UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

PETER J. VROOM, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 12-143 (RMC)

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER

Peter J. Vroom complains pro se that the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”)

improperly dismissed his administrative complaint1 that sought action against the General 

Electric Company and Penske Truck Leasing, LP. General Electric and Penske allegedly filed 

false and misleading information about their corporate relationship with the FEC, which led the 

FEC to disaffiliate the Penske Political Action Committee (“Penske PAC”) from the General 

Electric Company Political Action Committee (“GEPAC”). Mr. Vroom claims that Penske is 

financially dependent on General Electric and therefore the FEC should have denied 

disaffiliation of their respective PACs . The Commission moves to dismiss, arguing that Mr. 

Vroom lacks standing to complain. 

 1

 Under the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), “[a]ny person who believes a violation of 

[the] Act . . . has occurred, may file a complaint” with the FEC. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1). After 

reviewing the complaint and any response, the commissioners vote on whether they have “reason 

to believe” a violation has occurred. Id. § 437g(a)(2). If four of the six commissioners vote 

affirmatively, the FEC begins an investigation. Id. However, if no majority makes such a 

finding, the FEC dismisses the complaint, and the complainant may seek district court review of 

whether the dismissal is “contrary to law.” Id. § 437g(a)(8)(A).

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The doctrine of standing limits a federal court’s jurisdiction to cases and 

controversies. “Standing protects democratic government by requiring citizens to express their 

generalized dissatisfaction with government policy through the Constitution’s representative 

institutions, not the courts.” Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius, 671 F.3d 1275, 1279-80

(D.C. Cir. 2012). In order to demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he presents: 

(1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct of the 

defendant, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the 

court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The injury cannot be 

“conjectural” or “hypothetical” but must be “concrete and particularized.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

560. When “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful 

regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else,” standing is “substantially more difficult” to 

establish. Id. at 562.

The FEC challenges whether Mr. Vroom has constitutional and prudential 

standing before this Court. Specifically, it claims that Mr. Vroom “has failed to allege a legally 

cognizable injury-in-fact flowing from the statutory violation he alleged in his administrative 

complaint to the Commission . . . .” Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. 7] at 1. Mr. Vroom contends in his 

opposition briefing that he suffers informational injury from the FEC’s failure to act on his 

administrative complaint. He claims that the disaffiliation of General Electric PAC and Penske 

PAC “denies [him] the ability to determine the actual extent of the financial support that 

[General Electric] provides to political candidates.” Opp’n [Dkt. 9] at 10. PACs are subject to 

rigorous reporting requirements, which make such information publicly available. These groups 

“must register with the FEC, appoint a treasurer, keep names and addresses of contributors, track 

the amount and purpose of disbursements, and file complex FEC reports that include lists of 

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donors giving in excess of $200 per year (often, these donors may be the group’s members), 

contributions, expenditures, and any other disbursements irrespective of their purposes.” Akins

v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 524 U.S. 11, 14-15 (1998). In Akins v. Federal Election Commission, 

the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had alleged a concrete and particularized injury where 

the FEC had not defined the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) as a political 

committee because this determination deprived the plaintiffs of information regarding 

contributions to candidates made by AIPAC. The Court found that voters have a cognizable 

injury when they are unable to obtain information that helps them evaluate candidates for office. 

Id. at 21. 

While Mr. Vroom’s opposition briefing certainly could make out a claim for an 

informational injury, his Complaint does not. On the face of Mr. Vroom’s Complaint, it is clear 

that he only seeks a legal determination that General Electric and Penske are in violation of the 

law, not a remedy to an injury. He states: “The FEC’s failure to adequately investigate and 

pursue Vroom’s complaint and to cooperate fully . . . has allowed GE/Penske to continue to 

operate in violation of the law and denied Mr. Vroom the benefits of the FEC’s findings on the 

merits of his complaint.” Compl. ¶ 16. Mr. Vroom’s Complaint is more akin to that of the 

plaintiffs in Common Cause v. Federal Election Commission, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997), 

who complained that the defendants had made campaign contributions in excess of legal limits. 

The D.C. Circuit found that if the “information withheld [from plaintiffs] is simply the fact that a 

violation of FECA has occurred” then the Plaintiffs had not suffered a cognizable injury. 108 

F.3d at 417. It further stated: “To hold that a plaintiff can establish injury in fact merely by 

alleging that he has been deprived of the knowledge as to whether a violation of the law has 

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occurred would be tantamount to recognizing a justiciable interest in the enforcement of the law.

This we cannot do.” Id. at 418. 

Because Mr. Vroom fails to plead an injury-in-fact, the Court will grant the FEC’s 

motion and dismiss his Complaint. However, it will do so without prejudice. Mr. Vroom 

claimed in his opposition that he was prevented from seeking information that will help him to 

evaluate candidates for office, and he will be given the opportunity to amend his Complaint to 

reflect this injury. 

Accordingly, it is hereby 

ORDERED that the FEC’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 7, is GRANTED; and it is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Vroom’s Complaint is dismissed without 

prejudice; and it is 

FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Vroom may file an Amended Complaint no 

later than January 7, 2012, or this case will be closed. 

Date: December 6, 2012 /s/ _ 

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER

United States District Judge

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