UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

CURTIS JONES, 

 Petitioner, Civil Case No. 14-14205 

 Honorable Linda V. Parker 

v. 

DUNCAN MACLAREN, 

 Respondent. 

_______________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER (1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS; (2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY; 

AND (3) DENYING AS MOOT PETITIONER’S MOTIONS FOR 

EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND 

FOR LEAVE TO FILE AFFIDAVIT

 This is a habeas case filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On October 31, 2014, 

Petitioner Curtis Jones filed a pro se petition challenging the Michigan Parole 

Board’s February 5, 2014 decision of “no interest” in taking action on Petitioner’s 

case. Petitioner argues that the Parole Board’s decision violated his due process 

rights because it was based in part on several convictions obtained in violation of 

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court finds that the claim raised in this 

petition is duplicative of a claim raised by Petitioner in another habeas petition 

pending at the time he filed this petition. The Court therefore is dismissing the 

petition on that basis. The Court also declines to issue a certificate of appealability 

and denies as moot Petitioner’s pending motions requesting expedited 

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consideration of his habeas petition, for summary judgment, and for leave to file an 

affidavit. 

I. Background 

 In 1991, Petitioner pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Kent County, 

Michigan to possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, and 

was sentenced to two to five years in prison. Several months later, a jury in the 

Kent County Circuit Court found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder and 

felony firearm. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the second-degree 

murder conviction and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. 

In 2004, Petitioner pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Lapeer County, 

Michigan to possession of contraband in prison, and was sentenced to one year and 

one day to five years in prison. 

 On February 5, 2014, the Michigan Parole Board issued a Notice of 

Decision holding that a majority of the parole board had no interest in taking action 

on Petitioner’s case. The Parole Board scheduled Petitioner’s next interview in 

2019. (See ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 26-27.) 

 On October 31, 2014, Petitioner filed the pending petition. He challenges 

the Parole Board’s decision denying him parole on the ground that the Parole 

Board relied in part on a pre-sentence investigation report which listed six juvenile 

convictions which Petitioner contends are invalid. He argues that the juvenile 

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convictions are invalid because he pleaded guilty to four of the convictions without 

the assistance of counsel and was not informed of his right to appellate counsel or 

his right to appeal with respect to all six of the convictions. 

II. Discussion 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

restricts the power of federal courts to review second or successive habeas corpus 

petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Section 2244 provides: “A claim presented in a 

second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was 

presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). 

 On May 1, 2014, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Michigan challenging the same 

parole denial that is the subject of his current petition and raising the same 

argument that the Parole Board improperly relied on uncounseled juvenile 

convictions when deciding to deny him release on parole. See Pet., Jones v. 

MacLaren, No. 2:14-cv-00102 (W.D. Mich. May 1, 2014), ECF No. 1. On March 

31, 2015, the District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the 

petition because Petitioner failed to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2254’s “in custody” 

requirement.1

 Opinion, Jones, No. 2:14-cv-00102 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015), 

 

1

A federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus 

relief only from petitioners who are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or 

(Cont’d . . .) 

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ECF No. 14. The district court granted a certificate of appealability. Id. at Pg ID 

259-60. The dismissal was with prejudice. Judgment, Jones, No. 2:14-cv-00102 

(W.D. Mich., Mar. 31, 2015), ECF No. 16. Petitioner filed an appeal which is 

currently pending in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Jones v. MacLaren, No. 

15-1457 (6th Cir. filed Apr. 22, 2015). 

 Petitioner raises the same claim in this petition concerning the Parole 

Board’s alleged denial of parole based on uncounseled juvenile convictions as he 

raised in his earlier-filed habeas petition. “If a prisoner asserts a claim that he has 

already presented in a previous federal habeas petition, the claim must be 

dismissed in all cases.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001) (citation omitted); 

 

laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Supreme Court 

has interpreted the “in custody” language to require that “the habeas petitioner be 

‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is 

filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). A petitioner may indirectly 

challenge an expired conviction by challenging a sentence for which he is currently 

in custody, as enhanced by an allegedly invalid prior conviction. Lackawanna 

Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, Jr., 532 U.S. 394, 401-02 (2001) (citing Maleng, 490 

U.S. 488)). In Petitioner’s case, the District Court for the Western District of 

Michigan held that it was not clear whether the Lackawanna exception applies to 

parole determinations because the denial of parole does not “alter Petitioner’s 

underlying sentence, it merely requires him to continue serving it.” Opinion, Jones 

v. MacLaren, No. 2:14-cv-00102 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015), ECF No.14 at Pg 

ID 259. The district court held that, even assuming the Lackawanna exception 

applied, “[c]onsidering Petitioner’s extensive and violent criminal record, it is 

exceedingly unlikely that four juvenile convictions for which he received probation 

or was placed in foster care had any meaningful impact on the Parole Board’s 

decision.” Id. at Pg ID 259.

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see also Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529-30 (“First, any claim that has 

already been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed.”); In re Salem, 

631 F.3d 809, 812 (6th Cir.2011) (claims raised in previous habeas petition and 

barred under § 2244(b)(1) will be dismissed). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is 

barred from review under § 2244(b)(1) and the petition must be dismissed. 

III. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court is dismissing the petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus. Before Petitioner may appeal this decision, a certificate of 

appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A 

certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a 

court denies relief on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the 

petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the court’s assessment of 

the claim debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 

(2000). When a court denies relief on procedural grounds without addressing the 

merits, a certificate of appealability should issue only if it is shown that jurists of 

reason would find it debatable whether the petitioner states a valid claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id. The Court finds 

that the conclusion that the petition must be dismissed under § 2244(b)(2) is not 

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“debatable among jurists of reason.” The Court therefore denies Petitioner a 

certificate of appealability. 

 Having reached this decision, Petitioner’s motions seeking expedited review 

of his petition, for summary judgment, and for leave to file an affidavit are moot. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED, that Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DISMISSED and a certificate of appealability is 

DENIED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Petitioner’s Motion for Expedited 

Consideration (ECF No. 8), Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 9), and 

Motion for Leave to File an Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF 

No. 13) are DENIED AS MOOT. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: September 21, 2015 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, September 21, 2015, by electronic and/or 

U.S. First Class mail. 

 s/ Richard Loury 

 Case Manager 

 

 

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