use in actions during such a war to control intra-war escalation. It is not 

surprising that Solovtsov argued for increasing the 

forces under his command, but it also is the case that 

such dialectical reasoning makes no sense unless one 

postulates an a priori hostility between East and West 

and grants Russia the right of deterrence that it has 

unilaterally arrogated to itself over other states who 

have never publicly accepted it. Indeed, the new calls 

for renovating the nuclear forces and having a solution guaranteeing nuclear deterrence in all cases has 

now become policy even if America deploys its global 

defense system and moves to a defense dominant 

world.95

Makarov’s aforementioned statement concerning 

retention of TNW could take place in potential European contingencies, i.e., in the Baltic or in a war with 

China.96 In Vostok-2010, the exercise concluded with a 

simulated TNW strike against the People’s Liberation 
323

Army (PLA).97 Similarly, proof of the intended use of 

nuclear weapons in Europe appeared in the Russian 

combined arms exercises entitled Ladoga and Zapad 

2009, which were divided in two to avoid CFE treaty 

monitoring and which prominently featured nuclear 

strikes against a so-called Polish-Lithuanian offensive 

against Belarus which was defended by both native 

and Russian forces. Given the manifestations here of 

an old fashioned Soviet tank offensive but using newer arms, the presence of nuclear strikes, and the new 

command, control, communications, and intelligence 

(C3I) organizations developed by Russia with its reforms since 2006 (and presumably information warfare operations), it is hardly surprising that Baltic littoral states feel threatened and demand more security.

Beyond that, Russia is building new nuclear missiles whose main attribute is their ability to evade U.S. 

missile defenses and as part of the new prioritization 

of its nuclear forces will deploy over 70 strategic missiles, over 30 short-range Iskander missiles, and a 

large number of booster rockets and aircraft.98 Moscow 

will also spend $35.3 billion on serial production of 

all weapons in 2009-11 (1 trillion rubles) and virtually 

doubled the number of strategic missile launches to 

13 in 2009.99 This procurement policy represents both 

a quantum leap in Russian capabilities if it can be accomplished. But more importantly, it also would constitute a major step in a new action-reaction cycle of 

procurements based on the old Cold War paradigm. 

Indeed, these dynamics could lead to a new arms race, 

especially if Russia insists that any new treaty should 

first eliminate the missile defenses in Eastern Europe 

as a condition of its acceptance and consummation. 

The remarks by Patrushev in October 2009 that 

triggered the debate are fully consonant with the mili-
324

tary’s viewpoint. Patrushev told an interviewer that 

the forthcoming defense doctrine will be amended to 

allow for the possibility of preventive and preemptive first strikes, including nuclear strikes, even in the 

context of a purely conventional local war and even 

at the lower level of operational-tactical, as opposed 

to strategic, strikes.100 Soon afterward Lieutenant General Andrey Shvaichenko, Commander in Chief of 

Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)/(RVSN), stated 

on December 16, 2009, that:

In a conventional war, the RVSN and the strategic 

nuclear forces ensure that the opponent is forced to 

cease hostilities on advantageous conditions for Russia by means of multiple preventive strikes against 

the aggressors’ most important facilities. . . . Regional 

instability in immediate proximity to the borders of 

Russia and the CIS countries does not make it possible 

to completely rule out the risk that our country may be 

pulled into military conflicts of various intensity and 

scale.101

Here Shvaichenko went beyond the previous line 

that nuclear weapons may be used to defend Russia’s 

vital interests in a first-strike mode if the vital interests of the country are at risk or deemed to be at risk 

as stated in the 2000 military doctrine.102 That posture 

translated into a peacetime strategy of using Russia’s 

nuclear forces as a deterrent against any aggression 

launched against either Russia or its CIS neighbors or 

against Russia if it made war upon those states as in 

Georgia’s case in 2008.103 In other words, the nuclear 

warning’s strategic political purpose is to demarcate 

a theater of both military and peacetime operations 

wherein Russia would have relative if not full freedom of action to operate as it saw fit, free from foreign 
325

interference. In political terms, it not only represents a 

“no go” sign for potential enemies, it also is an attempt 

to intimidate NATO allies by making them targets of 

Russian nuclear strikes if they try to invoke Article V 

of the Washington Treaty should Russia move on the 

Baltic States or undertake similar kinds of attacks. 

In those remarks, we see a hidden or at least an 

unnoticed mission for Russia’s nuclear weapons. They 

serve to demarcate its sphere of influence by setting 

up a “no go” zone for foreign military entities, because 

the Russian elite almost unanimously believes that 

without such weapons, the whole of the CIS would be 

open to NATO intervention in a crisis. Thus, if Russia 

is to have a sphere of influence in the region, it must 

extend its deterrence umbrella throughout that sphere 

to make its claim credible and with that its claim to 

great or even superpower status. 

Neither is Russia’s professed readiness to use nuclear weapons confined to land-based systems. ViceAdmiral Oleg Burtsev, the Navy’s Deputy Chief of 

Staff, told RIA Novosti that: “Probably, tactical nuclear 

weapons will play a key role in the future,” and that 

the Navy may fit new, less powerful nuclear warheads to the existing types of cruise missiles. “There 

is no longer any need to equip missiles with powerful 

nuclear warheads,” Burtsev said. “We can install lowyield warheads [possibly fusion weapons?] on existing cruise missiles.”104 This is clearly something that 

creates an unacceptable threat to European security.105

Certainly, we cannot assume this to be mere rhetoric, 

for as Bildt has told us, Russia has already deployed 

TNW on its Baltic Fleet ships.106 In apparent confirmation of Bildt’s remarks, the following episode from 

2006 is informative.
326

In responding to a question from Putin on the number 

of nuclear submarines currently deployed worldwide, 

Ivanov stated: ‘At this moment. . .we have eight nuclear submarines deployed. Of them, five are strategic 

submarines and three are multipurpose submarines, 

but all of them are deployed with nuclear weapons. 

The ships have different missions – intercontinental, 

that is, and multipurpose, but on board of each of them 

are nuclear weapons.’ Since general purpose (attack) 

submarines do not carry SLBMs, Ivanov’s comments 

appeared to indicate that these vessels, which prior to 

the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives had carried tactical, nuclear-armed cruise missiles and nuclear-armed 

torpedoes, were again carrying weapons in either or 

both of these categories.107

The worst aspect of these deployments and plans 

as stated here is that they point to the General Staff’s 

and the government’s strategy as being one of supposedly limited nuclear war. Key officials confirmed 

this interpretation, conceding that limited nuclear war 

is Russia’s officially acknowledged strategy against 

many different kinds of contingencies.108 Ilya Kedrov, 

in his discussion of armored vehicles above, also 

showed that he understood the doctrine as affirming 

this strategy.109 In September 2008, at a roundtable on 

nuclear deterrence, General Solovtsov noted that Russia was giving explicit consideration to the concept of 

“special actions” or “deterring actions of the RVSN 

aimed at the prevention of escalation of a non-nuclear 

military conflict of high intensity against Russia.” Solovtsov further stated that: 

These actions may be taken with a view to convincingly demonstrating to the aggressor [the] high combat potential of Russian nuclear missile weapons, [the] 

determination of the military-political leadership of 
327

Russia to apply them in order to make the aggressor 

stop combat actions. . . . In view of its unique properties, the striking power of the Strategic Missile Forces 

is most efficient and convincing in the de-escalation 

actions.110

This strategy also openly reflects Moscow’s bizarre, 

unsettling, and unprecedented belief that Russia can 

control escalation and nuclear war by initiating it despite 40 years of Soviet argument that no such control 

was feasible. Meanwhile, current procurements display a reliance on new, mobile, survivable, and allegedly indefensible nuclear weapons, even as numbers 

fall. For example, Russia seeks to keep its mobile missile systems of the nuclear forces invisible to foreign 

reconnaissance systems, while also developing means 

to suppress those reconnaissance and surveillance 

systems.111 Accordingly, as Russian officials regularly 

proclaim, nuclear procurements are intended to develop missiles against which America has no defense, 

i.e., mobile missiles, multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and fusion, low-yield nuclear weapons that can also be used on the battlefield.

Thus, nuclear weapons are warfighting weapons. 

Moscow’s threats from October 2009 not only follow 

previous doctrine, they expand on it by openly admitting that limited nuclear war is its option or ace in the 

hole. If Russia should decide to invade or seize one or 

more Baltic State, then that would mean it is prepared 

to wage nuclear war against NATO and the United 

States to hold onto that acquisition although it would 

prefer not to, or thinks it could get away with it without having to do so. The idea behind such a “limited 

nuclear war” is that Russia would seize control of 

the intra-war escalation process by detonating a first-
328

strike even in a preventive or preemptive mode, and 

this would supposedly force NATO to negotiate a political solution that allows Russia to hold onto at least 

some of its gains. Apart from the immensity of Moscow’s gamble that NATO will not have the stomach 

to retaliate against Russian nuclear strikes, which will 

be carried out to inflict a “preset” amount of damage 

that Moscow believes will signal its “limited” intent. 

In essence, Moscow is essentially engaging in a game 

of nuclear chicken or blackmail. In fact, the real risk 

here is that the West will not acquiesce but rather that 

it will retaliate or even escalate, further adding to the 

inherent unpredictability of any conceivable nuclear 

war scenario. 

A recent article by Vipin Narang analyzing Pakistan’s nuclear posture outlined three differing nuclear 

postures among the nuclear powers, i.e., their operational rather than their rhetorical nuclear doctrine. It 

is apparent that posture and doctrine generate deterrent power against all potential enemies and can be 

used to develop different levels of ability to deter 

varying contingencies, as well as to induce nuclear 

and other political forms of restraint among adversaries. Russia’s nuclear posture which aims to deter both 

conventional and nuclear threats through varying levels of threatened response or first-strike use of nuclear 

weapons exemplifies the process.112 Russia’s declared 

nuclear posture therefore falls into the category of an 

“Asymmetric Escalation Posture.” This posture conforms with numerous statements by Putin et al. that 

Russia’s responses to U.S. missile defenses and NATO 

enlargement will be asymmetric in nature, hence the 

threat of a nuclear first-strike. This posture has the 

following characteristics and entails the recommendations that follow the portrayal of those characteristics 

below.
329

The asymmetric escalation posture is geared for the 

rapid and asymmetric first use of nuclear weapons 

against conventional attacks to deter their outbreak, 

operationalizing nuclear weapons as usable warfighting instruments. A state with this posture must therefore have sufficient tactical and potentially survivable 

second-strike strategic weapons to absorb potential 

retaliation. Although peacetime deployments can be 

centralized, to credibly deter conventional attacks, 

an asymmetric escalation must have the ability to 

disperse and deploy assets extremely quickly and to 

enable their release on the battlefield through pre-delegative procedures to military end-users in the event 

of a crisis; [in Russia’s case, its mobile missiles typify 

this first requirement and little or nothing is known in 

the unclassified literature as to whether it has pre-delegated end-user release] it is thus the most aggressive 

option available to nuclear states. To credibly threaten first use, this posture must be largely transparent 

about capabilities, deployment patterns, and conditions of use. The asymmetric escalation posture may 

have the most significant deterrent effect at all levels 

of conflict intensity, given the costly signal of credibly 

threatening early first use of nuclear weapons against 

even conventional attacks.113

It should be clear that in this context what Moscow 

seeks is to deter as well as to defend. Obviously, Moscow seeks to deter a U.S. nuclear strike in defense of 

its allies. But beyond that obvious concern is the fact 

that for Moscow, it is of paramount significance to deter the U.S. concept of global strike which entails both 

conventional and nuclear strikes from land, sea, and 

air based platforms and for which, by its own admission, it has no sufficient defense. As the Russian military commentator Petr Belov recently observed, the 

resort to nuclear weapons indicates that Russia can no 
330

longer guarantee a retaliatory response to aggression 

or defend against a conventional strike. Moreover, he 

believes that a fierce struggle that could culminate in 

a war can develop around attempts to seize Russia’s 

natural resources. (This notion is also enshrined as an 

official view in the 2009 National Security Concept).114

Therefore, to prevent foreign precision-guided munitions from destroying Russia’s C3I network, the order 

may be given to launch these weapons either to preempt such attacks or in a preventive mode.115

Russia’s exercises fully reflect these plans (and 

not only in the West).116 The Zapad 2009 and Ladoga 

exercises, bifurcated in half to avoid foreign inspections, were part of a nation-wide series of exercises in 

August-October 2009 from the Arctic to the Black Sea 

and culminated in a simulated nuclear strike on Poland, probably for the reasons given by Belov above. 117

The 2009 exercises built upon Stabilnost’ 2008 and earlier exercises that involved the use of nuclear weapons 

in a first-strike mode. During the period September 

28-October 10, 2009, Russia’s SRF (RVSN), i.e., their 

nuclear forces, conducted drills to launch massive 

nuclear strikes using the Topol-M and Stiletto RS-18 

ICBMs to apparently strike “army assets.”118 It is noteworthy because these exercises represented a change 

from the 2004 exercises where the Russians used TNW 

in a first-strike mode because they could not otherwise stop a conventional offensive. In other words, 

now it is equally as likely that they will use ICBMs or 

SLBMs against the United States or Europe for those 

purposes rather than TNW.119 Since Russian leaders acknowledge that large-scale exercises are both a show 

of strength and a training exercise, the significance of 

these exercises and their component operations, as 

well as ongoing nuclear war exercises, is quite evident 

to all observers.120
331

Finally, we must understand that Russian rhetoric 

is not just rhetoric but actual policy. Recent deployments of the SS-26 Iskander missile (that comes in 

both nuclear and conventional formats) in the Leningrad Military District where it could threaten Finland 

and the Baltic States suggest not just a desire to deter 

NATO, but also the continuing desire to intimidate 

Russian neighbors.121 Should Russia divine a threat in 

Europe, it reserves the right to place these missiles in 

Kaliningrad from where it could threaten Poland and 

even Germany as well.122

BEYOND THE DOCTRINE

From an optimistic standpoint, we can say that 

Medvedev successfully overrode the hawks and 

signed the treaty.123 Moreover, he rebuffed both Putin 

and the military on the idea of an expanded nuclear 

program. Thus, at the March 5, 2010, expanded session of the Defense Ministry Collegium, Medvedev 

made it clear that Russia does not need to increase 

its offensive nuclear capability any further than was 

originally planned.124 Clearly this directly contradicted 

Putin’s public remarks in December 2009, underscoring the continuing divisions between Putin and Medvedev and within the Russian military-political elite. 

Beyond those debates, the fact of Putin’s intervention 

on behalf of the military and his attempt to use them 

to check Medvedev is no less striking. First, it represents another in a series of ongoing efforts to assert 

the supremacy of military orientations in Russian national security policy over all other imperatives, while 

simultaneously representing another attempt to politicize the military in the context of the visible rivalry 

between Putin and Medvedev as well as their respec-
332

tive entourages. Such trends are dangerous in and of 

themselves and even more so where nuclear weapons 

and Russia’s most crucial foreign policy relationships 

are involved. 

Second, administration officials have stated that 

Medvedev told them in private what Putin said in 

public and that the two were in very close policy coordination and lockstep.125 Yet the public record, and 

not just the issue of building more nuclear weapons, 

clearly belies such contentions underscoring a wide 

range of disagreements between Medvedev and Putin 

on a broad range of both domestic and foreign policy 

issues.126 While debates over policy and the subsequent pressure on policymakers are the normal state 

of politics everywhere, the sheer scope of issues in 

which such discordance is manifest in Russian politics clearly points to ongoing tensions within Russia. 

What this means for the treaty is that it depends for 

its survival and endurance on the domestic balance 

of power in Russia because the Russian military and 

Putin are already publicly on record indicating that 

the U.S. missile defense program as it is represents 

exactly the kind of threat that Makarov and so many 

before him have invoked as justification for leaving 

the treaty. Indeed, one could argue as well that the 

Republican and conservative opposition in the U.S. 

represent an analogous case of the fragility of the reset 

policy and the limits to it. 

Furthermore, these facts of Russian domestic political life contravene that Obama administration’s 

argument that Russia’s statement is essentially for 

domestic posturing and that every treaty contains a 

withdrawal clause (as did the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

(ABM) Treaty when the United States withdrew from 

it). Every treaty does contain a withdrawal clause, but 
333

this Russian statement essentially represents a loaded 

gun held against the temple of the treaty, given the potential for a reversal of the domestic balance of forces 

in Russia, since the military has already argued as did 

Putin that missile defenses in and of themselves represent a threat to vital Russian interests like deterrent 

capability and its strategic stability. Indeed, the overall Russian reception of this treaty was not enthusiastic, and its critics allege that just as the 1991 Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was detrimental to 

Russia, so is this treaty. They particularly emphasize 

the failure to constrain U.S. missile defenses.127

Therefore the doctrine’s statements that: “The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear 

weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and 

other types of weapons of mass destruction against 

it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use 

of conventional weapons when the very existence of 

the state is under threat,” may be less than meets the 

eye.128 In fact, this represents only the public formulation of the deeply contested nuclear use issue. As Patrushev forecast, a classified document on nuclear use 

was signed along with the doctrine, but obviously not 

released for discussion.129

THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND CHINA

Until now we have focused on Europe, but similar 

dilemmas plague Russian strategists when they look 

at Asia. Moscow sees Washington as trying to bring its 

military forces closer to Russian borders in both Europe and Asia. So this is not only a question of NATO 

enlargement, but also of the enlargement of America’s 

Asian-Pacific alliances.130 Certainly, from Moscow’s 
334

standpoint its perception is a valid one and it may also 

have merit in more objective analyses. For example, 

David McDonough’s analysis of U.S. nuclear deployments in the Pacific Ocean states that: 

The increased deployment of hard-target kill weapons 

in the Pacific could only aggravate Russian concerns 

over the survivability of its own nuclear arsenal. These 

silo-busters would be ideal to destroy the few hundred ICBM silos and Russia’s infamously hardened 

command-and-control facilities as well as help reduce 

any warning time for Russian strategic forces, given 

their possible deployment and depressed trajectory. 

This is critical for a decapitation mission, due to the 

highly centralized command-and-control structure of 

the Russian posture, as well as to pre-empt any possible retaliation from the most on-alert Russian strategic 

forces. The Pacific also has a unique feature in that it 

is an area where gaps in Russian early-warning radar 

and the continued deterioration of its early-warning 

satellite coverage have made it effectively blind to 

any attack from this theatre. This open-attack corridor 

would make any increase in Pacific-deployed SLBMs 

appear especially threatening.131

Similarly, already in 2003 when the first reports of 

the Pentagon’s interest in new low-yield and bunker 

busting nuclear weapons became public, Russian analysts warned that even if such programs were merely 

in a research stage, they would add to the hostile drift 

of Russo-American relations.132 Events since then have 

only confirmed this assessment and their warning.

 A second major concern is the strengthening of the 

U.S.-Japan alliance in the twin forms of joint missile 

defenses and the apparent consolidation of a tripartite 

alliance including Australia and South Korea, if not 

India. For both Russia and China, one of the negative 
335

consequences of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear and missile tests has been the 

strengthened impetus it gave to U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense. The issue of missile defense 

in Asia had been in a kind of abeyance, but the North 

Korean nuclear tests of 2006, made in defiance of Chinese warnings against nuclearization and testing, intensified and accelerated the Japanese and American 

collaboration on missile defenses as the justification 

for them had now been incontrovertibly demonstrated. But such programs always entail checking China, 

which naturally is considerably annoying to Beijing.133

Therefore, China continues to criticize U.S.-Japan collaboration on missile defenses publicly.134 Perhaps this 

issue was on Chinese President Hu Jintao’s mind in 

September 2007 when he called for greater Russo-Chinese cooperation in Asia-Pacific security.135

Russian experts long ago noted that the military 

balance in the Asia-Pacific was unfavorable to Russia 

and specifically invoked the specter of Russia losing 

its nuclear naval potential there.136 That nuclear naval 

potential remains precarious as Moscow recently admitted that its submarines conducted a total of three 

patrols in 2007.137 In fact, in the Pacific, according to 

Japanese sources, Moscow is deploying formerly retired ships like the nuclear powered Admiral Lazarev, 

a decommissioned Kirov class cruiser, to counter the 

rise in Chinese power and deter threats ranging from 

an outbreak of war in Korea to growing Chinese naval and strike power along with U.S. buildups.138 To 

overcome these weaknesses and threats, and thanks to 

Russia’s economic resurgence (largely energy-driven, 

however), then President Vladimir Putin and Defense 

Minister Sergei Ivanov announced a planned strategic 

upgrade for the Pacific Fleet, specifically to address 
336

this problem and make the Fleet Russia’s primary naval strategic component.139

This policy reversed the prior naval policy that 

made Russia’s Northern Fleet the strategic bastion for 

anti-American scenarios during the 1990s, testifying 

to an enhanced threat perception in Asia despite the 

recent Russian show of force in the Arctic and calls to 

incorporate Arctic scenarios into the training and doctrine of Russia’s armed forces.140 Here we should understand that Russia’s forces, particularly those in the 

North and the Far East, may be deployed on a “swing 

basis,” where either the fleet or air forces in one theater moves to support the fleet or air forces in the other. Russia has carried out exercises whereby one fleet 

moves to the aid of the other under such a concept.141

Likewise, Russia has rehearsed scenarios for airlifting 

ground forces from the North to the Pacific in order 

to overcome the “tyranny of distance” that makes it 

very difficult for Russia to sustain forces in Northeast Asia. The revival of regular air patrols over the 

oceans have clearly involved the Pacific-based units 

of the Long Range Aviation forces as well as some of 

the air forces based in the North and Arctic who fly in 

the areas around Alaska.142 Indeed, nuclear exercises 

moving forces or targeting weapons from the North 

to the Pacific or vice versa have also occurred.143 To the 

degree that Arctic missions become part of the regular 

repertoire of the Russian armed forces, they will also 

to some degree spill over into the North Pacific.

Indeed, Russia’s heightened threat perception in 

Asia resembles its perception of European threats. 

Just as in regard to the perceived threat of U.S. missile 

defenses in Europe, Putin proposed that Russia and 

America share operation of the Gabala and Krasnodar 

radar and missile defense bases, and by so doing cre-
337

ate a real strategic partnership that would revolutionize world politics, so too in Asia, Moscow wants to 

participate in shaping strategic relationships there.144 

But at the same time, Moscow has warned that if its 

concerns are not heeded, it will go its own way. In 

Asia that means, at least in regard to missile defenses, 

enhanced cooperation with China. As Deputy Foreign 

Minister Aleksandr’ Losyukov said in 2007: 

We would like to see a non-circuited [i.e., non-exclusionary, or non-bloc] system. Besides, we might make 

our own contribution to it, too. Then we would have 

no reason to suspect this system is targeted against 

us,—If it is true that the system being created is expected to ward off some threats posed by irresponsible 

regimes, then it is not only Europe, the United States 

or Japan that one should have to keep in mind. When 

some other countries’ concerns are kept outside such 

a system, they may have the feeling threats against 

them are growing, too. Consequently, the systems to 

be created must accommodate the concerns of other 

countries concerned.145

Clearly the other countries to which he refers are 

Russia and China. Thus it is not surprising that Russia publicly criticized the U.S.-Japan collaboration on 

missile defenses and the linking of Australia to the 

U.S.-Japanese alliance about which it had previously 

been silent. Here Moscow has adopted China’s argument, for certainly the U.S. alliance system is not 

primarily targeted on Russia. Such arguing on behalf 

of mainly Chinese interests suggests that, as part of 

the Sino-Russian partnership, we are beginning to encounter the phenomenon that many Russian analysts 

warned about, specifically that Russia ends up following China’s line. But this may well be because Russia 

perceives that Washington will not grant it the admit-
338

tedly self-inflated status that it claims for itself either in 

Europe or in Asia. Interestingly enough, while China, 

according to most analysts, had been seen as desisting from challenging the U.S. missile defense program 

by a vigorous program of building nuclear weapons, 

Russia seems ready to do so even though the utility of 

that program for its overall interests, which normally 

focus on getting the West to include it as a major international actor, is decidedly moot.146

Russian opposition to an American missile defense 

system goes back a decade, and Russia argued against 

its appearance in Asia, using every available Asian 

security forum to voice its opposition at that time.147 

By 2005, it also was becoming apparent that the placement of such defenses in the Asia-Pacific as part of the 

U.S. alliance system was part of an effort to create a 

bloc to isolate Russia.148 And now, as it increasingly 

appears Russian hopes that a peaceful resolution of 

the North Korean nuclear problem would undermine 

Washington’s justification for Asian missile defenses 

will be dashed, it may have decided to go on the offensive in Asia just as it has in Europe.149

While Western and U.S. scholars and policy, seen 

from Moscow’s point of view, tend to marginalize 

Russia as an actor in Asia, Russia made up its mind 

to react.150 Russia perceives U.S. nuclear policy as part 

of an overarching strategy to isolate and threaten it, 

and therefore is responding accordingly, asymmetrically as promised. Thus its response includes: partnership, if not alliance, with China; pressure on Japan to 

desist from targeting Russia with its missile defenses, 

coupled with alternating offers of economic incentives 

for partnership in the region; and the nuclearization 

of the Pacific Fleet to ensure robust deterrence and a 

second-strike capability.
339

Neither are Russian military analysts or planners 

unaware of the possibility of Chinese military threats, 

even though they do not frequently discuss them. 

These threats are usually debated by people who are 

critical of the partnership with China or who profess 

to believe, as is apparently now the case, that they 

have at least 10 years before China can be a real threat 

and that China is currently not a real threat to Russia.151 Even so, at least some writers have pointed out 

that the rise in China’s capabilities could go beyond 

a conventional threat to Russian assets in Siberia and 

Russian Asia. 

For example, China’s “no first use” of nuclear 

weapons injunction in Chinese military doctrine is 

coming under pressure from younger officers there.152

Thus China is now debating retention of its no first 

use posture regarding nuclear weapons, and such 

weapons appear to be playing a more prominent role 

in Chinese strategy than was hitherto believed to be 

the case. China is building a previously undisclosed 

nuclear submarine base in the Pacific and a major 

nuclear base in its interior, moves that suggest consideration of a second strike capability, but that can 

also put much pressure on Russia’s Pacific Fleet and 

Russian Asia.153 Indeed, China’s new DH-10 cruise 

missile represents a significant advance in China’s 

own TNW capability, as does the operationalization 

of several cruise missile brigades. Even if Taiwan is 

the focus of Chinese military planning, that planning 

still identifies Russia and the United States (as well as 

India) as potential enemies, thereby envisaging possible nuclear scenarios against them.154 If Vostok-2010 

is any guide, the simulated launching of TNW and of 

Tochka-U precision missile strikes against China suggests that the role of TNW in Asia will grow, not decrease.155
340

The following analysis from 2004 took into account 

both the limited nuclear capability China had at that 

time and the possibilities that could ensue based on 

the ongoing development of those forces:

Despite the significant qualitative makeup of the current Chinese nuclear missile potential, its combat capabilities are quite limited; it would hardly be adequate to 

destroy highly protected command and control posts 

and could not substantially degrade Russia’s ground 

and sea-based strategic nuclear forces. However, this 

potential would be capable of substantially degrading the Russian Federation Armed Forces group in 

the Far Eastern theater of Military Operations and of 

doing major damage to the population and economy 

not only in the Far Eastern and Urals regions, but even 

in the Central Region of European Russia. According 

to available data, so far China does not have missile 

systems with MIRVed warheads, but the upsurge in 

activity related to the building of antimissile defense 

systems could accelerate its development of that type 

of weapons system, including antimissile defense 

countermeasures. It should be noted that the PRC’s 

economic and technological potential is quite adequate 

for a quantitative and qualitative breakthrough in the 

area of its strategic offensive weapons development.156

Given the aforementioned discoveries of growing 

Chinese interest in and capabilities for using nuclear 

weapons that suggest consideration of a second strike 

capability, which can also put much pressure on Russia’s Pacific Fleet and Russian Asia, it is understandable why we see a rethinking of Russia’s nuclear strategy in Asia.157

Thus, Moscow is already increasingly ambivalent 

about the INF Treaty of 1987-88. While this part of a 

heightened ambivalence about most of the Gorbachevera’s arms control treaties are very much tied to the 
341

consequences of NATO enlargement, the apprehension about this treaty reflects Russian concerns about 

China’s (and Iran’s) missile buildup. As Russian officials from Putin on down have argued, other countries 

to Russia’s south and east are building such missiles, 

but America and Russia are debarred from doing so. 

In October 2007: 

Mr. Putin said that Russia would leave the INF treaty 

unless it was turned into a global agreement to constrain other states, including those ’located in our near 

vicinity.’ He did not identify any country but Iran 

and North Korea are within the range covered by the 

treaty. Dmitri Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, later acknowledged that China, India and Pakistan had medium-range missile capabilities. He insisted that Mr. 

Putin was concerned about an imbalance of regional 

security rather than any specific threat.158

But these remarks also demonstrates that Moscow cannot publicly reveal or confront its true threat 

perceptions and consequently blames Washington 

for its failure to take Russian interests into account. 

Thus, while Moscow had “privately told Washington 

it wanted medium range missiles to counter Iranian 

threats, it publicly argued that the lack of Iranian missiles meant the U.S. did not need a defense system.”159 

As part of this debate, General Vladimir Vasilenko 

raised the issue of Russian withdrawal from the treaty 

after Sergei Ivanov did so in 2005, though it is difficult 

to see what Russia would gain by a withdrawal from 

that treaty.160 Furthermore, it is by no means clear 

that Moscow could regenerate production for either 

IRBMs or ICBMs, because of production difficulties. 

Therefore, a withdrawal from the treaty could actually further diminish Russian security, not enhance it.161
342

Consequently,162 Vasilenko also stated that the nature 

and composition of any future U.S.-NATO missile 

defense would determine the nature and number of 

future Russian missile forces and systems. Therefore, 

he argued in 2005 that:

Russia should give priority to high-survivable mobile 

ground and naval missile systems when planning the 

development of the force in the near and far future. . . .

The quality of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia 

will have to be significantly improved in terms of adding to their capability of penetrating [missile defense] 

barriers and increasing the survivability of combat elements and enhancing the properties of surveillance 

and control systems.163 

Obviously such advocacy represents a transparent 

demand for new, vast, and unaffordable military programs, similar to the demand for reactivating production of IRBMs regardless of consequences. But in that 

case, Russia’s government and military are, as Nikolai 

Sokov suggested, postulating an inherent East-West 

enmity that is only partially and incompletely buttressed by mutual deterrence.164 Vasilenko’s recommended posture makes no sense in today’s strategic 

climate, especially when virtually every Russian military leader repeatedly proclaims, as did Chief of Staff 

General Yuri Baluyevsky through 2006, that no plan 

for war with NATO is under consideration and that 

the main threat to Russia is terrorism, not NATO and 

not America.165 But since then, as is apparent to everyone, NATO and America have become enemy number 

one. Nevertheless, at the same time, that posture also 

openly warns Beijing and Tehran of Russian suspicions concerning their ambitions and capabilities. 
343

Russia’s reaction to Asian military challenges comprises both conventional force reforms and nuclear 

strategies. Here we restrict ourselves to nuclear issues. The Pacific Fleet will be the main fleet and one 

of two nuclear fleets, suggesting that the main mission of the fleet is to provide a reliable second-strike 

deterrent. The mission of the non-nuclear vessels of 

the fleet is to protect the “boomers” (nuclear armed 

submarines) and prevent hostile forces from coming 

within range. In other words, Russia is following a 

deterrence strategy here just as they are in Europe. 

Meanwhile, Russia’s long-term rearmament program 

apparently envisions the renewal of the submarine 

fleet as nuclear propelled multirole submarines, in an 

effort to save money. Three missions for them will be 

anti-submarine warfare, anti-aircraft carrier missions 

(mainly against U.S. carrier battle groups), and attacking surface ships and transports. They will be armed 

with precision conventional weapons in an effort to be 

a strategic non-nuclear deterrence force.166

The drive to the Arctic also presupposes the use of 

both Pacific and Northern Fleets, in particular the latter which is also a nuclear armed fleet, as a swing fleet 

that can challenge enemies from the North Pacific, 

presumably from bases there. Just as that fleet has a 

bastion or bastions in the Kola Peninsula, so too does 

the Pacific Fleet have its major bases which the Northern Fleet or elements thereof may be tasked to help 

defend. Alternatively, the Northern Fleet and Russian 

air forces based in the high north will be used to sweep 

the North Pacific of enemy air and naval assets. Nonetheless and even though the Far East is very much a 

naval theater, Moscow’s main investments through 

2010 will evidently go not so much to the Navy as to 

nuclear weapons (to redress Russia’s conventional 
344

inferiority vis-à-vis U.S. and Chinese threats) and to 

air and air defense in order to forestall a Kosovo-like 

aerial campaign.167

At the conventional level, apart from ongoing 

reinforcement or resupply of the forces with what is 

hoped to be more advanced conventional weapons 

and improved training and quality of the manpower 

(a very dubious assumption given the inability and refusal to build a truly professional Army), reform also 

entails experiments in new force structures and rapid 

reaction forces. While conventional forces in the Far 

East will have no choice but to fight at the end of a 

precarious supply line in an austere theater, Moscow 

is trying to develop a functioning mechanism of rapid 

response and airlift (the idea of the swing fleet also 

plays here) from Russia’s North or interior to threatened sectors of the theater. This program of airlift and 

rapid air mobility also applies to nuclear forces.168

Second, Russia is building an integrated, mobile, 

and all arms (if not combined arms) force, consisting 

of land, air, and sea forces capable of dealing with 

failing state scenarios, insurgencies, terrorism, scenarios involving large-scale criminal activities, and 

ultimately conventional attack. Third, if, however, the 

scale of the threat overwhelms or is too large for the 

conventional forces, doctrine evidently continues to 

point to the use of nuclear weapons (probably tactical 

or what Moscow calls non-strategic nuclear weapons 

[NSNW]) in a first-strike or possibly even preventive 

mode as stated by Baluyevsky on January 20, 2008:169

We do not intend to attack anyone, but we consider 

it necessary for all our partners in the world community to clearly understand . . . that to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and its allies, 

military forces will be used, including preventively, 

including with the use of nuclear weapons.170
345

Russian commentators noted that he was speaking 

entirely within the parameters of established Russian 

doctrine and that he essentially conceded the failure 

of conventional forces to provide adequate defense 

and deterrence at the high end of the spectrum of conflict.171 Beyond that, Baluyevsky invoked the use of nuclear weapons in a first or preventive strike to defend 

allies. While he probably meant largely the CIS states 

to which Moscow has extended an unsolicited nuclear 

umbrella, in the context of Russia’s Asia-Pacific territories, his remarks bring us to the political dimensions 

of Russia’s efforts to overcome the strategic challenges 

it faces there. Here again, we see the inclination to 

threaten limited nuclear war as part of the deterrence 

strategy.

China’s rise presents Russia with difficult choices, 

especially given its nuclear naval deficiencies. Russia 

must take account of the growing internal pressure in 

China to abandon its no first use policy and China’s 

increased nuclear and apparent second-strike capability, even as it must reduce its nuclear forces.172 This 

downward pressure on the Far East’s regional arsenal 

was already apparent in 2004-05, and if Baluyevsky’s 

remarks are to be taken seriously, it is likely that the 

Northern Fleet’s nuclear forces and Russia’s NSNW 

will become more important for consideration of deterrence or first strike in the Asian as well as European 

theater. As of 2004:

Currently, about 20% of the deployed Russian strategic nuclear forces remain in the Eastern part of Russia. As strategic forces shrink, the pace of reductions 

in the region is the fastest. In particular, three of the 

four divisions of the Russian Strategic Forces that have 

been disbanded since 2000 were located here. And the 
346

reductions will continue. Most likely, the SS-18 base 

at Uzhur will be closed down after 2010. The future 

of the SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs) is also uncertain, as they are getting older. 

The submarine base on the Kamchatka peninsula will 

likely no longer host strategic submarines once the last 

Delta-III nuclear submarines will be retired. Thus, perhaps, the only place where strategic forces will remain 

in this part of Russia is Ukrainka, the home of strategic 

bombers. As deployment of strategic nuclear forces in 

the Eastern part of Russia is curtailed, non-strategic 

nuclear weapons in the region may be assigned a 

stronger role. According to the author’s assessment, 

nearly one third of the 3,300 Russian non-strategic 

weapons are assigned for deployment with generalpurpose forces in the Siberian and Far Eastern military 

districts. All of these weapons are currently kept at 

central storage facilities of the 12th Directorate of the 

Russian Armed Forces. In case of hostilities they can 

be deployed with surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, 

air-to-surface, anti-ship, antisubmarine missiles, and 

other dual-use means of the Ground, Air, and Naval 

Forces.173

However, if nuclear missions grow in importance, 

that will inhibit any possible North Korean disposition to give up its existing nuclear weapons, not to 

mention foregoing new nuclear weapons. Similarly, 

Japan and South Korea will either be further tempted 

to go nuclear or cling ever more to Washington, who 

would likely increase its regional military presence 

under such conditions.174 Therefore, a purely military 

and very considerable nuclear strategy leads Russia 

into a strategic dead end. A political strategy is essential and even paramount in Russia’s endeavors to 

defuse potential security challenges.
347

CONCLUSIONS

Nuclear weapons issues deserve the most serious, rigorous, and sober thought based on evidence 

from the actions of governments other than the United 

States. The foregoing analysis shows that much U.S. 

writing about the inutility or “senselessness” of nuclear weapons is misplaced, unfounded, and based 

on a failure to take into account the evidence of other 

governments’ thinking and policies. Russia is by no 

means the only government whose programs must be 

seriously considered. Those who argue that nuclear 

weapons are only good for deterring nuclear attacks 

might profit by more serious study of Russia, Pakistan, China, and Israel, to cite only a few examples. 

They might also remember that in 1987 Iraq launched 

chemical missiles against Iran in defiance of international agreements, and that Iran, not irrationally drew 

the appropriate conclusions from those attacks.

If we are to make progress towards the noble goal 

of abolition and enhanced global security, a more rigorous understanding of contemporary international 

relations, strategy, and politics is needed, not more 

moralism or wishful thinking. It is clear that, for many 

states, nuclear weapons serve many useful purposes 

apart from gaining big power status or retaining it. 

We cannot make progress here until we realize that, 

for whatever reason, other nations genuinely feel 

threatened, and not just psychologically deprived. 

A sober unsentimental analysis would confirm that 

point rather than stigmatizing these states as being 

somehow benighted, as in Paul Warnke’s memorable 

phrase, as “apes on a treadmill.” Apart from the policy 

significance of Russia for the United States, Russia’s 

strategic posture needs to be understood and not just 

brushed aside. 
348

If Russian leaders are to decrease their reliance on 

nuclear security, they must feel that their security is 

some manner enhanced, a conclusion that is not readily apparent to them at the present. If we are to convince the Russians of the rightness of reducing their 

reliance on nuclear weapons, like it or not, we must 

understand their perspective and take it seriously. 

Otherwise, as has all too often been the case, we will 

continue to talk at or past each other. Russia demands 

that it be taken seriously. While doing so might not 

and probably should not lead to our approval of their 

policies or thinking, taking Russian nuclear postures 

seriously means engaging with their strategy and policies, not dismissing them outright or worse, deprecating our own capabilities on the basis of a hoped-for 

end that is not grounded in empirical validation. Until 

such time as we or others can persuade other states 

that they do not need nuclear weapons to defend 

themselves against us or anyone else, the mere repetition of the incantation that nuclear weapons serve no 

useful purpose in utter defiance of the facts is merely 

an invitation to a disaster.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Stephen J. Cimbala, “Nuclear Arms control After a Time 

of Troubles” Mark Galeotti, ed., The Politics of Security in Modern 

Russia, Farnham, Surrey, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing 

Company, 2009, pp. 105-122.

2. Stephen Blank, “Undeterred: The Return of Nuclear War,” 

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, Summer/Fall, 

2000, pp. 55-63.

3. Simon Saradzhyan, Russia’s Support For Zero: Tactical Move 

or Long-term Commitment? Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center, Harvard University, 2009, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/

files/russias-support-for-zero.pdf. 
349

4. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 5, 2010, 

www.kremlin.ru, Open Source Center, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia (Henceforth FBIS SOV), February 9, 

2010.

5. Ilya Kedrov, “An Expert Evaluation: A Universal Armored 

Vehicle; The Infantry Needs a Fundamentally New Combat Vehicle and Not a Taxi to the Forward Edge of the Battle Area,” 

Moscow, Russia, Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer Online, in Russian, 

May 26, 2010, FBIS SOV, June 4, 2010.

6. Artem Troitsky, “Interview With CINC Ground Troops 

General of the Army Vladimir Anatolyevich Boldyrev,” Moscow, Russia, Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kuryer, in Russian, October 

1, 2008, FBIS SOV, October 19, 2008.

7. Kedrov.

8. For an example of this nostalgia for Stalin’s leadership 

structure of 1941-45, see Colonel V. V. Natvichuk and Colonel A. 

L. Khryapin (Ret.), “A Strategic Deterrence System Under New 

Conditions,” Military Thought, No. 1, 2010, pp. 43-49.

9. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 

10. Interview With Russian Federation Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Moscow, Russia, Izvestiya, in Russian, 

October, 14, 2009, FBIS SOV, October 14, 2009; David Novak, “Report: Russia To Allow Pre-Emptive Nukes,” Associated Press, October 14, 2009.

11. Kedrov.

12. “Putin Says Russia will build weapons to offset planned 

US missile defences,” December 29, 2009, available from www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/29/nuclear-weapons-russia.

13. Speech at an Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, March 5, 2010, available from eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2010/03/05/2058_type82913_224669.html.
350

14. “Failure to build a professional army, return to conscription,” Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, May 26, 2010.

15. Ibid.

16. “Share of Modern Weaponry in Russian Military Must 

Be 30% by 2015-Medvedev,” RIA Novosti, May 24, available from 

2010,en.rian.ru/military_news/20100524/159135253.html.

17. Maria Antonova, “Kudrin Signals Steep Spending Cuts,” 

The Moscow Times, April 7, 2010. 

18. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Struggles to Modernize Its 

Military,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 10, 2010.

19. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, June 3, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, June 4, 2010 CEP20100607964184. 

20. Ibid.; Moscow, Russia, Inteerfax, in English, June 2010, FBIS 

SOV, CEP 20100607964287. 

21. Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Then Most Modernized,” Moscow, Russia, Vedomosti Online, in Russian, August 9, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, August 19, 2010.

22. Richard Weitz, “Strategic Posture Review: Russia Resurgent,” World Politics Review, January-February 2009, pp. 58-59.

23. Martin Sieff, “Russia Reveals New 10-year Arms Plan to 

Upgrade Armed Forces,” UPI, January 20, 2009, available from 

www.upi.com.

24. Dmitry Litovkin, “The Army Will Become a Trillionaire,” 

Moscow, Russia, Izvestiya, in Russian, January 20, 2009, FBIS SOV, 

January 20, 2009.

25. Sieff.

26. Stephen Blank, “The Political Economy of the Russian 

Defense Sector,” Jan Leijhonhielm and Frederik Westerlund, 

eds., Russian Power Structures: Present and Future Roles in Russian 

Politics, Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 
351

2008, pp. 97-128; Stanislav Secrieriu, “Illusion of Power: Russia 

After the South Caucasus Battle,” CEPS Working Document, No. 

311, February, 2009, p. 5, available from www.ceps.be (CEPS stands 

for Center for European Policy Studies); Alexander Chuykov, 

“Bulava and Dolgoruky Unveiling,” Moscow, Russia, Argumenty 

I Fakty, in Russian, June 18, 2009, FBIS SOV, June 18, 2009.

27. Alexander Chuykov, “Bulava and Dolgoruky (Unveiling),” Moscow, Russia, Argumenty Nedeli Online, in Russian, June 

18, 2009, FBIS SOV, June 18, 2009; Alexander Chuykov, “The Crisis Has Caught Up with the Military Bases,” Moscow, Russia, Argumenty Nedeli Online, in Russian, June 25, 2009, FBIS SOV, June 

15, 2009; Moscow, Russia, Prime-TASS Online, in Russian, June 29, 

2009, FBIS SOV, June 29, 2009.

28. Roger McDermott, “Russia Flexes Its Military Muscle,” 

January 4, 2009, available from www.guardian.co.uk.

29. Catherine Belton, “Russian Economy Plummets 10.1%,”

Financial Times, July 15, 2009, available from www.ft.com.

30. Roger McDermott, “Russia’s National Security Strategy,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 19, 2009.

31. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Will Spend 20 Trillion Rubles 

on New Weapons,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 22, 2010.

32. Ibid.

33. Moscow, Russia, Interfax in Russian, July 28, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, July 28, 2010.

34. Felgenhauer, “Russia Will Spend 20 Trillion Rubles on 

New Weapons.”

35. Ibid.

36. “Russia in Counter-Trend: Defense Spending Will Increase 

by 60% in 2013,” available from www.avionews.clom; “Russian Defense Spending To Rise By 60% by 2013,” RIA Novosti, July 30, 2010, 

available from en.rian.ru/military_news/201000730/16000003543.

html.
352

37. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN Online, in Russian, August 

5, 2010, FBIS SOV, August 5, 2010.

38. Vladimir Kalinin, “Realities,” Moscow, Russia, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, in Russian, August 6, 2010, FBIS SOV, 

August 6, 2010.

39. Remarks by Stephen Blank, Eugene Rumer, Mikhail Tsypkin , and Alexander Golts at the Heritage Foundation Program, 

“The Russian Military: Modernization and the Future,” April 8, 

2008, available from www.heritage.org/press/events/ev040808a.cfm;

Stephen Blank, “Civil-Military Relations and Russian Security,” 

Stephen Blank, ed., Contemporary Issues in International Security, 

Russian, European, and American Views, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Forthcoming.

40. Julian Cooper, “The ‘Security Economy’,” Mark Galeotti, 

ed., The Politics of Security in Modern Russia, Farnham, Surrey and 

Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009, pp. 145-169.

41. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. “Russia Could Focus On Tactical Nuclear Weapons For 

Subs,” RIA Novosti, March 23, 2009, available from en.rian.ru/russia/20090323/120688454.html.

45. Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, do 2020 Goda, 

Moscow, Russia: Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 

12, 2009, available from www.scrf.gov.ru, in English, FBIS SOV, 

May 15, 2009; Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

46. Text of Speeches by President Dmitry Medvedev and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov at a Defense Ministry Collegium, Samara Volga Inform, in Russian, March 17, 2009, FBIS SOV, 

March 17, 2009.

47. Ibid.
353

48. Colin Gray, House of Cards, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991; Keith Payne, Deterrence In the Second Nuclear Age, 

Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996; Keith Payne, 

Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction, Lexington, KY: 

University Press of Kentucky, 2001; Alexei Arbatov and General 

(Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming 

the U.S.-Russian Equation, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, 2006, John F. Steinbruner, Foreword.

49. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 26-32.

50. Ibid., p. 66.

51. Moscow, Russia, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey Internet 

Version, in Russian, September 10, 2008, FBIS SOV, September 10, 

2008.

52. Ibid.

53. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, April 6, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, April 6, 2010.

54. Ibid.

55. “Russia Could Focus On Tactical Nuclear Weapons For 

Subs,” RIA Novosti, March 23, 2009, available from en.rian.ru/russia/20090323/120688454.html.

56. “Bildt Plays Down Russian Nuclear Threat,” The Local, 

August 18, 2008,” available from www.thelocal.se/13780/20080818; 

Mark Franchetti, “Russia’s New Nuclear Challenge to Europe,” 

Times Online, August 17, 2008, available from www.timesonline.

co.uk/tol/news/worldeurope/article4547883.ece.

57. “Russian Military Chief Defends Nonstrategic Nukes,” 

Global Security Newswire, December 17, 2008, available from gsn.

nti.org.

58. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 
354

59. Open Source Committee, OSC Analysis, August 1, 2008, 

FBIS SOV, August 4, 2008.

60. Martin Sieff, “Russians Bet On Dems’ Passion For Arms 

Control,” December 19, 2008, available from www.upi.com; “US 

Sen Lugar Hopeful On Renewing Russia Nuclear Arms Treaty,” 

Agence France-Presse, December 19, 2008, give the two conflicting 

impressions as to whether or not Russia is tying those missile defenses to achievement of a strategic nuclear missile treaty.

61. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS in English, September 11, 

2008, FBIS SOV, September 11, 2008.

62. Pavel Podvig, “Revolution in Military Affairs: Challenges 

to Russia’s Security,” Paper Presented at the VTT Energy Styx 

Seminar, Helsinki, Finland, September 4, 2001, available from 

www.armsocntol.ru/Podvig/eng/publications/misc/20010904styx.shtm.

63. Moscow, Russia, Zvezda Television, in Russian, September 

11, 2008, FBIS SOV, September 11, 2008.

64. “Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 

Warsaw, Poland, Gazeta Wyborcza, September 11, 2008; and Moscow, Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Internet Version, in English, 

September 15, 2008, FBIS SOV, September 15, 2008.

65. Ibid.

66. Dmitri Solovyov, “Russia Says It Must Have Nuclear Parity With U.S.,” Reuters, December 7, 2007; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, October 1, 2004, FBIS SOV, October 1, 2004.

67. Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions 

by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at Press Conference 

in Relation to the Upcoming Signing of a Treaty between Russia 

and the USA on Measures to Further Reduction and Limitation of 

Strategic Offensive Arms, Moscow, Russia, April 6, 2010, available from www.mid.ru.

68. Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick 

J. O’Reilly, USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the 

House Armed Services Committee Regarding Missile Defense in 

Europe, October 1, 2009.
355

69. Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions 

by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at Press Conference 

in Relation to the Upcoming Signing of a Treaty between Russia 

and the USA on Measures to Further Reduction and Limitation of 

Strategic Offensive Arms, Moscow, Russia, April 6, 2010, available from www.mid.ru; Moscow, Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

of the Russian Federation, in English, May 24, 2010, FBIS SOV, May 

24, 2010.

70. Moscow, Russia, Interfax , in English, March 16, 2010, FBIS 

SOV March 16, 2010.

71. William J. Perry and George P. Shultz, “How to Build on 

the Start Treaty,” New York Times, April 11, 2010, available from

www.nytimes.com.

72. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, April 6, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, April 6, 2010.

73. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

74. ”US Does Its Best to Accelerate Drafting of New STARTState Department Aide,”Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS in English, 

November 14, 2009, FBIS SOV November 14, 2009.

75. “Russia Says Arms Control Talks Held Up By US Missile 

Shield Plan,” Global Security Newswire, available from www.nti.org, 

February 22, 2010; Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, February 

9, 2010, FBIS SOV, February 9, 2010.

76. “Putin Says Russia will build weapons to offset planned 

US missile defences.”

77. Viktor Litovkin, “Strategic Reservations in Geneva, Moscow, and Washington Seek Compromise on START, But on Their 

Own Terms,” Moscow, Russia, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, in Russian, January 22, 22010, FBIS SOV, February 10, 2010; 

Ellen Barry, “Putin Sounds Warning on Arms Talks,” New York 

Times, December 30, 2009, available from www.nytimes.com; Moscow, Russia, Ekho Moskvy Agency, in Russian, December 29, 2009, 

FBIS SOV, December 29, 2009.
356

78. Open Source Center, “Russians Remain Publicly Optimistic On New START Treaty,” January 7, 2010, FBIS SOV, January 7, 

2010; Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov Interview 

to the Interfax News Agency,” Moscow, Russia, available from 

www.mid.ru (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), 

in English, February 25, 2010, FBIS SOV, February 25, 2010; Andrey Lavrov, “START I Falters Over Missile Defense,” Moscow, 

Russia, Novaya Politika, in Russian, February 27, 2010, FBIS SOV, 

March 2, 2010.

79. Yaroslav Vyatkin, “Armed Forces Fight for the Title of 

World Champion in the Nuclear Heavyweight Class,” Moscow, 

Russia, Argument I Nedeli Online, in Russian, March 11, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, March 11, 2010.

80. Josh Rogin, “Stage Set for New Fight Over START Treaty,” 

The Cable, February 17, 2010, available from thecable.foreignpolicy.

com/posts/2010/01/17/stage_set+for+new_fight_over_missile_defense.

81. Ibid.

82. “Missile Shield Should Completely Cover Europe by 2018, 

U.S. Says,” Global Security Newswire, available from www.nti.org, 

April 16, 2010.

83. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, March 22, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, March 22, 2010.

84. Andrei Uglanov, “What is Behind Washington’s Ultimatum?” Moscow, Russia, Argument Nedeli, in Russian March 10-17, 

2010, Johnson’s Russia List, March 17, 2010.

85. Ibid.

86. “Moscow Pulls the Brake At START Talks,” Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, March 11, 2010, in English, FBIS SOV, March 11, 

2010; Peter Baker, “Twists and Turns On Way to Arms Pact With 

Russia,” New York Times, March 27, 2010, available from www.

nytimes.com; Mary Beth Sheridan and Michael D. Shear, “U.S., 

Russia Agree To Nuclear Arms Control Treaty,” Washington Post, 

March 27, 2010, p. A02.
357

87. “Interview with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 21-28, 2007, available from www.mid.ru.

88. Alexai Arbatov, Russia and the United States—Time To End 

the Strategic Deadlock, Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Moscow Center, 

June 2008, p. 2.

89. Ryabkov, Interview, FBIS SOV, February 25, 2010.

90. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, February 6, 2010, 

FBIS SOV, February 6, 2010.

91. “Putin Says Russia will build weapons to offset planned 

US missile defences.” 

92. Dimitry Rogozhin and Boris Gromov, Open Letter, New 

York Times, March 17, 2010. The Russians fear that the Sm-3 can 

shoot down the IRBMs.

93. Martin Nesirsky, “Russia Says Threshold Lower for Nuclear Weapons,” Reuters, December 17, 1999. 

94. Troitsky.

95. Moscow, Russia, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey Internet 

Version, in English, September 29, 2008, FBIS SOV, September 29, 

2008.

96. “Russian Military Chief Defends Nonstrategic Nukes,” 

Global Security Newswire, December 17, 2008, available from gsn.

nti.org.

97. Roger McDermott, “Reflections on Vostok 2010: Selling 

an Image,” World Security Network, July 20, 2010, available from 

www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=183

55&topicID=54.

98. Moscow, Russia, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey Internet 

Version, in English, September 29, 2008, FBIS SOV, September 29, 

2008.; “Russia Orders 70 Nuclear Missiles by 2011; Report,” defensenews.com from Agence-France Presse December 22, 2008.
358

99. “Russia To Allocate $35.3 Billion For Arms Production in 

2009-11,” RIA Novosti, December 12, 2008; “Russian Military Confirms 13 Strategic Missile Launches for 2009,” RIA Novosti, December 12, 2008.

100. Interview With Russian Federation Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Moscow, Russia, Izvestiya, in Russian, 

October, 14, 2009, FBIS SOV, October 14, 2009; David Novak, “Report: Russia To Allow Pre-Emptive Nukes,” Associated Press, October 14, 2009.

101. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in Russian, December 16, 2009, 

FBIS SOV, December 16, 2009.

102. See Russia’s last doctrine of 2000, Moscow, Russia, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye in Russian, January 14, 2000, FBIS 

SOV, January 14, 2000.

103. FBIS SOV, December 16, 2009.

104. “Russia Could Focus On Tactical Nuclear Weapons For 

Subs,” RIA Novosti, March 23, 2009, available from en.rian.ru/russia/20090323/120688454.html.

105. Ibid.

106. “Bildt Plays Down Russian Nuclear Threat,” The Local, 

August 18, 2008,” available from www.thelocal.se/13780/20080818; 

Mark Franchetti, “Russia’s New Nuclear Challenge to Europe,” 

Times Online, August 17, 2008, available from www.timesonline.

co.uk/tol/news/worldeurope/article4547883.ece.

107. “Russia’s Newest Submarine-Launched Missile Fails 

in Tests, But Tests of Other Systems Succeed: Defense Minister 

Ivanov Raises Questions on Status of Russian Sea-Based Tactical 

Nuclear Weapons,” WMD Insights, November 2006.

108. “Bildt Plays Down Russian Nuclear Threat”; Franchetti.

109. Kedrov.
359

110. “Russia RVSN Military Academy Discussing Strategic Deterrence,” ITAR-TASS, September 22, 2008, Johnson’s Russia List, No. 173, September 22, 2008, available from 

ww.worldsecurityinstitute.org.

111. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, December 17, 2009. 

112. Vipin Narang, “Posturing For Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear 

Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security, Vol. 

XXXIV, No. 3, Winter 2009/10, p. 41.

113. Ibid., p. 44.

114. Moscow, Russia, Ekho Moskvy Radio in Russian, December 15, 2009, FBIS SOV, December 15, 2009; Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, do 2020 Goda, Moscow, Russia, Security 

Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009, available from 

www.scrf.gov.ru, in English, FBIS SOV, May 15, 2009, in a translation from the Security Council website available from www.scrf.

gov.ru.

115. FBIS SOV, December 15, 2009.

116. Stephen Blank,”Russia’s Strategic Dilemmas in Asia,” Pacific Focus, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, December, 2008, pp. 271-293.

117. Matthew Day, “Russia ‘Simulates’ Nuclear Attack On 

Poland,” November 2, 2009, available from www.telgraph.co.uk.

118. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN in English, October 12, 

2009, FBIS SOV, October 12, 2009

119. Viktor Myasnikov, Vladimir Ivanov, and Anton Khodasevich, “Lukashenka Presses Nuclear Button,” Moscow, Russia, 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, June 26, 2006, FBIS SOV, June 26, 

2006.

120. Dmitri Litovkin, “Defense Minister: Any Large-Scale Maneuvers Are a Show of Strength as Well as a Training Exercise,” 

Moscow, Russia, Izvestiya, in Russian, November 2, 2005, FBIS 

SOV, November 2, 2005.
360

121. Jussi Kontinen, “Russia Plans to Deploy Some of its New 

Missiles Next to Finland,” Helsinki, HS.6, in Finnish, March 29, 

2010, FBIS SOV, March 29, 2010.

122. “Russia Says May Yet Deploy Iskander Missiles in Baltic 

Exclave,” RIA Novosti, February 19, 2010.

123. Baker; Barry.

124. Speech at an Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, March 5, 2010, available from eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2010/03/05/2058_type82913_224669.html.

125. “Russian Leaders Seen in “Lockstep” During the START 

Talks,” Global Security Newswire, April 1, 2010, available from 

www.nti.org.

126. Stephen Blank,” Presidential Succession: The Achilles 

Heel of Russian Politics,” Perspectives, Forthcoming.

127. Phillip P. Pan, “Critics Uneasy About Russian Concessions in Arms Control Deal,” Washington Post, April 8, 2010, p. 

A08.

128. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 

129. Interview With Russian Federation Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Moscow, Russia, Izvestiya, in Russian; 

Novak. 

130 . Stephen Blank, “Threats to and From Russia: An Assessment,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Forthcoming.

131. David McDonough, “The US Nuclear Shift to the Pacific,” RUSI Journal, April, 2006, p. 68.

132. Vladimir Dvorkin, The Russian Debate on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Vehicles, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 

Harvard University, No. 4, 2004, p. 9.
361

133. Jonathan Pollack, “U.S. Strategies in Asia: A Revisionist 

Hegemon,” Byung-Kook Kim and Anthony Jones, eds., Power and 

Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies, Boulder, CO: Lynne 

Rienner Publishers, 2007, pp. 86-87.

134. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, October 24, 2007, 

FBIS SOV, October 24, 2007.

135. Beijing, China, Xinhua, in English, September 8, 2007, 

FBIS SOV, September 8, 2007.

136. Moscow, Russia, Interfax, in English, September 15, 2003, 

FBIS SOV, September 15, 2003.

137. “Russia ‘No Longer Uses’ Nuclear Sub Deterrent, “United Press International, April 29, 2008.

138. Tokyo, Japan, Tokyo Shimbun Morning Edition, in Japanese, May 10, 2010, FBIS SOV, May 10, 2010.

139. Open source Center, OSC Report, in English, FBIS SOV, 

September 7, 2007.

140. Kristian Atland, “The Introduction, Adoption, and Implementation of Russia’s “Northern Strategic Bastion” Concept, 

1992-1999,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. X, No. 4, 2007, 

pp. 499-528; “Russia and Norway’s Arctic Challenge,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, May 20, 2008.

141. Dmitri Litovkin, “We Didn’t Send Him For a Star: A Skif 

Flew From the North Pole to Kanin Nos,” Moscow, Russia, Izvestiya Moscow Edition in Russian, September 13, 2006, FBIS SOV, 

September 13, 2006.

142. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, May 5, 2008, 

FBIS SOV, May 5, 2008; Yuri Gavrilov, “Long-Range Aviation 

Inhabits Arctic Skies,” Moscow, Russia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in 

Russian, May 15, 2008, FBIS SOV, May 15, 2008; Moscow, Russia, IRAR-TASS, in English, March 20, 2008, FBIS SOV, March 20, 

2008.
362

143. Litovkin, “We Didn’t Send Him For a Star: A Skif From 

the North Pole to Kanin Nos”; Moscow, Russia, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, April 9, 2008.

144. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, July 4, 2007, 

FBIS SOV, July 4, 2007; Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, 

July 2, 2007, FBIS SOV, July 2, 2007; Moscow, Russia, Agentstvo 

Voyennykh Novostey, July 4, 2007, FBIS SOV, July 4, 2007.

145. Moscow, Russia, ITAR-TASS, in English, October 23, 

2007, FBIS SOV, October 23, 2007.

146. Minxin Pei, “China’s Hedged Acquiescence,” ByungKook Kim and Anthony Jones, Eds., Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, 2007, p. 115. 

147. Esook Yoon and Dong Hyung Lee, “A View From Asia, 

Vladimir Putin’s Korean Opportunity: Russian Interests in the 

North Korean Nuclear Crises,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. XXIV, 

No. 3, 2005, p. 188.

148. Alexander Ignatov, “Russia in the Asia-Pacific, “ Rouben 

Azizian, ed., Russia and America in the Asia-Pacific, Honolulu, HI: 

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2007, pp. 9-11.

149. Yoon and Lee, p. 194.

150. Glenn C. Buchan, David Matonic, Calvin Shipbaugh, and 

Richard Mesic, Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for 

U.S. Strategy, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2000, p. 15; 

Joseph Ferguson, “U.S.-Russia Relations: Awaiting the G-8,” Comparative Connections, June 2006.

151. Open Source Committee, OSC Analysis: “Russia: Foreign 

Policy Thinkers Undaunted by Rising China,” FBIS SOV, September 6, 2007.

152. Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, 

Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007; 

Richard Spencer, “China To Modernize Nuclear Weapons Capability,” London Daily Telegraph, May 9, 2008; Baohui Zhang, “The 
363

Taiwan Strait and the Future of China’s No-First-Use Nuclear 

Policy,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, March-April, 

2008, pp. 164-183.

153. Wortzel; Spencer; Zhang; “Extensive Missile Site in China Revealed by Satellite: Analyst,” Space War, May 15, 2008; “Extensive Nuclear Missile Deployment Are a Discovered in Central 

Asia,” posted by Hans Kristensen, May 15, 2008, available from 

www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2208//05/extensive-nuclear-deployment-areadiscovered-in-central-china.

154. “Power Posturing—China’s Tactical Nuclear Stance 

Comes of Age,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 12, 2010, available from www4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey.

155. Moscow, Russia, infox.ru, in Russian, July 8, 2010, FBIS 

SOV, August 23, 2010; Private conversation with Roger McDermott, August 9, 2010.

156. Aleksandr’ Menshikov, “Problems of Russian Antimissile Defense: What It Can and Should Protect Against, And What 

It Should Not,” Moscow, Russia, Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona, in Russian, August 15, 2004, FBIS SOV, August 15, 2004.

157. Wortzel; Spencer; Zhang.

158. Tony Halpin, “Putin Confronts US With Threat To Arms 

Pact,” Times Online, October 13, 2007, available from www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2648440.ece.

159. Demetri Sevastopulo, Neil Buckley, Daniel Dombey, and 

Jan Cienski,” Russia Threatens To Quit Arms Treaty,” Financial 

Times, February 15, 2007, available from www.ft.com.

160.Martin Sieff, “Russia Rattles Missile Treaty,” UPI, March 

2, 2006.

161. “The ISCIP Analyst,” Vol. XIII, No. 9, March 8, 2007, Boston, MA: Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, 

Boston University, available from www.bu.edu/iscip.

162. “Press Conference with Political Analyst Alexei Arbatov 

and Vice President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems Leo-
364

nid Ivashov on Russian Foreign Policy,” RIA Novosti, February 6, 

2007, available from www.fednews.ru; Alexei Arbatov, “An Unnecessary and Dangerous Step,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 

No. 7, March, 2007, available from www.america-russia.net/eng/security/143683092.

163. Interfax, February 27, 2006.

164. Nikolai Sokov, “Second Thoughts About a First Strike,” 

Nonproliferation Review, Vol. XIV, No. 1, March, 2007, p. 141.

165. Keith C. Smith, Russian Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland, and the Ukraine: A New Stealth Imperialism? Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004, p. 13.

166. Moscow, Russia, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey Internet 

Version, March 21, 2005, FBIS SOV, March 21, 2005.

167. FBIS SOV, November 17, 2006.

168. Litovkin, “We Didn’t Send Him For a Star: A Skif Flew 

From the North Pole to Kanin Nos.” 

169. Steve Gutterman, “Russia Could Use Preemptive Nuclear Strikes,” Associated Press, January 21, 2008.

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid.

172. Wortzel; Spencer; Zhang, pp. 164-183.

173. Eugene Myasnikov, “Russian Perceptions and Prospects 

for Nuclear Weapons Reductions in Northeast Asia,” Inesap Bulletin, No. 24, 2004, available from www.inesap.org/bulletin24/art05.

htm.

174. James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The 

North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy and New Perspectives from Russia, New York, NY: Routledge, 2000.
365

CHAPTER 8

RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

CURRENT POLICIES AND FUTURE TRENDS

Richard Weitz

From Moscow’s perspective, nuclear weapons, 

including tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), serve a 

variety of valuable and often unique security functions that Russian policymakers will not soon surrender. First, they deter other countries from launching 

a nuclear strike against Russia. Second, having such 

an enormous nuclear arsenal bolsters Moscow’s international status. Third, Russia’s nuclear weapons help 

compensate for weaknesses in Russian conventional 

forces in two ways—for deterrent purposes (by denying adversaries the presumption that they can guarantee that any conflict with Russia will remain conventional) and, under certain conditions, for actual 

battlefield operations, by destroying important targets 

more effectively than conventional weapons. 

Fourth, Russian nuclear weapons can achieve both 

results at a lower financial cost than Moscow would 

incur by acquiring and sustaining a conventional force 

equivalent in strength to that of the United States (if 

this were even possible, notwithstanding the major 

weaknesses in Russia’s military-industrial base). Fifth, 

Russia’s response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) expanding ballistic missile defense 

program has been to strengthen its offensive nuclear 

forces so as to overwhelm any defense system. Russia’s large number of TNWs would almost guarantee 

that at least some nuclear strikes, especially against 

frontline forces, would evade enemy defenses. 
366

Sixth, Russian policymakers can issue nuclear 

threats to try to influence the foreign and defense 

policies of other countries. In recent years, Russian 

political and military leaders have sought to discourage former Soviet bloc states from joining NATO or 

hosting U.S. ballistic missile systems on their territory by warning that such actions would make them 

legitimate targets for Russian nuclear strikes. Finally, 

TNWs represent one of the few defense dimensions 

in which Moscow has a clear advantage over NATO 

militaries. This superiority enhances Russia’s bargaining position in certain arms control negotiations. 

Given the many benefits that the Russian Government 

derives specifically from its TNWs, Russian officials 

would likely require major NATO concessions to relinquish, reduce, or otherwise restrict them. 

FORCES

There is no agreed definition of what constitutes a 

“tactical nuclear weapon.” Terms such as “nonstrategic,” “substrategic,” “short-range,” “battlefield,” and 

“theater” nuclear weapons are also used. The yield 

of the weapon’s explosive power may no longer be a 

good indicator, now that many countries are developing low-yield nuclear weapons. Range is therefore 

more often used as a classifying category, but many 

nuclear warheads can simply be moved from a shortrange launcher to a longer-range one. Yet, relying on 

nonphysical properties—such as the weapon’s intended use—is difficult when some countries, such as 

Russia, intend to use TNW for both tactical battlefield 

purposes and strategic ones. Fundamentally, these 

systems are those nuclear weapons not deployed on 

“strategic” nuclear delivery vehicles such as land-
367

based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 

long-range heavy bombers. 

All three systems are capable of attacking targets 

at great distances (at least 5,500 kilometers [km], 

and often twice as far). The 1987 Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty prohibits Russia and the 

United States from developing, manufacturing, or 

deploying ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 km. The two countries 

still retain many nuclear weapons with ranges under 

500 km. These shorter-range tactical systems can be 

launched by short-range missiles, dropped from the 

air as gravity bombs, loaded onto torpedoes or other 

tactical naval weapons, or otherwise delivered by 

nonstrategic systems (though neither country appears 

to have the fabled “nuclear” hand grenade). Another 

possible criterion for identifying a tactical nuclear 

weapon, its small yield, offers a less helpful indicator 

since the constantly improving accuracy of strategic 

delivery vehicles has meant that their warheads can 

also have low yields but still destroy their distant targets.

No bilateral treaty limits the number of short-range 

nuclear weapons in the American and Russian arsenals. The most important measure constraining these 

weapons occurred in 1991. That fall, U.S. President 

George H. W. Bush became alarmed that the ongoing 

disintegration of the Soviet Union, which had been accelerated by the failed August 1991 coup by communist hardliners, was endangering Moscow’s control 

over thousands of Soviet nuclear warheads. Therefore, in late September, Bush announced major reductions in the number of deployed American TNWs, 

including the elimination of all U.S. ground-launched 

systems and the removal of all nuclear weapons from 
368

U.S. surface ships and attack submarines, and invited 

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to reciprocate. 

Gorbachev made a similar announcement on October 

5, pledging to eliminate many TNWs and transfer others from deployment with operational units to central 

storage facilities. The following January, Boris Yeltsin, 

President of the new Russian Federation, committed 

his government to implement Gorbachev’s original 

offer, as well as some other reductions that Yeltsin 

subsequently added.1

Although these 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) consisted only of parallel and reciprocal measures, they have eliminated more nuclear 

weapons than any arms control treaty. Under their 

terms, Russia and the United States have destroyed 

thousands of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and 

removed other nonstrategic nuclear systems from operational deployment, transferring their warheads to 

secure storage. Yet, the PNIs are not a formal arms 

control agreement, and they do not entail provisions 

to verify compliance. Neither Russia nor the United 

States has allowed monitors from the other country 

to conduct technical inspections at its TNW storage 

sites. The two governments also do not exchange data 

about their remaining nonstrategic weapons, though 

at some NATO-Russia meetings, they have simply 

reported the percentage of PNI-applicable warheads, 

but not their absolute numbers, that they have eliminated.2

In 2005 and 2006, however, American officials complained that the Russian Government was not providing sufficient information to substantiate its claims to 

have made further reductions in its nonstrategic nuclear systems.3

 Some multilateral nuclear arms control 

agreements do cover TNW, but their provisions are 
369

also not well enforced. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) anticipates the eventual elimination of 

all nuclear weapons. Proposals to reduce and better 

control Russian and American nonstrategic weapons 

regularly arise at NPT-related meetings. For example, 

several delegates to the May 2010 NPT Review Conference advocated making greater efforts to eliminate 

nonstrategic weapons regardless of their range. Yet, 

nuclear abolition is seen by the Russian and American Governments as a long-term goal—the horizon 

appears to be longer in Moscow—requiring stringent 

conditions. Other arms control agreements—such as 

those establishing nuclear-free zones or requiring that 

nuclear weapons states guarantee never to use their 

nuclear weapons against states not possessing them—

restrict the legally permissible use of nuclear weapons, but they lack means to ensure compliance. 

The number, status, and other characteristics of 

the nonstrategic nuclear weapons stockpiles of Russia and the United States are state secrets. Information 

about the possible nonstrategic nuclear weapons of 

other countries is also minimal, though all the nuclear 

weapons of India, Pakistan, and North Korea appear 

to have ranges below 5,500 km. Although China appears to have some 20 intercontinental-range ballistic 

missiles capable of reaching targets in North America, 

the Chinese military has hundreds of nonstrategic 

nuclear weapons designed for potential use around 

China’s periphery as well as possibly on Chinese territory against an invading land army (a very unlikely 

contingency at present). 

Although the United States had thousands of nonstrategic nuclear systems during the Cold War, analysts believe that the U.S. military now has only some 

500 short-range nuclear weapons in its operational 
370

arsenal, as well as approximately an equal number in 

the U.S. inactive stockpile. These TNWs consist of B61-

3 and B61-4 nuclear gravity bombs for airplanes (some 

at U.S. air bases in Europe) and nuclear-armed submarine-launched Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles 

(TLAM-N) deployed at secure land facilities in the 

United States.4

 The Obama administration’s Nuclear 

Posture Review Report, published in April 2010, decided to retire the TLAM-N after the Japanese Government indicated that Tokyo no longer saw that particular weapon system—as opposed to other U.S. nuclear 

and conventional forces—as essential for maintaining 

the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees 

for Japan.5

The U.S. Armed Forces have been dramatically reducing their holdings of TNWs because the advent of 

precision-guided conventional munitions has reduced 

the number of missions that might require nuclear 

warheads. In addition, an important role for TNWs—

defending NATO allies in Europe from the large 

conventional militaries of the Soviet bloc—vanished 

with the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, many 

U.S. commanders and civilian strategists doubt that 

the American President or other senior civilian and 

military leaders would authorize the use of a nuclear 

weapon except under the most extreme circumstances. 

The U.S. military has preferred to redirect monetary 

and other resources to researching and developing 

conventional weapons whose use is more likely. At 

present, the main factor sustaining the U.S. TNWs is 

to meet NATO’s formal requirements for such weapons, make U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees appear more credible to countries that might otherwise decide to pursue their own nuclear weapons, 

and have some nonstrategic assets to trade away in 

any TNW negotiations with Moscow. 
371

The Soviet and Russian Armed Forces have also 

decreased their TNWs since the mid-1980s. The INF 

Treaty required the Soviet Union to eliminate several 

important medium-range missile systems, while the 

PNI led to the destruction of many shorter-range systems. During the early 1990s, the withdrawal of the 

Russian Army from central Europe and the Russian 

Navy from combat patrols also decreased Russian 

military interest in nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The 

severe problems experienced by the Russian defense 

industry during this period also led the Russian Government to concentrate Russia’s limited production 

resources on higher-priority weapons, such as strategic delivery systems and major conventional weapons systems, though few of either was produced. But 

toward the end of the decade, Moscow’s interest in 

strengthening Russia’s nuclear forces, including those 

having short ranges, increased. Russian policymakers 

decided to retain many nonstrategic nuclear weapons 

because they perceived them as a vital instrument 

for preventing NATO, which was then expanding its 

membership and engaging large and unprecedented 

military operations in the former Yugoslavia, from exploiting its conventional military superiority in a possible war with Russia. 

Even today, the Russian defense industry finds it 

impossible to manufacture the large number of sophisticated precision conventional weapons like those 

produced by several NATO countries.6

 The Ministry 

of Defense has also proved unable to transition the 

Russian military to an entirely professional force of 

long-term contract soldiers. Instead, it has had to keep 

using large numbers of unmotivated, poorly trained, 

but low-cost short-term Russian conscripts.7

 To make 

up for the weaknesses of Russia’s conventional forces, 
372

the Russian military has continued to deploy hundreds of nuclear warheads on short-range tactical 

surface-to-surface and air-to-ground strike missiles 

as well as systems designed for anti-air and anti-ship 

defense. The greater destructive power of their nuclear warheads compensates for the higher targeting 

inaccuracies and lower preparedness of Russian military forces compared with their NATO counterparts. 

Some Russian military leaders also seem to view Russia’s TNWs as helping Russian troops compensate for 

China’s much larger ground forces in the event of a 

Russia-China war—though this perspective is rarely 

discussed in public given the official line.8

 Since it 

could take decades for Russia’s defense industrial and 

military reform programs to achieve success, the Russian military will likely believe it will need to rely on 

nuclear weapons, including TNWs, for years to come. 

Although security tensions between Russia and 

the United States and its NATO allies have lessened 

from the time of troubles in the years between 2007 

and 2009, Russian leaders still consider nuclear weapons—tactical as well as strategic—an essential tool in 

their foreign and defense policy portfolio. Despite the 

recent emphasis on how Russia’s oil and gas have replaced the Army and Navy as Russia’s two most influential strategic tools, the most important fact about 

Russia is that, along with the United States, it possesses one of the world’s two most powerful nuclear 

arsenals, with sizeable offensive nuclear forces in all 

categories of the traditional triad of strategic nuclear 

delivery vehicles—ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range 

strategic bombers. Russia also possesses far more 

TNWs than any other country. 

During a Duma hearing on ratifying the New 

Strategic Arms Treaty (START) in July 2010, Russian 
373

nuclear expert Alexei Arbatov confirmed that Russia 

had a least 10,000 nuclear warheads in its current arsenal when one includes its large TNW holding.9

 Other 

Russian sources also confirm that the Russian Armed 

Forces possess thousands of TNWs.10 In their latest annual survey of Russian nuclear forces, Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen calculate that, in late 2009, 

the Russian military possessed a total of approximately 12,000 nuclear warheads. Some 4,600 nuclear warheads were in Russia’s operational arsenal (i.e., ready 

for rapid use), of which approximately 2,600 were 

deployed on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 

some 2,000 were “nonstrategic” or TNWs. They conclude that roughly 7,300 nuclear warheads were in a 

reserve status or awaiting dismantlement.11 In terms of 

nonstrategic warheads (i.e., those not designed for use 

on the triad of strategic delivery vehicles), Norris and 

Kristensen assess that Russia has some 5,390 TNWs. 

These consist of 2,000 TNWs (AS-4 air-to-surface missiles and a variety of gravity bombs) for use by tactical 

aircraft, 1,120 tactical warheads for air defense, and 

2,270 nuclear warheads for use by Russian warships. 

They also estimate that the Russian Army has an indeterminate number of TNWs that might still be usable 

for ground operations.12

The Russian Navy is especially prone to view 

TNW on Russian surface ships and submarines as 

an important operational weapon to compensate for 

the potentially superior numbers and capabilities of 

Russia’s maritime adversaries, above all, that of the 

U.S. Navy. For example, in 2009, Vice-Admiral Oleg 

Burtsev, Deputy Chief of the Russian Navy General 

Staff, claimed that the Navy was making such progress in extending the range and accuracy of its TNWs 

that: “They do not need to deliver high-yield war-
374

heads, instead it is possible to make a transition to 

low-yield nuclear warheads that could be installed 

on the existing types of cruise missiles.”13 Burtsev also 

implied that Russia’s new nuclear-power attack submarines, such as the Severodvinsk-class ships, would 

“probably” continue to carry TNW. Norris and Kristensen calculate that the Russian Navy maintains 

2,270 operational nonstrategic nuclear warheads, primarily for use on various types of short-range cruise 

missiles. These include nearly 700 warheads for naval 

cruise missiles, anti-submarine weapons, anti-air missiles, or anti-ship torpedoes.14 These TNWs are stored 

on land at various Russian naval bases. Russian crews 

regularly rehearse loading these warheads on delivery systems and launching them.15

DOCTRINE

On February 5, 2010, the new Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation was finally published on the 

Kremlin website. Despite all the developments of the 

past decade, including the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, 

and Georgia, this latest version generally advocated 

the same policies as the previous Military Doctrine adopted in 2000. Notably, the new draft expresses particular dissatisfaction with NATO, complaining about 

the growth of the alliance’s military infrastructure 

close to Russia’s border as well as its alleged efforts to 

acquire “global functions in contravention of international law.”16 The current draft identifies four types of 

military conflicts: 

• small-scale armed conflicts;

• local wars such as that between Russia and 

Georgia in 2008;

• regional wars that can potentially involve many 

countries;
375

• large-scale conflicts such as World Wars I and 

II.

Although U.S. defense officials briefed their Russian colleagues in advance about the content of the recently released U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 

Russian doctrinal writers appear not to have taken 

the other’s declaratory doctrine into account when 

composing the Russian text. Whereas the current Russian Military Doctrine basically describes U.S. actions 

as threatening Russia, the QDR characterizes Russia 

as a potential partner with the United States against 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, 

terrorism, and ballistic missile threats. We thus have 

a conceptual asymmetry in which Russian defense 

planners are preoccupied with hypothetical U.S. and 

NATO threats while American strategists are seeking 

Moscow’s help in winning the war in Afghanistan as 

well as countering international terrorists, states, and 

proliferation concerns. 

The 2010 Military Doctrine affirms that: 

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and 

other types of weapons of mass destruction against it 

and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale 

aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian 

Federation.17

Similarly, the 2010 Military Doctrine affirms Moscow’s 

readiness to employ nuclear weapons only in retaliation for the use of nuclear or other WMD against 

Russia or its allies. It also allows Russia to initiate the 

employment of nuclear weapons first when a conventional attack by an aggressor proves so effective that 
376

it endangers the Russian state (a provision not in the 

first 1993 doctrine). 

In both documents, the declared purpose of Russian nuclear weapons is to deter other countries from 

engaging in a military conflict with Russia. Like the 

United States and the other declared nuclear weapons 

states, with the notable exception of China, the Russian Government has refused since the release of its 

November 1993 Military Doctrine to declare in public 

its adherence to an unqualified no nuclear-first-use 

posture.18 In principle, Russian officials are prepared 

to start a nuclear war in an emergency. These declaratory statements still appear operationally relevant, 

since Russian military forces continue to conduct 

large-scale exercises with scenarios involving possible 

nuclear use—though these seem to involve longerrange strategic systems rather than tactical nuclear 

weapons.19

Despite expectations based on earlier statements 

by the Russian Government, the 2010 doctrine does 

not expand the range of permissible uses of nuclear 

weapons to include preventive or preemptive nuclear 

strikes or explicitly affirm Russia’s right to employ 

nuclear weapons for regional and even local wars 

against terrorists. Such an expansive posture was offered in several apparent trial balloon statements by 

senior Russian military and security policymakers in 

the years before the 2010 Military Doctrine was published, including General Yuri Baluyevsky, head of 

the Russian General Staff and First Deputy Defense 

Minister.20 Likewise, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev made the following statement to the Rossiyskaya Gazeta concerning the draft of the new Military Doctrine then under consideration: “The conduct 

of a nuclear strike against an aggressor, including a 
377

preemptive strike, is not ruled out in critical situations 

for national security.”21 At the same time that President Medvedev endorsed the public Military Doctrine, 

however, he also approved a classified document: 

“The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020,” which defined in greater detail the conditions under which Russia might employ 

nuclear weapons. Observers speculate that this document may contain some of the more expansive language about the use of nuclear strikes for purposes of 

preemption, regional conflicts, or other purposes not 

explicitly identified in the public Military Doctrine.

22

Other Russian Government security documents 

confirm that maintaining a strong nuclear force and 

the option to use it has long been—and will likely remain—a key element of Russian security policy.23 The 

statements of Russian officials and defense analysts 

also support this declaratory policy—Russia must retain and be prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend itself from major conventional as well as nuclear 

threats. In a January 12, 2006, article entitled, “Military 

Doctrine: Russia Must Be Strong,” published in the 

Russian Vedomosti newspaper, then Defense Minister 

Sergey Ivanov said Russia’s first task for the 2006-10 

period was “to sustain and develop strategic deterrent 

forces at the minimum level needed to guarantee that 

present and future military threats are deterred.”24 In 

February 2007, Ivanov stressed to the Russian Duma 

that, were deterrence to fail, the Russian military was 

prepared to use these nuclear forces, observing: “What 

else were they built for?”25

Russian Government representatives openly acknowledge that they take U.S. nuclear capabilities 

into account when structuring their own forces. As 

Ivanov put it: “Moscow is attentively tracking the developments in the U.S. strategic nuclear forces.”26 In 
378

particular, Russian Government representatives insist 

they will retain sufficient—if not necessarily equal—

nuclear weapons capacity to overcome any U.S. attack. Russian leaders also see their nuclear forces as 

essential for deterring threats by the other nuclear 

powers—including not only NATO allies, Britain and 

France, but also China, though the Chinese threat is 

never mentioned by name. When Russia’s new Military Doctrine was being revised, one of its main authors, Army-General Makhmut Gareyev, argued that: 

The nuclear weapons of all major nuclear powers are 

ultimately designed to be used against Russia, whether 

we want to admit it or not. In this context, the task of 

curbing a potential aggressor by means of a strategic 

nuclear deterrent is becoming more important than in 

the past.27

Similarly, “The Strategy of National Security of the 

Russian Federation to 2020,” approved on May 12, 

2009, also sees a major threat to Russia’s security in 

how the other countries aim to achieve overwhelming 

dominance in the military sphere through their development of strategic nuclear forces; precision, information weapons; strategic weapon systems with non-nuclear warheads; global anti-missile defense systems; 

and by militarizing outer space. It describes nuclear 

weapons as essential for compensating for any weakness in Russia’s conventional forces.28

Although the process of modernizing Russian conventional forces was underway at the time the 2009 

National Security Strategy was written, it was (and 

still is) moving at a slow pace.29 For this reason, when 

looking at U.S. and NATO superiority in advanced 

conventional military technologies, and China’s potential conventional advantages in Central and East 
379

Asia, Russian leaders see resorting to—or at least 

threatening to employ—nuclear weapons as an essential equalizer. In December 2006, Russian President 

Vladimir Putin reportedly told Ivanov that Russia’s 

nuclear forces account for 90 percent of the country’s 

security.30 According to Russian nuclear expert Alexei 

Arbatov: “Nuclear weapons are for Russian people 

now much more important than decades ago. . . . They 

are more important than during the Cold War times as 

a pillar of national security.”31 This assessment makes 

sense given that during the Cold War period, Moscow 

disposed of massive conventional military power in 

the form of both the Soviet Armed Forces and the military forces of its captive Warsaw Pact allies. 

As in Cold War times, however, Russian leaders 

continue to issue nuclear threats to try to influence the 

foreign and defense policies of other countries. In recent years, Russian leaders have proclaimed their intent to consider nuclear strikes against former Soviet 

bloc states that join NATO or establish U.S. ballistic 

missile systems or military bases on their territory. In 

addition to whatever Russian security dangers these 

Russian nuclear threats tried to avert, the threats also 

aimed to support Moscow’s claim that the former Soviet states fall within Russia’s special security zone—a 

type of sphere of influence in which Moscow asserted 

the right to veto foreign and defense policies of the 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries 

that Russian leaders might perceive as a challenge to 

Moscow’s vital national interests. Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, for instance, characterized 

Russian threats as an attempt to establish that his 

country still falls within Moscow’s zone of control 

when international security issues arise: “We are talking about the status of Poland and Russia’s hopes that 
380

Poland will once again come under its sphere of influence.”32

In January 2008, the leaders of Ukraine’s new proWestern coalition government—Prime Minister Yulia 

Tymoshenko, President Viktor Yushchenko, and 

Parliament Chairman Arseny Yatsenyuk—submitted a joint letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de 

Hoop Scheffer, declaring Ukraine’s readiness to accept a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO.33

Russian leaders quickly underscored their opposition 

to Ukraine’s becoming yet another NATO member 

on Russia’s borders. After meeting with Yushchenko 

at the Kremlin on February 12, Putin warned that if 

Ukraine were to join NATO and host U.S. missile defense sites: “It’s horrible to say and even horrible to 

think that, in response to the deployment of such facilities in Ukrainian territory, which cannot theoretically 

be ruled out, Russia could target its missile systems at 

Ukraine.”34

Russian nuclear threats against nearby states showing an interest in hosting U.S. ballistic missile defense 

(BMD) systems have become even more common in 

recent years. Starting in 2006, senior Russian Government officials, military officers, and policy analysts 

offered an escalating range of complaints regarding the planned deployment of U.S. BMD in former 

Soviet bloc countries. They insisted that, whatever 

their stated aim, the deployments really sought to intercept Russia’s own decreasing ICBM arsenal. They 

also claimed that, despite the small number of BMD 

interceptors originally intended for deployment, the 

United States aimed to establish many more missile 

defense systems near Russia in coming years, accompanied by additional military facilities close to Russia 

using the pretext that they were needed to defend the 

BMD systems. 
381

In response, Russian leaders threatened to retaliate 

with nuclear weapons to destroy the offending facilities. In September 2006, Interfax quoted retired Major 

General Vladimir Belous as stating that his country’s 

“military doctrine envisages that Russian Armed 

Forces are allowed to attack installations in foreign 

countries that threaten its security.”35 That same 

month, two Russian submarines—one based in the 

North Pole and the other in the Pacific Ocean—each 

launched a ballistic missile towards the Kizha missile 

range in northwest Russia rather than the traditional 

Kamchatka test range in the Russian Far East. If the 

Russian Navy sought to attack targets in Poland or 

other Eastern European countries, they would launch 

them in that direction.36 Another Russian defense 

analyst, Alexander Pikayev, acknowledged that Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons to ensure the 

elimination of threatening BMD systems in Eastern 

Europe.37 In October 2006, Yevgeny Buzhinsky, the 

head of the international military cooperation department of the Russian Ministry of Defense, told the daily 

Izvestia that the Russian Government would consider 

NATO’s deployment of BMD near Russia’s borders as 

“a real threat to our deterrent forces” and “as an unfriendly gesture on behalf of the United States, some 

Eastern European nations and NATO as a whole.” He 

cautioned: “Such actions would require taking adequate retaliatory measures of a military and political 

character.”38

As U.S. BMD deployment plans continued in the 

following years, so did Russian threats of nuclear retaliation. Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, the commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, warned 

in 2008 that should the governments of Poland, the 

Czech Republic, or other neighboring countries agree 
382

to host U.S. BMD facilities, Russia would “have to take 

appropriate action.” He explained that: 

I cannot rule out that should the country’s militarypolitical leadership make such a decision, some of our 

ICBMs could be targeted at missile defense sites in 

Poland and the Czech Republic, and subsequently at 

other such facilities.39

Similarly, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel 

General Anatoli Nogovitsyn warned that the Polish 

decision “cannot go unpunished.”40 He added that 

it was now “100 percent” certain Poland would be a 

priority target of the Russian military in a future war 

with NATO.41

In his first state of the nation address before both 

houses of the Russian parliament, President Dmitry 

Medvedev said that Russia would, “if necessary,” 

deploy short-range Iskander missile systems in Kaliningrad “to neutralize if necessary the anti-ballistic 

missile system in Europe.”42 Kaliningrad, a Baltic Sea 

port which lies between NATO members Lithuania 

and Poland, hosts a major Russian military base. Medvedev also stated that Russian electronic equipment 

would jam the U.S. systems and that he had cancelled 

plans to dismantle three Russian missile regiments deployed in western Russia. The Iskander-M surface-tosurface missile has a declared range of slightly under 

500 km (300 miles), which allows it to escape the prohibition in the INF Treaty. If deployed in the Kaliningrad region, the missile could allow Russia to target all 

of Poland and also territory in eastern Germany and 

the Czech Republic.43 Each missile can carry several 

warheads. The Iskander has been tested with a conventional payload but could carry a nuclear warhead, 

though the Russian Government has not indicated 
383

any such intent. In July 2010, Aleksandr Postnikov, 

the commander of Russia’s Ground Forces, told Ekho 

Moskvy radio that the Russian military was deploying the Iskander near St. Petersburg. From there, they 

could hit targets in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland.44

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

At a minimum, Russian nuclear forces aim to 

prevent the United States or any other country from 

launching a major attack against Russian territory. 

This requirement is likely to persist for at least the 

next decade. In late 2006, Putin told Russian military 

leaders that the country’s “deterrent forces should be 

able to guarantee the neutralization of any potential 

aggressor, no matter what modern weapons systems 

he possesses.”45 Russian nuclear planners most likely 

concentrate their planning and resources on surviving 

a war with the United States, since such a capability 

should provide the assets that Russia would need to 

defeat weaker nuclear adversaries (e.g., Britain, China, 

or France). Russian strategists most fear an American 

attempt to decapitate the Russian leadership through a 

surprise attack involving U.S. nuclear and conventional attacks against Russia’s centralized command-andcontrol networks and against its nuclear forces when 

they are on their lower peacetime alert status. They 

worry that American leaders might anticipate crippling the Russian military response by incapacitating 

Russia’s political and military decisionmakers before 

they could organize a coherent retaliatory strike. Such 

a hypothetical attack could employ SLBMs with depressed trajectories from Trident submarines on patrol 

near Russia, or stealthy conventional weapons that 

would exploit weaknesses in Russia’s early warning 
384

systems. U.S. ballistic missile and air defense systems 

would then attempt to intercept any Russian nuclear 

delivery platform that had survived an American first 

strike and was launched in reprisal.46

Should deterrence fail, then Russia’s nuclear weapons could perform various strategic warfighting roles. 

In terms of damage limitation, a massive counterforce 

strike that overcame the adversary’s active and passive defenses might be able to severely weaken the 

targeted state’s ability to retaliate. In addition to compensating for Russian weaknesses in conventional military power, Russian military thinkers perceive their 

nonstrategic weapons as helping accomplish missions 

that otherwise might require the use of Russia’s more 

limited supply of effective strategic nuclear weapons, 

which at present primarily lie in the latest-generation 

ICBMs due to lagging modernization of the strategic 

air and Navy deterrents. For example, they could be 

used to uphold Russian security guarantees offered 

to some of the former Soviet republics through the 

Collective Security Treaty (CST), which was signed 

in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 1992 by the members of 

the CIS.47 Under CST Article 4, members pledge to 

render each other “all necessary assistance, including 

military assistance” in case of external aggression. Following a joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise in 

June 2006, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said that he could not exclude the use of Russia’s 

TNW in his country’s defense.48 The CST underpins 

the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, as well 

as Russia and Belarus. 

Russian strategists have long considered using 

limited nuclear strikes to alter the course of a conven-
385

tional conflict that Russia risked losing. The January 

2000 National Security Concept, for example, implied 

that Russia could use nonstrategic nuclear forces to 

resist a conventional attack without engendering a 

full-scale nuclear exchange. Russian strategists have 

also indicated that they might detonate a limited number of nuclear weapons—perhaps just one—to induce 

an adversary to end (“de-escalate” in Russian terminology) a conventional military conflict with Russia.49

The selective strike would seek to exploit the inevitable “shock and awe” effect associated with nuclear 

use to cause the targeted decisionmakers to weigh 

the risks of nuclear devastation more heavily. This 

strategy exploits the fear that, after one nuclear explosion, the prospects of further detonations increase 

substantially. Initiating nuclear use would underscore 

the seriousness with which the Russian Government 

viewed the situation and might encourage the other 

side to de-escalate the conflict and to pressure its allies 

into making concessions. 

A related function of Russia’s nuclear forces would 

be to prevent other countries from escalating a conventional conflict to a nuclear war. In such a scenario, 

Russia could threaten to retaliate disproportionately 

should an adversary employ nuclear weapons to try 

to alter a conventional battle in its favor. Even after 

one party has initiated a limited nuclear exchange, 

Russian commanders might attempt to control further 

intra-war escalation by issuing nuclear threats, showing restraint, or pursuing other “nuclear signaling.” 

The most commonly discussed contingency for a “deescalation” mission is a NATO decision to intervene 

against a Russian military ally (e.g., Belarus) or on 

behalf of a nonmember country (e.g., Georgia) in a 

conflict with Russia. In its 1993 Military Doctrine, the 
386

Russian Government abandoned its declared pledge 

not to employ nuclear weapons first in a conflict, effectively establishing a justification in Russian doctrine 

for initiating nuclear use.50 The statement brought 

the declared strategic posture of Russia into line with 

that of the United States, Britain, and France (but not 

China). These NATO countries have never renounced 

the right to resort to nuclear weapons first in an emergency. 

Actually exploding a nuclear device in a conflict 

would prove problematic. On the one hand, it could 

terminate the conflict in Russia’s favor. On the other, 

it could potentially lead to large-scale nuclear use if 

the other side considered the detonation as a prelude 

to additional nuclear strikes and subsequently decided to escalate first. Russian officials would probably 

attempt to underscore the strike’s limited nature to 

minimize the risks of further escalation. In conducting 

a nuclear strike for a “de-escalation” mission, for instance, Russian commanders could seek to minimize 

their opponent’s civilian and perhaps even military 

casualties to discourage further nuclear use. For example, they could employ a low-yield tactical nuclear 

warhead against an adversary’s military base, warship, 

or armored formation operating in a scarcely populated area. Alternately, Russian forces could detonate 

a high-altitude burst near an adversary’s warships 

with the expectation that the explosion would not 

produce casualties or nuclear fallout, but would still 

devastate the fleet’s sensors and communications due 

to its electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and other effects. 

Since Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are needed to 

deter adversaries from resorting to major nuclear war, 

detonating a TNW might provide the optimal balance 
387

between signaling Moscow’s seriousness and avoiding an action that might provoke more escalation than 

the Russian Government is actually seeking.51

Russia’s nuclear weapons also play an important 

role in ensuring Moscow’s status as a significant global player. During the 1990s, Russian strategists vigorously debated the importance of maintaining a robust 

nuclear deterrent.52 A minority argued that, in the 

post-Cold War world, nuclear weapons had lost much 

of their military utility, and hence Russia should concentrate on developing its conventional forces. The 

majority, however, continued to view Russia’s nuclear arsenal as an essential instrument for preserving 

its status as a great power, especially since the other 

nuclear powers showed little inclination to relinquish 

their own arsenals. 

The 1968 NPT formally designates Russia as one of 

the five countries legally permitted to possess nuclear 

weapons for an indefinite transition period leading to 

global nuclear disarmament. The long-standing strategic nuclear arms control negotiations between Moscow and Washington help confirm Russia’s equality 

with the United States in an important security dimension. When asked why Russia deserved to be in 

the G-8, Russian President Vladimir Putin told a January 31, 2006, press conference that: 

the G-8 is a club which addresses global problems and, 

first and foremost, security problems. Can someone 

in this hall imagine resolving, shall we say, problems 

concerning global nuclear security without the participation of the largest nuclear power in the world, the 

Russian Federation? Of course not.53 
388

Later that year, Putin told leading defense sector managers that: “The reliability of our ‘nuclear shield’ and 

the state of our nuclear weapons complex are a crucial 

component of Russia’s world power status.”54

In addition to the traditional function of deterring 

a nuclear strike against the Russian Federation as well 

as securing Russia’s elite global security status, many 

Russians see their nuclear forces as a way to negate 

NATO’s advantage in conventional forces. The decisive Western victories in Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan were due to the precision conventional strike capabilities the United States and certain other NATO 

militaries had acquired in recent decades. Although 

Russian analysts recognized that these new conventional capabilities further decreased NATO’s need to 

employ nuclear weapons in an operational role, they 

drew the lesson that Russia needed, if anything, to increase its reliance on having a strong nuclear arsenal 

to balance the conventional weaknesses of the postSoviet Russian Army. Moreover, they observed that 

upgrading Russia’s conventional forces to American 

standards, even if technically possible (a dubious assumption given the frailties of Russia’s military-industrial complex) would entail considerably greater 

expenditures than maintaining even a large nuclear 

force. 

In April 2006, General Baluyevsky told a press conference: 

Strategic parity in a sense of an equal number of missiles, aircraft, and ships—this meaning is going and 

has already gone into non-existence. We are not going 

to tighten our belts or take off our last pair of trousers 

to achieve parity in the number of aircraft and missiles 

with the United States or all of NATO. . . . [Russia] 

has and will have nuclear deterrent forces sufficient 
389

to bring to reason anyone who could try to test the 

strength of our borders or tap our natural resources.55

In his May 2006 address to the Federal Assembly, Putin likewise stressed that Russia could not afford to 

wage a quantitative arms race with the United States, 

but instead had to rely on less costly, asymmetric 

means in designing Russia’s strategic deterrent.56

Yet, Russian leaders are caught in a vicious circle. 

They hesitate to shift funds away from their nuclear 

arsenal at a time when Russia’s conventional forces 

lack sufficient strength to counter a NATO conventional military offensive. But by refusing to transfer 

substantial financial or other resources to the country’s 

conventional forces, Russian decisionmakers cannot 

wean themselves away from their dependence on nuclear deterrence. By some estimates, up to 40 percent 

of the Ministry of Defense’s annual budget has been 

devoted to developing the fundamentally troubled 

Bulava SLBM, around which Russia’s next generation 

of strategic submarines have been designed.57 Russian 

force planners could resolve this spending dilemma if 

they abandoned the need to defend against implausible threats such as an American nuclear attack or a 

NATO conventional invasion, and instead focused on 

managing small-scale wars, insurgencies, and terrorist threats within Russia and neighboring states. 

Adopting a new force-sizing standard, however, 

would require a top-level decision by the Russian 

leadership that the West no longer presented a mortal 

threat, which the Russian leadership has consistently 

refused to do.58 Until now, they have merely added the 

new challenge of resisting insurgents and terrorists to 

the traditional requirement of deterring and defeating 
390

a U.S.-NATO attack. In his May 2006 address, Putin 

himself reaffirmed the ambitious force planning goal 

that Russia’s Armed Forces must be “able to simultaneously fight in global, regional and—if necessary—

also in several local conflicts.”59 Only a large conventional military backstopped by strategic and tactical 

nuclear weapons can meet such demanding criteria.

TNW ARMS CONTROL

Many Western arms control advocates favor eliminating TNW because their small size, scattered location, relative mobility, and weaker security and safety 

features (the older Russian systems are thought to lack 

advanced electronic locks) render them more at risk 

for terrorist seizure than the nuclear warheads that are 

deployed on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which 

are generally some of the most well-guarded military 

assets in the Russian and American defense communities.60 These arms control specialists also fear that Russia and the United States are more likely to employ a 

TNW than a strategic nuclear warhead. In addition to 

their generally lower yield, their battlefield missions 

encourage commanders to see them as weapons for 

warfighting rather than deterrence.61 In turn, this status might place them under the tactical control of field 

commanders in certain conditions. A RAND Corporation (RAND) study concluded that some Russian 

operational commanders can launch ground-based 

TNW without further central government approval 

after Russia’s civilian national security leaders have 

authorized their deployment to front-line troops.62

Pending their elimination, analysts concerned about 

TNWs seek to bring non-strategic weapons under a 

more formal and transparent arms control regime 
391

than the existing PNIs, which lack a legal basis and 

do not entail obligatory data exchanges or other verification procedures.63 The governments of many developing countries also favor eliminating Russian and 

NATO TNWs, a position they again advocated during 

the May 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The George W. Bush administration concluded 

that it would prove too difficult to address TNWs 

within the context of the Russian-American strategic 

nuclear arms control talks. The May 2002 Strategic 

Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), like previous 

Soviet-American and Russian-American arms control 

agreements, does not address nonstrategic nuclear 

forces. In subsequently explaining this TNW exclusion before the U.S. Senate, then-Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld explained that the parties decided 

it would prove too difficult to resolve the many arms 

control complexities associated with these nonstrategic weapons: 

We might have argued that Russia’s proximity to 

rogue nations allows them to deter these regimes with 

tactical systems; because they are many thousands of 

miles away from us; the United States distance from 

them requires more intercontinental systems possibly 

than theater systems. This could have resulted in a 

mind-numbing debate over how many non-strategic 

systems . . . should equal an intercontinental system, 

or open the door to a discussion of whether an agreement should include all nuclear warheads regardless 

of whether they’re strategic or tactical.64

In early June 2005, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Arms Control Stephen Rademaker said Russian officials continued to evince “very little interest in talking to us” on further Russian-American non-strategic 

arms control.65
392

The Obama administration also decided not to 

press Russia to address nonstrategic nuclear weapons 

in the negotiations on the New START. When asked 

about the issue at the April 6, 2009, session of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace conference 

on nuclear nonproliferation, chief U.S. New START 

negotiator Rose Gottemoeller said that, while President Obama was concerned about nonstrategic warheads: “My own view is that the immediate START 

follow-on negotiations will not be the area where that 

issue is immediately pursued.” Instead, she simply 

advocated that “we should begin exploring the issues with the Russian Federation and decide how to 

fit that into the agenda.” At the same session, Sergey 

I. Kislyak, currently the Russian Ambassador to the 

United States and an influential figure in determining 

Russia’s strategic arms control policies, argued that, 

while nonstrategic nuclear weapons would need to be 

eliminated “if you decide to move to the world free 

of nuclear weapons,” for the moment Russia and the 

United States “have enough work to do now to focus 

on things that are doable,” adding that, “when you 

go to substrategic, there will be a lot of other things 

that needs to be entered into the play.” Among these 

issues, Kislyak cited “the imbalances in conventional 

weapons [and the] appearance of new systems that 

maybe are non-nuclear, but designed to do the same 

job.”66

The provisions of the New START Treaty—the 

term encompasses the main treaty text, a protocol 

specifying some additional rights and obligations of 

the parties, and the technical annexes—will not affect 

the TNW issue directly but will help define Russian 

military planning for future nuclear scenarios. Many 

provisions legally confirm reductions that have already 
393

taken place or are in the process of occurring as Russia and the United States continue their decades’ long 

practice of fielding fewer but more capable and versatile nuclear systems. The new 1,550 limit for deployed 

nuclear warheads on no more than 700 deployed 

strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is lower than any 

previous treaty, but each side possesses thousands of 

additional warheads in storage, undergoing maintenance, or in the form of shorter-range nuclear systems. 

The 7-year implementation timeline gives Russia and 

the United States ample time to gradually continue reducing their totals while modernizing their remaining 

arsenals. Furthermore, the provisions give Russia and 

the United States considerable flexibility to determine 

how to structure their nuclear arsenals within these 

aggregate limits. Both sides can continue to keep a 

strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers, distributing the warheads among these three legs 

as they prefer. The United States and Russia are even 

allowed to keep an additional 100 non-deployed ICBM 

and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped 

for nuclear armaments, a provision designed to deal 

with the problem of the U.S. “phantom” systems—

those missile launchers and strategic bombers that are 

no longer usable but still counted under the original 

START, because they had not been eliminated according to its procedures. 

The treaty’s proposed verification regime would 

be less intrusive and costly than the elaborate requirements of the 1991 START Treaty, yet it still includes 

on-site inspections of nuclear weapons facilities, mandated exhibitions of delivery vehicles, obligatory exchanges of data, and advanced notifications of some 

activities related to Russian and American nuclear 

weapons policies. Other provisions would facilitate 
394

treaty monitoring by prohibiting acts that could disrupt national technical means of verification and by 

mandating the continued exchange of some missile 

testing telemetry.

NATO foreign ministers discussed the future of 

the alliance’s TNWs at an April 22-23, 2010, informal 

meeting in Tallinn, Estonia. The issue had become divisive within the alliance as some governments were 

pressing for unilaterally ending NATO nuclear sharing, while others were insisting on retaining it. Although not empowered to make conclusive decisions, 

the foreign ministers nevertheless agreed on ”some 

clear themes” to guide their approach to the TNW issue:

• NATO member states will not make “unilateral 

moves” on nuclear weapons issues;

• Members would share the burdens of maintaining a safe and credible nuclear deterrent;

• The alliance would balance maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the need to contribute to general arms control and disarmament.67

According to NATO Spokesman James Appathurai, the foreign ministers did indicate one way in which 

NATO could reduce its TNWs—if Russia agreed to 

eliminate some of its much larger stockpile of these 

weapons, as well as relocate any TNWs its does keep 

away from neighboring NATO countries, and make 

these holdings more transparent. Secretary of State 

Hilary Clinton told the foreign ministers that: 

In [seeking] any future reductions, our aim should be 

to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency 

on non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, relocate those weapons away from the territory of NATO 

members, and include non-strategic nuclear weapons 
395

in the next round of U.S.-Russian arms control discussions.68

Apparthurai observed that, while NATO might take 

actions affecting its nuclear weapons policies without a direct Russian input, “Russia had to be taken 

into account when looking at the broader issue of reducing the total holdings of nuclear weapons in Europe.”69 Nonetheless, Apparthurai acknowledged that 

the Russians have not shown interest in negotiating 

formal limits on their TNWs, and that the allies have 

yet to propose initiating formal negotiations with the 

Russians.

Indeed, Russian officials have expressed little interest in entering into TNW reduction negotiations with 

NATO. Instead, they have regularly denounced the alliance’s nonstrategic weapons as being threatening to 

Russia and have persistently urged NATO to relocate 

all foreign (i.e., American) TNWs to their home territories. In this regard, Russian Government representatives often refer to how Moscow has already eliminated the majority of the nonstrategic systems that it 

inherited from the Soviet Union and relocated the remainder in secure storage exclusively within Russian 

territory.70 In late 2003, General Baluyevsky observed 

that the hundreds of U.S. air-deliverable TNWs in Europe “are for Russia acquiring a strategic nature since 

theoretically they could be used on our command centers and strategic nuclear centers.”71 In June 2005, Defense Minister Ivanov said that Russia was “prepared 

to start talks about tactical nuclear weapons only when 

all countries possessing them keep these weapons on 

their own territory.”72 In March 2010, Foreign Minister 

Sergey Lavrov said that ending the forward-positioning of U.S. TNWs “should be the starting point in any 

conversation on this topic.”73
396

The main Russian military newspaper, Krasnaya 

Zvezda, has published several articles this year underscoring that Russia wanted the United States to 

remove all its TNW from Europe even before Moscow 

would consent to enter into nonstrategic arms control 

talks. One author explained: 

Before the beginning of official discussions on this 

theme, Washington and Moscow must take the same 

starting position in the negotiations. [The United 

States must agree] to withdraw all of its TNW from the 

European continent and bring them back to its own 

territory. That is, it must do what Russia did 15 years 

ago.74

American officials have traditionally responded to 

this Russian argument by noting that U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons play an essential role in sustaining NATO’s nuclear deterrence and discouraging efforts by additional NATO members to acquire their 

own nuclear weapons.

On those rare occasions when prominent Russian 

policymakers have gone beyond this party-line position, they have laid out stringent conditions for even 

initiating nonstrategic arms control talks—these conditions are unlikely to be soon realized unless NATO 

proves willing to make vary generous unilateral concessions. On September 3, 2007, Russian Colonel General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, head of the Defense Ministry’s 12th Main Directorate (Glavnoye Upravleniye 

Ministerstvo Oborony—GUMO), which is responsible 

for Russia’s nuclear weapons, told reporters that Russia would consider negotiating additional restrictions 

on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, “but it must take 

place with the participation in the process of other 

countries, above all Britain and France.”75 Since France 
397

and Britain characterize their nuclear-armed ballistic 

missiles as strategic rather than nonstrategic weapons, 

they and other NATO governments, including Washington, have resisted their inclusion in any nonstrategic negotiations. The following year, General Nikolai 

Makarov, General Baluyevsky’s replacement as head 

of the Russian General Staff, told ITAR-TASS that the 

Russian Armed Forces had no intention of eliminating 

its TNWs “as long as Europe is unstable and packed 

with armaments”—a condition that could be used indefinitely to characterize the military situation on the 

Continent pending universal disarmament (though 

Makarov probably meant the continued existence of 

NATO and its robust conventional forces).76

Russians outside the executive branch have been 

somewhat more creative and flexible in considering 

how to achieve some TNW arms control—suggesting 

linking talks on reducing Russian TNWs, an area of 

Russian advantage, in return for U.S. and NATO concessions regarding strategic offensive nuclear weapons (especially by reducing the larger number of U.S. 

non-deployed nuclear warheads), strategic defenses, 

or the conventional force imbalance in Europe, which 

presently favors NATO.77 Western analysts have offered similar proposals, linking Russian concessions 

regarding TNWs to NATO’s accepting limits on its 

conventional superiority through an enhanced Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.78 Other Western analysts have proposed extending the provisions 

of the bilateral INF Treaty to encompass both shorterrange missiles and additional countries.79 Before assuming office, a senior advisor to Secretary of State 

Clinton suggested removing some or all U.S. TNWs 

from NATO Europe in return for encouraging Russia 

simply to concentrate its large number of TNWs in 
398

more secure locations.80 Russian officials have also expressed alarm about U.S. prompt global strike plans—

the arming of traditionally nuclear-armed strategic 

delivery systems with conventional warheads—so 

they might want to restrict those further in return for 

constraining TNWs.81

Russian government officials might be seeking 

to avoid nonstrategic arms control talks in anticipation that European governments might at some point 

decide to request the removal of U.S. TNWs in any 

case given a lack of widespread popular support for 

NATO’s nuclear mission. Some Russian analysts also 

seem concerned that any formal negotiations on the 

issue would raise the prominence of the issue within 

Europe and lead NATO members concerned about 

Russian military power to demand that the alliance 

either keep the NATO TNWs or take other steps to 

bolster their defenses against Moscow.82 Finally, several Russian writers have expressed concern that discussing limitations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons 

could undermine the prospects for reforming Russia’s 

conventional forces. Not only could opponents of reform cite the resulting anti-Russian rhetoric of East 

European NATO members fearful of Moscow, but 

they could object to exposing Russian vulnerabilities 

during the unstable transition period that would arise 

between when the existing structure was dismantled 

and the new one was fully operational.83

Even if Russia were to agree to enter into formal 

nonstrategic negotiations with NATO, it is unclear 

how these talks could best be structured. TNW issues 

could be discussed in bilateral Russia-U.S. talks devoted solely to that issue, though Russia has always 

resisted that approach and Washington’s NATO allies 

would not welcome their exclusion. They could also 
399

be dealt with as part of the NATO-Russia dialogue 

regarding a new European security architecture. Moscow would like to draw up a new European Security 

Treaty along the lines of the draft text proposed by 

Russian President Medvedev. These could occur 

within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, 

but Appathurai said during his April 22 Tallinn news 

conference that: “I don’t think that that is on the immediate agenda. That’s not the forum in which that 

kind of discussion, I think, would be held, and certainly not now.”84

Furthermore, the TNW issues could be negotiated 

as part of follow-on negotiations to the New START,

which would cover other issues set aside in the rush 

to negotiate the recently signed treaty (non-deployed 

nuclear warheads, strategic defense systems, and the 

use of conventional warheads on traditionally strategic delivery vehicles such as long-range ballistic 

missiles). Finally, they might be considered as part of 

the discussions to strengthen the NPT against further 

nuclear proliferation (many NPT parties consider NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement a violation of the 

first two articles of the treaty). 

What results one might reasonably hope to achieve 

from such negotiations is unclear. Even an American 

offer to redeploy all U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe 

to the United States might prove insufficient to convince the Russian Government to agree to additional 

TNW arms control measures. The United States could 

return its short-range nuclear weapons to Europe in 

a few hours unless their storage sites and related infrastructure had also been destroyed. In addition, it 

would prove difficult to verify any agreement since 

attack aircraft, the main NATO delivery system for 

U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons, are typically dualuse systems that can also launch conventional strikes.
400

Any proposals for increased transparency or TNW 

consolidation would need to overcome Russian fears 

about NATO preemption, since placing the weapons 

in a few designated places would make them easier 

to attack, creating opportunities (and incentives) for a 

preemptive first strike that would destroy the weapons 

before they could be dispersed to their launch sites. 

Any proposals for less than total reductions would 

need to address U.S. congressional concerns about the 

imbalance in the Russian-U.S. TNWs, which would 

become especially salient were both countries to negotiate further reductions in the size of their strategic 

nuclear arsenals. The warhead and launcher limits in 

the New START may already be lower than the size 

of Russia’s residual TNWs, though the latter are by 

definition less threatening to the U.S. homeland and 

compensated for by NATO’s superior conventional 

forces.

Even if the parties are unable to secure the elimination of all NATO and Russian TNW, or if some weapons were exempt from the transparency arrangements 

to enhance deterrence through the increased uncertainty, mutual TNW reductions could provide several 

advantages, including reducing the number of possible terrorist targets, saving money that would have 

to be spent on having to modernize a larger number of 

weapons, allowing NATO to remove the TNWs from 

countries no longer eager to host them (which might 

leave U.S. TNWs in only Turkey and perhaps Italy), 

and demonstrating NATO and Russian commitment 

to making progress toward nuclear nonproliferation. 

Yet, securing Russian Government approval for even 

partial reductions looks unlikely for the indefinite future.
401

CONCLUSION: NUCLEAR POSSIBILITIES AND 

ILLUSIONS

In recent years, a number of American and international security experts, including several who held 

prominent U.S. Government positions during the 

Cold War, have supported various proposals leading 

toward general nuclear disarmament.85 In his April 

2009 speech in Prague, President Obama declared his 

ultimate objective to be the complete elimination of all 

nuclear weapons. Russian officials have publicly offered general support for eliminating nuclear weapons at some point. At his September 2008 meeting in 

Sochi with foreign experts of Russia who were members of the Valdai Discussion Club, Prime Minister 

Putin gave conditional support for abolishing nuclear 

weapons. Although Putin acknowledged that, until a 

few years ago, he would have considered achieving 

the practical elimination of nuclear weapons “absolutely impossible,” he now professed that: “Today I 

consider it almost realistic” given that the conventional weapons capabilities of nuclear weapons states, like 

Russia, had improved sufficiently to deter any aggressor.86 Medvedev and Obama reaffirmed in their April 

1 joint statement their ultimate goal of abolishing all 

nuclear weapons. Additionally, Putin responded affirmatively to a question at a joint news conference with 

visiting German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier when asked whether he could imagine a Russia 

without nuclear weapons, though Putin indicated he 

would expect for the United States to also eliminate its 

own nuclear forces.87

Nonetheless, many foreign observers of the Russian defense community doubt that the Russian government would want to relinquish one of the last 
402

remaining props of Russia’s great power status, and 

create a situation in which American and NATO conventional military superiority would be unchecked by 

Russian nuclear weapons.88 Influential Russians have 

also expressed unease at transitioning to a nuclear-free 

world. In April 2009, Sergey Rogov, the director of the 

USA and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy 

of Sciences, published a commentary in the Russian 

newspaper Kommersant explicitly warning that, the 

lower the level of Russia and American nuclear forces, 

the more significant the conventional imbalance of 

forces will become.89 Like Putin, President Medvedev 

has described Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons 

as the main bulwark guaranteeing the country’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy in an international system heavily dominated by the United 

States.90

On April 20, 2009, Medvedev directly addressed 

Obama’s April 5 Prague speech in which Obama 

called for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Medvedev said that a number of “conditions” 

must be achieved for universal nuclear disarmament. 

These prerequisites include: banning the deployment 

of nuclear weapons in outer space; ensuring that nuclear weapons removed from operational deployment 

were destroyed rather than simply stockpiled; and, 

preventing a compensating buildup in conventional 

arms following a reduction in nuclear forces. Medvedev further warned that the unilateral deployment 

of missile defense systems also “complicates nuclear 

disarmament.”91 The Russian people also favor their 

country’s retention of a robust nuclear force. For example, a recent poll by the Russia Public Opinion 

Research Center (VTsIOM) found that, unlike in the 

years immediately following the end of the Cold War, 
403

a majority of Russian respondents (60 percent) now 

oppose further nuclear disarmament. Most cited a 

concern with assuring Russia’s security in case of war, 

while a quarter of the respondents favored preserving 

Russia’s nuclear weapons to showcase Russia’s political power. Only 4 percent said that nuclear weapons 

were essential for countering U.S. military strength, 

though such a perspective may be encompassed in the 

above responses and appears common among Russia’s current generation of foreign and defense policy 

leaders.92

Most Americans would probably not presently favor eliminating the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In its April 

2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Obama administration itself sets very high standards for realizing a 

nuclear-free world: 

The conditions that would ultimately permit the United States and others to give up their nuclear weapons 

without risking greater international instability and 

insecurity are very demanding. Among those are the 

resolution of regional disputes that can motivate rival 

states to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons, success in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

much greater transparency into the programs and 

capabilities of key countries of concern, verification 

methods and technologies capable of detecting violations of disarmament obligations, and enforcement 

measures strong and credible enough to deter such 

violations. Clearly, such conditions do not exist today. 

But we can—and must—work actively to create those 

conditions.93

Realizing these conditions in Russia’s case would 

require a transformation in the threat perceptions, 

security culture, and defense ambitions of Russian 

leaders comparable to that which occurred in Ger-
404

many and Japan in the generations after World War 

II. Although these cases show that these types of security revolutions are possible—and Russia might have 

come close to experiencing one during the few years 

immediately following the demise of the Soviet Union 

and its inherently antagonistic Communist ideology—they are also very rare. Russia will likely remain 

a nuclear weapons power for decades to come, with 

nonstrategic weapons serving as a prominent tool in 

its portfolio.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Nikolai Sokov, “Issue Brief: Tactical Nuclear Weapons 

(TNW),” Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2002, available from www.

nti.org/e_research/e3_10a.html.

2. Ibid.

3. Wade Boese, “Deeper Nuclear Cuts Unlikely for Now,” 

Arms Control Today, Vol. 35, No. 6, July/August 2005, p. 36; and 

“Press Conference with Stephen Rademaker, Acting Assistant 

Secretary of State for Security and Nonproliferation Issues,” Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, April 12, 2006, available from www.sgpproject.org/Personal%20Use%20Only/G8Rademaker4.12.06.htm.

4. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear 

Forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2010, 

p. 65.

5. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010, p. 29.

6. “Yadernoe Oryzhie Rossii - Protivoves Vooryzheniyam 

v Evrope,” Oryzhie Rossii, 2010, available from www.arms-expo.

ru/site.xp/049051124053055052049.html; and Igor Korotchenko, 

“Voennyi Disparitet s NATO RF Neitralizyet Yadernym Oryzhiem,” December 12, 2008, available from news.km.ru/voennyj_

disparitet_s_nato_rf_nej.
405

7. Sergei Zhuravlev, “On Combat Readiness: The 

1,000,000-Strong Army Cannot Fight,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, April 2, 2010.

8. Nikolai Poroskov, “O Probleme Sokrasheniya Takticheskogo Yadernogo Oryzhiya,” Evropeiskaya Bezopasnost’: Sobytiya, 

Ozenki, Prognozy, No. 11, March 2004, available from www.inion.

ru/product/eurosec/st1vp11.htm#1.

9. “Alexei Arbatov: v Yadernom Arsenale RF ne Menee 10 Tysyach Boezaryadov,” RiaNovosti, July 6, 2010, available from www.

rian.ru/defense_safety/20100706/252532909.html.

10. Alexei Arbatov, “Takticheskoe Yadernoe Oryzhie - Problemy i Resheniya,” May 5, 2010, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kyr’er, 

available from vpk.name/news/39071_takticheskoe_yadernoe_oruzhie__problemyi_i_resheniya.html; and “Kolichestvo Nositelei i 

Boezaryadov Strategicheskix Yadernyx Sil U.S. i Rossii,” Novosti 

VPK, March 30, 2010, available from vpk.name/news/37967_kolichestvo_nositelei_i_boezaryadov_strategicheskih_yadernyih_sil_ssha_i_

rossii.html.

11. Norris and Kristensen, p. 74.

12. Ibid., p.79.

13. “Rol Takticheskogo Yadernogo Oruzhiya na Mnogotselevykh APL Vozrastet – VMF” (“The Role of Tactical Nuclear 

Weapons on Multipurpose Submarines Set to Grow—the Navy,”) 

RIA-Novosti, August 23, 2009, available from www.rian.ru/defense_

safety/20090323/165742858.html.

14. Norris and Kristensen, p. 79.

15. Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in 

Europe, Monterey: CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, December 

2009, p. 14.

16. Voennaya Doktina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation), Russian President’s website, February 5, 
406

2010, available from news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461. See also “NATO 

Predstavlyaet Dostatochno Ser’eznyu Ygrozy dlya Rossii,” Rambler Novosti, February 9, 2010, available from news.rambler.ru/

Ukraine/r/5285633/; and Sergei Tyrchenko and Petr Vladimirov, 

“Nikolai Patryshev: Rossiya Imeet Pravo na Preventivnyi Yadernyi Ydar. Sekretar’ Sovbeza RF Napomnil, Chto y Atomnoi Dybinki, Kotoroi Tak Lubyat Razmaxivat’ US, Est’ i Vtoroi Konez,” 

Svobodnaya Pressa, October 14, 2009, available from svpressa.ru/

society/article/15470/.

17. Voennaya Doktrine Rossiyskoy Federatsii, (Military Doctrine 

of the Russian Federation), April 21, 2000, available from www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00003/index.htm.

18. “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” adopted by Edict No. 1833 of the President of 

the Russian Federation, November 2, 1993, available from www.

fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html. 

19. Matthew Day, “Russia ‘Simulates’ Nuclear Attack on 

Poland,” The Telegraph, November 2, 2009, available from www.

telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/6480227/Russia-simulates-nuclear-attack-on-Poland.html; and Pomper, Potter, and Sokov, p. 14.

20. See, for example, “Head of the General Staff: the RF Develops a New Military Doctrine and Plans Military Measures 

Against the U.S. BMD,” Newsru.com, May 7, 2007, available from 

www.newsru.com/russia/07may2007/baluevskij.html.

21. Timofey Borisov, “Nikolay Patrushev: The Draft of the 

New Document, which Defines the Country’s Defense Capability, 

Has Been Prepared,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 20, 2009. See 

also Vladimir Mamontov, “Security Council’s Nikolai Patrushev 

Interviewed on Military Doctrine,” Izvestiya, October 14, 2009.

22. See, for example, Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine: An Exercise in Public Relations,” February 8, 2010, 

available from russiamil.wordpress.com/2010/02/08/russias-new-military-doc; and Marcel de Haas, “Doctrinal Stipulations and Political Realities. What Should Be the Western Response to the New 

Doctrine?” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 2, 2010, available from 

www.ng.ru/realty/2010-02-26/1_doktrina.html.
407

23. See for example: “The National Security Concept of the 

Russian Federation,” adopted by the Decree of the President of 

the Russian Federation No. 1300 of December 17, 1997, in the 

“Edited Version of the Presidential Decree No. 24 of January 10, 

2000,” available from www.iss.niiit.ru/doktrins/doktr01.htm; and 

“The Law of the Russian Federation on Defense,” adopted by the 

State Duma on April 24, 1996, and Approved by the Federation 

Council on May 15, 1996, available from www.hro.org/docs/rlex/defence/index.htm.

24. Sergey Ivanov, “Military Doctrine: Russia Must Be 

Strong,” Vedomosti, January 12, 2006. 

25. Sergey Ivanov, “Russia Reserves the Right to Preemptive 

Strikes,” Moscow Agentstvo Voennykh Novostei, February 7, 2007. 

26. “Sergey Ivanov raskryl britantsam tseli I zadachi rossiyskikh yadernykh sil,” July 14, 2004, available from www.rol.ru/

news/misc/news/04/07/14_010.htm. 

27. Viktor Litovkin, “General Gareyev: Russia Changing its 

Military Doctrine,” RIA Novosti, Part 2, January 18, 2007, available from en.rian.ru/analysis/20070118/59307373.html. See also 

Makhmut Gareyev, “New Conditions—New Military Doctrine,” 

Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 2, 2007.

28. “Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti RF do 2020 goda,” 

May 12, 2009, available from www.nsnbr.ru/strategiya_nb_rf.html.

29. Vera Sitnina, “Voina Mozhet Vspykhnut Vnezapno,” Vremya Novostei, September 29, 2008.

30. Viktor Myasnikov, “Starie osnovi novoy doktriny,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 19, 2006. 

31. Alexei Arbatov, “Advancing U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation,” transcript of presentation at the Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, April 1, 2010, available from www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0402carnegie-russia1.pdf.
408

32. Cited in Peter Finn, “Antimissile Plan By U.S. Strains 

Ties With Russia,” Washington Post, February 21, 2007, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/20/

AR2007022001431.html?nav=rss_world/Europe. 

33. Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine’s Top Three Leaders Request 

NATO Membership Action Plan,” January 18, 2008, available from 

www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%

5D=33304.

34. Luke Harding, “Putin Issues Nuclear Threat to Ukraine 

over Plan to Host US Shield,” The Guardian, February 13, 2008, 

available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/13/russia.putin.

35. Cited in “Russia Might Target U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe,” Global Security Newswire, September 21, 2006, available 

from 204.71.60.35/d_newswire/issues/2006/9/21/129e3869-dfe9-4e90-

bd29-da75bf307a26.html. 

36. Nikolai Sokov, “Russia’s Newest Submarine-Launched 

Missile Fails in Tests, but Tests of Other Systems Succeed: Defense 

Minister Ivanov Raises Questions on Status of Russian Sea-Based 

Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” WMD Insights, No. 10, November 

2006, pp. 30-31; and Vladimir Mukhin, “Bulava kak zerkalo oboronki” (“Bulava is Like a Defense Circle”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 

September 12, 2006. 

37. “Russia Could Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons to Defeat 

U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe, Experts Say,” Global Security 

Newswire, September 22, 2006, available from www.nti.org/d_

newswire/issues/2006_9_22.html. 

38. “Deployment of U.S. Missile Defense in Europe Is Threat 

to Russia—Military Chief,” October 18, 2006, available from www.

mosnews.com/news/2006/10/18/usthreat.shtml. 

39. “Russia Could Target Missiles at Sites in Central Europe,” 

RIA Novosti, September 10, 2008, available from en.rian.ru/russia/20080910/116678626.html.

40. Thom Shanker and Nicholas Kulish, “Poland-U.S. Missile 

Deal Draws Anger from Russia,” New York Times, August 15, 2008, 
409

available from www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/world/europe/15ihtmissile.3.15333406.html.

41. “Rice to Visit Poland to Sign Missile Shield Deal,” AgenceFrance Press, August 17, 2008, available from afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gLzVO9YmRVo2zJXJwfNJ0XQRZQWg. 

42. “Russian Missiles Near Poland to ‘Offset’ U.S. Shield - 

NATO Envoy,” RIA Novosti, November 5, 2008, available from 

en.rian.ru/russia/20081105/118146144.html.

43. “Russia’s Iskander Best Answer to U.S. Missiles in Europe 

- Analyst,” RIA Novosti, November 5, 2008, available from en.rian.

ru/russia/20081105/118140039.html.

44. “Russian Missile Move Worries NATO Member Estonia,” 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 20, 2010, available from 

www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Missile_Move_Worries_NATO_

Member_Estonia/2105076.html.

45. Cited in “Russia to Buy 17 ICBMs in 2007 - Minister,” 

RIA Novosti, November 16, 2006, available from en.rian.ru/russia/20061116/55705839.html. 

46. For a probably exaggerated assessment of the U.S. capacity to launch an effective first strike against Russia and China, 

see Kier A. Leiber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear 

Primacy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, March-April 2006, pp. 

42-54; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? 

The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, 

Vol. 30, No. 4, Spring 2006, pp. 7-44. Russian responses to their 

assessment are surveyed in Arthur Blinov and Igor Plugatarev, 

“Guaranteed Unilateral Destruction,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 

March 23, 2006; and Pavel K. Baev, “Moscow Puts PR Spin on 

its Shrinking Nuclear Arsenal,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 17, 

2006, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31591. Other critiques appeared in the 

September-October 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs. 

47. “Rossii Nyzhno Dat’ Pravo na Primenenie Ydernogo Oryzhiya – Expert,” RIA Novosti, March 12, 2008, available from nuclearno.ru/text.asp?12665.
410

48. Viktor Myasnikov, Vladimir Ivanov, and Anton Khodasevich, “Novaya strategicheskaya initsiativa,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 

June 26, 2006. 

49. According to one authoritative source, “De-escalation of 

aggression” is defined as “forcing the enemy to halt military action by threat to deliver or by actual delivery of strikes of varying 

intensity with reliance on conventional and (or) nuclear weapons.” Sergey Ivanov, Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed 

Forces of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia: Ministry of Defense, October 2, 2003, p. 70, available from www.pircenter.org/index.php?id=184.

50. “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” adopted by Edict No. 1833 of the President of 

the Russian Federation, November 2, 1993, available from www.

fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html. 

51. Aleksei Arbatov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons - Problems 

and Prospects,” Voenno-promyshlennyi kuryer, May 5, 2010, available from www.carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=40747.

52. This debate is reviewed in Nikolai Sokov, “Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia: The Emerging New 

Posture,” May 1998, available from www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/

modern.htm; and Frank Umbach, Future Military Reform: Russia’s 

Nuclear & Conventional Forces, Camberley, UK: Conflict Studies 

Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, August 2002, pp. 11-14.

53. “Transcript of the Press Conference for the Russian and 

Foreign Media,” January 31, 2006, available from www.kremlin.ru/

eng/speeches/2006/01/31/0953_type82915type82917_100901.shtml. In 

an interview with NBC News, Putin likewise observed: “How can 

we talk about ensuring global security and address the issues of 

nonproliferation and disarmament if we do not include Russia, 

which is one of the biggest nuclear powers?” available from kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/07/12/1443_type82916_108525.shtml. 

54. “Opening Remarks at Meeting with Heads of the Russian Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy Complexes,” Novo-
411

Ogaryovo, June 9, 2006, President of Russia Official Web Portal, 

available from www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/06/09/1952_

type82912type82913_106757.shtml.

55. Nabi Abdullaev, “Russia Won’t Seek Nuclear Parity with 

West,” Defense News, April 10, 2006, p. 12.

56. Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly 

of the Russian Federation,” May 10, 2006, available from www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.

shtml. 

57. “The Bulava Should Be Put in the Kremlin: It Does Not 

Fly,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets, August 2, 2009.

58. Aleksei Pyshkov, “Perezagryzka-Smena Politiki ili Smena 

Ritoriki?” Izvestia, July 5, 2009, available from www.izvestia.ru/

comment/article3130323/.

59. Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly 

of the Russian Federation,” May 10, 2006, available from www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.

shtml.

60. See, for example, Robin Cook and Robert McNamara, “Is 

it Time to Dismantle the Cold War’s Nuclear Legacy?” Financial Times, June 23, 2005; and Daryl G. Kimball, “Small, Portable, 

Deadly, and Absurd: Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” International 

Herald Tribune, May 3, 2005.

61. Nikolai Poroskov, “O Probleme Sokrasheniya Takticheskogo Yadernogo Oryzhiya,” Evropeiskaya Bezopasnost’: Sobytiya, 

Ozenki, Prognozy, available from www.inion.ru/product/eurosec/

st1vp11.htm#1.

62. Olga Oliker and Tanya Charlick-Paley, Assessing Russia’s 

Decline: Trends and Implications for the United States and the U.S. Air 

Force, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, pp. 81-83.

63. Pierre Claude Nolin, The Security of WMD Related Material in Russia, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 2005, p. 7, available from www.nato-pa.int/Default.
412

asp?SHORTCUT=695; John Edwards and Jack Kemp, eds., Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do, 

New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, pp. 48-49.

64. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, “Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the Moscow Treaty as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld,” July 17, 

2002, available from www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020717-

secdef1.html.

65. Cited in Wade Boese, “Deeper Nuclear Cuts Unlikely for 

Now,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 35, No. 6, July/August 2005, p. 36.

66. “Whither U.S.-Russia Relations?” Carnegie International 

Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, available from www.

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&proj=zted.

67. “Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai 

at the Informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers - Tallinn, 

Estonia,” April 22, 2010, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/SIDE0A8F737-39D940A7/natolive/opinions_62906.htm.

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2010; available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/22/AR2010042202712.html.

69. “Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai 

at the Informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers - Tallinn, Estonia.” 

70. See, for example, Sergei B. Ivanov, “Speech at the 46th 

Munich Security Conference,” Munich Security Conference, February 6, 2010, available from www.securityconference.de/Ivanov-Sergey-B.457.0.html?&L=1. 

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Nuclear Forces, 2004,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 60, No. 

3, May/June 2004, p. 69.
413

72. “Russia Warns U.S. about Weapons in Space,” Associated Press, June 3, 2005, available from www.msnbc.msn.com/

id/8073961/.

73. “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Next Target for Arms Control 

- Lavrov,” RIA Novosti, March 26, 2010, available from en.rian.ru/

russia/20100326/158322926.html.

74. Vladimir Kozin, “TNW: Ill-Conceived Messages from the 

Foreign Ministers of Poland and Sweden,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 21, 2010. See also Viktor Ruchkin, “Old Bombs and New 

Problems,” Krasnaya Zvezda, March 16, 2010.

75. “Britain, France Must be Included in Weapons Talks: 

Russian General,” Agence-France Presse, September 3, 2007, 

available from www.france24.com/france24Public/en/archives/news/

world/20070903-Russia-France-Britain-nuclear-power-reduce-weapons.php.

76. “Russian Military Chief Defends Nonstrategic Nukes,” 

Global Security Newswire, December 17, 2008, available from gsn.

nti.org/gsn/nw_20081217_4724.php.

77. These proposals are reviewed in Johan Bergenäs, Miles A. 

Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non-strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Moving 

Forward?, Washington, DC: The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2010, p. 13.

78. Ibid., p. 42.

79. Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren, “Getting to 

Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Today, 

October 2009, available from www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/

Kelleher.

80. Martin Matishak, “U.S. Could Pull Back Europe-Based 

Nukes, State Department Official Says,” Global Security Newswire, August 5, 2009, available from www.globalsecuritynewswire.

org/gsn/nw_20090805_4929.php.
414

81. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 

“Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by 

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press 

Conference with Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski, 

Warsaw, Poland, September 11, 2008,” available from www.mid.

ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/cd9a026910cb657b

c32574c3003c69a2?OpenDocument.

82. Fedor Lukyanov, “Last Treaty: Russia and United States 

Have Exhausted Potential for Two-Way Nuclear Disarmament,” 

Vremya Novostey, March 30, 2010.

83. Sergei Karaganov, “Nuclear Free World is a Dangerous 

Concept That Ought to be Abandoned,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, April 

23, 2010.

84. “Press Briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai 

at the Informal Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers - Tallinn, Estonia.” 

85. George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, and James E. Goodby, 

eds., Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2008. See also George 

P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, 

“A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, 

January 4, 2007, available from www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_

id=2252&issue_id=54; George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. 

Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” The 

Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, available from online.wsj.com/

public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html.

86. Andrei Zolotov Jr., “Three Hours with Vladimir Putin,” Russia 

Profile, September 12, 2008, available from www.russiaprofile.org/page.

php?pageid=Politics&articleid=a1221223275.

87. “Putin Could Imagine a Russia with no Nuclear Weapons,” Deutche Welle, June 10, 2009, available from www.dw-world.

de/dw/article/0,,4315776,00.html.

88. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Will Retain as Many Nuclear 

Weapons as Possible,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 9, 2009, available 

from www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_
415

news%5D=34834&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=407&no_cache=1; 

Brian Whitmore, “Arms Control Redux: Let The Games Begin,” RFE/RL, April 24, 2009, available from www.rferl.org/

content/Arms_Control_Redux_Let_The_Games_Begin/1615455.

html; and Michael Bohm, “Finished From the START,” Moscow 

Times, June 11, 2009, available from www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1016/42/378486.htm.

89. Sergey Rogov, Kommersant, April 15, 2009.

90. “Rossia ne Bydet Yvelichivat’ Potenzial Yadernogo Sderzhivaniya,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 5, 2010, available from www.

rg.ru/2010/03/05/rossiya-anons.html.

91. Brett Young and Denis Dyomkin, “Russia Gives Cautious 

Response to Obama Nuclear Plan,” Reuters, April 20, 2009, available 

from www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSLK21213720090420.

92. “Most of Russians against nuclear disarmament – poll,” 

RIA Novosti, July 15, 2010, available from en.rian.ru/mlitary_

news/20100715/159825463.html.

93. Nuclear Posture Review Report, pp. 48-49.

417

CHAPTER 9

NEW START AND NONPROLIFERATION:

SUITORS OR SEPARATE TABLES?

Stephen J. Cimbala

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2010, the diplomatic atmosphere 

was an apparent success story for those seeking to reduce nuclear danger. The signing of the New Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement in April 

2010 took place almost exactly 1 year after President 

Barack Obama’s landmark speech calling for nuclear 

abolition. New START was followed by the successful outcome of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) review conference in May 2010, in marked 

contrast to the acrimonious denouement of the 2005 

meeting.1

 In addition, a U.S. Nuclear Posture Review 

and a revised Russian Military Doctrine made public 

in the spring of 2010 also seemed to reduce the role of 

nuclear weapons in the respective military strategies 

and national security policies of the two states. Russia, 

the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) talked of cooperation on missile 

defense and other issues, and Obama pushed forward 

an ambitious agenda of multilateral control measures, 

including ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty (CTB) and global support for a Fissile Materials 

Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Only Maurice Chevalier, strolling and singing on a boulevard in Paris, was lacking 

for suitable background music. 

Diplomatic atmospheres come and go, but the bankers of policy and strategy demand payment in hard 
418

currency. Russian-American strategic nuclear arms 

reductions neither preclude, nor guarantee, favorable 

prospects for multilateral disarmament or nonproliferation. This discussion first reviews the New START 

agreement and its implications for deterrence stability 

and arms control. Second, we develop and test the viability of a hypothetical, post-New START agreement 

with significantly lower numbers of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Third, we model a 

constrained nuclear nonproliferation regime, based 

on the post-New START agreement described earlier. 

A fourth section summarizes pertinent conclusions. 

POLICY

New START Gets Done.

U.S. President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New START agreement 

April 8, 2010, in Prague, Czech Republic. Replacing 

the START I that had already expired in December 

2009, the New START agreement called for reductions in the number of deployed long range nuclear 

weapons and their delivery systems: intercontinental 

missiles and heavy bombers. Part of the “reset” in 

U.S.-Russian relations following the acrimony of the 

Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush presidencies, the 

New START agreement was seen as a prelude to further Russian and American nuclear force reductions 

and to broader cooperation between Moscow and 

Washington on other nuclear related matters, including nonproliferation.

Under the new START agreement, each state 

would be required to reduce its number of deployed 

strategic warheads to a maximum of 1,550 and its 
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number of launchers to a maximum of 800 – 700 deployed – within 7 years of treaty ratification and entry 

into force.2 In theory, these limits were below the ceiling of 2,200 set by the preceding Strategic Offensive 

Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002 for deployed strategic warheads, and also below the START I maximum 

limit of 1,600 for long range delivery systems. Due to 

idiosyncrasies in the counting rules for weapons and 

the prior reductions by both states in their number of 

deployed weapons and launchers, neither the United 

States nor Russia would be required to make drastic 

changes in either existing or planned nuclear forces.3

Getting to New START from where they began in 

2009 required the United States and Russia to make 

some compromises inside and outside of the actual 

START negotiation process.4

 Russia made concessions 

on the issues of missile defenses and “upload potentials” for stored, but not deployed, warheads. With 

respect to missile defenses, Russian treaty negotiators 

attempted to obtain an American commitment to limit 

future missile defense deployments in Europe, and/

or to involve Russia in the planning and implementing of future defenses. The treaty includes statements 

attesting to the importance of the relationship between 

offensive and defensive weapons, but it places no 

limits on future U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) 

modernization or deployment.5

 This compromise was 

made possible by the prior U.S. decision, apart from 

START negotiations, in the fall of 2009 to reboot the 

George W. Bush administration’s plan to deploy missile defenses in Poland and in the Czech Republic, creating tension with Russia throughout 2007 and 2008. 

Writing in the Wall Street Journal in May, 2010, U.S. 

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates emphasized that 

the New START will not constrain American defenses:
420

The U.S. will continue to deploy and improve the interceptors that defend our homeland—those based in 

California and Alaska. We are also moving forward 

with plans to field missile defense systems to protect 

our troops and partners in Europe, the Middle East, 

and Northeast Asia against the dangerous threats 

posed by rogue nations like North Korea and Iran.6

The question of “upload potentials” raised some 

serious strategic issues. Russian START negotiators, 

doubtlessly reflecting the suspicions of their military, 

were concerned that the United States could first remove downloaded weapons consistently with START 

requirements and then, having decided to abrogate 

the treaty at a later date, rapidly upload the same 

weapons to achieve a surge or even a position of overwhelming nuclear superiority against Russia.7

 Theoretically, Russia would have a similar option to withdraw from the treaty and reload previously disarmed 

weapons. Compared to the American nuclear force 

modernization program, the Russian program was 

expected to provide fewer opportunities for timely 

reload on account of the disparity in suitable launchers, especially in submarine launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBMs). Russia’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine 

(SSBN) and SLBM modernization programs fell well 

behind schedule in the preceding decade, and the test 

results for the planned Bulava SLBM, to be deployed 

with the newest Borey class of SSBNs, have been disappointing.8

Russia’s concerns about U.S. relative nuclear advantage were not entirely based on arguments about 

upload potentials for current or future launchers. 

Three other issues played into Russian pessimism on 

this point. The first, already acknowledged, was the 
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U.S. plan for missile defenses deployed in Europe, 

adjusted by the Obama administration to a new approach that was presumably more acceptable to Russia than was the original Bush plan. The revised European BMD plan was a phased, adaptive approach 

built around sea and land-based missile interceptors 

for theater or shorter range ballistic missiles launched 

from Iran or other Middle Eastern locations.9

 Although 

the Obama European BMD plan was apparently less 

contentious than the Bush plan, Russian pessimists 

were not entirely mollified. They feared that the revised BMD plan left open the possibility of future 

enhancements to the antimissile systems that would 

degrade or even nullify Russia’s nuclear deterrent.10

The current probability of nuclear war between the 

United States and Russia is acknowledged by leaders 

of both states as being low to nonexistent, but Russia 

might still fear future political coercion on the part of 

the United States as supported by improved strategic 

defenses.11 Russian doubts about U.S. intentions could 

be increased if improved American and/or NATO antimissile defenses were complemented by newly deployed systems for non-nuclear prompt global strike.

Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence.

A second source of Russian concern about the appearance of U.S.-Russian nuclear parity, and about the 

future viability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent, resided 

in American plans for improving non-nuclear global 

strike capabilities. The George W. Bush administration 

had already introduced the notion of a “new triad” of 

conventional and nuclear offensive weapons, missile 

defenses, and improved nuclear infrastructure. The 

Obama Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR) of 2010
422

noted that U.S. policy was generally to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons over time, and specifically 

to forego nuclear weapons as an option for retaliation 

against non-nuclear weapons states that were fully in 

compliance with the NPT.12 Presumably this nuclear 

abstinence would even hold in the face of attacks by 

a non-nuclear state with chemical or biological weapons, although the 2010 NPR included an escape clause 

for any future biological attacks with catastrophic 

consequences. Although the Obama NPR fell short of 

a commitment to “no first use” of nuclear weapons 

under any conditions, it did chart a preferred course 

toward the use of nuclear weapons only for deterrence 

of a nuclear attack or in retaliation for one.13 Daryl G. 

Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, offered a favorable appraisal of the Obama 

NPR for narrowing the conditions under which the 

United States might use nuclear weapons, and for reducing the overall salience of nuclear weapons in U.S. 

security policy. But he also cautioned against NPR euphoria with respect to arms control:

Assigning U.S. nuclear weapons any role beyond ‘core 

nuclear deterrence‘ is both unnecessary and counterproductive. The United States, as well as Russia, 

should adopt a ’sole purpose‘ policy now rather than 

later. Reserving the option to use nuclear force in nonnuclear situations provides little or no deterrent value 

at high cost. It undermines the credibility of conventional deterrence, complicates our nonproliferation diplomacy and can be used by other countries to justify 

the pursuit or improvement of nuclear weapons.14

The Obama administration’s intent to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. political and 

military strategy invites the development and even-
423

tual deployment of weapons for conventional prompt 

global strike.15 According to the 2010 NPR, the Department of Defense will retain a margin above the 

minimum force required for nuclear deterrence “for 

the possible addition of non-nuclear prompt-global 

strike capabilities” that would be accountable under 

the New START treaty.16 START-accountable non-nuclear prompt global strike systems could include conventionally-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs), SLBMs, or purpose-built aerospace planes. 

In theory, conventional precision guidance systems (PGS) would permit timely attacks on terrorist 

bases, launch-ready missile parks, weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) storage sites, or other time urgent 

or important targets without the collateral damage 

and moral opprobrium of nuclear weapons. Russian 

negotiators at New START, and in other Russian and 

U.S. discussions with the George W. Bush and Obama 

administrations, had expressed reservations about 

conventional PGS weapons mounted on ballistic missiles or other launchers that also carried some part of 

the U.S. nuclear arsenal. One objection was that conventionally armed long-range ballistic missiles might 

pose a threat to nuclear crisis stability. Nuclear warning 

and response systems might not be able to distinguish 

between a conventional PGS launch and a nuclear first 

strike. In response to Russian concerns, New START 

negotiators agreed to a treaty provision that requires 

the decommissioning of one U.S. nuclear missile for 

every conventional PGS weapon deployed.17

In addition to the problem of nuclear crisis stability that is possibly implicit in conventional PGS systems, another Russian concern is that U.S. advanced 

conventional PGS systems could be combined with a 

nuclear offense and with improved missile defenses 
424

to create a conventional-nuclear first strike capability 

against Russia. Although this possibility might seem 

paranoid in a time when the United States and Russia have an official non-hostile political relationship, 

the scenario of an American nuclear first strike capability has received close attention from U.S. analysts 

and from Russian military experts.18 However, politics 

drives strategy—including domestic politics in the 

United States and Russia. In the case of Russia, domestic politics includes a General Staff and officer corps 

determined to preserve their status and power in the 

face of threatened military modernization to improve 

Russia’s conventional forces. This domestic political 

debate within Russia about conventional force modernization is a third force, in addition to U.S. missile 

defenses and conventional PGS systems, that makes 

some Russians less relaxed about the appearance of 

nuclear-strategic parity. 

Russian Perspectives.

The Russian ruling tandem of President Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, along with 

Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, have 

recognized the need for military reform in order to 

improve the quality of Russia’s Armed Forces. Improvements are needed in both conventional and nuclear forces, to be sure.19 But, compared to the former 

Soviet Union, the decline in the quality of Russia’s 

conventional forces relative to those of the United 

States and NATO has been more obvious and noticeable. Problems include both the quantity and quality 

of enlisted personnel, a top-heavy officer corps, and 

insufficient numbers of modern weapons and hours 

of training for personnel in the Ground Forces, Navy, 
425

and Air Force.20 Russia’s need for military modernization is not prompted exclusively by perceived threats 

from its western and southern directions. Russia’s 

strategic east faces a growing military and economic 

power in China, whose own military modernization 

“has moved the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] from 

a mass industrial army built to fight people’s war to a 

force seeking to rearm as an advanced conventional 

force and conduct their own version of net-centric 

warfare.”21

The Russian Defense Ministry’s plan for modernization and reform is ambitious on paper. It anticipates a broad transformation, departing from the 

historical experience of the Soviet Union in the 20th 

century with mass mobilization, conscript based forces, and trained for protracted interstate wars of attrition.22 Instead, future emphasis will be placed on the 

creation of light, rapidly deployable, and elite units 

of permanent readiness, staffed by specially trained 

contract soldiers instead of draftees. Additionally: 

the brigade, instead of the division, will be the focal 

operational-tactical unit of action; the officer corps 

will be downsized; and, emphasis will be placed on 

improving the command-control and network centric 

warfare capabilities of ready forces.23 The post-reform 

brigades will be the drivers of a new Russian military 

that is trained for the kinds of wars that Russia is more 

likely to have to fight in the 21st century: small wars, 

including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

operations, near or within Russia’s borders.

Skeptics question whether Russia has the necessary financial resources to fund this program for 

military transformation, and others have pointed to 

demographic problems in making available the numbers of eligible contract troops as well as draftees to 
426

achieve transformative goals in the next decade.24 But 

this skepticism is, among some quarters within Russia, fueled by the self-interest of a bloated military bureaucracy that seeks to preserve positions for general 

officers by resisting reform. One strategy for resistance 

is to adhere strictly to expired threat assessments and 

retro geopolitics, defining NATO and the United States 

as major enemies of Russia. Even the revised Russian 

Military Doctrine of 2010, which may suggest a lesser 

emphasis on its nuclear weapons for covering a wide 

variety of contingencies, compared to earlier versions 

(and thus, may be more compatible with the thrust of 

Obama’s NPR than those earlier editions of Russian 

military doctrine), nevertheless includes NATO enlargement among the dangers that Russia must take 

seriously and for which it must plan.25

Russian geostrategic thinking welcomes the emergence of a multipolar international order in which the 

leading military and economic state actors reach decisions by consensus.26 Ranking highest among Russia’s state priorities are the growth of its economy and 

an increase in the respect and deference accorded to 

Russian foreign and security policy, especially in its 

“near abroad” of former Soviet states, and particularly 

in Europe.27 From this perspective, Russia’s military 

clash with Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated 

Russia’s sensitivity, not only to Georgia’s perceived 

provocations, but also to the Russian leaders’ view of 

Georgia as a Trojan horse for U.S. and NATO political 

influence and military penetration. Although Russia’s 

conventional forces rapidly overpowered Georgian 

resistance and declared a postwar separatism from 

Georgia on behalf of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as an 

accomplished fact, obvious problems marked Russia’s 

military performance during this brief and one-sided 
427

war. The conflict also served as a warning to Georgia 

about poorly timed and ill-considered military brinkmanship. The war advertised how far away Russia’s 

conventional military forces are from those suited to 

the aspirations of a major regional or global military 

power. 

Among some Russian government officials and 

other elites, it is now recognized that broad changes in 

foreign policy must accompany, if not precede, the accomplishment of significant military reform. On this 

point, in May 2010 the Russian edition of Newsweek

magazine published a draft document from the Russian foreign ministry that was prepared earlier in February for President Medvedev.28 According to press 

reports, the foreign ministry document calls for a new 

Russian foreign policy, emphasizing improved relations with the United States and the European Union 

(EU) in order to expedite technology development 

and a more favorable climate for investment in Russia.29 Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center, 

writing in the Moscow Times, assessed the draft doctrine and its implications thus:

Russia is losing ground in the global pecking order by 

falling behind in terms of its industrial, technological, 

and scientific capabilities. All the proceeds from Gazprom’s sales notwithstanding, Russia is sorely lacking 

what it takes to be a major global economic and political force in the 21st century. Relative energy abundance and nuclear arsenals are simply not enough.30

An alternative perspective on the draft document 

was provided by Andrei Tsygankov, who regarded its 

interpretation as a pro-Western shift in Russian foreign policy as “not incorrect” but “insufficient.” Tsygankov argues that Russia’s rapprochement with the 
428

West is taking place within a larger context of a more 

decentralized, and less West-centric, world order. As 

he puts it, the post-Western world “has in store not 

only expertise and capital from advanced countries, 

but (also) new opportunities for improving Russia’s 

welfare and security in Asia, the Middle East and Latin 

America.”31 Edward Lozansky also supports the idea 

that Russia’s drive for economic and technology modernization is an all-azimuths one. The document, in 

his judgment, is “oriented toward West, East, South, 

North, and any other direction that has a potential for 

promoting Russian interests.”32 Putting the document 

in historical perspective, Stephen J. Blank cautions 

against euphoria with regard to Western expectations 

for Russian foreign policy transformation:

Indeed, it is a time-honored tradition of Russian and 

Soviet foreign policy to signal a détente based on common economic interests, the main goal of which is that 

Russia obtains foreign technology (which, because of 

its economic-political structure, it cannot optimally 

utilize) in return for sham or cosmetic concessions.33

Thus Russia’s nuclear and conventional force modernization depend both upon closing the gap between 

Russian performance and that of the other leading 

state economies. 

The conclusion of New START also provides symbolic benefits for Russia, by treating Russia as an equal 

negotiating partner with the United States for purposes of establishing a hierarchy of nuclear weapons 

states. So established, Russia has an additional hand 

to play at the head of the table among G-8 (the United 

States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom 

[UK], Canada, Italy, and Russia) and G-20 (South Africa, Canada, Mexico, the United States, Argentina, 
429

Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, 

Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Australia, and the European Union) major powers, despite its insufficiencies in non-nuclear 

forces. For the United States and its NATO allies, the 

impression of nuclear-strategic parity, as between the 

United States and Russia, should make Russia a more 

reliable partner for resolving conflicts short of war. 

In case of an outbreak of conventional war in or near 

Europe, Russia’s self-confidence, as a strategic nuclear partner of the United States, might delay Russia’s 

reach for its nuclear means of threat or actual nuclear 

use. Absent this reassurance, the gap between Russian 

and U.S.-NATO conventional forces creates a perilous temptation for prompt nuclear threat or use, once 

conventional war has begun. Into this double helix of 

escalation ladders fall U.S.-NATO and Russian substrategic nuclear weapons.

Sub-strategic Weapons and Alliance Politics.

The conclusion and eventual ratification of New 

START will leave unsettled the status of sub-strategic 

nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and 

Russia in Europe. Sub-strategic weapons are those 

deployed on other than strategic launchers, i.e., missiles or bombers of less than intercontinental range. In 

practice, this includes delivery systems at or below the 

outer limit of intermediate range missiles (5,500 kilometers), sometimes referred to as “battlefield,” “tactical,” “operational,” or “theater” missiles depending 

on actual ranges. U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons 

are presently located in five other NATO member 

countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 

and Turkey. The rationale for these forward deployed 
430

U.S nuclear weapons during the Cold War was to support the “coupling” of American and NATO European strategic commitments against Soviet intimidation 

or nuclear blackmail. Now decades beyond the Cold 

War, leading military experts and politicians within 

NATO Europe have recommended that these weapons should be removed and dismantled.34

Both the political and military rationales for U.S. 

sub-strategic weapons deployed in allied NATO 

states have been called into question. The political 

rationale of deterrence “coupling” seems beside the 

point if NATO and Russia are no longer declared or 

de facto enemies. The military rationale, or the need 

for a tactical nuclear option as part of an escalation 

“ladder” that would allow NATO to skirmish with 

Russia in increments, but short of total war, demands 

nuanced performance from command, control, and 

communications (C3) systems, and commanders on 

both sides. Otherwise escalation control turns into 

mutual confusion. Although current Russian military 

doctrine stipulates that NATO is a “danger” instead of 

a “threat,” Russian military concerns about a NATO 

conventional first strike option near Russia or within 

its state territory argue against a long pause between 

rungs of its escalation ladder.35

Some Russian strategists support the use of a small 

number of tactical nuclear weapons for the de-escalation of a conventional war based on the shock value of 

a nuclear “first use” option to obtain a favorable war 

termination. But such a use, as opposed to the threat 

of nuclear force employment, could backfire, causing 

a retaliatory and larger escalation by the opponent.36

As Pavel Baev noted, “deficiencies in Russia’s conventional military forces might increase the appeal of 

nuclear weapons under the exigent circumstances of 
431

perceived battlefield desperation.”37 Additionally, as 

Nikolai Sokov has explained:

The continuing weakness of Russian conventional 

forces vis-à-vis U.S. and combined NATO power as 

well as the close proximity of NATO forces to Russian territory (making limited use of force both more 

feasible and more effective) have led Russian military 

planners to rely on nuclear weapons for the purpose 

of de-escalation—the threat of a limited nuclear strike 

in response to a conventional attack that cannot be repelled by conventional forces is supposed to deter the 

attack in the first place.38

The group of experts tasked in 2010 to prepare 

guidelines for the revision of NATO’s strategic concept nevertheless endorsed the alliance’s deployment 

of U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons by noting that, 

as long as nuclear weapons “remain a reality in international relations,” NATO should retain a nuclear 

component to its deterrent strategy at the minimum 

level required by the international security environment.39 The rationales for this position are that the retention of some U.S. forward deployed nuclear weapons on European territory will support “extended 

nuclear deterrence and collective defense.”40 Having it 

both ways, as it were, the NATO group of experts also 

calls for “an ongoing nuclear dialogue with Russia” to 

expedite the further reduction, and possible elimination, of “the entire class of sub-strategic weapons.”41

Proposals from European politicians calling for the 

removal of U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons from 

NATO Europe, especially in the absence of some quid 

pro quo from Russia, are certain to meet with resistance 

across the Atlantic.42 Russia will be cautious about reciprocating. The “going in” position for Russia will 

be that the first step should be taken by the United 
432

States to repatriate or destroy all its nuclear weapons 

deployed outside of U.S. national territory, as did 

Russia with its nuclear weapons deployed in former 

Soviet states after the Cold War (with U.S. assistance). 

The U.S. argument will be that Russia must dismantle 

or relocate some of its own tactical nuclear weapons 

that are forward deployed in Russia’s western military districts and, in particular, near to the borders of 

NATO member states. 

Russia considers the assumption of symmetrical 

reductions in tactical nuclear weapons with NATO 

to be unfair because NATO already has superior conventional forces relative to Russia. Therefore, Russian 

tactical nuclear weapons provide reassurance against 

NATO escalation dominance, in case of any situation 

of threat or outbreak of local war. In addition, elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons calls for levels of 

transparency even beyond the inspection and verification regimes required for strategic nuclear weapons, 

as under New START, and steps on the national sensitivities of American NATO allies. Outside the realm 

of Russia’s public diplomacy, but surely on the minds 

of Russian military planners, as Jacob Kipp has noted, 

is the undoubted role of Russia’s sub-strategic nuclear 

weapons in deterring any conventional war against 

China or, in the event of deterrence failure, in contributing to a war termination on favorable terms.43

The Obama Nuclear Agenda.

President Obama’s extended agenda for nuclear 

marginalization (and, in theory, eventual abolition) 

goes beyond further START reductions and limitations 

on NATO and Russian tactical nuclear weapons.44 In 

addition, Obama wants the United States and other 

outliers to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
433

(CBT); to mobilize international support in favor of 

a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT); to extend 

and strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT); and, most importantly, to draw bright lines for 

preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons 

state and for reversing North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

status.45 This is an ambitious, although not impossible, 

agenda for nonproliferation, and it requires considerable cooperation from existing legally recognized and 

de facto nuclear weapons states. However, the United 

States and Russia have a special responsibility for 

leadership in this regard: they hold more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons and, as well, the 

historical responsibility for godfathering the nuclear 

revolution in military affairs. Their management of 

nuclear forces during and after the Cold War, despite 

some scary moments and embarrassing political posturing here and there, provide “lessons learned” for 

other, and especially newer, members of the nuclear 

weapons club. 

One of these lessons is that further progress in horizontal nuclear risk reduction (the spread of nuclear 

weapons among additional states) requires the simultaneous commitment by leading nuclear weapons 

states to vertical risk reduction (limiting the growth 

of existing arsenals, or preferably, reducing them in 

size). The preceding point does not depend upon the 

allegedly naive argument that a good example set by 

the United States and by Russia automatically translates into vertical or horizontal nuclear risk reduction. 

Critics of nuclear risk reduction attack a straw man 

here. The United States and Russia are not reducing 

their numbers of long-range nuclear weapons and 

launchers because of altruism. They are taking this 

step because excessive numbers of nuclear weapons 

are politically pointless and militarily useless. 
434

In doing so, the leaders of Russia and the United 

States commit themselves to a process of reciprocal 

nuclear risk management and support for stable deterrence and reassurance, a necessary step for further 

cooperation on vertical and horizontal disarmament. 

However, the United States and Russia cannot proceed to lower-than-New START reductions without 

tacit and explicit cooperation on the part of other current nuclear weapons states, and even some nuclear 

weapons-ready or virtual nuclear weapons states. As 

Henry Sokolski has explained:

In addition to making roughly equal reductions with 

Russia, then, the United States will have to keep other 

nuclear-armed states, such as China and India, from 

trying to catch up with U.S. nuclear weapons deployment levels and—as in the case of India and China, 

Pakistan and India, and Japan and China—from trying to catch up with each other. This means that additional nuclear restraints, either in the form of nuclear 

weapons reductions or further limits on the production or stockpiling of weapons-usable fuel, will need 

to be reached with Russia, of course, but also with China, India, and Pakistan. As a practical matter, this also 

means that other nuclear weapons-ready or virtual 

weapons states (e.g., Japan) will have to be persuaded 

to curtail or end their production of weapons-usable 

materials or to dispose of some portion of what they 

currently have.46

Obama’s vision of a nuclear free world, as he admits, may not be realized in his lifetime—if ever. But 

the avoidance of nuclear war, and the preservation 

of a nuclear taboo that has existed since Nagasaki, is 

a sufficiently challenging crusade for the rest of the 

present century.47 Managing toward that end will require international cooperation in nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament that connect 
435

linear to nonlinear strategies for risk reduction. Serial 

progress in U.S. and Russian nuclear arms limitation is 

a realistic expectation, but not a guaranty of nonlinear 

success stories in nonproliferation or in disarmament. 

To achieve broader objectives in nuclear renunciation, 

states will have to leapfrog beyond purely statist models of defense and deterrence into more communitarian and regional, or even global, paradigms of reference. The shared space of nuclear danger includes 

threats, not only from existing and aspiring nuclear 

weapons states, but also from nonstate actors such 

as terrorists with apocalyptic or other anti-systemic 

agendas.48 The two dangers are linked in theory and 

in practice: the more states with nuclear weapons and 

with anti-systemic grievances, the more vulnerable are 

the commons to lapses in nuclear security and, perhaps, nuclear terrorism. States that fail, individually 

and collectively, to embrace nuclear risk reduction or 

elimination could find themselves in the target coordinates of future extremists who are beyond deterrence. 

METHODOLOGY

Approach.

The preceding discussion sets the stage for the 

following analysis. The methodology will proceed in 

two principal steps. First, a statistical model is used to 

test the adequacy of projected U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces that are New START-compliant. As 

part of this framework, an examination is provided to 

determine if smaller forces for either state could meet 

the criteria for deterrence sufficiency and stability. 

The comparison with possible post-New START forces is not an idle academic exercise. Both the United 

States and Russia have indicated that the door is open 
436

to reducing the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear 

weapons below the levels agreed in the treaty signed 

on April 8, 2010. 

In a second step of the analysis, the connection between nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation 

will be examined through the use of a pertinent “what 

if” illustration of one hypothetical, but realistic, world 

environment. If, for example, the United States and 

Russia can agree to lower-than-New START levels of 

strategic retaliatory forces, their remaining maximum 

levels for deployed nuclear weapons could be the 

basis for a constrained nuclear proliferation system 

among the existing recognized and de facto nuclear 

weapons states. This connection between American 

and Russian vertical disarmament and responsibility 

for leadership on nonproliferation is not hypothetical 

or academic, but legal and operational.49

As acknowledged nuclear weapons states under 

the protocols of the nuclear NPT, the United States 

and Russia (among others) are required to engage in 

nuclear arms reductions and arms limitation. Operationally, the United States and Russia have the largest nuclear arsenals, the most experience with nuclear 

force operations, and the most experience in negotiating nuclear arms control agreements. In short, the connection between U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions 

and downstream success in controlling the spread of 

nuclear weapons is explicit, despite the denials of cynics, nay sayers, and prophets of inevitable nuclear proliferation and doomsday. On the other hand, accepting responsibility for action is not the same thing as 

accomplishing it. The United States and Russia cannot 

necessarily get the rest of the nuclear club to march in 

step with their ambitions, even when Washington and 

Moscow are agreed.
437

Data Analysis.

Current and New START accountable U.S. and 

Russian strategic nuclear forces are summarized in 

Table 9-1.

Russia

July 2009 

Old START

launchers

2010 

Actual 

Operationally 

Deployed

Launchers 

(total launchers)

Ca. 2020 

New START 

operationally 

deployed launchers 

(total launchers)-

estimate

Ca. 2020 New 

START warheads 

(estimate)

ICBMs

SS-25 176 171 0 0

SS-27 Silo 50 50 60 60

SS-27 Road 15 18 27 27

RS-24 85 255

SS-19 120 70 0 0

SS-18 104 59 20 200

Total ICBMs 465 367 192 542

SLBMs

Delta III/ 

SS-N-18

6/96 4/64 0 0

Delta IV/ 

SS-N-23

6/96 4/64 (6/96) 4/64 256

Typhoon/ 

SS-N-20

2/40 0 0 0

Borey/ Bulava 2/36 0 4/64 384

Total SLBMs 268 128 (164) 128 640

Bombers

Tu-160 13 13 13 13

Tu-95MS 63 63 63 63

Total Bombers 76 76 76 76

TOTAL 809 571(603) 396(396) 1258
438

United States

Source: Pavel Podvig, “New START Treaty in Numbers,” 

from his blog, Russian strategic nuclear forces, April 9, 2010, available from russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml.

Notes:

1. New START counting rules count each bomber as a single 

weapon (warhead) although bombers actually carry more than 

one weapon.

2. Under New START each state is permitted to deploy a maximum number of 700 operational launchers and to maintain up to 

100 additional nondeployed launchers.

Table 9-1. Russian and U.S. Strategic Nuclear 

Forces. Past and Projected.

July 2009 

Old START

launchers

2010 

Actual 

Operationally 

Deployed

Launchers 

(total launchers)

Ca. 2020 

New START 

operationally 

deployed launchers 

(total launchers)-

estimate

Ca. 2020 New 

START warheads 

(estimate)

ICBMs

Minute-man 

III

500 450 350 350

MX 50 0 0 0

Total ICBMs 550 450 350 350

SLBMs

Trident I/C-4 4/96 0 0 0

Trident II/D-5 14/336 12/288 (14/336) 12/288 (14/336) 1152

Total SLBMs 268 288 (336) 288 (336) 1152

Borey/ Bulava 2/36 0 4/64 384

Total SLBMs 268 128 (164) 128 640

Bombers

B-1 47 0 0 0

B-2 18 16 (18) 16 (18) 16

B-52 141 44 (93) 32 (93) 32

Total Bombers 206 60 (111) 48 (111) 48

TOTAL 1188 798 (897) 686 (797) 1550
439

Using the numbers in Table 3-1 as points of departure, we construct hypothetical, but not unrealistic, 

U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces for the period 2017-2020 that are consistent with New START 

guidelines and related policy statements made by officials of both states.50 These guidelines include: 

(1) the expectation that both the United States 

and Russia will maintain a triad of strategic nuclear 

launchers, including land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, and 

heavy bombers; 

(2) no limitations on future defenses deployed by 

either side, although a notification and withdrawal 

clause exists that could allow either party to depart 

the treaty for this or other reasons; 

(3) counting rules that underrepresent the numbers of weapons deployed on long-range bombers; 

(4) postponement of the issues of stored nuclear 

weapons and their related upload potential; and, 

(5) a two step limitation on the numbers of deployed intercontinental or transoceanic launchers—700 deployed and 100 additional nondeployed.51

Figure 9-1 provides a drawdown curve of second 

strike surviving and retaliating strategic nuclear warheads for U.S. forces under New START deployment 

limits of 1,550 weapons for each state.52 Surviving and 

retaliating warheads are calculated under each of four 

operational conditions of alertness and launch readiness: 

(1) forces are on generated alert and launched on 

warning (GEN, LOW); 

(2) forces are on generated alert and ride out the 

attack before retaliating (GEN, ROA); 

(3) forces are on day-to-day alert and launch on 

warning (DAY, LOW); and, 
440

(4) forces are on day to day alert and ride out the 

attack (DAY, ROA). 

The drawdown curve graphs the numbers of total, 

available, alert, surviving, and arriving weapons for 

each operational condition. 

Figure 9-1. U.S. Surviving and Retaliating 

Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit.

In Figure 9-2, the numbers of surviving and retaliating Russian second strike warheads are tabulated 

and depicted for each of the four operational conditions under New START deployment limits of 1,550 

weapons. The graph shows the numbers of total, 

available, alert, surviving, and arriving weapons for 

each operational condition, following the same schematic as shown in Figure 9-1 for U.S. forces.
441

Figure 9-2. Russian Surviving and Retaliating 

Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit.

A close inspection of Figures 9-1 and 9-2 reveals 

that U.S. and Russian New START-compliant forces 

can easily satisfy requirements for mutual deterrence 

based on assured retaliation. Each, under a variety 

of operational conditions, has sufficient numbers of 

surviving and retaliating warheads to guarantee unacceptable societal damage to the first striker. In addition to this “assured destruction” or “assured retaliation” metric, each side can also provide for additional 

warheads with which to attack nuclear, other forces, 

and command-control systems. The addition of defensive weapons to the equation for both sides does not 

change this picture fundamentally, although it does 

reduce the flexibility of targeting for each side in retaliation. 

What happens if the maximum number of strategic 

nuclear weapons permitted for each side is reduced to 
442

1,000 instead of 1,550? In Figures 9-3 and 9-4, the numbers of U.S. and Russian second strike surviving and 

retaliating warheads for the four operational conditions outlined in Figures 9-1 and 9-2 are summarized.

Figure 9-3. U.S. Surviving and Retaliating 

Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit.

Figure 9-4. Russian Surviving and Retaliating 

Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit.
443

The results summarized in Figures 9-3 and 9-4 

show that the United States and Russia can, within a 

maximum deployment limit of 1,000 weapons and under almost all conditions of operational alertness and 

launch readiness, provide for the assured destructionassured retaliation mission, and then some. Each has 

more than 400 surviving and retaliating weapons under all operational conditions, except for Russia under 

the “worst case” for a retaliator: with the retaliator’s 

forces postured on day-to-day alert, and riding out the 

attack. Neither Russian nor American forces would 

probably be in this condition during the kind of political crisis in which the use of nuclear weapons was seriously considered by each side. In addition, the reason 

for the greater degree of symmetry between the two 

sides in outcomes for the 1,000 warhead deployment 

limit, compared to the New START 1,550 maximum, 

lies in the fact that our 1,000 (hypothetical) illustration 

uses a Russian force that is closer in size and quality 

to the U.S. force than is the case in New START. In 

terms of strategic impact, however, this is a distinction 

without a difference. 

Why bother demonstrating what some scholars and 

defense analysts regard as self evident: that the United 

States and Russia have more than enough deployed 

long-range nuclear weapons, currently and prospectively, to maintain stable deterrence and to avoid the 

possibility of a nuclear first strike by the other side? 

The problem is more subtle than the question implies. 

The abstract possibility of a nuclear first strike capability by the United States against Russia has been used 

as a bargaining chip in Russian domestic politics by 

disgruntled conservatives in its military, by researchers in Russian think tanks, and by Kremlin-supportive 

media sources.53 This constellation of hawkish views 

outside of official Russian ministries, but acting in 
444

possible concert with sympathetic Kremlin sources, 

allows the Medvedev-Putin tandem to have it both 

ways. Official channels trumpet the “reset” in U.S.-

Russian relations, while supposedly independent 

hawkish commentators fan the flames of public opinion in defining the United States and NATO as major enemies of Russia.54 Nor were doubts about New 

START and further progress in nuclear arms control 

confined to skeptical Russians. During hearings before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 

May 2010, various Senators expressed doubts about 

New START, including the possibility that it would 

limit future American missile defense options.55

The first section of this chapter argued that there 

was a direct connection in policy and strategy between 

the bilateral U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions and 

the problem of multilateral nonproliferation management. If so, could the lower of the two illustrations 

for the U.S.-Russian force limitations, a maximum of 

1,000 deployed warheads for each side, serve as a basis for organizing a constrained nonproliferation system among the existing nuclear weapons states? Let 

us assume that, in this constrained nuclear proliferation system, Iran is prevented from deploying nuclear 

weapons and North Korean nuclear proliferation is 

rolled back by diplomatic agreement. The remaining 

nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, UK, 

France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel) agree to a 

tiered structure that provides for a maximum of 1,000 

deployed weapons for the United States and for Russia; a maximum of 500 each for Britain, France, and 

China; and a maximum of 300 for India, Israel, and 

Pakistan. Notional forces are assigned to each of these 

powers in Figure 9-5, and the numbers of second strike 

retaliating warheads provided by each force are estimated in Figure 9-6. These numbers are obviously not 
445

intended as predictions of actual forces to be deployed 

by these states in the 2017-20 time frame. Instead, they 

are heuristics to allow for broad comparisons and illustrations of possible second strike survivability under canonical conditions. 

Figure 9-5. Constrained Proliferation Model.

Total Strategic Weapons.

Figure 9-6. Constrained Proliferation Model,

Surviving and Retaliating Weapons.
446

The findings in Figure 9-6 show that within a threetiered constrained nuclear proliferation system, under 

an umbrella of U.S. and Russian forces each capped 

at 1,000 deployed long-range weapons, it is possible 

(although not guaranteed) to construct a deterrence 

and crisis-stable pyramid if—always the big “if”—negotiations can produce acceptable bargains, monitoring, and verification can be accomplished with necessary transparency, and those outliers seeking to bash 

their way into the club can be excluded. Is this fair? 

Neither nonproliferation nor any other serious goal in 

international politics is likely to be obtained by means 

that are entirely fair, but a less than entirely fair system might still meet the criteria of decision rationality. 

Those criteria include the premise that consensus on 

major points of agreement has been reached across the 

boundaries of diverse state interests and priorities. 

In addition, trade-offs and side payments to reach 

that consensus should not leave any nuclear armed 

state in a constrained proliferation system with incentives for cheating on the agreed numbers or, even 

worse, for overturning the entire structure in favor of 

nuclear adventurism. No arrangement of numbers can 

restrict the elbow room of states and their leaders to 

do harm, or good, based on domestic political motives 

and the structure of the international system. Arms 

control cannot substitute for politics; it can only take 

advantage of favorable political climates to reduce the 

probability of war or the disutility of war, if it occurs.56

In the case of nuclear war or nuclear weapons spread, 

the avoidance is to be preferred to the alternatives.
447

CONCLUSION

New START and other manifestations of U.S.-

Russian nuclear arms control are embedded in (at 

least) three overlapping levels of conceptual analysis. 

The first level is the need for reconceptualization of 

geostrategic space, especially Euro-strategic space, in 

order to extend the concept of a “European” security 

community from the Atlantic to the Urals, and from 

Svalbard to Sinope. This truly transcontinental security space must be approached by the United States, 

Russia, and NATO as a positive-sum policy and strategy game, instead of zero-sum competition. Cooperative

security is an empty vessel without active collaborative

security procedures and institutions to support it—as 

recent arms control experience has shown. Movement 

from cooperative into collaborative security will require persistent policymakers who are determined to 

overcome bureaucratic inertia in Washington, Moscow, and Brussels. 

The second level of analysis involves the necessary transformation in foreign policy orientations on 

the part of the United States, NATO, and Russia. The 

United States needs to discard its recent excursions 

into unilateralism, preemptive military doctrines, and 

omnivorous statements of foreign policy objectives, 

based on an oxymoronic cocktail of liberal internationalism and neoconservatism. Instead, the United 

States should pursue its traditional policy of being 

an “offshore balancer,” supplemented by preemptive leadership for (multilateral) conflict prevention 

and management, supported by America’s unique 

capabilities for systems integration and global military reach. Russia needs to adjust its military DNA to 

a world in which NATO is part of the solution, not 
448

the problem, from a Russian perspective: cooperation 

on missile defenses would be a step in this direction. 

NATO needs to adjust its near term goals, away from 

the acquisition of additional territories and dependencies (read: Ukraine and Georgia) and toward a “Great 

Northern Alliance” concept that includes Russia as a 

security partner, if not a member. 

The third level of analysis, derivative of the first 

two, is further Russian-American movement on nuclear arms reductions, with the potential for spillover 

into nonproliferation. Will the New START agreement, 

once ratified and brought into force lead necessarily, 

or inevitably, to progress on nuclear nonproliferation 

under the leadership of Moscow and Washington? A 

great deal depends on the priorities placed by each 

side on nonproliferation, compared to other foreign 

policy issues.57 The United States and Russia can do 

little without cooperation from other nuclear weapons 

states, especially the other permanent members of the 

UN Security Council (P-5): the UK, France, and China. 

Iran and North Korea are imminent test cases for the 

viability of the current nuclear nonproliferation regime, but even the most favorable outcomes in these 

cases do not preclude other challenges.58 Regardless 

the trials and tribulations of interstate proliferation, 

nonstate actors, especially terrorists, present additional challenges guaranteeing sleepless nights.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Eben Harrell, “A Surprising Consensus on Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Time.com, June 2, 2010, available from www.time.

com/time/printout/0,8816,1993339,00.html.

2. Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, “The New START Trea-
449

ty,” Opening Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, June 15, 2010, available from www.state.

gov/t/vci/rls/143159.htm.

3. Peter Baker, “Russia and U.S. Sign Nuclear Arms Reduction Pact,” New York Times, April 8, 2010, available from www.

nytimes.com/2010/04/09/world/europe/09prexy.html; and “Obama, 

Medvedev sign historic arms deal,” Associated Press, April 8, 

2010, available from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36254613/ns/politicswhite_house/print. For expert analysis and projections, see Pavel 

Podvig, “New START Treaty in Numbers,” from his blog, Russian 

strategic nuclear forces, April 9, 2010, available from russianforces.

org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml.

4. The text of the New START treaty appears in Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 

Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 8, 

2010, available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.

pdf. Contrasting appraisals of New START appear in Steven Pifer, “New START: Good News for U.S. Security,” Arms Control 

Today, May 2010, available from www.armscontrol.org/print/4209; 

Keith B. Payne, “Evaluating the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Deal,” Wall 

Street Journal, April 8, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List 2010, #69, 

April 8, 2010, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net; Jonathan 

Schell, “Nuclear balance of terror must end,” CNN, April 8, 2010, 

in Johnson’s Russia List 2010, #69, April 8, 2010, davidjohnson@

starpower.net; and Alexander Golts, “An Illusory New START,” 

Moscow Times, March 30, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List 2010, #62, 

March 30, 2010, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net.

5. On current and prospective U.S. missile defense programs, see Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency, before the 

House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Regarding the Fiscal Year 2011 Missile Defense Programs, Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, U.S. 

House of Representatives, April 15, 2010, esp. p. 18 on absence 

of New START constraints. See also Walter Pincus, “Arms treaty 

shouldn’t constrain U.S. missile defenses,” Washington Post, April 

20, 2010, p. A13, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2010/04/19/AR2010041904602_.
450

6. Robert M. Gates, “The Case for the New START Treaty,” 

Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List 2010, 

#94, May 13, 2010, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net.

7. An informative discussion of this appears in Alexei Arbatov, “The New START—A View from Moscow,” question and 

answer format, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 6, 2010, available from www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40506. 

8. Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Bulava Blunder,” Novaya Gazeta, 

July 25, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List 2009, #140, July 27, 2009, 

available from davidjohnson@starpower.net. According to Alexander Golts, the “Bulava fiasco” is more a matter of managerial 

incompetence than it is a technological failure. Golts, “The High 

Price of Feeding Russia’s Ambitions,” Moscow Times, July 28, 2009, 

in Johnson’s Russia List 2009, #141, July 28, 2009, available from 

davidjohnson@starpower.net.

9. Robert M. Gates, “A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe,” New York Times, September 19, 2009, available from www.

nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinion/20gates.html. The Obama Phased 

Adaptive Approach to missile defense will retain and improve 

some technologies deployed by the George W. Bush administration, but shift emphasis to other interceptors supported by improved battle management, command-control-communications 

(BMC3) systems, and launch detection and tracking. See Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the House Armed Services 

Committee, Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 

House Armed Services Committee, October 1, 2009. Prompt reactions to the Obama missile defense plan include George Friedman, “The BMD Decision and the Global System,” STRATFOR, 

September 21, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List 2009, #175, September 22, 2009, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net; Alexander Golts, “Calling Moscow’s Bluff on Missile Defense,” Moscow 

Times, September 22, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List 2009, #175, 

September 22, 2009, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net; 

Alexander L. Pikayev, “For the Benefit of All,” Moscow Times, September 21, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List 2009, #174, September 

21, 2009, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net; and Strobe 
451

Talbott, “A better base for cutting nuclear weapons,” Financial 

Times, September 21, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List 2009, #174, 

September 21, 2009, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net.

10. A critical expert appraisal of the Obama missile defense 

plan appears in George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “A 

Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” Arms Control 

Today, May 2010, available from www.armscontrol.org/print/4244. 

See also William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Review Cites 

Flaws in U.S. Antimissile Program,” New York Times, May 17, 

2010, available from www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/18missile.

html. For a favorable expert assessment of the Obama missile defense plan, see Hans Binnendijk, “A Sensible Decision: A Wider 

Protective Umbrella,” Washington Times, September 30, 2009, in 

Johnson’s Russia List 2009, #181, September 30, 2009, available 

from davidjohnson@starpower.net. Expert Russian commentary on 

prospects for U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation and on 

related strategic issues also appears in Sergei Rogov, “Concepts: 

The Window of Opportunity is Open,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye, May 28, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List 2010, #114, June 

11, 2010, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net. Continuing 

Russian doubts about BMD are noted in “Russia Still Suspicious 

of U.S. Missile Defense Plans,” Reuters, September 29, 2009, in 

Johnson’s Russia List 2009, #181, September 30, 2009, available 

from davidjohnson@starpower.net.

11. Nikolai Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons in Russian National 

Security Strategy,” paper presented at conference on “Strategy 

and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy,” Ft. McNair, National 

Defense University, Washington, DC, June 28, 2010, p. 30.

12. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010, p. 15.

13. Pertinent and spirited commentary on NPR and related 

nuclear security issues appears on the blog ArmsControlWonk edited by Dr. Jeffrey Lewis. See, for example, Jeffrey Lewis, “Grading the NPR: Transparency,” April 13, 2010; Lewis, “The Pivot,” 

April 7, 2010; and Joshua Pollack, “Where the NPR Meets in the 

Middle,” April 6, 2010, all available from www.armscontrolwonk.

com/category/nuclear-weapons/.
452

14. Daryl G. Kimball, “Obama’s Nuclear Doctrine Could Boost 

Reset,” Moscow Times, April 13, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List 

2010, #72, April 13, 2010, available from davidjohnson@starpower.

net. See also Daryl G. Kimball and Greg Thielmann, “Obama’s 

NPR: Transitional, Not Transformational,” Arms Control Today, 

May 2010, available from www.armscontrol.org/print/4223.

15. Craig Whitlock, “U.S. developing new non-nuclear missiles,” Washington Post, April 8, 2010, available from www.msnbc.

msn.com/id/36253190/ns/us_news-washington_post/print/1/.

16. Nuclear Posture Review Report, p. 20.

17. David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Faces Choice on 

New Weapons for Fast Strikes,” New York Times, April 23, 2010, 

p. A1. According to the same source, the Obama precision global 

strike concept envisions that Russia would regularly inspect PGS 

silos to reassure itself that the weapons were non-nuclear, and 

that American PGS launchers would be located far from those 

tasked for strategic nuclear forces.

18. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, available from 

www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204/keir-a-lieber-darylg-press/html. For rejoinders to Lieber and Press, see Peter C. W. 

Flory, Keith Payne, Pavel Podvig, and Alexei Arbatov, “Nuclear 

Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, available from 

www.foreignaffairs.com/print/61931.

19. Nuclear weapons, according to Nikolai Sokov, have three 

partially overlapping roles in Russian national security policy: (1) 

as a status symbol; (2) for existential deterrence; and, (3) as part of 

contingent plans for use or threat of use to deter large scale conventional attacks on Russia. Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons in Russian 

Security Strategy,” paper presented at conference on “Strategy 

and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy,” Ft. McNair, National 

Defense University, Washington, DC, June 28, 2010, p. 5.
453

20. Dale R. Herspring, “Putin, Medvedev, and the Russian 

Military,” Chap. 12, in Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring, 

eds., After Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, Fourth 

Ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010, pp. 265-290.

21. Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat 

That Dare not Speak Its Name,” paper presented at conference on 

“Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy,” Ft. McNair, 

National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 28, 2010, p. 5.

22. I gratefully acknowledge Dale Herspring for insights into 

this issue. He is not responsible for arguments here. See also, on 

the seriousness of Russian military reform, Keir Giles, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010,” NATO Research 

Review, Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, February, 2010, esp. 

p. 3.

23. Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed 

Forces, Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020,” paper presented at 

conference on “Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy,” 

Ft. McNair, National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 

28, 2010.

24. Projections suggest that between now and 2025, Russia’s 

pool of draft age manpower will decline at an even faster rate 

than the rate for the general population. The implications of this 

for the size and composition of Russia’s future forces are traced 

in Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine 

Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications, Santa 

Monica, CA; RAND, 2009, pp. 145-151.

25. For an assessment of the 2010 doctrine on this point, see 

Nikolai Sokov, “The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The 

Nuclear Angle,” Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 5, 2010, 

available from cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.

htm. See also, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, available from www.Kremlin.ru, February 5, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia 

List 2010, #35, February 19, 2010, available from davidjohnson@

starpower.net.

26. Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons in Russian Security Strategy,” 

p. 5.
454

27. According to some experts, Russians do not have a unified view of their foreign policy objectives, but a broad consensus emerged during Putin’s second term about Russia’s foreign 

policy goals. See Oliker et. al., Russian Foreign Policy, pp. 83-138, 

esp. p. 87. See also Anders Aslund and Andrew Kutchins, The 

Russia Balance Sheet, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, April, 2009; and Stephen J. Blank, Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration? Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 

2009, for additional perspective on Russian objectives pertinent to 

national security and nuclear arms control.

28. See “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Russia’s New 

Foreign Policy Doctrine,” introduction by Vladimir Frolov, in 

Russia Profile, May 21, 2010, available from www.russiaprofile.org, 

in Johnson’s Russia List 2010, #101, May 24, 2010, available from 

davidjohnson@starpower.net.

29. Ibid.

30. Trenin, quoted in Frolov et al., Russia Profile, May 24, 2010.

31. Tsygankov commentary in “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Russia’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine,” introduction 

by Vladimir Frolov, in Russia Profile, May 21, 2010, available from 

www.russiaprofile.org, in Johnson’s Russia List 2010, #101, May 24, 

2010, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net.

32. Lozansky commentary in Ibid. 

33. Blank commentary in Ibid. 

34. For an expert assessment, see Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn, NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma, London, UK: Royal 

United Services Institute, Occasional Paper, March 2010, available 

from www.rusi.org. Pertinent historical and technical background 

is given in Hans M. Kristensen, U.S Nuclear Weapons in Europe: 

A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning, 

Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, February 

2005.
455

35. “Military dangers” create conditions where threats are 

possible, whereas “military threats” exist where there is “a realistic possibility of armed conflict arising.” See Giles, pp. 4-5; and, 

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by Russian 

Federation Presidential Edict, February 5, 2010, Part I, No. 6, English translation available from www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010.

36. Richard Weitz, “Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security 

Policy,” paper presented at conference on “Strategy and Doctrine 

in Russian Security Policy,” Ft. McNair, National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 28, 2010, pp. 25-27, provides an 

insightful discussion.

37. Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Security Relations with the U.S.: 

Futures Planned and Unplanned,” paper presented at conference 

on “Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy,” Ft. McNair, 

National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 28, 2010, p. 8.

38. Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons in Russian Security Strategy,” 

pp. 7-8. See also Weitz, “Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy,” pp. 25-27; and Baev, “Russia’s Security Relations with 

the U.S.: Planned and Unplanned,” pp. 7-8.

39. NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic 

Concept for NATO, Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 17, 2010, p. 43.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Mark Landler, “U.S. Resists Push by Allies for Tactical 

Nuclear Cuts,” New York Times, April 22, 2010, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23diplo.html.

43. Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare 

not Speak Its Name. See also Ibid., p. 3, for Russian nuclear deployments on non-European strategic axes, including (among 

others) the Siberian and Far Eastern federal districts.
456

44. See George Perkovich, “After Prague: What’s Next 

for Arms Control?” International Herald Tribune, April 7, 2010, 

available from www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.

cfm?fa=view&id=40532.

45. On Iran’s progress toward the capability for nuclear weaponization and related issues, see Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts, 

New York: East-West Institute, May 2009, available from www.

ewi.info; and “Iran’s Nuclear Timetable,” Iran Watch, updated February 23, 2010, and regularly, available from www.iranwatch.org/

ourpubs/articles/iranucleartimetable.html. For possible scenarios if 

diplomacy fails, see Anthony Cordesman, Iran, Israel and the Effects of a Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 1, 2009, esp. pp. 

5-8 and 32-46. On North Korea, see Leon V. Sigal, “Let’s Make 

a Deal,” The American Interest Magazine, January-February 2010, 

available from the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=767; 

and Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, North Korea’s Military 

Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 

Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007.

46. Henry Sokolski, “Moving Toward Zero and Armageddon?” Chap. 5, in Sokolski, ed., Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, May 2010, pp. 77-101, citation from p. 87.

47. For possible dangers and pathways to nuclear first use, see 

George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken 

Taboo, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. On 

the concept of a nuclear taboo, see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear 

Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 

1945, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007, esp. pp. 

327-360.

48. See Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, New York: Henry Holt, Times Books, 2004, 

pp. 61-63.

49. For informative discussion on this point, see Blank, Russia 

and Arms Control; and Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History 
457

and Future of Nuclear Weapons, New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2007.

50. For U.S. force modernization plans pertinent to the New 

START agreement of April, 2010, see Nuclear Posture Review Report, pp. 19-27. For Russian possibilities, see Podvig, “New START 

Treaty in Numbers,” from his blog, Russian strategic nuclear forces, 

April 9, 2010, available from russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_

start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml; and Podvig, “Russia’s new arms 

development,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 16, 2009, 

available from thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/

russias-new-arms-development.

51. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 

Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 

Strategic Offensive Arms, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, April 8, 2010, available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf. 

52. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James Scouras 

for use of his AWSM® model for making calculations and drawing graphs pertinent to this study. He is not responsible for any 

arguments or opinions here. Additional information about this 

model with pertinent illustration appears in Stephen J. Cimbala 

and James Scouras, A New Nuclear Century, Westport, CT: Praeger 

Publishers, 2002, pp. 25-73. 

53. For pertinent references and commentary on this point, 

see Michael Bohm, “The Kremlin’s Shock Troops,” Moscow Times, 

May 6, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List 2010, #89, May 6, 2010, available from davidjohnson@starpower.net. 

54. Bohm, “The Kremlin’s Shock Troops.”

55. Rachel Oswald, “GOP Senators Remain Wary of U.S.-Russian Arms Control Deal,” available from www.globalsecuritynewswire.org, in Johnson’s Russia List 2010, #87, May 4, 2010, available 

from davidjohnson@starpower.net.
56. An argument in favor of a multi-causal explanation for 

Cold War and post-Cold War outcomes in nuclear policy and 

strategy is effectively presented in Michael Krepon, Better Safe 

than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.

57. In addition to sources previously cited, excellent discussions on this topic appear in Alexei Arbatov, “Terms of Engagement: Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and U.S.-

Russian Relations,” Chap. 5, pp. 139-168; and Stephen J. Blank, 

“Prospects for Russo-American Cooperation in Halting Nuclear 

Proliferation,” Chap. 6, pp. 169-284, both in Stephen J. Blank, ed., 

Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009.

58. Although official U.S. policy holds that Iran should not 

be permitted to obtain nuclear weapons, the United States also 

hedges against the possibility of a nuclear Iran, including plans 

for missile detection and defense systems and other military ties 

to Persian Gulf states and Obama’s revised missile defense plan 

for Europe. See “U.S. Considers Options Against Nuclear Iran,” 

Associated Press, April 23, 2010, available from www.cbsnews.com/

stories/2010/04/20/politics/main6414377.shtml.

458
459

CHAPTER 10

RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE AND THE

THREAT THAT DARE NOT SPEAK ITS NAME1

Jacob W. Kipp

The overwhelming focus of the limited Western 

writings on the contemporary Russian military and its 

nuclear forces is predominantly European. This exists 

in spite of the fact that Russia under Vladimir Putin 

and Dmitri Medvedev has proclaimed itself a Eurasian 

power. Western commentary on the Russo-Georgian 

Conflict of August 2008 highlights this tendency. The 

conflict in this context becomes about Georgia’s desire 

to join the West via membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia’s military 

response—although aimed at the Georgian government under President Mikhail Saakashvilli and the 

Georgian Armed Forces—intended to undermine U.S. 

and NATO interests in Europe.2 The same can be said 

about the Obama administration’s “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations and the emphasis placed upon reaching 

an agreement on offensive nuclear forces, which are 

a legacy of the militarized Cold War confrontation in 

Europe. Obama’s address in Prague in 2009 spoke of 

the promise of a “global zero” for nuclear weapons, 

but the approach to Russia focused upon strategic offensive nuclear forces to the exclusion of tactical and 

theater nuclear arms. The language of the treaty stresses measures to ensure strategic stability between the 

two signatories, even as the global security environment has moved from bipolar, through unipolar to an 

emerging multipolar system. The recently published 

National Security Strategy does seem to recognize this 
460

multipolar context and speaks of Russia as a regional 

partner along with China, India, and other “increasingly influential nations” such as Brazil, South Africa, 

and Indonesia.3 The document speaks of Russia as a 

partner for the United States in Europe and Asia in 

the context of fighting terrorism and providing stability for Afghanistan but not in terms of larger Asian 

security themes, leaving the impression that the White 

House does not envision an Asian dimension to the 

partnership.4

Indeed, while the post-Cold War world has moved 

from a bipolar system, through a unipolar one, to multipolarity, the U.S.-Russian security dialogue has been 

remarkably Euro-centric, whether it was about strategic partnership, NATO-Russian cooperation, Russian 

hostility to NATO expansion and out-of-area operations, or the U.S. deployment of anti-ballistic missile 

(ABM) assets into Central Europe.5 In fact, this silence 

in the West can be put at Moscow’s own door. Only 

this spring, a group of NATO “elders” visited Moscow 

to discuss NATO’s new “Strategic Concept” shortly 

after the publication of Russia’s new Military Doctrine, 

which had once again treated NATO as a “danger and 

threat” because of the actions it had taken on the periphery of Russia, including NATO expansion.6

 During the conversations led by former U.S. Secretary of 

State Madeleine Albright and the Vice Chair of the 

Expert Group, Jeroen van der Veer, the former Chief 

Executive Officer (CEO) of Royal Dutch Shell, the 

“elders” had asked the Russian officials and scholars 

with whom they met about Russian perceptions of the 

growing power and influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The official and unofficial Russian 

response was a studied silence. The conversation did 

not transcend the issues dividing Russian and NATO 

perspectives on European security.7
461

Russian foreign policy commentary on ChineseRussian relations continues to stress the elements of 

partnership comprise the interests of the two states in 

multipolarity to counter American hegemony, even as 

U.S. policy under Obama has stressed international engagement and a “reset” with Russia, and even though 

neither Moscow nor Beijing desired that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) would become 

an anti-Western military alliance. The only negative 

point made by Aleksandr Lukin in an assessment of 

those bilateral relations was that China would, from 

time to time, encourage Russia to take anti-Western 

actions that China itself would not do.8

 Two Canadian 

scholars in a recent review of Sino-Russian relations 

concluded that the “strategic partnership” between 

Moscow and Beijing was based on realpolitik focused 

on countering U.S. influence and the scholars did not 

see any prospect for a deepening relationship in the 

short- or mid-term future because of the continuing 

distrust between China and Russia.9 Western observers have seen more tension between Russia and China 

in Central Asia. Jeffrey Mankoff and Leland R. Miller 

have written of the bilateral competition between 

China and Russia, thereby affording the United States 

more room to maneuver politically and economically 

in that region.10

Some Russian authors have raised an alarm over 

an emerging security challenge to Russia’s Far East 

from a Chinese military that already has the marks of a 

military superpower in comparison with Russia’s own 

conventional forces. Aleksandr’ Khramchikhin spoke 

of a Chinese military that combined mass and modern 

technology deployed along Russia’s eastern frontiers 

at a time when it was evident that China no longer had 

to contemplate using military force to regain Taiwan.11
462

For well over 2 decades, Soviet and Russian military 

planners have looked upon tactical nuclear forces as 

the ultimate guarantor of Russian security in the East. 

For the last 15 years, the national political and military 

elite have been agreed that there was no conventional 

military threat from China, because of improved relations. But that situation has been changing rapidly 

over the last several years. Indeed, even as Russia’s 

Ministry of Defense and General Staff prepare to conduct a strategic-operational exercise this summer, 

Vostok-2010, there has been remarkable silence on the 

exercise’s scenario.12

The issue of advanced Chinese conventional capabilities has forced a reconsideration of Moscow’s 

military response. These tensions, in conjunction with 

other emerging military transformations among nonEuropean nuclear powers, should highlight the difficulties associated with stability outside of the main 

European framework, which become even more complex in Russia’s Asian frontiers. Nuclear disarmament, 

which does address the military-technical revolution 

associated with advanced conventional weapons, informatization, and network-centric warfare will not 

address the much more complicated role that nuclear 

weapons will be expected to play as an instrument of 

theater deterrence.

In this context, Russia’s nuclear arsenal remains, 

however, a key variable in Eurasian security. At present, that arsenal is estimated to be significantly smaller 

than the 40,000 that existed at the end of the Cold War, 

but is certainly in excess of 14,000 weapons, including 

3,113 strategic warheads and 2,079 nonstrategic warheads deployed and another 8,000 in storage or waiting to be dismantled as of 2008.13 A significant portion 

of these are stored east of the Urals and form a ma-
463

jor component of Russia’s geostrategic posture in the 

non-European strategic axes which include the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, the Russian Far East, and 

the Arctic.14 With regard to Asian security, the nuclear 

weapons deployed and stored in the Siberian Federal 

and the Far Eastern Federal Okrugs form the basis of 

Russia’s theater nuclear forces. These forces include 

the nuclear weapons of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Air 

Force, Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Army.15 The 

theater role that these forces will play in case of armed 

conflict with the PRC has been candidly described by 

Aleksandr Khramchikhin.16

At present, the Russian Ministry of Defense and 

the General Staff are in the process of redefining those 

strategic axes, and they are reducing the number of 

military districts from six to four, and they are creating operational-strategic commands in each. They 

include: the Western, covering Europe with its headquarters in St. Petersburg; the Southern, covering the 

Black Sea, Caucasus, and Caspian with its headquarters in Rostov-on-Don; the Central, covering Central 

Asia with its headquarters in Yekaterinburg; and the 

Eastern, covering the Far East and Pacific Ocean with 

its headquarters in Khabarovsk. This concept was 

tested in conjunction with Vostok-2010, a major exercise in Siberia that the Russian Far East Command 

conducted in late June and early July.17 Since 1999, 

Russia has conducted operational-strategic exercises 

dealing with its western strategic direction on a regular basis. Those exercises have included the first use of 

nuclear weapons to de-escalate and bring about conflict termination in a scenario involving a conventional 

attack upon Russia from the West by coalition forces 

that enjoy tactical-technical qualitative superiority 

over Russian conventional forces. The limited nuclear 
464

strikes seemed to have been designed to disrupt command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and 

precision strike capabilities of the aggressor forces in 

order to halt the attack.18 Vostok-2010 was the first to 

address the Eastern strategic direction and has been 

associated with the implementation of the military 

“new look” championed by Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and Chief of the General Staff General 

Nikolai Makarov as part of the transformation of the 

Russian military into a brigade-centric force, capable 

of conducting advanced conventional operations and 

network-centric warfare.19 As one of the Russian reformers described the “new look,” it was a gamble on 

the nature of the future war, which the Russian Army 

would face.20

The motivation behind this shift in direction is not 

military-technological development in the West but 

a deep reappraisal of the security situation in Russian Siberia and the Far East. In an article devoted to 

Russia’s “Eastern Vector,” General Makhmut Gareev 

pointed to the emergence of NATO as a global security organization with a footprint in Central Asia as a 

result of the Afghan War, and he predicted that there 

will be rising tensions between a U.S.-led NATO and 

the PRC. While he focused on NATO’s nonmilitary 

means of exerting influence, particularly on the model 

of the “color revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia that 

had brought regimes hostile to Russia to power, his 

primary focus was on the unleashing of armed conflict 

in regions where Russia was lacking in combat potential, especially combat readiness.21 Gareev returned to 

the theme of combat readiness in a follow-on article 

about lessons learned from the Great Patriotic War. 

In addition to citing the surprise attack of Nazi Ger-
465

many in 1941, Gareev pointed to the outbreak of local 

fighting between the Soviet Union and the PRC along 

the Amur River in 1969 that forced the mobilization 

of an entire military district. He also noted the risks 

involved when national political leadership did not 

appreciate the military-political situation they were 

addressing when they ordered the use of force. Gareev drew attention to the decision to intervene militarily in Afghanistan in 1979 and the decision to intervene in Chechnya in 1994. In both Afghanistan and 

Chechnya, the governments blundered into wars that 

they did not want, because they failed to understand 

the implied tasks that followed from the initial order 

and failed in their political guidance to take into account the real situation on the ground. The relevance 

of these lessons from all four conflicts is the nature of 

the true connection between politics and strategy:

The final and decisive word belongs to the political 

leadership but in the working out of the most important military-political decisions, military professionals 

and other specialists must take part, otherwise policy 

will not apply to the real life. And the main point is that 

politicians and diplomats are obliged to create favorable conditions for the actions of the Armed Forces.22

On the issue of “new look,” Gareev endorsed its 

content, i.e., the creation of precision-strike weapons 

and the necessary technological base to support the 

conduct of network-centric warfare. At the same time, 

he called for the working out and implementation of a 

more active and decisive strategy, and operational art, 

and tactics so as to impose upon the enemy those actions, including contact warfare, which he most seeks 

to avoid. 23 In this regard, combat readiness becomes 

one of the primary concerns of military profession-
466

als, since combat potential, when not linked to actual 

combat readiness, can create a false appreciation of the 

military power available. Here the nation’s capacity to 

mobilize additional military power defines its ability 

to manage the escalation of a local conflict toward a 

decision in keeping with national interests.24

This is supposed to be the exact focus of 

Vostok-2010.25 The “new look” military, which the 

Ministry of Defense has set out to create via a brigadebased ground force capable of launching precision 

strikes and conducting network-centric warfare faces a particular challenge in Siberia and the Far East, 

where Chinese military modernization has moved the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a mass industrial army built to fight people’s war to that of an army 

seeking to rearm itself as an advanced conventional 

force and to conduct their own version of networkcentric warfare. A year ago, informed Russian defense 

journalists still spoke of the PLA as a mass industrial 

army seeking niche advanced conventional capabilities. Looking at the threat environment that was assumed to exist under Zapad 2009, defense journalist 

Dmitri Litovkin spoke of Russian forces confronting 

three distinct types of military threats: 

...an opponent armed to NATO standards in the Georgian-Russian confrontation over South Ossetia last 

year. In the eastern strategic direction Russian forces 

would likely face a multi-million-man army with a 

traditional approach to the conduct of combat: linear 

deployments with large concentrations of manpower 

and firepower on different axes. In the southern strategic direction, Russian forces expect to confront irregular forces and sabotage groups fighting a partisan war 

against ’the organs of Federal authority,’ i.e., internal 

troops, the border patrol, and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).26
467

By the spring of 2009, a number of those involved 

in bringing about the “new look” were speaking of 

a PLA that was moving rapidly towards a high-tech 

conventional force with its own understanding of network-centric warfare.27 Moreover, the PLA conducted 

a major exercise, “Stride-2009,” which looked to some 

Russian observers like a rehearsal for military intervention against Central Asia and/or Russia.28

Speaking about the deployment of two newlyorganized brigades along the Russian-Chinese border 

on the Irkutsk-Chita Axis, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Valentinovich Chirkin, the recently appointed 

commander of the Siberian Military District, stated 

that the brigades were deployed there to counter the 

presence of five PLA combined arms armies across the 

border. From 2003 to 2007, Chirkin commanded an 

army in the Siberian military district. On the rationale 

for the deployment, Chirkin stated: “We are obligated 

to keep troops there because on the other side of the 

order are five Chinese armies, and we cannot ignore 

that operational direction.” He added that the Ministry of Defense intended to develop an army headquarters for command and control of the brigades.29

In a related report, Chirkin described the PLA forces 

across the border as composed of three divisions and 

10 tank, mechanized, and infantry brigades, which he 

described as not little, but also “not a strike force.” As 

to the role of the new brigades, Chirkin put them as 

part of a deterrent force aimed as friendly reminder to 

the PRC that: “. . . despite the friendly relations with 

China, our army command understands that friendship is possible only with strong countries, that is 

whose (sic) who can quiet a friend down with a conventional or nuclear club.”30
468

The gamble on the nature of future war described 

by Aleksandr’ Kondrat’ev in supporting the development of network-centric warfare capabilities, comes 

down to the issue of Russia’s capacity to arm, create, 

train, deploy, and keep combat ready forces capable 

of conducting advanced conventional warfare. In the 

absence of such forces, the deterrence equation is reduced to the credibility of the nuclear option for deterring conventional attacks. Given the economic and 

demographic realities of Siberia and the Russian Far 

East, Russia seeks by non-military means to preclude 

the emergence of a Chinese military threat. However, 

Russian observes also are aware of the fact that an imminent military threat from Beijing can emerge out of 

regional instability, which is beyond Russia’s unilateral means to control.

As the most recent Russian Military Doctrine of 2010 

states, nuclear weapons remain the primary instrument for deterrence against both nuclear and conventional attacks upon Russia and in defense of Russian 

interests, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.31 The 

doctrine does not explicitly state that Russia will use 

nuclear weapons in a preemptive attack against such 

threats, as had been discussed by senior members of 

the Security Council in the fall of 2009, but leaves the 

decision to use such weapons in the hands of the President of the Russian Federation. The context of use, 

however, is defined by the nature of the challenges 

and threats that Russia faces across Eurasia. A second 

classified document, “The Foundations of State Policy 

in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020,” which was 

issued at the same time as the Military Doctrine, has had 

portions leaked to the mass media. These describe two 

types of threats that could lead to the use of nuclear 

weapons: 1) attacks upon vital economic and political 
469

structures, early warning systems, national command 

and control, and nuclear weapons systems, which fits 

a U.S.-led NATO threat involving conventional forces 

cable of conducting global strikes against such targets; 

and 2) during an invasion by an enemy’s ground units 

onto Russian territory if Russia’s Armed Forces are 

incapable of stopping the enemy progress and it penetrates deep into the country through conventional 

means of waging war, which fits more closely with an 

assault by the PLA against the Russian Far East.32

The first concept resembles one popularized by 

General-Major Vladimir Slipchenko in his discussions 

of sixth-generation warfare and no-contact warfare on 

the model of NATO’s campaign against Kosovo, but 

applied on a global scale.33 Slipchenko speculated on 

the use of long-range precision-strike systems for attacks upon enemy economic, administrative, and military infrastructure. The second concept, which was not 

contained in the 2000 version of Russian Military Doctrine is quite new and reflects what the Russian military recognizes is an emerging threat from the PRC. 

In a polemic with Slipchenko in 2005, General Gareev 

discussed such a conflict which would require the 

development of a mass mobilization base to conduct 

a protracted war, which employed precision-strike 

systems, but did not achieve annihilation of the opponent’s forces.34 Both Slipchenko and Gareev agreed 

that nuclear deterrence had become self-deterrence in 

the post-Cold War era.
470

FACING WEST AND EAST

For Russia, which inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal, but has faced a serious change in its international position, the nuclear equation is, in fact, shaped by 

Russia’s status as a regional power in a complex Eurasian security environment, where nuclear issues are 

not defined exclusively by the U.S.-Russian strategic 

nuclear equation but by security dynamics involving 

interactions with Russia’s immediate periphery. On 

the one hand, Russia’s security responses have been 

shaped by a post-Soviet decade of sharp internal political crises, economic transformation, social instability, 

demographic decline, and the collapse of conventional 

military power. The impact of these developments has 

been uneven across Russia, leading to very distinct security environments, which have demanded regional 

responses. The initial focus of security concerns for 

both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation 

was primarily upon European security. This was the 

primary focus of the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition 

and the place where its militarization was most evident.

The end of the Cold War began with the attempt 

to reform the Soviet system under Mikhail Gorbachev 

by means of perestroika and glasnost and embraced the 

idea of getting time and space for reform by removing 

the ideological roots of East-West confrontation from 

Europe. As presented by Aleksandr Yakovlev, one of 

Gorbachev’s key advisors, the policy involved the removal of the primary driver of East-West conflict, the 

military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).35 Demilitarization 

of the Cold War in Europe and Soviet military disengagement from international conflicts, especially Af-
471

ghanistan, were part of an effort to save a system that 

had lost the capacity to innovate and only survived on 

the basis of bureaucratic inertia and coercion. Reform 

risked both domestic and international complications.36 In Europe, the first real indicator of successful 

demilitarization was the Intermediate Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 which abolished entire 

classes of intermediate-range nuclear forces with 

operational-strategic impact on the European theater, followed by moves under the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) toward 

greater military transparency, and was then consummated by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 

of 1990 which set limits on forward deployed conventional forces in Central Europe and on its flanks from 

the Atlantic to the Urals.37

Political developments, however, made this security regime obsolete when the Velvet Revolutions 

of 1989 replaced governments allied with the Soviet 

Union and led to the abolition of the WTO in December 1991. In the meantime, political discontent and rising nationalism within the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR) undermined Gorbachev’s program 

of gradual reform and led to a confrontation between 

hardliners opposed to further reform and nationalists 

calling for both the abolition of Soviet power and the 

end of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin, elected President of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic 

(RSFSR) in June 1991, became the spokesman for national democratic opposition to the existing Soviet order. The attempted coup by hardliners in August 1991 

failed, and Boris Yeltsin emerged as leader of a Russian 

Federation that was willing to see the Soviet Union 

abolished, which occurred on December 31, 1991. In 

a matter of months, the Cold War bilateral interna-
472

tional system had shifted to a unipolar order dominated by a U.S.-led Atlantic-European community. 

The Russian Federation found itself dealing with the 

dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the regathering of the Soviet nuclear arsenal under its control 

and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 

fissionable materials, and nuclear weapons expertise, 

a policy supported by the George H.W. Bush and Bill 

Clinton administrations. Hope of a strategic partnership, which flourished in Washington and Moscow in 

the early 1990s, was cooling by the second half of the 

decade. 

On the other hand, the emergence of the United 

States as the sole superpower put a distinct complication in Russia’s responses to these regional issues and 

led to efforts to cultivate the creation of a multipolar 

counterbalance to U.S. influence. As framed by Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov, the new order was 

supposed to rest on cooperation among Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi to balance Washington’s global 

influence. Neither New Delhi nor Beijing endorsed a 

policy of trilateral balancing, but Moscow and Beijing 

did move towards a de facto security system with 

the signing of the five-power Treaty on Deepening 

Military Trust in Border Regions in 1996. The agreement, a part of the relaxation of tensions associated 

with the end of the Cold War, was seen in Moscow 

as the foundation for balancing in a relatively benign 

environment in Central Asia and the Far East. Russia embraced arms sales to the PRC as a desperation 

measure to keep its own military industrial complex 

from complete collapse. In the absence of domestic 

orders, foreign sales kept design bureaus and production facilities operational. A case in point was the sale 

of Su-27M fighters to the PRC in 1992, which kept the 
473

design bureau in Moscow and the production plant at 

Komsomosk-na-Amur open.38 Russia did not see the 

PRC as an immediate military threat. Consequently, 

it was interested in reducing its own forces deployed 

in the Far East, and was most concerned with averting 

the total collapse of its defense industry. Primakov’s 

vision of a trilateral balancing mechanism among 

Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi did not depend upon 

arms sales, but it provided geopolitical justification 

for such sales to China and India. Primakov’s vision 

assumed relatively stable and benign relations among 

all three actors would exist.39

The Putin decade of recovery, which began in 1999 

and still continues under the Medvedev-Putin Tandem, was marked by a significant economic recovery, 

internal stability, state recentralization, and until very 

recently only marginal improvements in conventional 

military power. For much of the decade, favorable oil 

and gas prices allowed Russia to practice Putin’s own 

brand of energy diplomacy across Eurasia by cultivating supplier-consumer relations with major powers, 

while exercising energy discipline with the states on 

its own periphery.40 The decade began with a fundamental shift in the content of the Russian security 

relationship in Asia. The point of departure was the 

disillusionment with Euro-Atlantic engagement after 

NATO expansion and the NATO-conducted air campaign against Yugoslavia and in the face of Russia’s 

vigorous objections to military actions undertaken 

without a mandate from the United Nations Security 

Council (UNSC). At the same time, deteriorating security in the Caucasus and Central Asia invoked the 

need to create a new security regime to cover Asiatic 

Russia.41 On the one hand, renewed war in Chechnya 

raised the prospect of increased involvement by radi-
474

cal Islamic elements there and across the Caucasus. In 

Central Asia, the spread of Islamic radicalism by the 

Taliban out of Afghanistan had called into question 

the existing security structures provided by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russia, which 

had intervened in the Tajik civil war of 1992-97 and 

helped with the United States to broker a peace settlement there, now found itself faced by a more general 

regional Islamic threat, which had actually helped to 

drive the opposing Tajik factions into cooperation. 

That threat was the spread of jihad from Afghanistan 

into Central Asia. The PRC, which faced its own Islamic separatist threat among the Uyghur population, 

which made up a large percentage of the population 

in Xinjiang, China’s frontier region with Central Asia, 

had its own reasons to support collective security arrangements in the late 1990s. 

In this context, in 2001, Russia joined with four 

other Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), and China to form the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with an 

expressed mandate to cooperate against “terrorism, 

separatism, and extremism.”42 In addition to this regional security function, the SCO also became a vehicle for Moscow and Beijing to express their concerns 

over U.S. hegemony in the international system and 

to create a counterweight to NATO as the alliance 

moved more actively into out-of-area operations affecting Central Asia, especially after its intervention 

in Afghanistan and the U.S. development of bases in 

the region, especially Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 

The tensions became particularly acute after the U.S. 

intervention in Iraq when it appeared that the United 

States was planning for a long-term presence in both 

Iraq and Afghanistan. The acquisitions of nuclear 
475

weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 had intensified the India-Pakistan conflict and brought with it the 

possibility of a new “great game” in Central and South 

Asia, played by nuclear armed states and increasing 

tensions among Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi with 

the United States and NATO—were directly engaged 

in Afghanistan.43

For most of the decade, Russian official literature 

discussing foreign policy, national security strategy, 

and military doctrine focused upon the United States 

and NATO as the chief sources of challenges and 

threats to Russian national security, with secondary 

attention given to internal sources of instability (extremism and separatism) and to international terrorism. This official position masked what were developing concerns regarding the security of its own Eastern 

Siberian and Far Eastern domains. Those security concerns are rooted in Russia’s historical experience with 

this distant and relatively isolated territory.

Russian Cossacks pushed into the Far East in 

the mid-17th century, and a network of settlements 

spread. These remotes lands were more connected 

with Moscow by sea than by land, with the Russian 

Navy maintaining a nominal presence to enforce Russian claims. The integration of these regions into Imperial Russia took a quantum leap in the last decade 

of the 19th century with the construction of the TransSiberian railroad under the leadership of the Minister 

of Finances Sergei Witte. Witte saw the railroad as 

the key to the Russian development of Siberia and as 

access to the Chinese market. However, before those 

benefits could be reaped, Russia found itself drawn 

into imperial rivalries over Manchuria and Korea, 

leading to war with Japan and defeat. During the war, 

the railroad became the chief means of Russian strate-
476

gic mobility and underscored the need for the development of more infrastructure in Eastern Siberia and 

in the Far East. But the tsarist regime collapsed in the 

course of another war, and foreign powers (the United 

States and Japan) found it easy to intervene there during the Russian civil war, which followed the Bolshevik seizure of power and the decision to make peace 

with the Central Powers. Bolshevik power was slow 

to consolidate its control in the Far East, which did not 

come until 1922, when the Japanese military withdrew 

and the Far Eastern Republic, which had served as a 

buffer between Soviet territory and the Japanese zone 

of occupation, was abolished. 

Under Joseph Stalin, there was a major effort at developing the Soviet Far East, which included the mobilization of the Komsomol (young communist) cadre 

to set up new settlements; the creation of vast mining and forestry projects under the Russian People’s 

Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD); and, composing the islands in the Gulag Archipelago. After the 

Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, intensive 

efforts were made to strengthen the defenses of the 

Soviet Far East and the Mongolian People’s Republic, 

an ally of the Soviet Union from its establishment in 

1924. Soviet forces fought limited border engagements 

with the Japanese Kwantung Army in 1938 at Lake 

Khasan , near Vladivostok, and at Khalkhin-Gol in the 

Manchuko-Mongolian border in 1939. During World 

War II, the Soviet Far East was the arrival point for 

lend-lease materials from the United States—shipped 

on Soviet-flagged ships—and served as the staging 

area for the Soviet offensive of August 1945 which announced Soviet entry into the war against Japan and 

led to the Soviet occupation of Manchuria and North 

Korea and the seizure of the southern Sakhalin and the 
477

Kuril islands. In both Manchuria and North Korea, the 

Soviet military presence facilitated the establishment 

of local Communist regimes. In the postwar period, 

the Soviet Far East continued to be a major part of the 

Gulag until Stalin’s death and the dismantling of the 

camp system. 

During the Cold War, the Soviet Far East was the 

staging area for support to North Korean and Chinese 

Communist forces engaged in the Korean War. With 

the emergence of the Sino-Soviet conflict and especially after the border incidents with China in 1969, 

the Far East became a military bastion and remained 

so until the collapse of the USSR. In the decade that 

followed the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Far 

East experienced demographic decline and economic 

crisis, from which it began a slow recovery. The region has endured an energy crisis, criminality, and 

corruption. Tensions between Moscow and the Far 

East grew sharp with the global economic downturn 

and the decline in world energy prices, particularly 

when Moscow sought to impose a tariff on imported 

automobiles, which had been a thriving business in 

Vladivostok. In December 2008, local protestors took 

to the streets under the slogan: “Authorities: Raise the 

Standard of Living, not the Tariff.” They were met 

by Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) riot police sent 

from Moscow to restore order by applying their batons to the demonstrators’ bodies.44

In part, these crises were a legacy of the collapse 

of the Soviet system, which had treated those regions 

as the forward bastions of its security in the context 

of deteriorating relations with the PRC. Moscow had 

invested heavily in maintaining a military presence 

and infrastructure in the region, including the BaikalAmur Main Line (Magistral), which was to provide 
478

the transportation infrastructure to give the region 

strategic depth for defense but was never completed. 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that military infrastructure was allowed to decay, since Moscow had 

no resources to fund it. In the absence of continuing 

investment credits, Moscow granted the regions local 

self-government and looked to economic transformation on the basis of international trade to revive the 

area. There was much hope expressed in Moscow that 

Japanese capital, Chinese workers, and Russian raw 

materials would make the Russian Far East into a part 

of the dynamic Asia-Pacific economy. Instead, the Far 

East saw a radical decline in population (7.9 million in 

1989) and economic activity, leading to a total population in the Far East of 6.7 million by the 2002 census 

and making the region one of the most under-populated regions in the world in terms of persons per square 

mile. In fact, however, most of the population in the 

Russian Far East is concentrated in a 90-mile belt of 

settlement from Chita in the West to Vladivostok on 

the Pacific with the Trans-Siberian Railroad providing 

the single corridor for transregional transportation 

through it. Russia did move to resolve border disputes 

with the PRC under President Boris Yeltsin, which led 

to a general agreement in 1995 but left the settlement of 

conflicting claims over certain strategic islands in the 

areas of Chita and Khabarovsk unresolved. In 2005, 

these issues were resolved with the transfer of about 

half the disputed territory to China. In spite of the 

fact that islands near Khabarovsk were directly across 

from this major Russian city and defense center, military authorities downplayed any military threat to the 

city, although the Border Guards did express concern 

about possible illegal immigration.45 In the general climate of improved Sino-Russian relations, no military 

threat seemed to exist. 
479

There were, of course, all sorts of concerns about illegal Chinese settlers coming into the Far East. Viktor 

Ishaev, the Governor of Khabarovsk Krai from 1991 

to 2009, repeatedly raised the issue of Chinese migration into the region as part of plan for the “peaceful 

capture” of the Russian Far East.46 But unlike under 

Yeltsin, a stronger central government was able to 

keep local problems and perceptions from impacting 

the conduct of bilateral relations. Likewise, pertaining 

to nuclear issues, if the great concern had been regionalism and the actions of local officials in regard to supporting and protecting existing nuclear infrastructure 

from decay, criminal penetration, and incompetent 

management in the 1990s, when the center was weak 

under Putin, the center reestablished control and coopted local political leaders to the center’s interests, 

reducing the risks of crisis between the center and the 

Far Eastern periphery.47 Putin’s strategy, which has 

continued under President Medvedev, was to seek to 

bring about the economic integration of Russia into 

the global economic processes that have turned Asia 

into an engine of globalization. Russia has formally 

engaged with regional organizations such as the AsiaPacific Economic Council (APEC), which it joined in 

1998, and fostered a partnership with the Association 

of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, 

Russia has not achieved its goals as of 2010.

In the Far East, Russia’s primary gamble was on the 

prospect of good relations with China. Until to 2009, 

China was consistently described as Russia’s strategic 

partner, the primary engine of Asia’s economic transformation and growing global influence. Russia was 

to serve as a source of advanced military technology 

and raw materials and to provide China with a stable 

rear supporting its international position.48 No men-
480

tion of China as a strategic threat came from official 

sources, although commentators might worry about a 

yellow peril of Chinese settlers in the Far East or complain of Chinese goods driving out domestic products 

in local markets. Konstantin Pulikovsky, a former 

general and President Putin’s envoy to the Far Eastern 

Federal Okrug from 2000 to 2009, spoke of Chinese 

investment as vital to the future of the region.49 Russia’s residual influence in North Korea had declined 

rapidly after the collapse of the Soviet Union as the 

issue of North Korean nuclear weapons development 

emerged. In 2000, President Putin invited Kim Jong Il 

to visit Russia, which he did in the summer of 2000. 

Pulikovsky, who accompanied Kim in his rail trip to 

Moscow, became the Russian official with the closest 

ties to Kim Jong Il and appreciated the importance of 

North Korea to Russia’s own security interests and appreciated China’s strongest influence in Pyongyang.50

After Kim Jong Il’s visit to Russia in 2000, some spoke 

of the personal ties between Kim and President Putin 

as redefining Russian-North Korean relations, but developments over the rest of the decade confirmed China’s greater access and influence during the Six Party 

Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program. Russia’s 

approach to that ongoing crisis has been to support 

its legitimate security interests in Northeast Asia via 

preserving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.51 In this capacity, Russia has engaged in the Six 

Party Talks. Russia could and did develop economic 

ties with South Korea over the last 2 decades, while 

it kept its limited influence in North Korea. This balancing has been evident in Moscow’s approach to the 

crisis set off by the sinking of the South Korean patrol 

corvette, the Cheonan, by an acoustic torpedo, which 

an international investigation carried out by U.S. and 
481

Australian experts concluded was fired by North Korean forces.52 What Moscow wants most to avoid is a 

regional crisis becoming an armed conflict and inviting the intervention of other powers, especially the 

United States and the PRC in support of South and 

North Korea.

Over the last 2 decades, Russia has looked to Japanese investment even in the face of the lack of progress in resolving the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands, which had kept Japanese-Soviet and now 

Japanese-Russian relations frozen—the Soviet Union 

and then Russia offered a two of four split of the island chain, with Russia retaining the northern and 

Japan getting the southern islands. Japan demanded 

the return of all four islands, which Russia refused. 

Russian energy diplomacy under Putin favored Chinese interests over Japanese. Realists in Moscow saw 

no major movement in Tokyo’s security regime with 

Washington and simply gave a lower priority to the 

improvement of bilateral political relations even 

though Moscow continued to court Japanese investment in the Russian Far East. Border incidents and 

disputes over fishing rights led to periodic flare-ups 

but no major crisis, so Moscow was willing to keep its 

policy towards Japan in line with that of Beijing. Moscow supported the Six Party Talks but with the clear 

understanding that Beijing had the best leverage with 

Pyongyang. Moscow supported counterproliferation 

initiatives, but has worried that U.S. impatience and/

or North Korea provocations could lead to war and 

greater instability in northeast Asia and even risk a 

Sino-American confrontation. The Russian concern 

about Sino-American conflict grows in conjunction 

with the two major points of contentions between the 

two powers: Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. The 
482

concerns have become greater as the conduct of the 

North Korean regime has become more erratic. 

Strategic nuclear weapons loomed very large in 

the Yeltsin era when the strategic arsenal was expected to play a major political role in assuring that Russia 

would establish and retaining a strategic partnership 

with the United States and obtain a major say in the 

emerging post-Cold War order in Europe. Since 1999, 

Russia has emphasized the deterrent function of its 

strategic nuclear forces, but has focused its posture on 

conflict management to discourage military intervention in Russia’s periphery. For two decades, the Russian military has placed the likelihood of nuclear war 

at a very low level and has even seen the possibility of 

a general coalition war at a low probability. That being said, the Russian government has also recognized 

that its immediate periphery is quite unstable, fraught 

with local conflicts that can turn into local wars, and 

lead to foreign military interventions against the national interests, territorial integrity, and sovereignty 

of Russia. The question of the “near abroad,” a euphemism for the independent states that emerged on 

Russia’s periphery with the breakup of the USSR, has 

been closely tied to Russian national interests, a Russian sphere of influence, and the protection of Russian 

minorities living in the successor states. Russian intervention in ethnic conflicts in this region has been 

seen by the West as one of the primary areas of conflict 

with Russia, especially in the aftermath of the RussoGeorgian War of August 2008.53 For Russian leaders, 

the Russo-Georgian conflict revealed a number of 

problems associated with the command and control 

of modern conventional forces, especially the integration of air-land combat, which became a driver for the 

Ministry of Defense’s “new look.”54 At the same time, 
483

however, Chinese military modernization made the 

gamble on strategic partnership less inviting if China 

was intent upon developing large-scale theater warfare capabilities that embrace advanced conventional 

weapons and network-centric operations. The default 

military gamble on nonstrategic nuclear forces to deter a remote Chinese threat became less appealing. 

Thus, in June and July, the Russian Military Defense 

and General Staff conducted Vostok-2010 with the 

intent of assessing Russia’s capacity to mobilize and 

deploy its “new look” conventional forces to defeat 

a military intervention against the Russian Far East, 

and tested both the combat capabilities and combat 

readiness of these forces to deal with that threat.55 The 

outcome of that exercise was a major test for the “new 

look” and began the process of redefining the role of 

theater nuclear forces in the Far East from the perspective of the necessity toward a true second order response, giving Moscow the capacity to manage such 

a conflict toward a political solution that does not put 

into risk the territorial integrity of Russia or its survival as a sovereign state. Continued progress in this 

direction depends upon Russia’s capacity to rearm its 

forces with advanced conventional capabilities, which 

will depend on the adaptability of its military industrial complex, and on its capacity to escape its relative 

geostrategic isolation in the Far East if relations with 

China should deteriorate. 

Vostok-2010 underscored the existing geostrategic 

isolation of Russia in that region, even as the Ministry 

of Defense and the General Staff evaluated Russia’s 

“new look” military. One conspicuous feature of the 

exercise was the description of opposing forces as 

those of “a hypothetical enemy.” Roger McDermott, 

a prominent Western commentator on the “new look” 
484

reforms of the Russian military, offered an excellent 

overview of Vostok-2010 as an operational-strategic 

exercise. McDermott correctly pointed to the role of 

the exercise in testing concepts associated with the 

“new look” reforms of the Russian Armed Forces and 

called attention to the testing of the speed of deployment of brigades, their combat readiness, and their 

capacity to engage in combined arms combat in an 

air-land battle, and their logistical support to sustain 

combat actions. He also noted that while the scenario 

dealt with a wide range of combat actions, including 

anti-piracy, to counterterrorism, the senior military 

leadership, including Chief of the General Staff General Nikolai Makarov, stated that the opponent was 

hypothetical and was not intended to simulate “any 

one country or bloc.” McDermott, however, concluded that the actual objective of the exercise was a test of 

the defenses of Siberia and the Far East from attack by 

the PLA of China. McDermott raised the very threat 

about which the Russian political and military elite 

could not speak openly.56 To understand this silence, 

one needs to understand the political-military context 

of this exercise. 

Anyone who has been involved in the construction 

of a scenario for a wargame or exercise knows that the 

creation of the documents for the conduct of such an 

operational-strategic exercise involves the creation of 

a road to war, which brings about conflict between the 

contending sides, usually labeled “red” and “blue” 

in the case of Russian war games—with “blue” being 

the color associated with the aggressor forces against 

which Russian “red” forces defend. In the case of the 

“Vostok-2010,” the Russian forces involved in the exercise were facing a “hypothetical opponent” (uslovnyi 

protivnik). At a press conference at the start of the exer-
485

cise, General Makarov stated that: “First I would note 

that this particular exercise, like last years, is not directed against any concrete nation or military-political 

bloc. It has a strictly defense orientation to maintain 

security and defense of the state’s national interests 

along its Far Eastern borders from a hypothetical enemy.”57

Even a hypothetical opponent has to have some 

military capabilities in order to execute acts of aggression, which bring about the responses of the “red” 

defenders in the Russian case.58 An operational-strategic exercise is composed of many distinct tactical 

vignettes, which are used to test the training of the 

forces involved in the exercise. Vostok- 2010 not only 

involved air, ground, and naval forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense but also included forces of 

the Internal Troops of the MVD, FSB, Border Guards, 

Ministry of Extraordinary Situations, Federal Security 

Service (FSO), and Federal Service for Execution of 

Punishments (FSIN).59 Its scale was quite large in terms 

of troops, equipment, and the number of training areas 

in Siberia and the Far East that were involved. When 

asked about the opponent that drove these vignettes, 

General Makarov replied:

We did not look at any particular country and did not 

look at any particular enemy. We are talking about 

what direction we will create our own operationalstrategic situation in the course of which somewhere 

a group of terrorists or large group of separatists are 

active, which is quite characteristic for low-intensity 

conflicts. For instance we selected such scenarios. But 

by quantity—here a brigade, there a battalion, here a 

small groups of warships. I will say once again, we 

did not attempt to assemble huge forces and means in 

any district. We want to look at the capacity of execut-
486

ing tasks with small subunits. We have to understand 

how our troops must act, and most important what 

armaments they will need.60

According to Minister of Defense Dmitri Serdyukov, Vostok-2010 was designed particularly to test the 

deployment of forces and the operational command 

and control of the new brigade-based force structure. 

Vostok-2010 did not pit two opposing armies in linear combat. Instead, it involved isolated combat and 

noncombat episodes testing various forces. Fighter 

aviation conducted long-range deployments from European Russia to the Far East, employing in-air refueling from tanker aircraft. Air defense forces launched 

surface to air (SAM) missile strikes against “enemy 

bombers seeking to attack Khabarovsk.” Special forces cooperated with the camp guards to prevent the 

release of a special prisoner from a labor camp near 

Chita. Combined naval forces, including ships from 

the Pacific, Northern, and Black Sea Fleets, engaged 

enemy surface and subsurface forces at sea and conducted air assault and amphibious landings. Other 

troops beat back an enemy landing on one of the Kuril 

Islands. Motorized rifle and tank brigades in the Siberian Military District engaged separatists seeking to 

cut off the Russian Far East and they defeated the enemy by combined arms maneuver through the depths 

of the enemy, culminating in forcing the Onon River 

and imposing upon the enemy retreat and the assumption of a tactical defense. In Primorye (the Maritime 

Province), Russian forces simulated the flight of refugees from North Korea. At the same time, President 

Medvedev used his visit to the Far East in conjunction 

with the exercise to praise the evident progress made 

in the “new look” and to underscore the government’s 
487

commitment to make Russia into an integrated part of 

the Asia-Pacific world. Observing the naval exercise, 

Medvedev took time to decorate sailors from the Marshal Shaposhnikov, who had taken part in the recapture 

of the tanker Moscow University and the liberation of 

its crew. 

Russian commentators have concluded that, in 

spite of all the extensive press coverage of the exercise, the government failed to articulate one message 

and stay on point. The military, including the Minister 

of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were set 

upon emphasizing the progress made in creating the 

“new look” Armed Forces and to disarm critics who 

have charged that the Serdyukov reforms had broken 

the military.61 On the other hand, the political leadership in the person of President Medvedev had as its 

primary message Russia’s economic drive for regional 

integration as a vital national objective. Medvedev 

emphasized the Asia-Pacific region’s continued economic growth even during the current global economic crisis, and spoke of Russia’s integration with the 

entire Asia-Pacific region and not just the PRC, and 

he even listed integration of the Brazil-Russia-IndiaChina (BRIC) bloc as a national objective.62

Aleksandr’ Sadchikov described Medvedev’s 

policy as “the fourth campaign to the East,” recalling 

three earlier campaigns: Russia’s rivalry with England 

and France for position in the Far East in the middle of 

the 19th century; the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05; 

and, the “socialist expansion under the Soviet Union,” 

which culminated in the territorial gains achieved as 

a result of the August 1945 war against Japan. Sadchikov made reference to the political forecast made 

by Vyacheslav Nikonov about the advantages to Russia in leaning to the east to escape the pressure of the 
488

American superpower. In 2002, Nikonov had written 

of a China already transforming itself economically 

and strategically focusing on the unification of Taiwan with the PRC as its primary strategic objective. 

Nikonov projected a relatively slow transformation of 

the Chinese military over the next 25 years, making 

the East in the form of the PRC relatively low risk in 

terms of security. Sadchikov characterizes the fourth 

campaign to the East as an adaptation of Beijing’s 

strategy to Russian circumstances: “In its time, China 

formulated its own strategy: lean on the north, stabilize the west, and expand to the south and east. According to Nikonov, Moscow’s present strategy must 

be lean on the west, stabilize the south, and go east.”63

With the military addressing a separatist threat that 

obtains armed assistance from abroad and the political leadership committed to going East, one must still 

ask what were the underlying threats driving the General Staff’s accumulation of vignettes.

Looking at the various episodes that made up the 

scenario for Vostok-2010, one could conclude that going east has its own peculiar risks for Russia. The refugee scenario for North Korea highlights the instability 

of that regime and the likelihood of conflict developing out of its disintegration or from its desperate acts 

to sustain its position. Fear that a U.S.-Chinese conflict in the wake of the collapse of North Korea would 

impose difficult strategic choices upon Moscow has 

been a regular theme for press commentary concerning Korea. The sharp exchange between Moscow and 

Tokyo over the exercise in the disputed Kuril Islands 

highlights the troubled state of Russo-Japanese relations and brings into the strategic calculation the U.S.-

Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.64

Just as President Medvedev was visiting the nuclear 
489

cruiser Petr Velikii to observe a mock naval battle and 

amphibious landing, naval officers there informed the 

media that the tactical problem of the exercise was the 

destruction of “an American squadron” and that the 

probable enemy was unchanged. Commenting on the 

meteorological conditions at the time of this naval exercise, which involved heavy mist and low visibility, 

the author described Vostok-2010 as “covered in fog,” 

a categorization which would fit the confused military 

and political signals being sent.65 Finally, the air and 

ground exercises near Chita and Khabarovsk make 

no sense except as responses to some force threatening the territorial integrity of Eastern Siberia and the 

Far East. The only forces with the military potential to 

carryout air and ground attacks that deep into Russian territory are the PLA in support of the so-called 

separatists identified in the scenario. Reflecting on 

the vignettes that made up Vostok-2010, Aleskandr’ 

Khramchikhin concluded that the hypothetical opponent in these ground and air operations was, indeed, 

Russia’s probable opponent, the PLA. And he stated 

in his assessment of the exercise that: “The probable 

opponent will defeat us in a serious conflict.”66

The one branch of the Russian military not involved 

in direct combat operations during Vostok-2010 was 

the Strategic Rocket Forces, which carried out no operational launches. Their only role was the defense of 

their bases from attacks by terrorists. However, according to press reports, the exercise did end with a 

tactical nuclear strike. As Khramchikhin noted, such 

a strike was hardly in keeping with a fight against 

separatists and bandits.67 This seems to suggest that 

conventional forces could not handle such a challenge 

to the territorial integrity of the Russian state in so 

vulnerable a region as the Far East. However, the sce-
490

nario had left open the intervention of a powerful hypothetical opponent in support of the separatists after 

their defeat on the Onon. 

CONCLUSION

Short of a diplomatic revolution to end Russia’s 

international isolation in the Far East, we can expect 

the continuation of a Janus-like policy of looking to 

economic integration with the rest of the Asia-Pacific 

world, while exercising against these unnamed hypothetical opponents. Russia’s Vostok-2010 exercise did 

not define the role of theater nuclear forces in the Far 

East—whether they will be the response of necessity 

or become a true second order response—giving Moscow the capacity to manage such a conflict toward a 

political solution that does not put into risk the territorial integrity of Russia or its survival as sovereign state. 

Much will depend upon Russia’s capacity to rearm its 

forces with advanced conventional capabilities, which 

will depend on the adaptability of its military industrial complex and on its capacity to escape its relative 

geostrategic isolation in the Far East if relations with 

China should deteriorate. 

In recent articles, Aleksandr’ Khramchikhin raised 

two issues that make this problem particularly difficult. 

First, he did a strategic assessment of the threats faced 

by Russia on all strategic axes and then examined the 

military capabilities available to deal with them. He 

noted conventional military deficiencies in the west, 

the south, and north, but said that Russia’s defenses 

in the east were clearly the weakest of all. In this, he 

included the defenses covering Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, but focused on the Sino-Russian border in 

Siberian and the Far East. There he described Russia 
491

as effectively defenseless against Chinese aggression. 

Against a massive array of PLA conventional, ground, 

and air forces, the Siberian and Far Eastern military 

districts contain only one tank, eight motorized rifle, 

two air assault, three missile, four artillery, two rocketartillery, one covering, and four air defense brigades, 

and about 300 combat aircraft with their bases located 

close to the border. China has much greater capacity 

to reinforce its units in the theater by rail movement, 

while Russia must face the fact that the trans-Siberian 

railroad is vulnerable to air interdiction in Siberia and 

direct attack in the Far East.68 The second point concerned the conduct of Russian policy in the context of 

military weakness, where Russia invites confrontations with the United States even as it faces threats on 

other axes, on which its very weakness provokes the 

emergence of new threats.69

The new tenor of relations between Moscow and 

Beijing was evident at the recent SCO summit in Tashkent, where Moscow and Beijing discretely jockeyed 

for position. Moscow has put greater emphasis on security in Central Asia and has revived military cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 

Uzbekistan there under the Collective Security Treaty 

Organization (CSTO), just as joint military exercises 

under the SCO have declined since 2007. China has 

emphasized economic penetration via investment 

and follows a coherent long-range policy of regional 

integration with China’s economy. James Nixey of 

Chatham House commented on the recent summit 

that Russia now recognizes China as a major security 

concern but is unwilling to say so openly.70 Moreover, 

the threat is not just to Central Asia. Tensions between 

Russia and China have mounted over the Russian Far 

East. Press reports, citing sources in the Russian Bor-
492

der Guards, speak of Chinese efforts to dredge the 

Ussuri near Khabarovsk and change the navigational 

flow to China’s advantage in order to get additional 

territory ceded to China.71

Such incidents are not the real challenge to Russian sovereignty over its Far Eastern territories. The 

real challenge is to be found in the very contradictory claims about the Far East coming out of Moscow, 

where some see the region as the economic engine and 

source of raw materials to pull Russia into the 21st 

century, while others see the region as already being 

lost and as a de facto part of the Chinese economy. 

Dr. Viktor Larin, Director of the Institute of History, 

Archeology, and Ethnography of the Peoples of the 

Far East, took these conflicting opinions as the point of 

departure for a major analytical report on “The AsiaPacific Region in the Early 21st Century: Challenges, 

Threats, and Chances of Pacific-Ocean Russia.” Colleagues saw this piece as an intellectual provocation 

and an invitation for reflection on the current situation. 

Larin is skeptical about the government’s declarations 

about investment in the region and questions its willingness to sustain such investments in the region’s 

oil, gas, and transportation infrastructure. He notes 

that there is nothing inevitable about a Russian presence in the Far East. Other European colonial powers 

have failed to keep their Asian empires. Why should 

Russia be any different? Over the last 2 decades, government programs and foreign investments have not 

led to improvements in the lives of the local population—Larin cites oil and gas development in Sakhalin 

as an example. Russia is still really on the margins of 

the emerging Asia-Pacific economy. The center talks 

about investment in the Far East because it fears that 

it will lose the region. Moscow is motivated by exter-
493

nal threats, but the real problem is that the remaining population in the region has no stake in its future 

with Russia. Looking back 15 years, Russians spoke of 

a “yellow peril” from Chinese immigration, but that 

is not the case today. The real Chinese presence today is in pervasive economic penetration into Russia’s 

Far Eastern and Siberian markets for consumer goods 

and food stuffs. Russia missed the train for European 

economic integration and is likely to miss the Asian 

train as well. If Moscow does not stop thinking of the 

Far East as a colony to be milked and start thinking 

about it as a fully-integrated part of the Russian and 

Asian-Pacific economies, it will, at some time in the 

not-too-distant future, face the real threat of separatism. The Soviet answer of treating the Far East as a 

military bastion has no prospect of success.72

These developments may fundamentally shift the 

geostrategic context of President Obama’s global zero 

initiative on nuclear weapons. For the last 2 decades, 

Russia’s nuclear arsenal in Asia was first seen internationally as a problem of management and control 

as it declined in size and operational readiness. Operationally, even in its reduced capacity, it was for 

Russia the only military option open in case of attack 

in a region effectively denuded of conventional military power. China’s relative military inferiority made 

that prospect remote. Both Moscow and Beijing could 

look to strategic partnership without the prospect of 

an emerging military threat. Chinese military modernization has in the last year changed that perception 

in Moscow. Now, with the emergence of a potential 

conventional threat from its former strategic partner, 

Russia is in the process of evaluating whether its reformed conventional forces might achieve s viable deterrence in case of attack from a modernized Chinese 
494

military. In the absence of such a capability, Russia 

will be forced to gamble even more on theater nuclear 

forces and be even less willing to consider reductions 

in its nonstrategic nuclear forces. In the context of an 

increasing military confrontation on the Korean peninsula and periodic tensions between Washington 

and Beijing over Taiwan, Russia’s increased fear of 

China’s growing power and its military response adds 

one further complication to Eurasian security for all 

parties and makes Asian nuclear force reductions an 

even more complex problem for Washington to manage. Recent Russian statements on global zero have 

made it clear that Moscow expects the process to be 

long, out to 2045 and to involve multilateral discussions about nonstrategic nuclear weapons among all 

nuclear powers as part of a matrix of global security.73

There is now more evidence of a debate within 

the Russian national security elite on China’s role in 

Russian national security. Recently, Sergei Kazennov, geopolitics expert with the Russian Academy 

of Sciences, and Vladimir Kumachev, with the Russian Government’s Institute of National Security and 

Strategic Research, took issue with Khramchikhin’s 

pessimistic reading of Russia’s military capacity to resist China. They did not disagree with his analysis of 

Chinese military progress or his assessment of the balance of conventional forces, but said that Russia had 

sufficient nuclear-armed missile forces to engage in 

both counterforce and countervalue targeting against 

China.74 In fact, they accused Khramchikhin of hyping 

a hypothetical conflict between Russia and the PRC, 

when such a conflict was not even a remote possibility. The authors did drag out the well-worn threat of 

a Sino-U.S. conspiracy to divide Russia in something 

like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. They ac-
495

cused Khramchikhin of “playing with soldiers” when 

the real pieces were in clear view in “secret little boxes,” a thinly veiled reference to nuclear weapons as 

the weapon of immediate resort in the absence of conventional defense capabilities. Rehashing “massive retaliation” for the 21st century, the authors found their 

way out by pointing to Russia as a key supplier of critical raw materials to the world and therefore an economic guarantee that no one would want to disrupt a 

good thing. Khramchikhin did not depict China as an 

aggressor. What he pointed to was Russia’s relative 

geopolitical isolation in a region, where he sees rising 

tensions. Kazennov and Kumachev’s final words were 

that a “master pattern maker” could cover any threadbare parts of the geopolitical fabric with material (in 

this case nuclear weapons and energy exports) from 

another area to secure Russia’s national security well 

into the future.

These developments may fundamentally shift the 

geostrategic context of President Obama’s global zero 

initiative on nuclear weapons. For the last 2 decades, 

Russia’s nuclear arsenal in Asia was first seen internationally as a problem of management and control 

as it declined in size and operational readiness. Operationally, even in its reduced capacity, it was for 

Russia the only military option open in case of attack 

in a region effectively denuded of conventional military power. China’s relative military inferiority made 

that prospect remote. Both Moscow and Beijing could 

look to strategic partnership without the prospect of 

an emerging military threat. Chinese military modernization has in the last year changed that perception 

in Moscow. Now, with the emergence of a potential 

conventional threat from its former strategic partner, 

Russia is in the process of evaluating whether its re-
496

formed conventional forces might achieve s viable deterrence in case of attack from a modernized Chinese 

military. In the absence of such a capability, Russia 

will be forced to gamble even more on theater nuclear 

forces and be even less willing to consider reductions 

in its nonstrategic nuclear forces. In the context of an 

increasing military confrontation on the Korean peninsula and periodic tensions between Washington and 

Beijing over Taiwan, Russia’s new posture adds one 

further complication to Eurasian security for all parties and makes Asian nuclear force reductions an even 

more complex problem for Washington to manage.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. This chapter draws heavily upon research done for the paper, “Asian Drivers of Russia’s Nuclear Force Posture,” which 

will be published shortly by the Nonproliferation Education Center of Washington, DC. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Henry Sokolski, who provided invaluable comments and 

suggestions on that paper. 

2. Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, 

Russia, and the Future of the West, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 

2010.

3. The National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: White House, May 27, 2010, p. 3, available from www.

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 

4. Ibid., p. 44.

5. The obvious exception to this view is Zbigniew Brzezinski. 

His book, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives, reflected the assumptions of its time, which assumed America’s status as a superpower in a unipolar landscape, 

where the United States could forge arrangements with other 

regional powers. Brzezinski forecast China’s sphere of influence 
497

that included not only the Russian Far East but also eastern Siberia and left the impression among Russian readers that what 

he was purposing was a new geopolitical recasting of the board 

to Russia’s disadvantage. The book was particularly popular in 

Russia in 1999 during NATO’s campaign against Serbia when it 

was taken as an accurate portrayal of American policy goals. See 

Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And 

Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books, 1998.

6. Prezident Rossii, Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010.

7. Andrei Terekhov, “Mudretsy NATO napomnili Moskve o 

Kitaiskom vyzove,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, February 12, 2010.

8. A. Lukin, “Russian-Chinese Relations: Keeping up the 

Pace,” International Affairs, No. 1, 2010, p.27.

9. Christina Yeung and Nebojda Bjelakovic, “The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: Views from Beijing and Moscow,” The 

Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. XXIIII, No 2, April-June 2010, 

pp. 243-281.

10. Jeffrey Mankoff and Leland R. Miller, “China-Russia 

Competition Opens a Door for America,” Forbes, April 22, 2010, 

available from www.forbes.com/2010/04/22/china-russia-politics-tension-markets-economy-oil-gas.html?boxes=marketschannelnews.

11. Aleksandr’ Khramchikhin, “Milliony soldat plius sovremennoe vooruzhenie,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, October 9, 

2009.

12. Roger McDermott, “Russian Military Prepares for Vostok2010,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 2, 2010.

13. Robert S. Norris and Hans S. Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear 

Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 2, MayJune 2008, pp. 54-57, 62. 

14. Iurii Mikhailov, “Sistema ugroz bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi 

Feederatsii in ee obespechenie,” Orientir, No. 5, May 2010, pp. 49-

52.
498

15. On the facilities in these two okrugs, see the two chapters 

by Christina Chuen and Dmitry Kovchegin in James Clay Moltz, 

Vladimir A. Orlov, and Adam M. Stulberg, eds., Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: Managing Decentralization of Russia’s Nuclear Complex, 

Aldershot, UK, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004, pp. 105-134, 

184-210. 

16. Aleksandr’ Khramchikhin, “Neadekvatnyi vostok,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, July 27, 2010.

17. “The Quantity of Military Districts in Russia Will Be Reduced from Six to Four by December 1 and Operational Strategic 

Commands Will Be Formed,” Defense & Security, May 31, 2010.

18. Jacob W. Kipp, “Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Military Review, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-June 2001, pp. 27-38.

19. Aleksei Nikolsky, “To Be Assessed by East,” Vedomosti, March 9, 2010, p. 2. On the “new look” as a gamble on advanced technology and network-centric warfare, see Aleksandr 

Kondrat’ev, “Stavka na ‘voiny budushchego’,” Nezvasimoe voennoe obozrenie, June 27, 2008.

20. Kondrat’ev, “Stavka na ‘voiny budushchego’.”

21. Gennadii Miranovich, “Vostochnyi vektor,” Krasnaia zvezda, March 3, 2010.

22. Makhmut Gareev, “Opyt pobeditelei v Velikoi voine ne 

mozhet ustaret’,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, March 9, 2010.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Alesksei Nikol’skii, “Otsenku dast ‘Vostok’,” Vedomosti, 

March 9, 2010.

26. Dmitri Litovkin, “Ucheniia popali v seti,” Izvestiia, September 28, 2009.
499

27. Aleksandr’ Kondrat’ev, “Nekotorye osobennosti realizatsii kontseptsii ‘setetsentricheskaia voina’ v vooruzhennykh silakh 

KNR,” Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie. No. 3, March 2010, pp. 11-

17.

28. “Ucheniia,” Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie , No. 8, July 31, 

2009; and Aleksandr’ Khramchikhin, “Starye osnovy novoi doktriny,” Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kuryer, Bo. 6, February 17, 2010, p. 5. 

29. “Novosti,” VPK-Voennopromyshlennyi kur’er, March 3, 

2010.

30. “Russia Strengthens the Border with China,” Argumenty 

nedeli, March 4-10, 2010.

31. Prezident Rossii, Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii

(Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010.

32. Vladimir Mokhov, “Osnovy natsional’noi bezopasnosti,” 

Krasnaia zvezda, February 6, 2010. 

33. Vladimir Slipchenko, Beskontaktnye voiny, Moscow, Russia: “Gran-Press,” 2001, pp. 29-39.

34. Vladimir Slipchenko and Makhmut Gareev, Future War, 

Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2007, pp. 

67-68.

35. Christopher Shulgan, The Soviet Ambassador: The Making of 

the Radical Behind Perestroika, London, UK: McClelland and Stewart, 2008.

36. Jacob W. Kipp, “Perestroyka and Order [Poryadok]: Alternative Futures and Their Impact on the Soviet Military,” Military 

Review, No. 12, December 1989, pp. 2-16.

37. George L. Rueckert, Global Double Zero: The INF Treaty 

From Its Origins to Implementation, Westport, CT: Greenwood 

Press, 1993; John Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference, Washington, DC: 

Pergamon-Brassey International Defense Publishers, 1988; Ivo H. 
500

Daalder, The CFE Treaty: An Overview and an Assessment, Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1991; and 

Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The 

Inside Story of the End of the Cold War, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 

and Company, 1993.

38. V. Usol’tsev. “‘Golubye molnii’ i Rosssiiskie letchiki edut 

v Kitai,” Krasnaia zvezda, April 11, 1992.

39. Richard Weitz, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 

The Primakov Vision and Central Asian Realities,” Fletcher Forum 

of World Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2007, pp. 103-118.

40. Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New 

Russia, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

41. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds. Central Asian Security, 

London, UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991. 

42. “Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter,” China 

Daily, June 12, 2006, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_614628.htm.

43. Feroz Hassan Khan, “The New Great Game in Central 

Asia/South Asia: Continuity and Change,” in Charles Hawkins 

and Robert L. Love, eds., The New Great Game: Chinese Views on 

Central Asia, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 

2006, pp. 1-16.

44. G. A. Ziuganov, “Rasprava vo Vladivostoke ne dolzhena 

ostat’sia beznakazannoi,” Pravda, December 15, 2008.

45. Sergei Blagov, “Russia Hails Border Deal with China Despite Criticism, Eurasian Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 102, May 25, 

2005, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30445.

46. Jeanne L. Wilson, Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004, pp. 

126-127.
501

47. This process has been addressed in the work of Christina 

Chuan, “Nuclear Issues in the Far Eastern Federal Okrug,” in 

James Clay Molts, Vladimir A. Olav, and Adam M. Stolberg, eds., 

Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: Managing Decentralization of Russia’s 

Nuclear Complex, Aldershot, UK, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 

2004, pp. 105-134.

48. Vladimir Pyle, “Spasitel’myi Kitai?” Orientir, No. 3, March 

2009, pp. 8-11.

49. “Far East looks to China for investment,” The Russian 

Journal, October 10, 2003, available from www.russiajournal.com/

node/16455.

50. Konstantin Preobrazhensky, “Through Russia With 

Kim Jong Il,” North Korean Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, February 29, 

2004, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26321.

51. Alexander Vorontsov, “Current Russia-North Korea Relations: Challenges and Achievements,” Washington, DC: The 

Brookings Institution, February 2007, available from www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/02northkorea_vorontsov.aspx.

52. “Russian Specialists Arrive in S. Korea to Probe Warship 

Sinking,” RIA Novosti, May 31, 2010; “Russia, N. Korea to Continue Consultations to Settle Inter-Korean Conflict, RIA Novosti, 

May 28, 2010; and “Russia, South Korea to Discuss Cheonan Issue 

Thursday,” RIA Novosti, June 2, 2010. 

53. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World.

54. Mikhail Barabanov, Anton Lavrov, and Viacheslav Tseluiko, Tanki augusta: Sbornik statei, Moscow, Russia: Tsentr Analiza 

Strategii i tekhnologii, 2009.

55. Valerii Shcheblanin, “Voennaia bezopasnost’ na vostok 

Rossii budet obespechena,” Buriatiia, February 20, 2010.

56. Roger McDermott, “‘Virtual’ Defense of the Russian Far 

East, Vostok 2010,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, Vol. VII, No. 129, July 

6, 2010.
502

57. “Vostok-2010 bez konkretnykh protivnikov,” Interfax,

June 28, 2010 .

58. Hypothetical opponents are not new and are not the product of post-modern political correctness. Those familiar with the 

exercises of the U.S. Army after World War II will remember “FM 

30-102, Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces,” published in 1947, 

which stated: “The country, peoples and forces described herein 

are entirely fictitious. Any resemblance to existing countries or 

forces is inadvertent and coincidental.” That notional opponent, 

“Circle Trigon” with its Esperanto-speaking opposing forces continued to be used in US Army exercises into the 1970s. Such an 

official orientation did not prevent U.S. forces from exercising 

against a notional opponent that looked something like the Red 

Army, and by the 1980s the OPFOR (opposing force) at the National Training Center had evolved into a very good replication of 

a Soviet motorized rifle regiment. Thus, hypothetical opponents 

can over time evolve into probable opponents.

59. “V Rossii nachinaiutsia masshtabnye ucheniia 

‘Vostok-2010’,” RBC.ru, June 29, 2010.

60. “Opiat’ bez protivnika?” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 

July 2, 2002.

61. “Serdiukov ne vevel ustraivat’ voinu dvukh armii,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, July 9, 2010. 

62. “Dmitrii Medvedev postavil pered dal’nom vostokom 

glavnye zadachi,” Respublika Armeniia, July 7, 2010. 

63. Aleksandr’ Sadchikov, “Chetvertyi pokhod na Vostok,” 

Izvestiia, July 9, 2010.

64. “V khode uchenii ‘Vostok-2010’ Rossiiskie voennye obideli Iaponiiu s osobym pazmakhom,” NEWSru, July 7, 2010. 

65. Aleksandr’ Kolesnichenko, “Ucheniia, ukrytye tumanom,” 

Novye izvestiia, July 5, 2010.
503

66. Aleksandr’ Khramhikhin. “Neadekvatnyi vostok,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, July 27, 2010.

67. Ibid.

68. Aleksandr’ Khramchikhin. “Chetyre vektora Rossiiskoi 

oborony,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, May 21, 2010.

69. Aleksandr’ Khramchikhin, “Slabost’ provotziruet sil’nee, 

chem moshch’,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, March 19, 2010.

70. Bruce Pannier. “Unspoken Russian-Chinese Rivalry Is 

Subtext of SCO Summit,” RFE/RL, June 10, 2010.

71. Kitaitsy odvigaiut granitsu s Rossiei,” Vremia i den’gi, June 

8, 2010.

72. Natal’ia Ostrovskaia, “Zachem Rossii Dal’nyi Vostok?” 

Komsomol’skaia pravda, May 28, 2010.

73. Sergei Lavrov, “Novyi dogovor o SNV v matritse global’noi 

bezopasnosti,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, No. 7, July 2010. On the 

notion of a process lasting to 2045, see Vladimir Kozin, “6 Obstacles to Nuclear Zero,” Moscow Times, August 3, 2010.

74. Sergei Kazennov and Vladimir Kumachev, “Ne nado absoliutizirovat’ ‘ukgrazu s vostoka’,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 

August 13, 2010, p. 12.

505

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic 

Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the 

post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for 

Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; and taught at the University 

of Texas, San Antonio; and at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial 

Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of 

Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles and 

conference papers on Russia, the Commonwealth of 

Independent States, and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy 

and security in Eurasia. His two most recent books are 

Russo-Chinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command, 

London, UK: Global Markets Briefing, 2006; and Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for 

Indo-American Strategic Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005. 

Dr. Blank holds a B.A. in history from the University 

of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history 

from the University of Chicago.

PAVEL K. BAEV is a Research Professor at the 

Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO); he is also affiliated with the Centre for the Study of Civil War at 

PRIO. He worked in a research institute in the USSR 

Defence Ministry, and then worked in the Institute 

of Europe, Moscow, before joining PRIO in October 

1992. In 1995-2001, he was the editor of PRIO’s quar-
506

terly journal, Security Dialogue, and in 1998-2004, he 

was a member of the PRIO Board. Dr. Baev’s research 

on the transformation of the Russian military is supported by the Norwegian Defence Ministry; other 

research interests include the energy and security dimensions of the Russian-European relations and postSoviet conflict management in the Caucasus and the 

greater Caspian area. His weekly column appears in 

Eurasia Daily Monitor and his latest book, Russian Energy Policy and Military Power, was published by London, UK: Routledge, 2008. Dr. Baev holds an MA in 

political geography from the Moscow State University 

and a Ph.D. in international relations from the USA & 

Canada Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Distinguished Professor 

of Political Science at Penn State University-Brandywine and has contributed to the literature in U.S. national security policy, nuclear arms control, and other 

topics for many years. Dr. Cimbala is a past winner of 

the university’s Eisenhower Award for distinguished 

teaching and has served as a consultant to various 

U.S. Government agencies and defense contractors. 

He most recently edited and contributed a chapter for 

The George W. Bush Defense Program (Falls Church, 

VA: Potomac, 2010).

DANIEL GOURE is a Vice President with the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy research organization headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. Dr. 

Goure has held senior positions in both the private 

sector and the U.S. Government. Prior to joining the 

Lexington Institute, he was the Deputy Director, International Security Program at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. Dr. Goure spent 2 years in 
507

the U.S. Government as the director of the Office of 

Strategic Competitiveness in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He also served as a senior analyst on 

national security and defense issues with the Center 

for Naval Analyses, Science Applications International Corporation, SRS Technologies, R&D Associates, 

and System Planning Corporation. Dr. Goure holds a 

B.A. in Government and History from Pomona College, and Masters and Ph.D. degrees in international 

relations and Russian studies from Johns Hopkins 

University.

DALE R. HERSPRING is a University Distinguished Professor at Kansas State University, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a retired 

U.S. diplomat and Navy captain. He is the author of 

13 books and close to 100 articles. His forthcoming 

publications include a book to be entitled Shared Responsibility and Civil-Military Relations: The American, 

Canadian, German and Russian Cases and “Creating 

Shared Responsibility Through Respect for Military 

Culture: the Russian and American Cases,” Public Administration Review, July 2011.

JACOB KIPP taught at Kansas State University 

from 1971 to 1985. In 1986, he joined the Soviet Army 

Studies Office (SASO) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. In 1991, 

SASO became the Foreign Military Studies Office 

(FMSO). From 2003 to 2006, Dr. Kipp served as Director of FMSO. In 2006 he took the position of Deputy 

Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies 

(SAMS). He retired from federal service in 2009. Dr. 

Kipp has written extensively on Russian and Soviet 

military and naval history, aviation, strategy, operational art, and military doctrine. He served as deputy 
508

editor of Military Affairs, as assistant editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, as founding co-editor of 

European Security, and as a member of the editorial 

board of the Modern War Studies Series of the University Press of Kansas. He is a member of the Russian 

Academy of Natural Sciences. At present, he is an adjunct professor of History, and Russian and Eurasian 

Studies at the University of Kansas and a contributor 

to the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasian Daily Monitor. Dr. Kipp worked closely with Mary Fitzgerald on 

several projects relating to Soviet and Russian military 

affairs. Dr. Kipp holds a Ph.D. from the Pennsylvania 

State University.

ROGER N. MCDERMOTT is a graduate of the University of Oxford specializing in defense and security 

issues in the Commonwealth of Independent States 

(CIS). He is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC; Senior 

International Fellow, Foreign Military Studies Office, 

Fort Leavenworth; and, Affiliated Senior Analyst, 

Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. Mr. McDermott is on the editorial board of Central Asia and the Caucasus and the scientific board of 

the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies. 

His articles appear in scholarly journals including the 

Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and his weekly assessments of security developments in Central Asia, 

Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), are 

read by policy planners. He is also the co-editor of 

the book, Russian Military Reform 1992-2002 (London, 

UK/Portland, MD: Frank Cass, 2003). Mr. McDermott 

is also conducting extensive policy oriented research 

into Russian defense reform and will publish a book 

on the “new look” Russian armed forces, as well as a 
509

seminal chapter in a forthcoming book, published by 

Routledge, based on an FOI (Freedom of Information) 

conference in Sweden (October 4-5, 2010), in which 

he examines Russian perspectives on network-centric 

warfare.

ANDREI SHOUMIKHIN is Senior Analyst at the 

National Institute for Public Policy. His previous assignments were as Director of the Washington Office 

of the Moscow Public Science Foundation and coordinator of the Foundation’s projects in the United States; 

he was associated with the Institute of USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and 

headed the USA Institute’s Center for the Middle East 

and Conflict Resolution. Dr. Shoumikhin was responsible for analyses of U.S. foreign policy and the preparation of analyses and recommendations for use by 

the Russian president, parliamentary committees, and 

various ministries, with special emphasis on conflict 

resolution and the relationship between the United 

States, Russia, and the developing world. He was 

President of the Center for Conflict Resolution and 

also served as an interpreter for the United Nations 

Secretariat and the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow. Dr. Shoumikhin is a graduate 

of the Moscow Institute for Foreign Languages and the 

United Nations Translation and Interpreter Course. 

He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Institute 

of USA and Canada Studies. 

NIKOLAI N. SOKOV is a Senior Research Associate at James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 

Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, a Graduate School of Middlebury College. He 

worked at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies 
510

and the Institute of World Economy and International 

Relations in Moscow. From 1987-92 he worked at the 

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and 

later Russia, and participated in START I and START 

II negotiations as well as in a number of summit and 

ministerial meetings. Dr. Sokov has published extensively on international security and arms control. He 

is the author of Russian Strategic Modernization: Past 

and Future (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 

2000), co-author and co-editor of the first Russian-language college-level textbook on nuclear nonproliferation (Yadernoe Nerasprostranenie, Vol.I-II, PIR Center, 

1st Ed., 2000, 2nd Ed., 2002), and several monographs. 

Dr. Sokov graduated from Moscow State University in 

1981 and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and the Soviet equivalent of a Ph.D. Candidate of 

Historical Sciences degree from the Institute of World 

Economy and International Relations.

RICHARD WEITZ is Senior Fellow and Director of 

the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson 

Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and 

East Asia as well as U.S. foreign, defense, and homeland security policies. Dr. Weitz is also a non-resident 

Senior Advisor at the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), where he oversees case study research. 

He is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for a 

New American Security (CNAS), where he contributes 

to various defense projects. Dr. Weitz has published or 

edited several books and monographs, including The 

Russian Military Today and Tomorrow (2010); Global Security Watch-Russia (2009); a volume of National Security Case Studies (2008); China-Russia Security Relations

(2008); Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of 
511

Eurasia (2008); Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington 

Responds to Crisis (2008); The Reserve Policies of Nations: 

A Comparative Analysis (2007); and Revitalising US–

Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures (2005).
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Editor

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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