UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RANDLE GRIFFIN, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

PAUL KLEE, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

Case No. 2:14-cv-14290 

District Judge Matthew F. Leitman 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 32) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should grant Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. (DE 32.) 

II. REPORT 

 A. Procedural Background

 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without the assistance of counsel, filed 

his complaint and application to proceed without prepayment of fees on November 

6, 2014, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1, 2.) In his complaint, 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants, Gus Harrison Correctional Facility (“ARF”) 

Warden Paul Klee, Lakeland Correctional Facility (“LCF”) Inspector Roy Vest, G. 

Robert Cotton Correctional Facility (“JCF”) Deputy Warden Joe Barrett, and JCF 

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Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor (“ARUS”) Michelle Parsons violated his rights 

under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by retaliating against 

him for engaging in protected conduct. Plaintiff asks the Court to award 

declaratory relief, along with compensatory and punitive damages. He sues the 

Defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiff filed his first amended 

complaint on February 18, 2015, in order to indicate that Defendants were acting 

under the color of state law when they took action against him. (DE 22.) This 

matter is before me for consideration of Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment (DE 32) and Plaintiff’s response (DE 33). 

B. Factual Background 

 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff describes three main incidents occurring 

at three Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) correctional facilities: 

ARF, LCF, and JCF. First, he asserts that he was permanently removed from the 

Warden’s Forum due to a memorandum submitted by Defendant Klee. Second, he 

posits that Defendant Vest subjected him to lock up and a prison transfer as a result 

of Defendant Klee’s memorandum. Finally, he contends that Defendants Barrett 

and Parsons improperly increased his security level from II to IV. Plaintiff 

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maintains that Defendants undertook these actions in retaliation for his engaging in 

protected conduct. I will address each alleged incident in turn.1

 

 1. Removal from the Warden’s Forum 

 Plaintiff was first housed at ARF, where he was elected to the Warden’s 

Forum.2

 (DE 22 at ¶ 15.) During the course of his duties, he allegedly saw an 

officer assault a fellow prisoner and gave an eye-witness account of the incident to 

the Legislative Ombudsman. Plaintiff asserts that either he or another inmate 

overheard corrections officers indicating that they would file false complaints 

against him in retaliation for his testimony to the Ombudsman. On March 4, 2011, 

Plaintiff lodged a formal complaint to Defendant Klee and filed a grievance against 

                                                            

1

 Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint spans a fairly long timespan, three 

correctional facilities, and four Defendants, the following chart may help to clarify 

his claims: 

Defendant(s) Institution Plaintiff’s Allegations 

Klee ARF Wrote memorandum recommending that Plaintiff be 

permanently removed from the Warden’s Forum, which 

Plaintiff asserts was in retaliation for protected activity. 

Vest LCF Put Plaintiff in lock-up and transferred him to JCF as a 

result of Defendant Klee’s memorandum. 

Barrett JCF Improperly increased his security level from II to IV. 

Parsons JCF Improperly increased his security level from II to IV. 

Filed a false misconduct ticket against him. 

2

 The Warden’s Forum is an elected group of prisoners that “advises the warden on 

prisoners’ day to day concerns at their particular facility.” Griffin v. Berghuis, No. 

11-14876, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139405, at *1 n. 1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 2012). 

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him for failure to address the retaliation. (Id. at ¶ 20.) On March 10, 2011, 

Plaintiff was removed from the Warden’s Forum. (Id. at ¶ 21.) On or around 

March 22, 2011, Defendant Klee submitted a request to permanently prohibit 

Plaintiff’s participation in the Warden’s Forum. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff was 

transferred to LCF in April 2011. 

 In December 2011, Plaintiff was elected to the Warden’s Forum at LCF. 

Plaintiff attended one meeting of the Forum and “raised serious issues on behalf of 

uneducated prisoners whom otherwise could not seek redress without [P]laintiff’s 

assistance.” (DE 22 at ¶ 23.) On January 9, 2012, Plaintiff was informed that he 

had been permanently removed from the Warden’s Forum due to a memorandum 

submitted by Defendant Klee. Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Klee 

for sending the request. The grievance was denied at Step III. (Id. at ¶ 29.) 

Plaintiff asserts that, based on the memorandum from Defendant Klee, Defendant 

Vest ordered him to be “locked up and transferred.” (Id. at ¶ 32.) On January 10, 

2012, Plaintiff was transferred from LCF to JCF. (Id. at ¶ 34.) 

 According to Defendants, Plaintiff was permanently removed from the 

Warden’s Forum at every institution due to the results of a 2011 investigation 

conducted by Inspector Goldberg,3

 and not as a result of his engaging in any 

protected conduct. In a memorandum dated March 22, 2011, Inspector Goldberg 

                                                            

3

 It appears that two separate investigations took place in 2011 – one by Inspector 

Goldberg and one by Defendant Vest. 

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outlined his findings. Specifically, he found that Plaintiff may have secured his 

position on the Warden’s forum by “coercing the prior chairman into vacating the 

position.” (DE 32-2 at ¶7.) In addition, the secretary of the Warden’s Forum at 

ARF resigned due to threats made by Plaintiff. (Id.) He also noted that Plaintiff 

had been charged with a planned assault on another prisoner. Finally, he 

concluded that Plaintiff had been removed from the Warden’s Forum at a prior 

institution, such that he was ineligible to serve again until August 18, 2011. (Id. at 

¶ 10.) Defendant Klee avers that he submitted a request that Plaintiff be 

permanently removed from the Warden’s Forum because the results of the 

Goldberg investigation brought to light misconduct that he believed jeopardized 

the security of the facility. (Id. at ¶ 6.) 

 2. Solitary Confinement and Transfer from LCF to JCF 

 Plaintiff contends that Defendant Vest ordered that he be sent to solitary 

confinement at LCF and transferred to JCF. Although his transfer took place on 

January 20, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that the transfer was made in retaliation for the 

February 15, 2012 grievance he filed against Defendant Vest. He does not, 

however, indicate what conduct he believed that Defendant Vest was retaliating 

against. 

 Defendant Vest asserts that he was not aware that Plaintiff engaged in 

protected activity, and recommended the lock-up and transfer due to the results of 

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his own investigation, which named Plaintiff as an individual involved in an effort 

to take control of the Warden’s Forum. (DE 32-5 at ¶ 6.) Defendant Vest further 

found that an ARF inmate requested Protective Segregation because Plaintiff 

threatened him with physical injury, and Plaintiff was issued a Class I misconduct 

violation in 2011 for Assault Resulting in Serious Physical Injury. In addition, 

Defendant Vest concluded that potential members of the Warden’s Forum 

(including Plaintiff) were “planning to move forward with a collective agenda . . . 

including a possible assault and/or hostage situation . . . .” (Id. at ¶7.) Although 

Defendant Vest could not validate all of the information he received, and did not 

issue a misconduct violation against Plaintiff, he believed that Plaintiff posed a 

security risk and accordingly recommended to the LCF Security Classification 

Committee that Plaintiff be transferred to another correctional facility. 

 3. Security Level Increase 

 Plaintiff was transferred to JCF on January 20, 2012. When he arrived, he 

was housed in a Level II unit. After an hour, however, Plaintiff was informed that 

his security confinement status had been increased to Level IV. (DE 22 at ¶ 37.) 

Plaintiff received conflicting accounts as to why his security level had increased. 

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Parsons indicated that Defendant Barrett ordered 

that the security level be increased to monitor Plaintiff for trying to take over the 

Warden’s Forum at his previous institutions. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Plaintiff filed a formal 

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complaint and a grievance about the increase in his security level and resulting lack 

of access to his legal materials. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-42.) The grievance was denied at 

Step I, with a note that the increase in security level was caused by a lack of bed 

space. (Id. at ¶ 46.) Through some discussions with other prisoners, Plaintiff 

learned that others were improperly moved to a bed in a lower security level before 

him. This apparently made him doubt the explanation that the security level 

increase was due to a lack of bed space and he appealed the grievance to Step II. 

At Step II, Plaintiff was moved to his previous security level with a note that, while 

Plaintiff should have been moved before the other prisoners, it was an 

unintentional administrative error that had been rectified. (Id. at 48.) 

 Defendants Barrett and Parsons maintain that Plaintiff was housed in a Level 

IV security unit because of a lack of bed space in Level II. 

 4. The Instant Motion 

Defendants filed the instant motion on June 15, 2015. (DE 32.) They argue 

that they are entitled to summary judgment because their decisions were based on 

reasons other than Plaintiff’s exercise of a protected right. Specifically, they assert 

that Plaintiff was removed from the Warden’s Forum and transferred as a result of 

his own actions and the security level increase was due only to a lack of bed space. 

Further, Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because 

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Plaintiff failed to show that their conduct violated clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights. 

 Plaintiff opposes the motion and asserts that genuine issues of material fact 

exist such that summary judgment is not warranted. Specifically, he disputes 

Defendants’ sworn statements that they were unaware that Plaintiff engaged in 

protected conduct and would have taken the same measures against him regardless 

of his First Amendment actions. In support of this proposition, he provides a copy 

of the letter he sent to Defendant Klee, dated March 4, 2011, in which he states that 

he was engaged in “activities protected by the Constitution.” (DE 33 at 34.) In 

addition, he provides an affidavit from his wife, in which she avers that she spoke 

to Defendant Parsons several times about Plaintiff’s security level. (Id. at 40.) 

Plaintiff’s wife states that Defendant Parsons told her that Plaintiff’s security level 

was increased due to his attempt to “take over” the Warden’s Forum at his 

previous institutions, and did not mention a lack of bed space. (Id. at ¶ 1.) 

Plaintiff also provides various grievance requests and a letter written while he was 

presumably a member of the Warden’s Forum at an institution not described in his 

complaint. According to Plaintiff, this evidence demonstrates that his removal 

from the Warden’s Forum and increase in security level were done in retaliation 

for his activities with the Warden’s Forum. 

 B. Standard 

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing 

law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court 

“views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. 

Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 

 “The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of 

material fact exists . . . .” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 

(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e)(2) 

(providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of 

fact,” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the 

motion.”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the 

nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’” Wrench LLC 

v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The nonmoving 

party must “make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat 

the motion.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 

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10 

2011) (“The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . [T]here must be evidence 

upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving 

party to create a genuine dispute.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “a motion for summary 

judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond 

with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case. . . .” 

Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 371, 322-23 

(1986)). 

 C. Analysis 

 To state a claim of retaliation under the First Amendment, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that 1) he was engaged in protected conduct; 2) an adverse action was 

taken against him that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from 

continuing to engage in the conduct; and 3) there is a causal connection between 

the elements such that the adverse action was “motivated at least in part by the 

plaintiff’s protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 

1999). 

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 The element most at issue in Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 

the third. 4

 Courts employ a burden-shifting analysis of the causation element in a 

retaliation claim: 

Once the plaintiff has met his [or her] burden of establishing that his 

[or her] protected conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm, 

the burden of production shifts to the defendant. If the defendant can 

show that he [or she] would have taken the same action in the absence 

of the protected activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary 

judgment. 

Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, it is the 

“subjective motivation of the decision maker” which is at issue, and the plaintiff 

“must show that the decision was motivated, at least in part, by the plaintiff’s 

protected activity.” Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 2001). 

Here, Defendants argue that even where they were the decision makers, their 

decisions were based on reasons other than Plaintiff’s exercise of a protected right 

and would have been taken even in the absence of protected conduct and as such 

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate causation. I find their argument persuasive and 

conclude that Plaintiff has not introduced sufficient evidence to create a genuine 

                                                            

4

 Although the case law is clear that participation in the Warden’s Forum is not 

protected conduct, it is unsettled in the Sixth Circuit as to whether removal from 

the Warden’s Forum is sufficiently adverse to support a retaliation claim. Griffin 

v. Berghuis, 563 F. App’x 411, 420 (6th Cir. 2014). However, the Court need not 

address the adverse action element because Plaintiff’s claims fail on the causation 

element. 

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dispute of material fact on this element. I will address Plaintiff’s claims against 

each Defendant in turn. 

 1. Warden Klee 

Defendant Klee contends that Plaintiff cannot establish the causation 

element related to his permanent removal from the Warden’s Forum for several 

reasons: 1) he was unaware of Plaintiff’s protected conduct; 2) he did not have 

authority to remove Plaintiff from the Warden’s Forum and merely made the 

recommendation to the appropriate body; and 3) he made the recommendation that 

Plaintiff be removed based on the results of an investigation that indicated 

Plaintiff’s actions jeopardized the security of the facility. In support of his 

contentions, he provides an affidavit, the MDOC policy directive relating to the 

procedure for removing prisoners from the Warden’s Forum, the results of the 

2011 investigation conducted by Inspector Goldberg, and several of Plaintiff’s 

misconduct reports. (DE 32-2.) 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has 

provided sufficient evidence to defeat Warden Klee’s first argument. Specifically, 

in response to Defendant Klee’s contention that he was unaware of Plaintiff’s 

protected activity, Plaintiff provides a letter dated March 4, 2011, from Plaintiff to 

Defendant Klee, in which he specifically wrote that the “was engaged in activities 

protected by the Constitution . . . .” (DE 33 at 34.) Although Defendant Klee 

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asserts that inmate complaints are a daily occurrence, such that he did not recall the 

letter or Plaintiff’s various grievances, Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to support 

at least constructive notice of the activity and to create a genuine dispute of fact on 

this issue. However, Defendant Klee prevails on the second and third arguments. 

 First, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to dispute Defendant 

Klee’s sworn statement that he was not the decision maker and therefore did not 

have authority to permanently prohibit Plaintiff from being a member of the 

Warden’s Forum. Defendant Klee avers that he did “not have the authority to 

permanently remove or prohibit a prisoner from being a housing unit 

representative,” and that per the MDOC policy, only the Correctional Facilities 

Administration (“CFA”) Deputy Director has such authority. (DE 32-2 at ¶ 5.) 

The applicable policy, titled “Prisoner Housing Unit Representative/Warden’s 

Forum,” seems to bear this out, stating that a prisoner “shall be permanently 

prohibited from being a housing unit representative only with prior written 

approval of the CFA Deputy Director or designee.” (DE 32-2 at 9.) Although the 

wording of the relevant section deals with housing unit representatives, the 

Warden’s Forum procedures are found within the same policy and do not contain a 

separate process for removal from that body. 

 In response, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Klee set his permanent removal 

in motion and therefore was the decision maker. (DE 33 at 5.) These statements 

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by themselves are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See 

Crawford-EL v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998) (concluding that “bare 

allegations of malice would not suffice to establish a constitutional claim.”). 

Further, it is insufficient for Plaintiff to merely argue that Defendant Klee’s ability 

to put his permanent removal in motion. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 301 

(6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that defendants were not decision makers, even where 

they instigated the plaintiff’s firing, which was found to be an adverse action). 

Instead, Plaintiff “must show that [the defendant] had the ability and authority to 

take ‘adverse action’ against him.” Nettles v. Smoker, No. 1:14cv1353, 2015 WL 

1565429, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2015) (citing Smith, 250 F.3d at 1038 and 

Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also Echlin v. Boland, 

111 F. App’x 415, 417 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The motivations of non-decisionmakers 

cannot establish a causal connection in a retaliation case.”). He makes no such 

showing here. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to create a 

genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant Klee would have acted differently 

in the absence of his protected conduct. Defendant Klee avers that he submitted 

the recommendation to the CFA Deputy Director as a result of the investigation 

conducted by Investigator Goldberg, which revealed “numerous instances of 

misconduct by [Plaintiff] which [Defendant Klee] believed jeopardized the security 

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of the facility and demonstrated [Plaintiff’s] inability to follow the required rules.” 

(DE 32-2 at ¶ 6.) To dispute this point, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Klee took 

action in order to retaliate against him and points to his own grievances as 

evidence. However, this is not sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material 

fact for several reasons. First, Corrections Officials have broad discretion in the 

administration of prisons. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987). In 

describing the deference provided to prison officials in the management of their 

institutions, the Sixth Circuit has stated that: 

because the daily operation of a correctional facility poses difficult 

and unique management problems, prison official should be accorded 

substantial deference in the adoption and implementation of policies 

and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal 

order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. 

Brown v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). 

Thus, Defendant Klee’s determination that the investigation revealed that 

Plaintiff’s further service on the Warden’s Forum could have jeopardized prison 

safety is given great weight by the Court. Second, Plaintiff’s insistence that 

Defendant Klee acted in retaliation is insufficient to defeat Defendant Klee’s 

evidence, especially in light of the results of the investigation. Plaintiff merely 

points to his own allegations that Defendant Klee retaliated against him in order to 

support his position. This is insufficient to defeat Defendant Klee’s properly 

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supported motion for summary judgment. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 599 (citing 

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256-57). 

 Plaintiff does note that he filed a grievance against Defendant Klee on 

March 4, 2011 and he was removed from the Warden’s Forum several days later, 

on March 10, 2011. While the temporal proximity between the filing of the 

grievance and the decision to remove him from the Warden’s Forum “provides 

some circumstantial support for a causal connection . . . . this evidence alone is not 

sufficient to meet [Plaintiff’s] burden to show that the filing of grievances was a 

substantial or motivating factor” for his removal from the Warden’s Forum. Smith, 

250 F.3d at 1038. Accordingly, I conclude that Plaintiff has failed to create a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to the causation element of his retaliation claim 

with respect to his removal from the Warden’s Forum. 

 2. Inspector Vest 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Vest relate to his order to lock Plaintiff 

in solitary confinement and transfer him to JCF. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant 

Vest took these actions improperly as a result of Defendant Klee’s memorandum 

that Plaintiff was permanently prohibited from the Warden’s Forum. (DE 22 at ¶ 

32.) As a preliminary matter, while placement in solitary confinement is sufficient 

to constitute an adverse action, transfer from one prison to another is not. 

Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 11 F. App’x 467, 470 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court 

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need not consider Plaintiff’s transfer for the purposes of the causation analysis 

because it fails on the adverse action element. 

 Like Defendant Klee, Defendant Vest also argues that he was not 

“authorized nor personally involved in the decision to remove [Plaintiff] from 

LCF’s Warden[’s] Forum, or the decision to house [Plaintiff] in Temporary 

Segregation . . . .” (DE 32-5 at ¶ 13.) Furthermore, he asserts that he would have 

taken the same action “with any prisoner, regardless of any grievance or any other 

factor.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) In response, Plaintiff asserts that he was “informed by 

Acting Lieutenant Reincke that Insp. Vest ordered him to lock[] [P]laintiff up and 

transfer him due to Warden Klee’s memo.” (DE 33 at 12.) However, Plaintiff 

does not provide an affidavit or other sworn statement from Lieutenant Reincke, 

and again merely disputes Defendant Vest’s sworn statement that he took action 

based on the results of his extensive investigation, and not based on Plaintiff’s 

alleged protected conduct. Even if Defendant Vest’s decision was in fact based 

upon information from the “Klee Memo,” (DE 32-2 at 232), that memo indicates 

that Plaintiff’s actions “have jeopardized the security of the facility,” and thus 

provides a reasonable basis for Defendant Vest’s actions, irrespective of any 

Warden’s Forum activities. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence 

to indicate that Defendant Vest was aware of his protected conduct, other than his 

assertion that Defendant Vest “must have known about the protected activity.” (DE 

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33 at 10) (emphasis added). This is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of 

material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. 

 3. Deputy Warden Barrett 

 Defendant Barrett, in a sworn affidavit, avers that Plaintiff’s placement in 

Level IV security, rather than Level II, upon his arrival to JCF was based on a lack 

of bed space. (DE 32-6 at ¶ 5.) Defendant Barrett also provides the MDOC Policy 

Directive “Prisoner Security Classification,” which states that while prisoners 

should normally be placed consistent with their security level, “there may be 

reasons unrelated to security (e.g., medical mental health needs, lack of bed space 

at the appropriate level) which preclude such a placement.” (Id. at 8.) He avers 

that he was not aware of Plaintiff’s alleged protected conduct and would have 

taken the same action with any prisoner, based on the circumstances. 

 Plaintiff responds that Defendant Barrett was aware of his protected activity 

because when he arrived at JCF, unit officer Roberts stated “you are the one who 

tried to take over the Warden’s Forum at ARF and LCF,” and then began laughing. 

(DE 33 at 17.) According to Plaintiff, this indicated that the entire prison staff was 

aware of his activities. He does not provide an affidavit or other statement from 

Roberts, but even if he had, unit officer Roberts’ statement does not impute 

knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged protected conduct to Defendant Barrett. In fact, 

Plaintiff’s participation in the Warden’s Forum was not protected conduct. Griffin, 

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563 F. App’x at 420. Plaintiff does not contend that Defendant Barrett was aware 

that Plaintiff filed grievances and complaints against Defendants Klee and Vest 

and retaliated against him for those actions. See Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 

415 (6th Cir. 2000). Nor does he indicate that Defendant Barrett was aware that 

Plaintiff was providing legal help to other inmates who were not capable of 

handling their legal matters on their own. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 395. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to create a genuine dispute of material fact that 

Defendant Barrett was aware of his protected activity and retaliated against him for 

such conduct. 

 4. ARUS Parsons 

 Plaintiff contends that Defendant Parsons improperly maintained his security 

level at IV for longer than necessary and issued an improper misconduct violation 

in retaliation for filing grievances and a lawsuit. Defendant Parsons avers that she 

did not have the authority to change Plaintiff’s security level. She also notes that 

she issued the misconduct violation because the grounding wire in Plaintiff’s fan 

had been cut. Plaintiff was found guilty of the violation. 

 In response, Plaintiff provides two affidavits. The first is signed by his wife, 

Veronica Thomas-Griffin. Ms. Thomas-Griffin swears that she spoke with 

Defendant Parsons, who repeatedly told her that Plaintiff was being kept in Level 

IV to monitor his behavior because he attempted to take over the Warden’s Forum 

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at ARF and LCF. (DE 33 at 40.) Plaintiff does not provide any evidence to 

indicate that Defendant Parsons was a decision maker capable of increasing or 

decreasing his security level. In fact, the affidavit of Ms. Thomas-Griffin states 

that he would remain in Level IV for a year “per Deputy Joseph Barrett.” (Id.) 

Furthermore, Plaintiff and his wife only reference his activity on the Warden’s 

Forum, which (as addressed above) is not protected conduct. At most, Ms. 

Thomas-Griffin’s affidavit may demonstrate that Plaintiff received conflicting 

information as to why he was housed in Level IV security, some of which would 

appear to be speculative at best. It does not demonstrate that such action was taken 

in retaliation for any allegedly protected activity in which Plaintiff engaged. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s security level increase claim fails as it relates to Defendant 

Parsons. 

 Plaintiff also briefly alleges that Defendant Parsons issued a misconduct 

ticket with bad motive, but “does not challenge the misconduct” at issue. (DE 33 at 

20.) He provides the affidavit of a fellow inmate who overheard Defendant 

Parsons stating that Plaintiff “broke the fan and has no issues with writing all these 

cases on the department . . . .” (DE 33 at 46.) He also provides the affidavit of a 

fellow inmate and previous tenant of Plaintiff’s cell, who averred that the ground 

wire had been cut prior to Plaintiff moving in and that prison officials Robertson 

and Warner (although not Defendant Parsons) were aware of this fact. (Id. at 50.) 

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Despite this strong attempt to produce evidence, Plaintiff also fails on this 

claim. First, because he is unable to establish that Defendant Parsons’s stated 

reason for disciplining him was known or suspected to be false, or was in any way 

retaliatory or done with bad motive. Second, because, “A finding of guilt based 

upon some evidence of a violation of prison rules ‘essentially checkmates[a] 

retaliation claim.”’ Jackson v. Madery, 158 F. App’x 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994). In Jackson, the 

plaintiff alleged (as here) that prison officials filed false misconduct tickets against 

him in retaliation for protected activity. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the fact 

he was found guilty on those tickets demonstrated that there was “some evidence 

to support the charges,” thereby dooming his retaliation claim. Here, Defendant 

Parsons provides the guilty finding on Plaintiff’s misconduct charge (DE 32-7 at 7) 

and Plaintiff does not dispute that he was found guilty on the misconduct violation. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Parsons cannot 

succeed on this basis. 

 In conclusion, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be 

GRANTED because Plaintiff has failed to introduce a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to the existence of a causal connection such that the adverse actions taken 

against him were motivated at least in part by his protected conduct. Even if, for 

the sake of argument, I were to construe some of Plaintiff’s evidentiary assertions 

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22 

as being colorable—for instance, his taking issue with inconsistencies in the 

reasons given by different prison officials for his security upgrade or his quibble 

about who cut the wire on his fan—summary judgment is still appropriate here, 

where the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not 

significantly probative. City Management Corp. v. United States Chem. Co., 43 

F.3d 244, 254 (6th Cir. 1994).5

 Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of all of 

the remaining defendants is recommended. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

                                                            

5

 Defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they 

did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Because I 

addressed Defendants’ motion on the merits and concluded that Plaintiff has failed 

to establish a constitutional violation, and because their qualified immunity 

argument is largely the same as their retaliation argument, I will not address this 

issue separately. 

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23 

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

Dated: September 28, 2015 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

The hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of 

record on September 28, 2015, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

 Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

 

 

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