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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

TRAVIS MAY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

WARDEN HAAS, 

Respondent. 

 / 

Case No. 14-cv-13225 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

MICHAEL J. HLUCHANIUK

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT [7],

DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court initially denied Travis Durant May’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus [1] on September 29, 2014. Dkt. No. 4. In denying the petition, the Court noted 

that “Petitioner’s release on parole moots his habeas claims because there is no longer a case or 

controversy to litigate with respect to such matters.” Id. (Page ID # 59). Additionally, the Court 

denied Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability, finding that he had “not made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right and reasonable jurists could not debate the 

correctness of the Court’s ruling.” Id. (Page ID # 60). 

On September 25, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment [7] pursuant 

to Rule 60(b)(1). See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1). He claims that his pleadings did not accurately 

express the nature of his complaint, the mistake upon which he relies in his motion. Dkt. No. 7 

at 1. After reviewing these arguments, the Court will DENY Petitioner’s motion [7], DENY a 

Certificate of Appealability, and DENY leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

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II. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was sentenced by Michigan Department of Corrections to serve a sentence of 

nine months to ten years for larceny from a person. Dkt. No. 1 at 44. His earliest date of release 

was July 20, 2012. Id. On July 5, 2012, Petitioner was granted parole by the parole board, which 

required him to enter and complete Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (“RSAT”). Id. His 

projected release date was February 14, 2013. Id. 

It appears that RSAT took place at the Cooper Street Correctional Facility, where 

Petitioner was transferred in June 2012. Id. at 45. Petitioner was displeased that RSAT entailed 

unpaid work duty and group meetings where he felt he was subjected to demeaning comments. 

Id. He filed several grievances during his time there. Id. 

On August 25, 2012, Petitioner was transferred back to his prior correctional facility. Id. 

He then filed a complaint for a declaratory ruling with the Jackson County Circuit Court, which 

was denied in September 2013. Dkt. No. 4 at 2. Reconsideration was denied in November 2013. 

Id. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which 

was denied for lack of merit. May v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 318338 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2014). 

He also filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was 

denied in a standard order. May v. Dep’t of Corr., 849 N.W.2d 375 (Mich. 2014). Petitioner was 

released on parole on May 20, 2014, while his case was pending in the state appellate courts. See

Dkt. No. 4 at 2. On August 20, 2014, Petitioner signed his federal habeas petition, see Dkt. 

No. 1, and the next month this Court rendered its decision that his habeas claims were rendered 

moot by his status as a parolee. Dkt. No. 4 at 2–3. 

Petitioner has since been reincarcerated at the Kinross Correctional Facility as a result of 

a parole violation. Dkt. No. 7 at 1.

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III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 60(b)(1) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment based on mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)(1). “It is well settled that the 

[ruling on] a motion to set aside judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) is a matter addressed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and that determination will not be reversed except for abuse of 

discretion.” FHC Equities, L.L.C. v. MBL Life Assur. Corp., 188 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 1999) 

(quoting Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993); In re Salem Mortgage Co., 791 

F.2d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 1986)). The Sixth Circuit has stated that “a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is 

intended to provide relief in only two situations: (1) when a party has made an excusable mistake 

or an attorney has acted without authority, or (2) when the judge has made a substantive mistake 

of law or fact in the final judgment or order.” United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 

2002). “As such, Rule 60(b) does not allow a defeated litigant a second chance to convince the 

court to rule in his or her favor by presenting new explanations, legal theories, or proof.” Jinks v. 

AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2001). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A petition for writ of habeas corpus is not the proper vehicle in which to challenge 

conditions of confinement. See Hodges v. Bell, 170 F. App'x 389, 390 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(“Generally, a federal court's authority in a habeas proceeding ... extends only to determining the 

legality of a petitioner's state-court conviction and sentence, and not to addressing the conditions 

of his confinement.”); Lutz v. Hemingway, 476 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (stating 

that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the sole remedy for challenges to the fact or duration 

of physical imprisonment). Habeas corpus relief is not available to prisoners who complain only 

about the conditions of their legal incarceration. See Hodges, 170 F. App'x at 392. Instead, 

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“requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 

action.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004).1

Petitioner’s pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

concerned his parole and enrollment in a substance abuse program as a condition of his parole. 

Dkt. No. 1 at 44. Petitioner did not contest his criminal conviction or sentence in this proceeding. 

See id. He merely asserted that the parole board violated the Due Process and Equal Protection 

Clauses of the United States Constitution by ordering him to take part in RSAT.2 Dkt. No. 1 

at 15. In Petitioner’s Motion for Relief from Judgment, he states that he made a mistake in that 

his original pleadings did not accurately express the nature of his complaint. Dkt. No. 7 at 1. He 

then proceeds to repeat the same argument he asserted in his original complaint, objecting to the 

parole board’s order that he take part in RSAT. See id. at 1–2. 

Petitioner’s complaint about the parole board’s order did not relate to the legality of his 

confinement, nor did it touch on the legal sufficiency of the criminal court proceedings which 

resulted in his incarceration. His Motion for Relief from Judgment similarly fails to address 

either of these issues, much less identify an excusable mistake in the earlier proceedings. 

Accordingly, since Petitioner has not implicated the validity of his larceny conviction or duration 

 

1

 It would appear Petitioner is aware of this option, as he has already filed a civil suit against members of the parole 

board for constitutional violations. See May v. Heyns et al., No. 15-cv-10785 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2015). He has 

provided no facts in his civil complaint to illustrate exactly what events led to his constitutional rights being violated 

by the parole board members. See id. They may or may not be the same allegations found in his habeas petition. 2

 The Sixth Circuit has held that there is no protected liberty interest in parole in Michigan. See Sweeton v. Brown, 

27 F.3d 1162, 1164–65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The state’s applicable statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.233, does 

not place “substantive limitations on the discretion of the parole board through the use of particularized standards 

which mandate a particular result if the substantive predicate is met.” Janiskee v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 932 F.2d 

968 at *1 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989); Olim, 461 

U.S. at 249). Instead, Michigan authorities have broad discretion over parole. See Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164–65. The 

statute provides that the grant of parole is conditional on the board being reasonably assured that the prisoner will 

not become a menace to society or to the public safety. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.233(1)(a). Parole-in-custody may 

be imposed, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.233(2), as may other rules which restrict a prisoner’s activities substantially 

beyond the scope of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1972) 

(detailing restrictions that parole may impose). 

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of his state-court sentence for that crime, his claim falls outside of the cognizable core of habeas 

corpus relief. See Hodges, 170 F. App'x at 393. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, Petitioner’s Motion For Relief From Judgment [7] is 

DENIED. The Court reiterates that Petitioner’s Certificate of Appealability and Leave to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis on appeal are both DENIED. See Dkt. No. 4 at 4–5. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 6, 2015 

 /s/Gershwin A Drain 

 HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN 

 United States District Court Judge

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