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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

AARON RALPH, #271641, 

Petitioner, 

 Case No. 14-CV-13509 

v. 

 HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

ANTHONY STEWART, 

 Respondent. 

_______________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER 

(1) DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Dkt. 1) AS MOOT; (2) 

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY; AND (3) DENYING 

PERMISSION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner Aaron Ralph filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1). Petitioner was convicted in Montcalm County Circuit Court of one 

count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual 

conduct. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.520(B), (C). On September 18, 1998, Petitioner was 

sentenced to concurrent sentences of two-to-five years’ imprisonment for the second-degree 

convictions, and 17-to-50 years’ imprisonment for the first-degree conviction. The petition does 

not attack the validity of either Petitioner’s convictions or sentence. Rather, the petition alleges 

that the Michigan Parole Board wrongfully altered the conditions of his term of parole. 

Petitioner has since been discharged from parole and, therefore, he has been discharged from his 

maximum sentence. For the reasons explained fully below, the Court dismisses the habeas 

petition as moot. 

II. BACKGROUND 

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Petitioner was paroled in February 2013, for a period of 24 months. Various conditions 

were placed on his parole, including not engaging in any behavior that constitutes a violation of 

any criminal law, not engaging in any assaultive, abusive, threatening or intimidating behavior, 

and complying with Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring and requirements. 

In May 2014, Petitioner was charged with four counts of violating his parole. It was 

alleged that Petitioner failed to comply with his GPS agreement and engaged in behavior that 

was assaultive, abusive, threatening, and/or intimidating. After he was served with the parole 

violation charges, Petitioner waived his right to a preliminary parole violation hearing. 

Petitioner was found to have violated the rules of his parole. Despite recommendations that 

Petitioner be returned to prison and that his parole be revoked, the Parole Board ultimately 

decided to continue his parole, continue GPS monitoring, place him in a residential reentry 

program, and add a special condition to have “no contact” with the individuals who were the 

subject of the violation. Petitioner then successfully completed his parole term, and he was 

discharged on February 5, 2015. 

Petitioner’s habeas application was filed before his discharge. It challenges the 

proceedings resulting in the modification of his parole term: 

i. "Petitioner is restrained of his liberty in violation of his 1st 

Amendment right to free speech and freedom of expression,” 

ii. “Due process violation — abuse of process,” 

iii. “Parole dep[artment] overreaching,” 

iv. “Abuse of authority — process — discretion,” and 

v. “Conspiracy to commit fraud.” 

Pet. at 5, 7, 10, 14, 17. 

III. ANALYSIS 

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A. Mootness of Habeas Petition 

When a habeas petitioner challenges a parole revocation or modification, but 

subsequently completes parole and is discharged, the petitioner’s challenge to the revocation or 

modification is moot, unless he can demonstrate the existence of actual “collateral 

consequences” resulting from the revocation. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-14 (1998). 

In this case, Petitioner was discharged from his maximum sentence on February 5, 2015, and is, 

therefore, no longer under the jurisdiction of the Michigan Department of Corrections. When a 

petitioner does not attack the legality of his conviction, but merely contests the imposition and 

duration of his confinement, the case becomes moot when he is no longer confined. Lane v. 

Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982). Petitioner does not attack the validity of his conviction. 

Rather, Petitioner contends that the Parole Board wrongfully extended a period of parole. 

Article III of the Constitution requires the existence of an actual case or controversy 

through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This means that, 

throughout the litigation, the petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual 

injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 

Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). An incarcerated habeas petitioner's 

challenge to the validity of his or her conviction satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, 

because the incarceration constitutes a concrete injury which can be redressed by the invalidation 

of the conviction. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. Once the petitioner’s sentence has expired, 

however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole 

— i.e., some "collateral consequence" of the conviction — must exist if the suit is to be 

maintained in federal court and not considered moot. Id. 

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 When the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would have no effect on a petitioner's term 

of custody, and would impose no collateral legal consequences, the habeas petitioner fails to 

present a justiciable case or controversy within the meaning of Article III. See Ayers v. Doth, 58 

F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1034 (D. Minn. 1999). According to the Sixth Circuit, “mootness results 

when events occur during the pendency of a litigation which render the court unable to grant the 

requested relief.” Carras v. Williams, 807 F.2d 1286, 1289 (6th Cir. 1986). Because it strikes 

“at the very heart of federal subject matter jurisdiction,” the mootness of a habeas petition can be 

raised sua sponte by the federal court, even if the issue is not addressed by the parties. Medberry 

v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1054 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003). 

In this case, Petitioner completed his sentence and has been discharged from custody. 

Petitioner has not shown that he suffers any continuing collateral consequences flowing from the 

extension of his parole term. Absent such a showing, a petitioner's claims regarding the denial of 

parole and/or the revocation of his parole are rendered moot by the completion of the 

imprisonment term and his discharge from custody. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-14; see also 

Prowell v. Hemingway, 37 F. App’x 768, 769-770 (6th Cir. 2002) (federal prisoner's § 2241 

petition for writ of habeas corpus which challenged his parole revocation was rendered moot by 

petitioner's release upon completion of his sentence, absent a showing of actual collateral 

consequences). Petitioner's sentence has been completed and he has been discharged from 

custody. Therefore, any injury Petitioner suffered cannot be redressed by a favorable judicial 

decision from this Court. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the petition as moot. 

B. Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis

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 Before Petitioner may appeal this Court’s dispositive decision, a certificate of 

appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of 

appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court rejects a habeas claim on the merits, 

the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists 

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. See 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In 

applying that standard, a district court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its 

examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner's claims. Id. at 336-

337. "The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final 

order adverse to the applicant." Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a), 28 U.S.C. foll.§ 

2254. 

 Having considered the matter, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not 

debate the Court’s conclusion that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right and that the petition should be dismissed as moot. Therefore, 

a certificate of appealability is not warranted in this case. The Court also denies Petitioner leave 

to appeal in forma pauperis, because any appeal would be frivolous. See, e.g., Dell v. Straub, 

194 F. Supp. 2d 629, 659 (E.D. Mich. 2002); see Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). 

V. CONCLUSION 

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 For the reasons set forth above, the Court dismisses the petition for writ of habeas corpus 

as moot. The Court also declines to issue a certificate of appealability and denies leave to appeal 

in forma pauperis. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 s/Mark A. Goldsmith 

Dated: May 28, 2015 MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

Detroit, Michigan UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and 

any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on May 28, 2015. 

s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams 

CASE MANAGER 

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